



Analysis of the print media in Serbia
January - March

Quarterly **MEDIAMETER**


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SANDA RASKOVIĆ IVIĆ
TEŠKO JE ŽENI
U MUŠKOM
RINGU, ALI
BORIM SE

PRO
BUSINESS
MAGAZIN

PRO
BUSINESS

НИН
ЖИВОТ ПОД ПОЛИЦИЈСКОМ
ЗАШТИТОМ АКО СЕ
СПРЕТИМО, МИЉА СИ
СРПСКА ЕКОНОМИЈА
У ИЗБОРНИМ ГОДИНАМА
КОЛИКО КОШТА ДЕМОКРАТИЈА
ОЉА
НЕНАД
ЧАНАК
СОЦИЈАЛИ
СУ НАРУЧИ
МОЈЕ УБИС

Nedeljnik

SRBIJI
TREBA
IAK
VUCIĆ

VREME
ŠEŠELJ I
DRUŠTV
IZ VLAD
SRBIJE

1



INTRODUCTION

VELIMIR ĆURGUS KAZIMIR

INTRODUCTION

Lots of actors, few events

Narrowing topics and marginalization of all other topics except elections present the context and the characteristics of the print media in Serbia in the period January–March 2016. In contrast to announcements of politicians, as well as some media that we have analysed, this election campaign and public competition weren't as we have expected. Perhaps the very politicians and chroniclers of political situation were afraid of possible consequences. There is no other topic that would supplant the elections in any way.

As in the previous four trimesters, in the analyzing of this empirical content, the same methodological approach was applied. Unit of analysis was one text. The analysis itself represents a combination of two research methods: (a) analysis of content, which was directed towards "certain theoretical-hypothetical frame... which creates objective and systemic empirical content of social communications, enabling drawing of relevant conclusions on the social context in which the communication is taking place",¹ and (b) discursive analysis, which enabled us to understand different, epistemically and methodologically immeasurable,² author's interpretative strategies and editorial policies which reflect displays of different, primarily ideological and political discursive realities, by analyzing their specific discursive meanings.

In the interpretative sense, for more convenient text organization, the analysis is, just like in the previous reports, divided into two wholes which refer to: (a) analysis of quantitative indicators collected with the help of content analysis, and (b) discursive analysis of qualitative content derived from texts which were included in the research sample.

Reduction of topic interests and the focusing of the media on elections as a topic resulted in a considerable increase in the number of actors (personalities) who appear on front pages. In this trimester, there were two times more of them than usually. Personalities, not only from the political life but from the one surrounding it as well, prevailed on the front pages of dailies. Politics as a topic entirely prevails on the front pages. As if there was no other life or interest apart from it. When three quarters of texts deal with interior politics and then with foreign politics as well, it appears that nothing else apart from politics exists. All other key topics, such as EU or economy, become not only unexplored but rather utterly uninteresting areas of research.

¹ S. Gredelj, *S onu stranu ogledala [On the other side of the mirror]*, Beograd: Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije, 1986, 19

² G. Couvalis, *The Philosophy of Science*, London, Sage Publications, 1997.

Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić is unrivalled on the top of the list of actors again with 661 texts. Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić and Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić are at a considerable distance from him, with 232 and 225 texts, respectively. Critical assessment of Vučić's actions is present in only 32 texts (4.84%), while there are even less those with positive connotation – 16 texts (2.42%). Over 90% of texts have neutral intonation. Printed media in this period are two times more critical in regard to President Tomislav Nikolić – 9.05% (21 texts), while they are even more critical towards Dačić – 12.44% (28 texts). In this aspect, there are no significant changes in sequence.

There are no significant changes in regard to actions of the Government. Of 202 texts dedicated to the Government, 19 in total are with negative intonation (9.41%).

When it comes to foreign politicians, Vladimir Putin is unsurpassed on the first place, mentioned in 111 texts, with 10.81% of them positive. Barack Obama was mentioned in 44 texts, with 6.82% of them negative. And the same was true in the previous year. With such a large number of actors it is very interesting how negative intonation colors the character of the entire text.

We have finally analyzed the participation of "unnamed sources" in the structure of newspaper articles, and found that approximately 20% of texts belong to this specific media family. When we look at the structure of genres that are comprised from "unnamed sources", many things will be clearer to us. In the first place is *news* with 26.96%, followed by *reports* with 25.12%, and *articles* with 17.19% of information stemming from "unnamed sources". It is quite expected that the *news* are main generator of "unnamed sources", but that *reports* predominantly fall in this category as well is quite worrying for the professional status of our journalism. Newspaper that use "unnamed sources" the most is *Informer*, with the participation of such texts as much as 40%, followed by the *Kurir* and *Blic* with 28.32% and 27% respectively. Newspaper that uses "unnamed sources" at least is *Politika* – only 6.24%. When we look at the key issues on which "unnamed sources" are concentrated, - crime with 50%, Russia and the attitude toward Russia with 44% and the 2016 elections with 27.60%, it is clear in which institutions and organizations are located the sources referred to in newspapers. The police, diplomatic circles and centers of political power produce the greatest amount of information that comes from "unnamed sources".

In a word, the first trimester of 2016, at least considering the analysis of front pages of selected print media in Serbia, was seemingly an exciting period that will be forgotten very soon.

2



Sample

ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN


Sample

As stated in earlier publications, the basic idea of the project *Mediameter* is to try to reconstruct media reality of the dailies in Serbia, the way it can be defined considering the texts that are positioned (wholly or partially) on front pages, as various reflections of current political events and circumstances in both Serbia and the world. A sample of the dailies was composed considering two selection criteria – the largest circulation and reputation of the print media. Daily newspaper circulation data were taken from a research done by IPSOS¹. The front page is the part of the dailies which the readers connect the most with the identity/recognition of a media outlet. It is often responsible for the first impression, our potential affection or repulsion, formed about some printed media. The front page comes into contact with not only the readers of that particular paper, but also the people who will perhaps never touch that paper. Through newspaper and TV advertising and shop windows, the front page reaches a wider auditorium than that forming the readers of individual dailies. The front pages, hence, form, in a certain way, the public image of the newspaper which symbolizes its editorial policy, evaluative orientation and targeting of certain audiences. On account of the above mentioned reasons, the front pages of dailies from our sample were in the focus of analysis of the project *Mediameter*.

Texts from front pages reflect best the coordinates of editorial policies of daily print editions. Though this involves a small percentage of texts, editorial identity of a daily can be most easily identified through messages conveyed through front pages. The ratio of the total number of texts in each daily individually and the number of texts from the front pages that were included in the sample of our research are shown in the charts 1-7, for the period from 1st January to 31st March 2016.


¹ Research of average scope of the daily print media was done for the period from January 2nd 2016 to January 5th 2016, and from January 7th 2016 to January 31st 2016. Population: total individuals

Chart 1 – *Večernje novosti*²



Source: *Mediameter* research,
January - March 2016



Chart 2 – *Informer*³



Source: *Mediameter* research,
January - March 2016



² For further information, please see Table 101 in the Appendix.

³ For further information, please see Table 102 in the Appendix.

Chart 3 – *Alo!*⁴Chart 4 – *Blic*⁵


4 For further information, please see Table103 in the Appendix.

5 For further information, please see Table104 in the Appendix.

Chart 5 – *Politika*⁶Chart 6 – *Danas*⁷

6 For further information, please see Table105 in the Appendix.

7 For further information, please see Table106 in the Appendix.

Chart 7 – Kurir⁸

Source: Mediameter research,
January - March 2016

The total number of analysed texts considering all seven media that are included in our research sample is 1924 and that number accounts for averagely 62.18% texts from front pages and for 3.15% of the total number of texts.

⁸ For further information, please see Table107 in the Appendix.

Table 1 – Večernje novosti

Media outlet <i>Večernje novosti</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
events	69	12	57
society	102	78	24
politics	78	78	0
economics	59	45	14
current affairs	66	38	28
reportage	27	6	21
culture	13	4	9
interview	24	13	11
world	12	8	4
life plus	21	0	21
sport	14	0	14
Belgrade News	10	3	7
doctor in the house supplement	8	0	8
spectacle	4	1	3
BGD 011	0	0	0
Belgrade stories	10	0	10
sport plus	0	0	0
Terrorism in France	0	0	0
TV news	2	0	2
real-life stories	0	0	0
region	0	0	0
feuilleton	2	1	1
action	0	0	0
confessions	0	0	0
second page	7	2	5
Event	2	1	1
in memoriam	0	0	0
TOTAL	530	290	240

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 2 – Informer

Media outlet: Informer / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
breaking news	158	157	1
news	87	56	31
showtime	43	7	36
entertainment	0	0	0
sport	27	5	22
TOTAL	315	225	90

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 3 – Alo!

Media outlet: Alo! / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
current affairs	103	101	2
news	173	88	85
v.i.p	89	11	78
sport	45	5	40
world	0	0	0
TOTAL	410	205	205

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 4 – Blic

Media outlet: Blic / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
100 most powerful	3	3	0
300 most powerful	4	3	1

current affairs	11	8	3
archives	0	0	0
Belgrade	0	0	0
dossier	1	1	0
society	63	33	30
economics	30	18	12
phenomenon	0	0	0
events	53	6	47
culture	10	1	9
politics	52	52	0
Sport	32	1	31
real-life stories	4	1	3
world	4	2	2
topic of the day	67	58	9
topic of the week	14	11	3
in the focus	0	0	0
time machine	0	0	0
entertainment	66	2	64
TOTAL	414	200	214

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 5. – Politika

Media outlet: Politika / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
world	106	95	11
society	98	54	44
economics	69	54	15
politics	71	71	0
event of the day	58	56	2
culture	34	8	25
events	29	23	7

daily supplement	21	2	19
Belgrade	10	6	4
Serbia	19	9	10
readers' club	13	0	13
sport	21	1	20
topic of the week	13	11	2
personalities	13	10	3
region	19	18	1
front page	11	9	2
spectre	10	2	8
views	4	4	0
TV insert	0	0	0
feuilleton	0	0	0
consumer	0	0	0
Belgrade events	1	0	1
Dossier	0	0	0
TOTAL	620	433	187

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 6 – Danas

Media outlet: Danas / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
Belgrade	1	0	1
Christmas	0	0	0
dialogue	3	3	0
business supplement	26	23	3
Danas special	11	4	7
Danas supplement	7	2	5
Danas weekend	37	21	16
Event of the day	1	0	1
society	71	68	3
economics	45	43	2

globe	56	47	9
culture	36	9	27
interview	7	3	4
front page	3	2	1
health	2	0	2
politics	169	169	0
periscope	0	0	0
legal Danas	0	0	0
scene	5	0	5
sport	23	1	22
topic	0	0	0
scales	4	3	1
TOTAL	507	398	109

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 7. – Kurir

Media outlet: Kurir / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
society	38	24	14
economics	7	6	1
events	40	2	38
culture	4	0	4
planet	7	5	2
politics	62	62	0
sport	20	4	16
stars	52	6	46
topic of the day	68	64	4
TOTAL	298	173	125


Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

By reviewing the presented tables 1-7, it is still noticeable that the structures of dailies follow two different logics. In other words, *Večernje novosti*, *Politika*, *Danas*, *Blic*, even *Kurir* to some extent, follow the traditional structure of daily newspapers, while *Informer* and *Alo!* deviate from this matrix to a considerable extent. In these two publications, *news* are the dominant section, uniting different areas, and special attention is paid to entertaining content, like information about celebrities, then showbiz and sport, which gain a more or less social and political character. Editorial strategies which were established in the previous four editions of *Mediameter* are entirely visible in the first quarter of 2016. This may be clearly seen in Charts 8-14. If one compares the results from the first trimester of 2016 with the findings obtained during 2015, an identical structure of the sample is still visible, and the only change, compared to the last trimester of 2015, refers to the increase of the share of texts published under the politics section, which is visible in the daily *Kurir* (9.11%), *Blic* (7.93%), *Politika* (4.72%) and *Danas* (4.21). This is certainly the result of the fact that in the period from January to March 2016 the election process started. This trend has not been observed in the daily *Alo!* and *Informer*, due to lack of division into sections, while *Večernje novosti* kept almost the same structure as in the previous periods. At the same time, this can mean that the dailies *Kurir*, *Blic*, *Politika* and *Danas* took part in the topic of elections and election campaign more directly. This can mostly be explained by the concept and editorial policy of these dailies, which report in different ways and comment on events in the political life in Serbia. This, of course, does not say anything about the possible neutrality or bias of some papers, but about the approach to certain topics. Political topics are not equally in the focus of interest, not only because of (dis)interest of the editors and reporters, but because of various instruments and manners of communication. It is not simple to move from the showbiz and crime topics to analysing the political situation and vice versa. These are the limitations of method and style, which, of course, can be used in different ways.

In this content analysis, we “studied actually which ideas and images were expressed, i.e. represented... Studying representation is not aimed at testing the “truthfulness” of statements... It is not limited to commentary about whether a set of expressions accurately corresponds or describes what its alleged aim is. Actually, since the researchers focus on the process of representation, it has become clear that dealing with accuracy is misleading. Studying representation is, literally, studying the representation of production, i.e. construction ...in narrative from.”⁹


9 L. Rolend, *Masovne komunikacije*, Clio, Beograd, 1998, 258-259

Chart 8 – *Večernje novosti*




Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Chart 9 – *Informer*




Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Chart 10 – *Alo!*




Current affairs, news, v.i.p., sport JANUARY – MARCH 2016

Chart 11 – *Blic*




Current affairs, news, v.i.p., sport JANUARY – MARCH 2016

Chart 12 – *Politika*




Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Chart 13 – *Danas*




Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Chart 14 – Kurir

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

If we compare the number of selected texts in the period January – March 2016 (1924), to the same period in 2015 (1360), we can see an increase by around 41.5%, regardless of the equal number of non-business days (triple issue was printed to cover December 31 2015 and January 1 and 2 2016, double issues were printed for January 6 and 7 and for February 15 and 16 2016 as well). This can be interpreted as making intra-political relations more complex which certainly was caused by the upcoming elections.

3



Research Results

ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN

RESEARCH RESULTS

Share of journalistic genre

In the first quarter of 2016, the trend recorded in the previous issues of *Mediameter* continued so report was the prevalent journalistic form. In the first three months of 2016, this genre is present in 63.31% of texts, i.e. 1218 out of 1924 texts from the sample, while the average share of report during all four quarters of 2015 was 63.78%. The biggest share of the report was observed in *Informer* – 85.78%, while this genre was used the least in *Politika* (45.27%). The second-ranked genre according to appearance is article (11.49% – from 27.02% in *Politika* to 1.46% in *Alo!*), followed by interview with 8.52%. The highest number of interviews was recorded in *Danas* -14.07%, while *Informer* published only 2 (0.89%) interviews. Similar presence was noticed when it comes to commentary – 8.21% or 158 texts, while the number of news is still decreasing in comparison to the results from the previous year (average presence during 2015 was 9.89%) and it now amounts to only 5.98%. Reportage and other journalistic forms make up 2.49% of texts (please see in **Tables 8, 9, and 10**).

Table 8 – Individual share of genres in reporting of seven media from the sample

Genre	total number	% share
report	1218	63.31
article	221	11.49
interview	164	8.52
commentary	158	8.21
news	115	5.98
reportage	32	1.66
other	16	0.83
Total	1924	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 9 – Distribution of journalistic genres in texts from the sample, per media outlet

Genre	Blic	Kurir	Večernje novosti	Alo!	Informer	Politika	Danas	Total
report	145	106	197	162	193	196	219	1218
article	10	46	31	3	4	117	10	221
interview	9	16	29	16	2	36	56	164
commentary	7	0	4	2	1	65	79	158
news	18	3	14	22	22	10	26	115
reportage	3	2	14	0	0	9	4	32
other	8	0	1	0	3	0	4	16
Total	200	173	290	205	225	433	398	1924

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 10 – Share of journalistic forms in texts from the sample, per media outlet

Genre	Blic	Kurir	Večernje novosti	Alo!	Informer	Politika	Danas	Total
report	72.50	61.27	67.93	79.02	85.78	45.27	55.03	63.31
article	5.00	26.59	10.69	1.46	1.78	27.02	2.51	11.49
interview	4.50	9.25	10.00	7.80	0.89	8.31	14.07	8.52
commentary	3.50	0.00	1.38	0.98	0.44	15.01	19.85	8.21
news	9.00	1.73	4.83	10.73	9.78	2.31	6.53	5.98
reportage	1.50	1.16	4.83	0.00	0.00	2.08	1.01	1.66
other	4.00	0.00	0.34	0.00	1.33	0.00	1.01	0.83
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Report

All media from the sample recorded a fall in the number of reports compared to the last quarter of 2015, except the daily *Informer*, where about 11% more reports were published than in the period October – December. Apart from *Informer*, the highest number of texts in this journalistic genre was published by *Alo!* (79.02%), followed by *Blic* (72.5%), *Večernje novosti* (67.93%), *Kurir* (61.27%) and *Danas* (55.03%), while, as it was said above, *Politika* traditionally has the smallest share of reports (45.27%).

In all the analysed dailies, evaluative¹ reports are present, i.e. the attitude of the journalist is clearly visible in the text. The number of reports with evaluative connotations values from 84.98% in *Informer* to 11.42% in *Danas*. Positive or negative evaluative position of journalists is visible in 15.23% of texts written in this form in *Večernje novosti*, about 22% of texts in *Politika* and *Alo!*, about 32% in *Blic* and in 43.39% of reports published in *Kurir*. In the analysed dailies, the number of evaluative texts written in this genre is nearly equal (*Politika*) or lower (*Alo!*, *Večernje novosti*, *Kurir*, *Danas* and *Blic*) compared to the previous quarter, except for *Informer*, where a continuing increase of evaluative reports of 5.38% was noted. The biggest number of positive or negative reports, as much as 30.88% was recorded in the daily *Alo!* 11).

Table 11 – Report structure with regards to evaluative context in the seven media from the sample

Report	Evaluative context with regard to the topic		
Media outlet	positive %	neutral %	negative %
<i>Informer</i>	9.33	15.02	75.65
<i>Kurir</i>	3.77	56.61	39.62
<i>Blic</i>	0.69	68.28	31.03
<i>Alo!</i>	1.23	77.17	21.60
<i>Politika</i>	3.57	77.55	18.88
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	2.54	84.77	12.69
<i>Danas</i>	0.00	88.58	11.42
Total %	3.03	67.82	29.15

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Most reports (65.76%) published in seven media outlets from the sample in the first quarter

¹ In the analysis put forward herein, manners of presenting certain topics in individual texts from our sample were coded in three different ways, taking into consideration both the text and the accompanying textual content (headline, heading and subheading). Texts in which the authors/journalists did not take up an evaluative position towards a certain actor, but strived to present certain facts which are the subject of the text in a relatively neutral, reserved manner, respecting professional standards, were marked as *neutral*. Those interpretations in which the journalists clearly expressed sympathy and positive attitude towards the topics were marked as *positive*. We marked as *negative* those interpretations in which the journalists presented certain topics with clear antipathy and negative attitude towards certain topics.

of 2016 are unbalanced² (e.g. reports contain the statement of only one actor, i.e. the entire text is based on the standpoint of one interviewee or different interviewees advocating the same position), and this is a trend present throughout 2015. Only in the paper *Danas*, most reports are balanced (62.1%) while the smallest number of such reports is present in *Informer* (6.22%). *Kurir* followed with 16.04%, *Večernje novosti* with 25.38%, *Alo!* with 35.9%, *Politika* with 41.84% and *Blic* with 42.76%). However, *Alo!*, *Politika*, *Blic* and *Kurir* published between 23.23% (*Alo!*) and 5.73% (*Kurir*) more comprehensive texts compared to the period October-December 2015. Unlike these dailies, *Večernje novosti* reduced the number of balanced reports by about 15% in the first trimester of 2016 (Table 12).

Table 12 – Balance of reports in the seven media from the sample

Report	Balans %	
Media outlet	yes	no
<i>Informer</i>	6.22	93.78
<i>Kurir</i>	16.04	83.96
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	25.38	74.62
<i>Alo!</i>	35.80	64.20
<i>Politika</i>	41.84	58.16
<i>Blic</i>	42.76	57.24
<i>Danas</i>	62.10	37.90
Total %	34.24	65.76

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Other journalistic forms

The daily paper *Politika* published on its front pages the largest number of **articles** – 117 or 27.02%, which is more than half (52.94%) of all articles published in all texts from the sample (221) (Table 9). In comparison to the previous quarter, the biggest increase in the number of texts in the form of an article (as much as 18.4%) was recorded in *Kurir*, which in the period January – March 2016 published 46 or 26.59 texts in this journalistic form. Somewhat higher number of articles was noticed in *Večernje novosti* (31 or 10.69%), followed by *Blic* with 5% and *Danas* with 2.51%. Papers *Informer* and *Alo!* are still using the article in a insignificant extent – *Informer* in 1.78% (4) and *Alo!* in 1.46%, i.e. only three articles (Table 10).

The evaluative context is present in 26.7% of published articles, the least in *Danas* (10%), then in *Večernje novosti* and *Kurir* in 87.1% and 86.96% respectively, *Blic* 70%, *Alo!* 66.67% and *Politika* 65.81% while all articles published in *Informer* have negative connotation. All other

² Balance represents the manner in which the journalist approaches the topic. Balanced text involves a balanced and objective approach to the topic and interviewees and the comprehensiveness of information.

evaluative articles in the media from the sample are negative, except for the two texts written in the form of article in *Politika* (Table 13).

Table 13 – Structure of article with reference to value context in the seven media from the sample

Article	Value context with reference to the topic		
Media outlet	positive %	neutral %	negative %
<i>Informer</i>	0.00	0.00	100.00
<i>Politika</i>	1.71	65.81	32.48
<i>Alo!</i>	0.00	66.67	33.33
<i>Blic</i>	0.00	70.00	30.00
<i>Kurir</i>	0.00	86.96	13.04
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0.00	87.10	12.90
<i>Danas</i>	0.00	90.00	10.00
Total %	0.90	73.30	25.80

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

The highest number of texts written in this genre in this quarter had no balance (68.32%), which especially referred to *Kurir*, where only 8.7% of articles are balanced. In the daily paper *Politika*, which published the most articles, 70.99%, written in this form are not characterized by the comprehensive approach. Exactly 60% of articles from *Blic* have no balance, in *Večernje novosti*, we recorded 54.85% of balanced and proportionally objective texts, while in *Danas* most articles (70%) are balanced. In *Informer*, three out of four published texts have no balance, while in *Alo!* two out of three articles are balanced (Table 14).

Table 14 – Balance of articles from the seven media from the sample

Article	Balans %	
Media outlet	yes	no
<i>Kurir</i>	8.70	91.30
<i>Informer</i>	25.00	75.00
<i>Politika</i>	29.91	70.09
<i>Blic</i>	40.00	60.00
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	54.84	45.16
<i>Alo!</i>	66.67	33.33
<i>Danas</i>	70.00	30.00
Total %	31.68	68.32

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

In the first quarter of 2016, **interview** was the third-ranked genre in terms of share, and this is again thanks to texts in *Danas* (56 texts – 14.07%), *Politika* (36 – 8.31%) and *Večernje novosti* (29-10%) which is consistent with the editorial policy of these traditionally structured media

outlets. A few more interviews were recorded in *Kurir* (9.25%) and *Alo!* (7.8%). In *Blic* 5% of the published texts were written in the form of an interview, while on the front pages of *Informer* only two texts were of this genre.

Over 92% of interviews had neutral value context – in dailies *Danas*, *Blic* and *Večernje novosti* all texts written in this form are neutral, in *Kurir* and *Alo!* 93.75% are neutral, while in *Politika* 75% is neutral and 25% are evaluative (5.56% positive and 19.44% negative). *Informer* published one neutral and one negative text. (Table 15)

Table 15 – Structure of interviews in relation to the value context in the seven media outlets from the sample

Interview	Value context with regard to topic		
Media outlet	positive %	neutral %	negative %
<i>Informer</i>	0.00	50.00	50.00
<i>Politika</i>	5.56	75.00	19.44
<i>Kurir</i>	0.00	93.75	6.25
<i>Alo!</i>	0.00	93.75	6.25
<i>Blic</i>	0.00	100.00	0.00
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0.00	100.00	0.00
<i>Danas</i>	0.00	100.00	0.00
Total %	1.22	92.86	6.10

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

The next form according to share is **commentary** (column, editorial) which was present in 8.21% texts. Share of this genre in the first trimester of 2016 was higher than in all four quarters of 2015 individually, so the commentary is now the fourth-ranked form, present in 158 texts. Dailies *Danas* and *Politika* published the biggest number of commentaries, 19.85% (79), i.e. 15.01% (65), *Blic* 3.5% (7), while the share of commentaries in other analysed media outlets is insignificant (*Večernje novosti* – 4, *Alo!* – 2, *Informer* – 1, and in *Kurir* there were no texts in the form of commentary). Most commentaries published in all analysed media are critically oriented (53.17%), and especially in *Danas*, where 63.29% or 50 texts written in this genre were negative. In *Politika*, a high number of negative evaluative commentaries is also present – 29 or 44.02% and in both papers, we recorded 12% of positive texts (for more information about the value context of commentaries in other media, please see Table 16).

Table 16 – Structure of commentaries with reference to the evaluative context in the seven media outlets from the sample

Commentary	Value context with reference to the topic		
Media outlet	positive %	neutral %	negative %
<i>Kurir</i>	0.00	0.00	0.00
<i>Informer</i>	0.00	0.00	100.00
<i>Danas</i>	12.66	24.05	63.29
<i>Politika</i>	12.31	43.08	44.62
<i>Blic</i>	0.00	57.14	42.86
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0.00	75.00	25.00
<i>Alo!</i>	0.00	100.00	0.00
Total %	11.39	35.44	53.17

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

In the first quarter of 2016, **news** was present in only 115 texts though this is the basic journalistic form. The biggest share of news was in the daily *Alo!* (10.73% or 22 texts), in *Informer* 9.78% (22), *Blic* 9% (18), *Danas* 6.53% (26), *Večernje novosti* 4.83% (14), while in *Politika* and *Kurir* less than 3% of texts were written in the news form. The most evaluative news, about 60%, were present in *Informer* (54.55% negative and 4.55% positive), while most other media printed news in a dominantly neutral context – from 71.43% in *Večernje novosti* to 100% in *Kurir* and *Politika* (more information in **Table 17**).

Table 17 – Structure of news with reference to the value context in the seven media from the sample

News	Value context with reference to the topic		
Media outlet	positive %	neutral %	negative %
<i>Informer</i>	4.55	40.9	54.55
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	7.14	71.43	21.43
<i>Blic</i>	5.56	72.22	22.22
<i>Alo!</i>	0.00	72.73	27.27
<i>Danas</i>	0.00	96.15	3.85
<i>Kurir</i>	0.00	100	0.00
<i>Politika</i>	0.00	100	0.00
Total %	2.60	74.79	22.61

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

About 55% of news from the sample was not balanced, which also reveals a tendency towards interpreting content published in this form, from 86.63% news in *Informer*, and up to 30% in *Politika* (**Table 18**).

Table 18 – Balance of news in the seven media from the sample

News	Balans %	
Media outlet	yes	no
<i>Informer</i>	13.64	86.36
<i>Alo!</i>	31.82	68.18
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	50.00	50.00
<i>Danas</i>	57.69	42.31
<i>Blic</i>	61.11	38.89
<i>Kurir</i>	66.67	33.33
<i>Politika</i>	70.00	30.00
Total %	45.22	54.78

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Reportage was somewhat more present in the first quarter of 2016, mostly in *Večernje novosti* (14 – 4.83%) and *Politika* (9 – 2.08%), and both newspapers had nearly equal shares of reportages and news on the front pages (**Tables 9** and **10**). This genre was also recorded in *Danas*, *Blic* and *Kurir* (about 1% of texts), while it was not present in *Alo!* and *Informer*.

Other forms, in 16 i.e. 0.83% of texts usually represent various charts and actors' lists (which especially refers to *Blic*, which at the start of each year traditionally ranks personalities from the social and political life).

Causes

Structure of the top five causes in the first quarter of 2016 is very similar to the findings from previous issues of *Mediameter*. *Topics developed by the editorial staff* are still dominant in front-page texts of the media from the sample and they make up 596 or 30.98% of all texts. *Events initiated by a foreign factor* generated 13.46% or 259 texts, while *events initiated by the relevant actor* present causes in 10.08% (194) texts. *Statement by the other relevant actor* is cause in 8.16% (157), and event initiated by the Government of Serbia in 4.63% or 89 texts (**Table 19**).³

Cause developed by the editorial staff is traditionally the most prevalent when the topic of the text is *political life in Serbia* (157 texts). Since the election process started in the first quarter and since 105 texts on the topic of *2016 elections* were also initiated by editorial staff, so political topics were actually present in about 44% of texts developed in this way. Just over a third of these texts were written in negative context. Texts on the topic of economy have similar causes developed by the editorial staff (32 texts – 59.38% negative), as well as

³ Tables show five top ranked causes in terms of appearance.

those discussing the media (25 – 68% negative) and regional relations/cooperation in the region (17 – 47.06% negative) (please see more in **Table 20**). Out of 596 texts developed by editorial staff, 218 or 40.94% had negative or positive value context (**Table 21**).

Table 19 – Distribution of causes in the seven media from the sample

Cause	no. of appearances	% share
topic developed by the editorial staff	596	30.98
event initiated by a foreign factor	259	13.46
event initiated by the other relevant actor	194	10.08
statement by the other relevant actor	157	8.16
event initiated by the government of RS	89	4.63

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 20 – Cause developed by the editorial staff – most frequent topics and the value context in the seven media from the sample

Cause developed by the editorial staff/topic	Value context with reference to the topic							
	Total texts		positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
political life in Serbia	157	26.34	1	0.64	98	62.42	58	36.94
2016 elections	105	17.62	2	1.90	68	64.76	35	33.33
economy	32	5.37	0	0.00	13	40.63	19	59.38
media/freedom of media	25	4.19	0	0.00	8	32.00	17	68.00
regional cooperation/regional relations	17	2.85	0	0.00	9	52.94	8	47.06

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 21 – Cause developed by the editorial staff – value context of texts from all media

All media	no. of texts	positive	neutral	negative
Cause developed by the editorial staff				
no.	596	26	352	218
%	100	4.36	59.06	36.58

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

In the daily *Večernje novosti* most causes for writing texts were developed by the editorial staff (15.52% or 45 texts), followed by events initiated by a foreign factor (14.14% - 41), event related to other relevant actors (13.45% - 39), statements by other relevant actors (7.93% - 23) and events initiated by the government of the Republic of Serbia (7.59% - 22). All causes in the period January – March 2016 were present in exactly the same order and with very similar shares, as in the last quarter of 2015.

Table 22 – Distribution of causes in *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	no. of appearances	% share
topic developed by the editorial staff	45	15.52
event initiated by a foreign factor	41	14.14
event initiated by the other relevant actor	39	13.45
statement by the other relevant actor	23	7.93
event initiated by the government of RS	22	7.59

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Paper *Blic* in the first trimester of 2016 published the most texts developed by the editorial staff 38.5% (77). Out of all other causes, events initiated by the other relevant actor (13.5% - 27) and a foreign factor (7%-14) were also present. The same share was recorded for causes initiated by the Government of Serbia, while the fifth-ranked cause, with a share of 4.5%, is statement by the other relevant actor. Findings in *Blic*, as well as in *Večernje novosti*, are consistent with the previous issues of *Mediameter*.

Table 23 – Distribution of causes in *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	no. of appearances	% share
topic developed by the editorial staff	77	38.50
event initiated by the other relevant actor	27	13.50
event initiated by a foreign factor	14	7.00
event initiated by the government of RS	14	7.00
statement by the other relevant actor	9	4.50

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Share of causes in the daily *Kurir* was somewhat different compared to previous quarters. The biggest is the presence of topics developed in the editorial staff – 23.12% (40 texts), while the statement by the other relevant actor was cause of 15.03% or 26 texts. Events initiated by a foreign factor and other relevant actor were causes in 11.56% (20) and 10.98% (19) texts, respectively. Unlike in the previous trimester, cause for reporting of *Kurir* was writing of other media in 4.62% of texts this time.

Table 24 – Distribution of causes in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	no. of appearances	% share
topic developed by the editorial staff	40	23.12
statement by the other relevant actor	26	15.03
event initiated by a foreign factor	20	11.56
event initiated by the other relevant actor	19	10.98
reporting of other media	8	4.62

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

In the daily paper *Alo!* topics devised by the editorial staff had this time as well the highest share by far with 33.17% (68). Events initiated by the other relevant actor and foreign factor were causes in 15.12% (31), i.e. 7.32% (15) texts, while statement by the other relevant actor was cause in 6.83% (14) texts. Unlike in the previous quarters, in the first trimester of 2016, the fifth-ranked cause was the statement of the opposition representatives, present in 11 or 5.37% of texts from the front pages.

Table 25 – Distribution of causes in the paper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	no. of appearances	% share
topic developed by the editorial staff	68	33.17
event initiated by the other relevant actor	31	15.12
event initiated by a foreign factor	15	7.32
statement by the other relevant actor	14	6.83
statement by opposition representatives	11	5.37

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

In the daily *Informer*, most topics were devised by the editorial staff – 41.33% or 93 texts. Statement by the other relevant actor and event initiated by a foreign factor were causes in 11.11% (25) and 21 or 9.33% of texts. Cause which was largely present in the previous quarters, statement of opposition representatives, was now recorded in 19 texts, i.e. 8.44%. The fifth-ranked cause according to share in *Informer* was event initiated by the other relevant actor with 5.78% or 13 texts.

Table 26 – Distribution of causes in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	no. of appearances	% share
topic developed by the editorial staff	93	41.33
statement by the other relevant actor	25	11.11
event initiated by a foreign factor	21	9.33
statement by opposition representatives	19	8.44
event initiated by the other relevant actor	13	5.78

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Distribution of causes in *Politika* was also similar like in the last quarter of 2015, but most texts were developed by the editorial staff in the first trimester – 106 or 24.48%. Events initiated by a foreign factor was ranked second with 20.79% (90), while statement by the other relevant actor was cause present in 11.09% or 48 texts. Statement of the Serbian PM initiated 31 or 7.16% of texts, and event initiated by the other relevant actor 27 or 6.24%.

Table 27 – Distribution of causes in the daily *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	no. of appearances	% share
topic developed by the editorial staff	106	24.48
event initiated by a foreign factor	90	20.79
statement by the other relevant actor	48	11.09
statement of the PM of Serbia	31	7.16
event initiated by the other relevant actor	27	6.24

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Topic developed by the editorial staff, as the most prevalent cause in the paper *Danas* was more present than in the previous two quarters with 41.96% i.e. 167 texts, which is the result approximate to the findings from the second trimester of 2015. Events related to a foreign factor and events initiated by other relevant actors were causes in 14.57% (58) and 9.55% (38) texts. Government of the Republic of Serbia, i.e. an event initiated by it generated 6.78% or 27 texts, while statements of other relevant actors and the opposition were causes to 3.02% or 12 texts, each. The same as with *Informer* and *Alo!*, statements of other relevant actors and the opposition had for the first time a more significant presence in *Danas* in the first quarter of 2016.

Table 28 – Distribution of causes in the paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	no. of appearances	% share
topic developed by the editorial staff	167	41.96
event initiated by a foreign factor	58	14.57
event initiated by the other relevant actor	38	9.55
event initiated by the government of RS	27	6.78
statement by the other relevant actor	12	3.02
event initiated by the opposition	12	3.02

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Statements and events related to the Prime Minister and representatives of the Serbian Government in the first quarter of 2016 were causes of a total of 11.17% or 215 texts, which is about 2.5% less than in the last trimester of 2015 (please see **Table 29**).

Table 29 – Share of texts initiated by statements and activities of the president and representative of the government of RS in seven media from the sample

Cause	no. of texts	% total number of texts
event initiated by the government of RS	89	4.63
statement of the PM of Serbia	75	3.90
statement of representatives of the Serbian government	37	1.92
event initiated by the PM of Serbia	14	0.73
Total	215	11.17

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Topics

In order to define each text as clearly as possible, texts selected in the sample were classified around only one topic, but all elements present in the text were always recorded. In previous issues of *Mediameter*, this enabled us to have clearer insight into the manner of reporting and approach of the media to certain topics. In all research up to now, we separated separate topics of interest, and in the first quarter of 2016, we paid special attention to special topics of interest, such as scheduling of early parliamentary elections and all activities which followed after that, i.e. events which have here been classified as *2016 elections*.

Share of topics

In the period January – March 2016, political topics were the most prevalent on the front pages of the dailies from the sample. Apart from *political life in Serbia*, all through 2015 we were following *the activities of the Government of the Republic of Serbia*, *the activities of the Prime Minister of Serbia* and *the activities of the President of Serbia*, as topics that this time were recorded in 22.2% texts from the sample. When we add the topic *elections 2016* to this, the share of political topics accounts for 35.19%, which is by approximately 13% more than in last quarter of 2015. Considering their share, *Political life* and *elections 2016* are top two topics in all of the media from the sample. Most of the media express interest in topics dealing with industry, which is the third ranked topic considering its presence in texts from the sample, its share being 6.19% (119 texts). However, unlike topics dealing with industry, editors and journalists show extremely little interest in economic topics, which have as little share as 1.98% i.e. 38 texts in *Večernje novosti*, *Politika*, *Blic* and *Danas*, while *Alo!*, *Informer* and *Kurir* do not publish texts on this topic at all.

The next topic represented on front pages deals with *international relations*, and it was recorded in 87 texts (4.52%). Regional relations and cooperation is a topic which is typically represented on the front pages of the print media (82 texts – 4.26%), as it is the case with the Hague Tribunal topic, which was, primarily due to Radovan Karadžić's sentence and the announcement of Vojislav Šešelj's sentence, represented in as many texts as texts with topics concerning the region. *Migrants/refugees* and *media disputes* were the topics of 57 (2.96%) and 51 (2.65%) texts, respectively, while top ten topics also involve *Russia/relations with Russia* with a 2.6% share (50) and *the system of justice, activities of judiciary bodies* (46 texts, 2.39%) (**Table 30**).

If we take into consideration the media attitude towards Serbia's foreign policy, especially with respect to Russia and the European Union, we arrive at a conclusion that topics regarding Russia had a higher share and were put forward in a more positive context in all media (the biggest number of positive texts and with respect to all other topics), with 16% of negative texts (most of which, i.e. 87.5% were published by the paper *Blic* alone), while there was only one positive text (in *Danas* daily) and approximately 36.6% texts with negative connotation on the EU perceived (**Graph 15**). So, the topic *the EU/the European Union's policy* was not present on the front pages of *Blic*, while there was only one text noticed in *Kurir*, *Alo!* and *Informer*, each. *Večernje novosti*, *Danas* and *Politika* published 7, 13 and the total of 18 texts, respectively, on topics regarding the EU. Considering the media individually, the biggest number of negative texts on the EU was published by *Politika* (7 i.e. 38.89%), and it is followed by *Večernje novosti* with 5 texts (71.43%) while one negative text was published by *Danas*, *Kurir* and *Informer*, each.

The topic *reaching standards for the EU integration / opening of negotiation chapters* attracted even less attention of the media and hence, considering all media, there were only 7, i.e. 0.36% neutral texts on that topic published on front pages.

The structure of texts about Russia and relations with that country is considerably different. All media wrote about this topic, and most texts were published by *Politika* (12 – 3 i.e. 25% positive, 9 i.e. 75% neutral), and it is followed by *Blic* with 13, *Večernje novosti* with 7, *Kurir* with 6, *Informer*, *Danas* and *Alo!* with 4 texts each. Daily paper *Blic* published one positive and 7 (53.85%) texts with negative connotation. Another negative text was recorded in *Alo!*, and while all texts in *Informer* are positive, *Kurir* and *Večernje novosti* published 66.67% and 14.29% positive texts respectively. All texts published by *Danas* are written with a neutral context (**Table 32**).

Considering the value context of all 1924 selected texts in the first quarter of 2016, 31.91% texts had a value connotation – 28.84% negative and 3.43% positive (**Table 33**). When it comes to single topics, as stated already, we analysed specifically the texts regarding snap parliament election which was presented by most media in a neutral context, and so *Večernje novosti*, *Alo!*, *Politika* and *Blic* published texts without clear value connotation in more than 90% texts on that topic, while *Danas* and *Kurir* provide the value to 29.17% and 25% of such texts, respectively. The only media deviating from the mentioned tendency is *Informer* which assumed a clear position in 76.31% texts on this topic – 73.68% i.e. 28 negative and one positive writings (the topic *elections 2016* is shown separately in **Table 31**).

When it comes to other topics, the biggest number of negative texts were written regarding the media (27 texts – 52.94%), and, as usual, great number of negative writings refer to regional relations and cooperation (42.68%). Approximately one third of negative texts were recorded regarding the following topics: political life (125 -35.61%), industry (37 - 31.09%) and the system of justice (14 -30.43%). 25.61% (21) texts with negative connotation were on the Hague Tribunal, and 27.59% (24) were on international relations. The smallest number of negative texts refer to migrants and refugees – only 5.26% (3 texts), and the equal number of texts with positive tone was also written on that topic (**Table 30**).

Table 30 – Distribution of topics and their value context in the seven media from the sample⁴

Topic	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
political life in Serbia	351	18.24	2	0.57	224	63.82	125	35.61
elections 2016	250	12.99	3	1.20	190	76.00	57	22.80
economy	119	6.19	1	0.84	81	68.07	37	31.09
international relations	87	4.52	1	1.15	62	71.26	24	27.59
regional cooperation/ relations in the region	82	4.26	0	0.00	47	57.32	35	42.68

⁴ Ten most frequent topics are represented in all tables.

The Hague/war crimes	82	4.26	0	0.00	61	74.39	21	25.61
migrants/refugees	57	2.96	3	5.26	51	89.47	3	5.26
Media/freedom of media	51	2.65	0	0.00	24	47.06	27	52.94
Russia/relations with Russia	50	2.60	13	26.00	29	58.00	8	16.00
system of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	46	2.39	0	0.00	32	69.57	14	30.43

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 31 – Share and value context for topic *election 2016* in the seven media from the sample

Topic: <i>elections 2016</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Media outlet								
<i>Danas</i>	72	28.80	1	1.39	51	70.83	20	27.78
<i>Politika</i>	49	19.60	1	2.04	45	91.84	3	6.12
<i>Informer</i>	38	15.20	1	2.63	9	23.68	28	73.68
<i>Alo!</i>	33	13.20	0	0.00	31	93.94	2	6.06
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	26	10.40	0	0.00	26	100.00	0	0.00
<i>Blic</i>	24	9.60	0	0.00	22	91.67	2	8.33
<i>Kurir</i>	8	3.20	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Total	250	100.00	3	1.20	190	76.00	57	22.80

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 32 - Value context and number of texts on topics *Russia/relations with Russia* and *the EU/relations with the European Union*, per media

Media outlet/Topic	Value context with reference to the topic							
	TOTAL		positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
<i>Blic</i>								
Russia/relations with Russia	13	6.50	1	7.69	5	38.46	7	53.85
EU/EU policies	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
<i>Kurir</i>								
Russia/relations with Russia	6	3.47	4	66.67	2	33.33	0	0.00
EU/EU policies	1	0.58	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	100.00
<i>Večernje novosti</i>								
EU/EU policies	7	2.41	0	0.00	2	28.57	5	71.43
Russia/relations with Russia	7	2.41	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0.00

Alo!								
Russia/relations with Russia	4	1.95	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
EU/EU policies	1	0.49	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Informer								
Russia/relations with Russia	4	1.78	4	100.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
EU/EU policies	1	0.44	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	100.00
Politika								
EU/EU policies	18	4.16	0	0.00	11	61.11	7	38.89
Russia/relations with Russia	12	2.77	3	25.00	9	75.00	0	0.00
Danas								
EU/EU policies	13	3.27	1	7.69	11	84.62	1	7.69
Russia/relations with Russia	4	1.01	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00


Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 33 – Value context with reference to all topics and all seven media from the sample

All media – value context	no. of texts	%
positive	66	3.43
neutral	1310	68.09
negative	548	28.48
Total	1924	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Graph 15 - Value context in all media from the sample with reference to topics *Russia/relations with Russia* and *the EU /the European Union policy*



Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Distribution of topics per media outlets

Blic

The most frequent topics in the daily *Blic* were *political life in Serbia* and *2016 elections* with an equal share of 34.5% (69 texts), and most of these texts were written in neutral value context (75.56%, i.e. 91.67%). The next topic of interest was *economy*, it appeared in 6.5% or 13 texts, and this applies to topics related to Russia. Economy is presented negatively in 30.77% of texts. Different aspects of international relations were covered in 8 or 4% of texts (25% negative), while 7 texts discussed *activities of the Government of Serbia, The Hague and crime*. Activities of the Government of Serbia were presented in a negative context in 42.86% of texts, The Hague in 28.57% and topics related to crime in 71.43%. *Regional relations and cooperation* were given negative connotations in 60% of texts, while the share of this topic was 2.5%. Media were reported on in the same percentage, but this topic was presented in a neutral context in all texts (more information in **Table 34**).

In the first quarter of 2016, the daily *Blic* attributed positive or negative evaluations in 30% of all its texts (**Table 35**), which is a result consistent to the previous issue of *Mediameter*. In the paper *Blic*, we recorded an extremely small number of positive texts with reference to all topics – merely two. One, as we already mentioned, referred to topics related to Russia, while the other positive text was related to sport.⁵

Table 34 – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
political life in Serbia	45	22.50	0	0.00	34	75.56	11	24.44
elections 2016	24	12.00	0	0.00	22	91.67	2	8.33
economy	13	6.50	0	0.00	9	69.23	4	30.77
Russia/relations with Russia	13	6.50	1	7.69	5	38.46	7	53.85
international relations	8	4.00	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
activities of the government of RS	7	3.50	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
The Hague/war crimes	7	3.50	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
crime	7	3.50	0	0.00	2	28.57	5	71.43
regional cooperation/relations in the region	5	2.50	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00

⁵ Texts related to sport, showbiz and culture were analysed only when they had political connotations.

Media/freedom of media	5	2.50	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
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Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 35 – Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Blic*

<i>Blic</i> – value context	no. of texts	%
positive	2	1.00
neutral	140	70.00
negative	58	29.00
Total	200	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Kurir

As in all previous quarters, in texts sampled from *Kurir*, *political life in Serbia* dominates as a topic. It is present in 62 or 35.84% of texts, which is about 10% more than in the last trimester of 2015. About one third of these texts were written in negative context (32.26%). When we add to that the texts related to early parliamentary elections, the share of political topics in *Kurir* reaches 40%. *Regional cooperation and relations in the region*, *media* and *formal events* had a share of 7 texts (4.05%) each, but regional topics were covered with extremely negative connotation (71.43%), while the other two specified topics were presented in a mostly neutral context (85.71% each). In six texts (3.47%) *Kurir* wrote about the activities of the *Government of Serbia*, *migrant crisis*, *international relations* and *Russia*. *Activities of the Government* were presented negatively in 66.67% of texts, while about one third of negative texts referred to the migrant crisis. *Kurir* writes about *economy* in 2.89% or 5 texts, out of which 40% is negative (**Table 36**).

In the paper *Kurir*, 30.64% of texts are evaluatively defined – 28.32% have negative, and 2.59% positive connotation (**Table 37**), which is about 17% less texts in which the position of the journalist is visible compared to the last quarter of the previous year.

Table 36 – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
political life in Serbia	62	35.84	0	0.00	42	67.74	20	32.26
elections 2016	8	4.62	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
regional cooperation/relations in the region	7	4.05	0	0.00	2	28.57	5	71.43
Media/freedom of media	7	4.05	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
formal events	7	4.05	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
activities of the government of RS	6	3.47	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
migrants/refugees	6	3.47	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
international relations	6	3.47	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Russia/relations with Russia	6	3.47	4	66.67	2	33.33	0	0.00
economy	5	2.89	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Tabela 37. – Value context u odnosu na sve teme u listu *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i> - value context	no. of texts	%
positive	4	2.31
neutral	120	69.36
negative	49	28.32
Total	173	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Informer

Political life in Serbia and 2016 elections were the most frequent topics in *Informer* in the period January – March, with a common share of 46.22%. Topic political life in Serbia is in as many as 56 out of the total 66 texts (84.85%) represented negatively, while only two texts (3.03%) have positive connotation. All texts written about the media, whether on the topic of media freedom (21 texts – 9.33%) or conflicts (11 – 4.89%) were presented negatively. International relations were present in 8 (3.56%) texts, out of which, exactly one half is negative. Economy and sport were topics in 7 (3.11%) texts each, also mostly negative texts (71.43% of texts on both topics were written in a negative tone). The military, The Hague and terrorism of the Islamic State were written about in 6 (2.67%) texts. The military is presented positively in 50% of texts, while the rest are neutral. Contrary to this, The Hague Tribunal and war crimes were written about in a negative tone in 83.33% of texts, while the Islamic State was presented with negative connotation in all texts (more information in Table 38). The topic of ombudsman Saša Janković, which was in second, third and fourth quarters of 2015 the most frequent topic in *Informer*, was not covered at all in any of the texts during the first trimester of 2016.

In comparison to the other media from the sample, *Informer* has the most prominent evaluative judgment – in as many as 82.22% of texts the journalists express their attitude. Also, in this media, we recorded the highest number and share of positive texts (9.33% - 21). 72.89% of texts were written in negative context (please see Table 39).

Table 38 – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
political life in Serbia	66	29.33	2	3.03	8	12.12	56	84.85
elections 2016	38	16.89	1	2.63	9	23.68	28	73.68
Media/freedom of media	21	9.33	0	0.00	0	0.00	21	100.00
media/freedom of the media	11	4.89	0	0.00	0	0.00	11	100.00
international relations	8	3.56	0	0.00	4	50.00	4	50.00
economy	7	3.11	0	0.00	2	28.57	5	71.43
sport	7	3.11	2	28.57	0	0.00	5	71.43
military	6	2.67	3	50.00	3	50.00	0	0.00
The Hague/war crimes	6	2.67	0	0.00	1	16.67	5	83.33
terrorism and the Islamic State	6	2.67	0	0.00	0	0.00	6	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 39 – Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i> – value context	no. of texts	%
positive	21	9.33
neutral	40	17.78
negative	164	72.89
Total	225	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Alo!

The daily *Alo!* dedicated nearly half of the texts (48.78%) sampled from this paper to political topics. Political life in Serbia was presented in 80% of the texts in a neutral tone, while a large majority of writing which refers to the election process was also written with neutral connotations. In 13 (6.34%) texts from the sample, journalists of the paper *Alo!* wrote about topics related to crime, entirely without evaluative connotations, which is not the case when it comes to *regional cooperation/relations in the region*, in which 50% of the published 12 texts (5.85%) were written in a negative tone. One third of the total 9 written texts about *The Hague Tribunal and war crimes* was written in a negative tone, and more than half (57.14%) out of 7 texts talking about *economy* were negative. The same number of texts (7) was recorded on Kosovo topics (3.41%), out of which, most of them were written in a neutral context. Activities of the prime minister were followed by *Alo!* in 6 neutral texts, this is the same number of texts written about *religious issues*, which were presented negatively in 33.33%. 4 texts covered *international relations*, mostly in neutral context (Table 40).

Value context in the paper *Alo!* was present in 21.96% of texts in the period from January – March (Table 41), which is more than two times (27.33%) less texts with clear positioning of the journalist compared to the last quarter of the previous year.

Table 40 – Distribution of topics and their value context in the daily *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
political life in Serbia	67	32.68	0	0.00	54	80.60	13	19.40
elections 2016	33	16.10	0	0.00	31	93.94	2	6.06
crime	13	6.34	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
regional cooperation/relations in the region	12	5.85	0	0.00	6	50.00	6	50.00

The Hague/war crimes	9	4.39	0	0.00	6	66.67	3	33.33
economy	7	3.41	0	0.00	3	42.86	4	57.14
Kosovo/relations of Belgrade and Pristine	7	3.41	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
activities of the PM	6	2.93	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
religious issues, church, religion	6	2.93	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
international relations	4	1.95	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 41 - Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i> – value context	no. of texts	%
positive	2	0.98
neutral	160	78.05
negative	43	20.98
Total	205	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Politika

In the first quarter of 2016, political topics in *Politika* were present in about 20% of texts. Almost all texts written about the election process were in a neutral context (91.84%) while about 29% of texts about the *political life in Serbia* were negative. *International relations* were presented in 28 texts, out of which one half was negative. *Politika's* journalists wrote about economic topics in 25 (5.77%) texts – 28% of negative and 4% positive. The next topic according to share in this daily was *migrant crisis* (21 – 4.85%), about which 95.24% were written in neutral tone. Topics related to the United States of America and EU were presented in 18 (4.16%) texts, though USA was written about mostly in neutral context (88.89%). A bit more negatively evaluated texts – 50% (8) - were written about *regional cooperation/regional relations* (total share of the topic was 3.7 % or 16 texts). Regional relations in *Politika* are traditionally more frequently presented negatively. Top ten topics in this newspaper are completed with *The Hague/war crimes* and *terrorism/Islamic state*. Topics about The Hague were negatively presented in 42.86% of texts, while the other mentioned topic was negatively presented in 21.41% of texts (**Table 42**).

Compared to all other media across all quarters, *Politika* published the highest number of texts making up the sample (433), and in this paper we also recorded the biggest diversity of topics. *Politika* published 68.82% of texts which do not have clear evaluative connotation, 4.39% positive and 26.79% negative (please see **Table 43**), which are nearly equal results as in the fourth quarter of 2015.

Tabela 42. – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
elections 2016	49	11.32	1	2.04	45	91.84	3	6.12
political life in Serbia	38	8.78	0	0.00	27	71.05	11	28.95
international relations	28	6.47	0	0.00	14	50.00	14	50.00
economy	25	5.77	1	4.00	17	68.00	7	28.00
migrants/refugees	21	4.85	1	4.76	20	95.24	0	0.00
EU/EU policies	18	4.16	0	0.00	11	61.11	7	38.89
izbori u SAD	18	4.16	0	0.00	16	88.89	2	11.11
regional cooperation/relations in the region	16	3.70	0	0.00	8	50.00	8	50.00
The Hague/war crimes	14	3.23	0	0.00	8	57.14	6	42.86
terrorism and the Islamic State	14	3.23	0	0.00	11	78.57	3	21.43

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 43 – Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i> – value context	no. of texts	%
positive	19	4.39
neutral	298	68.82
negative	116	26.79
Total	433	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Večernje novosti

Večernje novosti distributed topics quite equally on the front pages in the first quarter of 2016. Hence, for the 5 top ranked topics, we recorded frequency from 7.24% to 8.97%. Still, two political topics were prevalent in this daily, and together they make up 16.56% of all texts. These topics were mostly covered in neutral evaluative tone (*2016 elections* – all texts were neutral, *political life in Serbia* 95.45% - neutral). *The Hague/war crimes* was a topic of 22 or 7.59% mostly neutral texts, with 22.73% of negative texts. *Economy and regional*

relations were present in 21 texts (7.24%) out of which most texts which refer to economy were neutral (85.71%) while regional relations and cooperation, as in *Politika*, were presented in negative connotation somewhat more than other topics (38.1%). 15 mostly neutral texts were written about infrastructure, while *Večernje novosti* is a media outlet which dedicated most of its attention to economic topics, which were present in 14 (4.83%) texts, which mostly were not evaluative. Journalists of *Večernje novosti* did not take an evaluative position when they wrote about the migrant crisis (**Table 44**).

Most texts in *Večernje novosti* were written in neutral context (84.48%) (**Table 45**) If we compare *Večernje novosti* to other dailies, we recorded in this paper the highest percentage of evaluatively neutral texts, though certain areas such as *EU policies* or *regional relations* still record a considerable share of negative texts.

Table 44 – Value context according to topics in the daily *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
elections 2016	26	8.97	0	0.00	26	100.00	0	0.00
political life in Serbia	22	7.59	0	0.00	21	95.45	1	4.55
The Hague/war crimes	22	7.59	0	0.00	17	77.27	5	22.73
economy	21	7.24	0	0.00	18	85.71	3	14.29
regional cooperation/ relations in the region	21	7.24	0	0.00	13	61.90	8	38.10
infrastructure	15	5.17	1	6.67	14	93.33	0	0.00
economics	14	4.83	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
international relations	14	4.83	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
religious issues, church, religion	13	4.48	1	7.69	12	92.31	0	0.00
migrants/refugees	8	2.76	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 45 – Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i> - value context	no. of texts	%
positive	7	2.41
neutral	245	84.48
negative	38	13.10
Total	290	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Danas

As in all other media from the sample, on the front pages of *Danas*, political topics are most frequent (30.9%). These texts were written mostly in neutral context (*2016 elections* in 70.83% of texts, *political life in Serbia* in 74.51%). *Economy* was the third ranked topic of interest in *Danas* in 41 i.e. 10.3% of texts, presented in 70.73% of texts neutrally and negatively in 29.27%. The *migrant crisis* was the topic of 20 (5.03%), and *The Hague* and *international relations* in 19 (4.77%) mostly neutral texts. Justice and regional topics were present in 17 (4.27%) texts. Regional relations and cooperation were presented in a negative context in 17.65% of texts, while the 30% of the texts write negatively about the justice system. *Danas* wrote about the European Union in 3.27% (13) mostly neutral texts (one positive and one negative was recorded), as well as about culture in 11 largely neutral texts (**Table 46**).

In the daily *Danas*, we again recorded a large share of neutral texts – 77.14%, 11 or 2.76% positive and 20.1% negative ones (**Table 47**).

Table 46 – Value context according to topics in the daily *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
elections 2016	72	18.09	1	1.39	51	70.83	20	27.78
political life in Serbia	51	12.81	0	0.00	38	74.51	13	25.49
economy	41	10.30	0	0.00	29	70.73	12	29.27
migrants/refugees	20	5.03	2	10.00	18	90.00	0	0.00
The Hague/war crimes	19	4.77	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
international relations	19	4.77	1	5.26	15	78.95	3	15.79
regional cooperation/ relations in the region	17	4.27	0	0.00	14	82.35	3	17.65
system of justice, activi- ties of judiciary bodies	17	4.27	0	0.00	12	70.59	5	29.41
EU/EU policies	13	3.27	1	7.69	11	84.62	1	7.69
culture	11	2.76	2	18.18	8	72.73	1	9.09

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 47 - Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i> - value context	no. of texts	%
positive	11	2.76
neutral	307	77.14
negative	80	20.10
Total	398	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Balance

When we consider all texts from the sample for the period January – March 2016, it can be observed that most of the prevalent topics were not treated in a comprehensive way, which may be seen from the information that balance is present in only 29% of all texts. The smallest number of balanced texts was recorded in *Informer* (7.11%) and *Kurir* (13.87%), which are findings aligned with the average values for 2015. *Večernje novosti* published 27.59% of balanced texts, *Politika* and *Alo!* 29.71%, i.e. 33.17% of balanced texts, which is when we consider both papers about 12% i.e. 14% more when compared to the previous year. Approach

to topics is balanced in 40.2% of writing of *Danas* (about 10% less than last-year's average) and 40.5% in *Blic* (**Table 48**). Though an evaluative context was not expressed in 68.09% of all texts, in order to have a realistic view of the media from the sample, one should definitely take into account the fact that texts from the front pages analysed by us are not balanced and that this unilateral approach depicts the general situation in the Serbian media.

Finally, balanced texts necessarily indicate a certain level of reservation, which obviously is not a widely spread occurrence in Serbian journalism. Orientation, is sometimes very passionate and attracts the auditorium, but decreases the level of seriousness. It is about the quick response, not about detailed and rational informing which requires research, larger number of interviewees and reliable and verifiable data from available sources of information. In this way, popularity and circulation are quickly acquired, but not reputation.

Tabela 48. - Balance in relation to all topics and all seven media from the sample

Balance	yes	no
Media outlet	%	%
<i>Informer</i>	7.11	92.89
<i>Kurir</i>	13.87	86.13
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	27.59	72.41
<i>Politika</i>	29.79	70.21
<i>Alo!</i>	33.17	66.83
<i>Danas</i>	40.20	59.80
<i>Blic</i>	40.50	59.50
Total	29.00	71.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Actors

The media in Serbia, judging at least from the analysis of the empiric material collected from front pages, deal predominantly with political events in Serbia. Political actors (individual and collective) who assume various positions in the political life of Serbia account for even 59.05% of the total number of actors that the selected texts from front pages deal with (see **Table 49** and **Tables 50, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61** and **62** for individual and **Tables 63, 64, 65** and **66** for collective domestic political actors). If we add to this number the texts dealing with foreign political actors, the share of political actors in the total number of actors on front pages rises up to 79.24%. Industrial and economic actors are protagonists in texts from front pages in only 3.16% cases (see **Table 49**).

Table 49 - Total distribution of actors who appear in texts that are included in the research sample (shown in absolute numbers)

Actors					
Political actors	8429	Domestic	6282	Individual	4732
				Collective	1550
		Foreign	2147	Individual	1692
				Collective	455
Economic actors	337	Domestic	316	Individual	209
				Collective	107
		Foreign	21	Individual	4
				Collective	17
Other social actors	1486	Domestic	1389	Individual	1178
				Collective	211
		Foreign	97	Individual	80
				Collective	17
Unnamed source					385
Total					10637

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

In **Tables 50, 55, 60-64** distribution of frequency of appearance of certain individual political actors that are active within the political scene of Serbia. Individual political actors – members of the Serbian government (37.48%), actors of political parties in office (12.95%) and actors from opposition parties (30.17%) – are increasingly present on the front pages (80.62%) compared to 7.73% for representatives of state agencies and institutions, 1.47% of representatives of armed and police forces, 9.12% of those who do not belong to the current Government of Serbia, or position and/or opposition parties and 1.14% for local government representatives.

Table 50 - Distribution of frequency and value context of appearance of individual political actors from the **Government of the Republic of Serbia and the President of the Republic of Serbia**

Government of Serbia and Serbian President	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandar Vučić	661	37.26	16	2.42	613	92.74	32	4.84
Tomislav Nikolić	232	13.08	1	0.43	210	90.52	21	9.05

Ivica Dačić	225	12.68	2	0.89	195	86.67	28	12.44
Nebojša Stefanović	107	6.03	1	0.93	91	85.05	15	14.02
Zorana Mihajlović	97	5.47	0	0.00	86	88.66	11	11.34
Aleksandar Vulin	84	4.74	0	0.00	74	88.10	10	11.90
Rasim Ljajić	61	3.44	0	0.00	61	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Selaković	51	2.87	0	0.00	48	94.12	3	5.88
Kori Udovički	34	1.92	0	0.00	30	88.24	4	11.76
Ivan Tasovac	34	1.92	0	0.00	26	76.47	8	23.53
Dušan Vujović	31	1.75	0	0.00	29	93.55	2	6.45
Aleksandar Antić	27	1.52	0	0.00	23	85.19	4	14.81
Željko Sertić	23	1.30	0	0.00	22	95.65	1	4.35
Velimir Ilić	20	1.13	0	0.00	16	80.00	4	20.00
Srdjan Verbić	19	1.07	0	0.00	16	84.21	3	15.79
Jadranka Joksimović	19	1.07	0	0.00	18	94.74	1	5.26
Zlatibor Lončar	17	0.96	0	0.00	14	82.35	3	17.65
Vanja Udovičić	14	0.79	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
Zoran Đorđević	10	0.56	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Snežana Bogosavljević Bošković	8	0.45	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Total	1774	100.00	20	1.13	1601	90.25	153	8.62

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Just like in the previous four trimesters, Aleksandar Vučić was the most prevalent actor on the front pages of the dailies in Serbia, about whom the media from our sample were reporting in a predominantly neutral tone (in 92.74% cases). 2.42% positive texts (a bit less than in the previous quarter) and 4.84%⁶ texts with negative connotation were also written about him. Prime Minister appeared even 661 times as a protagonist of the texts on the front pages, and this is considerably more than the first next ranked actor, President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić, who appeared in 232 texts. The largest frequency of the appearance of Aleksandar Vučić, expressed in absolute numbers, was recorded in the dailies *Danas* (140), *Politika* (130) and *Večernje novosti* (100) (see **Table 51**). However, expressed in relative numbers of percentage share of texts in which he appeared as an actor, compared to a total number of selected texts from the same individual papers, we can see that he was most present as an actor in *Kurir* (even 43.35% texts from our sample are about Vučić) and in the daily *Informer* (37.33% texts). Similar share was recorded in *Danas* (35.18%), *Večernje novosti*

⁶ Almost by 40% more than in the fourth quarter, and almost three times more compared to 1.77% texts with negative connotation, as that many were recorded in the third threemester 2015.

(34.48%) and *Blic* (34%), while the Prime Minister of Serbian Government was mentioned in the papers *Alo!* and *Politika* in 31.22%, and 30.02% texts respectively (see **Table 52**).

Regarding value context, the biggest share, as well as the number of negative texts was again present in *Danas* (12.14% i.e. 17 texts), while the similar share was also recorded in *Kurir* (12% - 9). Most texts about the prime minister with positive connotation were published by *Alo!* and *Informer* – 6 each. (see **Table 51**)

Table 51 - Aleksandar Vučić: Context value with reference to the media

Aleksandar Vučić	positive		neutral		negative		total	
Media outlet	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
<i>Blic</i>	0	0.00	64	94.12	4	5.88	68	100.00
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0.00	66	88.00	9	12.00	75	100.00
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0	0.00	100	100.00	0	0.00	100	100.00
<i>Alo!</i>	6	9.38	58	90.63	0	0.00	64	100.00
<i>Informer</i>	6	7.14	78	92.86	0	0.00	84	100.00
<i>Politika</i>	3	2.31	125	96.15	2	1.54	130	100.00
<i>Danas</i>	1	0.71	122	87.14	17	12.14	140	100.00
Total	16	2.42	613	92.74	32	4.84	661	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 52 - Number of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić in respect of total number of texts in particular dailies

Aleksandar Vučić prema Media outletma	no. of appearances	Total no. of texts	% share against total no. of texts
<i>Kurir</i>	75	173	43.35
<i>Informer</i>	84	225	37.33
<i>Danas</i>	140	398	35.18
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	100	290	34.48
<i>Blic</i>	68	200	34.00
<i>Alo!</i>	64	205	31.22
<i>Politika</i>	130	433	30.02
Total	661	1924	34.36

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Another individual political actor from the political milieu of Serbia, who appeared most often on the front pages of analysed dailies is the President of the Republic of Serbia Tomislav

Nikolić, who is a protagonist of 232 analysed texts (**Table 54**).

The biggest number of texts with the president of Serbia as an actor was published by the daily *Danas* (48) but, considering the total number of texts in the media, *Kurir* – 16.76% had the biggest share (**Table 53**). The biggest number of texts on Tomislav Nikolić with negative connotation was recorded in the dailies *Blic* (7) and *Alo!* (6), which account for the share of 21.21% (*Blic*) and 26.09% (*Alo!*) respectively. The only positive text on the President of Serbia was published by the paper *Politika* (**Table 54**).

In addition to the president and the prime minister, a bit bigger number of texts with negative connotation was recorded about Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić – 28 of whom the media from the sample published two texts with positive connotation.

Tabela 53. – Number of appearances of Tomislav Nikolić with reference to the total number of texts in particular dailies

Tomislav Nikolić per media	no. of appearances	Total no. of texts	% share against total no. of texts
<i>Kurir</i>	29	173	16.76
<i>Blic</i>	33	200	16.50
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	44	290	15.17
<i>Danas</i>	48	398	12.06
<i>Alo!</i>	23	205	11.22
<i>Politika</i>	43	433	9.93
<i>Informer</i>	12	225	5.33
Total	232	1924	12.06

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 54 - Tomislav Nikolić: Value context with reference to the media

Tomislav Nikolić	positive		neutral		negative		total	
Media outlet	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
<i>Blic</i>	0	0.00	26	78.79	7	21.21	33	100.00
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0.00	24	82.76	5	17.24	29	100.00
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0	0.00	44	100.00	0	0.00	44	100.00
<i>Alo!</i>	0	0.00	17	73.91	6	26.09	23	100.00
<i>Informer</i>	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33	12	100.00
<i>Politika</i>	1	2.33	42	97.67	0	0.00	43	100.00
<i>Danas</i>	0	0.00	46	95.83	2	4.17	48	100.00
Total	1	0.43	210	90.52	21	9.05	232	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

With reference to the last quarter of the previous year, the number of appearances of actors representing the opposition in the first trimester of 2016 was twice bigger (1428 compared to 762), which is certainly the consequence of current social and political situation, namely the approaching of snap parliament election. Most prevalent opposition leaders were Boris Tadić, Bojan Pajtić and Vojislav Šešelj, with 13.17%, 12.89% and 10.01% share, respectively. The biggest number of negative texts was about Bojan Pajtić – 50 (27.17%), while only around 11% of published negative writings were about the other two opposition leaders. Only two texts with positive connotation (0.14%) were written about the representatives of the opposition, Bojan Pajtić and Vojislav Šešelj in particular.

Table 55 - Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual political actors representing the opposition

Opposition	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Boris Tadić	188	13.17	0	0.00	166	88.30	22	11.70
Bojan Pajtić	184	12.89	1	0.54	133	72.28	50	27.17
Vojislav Šešelj	143	10.01	1	0.70	126	88.11	16	11.19
Čedomir Jovanović	99	6.93	0	0.00	84	84.85	15	15.15
Sanda Rašković Ivić	76	5.32	0	0.00	62	81.58	14	18.42
Borisav Stefanović	61	4.27	0	0.00	55	90.16	6	9.84
Dragan Šutanovac	59	4.13	0	0.00	38	64.41	21	35.59
Zoran Živković	52	3.64	0	0.00	42	80.77	10	19.23
Nenad Čanak	41	2.87	0	0.00	33	80.49	8	19.51

Saša Radulović	38	2.66	0	0.00	30	78.95	8	21.05
Dragoljub Mićunović	30	2.10	0	0.00	28	93.33	2	6.67
Vjerica Radeta	29	2.03	0	0.00	28	96.55	1	3.45
Đorđe Vukadinović	28	1.96	0	0.00	25	89.29	3	10.71
Balša Božović	26	1.82	0	0.00	15	57.69	11	42.31
Goran Ješić	20	1.40	0	0.00	11	55.00	9	45.00
Janko Veselinović	19	1.33	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Petar Jojić	17	1.19	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
Jovo Ostojić	16	1.12	0	0.00	15	93.75	1	6.25
Nataša Vučković	16	1.12	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Konstantin Samofalov	15	1.05	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandra Jerkov	14	0.98	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
Dušan Petrović	12	0.84	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Gordana Čomić	12	0.84	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Đurišić	12	0.84	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Maršićanin	11	0.77	0	0.00	8	72.73	3	27.27
Aleksandar Stevanović	10	0.70	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Bojan Kostreš	8	0.56	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Sulejman Ugljanin	8	0.56	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Dušan Elezović	7	0.49	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Bogdanović	7	0.49	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Oliver Dulić	7	0.49	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Radoslav Milojević Kena	7	0.49	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Saša Mirković	7	0.49	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Slobodan Milosavljević	7	0.49	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Aleksandar Đurđev	6	0.42	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Aleksandar Popović	6	0.42	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Kenan Hajdarević	6	0.42	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Vasin	6	0.42	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Žarko Korać	6	0.42	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Aleksandar Seniç	5	0.35	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Boško Ničić	5	0.35	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Veroljub Stevanović	5	0.35	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Vladimir Todorović	5	0.35	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Krasić	5	0.35	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00

Amir Bislimi	4	0.28	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Dragan Popović	4	0.28	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Jovan Najdenov	4	0.28	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Samardžić	4	0.28	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vladan Glišić	4	0.28	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Branimir Kuzmanović	3	0.21	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Ivan Ninić	3	0.21	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Jovan Marković	3	0.21	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Popović	3	0.21	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Parović	3	0.21	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vesna Marjanović	3	0.21	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vesna Rakić Vodinelić	3	0.21	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	46	3.22	0	0.00	42	91.30	4	8.70
Total	1428	100.00	2	0.14	1195	83.68	231	16.18

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

In the first quarter of 2016, we also measured the manner in which representatives of the Serbian Government, Serbian President and representatives of the opposition were present in texts, i.e. whether they were quoted and/or paraphrased or just mentioned. When it comes to the Government of Serbia, statement of the PM, as the most prevalent actor, was recorded in 44.78% of texts, while the position of the Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić was visible in 31.47% of writing. Out of the remaining representatives of the Government of Serbia, the most quoted and/or paraphrased was the Minister of Interior Nebojša Stefanović, whose attitude is present in 71.03% of texts, while on the other hand, the least frequently quotes attitude was that of the Minister of Education Srđan Verbić, whose statements were present in merely 26.32% of texts in which he was the actor.

Also, **Table 58** shows the value context in which the actors were treated, if they were only mentioned in the text. In this way, we can see that for three of the most frequent actors from this group, evaluative context is present in most texts in which they were merely mentioned. Hence, Aleksandar Vučić was only mentioned in 7 out of the total 16 positive and in 22 out of the total 32 negatively written texts. Tomislav Nikolić was only mentioned in 17 out of the total 21 negative texts, and Ivica Dačić in 12 out of the total 28 negative and one of two positive texts (please see **Tables 50 and 58**).

Referring to the most frequent opposition politicians (whose presence is higher than 1% or 15 texts), Konstantin Samofalov is an actor who was quoted or paraphrased in all texts (15), while Petar Jojić (17) and Jovo Ostojić (16) were actors who were only mentioned. For the three most present opposition leaders, we recorded very different type of appearance – statements of Boris Tadić were recorded in only 26.6% of texts, Bojan Pajtić in 28.04%, while

Vojislav Šešelj is quoted or paraphrased in 48.25% of texts. Value structure of the texts in which they were only mentioned is 14 out of 22 negative texts for Boris Tadić, 32 out of 50 and one positive for Bojan Pajtić while Vojislav Šešelj was only mentioned in 9 out of 16 negative texts about him (**Table 56 and 59**).

Table 56 – Type of appearance of actors from the Government of Serbia and the President of the Republic of Serbia in texts from the sample

Government of Serbia and Serbian President	total		quotation		paraphrase		quotation and paraphrase		mere mention	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Aleksandar Vučić	661	37.26	21	3.18	59	8.93	216	32.68	365	55.22
Tomislav Nikolić	232	13.08	19	8.19	19	8.19	35	15.09	159	68.53
Ivica Dačić	225	12.68	16	7.11	14	6.22	83	36.89	112	49.78
Nebojša Stefanović	107	6.03	12	11.21	13	12.15	51	47.66	31	28.97
Zorana Mihajlović	97	5.47	7	7.22	12	12.37	38	39.18	40	41.24
Aleksandar Vulin	84	4.74	11	13.10	9	10.71	27	32.14	37	44.05
Rasim Ljajić	61	3.44	10	16.39	5	8.20	18	29.51	28	45.90
Nikola Selaković	51	2.87	7	13.73	5	9.80	21	41.18	18	35.29
Kori Udovički	34	1.92	2	5.88	3	8.82	12	35.29	17	50.00
Ivan Tasovac	34	1.92	3	8.82	3	8.82	4	11.76	24	70.59
Dušan Vujović	31	1.75	0	0.00	4	12.90	12	38.71	15	48.39
Aleksandar Antić	27	1.52	3	11.11	2	7.41	6	22.22	16	59.26
Željko Sertić	23	1.30	3	13.04	4	17.39	6	26.09	10	43.48
Velimir Ilić	20	1.13	1	5.00	0	0.00	6	30.00	13	65.00
Srđan Verbić	19	1.07	1	5.26	1	5.26	3	15.79	14	73.68
Jadranka Joksimović	19	1.07	2	10.53	3	15.79	5	26.32	9	47.37
Zlatibor Lončar	17	0.96	1	5.88	1	5.88	4	23.53	11	64.71
Vanja Udovičić	14	0.79	0	0.00	2	14.29	2	14.29	10	71.43
Zoran Đorđević	10	0.56	0	0.00	1	10.00	2	20.00	7	70.00
Snežana Bogosavljević Bošković	8	0.45	1	12.50	0	0.00	2	25.00	5	62.50
Total	1774	100.00	120	6.76	160	9.02	553	31.17	941	53.04

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 57 – Type of appearance of opposition actors from the sample

Opposition	total		quotation		paraphrase		quotation and paraphrase		mere mention	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Boris Tadić	188	13.17	11	5.85	14	7.45	25	13.30	138	73.40
Bojan Pajtić	184	12.89	18	9.78	11	5.98	41	22.28	114	61.96
Vojislav Šešelj	143	10.01	22	15.38	9	6.29	43	30.07	69	48.25
Čedomir Jovanović	99	6.93	7	7.07	8	8.08	12	12.12	72	72.73
Sanda Rašković Ivić	76	5.32	26	34.21	6	7.89	26	34.21	18	23.68
Borisav Stefanović	61	4.27	23	37.70	8	13.11	11	18.03	19	31.15
Dragan Šutanovac	59	4.13	9	15.25	5	8.47	22	37.29	23	38.98
Zoran Živković	52	3.64	15	28.85	2	3.85	7	13.46	28	53.85
Nenad Čanak	41	2.87	5	12.20	3	7.32	6	14.63	27	65.85
Saša Radulović	38	2.66	5	13.16	2	5.26	7	18.42	24	63.16
Dragoljub Mićunović	30	2.10	6	20.00	4	13.33	8	26.67	12	40.00
Vjerica Radeta	29	2.03	8	27.59	1	3.45	6	20.69	14	48.28
Đorđe Vukadinović	28	1.96	2	7.14	2	7.14	21	75.00	3	10.71
Balša Božović	26	1.82	4	15.38	2	7.69	5	19.23	15	57.69
Goran Ješić	20	1.40	4	20.00	0	0.00	8	40.00	8	40.00
Janko Veselinović	19	1.33	11	57.89	1	5.26	4	21.05	3	15.79
Petar Jojić	17	1.19	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	17	100.00
Jovo Ostojić	16	1.12	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	16	100.00
Nataša Vučković	16	1.12	2	12.50	0	0.00	3	18.75	11	68.75
Konstantin Samofalov	15	1.05	10	66.67	0	0.00	5	33.33	0	0.00
Aleksandra Jerkov	14	0.98	5	35.71	0	0.00	6	42.86	3	21.43
Dušan Petrović	12	0.84	3	25.00	0	0.00	3	25.00	6	50.00
Gordana Čomić	12	0.84	2	16.67	1	8.33	3	25.00	6	50.00
Marko Đurišić	12	0.84	5	41.67	3	25.00	3	25.00	1	8.33
Dragan Maršićanin	11	0.77	4	36.36	0	0.00	5	45.45	2	18.18
Aleksandar Stevanović	10	0.70	3	30.00	0	0.00	6	60.00	1	10.00
Bojan Kostreš	8	0.56	3	37.50	2	25.00	2	25.00	1	12.50
Sulejman Ugljanin	8	0.56	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	8	100.00
Dušan Elezović	7	0.49	0	0.00	2	28.57	0	0.00	5	71.43
Goran Bogdanović	7	0.49	2	28.57	0	0.00	1	14.29	4	57.14
Oliver Dulić	7	0.49	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	7	100.00

Radoslav Milojević Kena	7	0.49	3	42.86	0	0.00	3	42.86	1	14.29
Saša Mirković	7	0.49	3	42.86	0	0.00	2	28.57	2	28.57
Slobodan Milosavljević	7	0.49	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	14.29	6	85.71
Aleksandar Đurđev	6	0.42	5	83.33	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	16.67
Aleksandar Popović	6	0.42	4	66.67	0	0.00	2	33.33	0	0.00
Kenan Hajdarević	6	0.42	3	50.00	0	0.00	3	50.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Vasin	6	0.42	2	33.33	0	0.00	4	66.67	0	0.00
Žarko Korać	6	0.42	0	0.00	1	16.67	2	33.33	3	50.00
Aleksandar Senić	5	0.35	2	40.00	1	20.00	0	0.00	2	40.00
Boško Ničić	5	0.35	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
Veroljub Stevanović	5	0.35	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
Vladimir Todorčić	5	0.35	4	80.00	0	0.00	1	20.00	0	0.00
Zoran Krasić	5	0.35	3	60.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	40.00
Amir Bislimi	4	0.28	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	4	100.00
Dragan Popović	4	0.28	0	0.00	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Jovan Najdenov	4	0.28	1	25.00	1	25.00	2	50.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Samardžić	4	0.28	2	50.00	0	0.00	2	50.00	0	0.00
Vladan Glišić	4	0.28	2	50.00	0	0.00	1	25.00	1	25.00
Branimir Kuzmanović	3	0.21	1	33.33	0	0.00	2	66.67	0	0.00
Ivan Ninić	3	0.21	1	33.33	0	0.00	2	66.67	0	0.00
Jovan Marković	3	0.21	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Milan Popović	3	0.21	1	33.33	0	0.00	2	66.67	0	0.00
Miroslav Parović	3	0.21	2	66.67	0	0.00	1	33.33	0	0.00
Vesna Marjanović	3	0.21	0	0.00	1	33.33	1	33.33	1	33.33
Vesna Rakić Vodinelić	3	0.21	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Other	46	3.22	8	17.39	2	4.35	13	28.26	23	50.00
Total	1428	100.00	262	18.35	92	6.44	342	23.95	732	51.26

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 58 – Value context of texts with actors from the Government of Serbia and Serbian President

Government of Serbia and Serbian President	total	positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Aleksandar Vučić	365	7	1.92	336	92.05	22	6.03
Tomislav Nikolić	159	0	0.00	142	89.31	17	10.69
Ivica Dačić	112	1	0.89	99	88.39	12	10.71
Zorana Mihajlović	40	0	0.00	31	77.50	9	22.50
Aleksandar Vulin	37	0	0.00	32	86.49	5	13.51
Nebojša Stefanović	31	1	3.23	24	77.42	6	19.35
Rasim Ljajić	28	0	0.00	28	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Tasovac	24	0	0.00	16	66.67	8	33.33
Nikola Selaković	18	0	0.00	16	88.89	2	11.11
Kori Udovički	17	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
Aleksandar Antić	16	0	0.00	12	75.00	4	25.00
Dušan Vujović	15	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Srdjan Verbić	14	0	0.00	12	85.71	2	14.29
Velimir Ilić	13	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38
Zlatibor Lončar	11	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Željko Sertić	10	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Vanja Udovičić	10	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Jadranka Joksimović	9	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Zoran Đorđević	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Snežana Bogosavljević Bošković	5	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Total	941	9	0.96	838	89.05	94	9.99

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 59 – Value context of texts in which the actors of the opposition were merely mentioned

Opposition	total	positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Boris Tadić	138	0	0.00	124	89.86	14	10.14
Bojan Pajtić	114	1	0.88	81	71.05	32	28.07
Čedomir Jovanović	72	0	0.00	58	80.56	14	19.44
Vojislav Šešelj	69	0	0.00	60	86.96	9	13.04
Zoran Živković	28	0	0.00	18	64.29	10	35.71
Nenad Čanak	27	0	0.00	21	77.78	6	22.22
Saša Radulović	24	0	0.00	21	87.50	3	12.50
Dragan Šutanovac	23	0	0.00	17	73.91	6	26.09
Borisav Stefanović	19	0	0.00	17	89.47	2	10.53
Sanda Rašković Ivić	18	0	0.00	15	83.33	3	16.67
Petar Jojić	17	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
Jovo Ostojić	16	0	0.00	15	93.75	1	6.25
Balša Božović	15	0	0.00	7	46.67	8	53.33
Vjerica Radeta	14	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
Dragoljub Mićunović	12	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Nataša Vučković	11	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Ješić	8	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Sulejman Ugljanin	8	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Oliver Dulić	7	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Dušan Petrović	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Gordana Čomić	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Milosavljević	6	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Dušan Elezović	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Amir Bislimi	4	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Boško Ničić	4	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Goran Bogdanović	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Veroljub Stevanović	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandra Jerkov	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Vukadinović	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Janko Veselinović	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Žarko Korać	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Other	41	0	0.00	33	80.49	8	19.51
Total	732	1	0.14	601	82.10	130	17.76

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Tables 60, 61 and 62 show the value context within which some individual political actors – representatives of political parties in the opposition, state bodies, agencies, institutions and local self-government – appeared in selected front-page texts, while **Tables 63 and 64** show the frequency and value context of appearances of representatives of military and police forces and other social and political actors.

Table 60 - Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual political actors representing **the position**

Position	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Bratislav Gašić	64	10.44	0	0.00	52	81.25	12	18.75
Milutin Mrkonjić	52	8.48	0	0.00	39	75.00	13	25.00
Branko Ružić	38	6.20	0	0.00	30	78.95	8	21.05
Zoran Babić	35	5.71	0	0.00	31	88.57	4	11.43
Dragan Marković Palma	29	4.73	1	3.45	27	93.10	1	3.45
Milan Krkobabić	22	3.59	0	0.00	20	90.91	2	9.09
Nenad Popović	22	3.59	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Lazanski	19	3.10	0	0.00	18	94.74	1	5.26
Vladimir Đukanović	19	3.10	0	0.00	18	94.74	1	5.26
Ištvan Pastor	17	2.77	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Predrag Marković	16	2.61	0	0.00	14	87.50	2	12.50
Milovan Drecun	14	2.28	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
Slavica Đukić Dejanović	14	2.28	0	0.00	12	85.71	2	14.29
Vuk Drašković	14	2.28	0	0.00	12	85.71	2	14.29
Dijana Vukomanović	13	2.12	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Goran Knežević	13	2.12	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Mirović	13	2.12	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Marijan Ristićević	12	1.96	0	0.00	10	83.33	2	16.67
Aleksandar Jovičić	10	1.63	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Dubravka Filipovski	10	1.63	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00

Srđan Dragojević	10	1.63	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Đorđe Milićević	9	1.47	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Momir Stojanović	9	1.47	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Muamer Zukorlić	9	1.47	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Veroljub Arsić	9	1.47	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Martinović	7	1.14	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Čotrić	6	0.98	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Bogdan Obradović	6	0.98	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Marija Obradović	6	0.98	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Momo Čolaković	6	0.98	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Konstantin Arsenović	5	0.82	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Meho Omerović	5	0.82	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandra Tomić	4	0.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Borković	4	0.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Bečić	4	0.65	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Ivan Karić	4	0.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Jadranka Jovanović	4	0.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ljiljana Habjanović Đurović	4	0.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Linta	4	0.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Novica Tončev	4	0.65	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Zoran Baki Anđelković	4	0.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dragomir Karić	3	0.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ivica Tončev	3	0.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Oliver Antić	3	0.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Stefana Miladinović	3	0.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	32	5.22	0	0.00	31	96.87	1	3.33
Total	613	100.00	1	0.16	551	89.89	61	9.95

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 61 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual political actors: **representatives of State bodies, agencies and institutions**

State bodies, agencies and institutions	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Maja Gojković	54	14.75	0	0.00	52	96.30	2	3.70
Slađana Stanković	46	12.57	0	0.00	46	100.00	0	0.00
Jovica Stepić	42	11.48	0	0.00	42	100.00	0	0.00
Siniša Mali	37	10.11	0	0.00	28	75.68	9	24.32
Marko Đurić	31	8.47	0	0.00	31	100.00	0	0.00
Oliver Potežica	29	7.92	0	0.00	22	75.86	7	24.14
Goran Vesić	15	4.10	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Veljko Odalović	15	4.10	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Radomir Nikolić	12	3.28	0	0.00	9	75.00	3	25.00
Jorgovanka Tabaković	10	2.73	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Darko Tanasković	9	2.46	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Miloš Vučević	9	2.46	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Andreja Mladenović	6	1.64	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Stanislava Pak	6	1.64	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Dejan Đurđević	4	1.09	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Nikodijević	4	1.09	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Novak Nedić	4	1.09	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Ivica Kojić	3	0.82	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Nela Kuburović	3	0.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Borovčanin	3	0.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vera Dondur	3	0.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Cucić	3	0.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	18	4.92	0	0.00	16	88.89	2	11.11
Total	366	100.00	0	0.00	333	90.98	33	9.02

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 62 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual political actors: **representatives of local governments**

Representatives of local governments	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandar Šapić	5	9.26	1	20.00	4	80.00	0	0.00
Dejan Matić	5	9.26	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
Miroslav Čučković	5	9.26	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Vojislav Ilić	5	9.26	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Meho Mahmutović	4	7.41	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Antić	3	5.56	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Milenković	3	5.56	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	24	44.44	1	4.16	19	79.17	4	16.67
Total	54	100.00	2	3.70	43	79.63	9	16.67

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 63 – Distribution and frequency and value context of appearances of individual political actors: **representatives of military and police**

Military and police	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Ljubiša Diković	15	21.43	0	0.00	13	86.67	2	13.33
Predrag Marić	11	15.71	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Milorad Veljović	7	10.00	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Rodoljub Milović	7	10.00	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
National Security Council	5	7.14	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Rebić	5	7.14	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Aleksandar Đorđević	4	5.71	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Dijana Hrkalo	4	5.71	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Momčilo Vidojević	3	4.29	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Predrag Bandić	3	4.29	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	6	8.57	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Total	70	100.00	0	0.00	59	84.29	11	15.71

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 64 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of **other** individual political and social actors

Other	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Slobodan Milošević	70	16.20	1	1.43	66	94.29	3	4.29
Zoran Đinđić	40	9.26	1	2.50	39	97.50	0	0.00
Vojislav Koštunica	35	8.10	0	0.00	31	88.57	4	11.43
Prince Charles	28	6.48	2	7.14	26	92.86	0	0.00
Aleksandar Karadžević	20	4.63	0	0.00	19	95.00	1	5.00
Dragan Đilas	20	4.63	0	0.00	19	95.00	1	5.00
Vuk Jeremić	20	4.63	1	5.00	18	90.00	1	5.00
Mirko Cvetković	19	4.40	0	0.00	18	94.74	1	5.26
Camilla, Duchess of Cornwall	17	3.94	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Emir Kusturica	16	3.70	2	12.50	14	87.50	0	0.00
Matija Bećković	15	3.47	2	13.33	13	86.67	0	0.00
Mirjana Marković	15	3.47	0	0.00	12	80.00	3	20.00
Mlađan Dinkić	15	3.47	0	0.00	12	80.00	3	20.00
Filip David	9	2.08	1	11.11	6	66.67	2	22.22
Nebojša Čović	9	2.08	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Vesna Pešić	9	2.08	0	0.00	7	77.78	2	22.22
Jelena Karleuša	8	1.85	0	0.00	5	62.50	3	37.50
Jelena Milić	7	1.62	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Nada Macura	7	1.62	2	28.57	4	57.14	1	14.29
Bogoljub Karić	6	1.39	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Dragomir Acović	6	1.39	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Božidar Đelić	5	1.16	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Radomir Počuča	5	1.16	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Vladimir Beba Popović	5	1.16	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Dušan Mihajlović	4	0.93	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Eisin Asaf	4	0.93	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Svilanović	4	0.93	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Petra Cvijić	4	0.93	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Srbijanka Turajlić	4	0.93	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

Dragica Nikolić	3	0.69	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Kokan Mladenović	3	0.69	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	432	100.00	13	3.01	386	89.35	33	7.64

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

It is evident that there is less texts dealing with significant collective political actors, which are among inter-political social actors present in less than 25.67%. **Tables 65 – 68** list out all actors from our sample classified in this category, together with the frequencies and value connotations of their appearance.

Table 65 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **state bodies and institutions**

State bodies, agencies and institutions	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Government of Serbia	202	40.56	1	0.50	182	90.10	19	9.41
National Assembly of Serbia	34	6.83	0	0.00	32	94.12	2	5.88
Ministry of Interior	32	6.43	0	0.00	31	96.88	1	3.13
Foreign Ministry	28	5.62	0	0.00	22	78.57	6	21.43
National Bank of Serbia	19	3.82	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Defence	17	3.41	0	0.00	15	88.24	2	11.76
Ministry of Finance	14	2.81	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
Ministry of Justice	14	2.81	0	0.00	12	85.71	2	14.29
Ministry of State Administration and Local Government	13	2.61	0	0.00	10	76.92	3	23.08
Ministry of Economy	12	2.41	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Tax Administration	11	2.21	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
Restitution Agency	10	2.01	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Business Registers Agency	9	1.81	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Republic Election Committee	9	1.81	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Construction, Traffic and Infrastructure	8	1.61	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50

Cabinet of the President of Serbia	7	1.41	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection	7	1.41	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development	6	1.20	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Health	6	1.20	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Commissariat for Refugees	5	1.00	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Culture and Information	5	1.00	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Agency for Licensing Bankruptcy Managers	4	0.80	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian Embassy in Libya	4	0.80	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
"Serbian authorities"	3	0.60	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Privatization Agency	3	0.60	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Policy	3	0.60	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Serbian Presidency	3	0.60	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	10	2.01	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Total	498	100.00	1	0.20	454	91.16	43	8.63

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 66 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **military and police**

Military and police	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Serbian Armed Forces	17	42.50	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
BIA	11	27.50	1	9.09	9	81.82	1	9.09
Military Security Agency	5	12.50	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Security Services Coordination Bureau	3	7.50	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Gendarmerie	3	7.50	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Headquarters of Serbian Armed Forces	1	2.50	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	40	100.00	1	2.50	38	95.00	1	2.50

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 67 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **position**

Position	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
SNS	235	54.52	4	1.70	209	88.94	22	9.36
SPS	108	25.06	1	0.93	87	80.56	20	18.52
PUPS	21	4.87	0	0.00	19	90.48	2	9.52
United Serbia	16	3.71	0	0.00	15	93.75	1	6.25
Socialists' Movement	11	2.55	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
SNP	9	2.09	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
SDPS	7	1.62	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
New Serbia	6	1.39	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
SPO	6	1.39	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Green of Serbia	6	1.39	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Strength of Serbia Movement	4	0.93	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
SVM	2	0.46	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	431	100.00	5	1.16	379	87.94	47	10.90

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 68 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective actors: **opposition**

Opposition	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Democratic Party	195	33.85	1	0.51	148	75.90	46	23.59
SDS	68	11.81	0	0.00	62	91.18	6	8.82
LDP	63	10.94	0	0.00	56	88.89	7	11.11
SRS	53	9.20	0	0.00	48	90.57	5	9.43
Coalition DSS – Dveri	38	6.60	0	0.00	30	78.95	8	21.05
DSS	37	6.42	0	0.00	32	86.49	5	13.51
Coalition Čeda-Boris-Čanak	27	4.69	0	0.00	26	96.30	1	3.70
Enough is enough	22	3.82	0	0.00	17	77.27	5	22.73
Left of Serbia	15	2.60	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
LSV	15	2.60	0	0.00	13	86.67	2	13.33
Dveri	14	2.43	0	0.00	10	71.43	4	28.57
New party	9	1.56	0	0.00	7	77.78	2	22.22
Coalition Patriots	4	0.69	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Upheaval Movement	4	0.69	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
SDA	3	0.52	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Together for Serbia	3	0.52	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Together for Šumadija	3	0.52	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Patrons	3	0.52	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	576	100.00	1	0.17	482	83.68	93	16.15

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

If we compare the results shown in **Tables 67** and **68** with the findings from the previous quarter, we can see nearly three times more collective actors/parties participating in the government (167 in the fourth quarter of 2015 against 431 in the period January-March 2016), as well as opposition parties (181 against 576). When it comes to ruling parties, the value context is similar to that from the previous trimester (about 2% more evaluative texts), while with opposition parties the number of negative texts doubled in number (8.84% in the last quarter of 2015 against 16.15% in the first trimester of this year).

A considerably lower percentage of front-page texts speak about foreign (individual and col-

lective) political actors and political actors from Kosovo (merely 20.18% out of the total number of actors). Protagonists of these texts are more often individual actors/individuals (in 78.80% of cases) than collective ones (21.18%) (please see **Table 49** and **Table 69-82**).

Table 69 - Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective actors: **Kosovo**

Kosovo	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Hashim Thaci	20	12.74	0	0.00	11	55.00	9	45.00
Oliver Ivanović	17	10.83	1	5.88	16	94.12	0	0.00
Isa Mustafa	13	8.28	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38
Ramush Haradinaj	8	5.10	0	0.00	5	62.50	3	37.50
KFOR	7	4.46	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0.00
Roksana Komša	7	4.46	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Dragoljub Delibašić	5	3.18	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Kosovo police	5	3.18	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Kosovo authorities	5	3.18	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
KLA	5	3.18	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
Nebojša Vlajić	4	2.55	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Lazović	3	1.91	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Atifete Jahjaga	3	1.91	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Baki Keljani	3	1.91	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Fatmir Ljimaj	3	1.91	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Ilija Vujačić	3	1.91	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ksenija Božović	3	1.91	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Radojević	3	1.91	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Vujačić	3	1.91	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Rada Trajković	3	1.91	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Slavko Simić	3	1.91	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian list	3	1.91	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	28	17.83	0	0.00	14	50.00	14	50.00
Total	157	100.00	2	1.27	113	71.97	42	26.75

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 70 - Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Croatia**

Croatia	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović	25	19.38	0	0.00	23	92.00	2	8.00
"Croatian authorities"	17	13.18	0	0.00	6	35.29	11	64.71
Tihomir Orešković	14	10.85	0	0.00	12	85.71	2	14.29
Tomislav Karmarko	10	7.75	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Zoran Milanović	7	5.43	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Ante Gotovina	6	4.65	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Franjo Tuđman	6	4.65	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Zlatko Hasanbegović	6	4.65	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
Milorad Pupovac	5	3.88	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ante Kotromanić	4	3.10	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Mijo Crnoja	4	3.10	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
HDZ	3	2.33	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Pero Čorić	3	2.33	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Others	19	14.73	0	0.00	18	94.74	1	5.26
Total	129	100.00	0	0.00	98	75.97	31	24.03

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 71 - Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Montenegro**

Montenegro	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milo Đukanović	11	26.19	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Filip Vujanović	4	9.52	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ranko Krivokapić	4	9.52	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Montenegrin Government	4	9.52	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Other	19	45.24	0	0.00	17	89.47	2	10.53
Total	42	100.00	0	0.00	38	90.48	4	9.52

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 72 - Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Federation of BH/Republic of Srpska**

Bosnia and Herzegovina	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milorad Dodik	53	39.26	0	0.00	51	96.23	2	3.77
Bakir Izetbegović	14	10.37	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Alija Izetbegović	10	7.41	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Naser Orić	8	5.93	0	0.00	4	50.00	4	50.00
Mladen Ivanić	7	5.19	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Čović	5	3.70	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
"Authorities of Republika Srpska"	4	2.96	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Munira Subašić	3	2.22	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Prosecution of BiH	3	2.22	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Constitutional Court in BiH	3	2.22	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Željka Cvijanović	3	2.22	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	22	16.30	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
Total	135	100.00	0	0.00	127	94.07	8	5.93

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 73 - Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual foreign political actors outside the region: **foreign politicians**

Foreign politicians	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	34	12.19	0	0.00	29	85.29	5	14.71
Bashar al-Assad	24	8.60	0	0.00	23	95.83	1	4.17
Ahmet Davutoglu	23	8.24	0	0.00	23	100.00	0	0.00
David Cameron	18	6.45	0	0.00	15	83.33	3	16.67
Alexis Tsipras	12	4.30	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Sebastian Kurtz	12	4.30	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Viktor Orban	11	3.94	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
Francois Hollande	10	3.58	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Charles Michel	10	3.58	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00

Manuel Valls	7	2.51	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Raul Castro	7	2.51	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Jan Jambon	6	2.15	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Philip Hammond	5	1.79	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ioannis Mouzalas	5	1.79	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Werner Faymann	5	1.79	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Edi Rama	4	1.43	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Johanna Mikl - Leitner	4	1.43	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Marine le Pen	4	1.43	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Matteo Renzi	4	1.43	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	4	1.43	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Bert Koenders	3	1.08	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dennis Keefe	3	1.08	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Joseph Muscat	3	1.08	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Eldar Hasanov	3	1.08	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Fidel Castro	3	1.08	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Hank van den Dol	3	1.08	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mark Rutte	3	1.08	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Miloš Zeman	3	1.08	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Gruevski	3	1.08	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Xi Jinping	3	1.08	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Valid al-Moalem	3	1.08	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	37	13.26	0	0.00	37	100.00	0	0.00
Total	279	100.00	0	0.00	263	94.27	16	5.73

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 74 - Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: **Germany**

Germany	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Angela Merkel	61	55.96	1	1.64	56	91.80	4	6.56
Thomas de Maizere	8	7.34	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Steffen Seibert	6	5.50	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Sigmar Gabriel	6	5.50	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00

Frank-Walter Steinmeier	5	4.59	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Alternative for Germany	4	3.67	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Others	19	17.43	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Total	109	100.00	1	0.92	104	95.41	4	3.67

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 75 - Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: **Russia**

Rusija	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Vladimir Putin	111	36.88	12	10.81	87	78.38	12	10.81
Dmitry Medvedev	28	9.30	0	0.00	28	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Rogozin	24	7.97	0	0.00	21	87.50	3	12.50
Marija Zaharova	21	6.98	0	0.00	18	85.71	3	14.29
Alexander Chepurin	20	6.64	1	5.00	18	90.00	1	5.00
Sergey Lavrov	16	5.32	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Centre	15	4.98	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Peskov	9	2.99	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Russian authorities	8	2.66	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Authorities of Russia	5	1.66	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Konstantin Malofeev	4	1.33	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Russia's Ministry for Emergency Situations	4	1.33	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Nikolay Patrushev	4	1.33	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Sergey Shoygu	4	1.33	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Others	28	9.30	0	0.00	27	96.43	1	3.57
Total	301	100.00	13	4.32	265	88.04	23	7.64

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 76 - Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: **the USA**

SAD	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Barack Obama	44	14.10	1	2.27	40	90.91	3	6.82
Donald Trump	36	11.54	0	0.00	26	72.22	10	27.78
Hillary Clinton	34	10.90	1	2.94	29	85.29	4	11.76
Kyle Scott	25	8.01	0	0.00	24	96.00	1	4.00
Bernie Sanders	17	5.45	1	5.88	16	94.12	0	0.00
John Kerry	17	5.45	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
US authorities	17	5.45	0	0.00	11	64.71	6	35.29
Ted Cruz	13	4.17	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Marco Rubio	11	3.53	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
US Defence Ministry	11	3.53	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
US Embassy	9	2.88	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
CIA	9	2.88	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Bill Clinton	8	2.56	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
FBI	7	2.24	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Jeb Bush	6	1.92	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Joseph Biden	5	1.60	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Jeff Davis	5	1.60	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
George Bush	4	1.28	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Peter Cook	4	1.28	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ben Carson	3	0.96	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
US Democratic Party	3	0.96	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
John Kasich	3	0.96	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
John McCain	3	0.96	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Pentagon	3	0.96	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Republican Party	3	0.96	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Others	12	3.85	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Total	312	100.00	3	0.96	277	88.78	32	10.26

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 77 - Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: **Islamic State**

Islamic state	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Islamic state	47	52.81	0	0.00	28	59.57	19	40.43
Salah Abdelsalam	15	16.85	0	0.00	13	86.67	2	13.33
Nuredin Shushan	7	7.87	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Ibrahim el-Bakraoui	5	5.62	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Najim Laachraoui	5	5.62	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Halid el-Bakraoui	3	3.37	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Others	7	7.87	0	0.00	3	42.85	4	57.15
Total	89	100.00	0	0.00	59	66.29	30	33.71

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 78 - Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign political actors: **representatives of EU institutions and EU institutions**

European Union	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
EU	30	17.44	0	0.00	24	80.00	6	20.00
European Commission	26	15.12	0	0.00	21	80.77	5	19.23
Federica Mogherini	17	9.88	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Donald Tusk	9	5.23	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Michael Davenport	8	4.65	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Jean Claude Juncker	7	4.07	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
David McAlister	6	3.49	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Johannes Hahn	6	3.49	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Eulex	5	2.91	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
European Parliament	5	2.91	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Maja Kocijančič	5	2.91	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Martin Schulz	5	2.91	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Europol	4	2.33	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ulrike Lunacek	4	2.33	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

EU Delegation to Serbia	3	1.74	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Others	32	18.60	0	0.00	31	96.88	1	3.12
Total	172	100.00	0	0.00	155	90.12	17	9.88

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 79 – Distribution of frequency and value context of individual and collective foreign political actors: **OSCE and Council of Europe representatives**

OSCE and Council of Europe	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
OEBS	8	36.36	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg	6	27.27	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Geert-Hinrich Ahrens	8	36.36	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Total	22	100.00	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 80 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective foreign political actors: **UN institution representatives and UN institutions**

UN	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
UN Security Council	13	25.49	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
UNESCO	11	21.57	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
UN	9	17.65	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Ban Ki-moon	6	11.76	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Hans Friedrich Schroeder	5	9.80	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
UNHCR	5	9.80	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Irina Bokova	2	3.92	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	51	100.00	0	0.00	51	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Tabela 81. – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors: **NATO**

NATO	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
NATO	71	93.42	1	1.41	62	87.32	8	11.27

Jens Stoltenberg	3	3.94	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	2	2.64	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	76	100.00	1	1.32	67	88.16	8	10.53

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 82 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective actors: **actors related to The Hague Tribunal**

Haški tribunal	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
The Hague Tribunal	55	20.15	0	0.00	41	74.55	14	25.45
Radovan Karadžić	48	17.58	0	0.00	45	93.75	3	6.25
Ratko Mladić	20	7.33	0	0.00	19	95.00	1	5.00
Florence Hartmann	12	4.40	1	8.33	11	91.67	0	0.00
Zdravko Tolimir	10	3.66	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Alphons Orie	9	3.30	0	0.00	7	77.78	2	22.22
O-Gon Kwon	8	2.93	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Biljana Plavšić	7	2.56	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0.00
Bitic brothers	7	2.56	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Carla del Ponte	7	2.56	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Serge Brammertz	7	2.56	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Jovica Stanišić	5	1.83	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Momčilo Krajišnik	5	1.83	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Šainović	5	1.83	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Peter Robinson	5	1.83	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Franko Simatović	4	1.47	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Howard Morrison	4	1.47	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Melville Baird	4	1.47	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Golčevski	4	1.47	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Teodor Meron	4	1.47	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Lazarević	4	1.47	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00

Jean-Claude Antonetti	4	1.47	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Borislav Đukić	3	1.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mile Novaković	3	1.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	29	10.62	3	10.34	26	89.66	0	0.00
Total	273	100.00	5	1.83	246	90.11	22	8.06

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

One may clearly perceive from this brief overview of the frequencies of particular actors' appearances on the front pages of selected dailies from our sample that the media deal with the issues from the domains of interior and foreign policy with unequal interest. The fact that the foreign actors on the front pages of the dailies in Serbia are present in a considerably smaller percentage (25.47% compared to 74.52% frequency of the appearance of domestic political actors), indicates the focusing of the domestic media on the interior politics, which in the interpretation of particular dailies often resembles fiction, as was discussed in more detail in the part of the analysis dealing with interpretative strategies in media processing of particular topics. The reasons why there is a noticeable lack of interest in industrial actors and their understanding of social, economic and political situation in Serbia and in the world remain obscure (only 3.17% of the total sample of actors are industrial actors), especially because in the narratives of many politicians the economic issues and industrial consolidation of the country are highlighted as key elements of future development strategies of Serbia's society (see **Table 49** and **Tables 83-85**).

Table 83 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of **individual domestic economic actors**

Economic actors	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Miroslav Mišković	35	16.75	0	0.00	23	65.71	12	34.29
Dušan Bajatović	20	9.57	0	0.00	16	80.00	4	20.00
Miodrag Kostić	15	7.18	0	0.00	12	80.00	3	20.00
Nikola Petrović	14	6.70	0	0.00	12	85.71	2	14.29
Aleksandar Obradović	13	6.22	0	0.00	5	38.46	8	61.54
Milan Beko	10	4.78	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Vlahović	7	3.35	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Mišković	7	3.35	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Milo Đurašković	7	3.35	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29

Miroslav Bogičević	6	2.87	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Blagoje Spaskovski	5	2.39	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
Branko Kovačević	5	2.39	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Klemens Tennis	5	2.39	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Lidija Udovički	5	2.39	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Petar Matijević	5	2.39	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Drobnjak	5	2.39	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Andrej Jovanović	4	1.91	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Atanacković	4	1.91	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dane Kondić	4	1.91	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Nedeljko Pantić	4	1.91	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Goran Pitić	3	1.44	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Stanko Subotić	3	1.44	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vojin Lazarević	3	1.44	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Zoran Drakulić	3	1.44	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	17	8.13	0	0.00	15	88.23	2	11.76
Total	209	100.00	0	0.00	165	78.95	44	21.05

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Tabela 84. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of **collective domestic economic actors**

Economic actors	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Elektroprivreda Srbije	17	15.89	0	0.00	14	82.35	3	17.65
Air Serbia	8	7.48	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Delta Holding	7	6.54	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Fiat Srbija	6	5.61	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
JP Putevi Srbije	6	5.61	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Galenika	4	3.74	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
RTB Bor	4	3.74	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
AIK banka	3	2.80	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Jugoimport SDPR	3	2.80	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
MK Group	3	2.80	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33

Srbijagas	3	2.80	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Zastava Oružje	3	2.80	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Železnice Srbije	3	2.80	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	37	34.54	1	2.70	34	91.89	2	5.40
Total	107	100.00	1	0.93	95	88.79	11	10.28

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 85 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective **foreign economic actors**

IMF and World Bank	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
IMF	14	66.67	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
James Roaf	4	19.05	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
World Bank	3	14.29	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	21	100.00	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Apart from the already mentioned political and economic actors, front-page protagonists are also various social actors, who in different ways affect social and political circumstances within the Serbian society. Based on the collected empirical material, we divided them into the following groups:

(a) representatives of independent government bodies and institutions (please see **Table 86**), (b) analysts⁷ of political, economic, security and other circumstances (**Table 87** and **88**), (c) representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organisations⁸ (**Tables 89** and **90**), (d) media actors (**Table 91**), (e) representatives of judicial bodies (**Tables 92** and **93**), (f) lawyers and protagonists of various court proceedings (**Tables 94, 95**), (g) media scandal protagonists (**Table 96**) and (h) actors from distant past that are part of collective memories and as such give specific symbolic expression within the media discourse (**Table 97**).

⁷ For more information about the appearance of certain analysts on the front pages of various media from our sample, please see **Table 108-114** in the Appendix.

⁸ For more information about the appearance of certain individual representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations on the front pages of the media from our sample, please see **Tables 115-121** in the Appendix.

Table 86 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of independent bodies**

Independent bodies	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Saša Janković	18	19.35	0	0.00	16	88.89	2	11.11
Rodoljub Šabić	13	13.98	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38
Anti-Corruption Agency	11	11.83	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslava Mile-nović	10	10.75	0	0.00	1	10.00	9	90.00
Pavle Petrović	8	8.60	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Fiscal Council	7	7.53	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Anti-Corruption Council	5	5.38	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
Jelisaveta Vasilčić	3	3.23	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Altiparmakov	3	3.23	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Strahinja Sekulić	3	3.23	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	12	12.90	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Total	93	100.00	0	0.00	77	82.80	16	17.20

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Special role in front-page texts of the media from our sample are played by the analysts (experts) (please see **Tables 87** and **88**). Media treat them neutrally in as much as 99.61% while only expert Mijat Damjanović and analyst Dževad Galijašević are treated negatively in one text each.

Table 87 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic and social actors: **analysts**

Analysts	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Dragomir Anđelković	40	7.71	0	0.00	40	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Radun	24	4.62	0	0.00	24	100.00	0	0.00
Dejan Vuk Stanković	24	4.62	0	0.00	24	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Radić	18	3.47	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Pejić	18	3.47	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00

Dragan Dobrašinović	16	3.08	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Stojiljković	16	3.08	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Bojan Klačar	14	2.70	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Darko Trifunović	13	2.50	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Jovo Bakić	11	2.12	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Krstić	11	2.12	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Vuletić	11	2.12	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Dragišić	11	2.12	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Janjić	10	1.93	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Nikolić	10	1.93	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Vladislav Jovanović	10	1.93	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Popov	8	1.54	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Vuković	8	1.54	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Goati	8	1.54	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Mahmud Bušatlija	7	1.35	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Šutić	7	1.35	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Zlatko Nikolić	7	1.35	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Cvijetin Milivojević	6	1.16	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dobrovoje Radovanović	6	1.16	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Kovačević	6	1.16	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Orhan Dragaš	6	1.16	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Božidar Prelević	5	0.96	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Božidar Spasić	5	0.96	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dubravka Stojanović	5	0.96	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dževad Galijašević	5	0.96	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Igor Avžner	5	0.96	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Savić	5	0.96	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Milojko Arsić	5	0.96	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Mladen Kovačević	5	0.96	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00

Ratko Božović	5	0.96	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Bojan Dimitrijević	4	0.77	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Danijel Server	4	0.77	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Draško Đenović	4	0.77	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubomir Madžar	4	0.77	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Mario Spasić	4	0.77	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Nicović	4	0.77	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Uljarević	4	0.77	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Jovanović	4	0.77	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandra Joksimović	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Boško Jakšić	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Branislav Tapušковиć	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Danilo Šuković	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Đukanović	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Proroković	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Simeonović	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Nikolić	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Rodić	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ivo Visković	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mile Bjelajac	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Gujaničić	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Neven Cvetičanin	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Srđan Bogosavljević	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Svetozar Vujačić	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Žarko Trebješanin	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Živadin Jovanović	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Milošević	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Borivoje Borović	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Čedomir Antić	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00

Dragan Simeunović	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Dragovan Milićević	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Draško Karađinović	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Džejms Ker Lindzi	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Novaković	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Mijat Damjanović	2	0.39	0	0.00	1	50.00	1	50.00
Milan Milić	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Prostran	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Avlijaš	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Ninoslav Stojadinović	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Obrad Kesić	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Petar Vojinović	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Antić	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Vojislav Stanković	2	0.39	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandra Janković	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Bogoljub Milosavljević	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Bojan Elek	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Borislav Miljanović	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Boško Mijatović	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Branka Tišma	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Dragaš	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Pavlović	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Daliborka Uljarević	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Dejan Jović	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Đerđ Pap	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Radović	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Simić	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Dragoslav Miša Ognjanović	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00

Dušan Spasojević	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Tabak	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Raonić	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Joža Mencinger	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Mihailo Crnobrnja	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Miladin Kovačević	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Miloš Šolaja	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Zdravković	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Perović	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Saša Đogović	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Saša Đorđević	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Srećko Mihajlović	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Sreto Malinović	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Trapara	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Voja Antić	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Živojin Rakočević	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Zlatko Vujović	1	0.19	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	519	100.00	0	0.00	517	99.61	2	0.39

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 88 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages in different media from the research sample

Media outlet	number of analysts	%
<i>Informer</i>	185	35.65
<i>Kurir</i>	97	18.69
<i>Politika</i>	85	16.38
<i>Blic</i>	61	11.75
<i>Danas</i>	36	6.94
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	28	5.39
<i>Alo!</i>	27	5.20
Total	519	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 89 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and religious organizations**⁹

Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious communities	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Patriarch Irinej	42	15.00	1	2.38	41	97.62	0	0.00
Serbian Orthodox Church	30	10.71	1	3.33	27	90.00	2	6.67
Pope Francis	27	9.64	2	7.41	25	92.59	0	0.00
Alojzije Stepinac	23	8.21	0	0.00	13	56.52	10	43.48
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	15	5.36	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Bishop of Bačka Irinej	10	3.57	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Russian Patriarch Kirill	8	2.86	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop of Slavonija Jovan	6	2.14	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Catholic Church	6	2.14	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Metropolitan Ilarion Alfejev	5	1.79	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Patriarch Pavle	5	1.79	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop of Zagreb and Ljubljana Porfirije	5	1.79	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Sava Janjić, prior	5	1.79	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Arch-bishop Stanislav Hočevar	5	1.79	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Moscow Patriarchy	4	1.43	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Adem Zilkic	3	1.07	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Croatian Catholic Church	3	1.07	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Muhamed Jusuf-spahić	3	1.07	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Pope Benedict XVI	3	1.07	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Pope John Paul II	3	1.07	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

9 197 actors from orthodox churches (Serbian, Russian) and 93 actors from other religious communities were recorded on the front pages of the media from our sample

Bishop Artemije	2	0.71	0	0.00	1	50.00	1	50.00
Bishop Georgije	2	0.71	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Joanikije	2	0.71	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Josip Bozanić	2	0.71	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Mevlud Dudić	2	0.71	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Miraš Dedeić	2	0.71	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	100.00
Bishop of Banat Nikanor	2	0.71	0	0.00	1	50.00	1	50.00
Bishop Pahomije	2	0.71	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Synod of SOC	2	0.71	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Tomislav Živković	2	0.71	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Vasilije Kačavenda	2	0.71	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	100.00
Abdurahman Kujević	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Adonis Tahiri	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Adriatik Staviļjeki	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Alesandro D Eriko, Apostolic Nuncio in Zagreb	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Andrej	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Anglican Church	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Arsenije Jovanović, monk	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Arsenije	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Bojan Jovanović	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Montenegrin Church	1	0.36	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	100.00
Dragan Urošev	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Dragica, novice	1	0.36	1	100.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Eparchy of Budimlje - Nikšić	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Filaret, former bishop	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Gligorije Marković	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop of Hercegovina and Zahumlje Grigorije	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Ignjatije, prior	1	0.36	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	100.00
Isak Asijel	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00

Islamic Community of Serbia	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Kurt Koch	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Laszlo Nemet	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Lavrentije	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Archimandrite Lazar Lazarević	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Macedonian Orthodox Church	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Mother Makarija	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Metodije, prior from Hilandar	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Milić Blažanović	1	0.36	1	100.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Mirko Šefković	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Ilić	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Onufrije, Metropolitan of Kiev	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Orlando Antonini, Archbishop	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Patriarch Alexey Second	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Patriarch Gavrilo	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Vartolomej, Ecumenical Patriarch	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Petar Lukić, archpriest	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Rade Simić, priest	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Rafailo, prior	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Ratomir Petrović, archpriest	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Council of the Canadian Eparchy	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Stefan Purić, monk	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop of Raška and Prizren Teodosije	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Trajan, archpriest	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Archpriest stavrofor Vasilije Tomić	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop of Srem Vasilije	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00

Velja Stojković	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Vinko Puljić, Cardinal	1	0.36	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	100.00
Vojo Bilbija, priest	1	0.36	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	280	100.00	6	2.14	252	90.00	22	7.86

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 90 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious communities on the front pages of difference media from the sample

Media outlet	no.	%
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	113	40.36
<i>Politika</i>	78	27.86
<i>Kurir</i>	30	10.71
<i>Danas</i>	22	7.86
<i>Alo!</i>	16	5.71
<i>Blic</i>	12	4.29
<i>Informer</i>	9	3.21
Total	280	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 91 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective social domestic actors from the media

Media outlet	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Dragan J. Vučićević	22	9.13	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
Kurir	20	8.30	1	5.00	8	40.00	11	55.00
Vukašin Obradović	19	7.88	0	0.00	12	63.16	7	36.84
Aleksandar Rodić	18	7.47	0	0.00	3	16.67	15	83.33
RTS	17	7.05	0	0.00	11	64.71	6	35.29
NUNS	12	4.98	0	0.00	5	41.67	7	58.33
Politika	12	4.98	5	41.67	6	50.00	1	8.33
Ljiljana Smajlović	11	4.56	0	0.00	8	72.73	3	27.27

Olivera Kovačević	11	4.56	0	0.00	3	27.27	8	72.73
Aleksandar Kornic	10	4.15	0	0.00	1	10.00	9	90.00
Dragan Bujošević	9	3.73	0	0.00	2	22.22	7	77.78
Željko Cvijanović	8	3.32	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Adria Media Group	7	2.90	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Stevan Dojčinović	7	2.90	0	0.00	1	14.29	6	85.71
Ivan Ivanović	6	2.49	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
Ratko Femić	6	2.49	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
Željko Mitrović	6	2.49	1	16.67	5	83.33	0	0.00
Zoran Kesić	6	2.49	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
KRIK	5	2.07	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Milomir Marić	5	2.07	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Dragoljub Draža Petrović	4	1.66	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Informer	4	1.66	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Milan Lađević	4	1.66	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
BIRN	3	1.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
CRTA	3	1.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Georgiev	3	1.24	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Svetlana Ceca Vojinović	3	1.24	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Total	241	100.00	8	3.32	136	56.43	97	40.25

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

While collecting the empirical material, a considerable presence of actors related to the justice system (278 appearances) was observed, i.e. intense reporting primarily about the current court and investigative proceedings. Actors from this group are shown in **Tables 92-95** as individual (64 appearances) or collective (60) representatives of judicial bodies, lawyers (80) or other protagonists of current or completed judicial/investigative proceedings (74).

Table 92 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **representatives of judicial bodies**

Judicial system	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Saša Obradović	10	15.63	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Vladimir Vukčević	10	15.63	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Maja Ilić	6	9.38	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Petrović	5	7.81	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Zagorka Dolovac	5	7.81	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Snežana Stanojković	4	6.25	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Miljko Radisavljević	3	4.69	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Tatjana Sekulić	3	4.69	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Vučinić	3	4.69	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	15	23.44	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Total	64	100.00	0	0.00	60	93.75	4	6.25

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 93 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective domestic social actors: **representatives of judicial bodies**

Judicial system	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Higher Court in Belgrade	10	16.67	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Prosecutor for War Crimes	8	13.33	0	0.00	5	62.50	3	37.50
First Primary Court in Belgrade	5	8.33	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Prosecution for Organized Crime	5	8.33	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Higher Public Prosecutor in Belgrade	5	8.33	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Court of Appeals in Belgrade	4	6.67	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
First Basic Public Prosecutor in Belgrade	4	6.67	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Constitutional Court	4	6.67	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Administrative Court	3	5.00	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	12	20.00	0	0.00	10	83.33	2	16.67
Total	60	100.00	0	0.00	52	86.67	8	13.33

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 94 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **lawyers**¹⁰

Advokati	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Toma Fila	11	13.75	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Peronijević	7	8.75	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Dragoljub Đorđević	5	6.25	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Živanović	5	6.25	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian Bar Association	4	5.00	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dragoš Cukavac	3	3.75	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Zdenko Tomanović	3	3.75	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Ateljević	3	3.75	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Bar Association of Belgrade	2	2.50	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Bar Association of Vojvodina	2	2.50	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Milorad Ivanović	2	2.50	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Stojanović	2	2.50	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Rajko Danilović	2	2.50	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Risto Lekić	2	2.50	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Srđan Sikimić	2	2.50	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Violeta Kočić Mitaček	2	2.50	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Law office Čendić	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Law office Toma-nović	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Aleksić	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Kovačević	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Branislav Avramović	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Milenković	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00

¹⁰ Individual lawyers, like Borivoj Borović, Svetozar Vujačić, Božidar Prelević, Nebojša Avijaš and Dragoslav Ognjanović, have a role of analyst in texts from the media from the sample, which is why that group of actors is classified under analysts

Gvozden Grgur	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Ignjat Pančevski	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Jugoslav Tintor	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Krsto Bobot	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Lazar Čendić	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Đukić	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Milorad Panjević	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Miloš Šaljić	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Vukasović	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Petar Stojkov	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Doklesić	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Šoškić	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Veljko Delibašić	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Veljko Đurđić	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Vera Čabarkapa	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Beljanski	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Marinkov	1	1.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	80	100.00	0	0.00	80	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 95 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **actors of court proceedings and investigations**

Actors of court proceedings and investigations	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Kristijan Golubović	7	9.46	0	0.00	2	28.57	5	71.43
Milorad Ulemek Legija	7	9.46	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Sreten Jocić	7	9.46	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Darko Šarić	6	8.11	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
Ratko Romić	5	6.76	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Zoran Njeguš	5	6.76	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Dragana Bajić	4	5.41	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Maja Adrovac	4	5.41	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Radonjić	4	5.41	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Dejan Milenković Bagzi	3	4.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Spasojević Šiptar	3	4.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Adrovac	3	4.05	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Miroslav Kurak	3	4.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Đokić	3	4.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Rade Stakić	3	4.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	7	9.46	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Total	74	100.00	0	0.00	59	79.73	15	20.27

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 96 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic social actors: **“Case Partizan”**

“Case Partizan”	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milorad Vučelić	10	41.67	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Miloš Vazura	8	33.33	0	0.00	0	0.00	8	100.00
Žarko Zečević	6	25.00	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
Total	24	100.00	0	0.00	12	50.00	12	50.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 97 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **actors from the distant past**

Actors from the distant past	no.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Josip Broz Tito	22	43.14	1	4.55	21	95.45	0	0.00
Milan Nedić	15	29.41	0	0.00	12	80.00	3	20.00
Dragoljub Draža Mihailović	9	17.65	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Dimitrije Ljotić	3	5.88	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Edvard Kardelj	2	3.92	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	51	100.00	1	1.96	45	88.24	5	9.80

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

UNNAMED SOURCE

Unnamed sources were, just as throughout 2015, the second-ranked actor in terms of frequency in the selected front-page texts of the media from our sample. This time, 385 mentions of unnamed sources were present, which makes 20.01% of texts, and the share of unnamed sources in texts was nearly equal as in the fourth trimester of last year. Wide use of unnamed sources has been precisely established thanks to the manner of quantifying anonymous sources, applied from the second issue of *Mediameter*, by not only classifying sources the paper defined as unnamed, but also all those where information cannot be verified, regardless of the manner in which it is introduced in the text. Of course, the presence of information obtained from anonymous sources rather speaks about the manner of reporting of the seven media from the sample, than about the real need for protection of identity of the persons providing certain information.

As Matt Carlson said, in his book *On the condition of Anonymity*, “Journalism is embedded in and reliant on its surroundings, which means it can never be the independent observer it

claims to be... These sorts of questions are better answered through an approach that recognizes the culture of unnamed sources as a *culture*. This view steers the inquiry into unnamed sources away from the frequency and implementation towards the questions of shared meanings and patterns of collective interpretation patterns among the journalists, source and audiences. The granting of anonymity is not simply a matter of technique. Rather, it is an appeal to a particular manner of imagining the relations between these three parties.”¹¹

Journalistic form which contains the most information obtained from unnamed sources was this time news. Out of 116 texts written in this form, 31 or 26.96% contained anonymous sources (**Table 98**), followed by the report which contained unnamed sources in 306, i.e. 25.12% of texts devised in this way.

Table 98 – Share of “unnamed sources” in all journalistic forms, in seven media from the sample

Genre	total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
news	115	31	26.96
report	1218	306	25.12
article	221	38	17.19
reportage	32	2	6.25
Commentary	158	7	4.43
interview	164	1	0.61
other	16	0	0.00
Total	1924	385	20.01

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

The biggest share of texts which contain information obtained from anonymous sources compared to the total number of published texts in an individual media outlet was in *Inform-er* (40%), which is a visible increase of share of unnamed sources in this daily (from about 8.5%) compared to fourth quarter of 2015. *Kurir* and *Blic* used information obtained from anonymous sources in 28.32%, i.e. 27% of texts, and *Alo!* in 23.41%. *Večernje novosti* obtained information in this way in 18.62% of cases, *Danas* in 15.83% while the lowest number and percentage share of unnamed sources recorded in *Politika* was 27, i.e. 6.24% of texts (**Table 99**).

Table 99 – Share of unnamed sources per analysed media outlets

Media outlet	total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
<i>Inform-er</i>	225	90	40.00
<i>Kurir</i>	173	49	28.32
<i>Blic</i>	200	54	27.00
<i>Alo!</i>	205	48	23.41
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	290	54	18.62
<i>Danas</i>	398	63	15.83
<i>Politika</i>	433	27	6.24
Total	1924	385	20.01

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Biggest number of texts containing information from anonymous sources was recorded in texts where the topic was *2016 elections* – 69 and *political life in Serbia* – 68. Unnamed sources are most frequent when it comes to the topic of *crime*. Out of 42 texts in which this was the dominant topic, exactly one half, i.e. 21 texts, contain information obtained from anonymous sources (for more information, please see **Table 100**).

Number of texts containing information obtained from “unnamed sources,” against five top ranked topics, in each of the seven analysed media may be seen in the Appendix in **Tables 122-128**.

Table 100 – Number of texts containing information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the seven media from the sample¹²

All the media from the sample			
Topic	total number of texts	Unnamed source	%
crime	42	21	50.00
Russia/relations with Russia	50	22	44.00
elections 2016	250	69	27.60
religious issues, church, religion	41	11	26.83
migrants/refugees	57	15	26.32

¹¹ M. Carlson, *On the condition of anonymity*, Urbana, Chicago, Springfield, University of Illinois Press, 2011, 7

international relations	87	21	24.14
Media/freedom of media	51	12	23.53
political life in Serbia	351	68	19.37
economy	119	21	17.65
regional cooperation/relations in the region	82	11	13.41

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Conclusion

Snap parliament and local elections characterized the media scene of Serbia, at least when it comes to the print media, in the period January – March 2016. Not any other topic in any way managed to gain considerably more importance. The reduction of topic to just one topic resulted in the absence of analytical, research texts regarding some more serious topics in the field of society, economy, European integrations, and regional relations. Simultaneously, it brings about a real booming of new actors (personalities) who appear in texts from front pages, who are two times more numerous than in the previous quarter. As if the introduction of new personalities was a part of the election campaign. This also may mean that most of newspapers were reaching for “witnesses” and “interpreters” from the outside, having attained in that way the alibi of objectivity and impartiality. The methodology of shifting responsibility (and the “guilt” as well) is not new in Serbian journalism. It has been developed for over past fifty years as a defence method: “we didn’t say it”, but in modern journalism, with all effects and consequences of *on-line* journalism and informative potentials of social networks, it appears to be utterly anachronous.

The shortage of other topics indicates chronic uncertainty of the media in Serbia to survive apart from breaking-news political topics and spinings. And this is not good, because it impoverishes the entire Serbian society not just the media offer.

Appendix

Table 101 – Sample *Večernje novosti*

Večernje novosti	
Total number of selected front-page texts	290
Total number of front-page texts that were not selected	240
Other	10845
Total	11375

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 102 – Sample *Informer*

Informer	
Total number of selected front-page texts	225
Total number of front-page texts that were not selected	90
Other	5782
Total	6097

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 103 – Sample *Alo!*

Alo!	
Total number of selected front-page texts	205
Total number of front-page texts that were not selected	205
Other	6844
Total	7254

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 104 – Sample *Blic*

Blic	
Total number of selected front-page texts	200
Total number of front-page texts that were not selected	214
Other	9661
Total	10075

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 105 – Sample *Politika*

Politika	
Total number of selected front-page texts	433
Total number of front-page texts that were not selected	187
Other	10443
Total	11063

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 106 – Sample *Danas*

Danas	
Total number of selected front-page texts	398
Total number of front-page texts that were not selected	109
Other	6747
Total	7254

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Tabela 107. – Sample *Kurir*

Kurir	
Total number of selected front-page texts	173
Total number of front-page texts that were not selected	125
Other	7515
Total	7813

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 108 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	number of analysts	%
Dejan Vuk Stanković	4	14.29
Čedomir Antić	2	7.14
Dušan Janjić	2	7.14
Dušan Proroković	2	7.14
Mile Bjelajac	2	7.14
Bojan Dimitrijević	1	3.57
Darko Trifunović	1	3.57
Dragomir Anđelković	1	3.57
Dubravka Stojanović	1	3.57
Dušan Simeonović	1	3.57
Dževad Galijašević	1	3.57
Igor Novaković	1	3.57
Mahmud Bušatlija	1	3.57
Miladin Kovačević	1	3.57
Milan Kovačević	1	3.57
Mladen Kovačević	1	3.57
Nenad Gujaničić	1	3.57
Slobodan Antonić	1	3.57
Sreto Malinović	1	3.57
Vladimir Pejić	1	3.57
Zoran Stojiljković	1	3.57
Total	28	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 109 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	number of analysts	%
Vladimir Pejić	13	7.03
Branko Radun	12	6.49
Dejan Vuk Stanković	10	5.41
Dragomir Anđelković	10	5.41
Dragan Dobrašinović	8	4.32
Miroslav Šutić	7	3.78
Darko Trifunović	6	3.24
Nebojša Krstić	6	3.24
Orhan Dragaš	6	3.24
Vladimir Vuletić	6	3.24
Zlatko Nikolić	6	3.24
Igor Avžner	5	2.70
Dušan Janjić	4	2.16
Mario Spasić	4	2.16
Marko Nicović	4	2.16
Milan Nikolić	4	2.16
Vladislav Jovanović	4	2.16
Zoran Dragišić	4	2.16
Aleksandar Radić	3	1.62
Bojan Klačar	3	1.62
Boško Jakšić	3	1.62
Svetozar Vujačić	3	1.62
Vladimir Goati	3	1.62
Zoran Stojiljković	3	1.62
Danilo Šuković	2	1.08
Đorđe Vuković	2	1.08
Draško Karađinović	2	1.08
Goran Rodić	2	1.08
Ljubodrag Savić	2	1.08
Ljubomir Madžar	2	1.08
Mladen Kovačević	2	1.08

Nebojša Avlijaš	2	1.08
Petar Vojinović	2	1.08
Živadin Jovanović	2	1.08
Aleksandar Popov	1	0.54
Aleksandra Janković	1	0.54
Aleksandra Joksimović	1	0.54
Bojan Dimitrijević	1	0.54
Borivoje Borović	1	0.54
Božidar Prelević	1	0.54
Branislav Tapušковиć	1	0.54
Branko Dragaš	1	0.54
Branko Pavlović	1	0.54
Cvijetin Milivojević	1	0.54
Đerđ Pap	1	0.54
Dobrivoje Radovanović	1	0.54
Dragan Đukanović	1	0.54
Dragan Radović	1	0.54
Dragan Simeunović	1	0.54
Dragoslav Miša Ognjanović	1	0.54
Dragovan Miličević	1	0.54
Draško Đenović	1	0.54
Dževad Galijašević	1	0.54
Ivan Raonić	1	0.54
Ivo Visković	1	0.54
Mahmud Bušatlija	1	0.54
Marko Uljarević	1	0.54
Milan Kovačević	1	0.54
Miroslav Zdravković	1	0.54
Nebojša Perović	1	0.54
Ninoslav Stojadinović	1	0.54
Srđan Bogosavljević	1	0.54
Total	185	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Tabela 110. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	number of analysts	%
Branko Radun	4	14.81
Dragomir Anđelković	3	11.11
Aleksandar Milošević	2	7.41
Aleksandar Radić	2	7.41
Milan Milić	2	7.41
Aleksandar Popov	1	3.70
Bojan Klačar	1	3.70
Borivoje Borović	1	3.70
Branka Tišma	1	3.70
Dejan Vuk Stanković	1	3.70
Dubravka Stojanović	1	3.70
Dževad Galijašević	1	3.70
Jovo Bakić	1	3.70
Mahmud Bušatlija	1	3.70
Milan Kovačević	1	3.70
Neven Cvetičanin	1	3.70
Obrad Kesić	1	3.70
Živojin Rakočević	1	3.70
Zlatko Nikolić	1	3.70
Total	27	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 111 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	number of analysts	%
Bojan Klačar	5	8.20
Dejan Vuk Stanković	5	8.20
Cvijetin Milivojević	4	6.56
Danijel Server	3	4.92
Ratko Božović	3	4.92

Aleksandar Popov	2	3.28
Aleksandar Radić	2	3.28
Božidar Prelević	2	3.28
Dragan Đukanović	2	3.28
Dušan Janjić	2	3.28
Milan Kovačević	2	3.28
Nebojša Krstić	2	3.28
Vladimir Vuletić	2	3.28
Zoran Stojiljković	2	3.28
Aleksandra Joksimović	1	1.64
Bojan Dimitrijević	1	1.64
Branislav Tapušević	1	1.64
Dobrovoje Radovanović	1	1.64
Dragan Dobrašinović	1	1.64
Dragomir Anđelković	1	1.64
Dubravka Stojanović	1	1.64
Dževad Galijašević	1	1.64
Goran Nikolić	1	1.64
Jovo Bakić	1	1.64
Joža Mencinger	1	1.64
Mahmud Bušatlija	1	1.64
Marko Uljarević	1	1.64
Mihailo Crnobrnja	1	1.64
Milan Nikolić	1	1.64
Milan Prostran	1	1.64
Neven Cvetičanin	1	1.64
Ninoslav Stojadinović	1	1.64
Srećko Mihajlović	1	1.64
Vladimir Goati	1	1.64
Vladislav Jovanović	1	1.64
Žarko Trebješanin	1	1.64
Zoran Dragišić	1	1.64
Total	61	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 112 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	number of analysts	%
Dragomir Anđelković	8	9.41
Jovo Bakić	5	5.88
Milojko Arsić	4	4.71
Aleksandar Popov	3	3.53
Vladimir Goati	3	3.53
Vladislav Jovanović	3	3.53
Bojan Klačar	2	2.35
Dejan Vuk Stanković	2	2.35
Đorđe Vuković	2	2.35
Goran Nikolić	2	2.35
Ivo Visković	2	2.35
Ljubomir Madžar	2	2.35
Mijat Damjanović	2	2.35
Nebojša Krstić	2	2.35
Nenad Gujaničić	2	2.35
Slobodan Jovanović	2	2.35
Srđan Bogosavljević	2	2.35
Vladimir Pejić	2	2.35
Vladimir Vuletić	2	2.35
Vojislav Stanković	2	2.35
Zoran Stojiljković	2	2.35
Aleksandar Radić	1	1.18
Aleksandra Joksimović	1	1.18
Bojan Dimitrijević	1	1.18
Boško Mijatović	1	1.18
Branislav Tapušковиć	1	1.18
Danijel Server	1	1.18
Dejan Jović	1	1.18
Dragan Simić	1	1.18
Dragovan Milićević	1	1.18
Dubravka Stojanović	1	1.18

Dušan Janjić	1	1.18
Dušan Proroković	1	1.18
Dušan Simeonović	1	1.18
Dušan Spasojević	1	1.18
Džejms Ker Lindzi	1	1.18
Goran Rodić	1	1.18
Igor Tabak	1	1.18
Ljubodrag Savić	1	1.18
Marko Uljarević	1	1.18
Milan Nikolić	1	1.18
Mile Bjelajac	1	1.18
Neven Cvetičanin	1	1.18
Obrad Kesić	1	1.18
Saša Đorđević	1	1.18
Slobodan Antonić	1	1.18
Vladimir Trapara	1	1.18
Voja Antonić	1	1.18
Žarko Trebješanin	1	1.18
Zoran Dragišić	1	1.18
Total	85	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 113. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	number of analysts	%
Dragomir Anđelković	4	11.11
Đorđe Vuković	2	5.56
Jovo Bakić	2	5.56
Ljubodrag Savić	2	5.56
Mahmud Bušatlija	2	5.56
Vladimir Pejić	2	5.56
Zoran Dragišić	2	5.56
Aleksandar Popov	1	2.78
Aleksandar Radić	1	2.78

Bogoljub Milosavljević	1	2.78
Bojan Elek	1	2.78
Bojan Klačar	1	2.78
Cvijetin Milivojević	1	2.78
Daliborka Uljarević	1	2.78
Dragan Simeunović	1	2.78
Dubravka Stojanović	1	2.78
Džejms Ker Lindzi	1	2.78
Dževad Galijašević	1	2.78
Igor Novaković	1	2.78
Marko Uljarević	1	2.78
Milan Prostran	1	2.78
Milojko Arsić	1	2.78
Nebojša Krstić	1	2.78
Vladimir Goati	1	2.78
Vladislav Jovanović	1	2.78
Zlatko Vujović	1	2.78
Zoran Stojiljković	1	2.78
Total	36	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 114 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Kurir*

Kurir	number of analysts	%
Dragomir Anđelković	13	13.40
Aleksandar Radić	9	9.28
Branko Radun	8	8.25
Dragan Dobrašinović	7	7.22
Zoran Stojiljković	7	7.22
Darko Trifunović	6	6.19
Božidar Spasić	5	5.15
Dobrivoje Radovanović	4	4.12
Milan Nikolić	4	4.12
Draško Đenović	3	3.09

Zoran Dragišić	3	3.09
Bojan Klačar	2	2.06
Božidar Prelević	2	2.06
Dejan Vuk Stanković	2	2.06
Đorđe Vuković	2	2.06
Jovo Bakić	2	2.06
Mladen Kovačević	2	2.06
Ratko Božović	2	2.06
Slobodan Jovanović	2	2.06
Borislav Miljanović	1	1.03
Danilo Šuković	1	1.03
Dušan Janjić	1	1.03
Dušan Simeonović	1	1.03
Mahmud Bušatlija	1	1.03
Milan Kovačević	1	1.03
Miloš Šolaja	1	1.03
Saša Đogović	1	1.03
Vladimir Vuletić	1	1.03
Vladislav Jovanović	1	1.03
Žarko Trebješanin	1	1.03
Živadin Jovanović	1	1.03
Total	97	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 115 – Distribution of appearances of SOC and other religious communities' representatives on the front pages of the daily *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	no.	%
Serbian Orthodox Church	16	14.16
Patriarch Irinej	15	13.27
Pope Francis	9	7.96
Alojzije Stepinac	5	4.42
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	5	4.42
Catholic Church	5	4.42
Russian Patriarch Kirill	4	3.54

Bishop of Bačka Irinej	3	2.65
Bishop of Slavonija Jovan	3	2.65
Moscow Patriarchy	3	2.65
Pope Benedict XVI	3	2.65
Pope John Paul II	3	2.65
Archbishop Stanislav Hočevar	3	2.65
Metropolitan Ilarion Alfejev	2	1.77
Bishop Joanikije	2	1.77
Muhamed Jusufspahić	2	1.77
Patriarch Pavle	2	1.77
Bishop of Zagreb and Ljubljana, Porfirije	2	1.77
Adem Zilkić	1	0.88
Adriatik Staviļjeci	1	0.88
Bishop Andrej	1	0.88
Bishop Arsenije	1	0.88
Montenegrin Church	1	0.88
Eparchy of Budimlja and Nikšić	1	0.88
Filaret, former Bishop	1	0.88
Bishop Georgije	1	0.88
Gligorije Marković	1	0.88
Bishop of Herzegovina and Zahumlje Grigorije	1	0.88
Isak Asijel	1	0.88
Islamic Community of Serbia	1	0.88
Croatian Catholic Church	1	0.88
Bishop Lavrentije	1	0.88
Archmandrite Lazar Lazarević	1	0.88
Macedonian Orthodox Church	1	0.88
Mother Makarija	1	0.88
Metodije, prior of Hilandar	1	0.88
Mevlud Dudić	1	0.88
Miraš Dedeić	1	0.88
Bishop of Banat Nikanor	1	0.88
Ratomir Petrović, archpriest	1	0.88
Sava Janjić, prior	1	0.88
Bishop of Raška and Prizren Teodosije	1	0.88

Tomislav Živković	1	0.88
Vojo Bilbija, priest	1	0.88
Total	113	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 116. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of SOC and other religious communities' representatives on the front pages of *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	no.	%
Alojzije Stepinac	2	22.22
Pope Francis	2	22.22
Patriarch Irinej	2	22.22
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	1	11.11
Bishop of Bačka Irinej	1	11.11
Sava Janjić, prior	1	11.11
Total	9	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 117. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of SOC and other religious communities' representatives on the front pages of *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	no.	%
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	2	12.50
Patriarch Irinej	2	12.50
Alojzije Stepinac	1	6.25
Arsenije Jovanović, monk	1	6.25
Bishop of Bačka Irinej	1	6.25
Nenad Ilić	1	6.25
Bishop Pahomije	1	6.25
Rade Simić, priest	1	6.25
Rafailo, prior	1	6.25
Sava Janjić, prior	1	6.25
Trajan, prior	1	6.25

Bishop Vasilije Kačavenda	1	6.25
Velja Stojković	1	6.25
Cardinal Vinko Puljić	1	6.25
Total	16	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 118 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of SOC and other religious communities' representatives on the front pages of *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	no.	%
Patriarch Irinej	4	33.33
Alojzije Stepinac	1	8.33
Bishop Artemije	1	8.33
Bojan Jovanović	1	8.33
Ignjatije, prior	1	8.33
Milić Blažanović	1	8.33
SOC	1	8.33
Bishop Vasilije Kačavenda	1	8.33
Bishop of Srem Vasilije	1	8.33
Total	12	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 119 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of SOC and other religious communities' representatives on the front pages of *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	no.	%
Pope Francis	10	12.82
Alojzije Stepinac	9	11.54
Patriarch Irinej	6	7.69
SOC	6	7.69
Bishop of Bačka Irinej	3	3.85
Bishop of Zagreb and Ljubljana, Porfirije	3	3.85
Adem Zilkić	2	2.56
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	2	2.56
Metropolitan Ilarion Alfejev	2	2.56
Josip Bozanić	2	2.56

Bishop of Slavonija Jovan	2	2.56
Croatian Catholic Church	2	2.56
Patriarch Pavle	2	2.56
Russian Patriarch Kirill	2	2.56
Synod of SOC	2	2.56
Abdurahman Kujević	1	1.28
Adonis Tahiri	1	1.28
Alesandro D Eriko, Apostolic Nuncio in Zagreb	1	1.28
Anglican Church	1	1.28
Bishop Artemije	1	1.28
Dragan Urošev	1	1.28
Dragica, novice	1	1.28
Bishop Georgije	1	1.28
Kurt Koch	1	1.28
Bishop Laszlo Nemet	1	1.28
Mevlud Dudić	1	1.28
Miraš Dedeić	1	1.28
Mirko Šefković	1	1.28
Nikanor, Bishop of Banat	1	1.28
Metropolitan of Kiev Onufrije	1	1.28
Archbishop Orlando Antonini	1	1.28
Patriarch Alexey the Second	1	1.28
Patriarch Gavrilo	1	1.28
Sava Janjić, prior	1	1.28
Council of the Canadian Eparchy	1	1.28
Stefan Purić, monk	1	1.28
Tomislav Živković	1	1.28
Vasilije Tomić, archpriest stavrofor	1	1.28
Total	78	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 120 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of SOC and other religious communities' representatives on the front pages of *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	no.	%
Patriarch Irinej	6	27.27
Alojzije Stepinac	3	13.64
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	3	13.64
Pope Francis	3	13.64
SOC	3	13.64
Archbishop Stanislav Hočevan	2	9.09
Bishop of Bačka Irinej	1	4.55
Petar Lukić, archpriest	1	4.55
Total	22	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 121 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of SOC and other religious communities' representatives on the front pages of *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	no.	%
Patriarch Irinej	7	23.33
SPC	4	13.33
Pope Francis	3	10.00
Alojzije Stepinac	2	6.67
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	2	6.67
Russian Patriarch Kirill	2	6.67
Metropolitan Ilarion Alfejev	1	3.33
Bishop of Bačka Irinej	1	3.33
Bishop of Slavonija Jovan	1	3.33
Moscow Patriarchy	1	3.33
Muhammed Jusufspahić	1	3.33
Bishop of Slavonija Jovan	1	3.33
Patriarch Pavle	1	3.33
Bishop of Slavonija Jovan	1	3.33
Catholic Church	1	3.33
Sava Janjić, prior	1	3.33
Total	30	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 122 – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the paper *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
elections 2016.	24	12	50.00
political life in Serbia	45	11	24.44
Russia/relations with Russia	13	6	46.15
activities of the government of RS	7	3	42.86
economy	13	2	15.38

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 123 – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	62	8	12.90
Russia/relations with Russia	6	5	83.33
elections 2016.	8	5	62.50
Media/freedom of media	7	4	57.14
activities of the government of RS	6	3	50.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 124 – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the paper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
international relations	14	7	50.00
elections 2016.	26	6	23.08
religious issues, church, religion	13	5	38.46
crime	8	4	50.00
political life in Serbia	22	3	13.64

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 125 - Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources”

according to topics in the paper <i>Alo!</i>			
<i>Alo!</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	67	14	20.90
elections 2016.	33	11	33.33
crime	13	10	76.92
military	2	2	100.00
regional cooperation/relations in the region	12	2	16.67

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 126 – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	66	25	37.88
elections 2016.	38	18	47.37
Media/freedom of media	21	7	33.33
media/freedom of the media	11	7	63.64
terrorism and the Islamic State	6	5	83.33

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 127 – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the paper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
elections 2016.	49	5	10.20
economy	25	3	12.00
migrants/refugees	21	2	9.52
social issues/social policy	10	2	20.00
international relations	28	2	7.14

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

Table 128 – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
elections 2016.	72	12	16.67
migrants/refugees	20	7	35.00
political life in Serbia	51	6	11.76
economy	41	6	14.63
The Hague/war crimes	19	4	21.05

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2016

4



Discourse
analysis

DEJAN VUK STANKOVIĆ

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Images of protagonists and the election campaign in weeklies in the first quarter of 2016

Predominantly negative pictures of political protagonists – both the authorities and the opposition and plethora of mutually conflicting interpretations of extraordinary national elections and regular local and provincial elections were the core characteristics of texts in Serbian weeklies. The content confirmed the existence of various approaches, argument patterns, rhetorical figures and conclusions. Basically, original and almost emphasised plurality of standpoints is a trademark of journalism in weeklies.

Another prominent characteristic is an overwhelmingly critical attitude towards the current authorities. The critique is personified to a great extent and it is almost exclusively negative in terms of its content.

The focus of the texts is on the current Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić. He is the recipient of almost all possible and realistic complaints and he is in the centre of all imaginable socio-political and historical expectations. Unlike Vučić and SPP (Serbian Progressive Party), the opposition, either right-wing or civic – pro-European, is treated much more mildly, with a more-or-less explicit expectation that it will grow politically stronger and gain greater popularity among the general public. In a nutshell, the opposition is not criticised from a political and conceptual standpoint, nor is much effort invested to re-examine the period of its rule from the standpoint of moral. Instead, what is noted is the opposition's lack of power to compete with the politically and popularity-wise superior authorities, primarily SPP.

The third important moment in weeklies is the prominent role of the interview as a journalistic genre. This is a continuous process of conversations with mostly critically oriented intellectuals, activists from NGOs, as well as the representatives of independent legal institutions, such as the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance or the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality. The emphasis on the interview is accompanied by the design of front pages, where the interviewee's picture is often in the foreground. This is a way to promote a political message and suggestively encourage accepting his/her way of thinking. From the visual aspect, the front pages of weeklies resemble the posters of political parties when they are trying to give weight to a certain individual.

The abovementioned can be confirmed by a short message which is always used to announce the title of the interview. This insistence on the interviewee and their attitude is a direct attempt to make them a kind of political brand, a trademark of a certain political group. Also, another prominent feature is the continuous striving to set a specific group as the supreme authority in the field of analysis of socio-historical processes, events, decisions and steps taken by the main protagonists. Emphasising the importance of capillary public aims to fill the void in the public-political life, a glaringly obvious consequence of the long-term political crisis of political identity and trust in the opposition leaders and parties.

The already amplified daily-political effect of the texts in weeklies is additionally amplified by numerous caricatures and photographs published week after week, suggesting a certain political content. The dynamic unity between words and images additionally strengthens, quite often, the already strong political-propaganda message.

The fifth important characteristic of the texts in weeklies and editorial columns is the overlap in terms of meaning and rhetoric of journalists' attitudes and actively engaged public and direct political protagonists. This overlapping has a double meaning. It shows that weeklies are too often a sophisticated resource in the daily political struggle between parties, particularly in the field of constructing and maintaining their images in the media.

Fixing an image of a protagonist or event is one of the most commonly used tools in a political-propaganda war. Fixing an image is a process where, and because of which, one protagonist always remains the same as they have always been, both in distant and recent past, regardless of their possible and real transformations and significantly changed political, economic and wider socio-historical circumstances. This pseudo-intellectual matrix functions in accordance with the principle of assigned roles. The protagonists are set in the public space using a model of "good" and "bad" guys. Morally and politically positive attributes are ascribed to a certain group of politicians and organisations, while the negative ones are irrevocably ascribed to the other side. The Manichean division among the political-media elite is in the centre of conflict in the public-political field. Consequently, weeklies are biased and very clear and strict in their biasness. The conflict between interpretations of events, processes and protagonists is such that the original nationality in the public field, which becomes a democratically constituted public, cannot function even as a useful illusion, nor can any regulative principle in classifying the textual-visual contents.

Everyone can go against everyone and everyone does it for *their* reasons, which are incomparable with the attitudes and arguments of the other side. The spirit of debate in Serbian weeklies, particularly in columns and interviews is truly radical, conveying political defamation of the opponent and moral exclusiveness of the first order.

As in the previous editions of *Mediameter*, it is necessary to point out three moments which characterise the texts in weeklies. There is a prominent overlap between the attitudes of journalists, carefully selected interviewees and direct protagonists in the political life, most commonly party leaders.

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that weeklies contain a true variety of attitudes, arguments, rhetorical figures and conclusions. There is no content relevant to social, political and economic events, processes and protagonists that has been excluded or blocked. Concretely, it is possible to publish or draw anything and send different types of messages. At the same time, all political orientations are present, from the radical right to the left-wing. In a nutshell, there is no censorship, nor self-censorship. This fact is important for two reasons, which, strictly speaking, are not directly political. On the one hand, it is possible in the public field to make legitimate any claim or interpretation model related to events, protagonist and socio-historical processes. On the other hand, the interpretation codes have power to be constantly spread on the Internet and, more often than not, they are a significant stimulus for many TV reports and interviews.

Mediameter firmly claims that the same pattern of negative campaign, especially against the authorities, was used at the early stage of the election campaign. The key presumptions of the anti-government, anti-Vučić discourse, created and cemented during his reign since 2014, were reproduced even more intensively. At the same time, a negative attitude, though a bit more moderate and less present, was detected in the context of the opposition. The interpretation of the opposition often followed the train of thoughts, meaning and connotation of the attitudes expressed by the representatives of current authorities.

For the purpose of the election campaign, the radically critical discourse against the present authorities was even more concrete. Every step taken by the authorities had to be questioned, every decision of every state body re-examined, while, at the same time, a message had to be sent to a large part of the opposition-inclined electorate, currently in "hibernation".

The elections are an issue that rightfully deserved most texts in the columns dealing with domestic affairs. This topic showed the variety of standpoints, which is the main trademark of journalism practices at weeklies. Various interpretations of the elections were presented, week in, week out. They oscillated from a standpoint requiring nothing but a justification from the party for calling the elections, over the emphasis on the reform, to some interpretations which called for a U-turn in foreign policy towards Russia in case the patriotic ideas prevail.

Weeklies can be divided using two methods. According to the selection criterion common in a democratic society, they should be divided into those close to the authorities' standpoint and those moderately or radically critical of it. This criterion cannot be fully developed in Serbia, simply because all weeklies in Serbia are either partly or completely critical of the authorities. The partly critical ones include *Pečat*, which completely openly criticises the pro-European foreign policy of the current government led by Vučić. Still, this weekly shows a strong critical instance towards the moral credibility, axiological orientation and political attitudes of the post-5th October victors. On the other hand, weeklies, such as *NIN*, *Vreme*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* are completely critical of the authorities. There is a difference in the intonation of their critique. While *Vreme*, and *NIN* to some extent (particularly in the domain of interior policy and economy), offer comprehensive, concrete and feisty criticism

of the authorities, weeklies such as *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik*, use a more moderate tone in expressing their criticism. They accuse and label much less than the most influential Serbian weeklies, *Vreme* and *NIN*.

In a similar way, weeklies can be classified in terms of their orientation related to foreign policy. *Vreme*, *NIN*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* are more-or-less pro-European. On the other hand, *Pečat* more than clearly advocates an anti-western, and consequently pro-Russian, attitude, which is supposed to support the nationalist discourse relevantly similar to the dominant discourse in the war-plagues nineties.



Vreme, 31st March 2016

Image of the authorities – authoritarian, non-democratic, manipulative, morally questionable, without economic results, reflection of socio-historical decadence

The image of the authorities portrayed in the weeklies in January-March 2016 follows the same matrix we noticed in 2015. In terms of content, there are relevantly similar definitions of both the structure and the operations of the current authorities. When creating an image of the authorities it is necessary to point out the mutually connected moments conditioned by a specific political moment – the election campaign. Firstly, for the purpose of the campaign rhetoric, radically critical texts have a sharper, more devaluing and accusing tone. On the other hand, apart from that aspect, there is an issue related to concretising critical writing. The original idea behind this writing style is to show concrete examples of “wrong policy” instil revolt, anger and protest among mostly unsatisfied voters.

In order to make the image more memorable, the model of personified negative campaign is used. The prime minister and leader of the Serbian Progressive Party Aleksandar Vučić is in the centre of such criticism. In this media-political war between various political groups there is an intensive media-political dialectics present: an attack on Vučić is an attack on SPP and the Serbian Government, the Serbian Government and the Serbian Progressive Party are exposed to political and media attacks by constant attacks on Vučić. This pattern of writing is dominant in Serbian weeklies and it has been continuously reproduced, most likely with an aim to demission the political option of SPP by stigmatising its leader. A reverse process is also in place in the reality of the Serbian political-media struggle. The Progressive Party are increasing their political gain by playing the card of Vučić’s popularity, which is unimpeachable at this moment.

In order to present the structure and operation of the authorities, we need to have a look at a wider socio-historical or, more precisely, spiritual-material context. The theory of a decadent socio-historical moment is based on the theory of spiritual decadence and the role of the state, i.e. the authorities, in its development and maintenance. Such attitude is expressed by writer Dragan Velikić in his interview for *NIN*.

Having listed all the projects in the field of high culture that might be jeopardised by the budget cuts implemented by the government, Velikić radically concludes that we are living in a state of spiritual decadence deliberately created by the ruling political class for the purpose of self-preservation: “...this state is wilfully and deliberately working on suffocating the spiritual life of its subjects. They make cuts in this field. But they don’t cut the salaries of thousands and thousands of apparatchiks, who have been provided with sweet and easy lives by this and previous governments at the expense of all of us. That is why this army of parasites greets the elections with acclamation, since they believe that they will be able to steal one more term of office. Well, they’ll succeed if we let them.”¹

¹ Dragan Velikić, “Država svesno guši duhovni život,” [The state is deliberately suffocating spiritual life], interviewed by

A similar characterisation of the “spirit of the times” was offered by Sanda Rašković Ivić, president of the Democratic Party of Serbia: “...the SPP-led way into a bright future is merely a utopian propaganda. The reality directed by them is so sickening, and that “road to the future” is just Vučić and his friends riding westward on the back of the people to the setting sun.”²

The deliberately created spiritual decadence is almost endemic to the extremely unfavourable economic indicators which reflect to present state of affairs in Serbia. In contrast to the optimistic attitudes of Prime Minister Vučić regarding the economic growth and almost tangible better life in the near future, a journalist from *Vreme*, renowned economic analyst Dimitrije Boarov, points out the low rate of economic growth which characterises the present-day Serbia. According to the statistical data quoted by Boarov, Serbia is the country with the lowest economic growth rate in the region, which is also below the average rate in Central-European and East-European countries: “In the period between 2008–2014, Serbia recorded a drop in GNP by around 0.5 percent, while the average drop in the Balkan countries was 0.2 percent and the region of Central and East Europe (CEE) even recorded a minimal growth. Also, in the previous three years (2012–2014), Serbia was stagnating, with an average annual growth rate of 0.3 percent, while the Balkan countries have been growing at the rate of 1.8 percent and the CEE countries at the rate of 1.9 percent. The comparison for last year, 2015, was not in Serbia’s favour either, since its GNP, as it is estimated at the moment, was increased by 0.8 percent, while the same rate for the Balkan countries was 2.4, i.e. 2.7 for the CEE countries (data taken from *Kvartalni monitor*, published by *Novi magazin*, 14th January 2016). We can also add to such comparisons, unfavourable to Serbia, Bloomberg’s last year’s estimate that Serbia was among the ten countries with the slowest economic growth and that this agency estimated that in the 2014–2017 period Serbia would have an average annual economic growth rate of just 0.29 percent.”³

At the same time, Boarov continues, no serious growth and economic recovery is possible in the current 2016 and the following 2017, when Serbia will be at the bottom of the table or worse off in any comparison with any individual country in the region in terms of the growth rate. The pessimistic projection of growth is also, according to this economic analyst, a proof that it is still not genuinely believed that Serbia is going in the direction of creating a dynamic market economy: “The fact that this is still not an accepted belief (referring to the reforms and market economy – author’s comment) is confirmed (again) by the Bloomberg’s projection (reported by TANJUG) that the Romanian GDP in 2016 would be increased by 3.8 percent (however, recession remains an option, as well); the Macedonian GDP will be increased by 3.5 percent; the GDP of Bosnia and Hercegovina will rise by three percent; Bul-

garian by 2.5 percent; Slovenian by 2.2 percent. According to other sources, Montenegro is expected to record a growth of 4.1 percent in 2016, while Croatia is expected to develop by 1.8 percent. So, Serbia, with the projected growth of 1.5%, is again “a tiger at the bottom of every regional table.”⁴

Apart from disputing the story of the economic growth, which is one of the central points in the media presentation of the work of the current Serbian Government, infrastructural projects are also being heavily scrutinised. The basic premise of journalist Slobodan Georgijev, editor at the BIRN Research Network and commentator at *Vreme*, is that Vučić’s government has very little, if any, credit for the works on infrastructure: “Vučić’s advertising slogan ‘This year, we are going to build more kilometres of motorways than Germany’ sounds equally good as the statement made by his predecessor from the nineties Mirko Marjanović, who claimed after the wars that Serbia was recording the biggest economic growth in Europe.”⁵ Although, according to Georgijev, this political marketing looks slightly bizarre, the execution of works cannot be credited to Vučić, but it is a consequence of arrangements and credits negotiated by the government led by the Democratic Party, i.e. Mirko Cvetković’s government: “...Serbian budget for 2016 has allocated funds for sections Obrenovac-Ub and Lajkovac-Ljig, where 55 percent of works have been finished (currently 30 percent finished), while the Ub-Lajkovac section is supposed to be finished this year (89 percent finished so far). This is financed from the “Chinese loan”, arranged by Mirko Cvetković’s government in 2010. Most other works on the construction of motorways were negotiated much earlier. Those are long-term loans that Serbia has taken from international financial institutions, such as the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.”⁶ At the same time, the journalist from *Vreme* detects and suggest to his reader the inconsistency of Vučić’s economic policy and vision of reconstruction and development, especially in terms of the correlation between being charged with a debit and investments in infrastructure: “The predecessors are being accused of creating outrageous debts, thus destroying the public financing in Serbia, but Vučić uses those same loans to finish some works, which are beneficial to his ongoing campaign.”⁷

Georgijev himself draws a parallel with the time after the bombing and the period of reconstruction and development. The journalist’s intention is clear. To awake the association among the citizens. To bring them back to the nineties. To wake up resignation and encourage protest. Vučić is the same Vučić from the nineties. Truth be told, Georgijev gives primacy to Milutin Mrkonjić over Vučić when it comes to building motorways: “If we take a look at it, Mrkonjić’s work in rebuilding the country after the bombing looks like an incredible achievement bearing in mind the facts that Serbia was in isolation, that there no parts unaffected and totally or partially destroyed, that the citizens hit the lowest level of poverty, that almost

1 Mića Vujičić, *NIN*, no. 3395, p. 11

2 Sanda Rašković Ivić, “Neću više da branim Koštunicu,” [I don’t want to defend Koštunica any more] interviewed by Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3401, p. 22

3 Dimitrije Boarov, “Najavljeni tigar, ispaljena raketa,” [Heralded tiger, launched rocket] *Vreme*, no. 1308, p. 14–15

4 Idem, p. 15

5 Slobodan Georgijev, “Od Velike Srbije do velike mape Srbije” [From Great Serbia to a great map of Serbia] *Vreme*, no. 1310, p. 12

6 Idem, p. 13

7 Idem, p. 12

all major companies were facing liquidation, that there was no help from abroad.”⁸

After Slobodan Georgijev presented his narrative about the construction of motorways as an artificially constructed political-propaganda activity, a former journalist from *Vreme*, now working at *NIN*, Vera Didanović analysed the economic policy of the Government in the context of the classical propaganda matrix “promised-delivered”. A mere list and research into the possibility of their realisation were compiled too mechanically, without a necessary accompanying analysis of the circumstances in which the economic policy is exercised. Among many promises, quite deliberately and utterly suggestively, the unfulfilled promise of improving the living standard was selected. Such simplified propaganda matrix should persuade the reader that the authorities are deceiving him when it comes to the issue that influenced their life more than any other – expectation of better material position and an opportunity to lead a dignified life: “The *Istinomer* website followed the destiny of Vučić’s key promise – the one of an imminent better life. From April 2011, when, during Tomislav Nikolić’s hunger strike, he said that we would be better off after the first six months of SPP’s reign, over the claims from 2013, when, as the first deputy prime minister, he promised a much better 2014, the deadline was just being postponed... At the end of 2013 there were promises of a better future in 2015, but that promise was only valid until the end of March 2015, when the deadline was set to two years into the future. In May 2015 a wave of optimism broke through – or the decision to call extraordinary elections had been imminent for a year – so a significant improvement was announced for this 2016.”⁹

A spiritually decadent society, deprived of economic reforms and, consequently, any prospect of reaching near and tangible improvement, a society prone to falling for false promises and following blindly political and any other type of fiction, as portrayed by the aforementioned journalists and members of the cultural elite is such because of the specific organisation and operation of the political order. At the top of the pyramid of political power is the key political protagonist, the person with the highest political authority and support - Aleksandar Vučić.

His political (dis)qualification is obvious and concretely developed in many aspects: from the psychological and moral aspect to the political-evaluative one. A negative image of Vučić is produced by a synergy of various attitudes which have been continuously expressed by various protagonists from public and political life.

Authoritarianism, endeavour to fully concentrate all forms of political and other social power, undermining the democratic principles of sharing the power, sabotaging and practically breaking basic human right, coupled with an extremely ideologically colourless, violent and manipulative nature of the reign is a summarised description of Vučić’s reign.

This description does not differ, either rhetorically or semantically, from the portrait of Vučić

⁸ Idem, p. 12

⁹ Vera Didanović, “Bolji život i druge bajke,” [A better life and other fairytales] *NIN*, no. 3399, p. 17



NIN, 18th February 2016

which was “painted” both narratively and visually in Serbian weeklies during 2015. What is specific for 2016 is that relevantly similar messages are coming from ideologically opposing protagonists. In the first quarter of 2016, Vučić was “in the line of fire” of various protagonists from public life.

Vučić’s reign is, apart from being openly frivolous and authoritarian, also deeply populist and founded on dilettantes, present in practically all institutions of the system. “You have a dilettante government, which came to power making various promises about fulfilling the hopes of desperate citizens. None of the promises have been fulfilled. This is still a society founded on dilettantism. Many important positions in the country have lately been occupied by the ignorant and dilettantes.”¹⁰

In a non-democratic society with fragile institutions and a highly authoritarian style of implementing policies, it is natural to build a cult of a political leader, who is the supreme authority in the eyes of the citizens. This process of creating an image of a leader with undisputed authority is also seen by the already quoted director Goran Marković as an expression of dilettantism and personal obsession of the Serbian leader: “The cult of personality that Vučić is building is a rather personal initiative, implemented rather amateurishly. Tito had huge state machinery; he had Dior coming over to make suits for him. Vučić is a small, petty player. He is trying to make people deaf with his own name. It is all very dilettante – as is his society, anyway.”¹¹

In a society dominated by an authoritarian pattern of reign, with an endemic occurrence of populism and endeavour to create a cult of personality, it is inevitable for poltroonery to emerge as the key characteristic among those who exercise authority: “It has become increasingly common for the ministers to speak, instead of about the authorities, system, institution, about Aleksandar Vučić... it turns out that no-one is criticising the regime because of potentially damaging steps it has taken, mistakes it makes, misuse of the institutions, etc., but that everyone has a problem with this citizen Aleksandar Vučić. An opportunity for democratisation of this society will rise once this thesis dies out as a notion. Until then, we will be lied to that there is someone who bears a grudge against “the prime minister himself”. Behind that lie, however, lies a glaringly obvious truth: none of the ministers have a *carte blanche* when it comes to their department, one man is involved in everything and he makes all the decisions.”¹²

The attitudes of this journalist from *Vreme* are identical to the standpoints of Boris Tadić, president of the Social Democratic Party. Analysing the current political situation, the former president of Serbia says: “Vučić controls not only all the media, but all social relations, finance and media systems. That is a control of the whole social ambience in which the media exist and it is much more dangerous than a direct control of media... One of the greatest

responsibilities that Vučić has in his political activity is the fact that he abolished a political dialogue, we only have a monologue and very short and rare broadcast of statements by the opposition. Their technique is fabrication of the past, not only their own, but the whole reality up to 2012. Their instruments are only accusations of previous regime, that has been their only answer for the past four years. I have been in politics for 25 years and the situation has never been so dangerous.”¹³

The same attitude towards the nature and operation of the authorities was expressed by the president of the Political Council of the Democratic Party, Dragoljub Mićunović, who explicitly said in his interview for *Novi magazin*: “Perhaps what is new is this degree of obscenity, populism in statements, as if no-one has eyes or a wallet, breakfast before them, this careless use of words and a great amount of hate for the politically poor, the minority in the parliament. They are creating a virtual reality in which we are the best and adored by everyone, while in reality we don’t have a better standard than before, nor do we have more freedom than before, nor do we have more justice than before.

Everything is in regression, which is shown as progress and we are given this patronising talk – “it will be better tomorrow”. This can be checked; take any number you like. All this facilitates a new institutional crisis and that is our great problem... We no longer have a parliament, it is now a government’s voting machine, in emergency situations I might add. Things are done hastily, depending on the needs, which is why most laws are entitled “amendments to the law”, followed by the “Law on Amendments to the Amendments”. This is a practical proof of the famous remark by Svetozar Marković that there is no such barbarism in Serbia that cannot be adorned by legal attire. Then there is a lack of judicature, justice, compliance with the laws, and when no-one abides the laws there is a total corruption, from the pettiest one at the counter to the greatest one, involving non-transparent major contracts and loans, investments, as rumour has it.”¹⁴

The political order is presented in various ways as a symbiosis between an authoritarian leader and his poltroons. Any variations in this depiction are merely add-ons to the extremely negative image ascribed to the current authorities. One of the characteristics of the current authorities and their front man is their open proneness to manipulations, i.e. to creating a false image of themselves by constantly serving a story about political and other types of success, but through permanent persuasion about the rightness of every step taken or meant to be taken. Such approach is present in the story about the elections, as well. An example of the manipulative nature of the authorities is the story of the elections, politics and mathematics that was told to the media by the Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić: “He is bewitching the people even when he says that politics is not mathematics. He is personally committed to ratings, focus groups, election projections and, consequently, planning a mathematical formula which would allow him four more years in the office, following the partial

10 Goran Marković, “Do đavola sa strahom,” [To hell with fear] *Nedeljnik*, no. 219, p. 52

11 Idem, p. 53

12 Jovana Gligorijević, “Klub slomljenih srca,” [Broken hearts club] *Vreme*, no. 1310, p. 9

13 Boris Tadić, “Ja sam pao, može i Vučić,” [I went down, so can Vučić] interviewed by Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3399, p. 11

14 Dragoljub Mićunović, “Ni mi nismo znali šta je vlast, a ovi su katastrofa,” [We didn’t know what power was all about, but they are a disaster] interviewed by Jelka Jovanović, *Novi magazin*, no. 250, p. 19

term that started in 2014. Who could blame him? Every politician in the world does the same. What someone might find irritating is affectation, moralising and whining about how only few understand him, although it is obvious that it is also part of the campaign and something like an acted characteristic: a devoted and honest person in the jaws of a calculating one.”¹⁵

This Žarković’s attitude, which confirms the authoritarian-manipulative nature, should be added several amendments. What we have here is the use of historical and current analogies in order to make the claims about the non-democratic nature and practice of the current authorities more suggestive and, as such, susceptible to the readers.

In his personal analysis, a political analyst, editor of NSPM (Nova srpska politička misao) website and then-candidate on the election list of DPS-Dveri Đorđe Vukadinović, compared the present-day Serbia, which is opening chapters in the process of European integrations, with the countries in Central Asia, which boast authoritarian patterns of reign: “And what does the opposition do? What opposition? Indeed, what does the opposition in Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan do, or in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates? (Let’s not inquire about the North Korea). What I am trying to say is that the position of the opposition in Serbia, as well as the position of a critical word in general, is at the lowest level “in recent history of Serbia” and it is quite likely that it will reach new lows in the forthcoming period and the circumstances surrounding the election campaign. There are myriad indications. Basically, these elections are about whether we will turn towards these (central) Asian and Middle East role models or whether, by some miracle, this process of turning Serbia into a country run by a sultan, in the tradition of Oriental despotism.”¹⁶

In the current political-media practice Vukadinović recognises “structural fascism”, scolding the political and cultural elite as an activist, for not being in the same line with him in the struggle against the political and moral pest, which is, allegedly, personified in Aleksandar Vučić’s government: “And now, when the real structural fascism (since fascism is always primarily a matter of form, i.e. method, rather than content) came knocking on the door, they turn they head in disbelief and close their eyes. And they are quite surprised by what has happened to them/us. And how few people are ready to stand up to this evil. (Unlike in the days of Đindić, Koštunica and Tadić, and even Milošević, in the times when it was more-or-less easy and joyful to be in the opposition).”¹⁷

The development of Vukadinović’s thesis was provided by the leader of his coalition, Ms Sanda Rašković Ivić, president of DPS. To be fair, unlike her candidate for a member of parliament, she went much further in creating a negative image of the leader of SPP.

15 Dragoljub Žarković, “Vučićevo zamajavanje naroda-kampanjom će da se bavi deset dana, a već dve godine potpiruje žar obećanja i ljudima podgreva nadu da će biti bolje,” [Vučić lying to people – he would spend ten days campaigning, but for two years he has been agitating them with promises and rekindling their hope that it would be better in the future] Vreme, no. 1308, p. 4

16 Đorđe Vukadinović, “Zašto ste tako predivni? ili šta nas snašlo i dokle će da traje?” [“Why are you so wonderful?” or what has happened to us and how long will it last?] Vreme, no. 1309, p. 15

17 idem, p. 16

In her interview for *NIN* weekly, she compared the present authorities with Hitler’s reign in Germany: “...On 18th January, when he announced the elections, not to the government, but to his own party... that was accompanied by a three-minute applause, which bore striking similarities with certain situations in Germany between the two wars.”¹⁸

At the same time, she compared *Informer* daily, often pro-government, with radio stations in Rwanda, which used to call for nothing less than genocide. This “analytical discovery”, the successor to Vojislav Koštunica presents in the following sentences:

“Unrecorded amount of boorishness. We have journalists who look like that anchor from Rwanda who invited the Hutu tribe to kill and exterminate the Tutsi. I am just waiting for the moment when he starts calling for a lynch and conflict with the members of DPS and me personally, everything is pointing in that direction... Let’s not mince words, Dragan J. Vučićević is Aleksandar Vučić’s spokesperson.”¹⁹

Following the political disqualifications founded on brutal and incorrect analogies, the criticism of Vučić manifested some very clear signs of personal animosity, in line with political labels, deprived of any remotely solid rational construction. It is important to politically brand someone in a psychologically suggestive way, so that the reader does not doubt the expressed attitudes of either the author or the interviewee. A typical example of such attitudes is the interview that Vesna Pešić gave to *Nedeljnik* weekly: “Serbia has not deserved to have an impolite prime minister who insults the citizens’ common sense. It is natural that the citizens are angry with him for constantly causing instability, creating affairs and conspiracies, directing coups, for loving poltroons, bossing the police and prosecution and shouting at MPs and journalists. Plus, he lowered the salaries and pensions! He’s going straight to Hell!”²⁰

As a permanent motif in depicting the current authorities there is this campaign of reminiscence designed in 2008, which has been intensively and systematically executed ever since. The aim of the campaign is to cement the image of Vučić, make it unchangeable and once and for all negative. All negative images that were associated with the gloomy nineties are transferred onto Aleksandar Vučić, who is nothing but a copy of Slobodan Milošević and Vojislav Šešelj at the peak of their political power. Another important and by no means secondary effect of this campaign is to annihilate any political transformation that Vučić started in 2008 by forming the Serbian Progressive Party and which is still ongoing, when the current Serbian prime minister measures his political success, despite everything, by pointing out the progress towards the membership in the EU and the reform process designed to follow in the footsteps of creating a *Rechtstaat* and dynamic market economy. A striking example of this political-media trend is contained in the text by Jovana Gligorijević,

18 Sanda Rašković Ivić, “Neću više da branim Koštunicu,” [I don’t want to defend Koštunica any more] interviewed by Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3401, p. 20

19 Idem, p. 24

20 Vesna Pešić, “Sa nama stvarno nešto nije u redu,” [Something is really off with us] interviewed by Nenad Čaluković, *Nedeljnik*, no. 211, p. 19

deputy editor-in-chief at *Vreme*. This proactive author with a strong sense of party propaganda evokes memories of a historic downfall in order to prevent alleged reaffirmation of the persona and opus, which is allegedly happening both directly and indirectly, in her two texts published in *Politika* daily.

Still, Jovana Gligorijević's aim is not to give a rational judgement of the time under Milošević, but to create space for stigmatising the current Prime Minister Vučić at important moments during the election campaign: "We have to remember everything exactly as it was in order not to believe the texts we are reading these day on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Milošević's death. So that we do not believe Emir Kusturica, who offers beatification of Milošević on the pages of *Politika*, presenting him as a scapegoat of the global international politics. Or, also in *Politika*, Aleksandar Apostolovski offers his vision of Milošević's image in a mirror of every person who succeeded him as the leader of Serbia. It is all part of an operation: if Milošević is rebranded from an autocrat to a "good guy", those who stood shoulder to shoulder with him will no longer be bad guys. We also have to remember exactly how it was in order to, if nothing else, notice a serious logical flaw in the fact that Aleksandar Vučić lays a wreath on 12th March for Zoran Đinđić, while only a few hours later the party whose president he is assails on DOS as the main culprit for all the evil things in the world. It is also important to remember exactly as it was because those who claim otherwise are simply lying."²¹

Director Lazar Stojanović is following the same ideological trail and blames SPP politically and morally for the nineties and somehow, but in a weird way, clearly abolishes DP and its allies for the failed process of transition following Milošević's downfall on 5th October: "The first step would have to be to establish responsibility for that crisis. The authorities are blaming their predecessor, the Democratic Party, who were in power at that time. It is very likely that they did not improve the state they found the best they could. However, what they inherited was a completely destroyed country, where one foreign power had a privileged status, the economy was looted and destroyed, the society corrupted and pauperised, the Nazified media were serving an ethnocentric policy, while the middle-class was destroyed. Perhaps the democrats did not fix all that enough, but they certainly did not make anything worse. It is a paradox that those who exercise power now are the same ones who destroyed the same country during Milošević's reign, but now they blame someone else. Without raising the question of that responsibility, we might be accepted into Europe, but we will not become Europeans."²²

Apart from the accusations for violence and manipulation, the weeklies often offered direct or indirect accusations of corruption. The most illustrative example in that respect is the interview given by the leader of the "Enough is enough" movement, Saša Radulović. Radulović, who used to be a minister in a government alongside Aleksandar Vučić, claims that the current Serbian prime minister is nothing no less than "the centre of corruption in the

21 Jovana Gligorijević, "Sećanje na zla vremena," [Memories of evil times] *Vreme*, no. 1315

22 Lazar Stojanović, "NATO nema alternativu," [NATO has no alternative] *Vreme*, no. 1310

country". A strong moralistic pathos in his speech is noticed in the following quotes: "Vučić is the centre of corruption. I had a conflict with Aleksandar Vučić, because I did not let him use the Development Fund to grant a loan to the company which rented "Fidelinka", owned by Čedomir Jovanović. Vučić invited me to the Government only to later remove me and Miroslava Milenović from the team investigating 24 disputable privatisations. All the files ended in the drawer, except the case of Mišković, but the prime minister is doing everything he can to make that case disappear, as well."²³

The ideologically colourless orientation of Aleksandar Vučić, inconsistent in terms of values, was one of the topics dealt with by the weeklies in the period between January and March. The current prime minister of Serbia was then in the line of fire of both the right-wing leaders and parties and the leaders of pro-European parties.

An introduction to the ideological stigmatisation of Vučić, or to be more precise, a plea for proving that his policy is deprived of any value-related component. A hidden agenda behind this text is to show that Vučić is the sole executor of power, relentless, totally committed to manipulation and repression in order to gain more and more political power, which, it goes without saying, he is ready to continuously defend and renew, regardless of major and fatal historical outcomes of his reign. The "ideological colourlessness" of Vučić's policy is portrayed by the already mentioned journalist from *Vreme*, Jovana Gligorijević. This author claims that Vučić's pro-European policy is just a farce, since he has stultified, with his political practice, all key ideological toposes of the Euro-reform discourse and the accompanying practice: "It was Aleksandar Vučić who pumped out a great amount of political content from Serbia. That is why values, such as Europe, civil society, rule of law, institutions, because of the current practice, sound hollow, like empty shells that used to have some meaning."²⁴ As much as Vučić is not and cannot be a representative of a pro-European political option, Vučić also cannot deliver when it comes to the national or nationalistic option, which is where he was created politically and where he developed into a significant political and public figure.

Vučić's unworthiness of the halo of a Serbian nationalist and, thus, "supreme patriot", is also discussed by his former boss and defendant from The Hague, Vojislav Šešelj. By establishing basic connections between Vučić and Tomislav Nikolić, Šešelj claims that Vučić is a kind of an ideological outlaw from the nationalistic discourse and political practice: "... If they were my 'sons' (referring to Tomislav Nikolić, President of Serbia, and Aleksandar Vučić, Serbian Prime Minister, author's comment), they wouldn't have changed their minds completely, they wouldn't have made a U-turn in terms of ideology and politics, they wouldn't have betrayed SRP."²⁵

It is worth noticing that there is a significant semantic and to some extent rhetorical simi-

23 Saša Radulović, "Vučić je centar korupcije," [Vučić is the centre of corruption] *NIN*, no. 3400, p. 16

24 Jovana Gligorijević, "U kolonu po jedan," [In a file, one by one] *Vreme*, no. 1308

25 Vojislav Šešelj, "Vučić je moj najveći pedagoški neuspeh," [Vučić is my greatest pedagogical failure] interviewed by Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3404, p. 9

larity between the attitudes towards Vučić shared by the editor of the BIRN research team, Slobodan Georgijev, and his political enemy, the leader of SRP, Vojislav Šešelj.

This overlapping of horizons between the two mentioned protagonists of the public and political life will show how well founded is the thesis that the election campaign has unified the opposition in a simple way.

The “meeting point” is the standpoint on the domestic affairs in Serbia – technology of authority and the position and status of media.

Talking about the elections, or more precisely about their technology over the previous two years, a journalist from *Vreme* and the first man of BIRN, Slobodan Georgijev, insists that the local elections held in Serbia in the past two and a half years have shown a rare influence of violent behaviour in relation to political opponents and significant pressure on local citizens: “A common thing for the events in Mionica, Odžaci, Vrbas or Lučani is that people from other places would come and put pressure on people to vote for the Progressive Party’s list and that is some cases certain individuals were attacked, beaten up, some heads were broken, yet we have never learnt the outcome of those attacks.”²⁶

In his “investigative approach” Georgijev tries to identify a SPP’s “special team”, which allegedly tortures and pressures local citizens. The story about the connection between Aleksandar Vučić, leader of SPP, and his “assault divisions” dates back to 2011. Georgijev writes: “It remains recorded that during the crisis in Jarinje in 2011, Vučić praised Veselinović, talking about another businessman from Kosovo, Branko Miljković, as the first criminal who was provided jobs by the then-government made up of the democrats. Such Vučić’s standpoint is used to confirm the thesis that Serbia is publicly silent about: allegedly, Vučić controlled Veselinović and his team during the events in Jarinje and later introduced him to the construction works, when he took over the power. In return, Veselinović is available to help with “his men” to overthrow local authorities. There is no direct evidence supporting this claim, but there is circumstantial evidence that over the past several years Veselinović has made progress in his business and that apart from being involved in the construction of roads in Serbia he has also become the owner of a large hotel on Kopaonik in zone 1 and that it was in that hotel that an associate of Aleksandar Vučić was seen.”²⁷

This loosely based conclusion did not prevent the author from presenting the elections and the atmosphere surrounding the current election campaign as more than disputable. A rational foundation is not based on any facts. The evidence is circumstantial and related to the economic development of Veselinović’s companies. These suspicions are based on coincidences that have never been proven. The investigative journalism of Slobodan Georgijev is at a very low intellectual level. It is a combination of a conspiracy theory, aversion towards the rich and people in power, with a touch of propagandistic labelling. If we

²⁶ Slobodan Georgijev, “Čuvari napredne Srbije,” [Guardians of progressive Serbia] *Vreme*, no. 1309, p. 5

²⁷ Idem, p. 6

look at a wider political context related to the date when the text was written, we can say that the text is aligned with the legitimatisation of the political idea about the internationalisation of the elections, suggested by the leader of the Democratic Party, Bojan Pajtić.

Still, what is particularly interesting is the semantical and, to some extent, rhetorical overlapping between the standpoints of the pro-European journalist from BIRN, Slobodana Georgijeva and the leader of the right-wing anti-European Serbian Radical Party, Vojislav Šešelj. In his interview with Olja Bečković, talking about the regularities of the elections, the leader of the Radical Party claims the following: “Question: You did not take part in the local elections due to, as you said, “battalions of skinheads who take people to vote”. Who are those “Mafiosi, skinheads, criminals” and where are they brought from?

Šešelj: They are mostly brought from Belgrade, but from other places in Serbia, as well. It is a campaign of “enticing” and “scaring” at the same time. They give away to people basic food, household appliances, whatever they can think of. Then come those divisions, which are meant to scare people, they knock on the door and call a person to go to the elections, offering 2,000-3,000 dinars for one vote and then they control how people vote.

Question: Is that a legacy from the Radical Party?

Šešelj: No, we have never done that. Such violence and bribery was not even present with the Socialist Party in the 90’s, although they did all sorts of things. What the Progressive Party is doing now is something we have never done.”²⁸

In order to complete the image of the authorities, i.e. Aleksandar Vučić, as their main and undisputed representative, we should also look at another interview published in the renowned *NIN* weekly on 28th January 2016. This is an interview done by famous journalist Olja Bečković with Professor Srbijanka Turajlić, PhD, a civil activist who is not a member of any party.

The text under the headline “We are constantly being humiliated” features the typical characteristics of the image of the authorities in the Serbian public, point out the key moments of a radically critical discourse, reveals its presumptions, structure and manner of drawing conclusions. Furthermore, apart from the cognitive, rhetorical aspect, the interview exudes strong advocacy for political activism in the political arena. The interview is a paradigm of an engaged socio-political activist, i.e. an independent individual who has completely and without any restrictions joined a propagandistic political struggle, with even greater moralistic zeal than it is the case with party leaders, accompanied by indignation and wish for political confrontations.

Under Srbijanka Turajlić’s magnifying glass, the Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić is an anti-democrat, a fraud who has been constantly humiliating the citizens, and especially

²⁸ Vojislav Šešelj, “Vučić je moj najveći pedagoški problem,” [Vučić is my greatest pedagogical failure] interviewed by Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3404, p. 24

his own associates, a man who is leading us towards a disaster, who suffocates freedoms and rights, an almighty authoritarian controller of media, a thug who destroys the democratic rules of the game. The headline was created in order to awake an authentic negative feeling, such as deep disappointment and anger with the reader, solely for the purpose of the authorities' policy. In order to create such effects, extreme, morally and psychologically negative terminology is selected to explain complex political and wider processes. Vučić's decision to call elections is seen as "... careless mocking of democracy and democratic rules."²⁹

Vučić's alleged destruction of democracy is simultaneous to the construction of a system of lies and deceptions, which is continuously and intensively (self)renewed: "I am afraid that most citizens' failure to understand that they are living in an outrageous lie is going to win. Helped by the media, Vučić has managed to create an illusion that he is a superman, ready for everything, prepared for any sacrifice, so that the citizens would be better off. Unfortunately, most of them still believe that. Still, no illusion has managed to last forever. It has to burst like a soap bubble eventually, the only question is when. I am afraid we're destined to live in this lie for four more years."³⁰

This "non-democratic order of a great lie" is ruled by a "fraud" and "conceited Messiah who is always troubled by someone". The two qualifications mentioned above are also noticed in the following parts of the interview: "Whether Vučić is going towards Europe is not an issue, the issue is this unreal carelessness he uses to rule this country, my issue is that he has turned out to be just a simple fraud... He said there would be no employing of party members, but an enormous number of people have been employed. Someone asked him about it and the reply was fascinating: "Give me his name and surname..." The moment you solemnly promise that party members would not be employed, yet bring one of you closest friends to Elektromreže Srbije, you become a simple fraud."³¹

When asked, "Do you belong to the conceited elite?", Turajlić replies, "I think it is he who is a conceited Messiah, who imagines beings bothered by someone." The moral-psychological degradation of Aleksandar Vučić is followed by a combination of moralistic pessimism and a call for political support to the Democratic Party, based on rationally disputable foundations. The language the interviewee uses maintains a lot of personal colloquialism and is accompanied by a naïve activist call for support to one of the parties in a political confrontation. An intellectual from the public-political life, who should remain unbiased and morally persistent, becomes a propagandist of the first order. The words are instruments in the struggle for the Party's cause:

"I am starting to be afraid that we are losing a sense of what is decent and what isn't. We

29 Srbijanka Turaljić, "Mi se neprekidno ponižavamo," [We are constantly humiliating ourselves] interviewed by Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3396, p. 16

30 Idem, p. 16

31 Idem, p. 17

are constantly being humiliated."³² In the spirit of the aforementioned political activism, the following standpoints are expressed: "I think that the topic of these elections is "let's vote for a change", because it is obvious that the situation we are living in at the moment is leading to a catastrophe and with democratic forces."³³

A change whose political agents would be representatives of 5th October Serbia is justified in the allegedly acquired awareness of DS and its partners that they were punished at the 2012 elections. A loss at elections is a comparative advantage over Vučić: "If the Democrats regained power, they would have to reign knowing that they would be punished if they did not deliver, because it has already happened to them. Vučić does not have such experience."³⁴

A brief glance at the image of the authorities in Serbian weeklies in the period January-March 2016 showed that the process of creating the image was boiled down to creating negative attitudes towards the key protagonist of Serbian authorities - Aleksandar Vučić.

Serbian prime minister was analysed using a number of various negative attributes. Their range includes the following: an autocrat, manipulator, dictator, fraud, "conceited Messiah", ideologically colourless, thug, careless, egoistic, resembling Hitler, politically similar to central-Asian dictators... The concentration of a large number of negative attributes related to personified character shows that the campaign against the authorities in Serbia, or more precisely against its front man, was led following the pattern of a personified negative campaign. The aim of this campaign was to use this "media radiation" of negativity to awake the feelings of anger and indignation and stimulate anti-Vučić activism. The sharp tone and constant emphasis on certain decisive political messages are understandable in the context of the then-ongoing intensive election campaign.

Image of the opposition – weak according to public opinion, fragmented, facing the survival challenge, disputable moral and political credibility, desirable to be stronger, sometimes of uncertain patriotic orientation

Image of the opposition is more nuanced and complex than that of the government. The government is primarily depicted negatively, while some weeklies and editorial columns portrayed the opposition on several different levels. This circumstance is somewhat paradoxical bearing in mind the level of public support for the government and the opposition. And while the considerably more superior government is depicted extremely negatively, the opposition has a kind of different, less sharp and ideologically focused treatment, excluding Šešelji's Radicals, who mostly have the same negative image attributed to them during the war years in the nineties. Apart from the weekly *Pečat*, civil and pro-European opposition is not particularly negatively questioned and disputed. The only distinct challenging in the pro-European weeklies was derived from the information that this political group is not polit-

32 Idem, p. 17

33 Idem, p. 16-17

34 Idem, p. 17

ically stronger, and inherently not competitive, compared to SNS in the overcrowded political market. Particular objections to the period when the opposition had been in office were not present, nor were the objections specifically targeting leaders and political positions during the campaign. On the contrary. In certain texts and interviews, distinct contrasting between the current, Vučić's Serbia, and former Serbia, Serbia of the winners of October 5th (most direct examples "We are continuously humiliating ourselves," interview with Professor Srbi-janka Turajlić, PhD, *NIN* of 28th January 2016 and Jovana Gligorijević "Reminiscences of evil times," *Vreme* of 17th March 2016), with the aim of making an indirect alibi for the political elite of October 5th.

In the classical propaganda key, two Serbias are confronted: 1) Serbia of the nineties, for which blame is attributed to the current Prime Minister Vučić, despite his minor political role at that historic moment; 2) Serbia after the fall of Milošević up to 2012, which despite all its faults surpasses the apocalyptic Serbia of Milošević's time as well as the present political moment. This journalistic narrative was additionally supported by explicit statements of opposition leaders which could have been read in numerous interviews during the first three months (as well as the typical form of interview, please refer to the interview of former President Tadić in *NIN* "I went down, so can Vučić," of 18th February 2016).

Portraying the state of the political life in Serbia, Ljiljana Smajlović, Editor in Chief of *Politika*, pointed to the weakness of opposition as the political weakness of the nation, but also of Vučić's government itself, "In the Serbian context...in the great weakness of Vučić's opposition lies grave danger both for Serbia and for Vučić." This weakness of the nation and inherently of the prime minister is reflected in the strong dividing line made in the Serbian society. This is why the editor of *Politika* asks herself whether and why the elections are necessary, taking into account division as the key word which defines Serbian society, "Are elections really the solution for divisions and political hatred? Will there be less or more of this in the campaign? Is the government determined to build for itself a strong and principled opposition?"³⁵

The most prominent critical depiction of the opposition scene in the print media, without any moralist scruples and stylish modifications and politically extremely incorrect, is the work of the editor of *Informer* Dragan J. Vučićević. Sharp tongue, harsh words, personified criticism make up the core of Vučićević's writing approach. Essentially, his discourse represents a blend of several moments which paint the picture of the opposition as the political actor: lack of moral credibility, corruption, pro-Western, more specifically EU and NATO, orientation, destructive and socially and historically dangerous "squad."

Moralistic discourse of Vučićević's column contains a myriad of elements – challenging the credibility of the programs and the leaders. Vučićević's wording is criticising *ad hominem* and it bears strong emotional charge. Vocabulary of this author is sprawling with curse words, accusations, many harsh words, frequently labels. Brutal language is supposed to show the

severity of real and alleged moral transgressions of the opposition leaders and their supporters among the public. At the same time, deepening of anger and indignation is achieved by two interconnected effects – preventing large-scale spreading of opposition activity and maintaining the negative tension of the population directed against the opposition leaders and parties.

Opposition is put in the wider context of possible notion of social chaos. What is more, it has the role of constantly independently inciting social riots and if possible providing them with a plausible political articulation. Opposition as part of the wider context – foreign and domestic policy – appears as the maker and executor. In a nutshell, chaos is the only state in which the opposition can function meaningfully, "The New Year will bring us, as it should, lots of new things. In Serbian politics, it is quite certain that things will remain as they are. Same old, same old. Same Vučić, same opposition. Same media, same tycoons. Same interests of foreign powers, same embassies...Not even the chaos, the daily political one, or the media chaos, read on the front pages every day and followed in breaking news, will be new. Only this chaos will be considerably stronger in 2016! Anyway, in order to understand what awaits us in the new year, we must firstly understand whose destiny is being resolved and whose millions-worth interests are at hand in this leap 2016. This is the year of Mišković's sentencing. This is the year in which Pajtić will lose the majority in Vojvodina after 16 years. This is the year in which at least one or likely two dailies will face the market and be forced to shut down. This is the year in which Vučić – provided he really wants Serbia to be a legal state – will have to apply the law to all, even to those who hide their stinking robbing combinations behind business cards of controversial media businessmen. This is, finally, the year in which, faced with an increasing NATO threat, Serbia will have to make a strategic decision about arming. This is the year, let us not forget, in which Serbia will be under the greatest possible pressure from the West to give up on itself by giving up mother Russia."³⁶

The only way out of the chaos is elections on all levels of government. Early parliamentary elections, regular provincial and local elections. The elections, according to the editor of *Informer* are "the only good solution." They are viewed as a political chance to defeat all opponents of Vučić's political course. At the same time, the upcoming parliamentary elections should be the last "early elections." This means that the revalidated government of Vučić and SNS would fortify its positions and extend its mandate to 2020. "Special parliamentary elections are not the only option, but in present-day Serbia they are the only good solution. In an atmosphere of daily political and media chaos which is imposed by most of the newspapers and TV stations, in a situation in which nearly every day endless false affairs are launched, aimed at accumulating nonsense, at a time when the Public Media Service of Serbia is openly working against the majority in Serbia, in a position in which each even slightly good news is buried under a pile of unscrupulous lies, Vučić actually has no choice. He must in the spring elections prove once again his own legitimacy. And these elections, which are quite certain now, must be clearly time-limited with one very important condition in order to make sense. The prime minister and his Progressives must, namely, say loud and

35 Ljiljana Smajlović, "Stanje nacije," [State of the nation] *Politika*, 14. 01. 2016, p. 5

36 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Godina haosa," [Year of chaos] *Informer*, 10. 01. 2016, p. 5

clear to the Serbian people that these are the last early elections which the people will have to take part in. Therefore, if they again win the most votes, then their first irrevocable decision must be: Next elections are in 2020! There will be no more early elections regardless of the campaigns and media affairs. We must spend the next four years working and focusing on the state. Period.”³⁷

Vučičević's image of Serbia is Manichean. There is a division to the politically and morally good and politically and morally evil. Vučićević cast the role of the positive hero of “our Serbian political story” to the leader of SNS, Aleksandar Vučić. All others, excluding Vojislav Šešelj, are on the other political and moral side. Politically and morally, they are the bad guys. His penchant for strong polarization of the elite is transported to the division of the media. They are categorized based on the same moral-political key:

1) those free and dedicated to the truth and good of Serbia and 2) media under the influence of the defeated political groups which had been in office by 2012, tycoons and Western power centres.

Division to two Serbias, as a methodological principle in approaching actors, events and political processes, will be particularly visible in Vučićević's portrayal of the distribution of political power on the political stage of Serbia and its ideological profile.

On one side is Aleksandar Vučić, SNS and his coalition partners, on the other side are all other political parties, which are united in a merciless fight against SNS and its leader. This typology includes the coalition partner SNS, Socialist Party of Serbia. The aim of SPS and all other parties is to take down SNS and Vučić for one clear cause – return to office and furthering their material wealth. Dedicated to this cause, the anti-Vučić forces will rely on the idea of uniting whilst simulating that they are actually not present as political actors, “Čeda Jovanović said over a year ago that Dačić's political strategy boils down to lying down and playing dead when the bear comes. It seems that in the dawn of the upcoming campaign for the spring early elections both Dačić and Čeda Šiler and all other vivid characters of the pretentiously self-proclaimed Serbian opposition – which is really the crumbling Democratic Party – are resorting precisely to this strategy. They will try to trick the “bear” by playing “dead.” To simplify, together – from SPS, over DS and LDP, and all the way to DSS and Dveri – they will all take part in the elections with three, four, maybe five, columns with only one idea: to win one vote more than Vučić's Progressives. And then, overnight, they will be “revived” and form government, all against one.”³⁸

What applies to the distribution of political actors entering the election race, also applies to the ideological or idea conflict in Serbian society and politics. Division onto two Serbias is primarily a division between Vučić's concept of reforms and concept deprived of any clear

content and political and historic responsibility, “That one and only idea is Vučić's idea of Serbia united around Serbia. Everything else, more or less obviously, boils down to the already overused clichéd parole: “Vučić, you fag!” Because, if it were not so, if Serbian party politics are focused on anything apart from the bare, personal, mostly financial interest, if the damn dirty cash did not enjoy the status of supreme divinity among the parties' quasi-leaders, then certainly it would not be possible for Sanda Rašković Ivić, Bojan Pajtić, Boris Tadić, Borko Stefanović, through Ružić and Mrkonjić and even Ivica Dačić to join forces for the sake of one single task.”³⁹

Opposition is very clearly depicted as politically harmful. Its, according to Vučićević, harmful effect is reflected in the neglect of the common good and understanding of politics as a tool for acquiring power and privileges. In order to remain in the fight for privileges and political power, coalitions are formed, and they are the first necessary step towards winning majority. Moralistic criticism of the opposition, told in a summarised and suggestive form, may be recognised in the following places from the text of the editor in chief of *Informer*, “Coalitions are made just to make the threshold, and they storm positions only to snatch more cash. Anyone claiming differently is either stupid or paid to lie...Vote for me so that I can have it better, if the majority believes the fairy tales of those who have cheated and robbed this country whenever they were given the chance, then this will mean that Serbia does not deserve a future.”⁴⁰

Strong polarization of the political stage, either on the level of distribution of political actors, or on the level of idea orientations, is transposed to the foreign policy plan, as well. According to Vučićević, Serbia is divided to patriotic, pro-Serbian political groups, which are embodied in Vučić's coalition and SRS of Vojislav Šešelj, and EU, more specifically pro-European parties, which represent all other parties, though during the campaign, the daily *Informer* attributed a strongly emphasized American influence to Dveri.

An important element in Vučićević's portrayal of the political moment is the debate among the media. And in the case of the media, like with political actors, a division which is strictly ideological and political is present. Positioning himself in opposition of the journalistic elite from the previous DOS era, Vučićević quite severely argues with IAJS, investigating networks, like BIRN, CINS, KRIK. All mentioned media companies, together with a set of parties and non-government organizations, are grouped by Vučićević under the front with a common denominator – merciless fight against Vučić reflected in the intention to restore political order from before 2012, i.e. 2014. Negative obsession with Aleksandar Vučić results in a dirty political campaign. A campaign of defamation of the first man of Serbian politics, tearing down his authority and personal credibility, “The election campaign upon us will be, you can bet on it, politically stinking and media quicksand in which the other-Serbia's yellow scum elite will try to drown the normal and honest Serbia. This, let me be clear, the last political chance for Pajtić, Tadić, Živković, Čeda Jovanović, Šutanovac, but also Ružić and

37 Dragan J. Vučićević, “Biće to poslednji vanredni izbori,” [These will be the last early elections] *Informer*, 16. 01. 2016, p. 5

38 Dragan J. Vučićević, “Svi protiv jednog,” [All against one] *Informer*, 30. 01. 2016, p. 5

39 Dragan J. Vučićević, “Kraj ideologije,” [The end of ideology] *Informer*, 12. 03. 2016, p. 5

40 Idem, p. 5



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Mrkonjić and all others similar political scoundrels and thieves; this is the last chance for the numerous racketeers hidden behind business cards of journalists, editors and newspaper and TV owners; this is the last chance for Mišković and the likes of he, DOS' tycoons, all those who are slowly, but surely, being brought to justice, and this is actually the most dangerous thing for the fate of Serbia. This is, let us sum it up, the last chance for the worst and the most corrupt to get back in the saddle again and to take us all back to the time of bro-mate combinations.⁴¹

To sum up, similar to the general image and image of the government, image of the opposition is predominantly negative. A distinguished role in attributing negative value component to opposition parties is played by the paper *Informer*, both in terms of texts which appear in the daily edition, and in the editorial column of Dragan J. Vučićević.

Vučićević's columns in the moral-political sense problematize actors on the opposition stage, just as they are critical to opposition media and NGOs, with almost inevitable reflection on the period of rule of the winners of October 5th. Basic theses could be summed up in these three mutually connected moments which constitute the approach of this author: 1) current opposition has no moral credibility (due to highly corrupted political class it comprises) and no political capacity to lead the country due to the failed transition in Serbia, 2) in the pro-opposition media, and among the print media this means the majority, the current Government is attacked without a serious rational explanation with one single goal to overthrow it as soon as possible 3) there is an undoubted discrimination of all who are not direct opponents of Vučić's government in the media supporting the current opposition.

Vučićević's criticism of the Serbian opposition scene is equally directed towards the opposition as the component of political life, but also towards the media that are extremely critical towards the government. His criticism is always based on *ad hominem* principle, strictly personalised, in order to make it convincing. That is why stigma is attached to a certain person, its moral and psychological profile is sketched, making this person unworthy of any function in the public life.

Writing of *Informer's* editor in chief is relevant for the comprehension of the media and political stage in Serbia for three interconnected reasons. Firstly, the style of writing and content of messages of some of his texts are such that they keep the interest in politics with the undereducated layers of the population who mostly buy and read tabloids and who are very loyal voters in the election process. Secondly, *Informer* is important for the current government because week in and week out this paper questions the negative attitudes towards the government and media and political images of it which are created and continuously reproduced by the critical media. And finally, *Informer* is a leader in the area of daily press in the creating of the negative image of the current opposition as a political actor.

Negative view of the Euro-civil opposition is also advocated by the weekly *Pečat*. The weekly

41 Dragan J. Vučićević "Najprljavija kampanja," [The dirtiest campaign] *Informer*, 06. 02. 2016, p. 5

Pečat is essentially pro-Serbian and pro-Russian oriented and it views the actions of the current opposition as extremely negative – detrimental to national and state interests. This thesis is based on non-critical acceptance of cooperation with EU and NATO, which involves giving up vital and national interests in its essence. Construction of the negative image of the Euro-civil opposition was directly conducted by the historian and political analyst Dragomir Anđelković, who writes as follows with reference to the possible victory of the Euro-civil parties in the elections, “First they will coercively undermine Republika Srpska and then the few remaining Serbian positions in Kosovo and Metohija and then they will offer us to join NATO in an accelerated procedure and to distance ourselves from Russia. Then, they will allegedly leave us alone. Of course, provided we are “reasonable,” and that means that we accept the “rearranging” of Dayton, which would mean certain level of centralization of BiH. In a nutshell, their intention is to get concessions from us in the Balkans, but also in terms of global positioning. What would Serbia get in return? Nothing. Only a promise that they will not inflict more harm onto us. At the same time, we would be signing a blank acceptance of this being done when the time is right, if they wanted to. Because, after all, cooperation with Russia is some kind of protection from further mutilation of Serbian area. If we give it up, we would be left to the mercy of those who already dismembered us.”⁴²

Unlike this harsh criticism of the opposition implemented consistently and systematically by Dragan J. Vučićević in his texts or by authors from the weekly *Pečat*, some authors, like Đorđe Vukadinović in *Vreme* or Vera Didanović in *NIN* depict the opposition as a political force which is under strong and brutal repression of the regime either on the media plane, or on the plane of party battles. From the spirit and the letters of this kind of texts, one can read that the opposition represents a blend of heroism and suffering. Characteristic formulation of this and this type of political viewpoint and moral stand is contained in the following positions of Đorđe Vukadinović, “And what does the opposition do? What opposition? Indeed, what does the opposition in Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan do? What does it do in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates? (Let us not inquire about North Korea). What I want to say is the position of the opposition in Serbia, as well as critical word in general, is at its lowest point in “more recent Serbian history” and it seems that it will be additionally lowered in the conditions of the forthcoming election campaign. There are numerous indications of this. Without much exaggeration, the position of the opposition in Serbia (I am referring to real opposition to the regime of his personal government, not the declarative, quasi-ideological and extreme one, which Vučić nurtures under the condition that it does not target him and with which he manipulates in order to present himself as the “voice of reason”, “moderate” and “sensible” centre-oriented politician to his interlocutors from the West) may be compared to its position in certain Central-Asian republics, or East-European after the Second World War. You think I’m overreacting? You think that in Serbia (which is, isn’t it, making way down its “European path”) there is no social and psychological basis for something like that? Try to glance outside your circle of real and virtual friends and look over the fence to Serbia of “Farma” (Farm), “Parovi” (Couples), “Minut dva” (Minute or two) and other *Informers*. Serbia which is unaffected by posts of Bojana Maljević, columns of Draža and Medenica, or witty satirical

decasyllabics of “Filip Višnjić.” Serbia of “grandma from babušnica” who says that she “has two internets, but the kids took both of them to Belgrade”. The grandma who trusts Vučić because he “passed on the telegraph”...structural fascism (because fascism is always primarily about form, i.e. method and then content) is knocking at our door. People are turning their heads away with disbelief and closing their eyes. They cannot believe what has befallen them/us. They cannot believe how few people are ready to confront this evil. (Unlike in the time of Đinđić, Koštunica and Tadić – or even Milošević, at one point – when it was more or less easy and merry to be the opposition).⁴³

Vukadinović’s heroisation of the Euro-civil and patriotic opposition, gathered around the coalition DSS-Dveri (on whose list he is running in the elections – author’s comm.), is followed also by an alibi for opposition’s weakness. It rests on the circumstance of insufficient foundation in the social, political and media surroundings in Serbia. Serbia’s opposition is not dominant because it cannot be due to sociological, cultural and psychological circumstances. In such circumstances, being the opposition represents a moral feat and some kind of political obligation of the first order, this author, who is essentially politically oriented, and inherently tendentious, seems to be saying to us.

Image of the opposition has also been built starting from the examining of its chances, more specifically its potential to pose a threat to the favoured government, i.e. Serbian Progressive Party and Aleksandar Vučić. In terms of reflection, i.e. self-reflection, possibilities and reaches of opposition parties in the elections, two viewpoints have been established. One viewpoint, more specifically one journalistic-analytical school of thought, pointed to objective limits in terms of model of appearance and reach of the opposition in the upcoming elections.

Paradigmatic text depicting objective thoughts about the potentials and outlook of the opposition in the upcoming elections is the article of Jovana Gligorijević “In a file, one by one”, *Vreme* dated 28th January 2016. An analysis of the state of things with the opposition based on facts at the time of scheduling the elections is presented in the text, “From the moment when Aleksandar Vučić “threw the bone” and decided to go for early parliamentary elections, along with the regular local and provincial ones, opposition parties started kicking and showing signs of life. However, from what we saw over the last ten days, parties which are not part of the government are running around like headless chickens, like insulted primadonas or in some serious discord with reality, unaware of their real power, i.e. lack of it.”⁴⁴ Despite the realistic analysis of the opposition’s potential and chances, journalist of *Vreme* clearly underlines an attitude about the disputable nature of the elections scheduled for 24th April 2016. This manoeuvre has double meaning. On one hand, this is a follow-up on the already created image of Vučić’s rule as anti-democratic, authoritative and socially and historically detrimental. On the other hand, by casting doubt over the regularity of the elections, an alibi

42 Dragomir Anđelković, “Postizborne zamke,” [Post-election traps] *Pečat*, no. 412, p. 12

43 Đorđe Vukadinović, ““Zašto ste tako predivni” ili šta nas snašlo i dokle će da traje?” [“Why are you so wonderful?” or what has happened to us and how long will it last?] *Vreme*, no. 1309, p. 15- 16

44 Jovana Gligorijević, “U kolonu po jedan,” [In a file, one by one] *Vreme*, no. 1308, p. 6

is being sought for the failure of the opposition and basis is created for the dispute of all that will come out of the election result: new government led by the prime minister, its program, political moves, and finally its duration. "Serbia is facing at least 50 days of the election campaign, and it is already evident that it will be a ruthless one. If we were to judge by what we have been witnessing since 2012 till now, it is most likely that we will watch the stronger take it out on the weaker. This will not be pleasant or harmless, because we have already seen how individuals, media or independent institutions become collateral damage in political showdowns. Actually, all institutions. We should be worried precisely because of this. Also, it is indicative that for the first time since 2000 the democratic nature of the election process is under question. Repeated local elections in small towns over the past two years brought about beatings, threats and other intimidation mechanisms. This prompts the question whether the ruling SNS is really that sure in its superiority as it pretends."⁴⁵

State of unpreparedness, political dilettantism, lack of reality, in a word, incompetence to create realistically competitive political alternative to the present government marks the political moment the opposition is in. This powerlessness is seen through three aspects: 1) crisis of trust in the leadership and lack of new credible opposition parties 2) crisis of political identity, more specifically lack of program orientation which is a believable alternative to the leaders of the ruling coalition of Aleksandar Vučić and Ivica Dačić, 3) fragmentation of the opposition scene, more specifically the circumstance that opposition parties of identical or relevantly similar orientation are acting independently and risking their remaining above the high election threshold of five percent of citizens' support. About this and other aspects of opposition's activity in Serbia, columnist of *Pečat* Nikola Vrzić writes, "In any case, this pro-European opposition, which has not recovered from the loss of power and accompanying authorities and Vučić's snatching of its pro-European politics, awaits the elections and the campaign in a state which, as we said before, Vučić could only ask for. Divided into two columns, actually three, maybe even all four, because along with Pajtić and Živković, i.e. Tadić and Jovanović and Nenad Čanak, Saša Radulović (Enough is enough) and Left wing of Serbia of Borislav Borko Stefanović will charge the same electorate. Naturally, for the simple reason that they have the same target group, none of them are posing as an unparalleled leader, their mutual fight will have to be pretty harsh, and also sneaky because they publically swore not to attack each other."⁴⁶

Parallel to the objectively torn scene, pro-European alternative to Vučić has a problem with maintaining its main goal – Serbia's accession to EU. EU has been in a crisis for a long time, and consequently, according to Vrzić, it is hard to believe in the certainty of Serbia's entering this supranational organization. Pursuant to that, there are slim chances for political mobilization of some new or disappointed voters who would support the pro-European political parties," In the last elections in 2014, the electorate we are talking about, the one that honestly thinks the EU has no alternative, counted about 75 thousand voters; given all that is ongoing in the European Union, it is hard to imagine that the number of these voters increased by

45 Idem, p. 12

46 Nikola Vrzić, "Mala predizborna svađa," [Minor pre-election argument] *Pečat*, no. 410

some substantial sum, but quite the contrary. An additional problem with these parties is the fact that since 2014 to this day, they have not managed to formulate any other policy or even idea which would make them distinguishable and more attractive than they were then."⁴⁷

In the period from January to March 2016, another school of thought has appeared in the weeklies, the school advocated by opposition leaders and the school which prompted optimism. This optimism fluctuated from pointing to the possibility of victory of opposition parties to forecasting a much better result in support percentage and number of MPs compared to the estimates of public opinion research agencies. Optimism of the opposition has additionally been inflated by certain journalistic speculations about Đinđić's political course in the current political circumstances, as well as the compromising of Vučić's unparalleled domination over the public opinion, by pointing to the political potential of the current candidate from Serbia for the position of UN Secretary General and Tadić's former foreign minister, Vuk Jeremić in some future presidential elections in the midst of an election campaign for local, provincial and republican elections.

The motif "we are stronger than they think" is present on regular basis in the statements of all opposition leaders. This tendency is particularly visible in interviews given during the campaign. The tendency is understandable. It is necessary to motivate one's own members, especially activists out in the field, attract donors for the campaign, and above all, motivate a wider layer of disappointed opposition voters to take part in the election race.

Anyway, even a glance at the campaign of the opposition parties will reveal that the success formula was "increase voter turnout in order to increase the election result." Practical development of this motto is precisely the mentioned attitude "We are stronger than they think."

In the placement of this attitude, as it was already indicated, opposition leaders fluctuated from claims that artificially increased their ratings to the position on the uncertainty of Vučić's victory. Referring to the latter option, former president of Serbia Boris Tadić was especially vocal in his interview with the journalist Olja Bečković, done for *NIN* in early March 2016. In an interview headlined "I went down, so can Vučić," Tadić puts forward the following, "I was also the so-called sure winner, well Vučić should think about that in these elections. A twist is always possible in politics and I believe it is possible already on these elections. This mostly depends on the turnout, because SNS is supported by less than one quarter of the electorate. Opposition still has not been completely consolidated, but it is more organized and stronger than six months ago."⁴⁸

47 Idem

48 Boris Tadić, "Ja sam pao, može i Vučić," [I went down, so can Vučić] interviewed by Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3399, p. 13

With the same message for the government, more precisely to Aleksandar Vučić, Bojan Pajtić, President of the Democratic Party, appears, “No. There is research which we trust because we know they are objective, where DS is at about 11 percent. To start.”⁴⁹

Obviously trying to motivate voters at all costs, Pajtić claims that Vučić’s days of political domination are numbered, “In these elections, it is possible to create a situation in which Vučić will not have the majority to form the government. Serbia has a chance provided three quarters of voters who are unhappy with the regime vote. Vučić is basing his entire support on the twenty percent of those who support him. 75% of the citizens are unhappy with the fact that the land they used to cultivate is being taken from them, that the country is destroyed by secret contracts, depleting natural resources, that those who bought diplomas are in office, that even 65-year-olds are fleeing the country due to the atmosphere in our society. Not only for economic reasons, but because it has become physiologically unacceptable to live in a country run by Gašić, Maja Gojković, Vučić and Vulin.”⁵⁰

Raising self-confidence with the psychological and political slogan “we are stronger than they think” is not just a characteristic of the ambitious Tadić and Pajtić, but also of the right-winged opposition. Motivational propaganda is recognised in the address of Sanda Rašković Ivić, President of DSS, who, without any reserves, claims in the weekly *NIN* as follows:

“Question of Olja Bečković (*NIN*): ‘What kind of result are you expecting?’

Answer of Sanda Rašković Ivić: ‘Before starting with this campaign, we were at 8 percent, we hope to improve that result, to speak ambitiously – I expect a double-digit result.’”⁵¹

In the same way, with accompanying harsh accusations at the expense of polling agencies, Vojislav Šešelj, leader of the Serbian Radicals, also put forward his election parole. In an interview for *NIN*, he says:

„Question of Olja Bečković (*NIN*): ‘Whatever he is, why is he doing this if he has such popularity as the polls indicate?’

Answer of Vojislav Šešelj: ‘I alone am proof that there are no public opinion polls to base such results on. Faktor plus, Ipsos Strategic Marketing and NSPM, these agencies do not conduct the research, they just arbitrarily, as ordered, publish percents. Vučić has his own research done in strict secrecy, and this research gives different results. Things are changing rapidly, his cart started going downhill a long time ago, and he is now at about 35-40 percent.’

49 Bojan Pajtić, “Vučić neće imati većinu za vladu,” [Vučić will not have the majority for government] *NIN*, interviewed by Olja Bečković, no. 3402, p. 9

50 Idem, p. 9

51 Sanda Rašković Ivić, “Neću više da branim Koštunicu,” [I do not want to defend Koštunica anymore] interviewed by Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3401, p. 20

Question of Olja Bečković (*NIN*): ‘According to which research is SRS at about 20 percent?’

Answer of Vojislav Šešelj: ‘His research a few months ago showed that we have over 20 percent. And who else could have it, if not us? Pajtić, Boris Tadić, Čedomir Jovanović, Sanda Rašković Ivić? Come on, please.’”⁵²

Rhetorical increase of percentages was supposed to *ad hoc* create an image of a strong opposition scene, to convince the voter who is unhappy with the current state of politics, economy and society, that it makes sense to vote, that it is not all over, that Vučić is not untouchable and politically invincible. Questioning Vučić’s superiority was an amalgam of symbolic and promoting important issues which were not, nor could they have been, relevant during the current campaign. As genies from the “propaganda bottle” Zoran Đinđić and Vuk Jeremić appeared.

For sake of the propaganda-political reviving of the opposition scene and establishment of meaningful opposition activism and political orientation, persona and opus of Zoran Đinđić were (ab)used. Đinđić as a symbol of the democratic and enlightened Serbia is remembered as a raw realist, a pragmatic man characterised by strong energy and extraordinary organisational abilities. As part of such assessment of Đinđić’s personality and his political stand, Nenad Čaluković, journalist of the weekly *Nedeljnik*, notes that the late leader of the Democrats Zoran Đinđić would have made an entire opposition front which would unite other politically interested social groups, and at the same time he would accept the bitter reality of the tabloidization of the media scene, and develop more plausible mechanisms of attacking the government, “Intellectuals probably would not stay silent, at least not to this extent. Voice of the NGO sector would be much louder. He would use every chance to put pressure on Vučić. Protests against Minister Gašić, for example, would not be attended by only journalists, but DS and other opposition parties would play a key part or they would provide serious logistic support. He would motivate the cultural elite not to withdraw to the theatre and to whine far from the ears of the audience...If the tabloidization of the media was to peak – but one should mention that even Đinđić himself laid foundations for this – he would appear on the front pages frequently, he would try to cash in on the texts against him. He would have bigger support of the tycoons who have been targeted by Vučić, but he would not shy away from going against the nouvelle riches that have increased their financial accounts over the past four years. Pragmatically, as only he could, he would realise some political goal. Following a tested recipe, he would form some new “Resistance” which would be the wind in the sails of the opposition. He would ask for strong support of the civil, i.e. non-government sector. Zoran’s strike on the Progressives’ government would come from several directions. So, not only from parties, but from several political cells. Sufficient for the start of the political show-down with Vučić.”⁵³

52 Vojislav Šešelj, “Vučić je moj najveći pedagoški promašaj,” [Vučić is my greatest pedagogical failure] interviewed by Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3404, p. 9-10

53 Nenad Čaluković, “Šta bi Đinđić uradio u opoziciji danas?” [What would Đinđić do in the opposition today] *Nedeljnik*, No. 210, p. 21

If turning to Đinđić was aimed at “breathing in” optimism in the opposition activism on the level of party elites and activists in the field, underlining the story about the presidential candidacy of Vuk Jeremić seemed strange, to say the least. Former foreign minister of Serbia has not been active in party life for over three years, he formed an international think-tank, he travels the world, promoting himself as the most influential player in world organisations; he publishes a magazine which deals with current global topics and dilemmas. All in all, Jeremić is not even relevant as a topic, let alone a political player in the domain of internal political battles in Serbia. However, after the decision about early elections on all levels of government, and in the light of the circumstances that Aleksandar Vučić is convincingly dominant in Serbian politics and public opinions, news about public polls making Vuk Jeremić no other than the President of Serbia was released.

The whole media performance happened at a time when the government was “crossing spears” about whether the state would support Vuk Jeremić in the race for UN Secretary General. This internal-foreign political media play in the context of the current election campaign was aimed at showing that apart from Aleksandar Vučić there is someone who is ready to win over a considerable part of the voters, “Vuk’s chances of winning the most important position on the foreign policy plan lessen and lessen on the internal plan. South African Republic is ready to nominate Jeremić. It sent its enquiry to the Serbian government, which still has not taken a stand. President Nikolić publically withdrew his support after he got the results of the research ordered by Jeremić. This research asks a direct question “who would you vote for in presidential elections” and Jeremić is ranked right behind Vučić and Nikolić, and since the Progressives will not have two candidates, Jeremić will go to the second round where he will beat Nikolić. Thus, if the elections were held today, Jeremić would be President of Serbia. Vuk’s plan is clear. He wants to become the president of the world. Or Serbia. Vučić is in his way for both options.”⁵⁴

Behind a superficial dispute on the relation Jeremić – Nikolić lies an idea of legitimizing of one new (old) political leader on the national level. Choice of the “agency” Nova Srpska politička misao indicates an extremely anti-Vučić context of the entire instant media project. NSPM is not an agency, but an internet installation, which belongs to the group of radical critics, mostly critics of Vučić’s politics. Also, opening the topic of the presidential campaign in the dawn of the campaign for parliamentary, provincial and local elections, shows the necessity of relocating it outside its immediate plane. Motive, more exactly, reason, for releasing this is somewhere else. It is necessary to, as the last sentence says, to impose on Vučić the burden of orientation in terms of presidential candidacy. Here comes in either the party-inclination of Nikolić or secret wishing for a “short-circuit” on the relation Vučić-Nikolić, i.e. Vučić-Nikolić-Dačić. At the same time, the message “Vuk Jeremić is ours” is sent out. If South Africa wants Vuk Jeremić for UN Secretary General, what is with the patriotism of our elite in office? Also, thanks to Jeremić, more specifically his ratings “according to NSPM”,

54 Veljko Lalić and Nenad Čaluković, “Najvažnija jednačina Vuka Jeremića: predsednik Srbije ili predsednik sveta” [Vuk Jeremić’s most important equation: to be the president of Serbia or the president of the world] *Nedeljnik*, no. 212, p. 16

it is shown that there is still hope for the winners of October 5th. The distinguished member of this group, former foreign minister, straight out of nowhere, shows that he has potential; he is interesting as a gathering point and a point of resistance to Vučić. Indirectly, but undoubtedly, *Nedeljnik*’s propaganda twist was supposed to break the “myth about Vučić being invincible” and show to the opposition “we can do this.”

Unlike the image of the government coloured by an array of nearly anthological negative determinants, image of the opposition is far more balanced. The biggest number of weeklies supports the “opposition cause” by ruthlessly and radically criticising the government, making along the way unlimited room for promoting either stands of opposition leaders, or the viewpoints supported by their party activism, with a warning to the readers that being the opposition is a “martyring” job, intertwined with a dose of “heroism” guaranteed by perseverance and commitment to the political battle. Reflection on the slim chances of the opposition to have a good election result is always complemented by the awareness of unfair conditions of the election match. Still, a portion of “propaganda optimism” is often “injected” by evoking the person and work of Zoran Đinđić. In addition to this, the plot is additionally thickened by promoting the high ratings of Vuk Jeremić.

Generally, apart from the criticism by Dragan Vučićević and the weekly *Pečat*, the political elite of October 5th in opposition has not been nearly as radically challenged as the ruling party.

Elections – numerous interpretations revealing the complexity of the political process and the versatility of the journalistic approaches and political standpoints

Scheduling early parliamentary elections, more specifically their blend with the regular provincial and local elections, incited various interpretations of this event. As in all other similar situations, an extraordinarily important political and social event resulted in versatile and mutually radically conflicting and immeasurable interpretations. There was not even consensus about why the elections were scheduled: paradoxically, despite the different shapes of public skepsis towards the circumstances around the elections, there was no boycott. Among the numerous interpretations, three should be separated as they perhaps in the best way portray the polemics about the elections in the weeklies and editorial columns in the third week of January, when Serbia realised that it would again be picking its Parliament.

First interpretation of the reasons behind the elections could be called – enlargement of the gain for the key actor in power, the Serbian Progressive Party and its leader, Aleksandar Vučić. According to this viewpoint, which is very popular in numerous newspaper writings, interviews and critical analysis of the election process, key reasons are party-based. SNS, more specifically its leader, enjoys enormous support in the electorate. That support will

fortify and enlarge if the parliamentary elections are held along with the provincial and local. Argument in favour of the elections is a blend of real politics, public opinion approach and party interest. By joining elections on all three levels of government, the convincingly strongest positioned politician in the public opinion of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, would increase the political gain of the party and prevent the defeated forces of rejoining the political match in the local level and surviving on the level of the Province Vojvodina. According to this school of thought, the political and media game of Vučić's charisma would enable maximising of the party gain: 1) fortification of party leadership, 2) stronger positioning in comparison to the partners, like SPS, and competitors of all colours and ideological beliefs, 3) full legitimacy in light of the battle for protection and improvement of interests of the state of Serbia compared to different actors of regional and global policy.

Top reasons for the elections in the context of internal policy are seen in party interests of SNS and Vučić, "As the only real reason for possible review of the electoral will throughout Serbia, interviewee of *NIN* (he is referring to the editor of Nova srpska politička misao – Đorđe Vukadinović – author's comm.) sees the "politican" need to "draw" the Progressives' local candidate lists in with the republican ones, directly leaning on the popularity of the Prime Minister Vučić."⁵⁵ This popularity should enable a higher level of concentration of power in the hands of one party, but also enable legitimate extension of the mandate over the next four years. With party gains, early republican elections would yield a promising chance of preventing the entering in the zone of social uncertainty and political chaos. This explanation has been offered by the Editor of *Informer*, Dragan Vučićević, who wrote the following, "Special parliamentary elections are not the only option, but in present-day Serbia they are the only good solution. In an atmosphere of daily political and media chaos which is imposed by most of the newspapers and TV stations, in a situation in which nearly every day endless false affairs are launched, aimed at accumulating nonsense, at a time when the Public Media Service of Serbia is openly working against the majority in Serbia, in a position in which each even slightly good news is buried under a pile of unscrupulous lies, Vučić actually has no choice. He must in the spring elections prove once again his own legitimacy."⁵⁶

Parallel to naming the strictly party or state reasons in favour of scheduling elections, debate about the elections often echoed with two more interpretations of this important political event. Namely, early elections are an example of political irresponsibility and violation of democratic rules of the game and suspending of the parliamentary political practice. Therefore, the already quoted Professor Srbijanka Turajlić claims that the early elections on the level of the republic are an "arrogant mockery of democracy and democratic rules."⁵⁷

Vesna Pešić, the sociologist and political activist, expressed her opinion even more explicitly and more aggressively, "Everyone knows that the Government has a two-third majority for all

its decisions in the Serbian Parliament, and that in such ideal conditions, early elections are not a necessity. It is better for the mandate of this Government to last for regular four years, in order for the citizens to be able to assess the results of its work. Well, this is not possible because the government answers to no one. We will rather start all over again. Again promises about the next two years, again new mandate, again promises and we go in circles like that."⁵⁸

55 Vera Didanović, "Tajna Pitijine zagonetke" [The secret of Pythia's riddle] *NIN*, no. 3395

56 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Godina haosa" [Year of chaos] *Informer*, 10. 01. 2016, p. 5

57 Srbijanka Turajlić, "Mi neprekidno ponižavamo" [We are constantly humiliating ourselves] interviewed by Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3396, p. 16

58 Vesna Pešić, "Sa nama stvarno nešto nije u redu" [Something is really off with us] interviewed by Nenad Čaluković, *Nedeljnik*, no. 211, p. 16

The second important element in favour of the elections saga, party battles and media circumstances in which they are taking place is the narrative about the unjust conditions in which they are being held. The unfair conditions constitute a certain meeting place of the left and right-wingers on the political stage, therefore it is suffice to quote one text about the elections confirming the content of the message from weeklies at the time of scheduling the elections in last weeks of January 2016. In the weekly *Vreme*, journalist Jovana Gligorijević writes "Serbia is facing at least 50 days of the election campaign, and it is already evident that it will be a ruthless one. If we were to judge by what we have been witnessing since 2012 till now, it is most likely that we will watch the stronger take it out on the weaker. This will not be pleasant or harmless, because we have already seen how individuals, media or independent institutions become collateral damage in political showdowns. Actually, all institutions. We should be worried precisely because of this. Also, it is indicative that for the first time since 2000 the democratic nature of the election process is under question."⁵⁹

Second interpretation of the elections came from various political actors, direct participants in the political match who looked for a chance at a political twist in the elections. This type of optimism is typical of many parties regardless of their ideological orientation. Essentially unrealistic, intentionally created political and media optimism bore a line of real political naivety, but also a motivational potential for the voters of parties whose leaders spread optimism about the uncertainty of Vučić's victory and practical possibility of a political twist.

This kind of construction was based partially on the inadequate interpretations of the public polls, which suggested that the range of support for Vučić is from 24 to 25 of the total voting population, non-critically believing in one's own potential to animate the considerable number of the undecided, by reminding them of the experience with Slobodan Milošević and Boris Tadić who cut short their mandates and lost office and the perception of Aleksandar Vučić as an extremely bad ruler who should be overthrown by the people of Serbia as soon as possible. The most distinct statements in favour of this interpretation of the elections were visible in the interviews of Boris Tadić, Bojan Pajtić and Vojislav Šešelj. Though mutually radically opposed in the political sense, all three found the common denominator of their addresses to the public in the position that they should see Vučić's political end as soon as possible. That one should not be sure of winning the elections despite the tendencies in the public polls, Boris Tadić suggested, "I was the so-called sure winner. Well, Vučić should think about that in these elections. In politics, a twist is always possible and I believe it is possible already in these elections."⁶⁰

Bojan Pajtić, leader of DS, made a similar construction. He bases his point on the political evaluation of Vučić's power, interpreting public opinion polls and desired political conduct of citizens, "In these elections, it is possible to create a situation in which Vučić will not have the majority to form the government. Serbia has a chance provided three quarters of voters

59 Jovana Gligorijević, "U kolonu po jedan" [In a file, one by one] *Vreme*, no. 1308, p. 12

60 Boris Tadić, "Ja sam pao, može i Vučić" [I went down, so can Vučić] interviewed by Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3399, p. 13

who are unhappy with the regime vote. Vučić is basing his entire support on the twenty per-cent of those who support him. 75% of the citizens are unhappy with the fact that the land they used to cultivate is being taken from them, that the country is destroyed by secret contracts, depleting natural resources, that those who bought diplomas are in office, that even 65-year-olds are fleeing the country due to the atmosphere in our society."⁶¹

Using a very similar tone to this one, the leader of the Radicals gives his view of the dynamics of the election process. As the campaign unfolds, Šešelj observed that Vučić's popularity was going down. Inherently, prospects for a political twist are opening, "Vučić has his research in strict secrecy, and they give quite a different result. Things are changing rapidly, his cart started going downhill a long time ago; he is at 35-40 percent now."⁶²



Danas, 6th March 2016

61 Bojan Pajtić, "Vučić neće imati većinu za vladu" [Vučić will not have the majority for the government] *NIN*, interviewed by Olja Bečković, no. 3402, p. 9

62 Vojislav Šešelj, "Vučić je moj najveći pedagoški promašaj" [Vučić is my greatest pedagogical failure] interviewed by Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3404, p. 9

And finally, in view of the elections, in the Serbian weeklies, a third interpretation appeared, and that is the possibility of Serbia ending its European journey after the elections on 24th April and start going in the direction of connecting with Russia. This viewpoint appeared and was widely advocated in the weekly *Pečat*. The aim of this position was to symbolically and if possible in a politically realistic way strengthen the influence of Russia in Serbian politics. Advocating and defending this viewpoint, *Pečat* continues with the line of thought about which there was word in the previous issues of *Mediameter*. This is the support to pro-Russian politics.

It is interesting that this interpretation respects only the policy of equal distance between the East and the West which is the policy of the Government of Serbia headed by Aleksandar Vučić, but with accompanying support in all cases in which the state top stands up to the West. From Srebrenica, the “Orić” case, to the “Storm”, customs war between Serbia and Croatia, diplomatic victory in the preventing of Kosovo in becoming a member of UNESCO, not introducing sanctions for Russia... Sign that maybe after the elections distancing from the somewhat vain policy of European integrations might take place, journalist of the paper *Pečat* Nikola Vrzić sees in the affirmative mention of Russia in the pre-election promises to the citizens and the fact that European orientation of Serbian foreign policy is slowly but surely being put on the backburner, “In a country which is – as they say – on an irrevocable path towards the European Union, you do not promise the acceleration of that EU journey, but preservation and improvement of relations with a country that is facing sanctions of the European Union, with Russia.”⁶³

Interpretative models in determining the sense and meaning of the elections will display all the versatility of approaches, arguments and conclusions which may be detected in the Serbian media scene. Possibility of various interpretations has always been testimony to immanent pluralism of intellectual, evaluative and political stands. This is proof of spiritually dynamic and rich media life which is not available in an order of controlled truth and big lie, which are the primary characteristics of the spiritual situation in a dictatorship.

63 Nikola Vrzić, “Ruski faktor srpskih izbora” [Russian factor in the Serbian elections], *Pečat*, no. 412, p. 9

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About
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Public Policy Institute is a regional think-tank organization that operates in the Western Balkans region through the work of its branch offices in Belgrade, Podgorica and Ljubljana. By promoting public dialogue and constructive solutions, Public Policy Institute contributes to the efforts of the Western Balkan countries to become equal, reliable and progressive partners in the process of European integrations and mutual relationships. After the initial research and analysis of social and media context in the countries of the Western Balkans, the Institute has developed and implemented a series of media related projects, including: Role of the media in the process of securitisation in the Western Balkans, Civil Response to Clientelism in the media - MEDIA CIRCLE, NATO Reach Out - media monitoring and Role of the media in monitoring of R1325 in Montenegro.

EBART Media Archive is privately owned company established in 2000. Its main activity is archiving print media data in e-format. The print media archive consists of up-to-date material dating back to 2003, and more than 3 million print media reports from sources with national coverage. EBART is also specialized for media analysis, basic quantitative and qualitative analyses, comparing media treatment of specific keywords, as well as complex content analyses according to BBC methodology. EBART Media Archive is unmatched in the region with its unique media reports database, and 12 years of media research experience. This media database allows for the overall study of long-term media presence.

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