

Volume IV, Issue 3/2018  
ISSN: 2406-274X

Analysis of the print media in Serbia  
July - September

# QUARTERLY MEDIAMETER

03/2018



QUARTERLY MEDIAMETER

*Analysis of the print media in Serbia*

Volume IV, Issue 3/2018

ISSN 2406-274X

*Published by*

Public Policy Institute Belgrade

Kneza Miloša 68

E-mail: office@ijp.rs

Web: www.ijp.rs

*For publisher*

Vladimir Popović

*Editors in Chief*

Vladimir Popović

Velimir Ćurgus Kazimir

*Editorial staff*

Milana Brisić

Vladimir Abramović

Aleksandra Milićević

Marija Benke

*Cover design and prepress*

Pavle Farčić

*Print*

Instant System Belgrade

CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији  
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

659.3

**QUARTERLY mediameter** : analysis of the print media in Serbia / editors in chief Vladimir Popović, Velimir Ćurgus Kazimir. - Vol. 1, Issue 1 (2015)- . - Belgrade : Public Policy Institute (Belgrade : Instant System). - 24 cm

Tromesečno. - Ima izdanje na drugom jeziku: Kvartalni medijametar = ISSN 2406-2707  
ISSN 2406-274X = Quarterly mediameter  
COBISS.SR-ID 215100940

# CONTENT

- 1** Isidora Jarić, Danica Laban:  
**INTRODUCTION**
- 2** Isidora Jarić, Danica Laban:  
**SAMPLE**
- 3** Isidora Jarić, Danica Laban:  
**RESEARCH RESULTS**
- 4** Dejan Vuk Stanković:  
**DISCOURSE ANALYSIS**
- 5** **ABOUT AUTHORS**





We dedicate this issue of Quarterly Mediameter  
to the memory of our dear colleague and friend

VELIMIR ČURGUS KAZIMIR  
(1948-2018)









SOROS  
GO HOME!

Македонија  
Раѓање словенске и

TEODOROVIT

Против смо евра, митраната и бирок  
Александар Е. Гавран, потпреседник Антикриминалне

Advokat Momčilo Vukotić  
o presudama u slučaju  
BINIČ I STAMBOLOVIĆ

Beli predsednik,  
Četovo politična gradana Srbije nije laska  
na izjave, nimalašnost nezainteresovanosti?

ok

ije glasalo, pala nije

Тереза Форкадес  
Медији су глас господара

NIN

АКАДЕМИК  
ДУШАН  
ТЕОДОРОВИЋ  
МИ ЋЕМО  
ВУЧИЋА  
СИГУРНО ДА  
ПОБЕДИМО

ključivna ispovest  
dičeve sekretarice

Intimne  
o Dragani

Newsweek

BILJANA  
PLAVSIĆ

SVE

ČEMU

SAM


ITALA

JE UHIGU SLAVIO  
OVO GUSTVO  
MAJILI ZAO


www.nin.co.rs  
facebook.com/ninonline  
twitter.com/ninonline

POLITICARI  
NE TRE  
DA KRIL  
SVOJE ŽENE

KAKO  
UMAJ  
LJUBL







# Introduction

# INTRODUCTION:

## The Kosovo knot

Although it was a summer period during which intensive events are not usually expected on the political and social scene, the third quarter of 2018 brings us a sudden increase in the number of texts in the sample, which this time was as high as 2248 or almost 11% more than in the previous quarter. This is largely conditioned by focusing media focus on topics and concrete developments in relation to Kosovo. This is the first quarter since the project *Quarterly Mediameter* exists, that political life in Serbia is not the most frequent topic, but that the front pages were “occupied” with themes in relation to Kosovo.

The media in this quarter have traditionally treated regional relations in a negative way. About 54% of the articles on this subject are negatively connotated, for which it can now be said with certainty that it is a form of reporting of most media.

It is interesting that in this quarter we recorded a change in the presence of actors from the USA and Russia. In the previous research period, their presence was virtually identical, while Russian President Vladimir Putin was the most represented foreign actor. In the third quarter of 2018, actors from the United States are much more present. They appear in as many as 517 texts versus 314 in the previous quarter, while Donald Trump, the US president, is the most represented foreign leader.

Globally, this time we recorded an almost identical use of genres, which speaks of established reporting patterns.

Many of the disturbing practices of the editorial strategies of print media seen in the previous analyzes of *Mediameter* are still present. Many editorials are still being created in the editorial boards, that is, direct causes for the emergence of text are not real events. In this quarter, the number of texts devised in the editorial offices is somewhat smaller, but this does not disturb the general picture that is the same as in the previous numbers of *Mediameter*, and in which still too many texts are created in this way.

We again had the opportunity to monitor the media coverage of the murder of singer Jelena Marjanović. Although more than two and a half years have passed since the immediate event, the media continue to report as if it was a current event. The presence of this case is unbelievable, which, even after a great flow of time, does not move from the front pages. Perhaps the media's obsession with this case is most illustrative of the fact that individual economic actors on the covers in this quarter are mentioned 240 times, while the actors in connection with the murder of Jelena Marjanović are mentioned as 226 times.

However, there is a certain increase in the number of economic actors (primarily collective ones), as well as the traditional over-representation of unnamed sources and analysts in the cover texts. There is also a significant increase in the number of actors related to religion, which in this quarter appear 429 times (the presence of almost half of these actors is recorded in the *Večernje novosti* and *Politika*).

In the latest issue of the *Quarterly Mediameter* empirical material was explored in the same standardized way. A single text was chosen for the subject of analysis. Analysis itself represents the combination of two research methods: (a) content analysis, which was guided by a „specific theoretical and hypothetical frame... creating an objective and systematic empirical collection of the social communication content, which enables the formation of relevant conclusions about the social context in which the communication takes part,”<sup>1</sup> and (b) a discourse analysis which enabled us to understand various, epistemologically and methodologically immeasurable,<sup>2</sup> authors' interpretative strategies and editorial policies which reflect perceptions of different, primarily ideological and political, discourse realities, by analyzing their specific discourse meanings.


In the interpretative sense, in order to offer better coherence of the text, the analysis is, as in the previous reports, divided into two wholes which refer to: (a) analysis of quantitative indicators collected using content analysis; and (b) discourse analysis of the qualitative content excerpted from texts which were included in the research sample.

1 S. Gredelj, *S onu stranu ogledala* [On the other side of the mirror], Beograd: Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije, 1986, 19

2 G. Couvalis, *The Philosophy of Science*, London, Sage Publications, 1997.








Sample

## Sample

As stated in earlier publications, the basic idea of the project *Mediameter* is to try to reconstruct media reality of the dailies in Serbia, the way it can be defined considering the texts that are positioned (wholly or partially) on front pages, as various reflections of current political events and circumstances in both Serbia and the world. A sample of the dailies was composed in 2015 considering two selection criteria – the largest circulation and reputation of the print media. Newspapers *Alo!*, *Blic*, *Danas*, *Informer*, *Kurir*, *Politika* and *Večernje novosti* will compose the *Mediameter* sample in 2018, in order to facilitate parallel study of results. The front page is the part of the dailies that the readers connect the most with the identity/recognition of a media outlet. It is often responsible for the first impression, our potential affection or repulsion formed about some printed media. The front page comes into contact not only with the readers of that particular paper, but also the people who will perhaps never touch that paper. Through newspaper and TV advertising and shop windows, the front page reaches a wider auditorium than that forming the readers of individual dailies. The front pages, hence form, in a certain way, the public image of the newspaper which symbolizes its editorial policy, evaluative orientation and targeting of certain audiences. On account of the above-mentioned reasons, the front pages of dailies from our sample were in the focus of analysis of the project *Mediameter*.

Texts from front pages reflect best the coordinates of editorial policies of daily print editions. Though this involves a small percentage of texts, editorial identity of a daily can be most easily identified through messages conveyed through front pages. The ratio of the total number of texts in each daily individually and the number of texts from the front pages that were included in the sample of our research are shown in the charts 1-7, for the period from July 1<sup>st</sup> to September 30<sup>th</sup> 2018.


Graph 1. – *Alo!*



- Other
- Total number of selected front-page texts
- Total number of front-page texts that were not selected

Source: Mediameter research,  
July – September 2018


Graph 2. – *Blic*




- Other
- Total number of selected front-page texts
- Total number of front-page texts that were not selected

Source: Mediameter research,  
July – September 2018

Graph 3. – *Danas*




Graph 4. – *Informer*







Graph 5. – Kurir



Graph 6. – Politika



**Graph 7.** – *Večernje novosti*



The total number of analyzed texts in all seven media that entered the sample of our research is 2248, and this number makes on average 59.48% of headlines and 4.05% of the total number of texts.

**Table 1. – Alo!**

<i>Alo!</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
current affairs	62	57	5
news	65	63	2
politics	35	35	0
society	34	20	14
chronicle	80	16	64
v.i.p.	108	9	99
sport	48	9	39
world	12	6	6
interview/interview of the week	3	3	0
Belgrade	5	2	3
reportage	1	0	1
supplement	5	2	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>458</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>236</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

**Table 2. – Blic**

<i>Blic</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
politics	65	65	0
current affairs / interview	18	15	3
topic of the day / issue	82	74	8
society	78	46	32
chronicle	65	9	56
economy	13	10	3
culture	20	2	18
sport	75	3	72
destinies	7	0	7
world/planet	8	4	4
research/dossier	6	1	5
phenomena	1	0	1
entertainment	51	3	48
Blic Foundation	8	0	8
Belgrade	3	1	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>267</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

**Table 3. – Danas**

Danas/section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
Danas business	11	9	2
Danas special supplement	16	14	2
Danas weekend	37	27	10
event / topic of the day	2	2	0
society	82	78	4
economy	72	72	0
Globe	31	27	4
culture	31	18	13



interview	1	1	0
front page	47	47	0
politics	120	120	0
Belgrade	3	2	1
sport	33	1	32
last page	9	9	0
dialogue	9	9	0
Pomodoro	3	1	2
confrontation	2	2	0
chronicle	0	0	0
Novi Sad	1	1	0
Periscope	4	4	0
scales	1	1	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>515</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>70</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

**Table 4. – Informer**

<i>Informer/ section</i>	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
breaking news	143	142	1
news	133	51	82
showtime	91	3	88
sport	86	18	68
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>239</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

**Table 5. – Kurir**

<i>Kurir</i> /section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
news	4	4	0
interview	4	3	1
Planet	11	5	6
chronicle	127	37	90
society	90	36	54
politics	107	107	0
stars	77	3	74
culture	11	1	10
sport	55	9	46
topic of the day	0	0	0
supplement	6	5	1
business	2	1	1
special	25	8	17
feuilleton	3	0	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>522</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>303</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

**Table 6. – Politika**

<i>Politika</i> /section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
world	61	38	23
society	61	20	41
economy	32	26	6
politics	24	24	0
event of the day	29	28	1
culture	36	6	30
chronicle	51	14	37
daily supplement	5	0	5
Serbia	33	16	17
sport	34	0	34
topic of the week / day	34	20	14
personalities	1	0	1
region	13	12	1
front page	280	278	2
views	8	8	0
consumer	24	15	9
Belgrade / Belgrade chronicle	20	8	12
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>746</b>	<b>513</b>	<b>233</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018


**Table 7. – Večernje novosti**

<i>Večernje novosti</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
chronicle	102	29	73
society	105	91	14
politics	127	127	0
economy	60	51	9
current affairs	48	32	16
reportage	18	8	10
culture	9	4	5
interview	12	10	2
world	16	11	5
sport	40	5	35
Belgrade	5	1	4
topic of the day	13	13	0
reflector	12	4	8
events	16	14	2
second page	2	2	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>585</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>183</b>


Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

By looking at the presented Tables 1-7, it is still evident that the structure of the analyzed daily newspapers follows two different logics. *Večernje novosti*, *Politika*, *Danas* and *Blic* follow the classic structure of daily newspapers, while only *Informer*, with its reduced rubric structure, deviates significantly from this matrix. It is a novelty that in the previous three quarters of this editorial strategy, *Kurir* has also adhered to this strategy in a certain way. In the daily *Informer* news is a dominant column, which unites different areas,<sup>1</sup> and special attention is given to entertainment content, such as information about famous people, then show business and sports, which increasingly receive a socio-political character. On the other hand, the daily *Alo!* in the previous three months has expanded the structure of the rubrics in a certain way, but still remains dominantly focused on the contents of a sensational and entertaining character. The editorial strategies identified in the previous fourteenth editions of the Mediamater are fully visible in the third quarter of 2018, as can be clearly seen in Charts 8-14.


<sup>1</sup> Since May 2016, the rubric under this name has also appeared in *Kurir*, which had until then been following the classic structure of daily newspapers. Until then, the existing columns: society, economy and politics are merged into a new news column. However, from the beginning of 2018, the structure of *Kurir* is again approaching the classic structure of daily newspapers.

**Graph 8. – Alo!**

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018


**Graph 9. – Blic**

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

**Graph 10. – Danas**


Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Graph 11. – *Informer*




Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Graph 12. – *Kurir*




Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Graph 13. – *Politika*



Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

**Graph 14. – Večernje novosti**


Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Table 8 shows the number of selected texts in all previous *Mediameter* issues, where it can be noted that the number of selected texts is again on a significant increase. This is primarily a consequence of all developments in relation to Kosovo, a topic that most media have paid the highest attention.


**Table 8. – Number of selected texts by quarter for period 2015 – 2018**

	2015.	2016.	2017.	2018.
First quarter	1360	1924	2403	2173
Second quarter	1673	2106	2091	2009
Third quarter	2172	2012	1991	2248
Fourth quarter	2177	2251	2167	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7382</b>	<b>8293</b>	<b>8652</b>	

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018







# Research results

## RESEARCH RESULTS

### Share of journalistic genres

In the third quarter of 2018, the share of reports in the total number of texts that make up the sample published on the front pages is 76.56% or 1721, that is, decreased by about 2% compared to the previous quarter. The largest share of the report was again spotted in *Informer* - 96.26%, while the lowest proportion of texts written in this genre in *Politika* - 64.33%. The following news forms according to participation are the interview and the article, which comprise 7.65%, or 6.72% of all texts from the sample. Interviews are most frequent in *Danas* (13.26%), while the least number of texts on the cover pages is published in this news genre in *Informer* - 0.47% or 1. The highest number and participation of articles is recorded in *Politika* (85 or 16.57%), while daily newspapers *Alo!*, *Blic* and *Informer* did not publish any inscription of this type. The next genre for representation is the commentary - 4.63% (104 texts), while news coverage again is less than 2% (40 texts). Reports and other forms (such as hybrid genres or feuilleton) are present in 2.67% or a total of 60 entries. Compared to the previous quarter, the same schedule was recorded and very similar was the participation of newspaper forms.

Individual share of genres in reporting of seven media from the sample

Genre	Total number	%
Report	1721	76.56
Interview	172	7.65
Article	151	6.72
Commentary	104	4.63
News story	40	1.78
Reportage	32	1.42
Other	28	1.25
<b>total</b>	<b>2248</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of journalistic genres in texts from the sample, per media, in numbers

Genre	<i>Alo!</i>	<i>Blic</i>	<i>Danas</i>	<i>Informer</i>	<i>Kurir</i>	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	total
report	184	207	296	206	185	330	313	1721
interview	12	20	59	1	11	44	25	172
article	0	0	16	0	13	85	37	151
commentary	10	1	48	0	2	40	3	104
news story	13	3	7	6	2	6	3	40
reportage	0	1	2	0	3	8	18	32
other	3	1	17	1	3	0	3	28
<b>total</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>513</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>2248</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of journalistic genres in texts from the sample, per media, in percents

Genre	<i>Alo!</i>	<i>Blic</i>	<i>Danas</i>	<i>Informer</i>	<i>Kurir</i>	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	total
report	82.88	88.84	66.52	96.26	84.47	64.33	77.86	76.56
interview	5.41	8.58	13.26	0.47	5.02	8.58	6.22	7.65
article	0.00	0.00	3.60	0.00	5.94	16.57	9.20	6.72
commentary	4.50	0.43	10.79	0.00	0.91	7.80	0.75	4.63
news story	5.86	1.29	1.57	2.80	0.91	1.17	0.75	1.78
reportage	0.00	0.43	0.45	0.00	1.37	1.56	4.48	1.42
other	1.35	0.43	3.82	0.47	1.37	0.00	0.75	1.25
<b>total</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

## Topics

In order for each article to be defined as clearly as possible, the selected texts that make up the sample are classified under a single topic, but nevertheless, all relevant elements present in these articles have been accounted for. This gave us a clearer insight into the manner of how the news is provided and also into the manner approach of the media to certain topics in the previous issues of the *Mediameter*. The texts in the field of chronicle, which have socio-political character, as well as the writings relating to the murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović, were again included into the sample, as an example of the paradigm of the state of Serbian journalism, which is marked by various kinds of disrespect for the ethical principles of reporting.

### Topic prominence

For the first time since the survey was carried out within the project *Mediameter*, the first topic regarding the representation in the texts that made the sample was not *political life in Serbia*, but the focus of the media was directed towards Kosovo, that is, relations between Belgrade and Priština. About this topic 15.52% inscriptions were written, or 349 texts, which is almost threefold more compared to the previous quarter.

In the period July-September 2018, all political topics were present in a total of 402 or 17.88% of texts from the sample: *political life in Serbia* in 274 or 12.19% of articles, *activities of the president of Serbia* in 3.47% or 78 articles, *activities of the Government of Serbia* 1.65% 37 and activities of the *President of the Government of Serbia* 0.58% - 13 texts. Compared to the previous quarter, *the political life in Serbia*, which is the second in terms of representation, was recorded in about 8% less texts compared to the total number of articles that make up the sample, or expressed in absolute numbers, as much as 128 texts less. The next topic is the participation of *the economy*, about 190 or 8.45% of the articles published by the media, while 164 or 7.3% of the articles dealt with *regional relations*. *International relations* were dedicated to 87 or 3.87%, while in 78 articles (3.47%) media reported on the activities of the president of Serbia. Other topics that attracted the attention of the media are *social issues / social policy* (67 - 2.98%), *judicial topics* (66 or 2.94%), *USA, relations with the United States* (61 - 2.71%).

Solving the case of murder of singer Jelena Marjanović is the tenth topic by representation, present in 2.58% or 58 articles. The media continue to report on this subject in a sensational manner, largely placing information obtained from unnamed sources.

If the value context of 2248 selected texts in the third quarter of 2018 is evaluated, 32.96% of texts have value connotation – 5.96% positive and 27% negative (Table 31), which is about 2.5% more value-intensive texts compared to the previous quarter. Traditionally, the highest number of negative texts was written on *regional topics* – 54.27% (89), while about 40% of negative connotations were published on topics related to *Kosovo*. A quarter of the articles on *international relations* (26.44%), *political life in Serbia* (25.55%), *social politics / social issues* (25.37%), *economy* (24.21%) and *the murder of singer Jelena Marjanović* is also negative. In the third quarter of 2018, there were also several positive connotations – even 18 articles on *economic issues* were positively connotated (9.47%), 14 texts that talked about *the activities of the President of Serbia*, as well as 10 about the topic related to the *United States of America*.

*Topics related to the European Union* were not in the focus of the media in the third quarter and they represented a backbone of a small number of texts – 34 or about 1.5%. The most neutral ones were written – 27 or 79.41%, with 5 or 14.71% negative and 2 or 5.88% of positively connotated texts. On the other hand, about 43 or about 1.9% of the sample was published about *Russia*. The daily newspapers *Politika* (5), *Večernje novosti* (4) and *Informer* (2 texts) published 11 (25.58%) of positively connotated texts, while negative texts were published by *Blic* (2), *Kurir* and *Alo!* (1 each) (**Graph 15**).

Distribution of topics and their value context in seven media from the sample<sup>1</sup>

	Value context with reference to the topic							
<b>All media</b>	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Priština	349	15.52	1	0.29	210	60.17	138	39.54
Political life in Serbia	274	12.19	1	0.36	203	74.09	70	25.55
Economy	190	8.45	18	9.47	126	66.32	46	24.21
Regional cooperation /relations in the region	164	7.30	1	0.61	74	45.12	89	54.27
International relations	87	3.87	8	9.20	56	64.37	23	26.44
Activities of the President of Serbia	78	3.47	14	17.95	61	78.21	3	3.85
Social issues / social policy	67	2.98	5	7.46	45	67.16	17	25.37
System of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	66	2.94	1	1.52	56	84.85	9	13.64
USA/ attitude towards USA	61	2.71	10	16.39	45	73.77	6	9.84
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	58	2.58	0	0.00	44	75.86	14	24.14

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018


Value context in relation to all the topics in all seven media

<b>Total</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>%</b>
Positive	134	5.96
Neutral	1507	67.04
Negative	607	27.00
<b>total</b>	<b>2248</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

<sup>1</sup> In all the tables relating to the third quarter of 2018, the ten most common topics are presented.

**Graph 15. – Value context in all media in relation to the topic *Russia/ Attitude towards Russia and EU / EU policy***



Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

### Distribution of topics according to media

#### *Alo!*

Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Political life in Serbia	41	18.47	0	0.00	31	75.61	10	24.39
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Priština	39	17.57	0	0.00	29	74.36	10	25.64
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	22	9.91	0	0.00	4	18.18	18	81.82
Economy	17	7.66	3	17.65	4	23.53	10	58.82
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	15	6.76	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Issues of faith, church and religion	13	5.86	0	0.00	8	61.54	5	38.46
Activities of the President of Serbia	9	4.05	4	44.44	5	55.56	0	0.00
International relations	7	3.15	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Crime	6	2.70	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
USA / attitude towards USA	5	2.25	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Russia / attitude towards Russia	5	2.25	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
System of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	5	2.25	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	No.	%
Positive	7	3.15
Neutral	147	66.22
Negative	68	30.63
<b>total</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

### ***Blic***

Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Blic*

	Value context with reference to the topic							
<i>Blic</i>	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Priština	52	22.32	0	0.00	45	86.54	7	13.46
Political life in Serbia	44	18.88	0	0.00	39	88.64	5	11.36
Economy	25	10.73	0	0.00	19	76.00	6	24.00
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	12	5.15	0	0.00	8	66.67	4	33.33
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	11	4.72	0	0.00	5	45.45	6	54.55
Social issues / social policy	9	3.86	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Crime	9	3.86	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Education	8	3.43	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Issues of faith, church and religion	7	3.00	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Culture	6	2.58	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	No.	%
Positive	1	0.43
Neutral	195	83.69
Negative	37	15.88
<b>total</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

**Danas**

Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Danas*

	Value context with reference to the topic							
<b>Danas</b>	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Political life in Serbia	113	25.39	0	0.00	89	78.76	24	21.24
Economy	56	12.58	0	0.00	43	76.79	13	23.21
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Priština	47	10.56	0	0.00	46	97.87	1	2.13
Culture	24	5.39	1	4.17	21	87.50	2	8.33
Media/freedom of the media	21	4.72	0	0.00	13	61.90	8	38.10
International relations	17	3.82	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Social issues/social policy	16	3.60	0	0.00	11	68.75	5	31.25
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	16	3.60	0	0.00	15	93.75	1	6.25
Local government	16	3.60	0	0.00	7	43.75	9	56.25
USA / attitude towards USA	14	3.15	3	21.43	11	78.57	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Danas*

<b>Danas</b>	No.	%
Positive	5	1.12
Neutral	351	78.88
Negative	89	20.00
<b>total</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018



**Informer**Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Informer*

	Value context with reference to the topic							
<b><i>Informer</i></b>	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Priština	53	24.77	1	1.89	21	39.62	31	58.49
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	34	15.89	0	0.00	9	26.47	25	73.53
Political life in Serbia	24	11.21	0	0.00	6	25.00	18	75.00
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	14	6.54	0	0.00	7	50.00	7	50.00
USA / attitude towards USA	11	5.14	0	0.00	8	72.73	3	27.27
Army	9	4.21	6	66.67	3	33.33	0	0.00
Sport	8	3.74	2	25.00	4	50.00	2	25.00
Economy	8	3.74	2	25.00	5	62.50	1	12.50
International relations	7	3.27	1	14.29	3	42.86	3	42.86
Russia / attitude towards Russia	5	2.34	2	40.00	3	60.00	0	0.00
Activities of the President of Serbia	5	2.34	2	40.00	3	60.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Informer*

<b><i>Informer</i></b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>%</b>
Positive	18	8.41
Neutral	92	42.99
Negative	104	48.60
<b>total</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

## Kurir

Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Kurir*

	Value context with reference to the topic							
<i>Kurir</i>	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Priština	44	20.09	0	0.00	17	38.64	27	61.36
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	24	10.96	0	0.00	7	29.17	17	70.83
Political life in Serbia	18	8.22	0	0.00	15	83.33	3	16.67
Activities of the President of Serbia	15	6.85	5	33.33	10	66.67	0	0.00
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	13	5.94	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
System of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	9	4.11	0	0.00	7	77.78	2	22.22
Activities of the Government of Serbia	8	3.65	2	25.00	6	75.00	0	0.00
Economy	6	2.74	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Political life in Montenegro	6	2.74	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
Police	6	2.74	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	No	%
Positive	12	5.48
Neutral	143	65.30
Negative	64	29.22
<b>total</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

**Politika**

Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Politika*

	Value context with reference to the topic							
<b>Politika</b>	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Economy	56	10.92	10	17.86	32	57.14	14	25.00
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Priština	50	9.75	0	0.00	22	44.00	28	56.00
International relations	40	7.80	5	12.50	19	47.50	16	40.00
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	26	5.07	1	3.85	14	53.85	11	42.31
Political life in Serbia	23	4.48	0	0.00	14	60.87	9	39.13
Social issues/social policy	22	4.29	4	18.18	11	50.00	7	31.82
Infrastructure	21	4.09	4	19.05	14	66.67	3	14.29
System of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	20	3.90	1	5.00	16	80.00	3	15.00
Education	20	3.90	2	10.00	9	45.00	9	45.00
EU/EU policy	17	3.31	0	0.00	14	82.35	3	17.65

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Politika*

<b>Politika</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>%</b>
Positive	59	11.50
Neutral	308	60.04
Negative	146	28.46
<b>total</b>	<b>513</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

***Večernje novosti***

Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Večernje novosti*

	Value context with reference to the topic							
<b><i>Večernje novosti</i></b>	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Priština	64	15.92	0	0.00	30	46.88	34	53.13
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	30	7.46	0	0.00	17	56.67	13	43.33
Economy	26	6.47	3	11.54	21	80.77	2	7.69
Activities of the President of Serbia	25	6.22	3	12.00	22	88.00	0	0.00
Infrastructure	18	4.48	2	11.11	11	61.11	5	27.78
Political life in Croatia	17	4.23	0	0.00	4	23.53	13	76.47
Commerce	15	3.73	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
System of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	15	3.73	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Activities of the Government of Serbia	15	3.73	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Issues of faith, church and religion	13	3.23	0	0.00	9	69.23	4	30.77

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Večernje novosti*

<b><i>Večernje novosti</i></b>	<b>No</b>	<b>%</b>
Positive	32	7.96
Neutral	271	67.41
Negative	99	24.63
<b>total</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

## Balance

When we take into consideration all the texts from the sample for the third period of 2018, it can be noticed that most of the topics presented are not treated in a comprehensive manner, as evidenced by the fact that the balance is present in only 17.97% of all texts, which is about 4.63% less complete texts than in the previous quarter. The least balanced texts were recorded in *Informer* 0.93% or 2 of 214 entries, followed by *Alo!* - 10.81%, *Kurir* - 15.07%, *Politika* - 16.96%, *Danas* - 21.57%, *Večernje novosti* - 21.64%, *Blic* - 32.19%. Major differences compared to the previous quarter are noticeable only in *Politika*, where the share of unbalanced texts increased by 17% and in *Alo!* in which we record decrease of complete texts of about 5%.

Although the value context is not expressed in 67.04% of all texts, consideration must be given to the fact that the vast majority of texts from the cover pages we have analyzed are not comprehensive, and that one-sided approach reflects the general situation in the Serbian media. Balanced texts, of course, necessarily show some degree of restraint, which, obviously, does not represent a particularly widespread phenomenon in Serbian journalism. Taking sides, which is sometimes very passionate, attracts the audience but reduces seriousness. It's about the speed of the reaction, not the detailed and rational information required by the research, a larger number of interlocutors and reliable and verifiable data, along with available information sources. In this way, circulation and popularity are gained in a short time, but not a reputation.

The balance in relation to all the topics and all seven media from the sample

All media	Yes		No	
media	%	No.	%	No.
<i>Informer</i>	0.93	2	99.07	212
<i>Alo!</i>	10.81	24	89.19	198
<i>Kurir</i>	15.07	33	84.93	186
<i>Politika</i>	16.96	87	83.04	426
<i>Danas</i>	21.57	96	78.43	349
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	21.64	87	78.36	315
<i>Blic</i>	32.19	75	67.81	158
<b>total</b>	<b>17.97</b>	<b>404</b>	<b>82.03</b>	<b>1844</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

## Actors

Media u Srbiji se, bar sudeći prema analizi empirijskog materijala prikupljenog sa naslovnica, pretežno bave političkim događajima unutar Srbije. Individualni i kolektivni politički akteri, koji zauzimaju različite pozicije unutar političkog života Srbije, čine 42.93% od ukupnog broja aktera o kojima govore selektovani tekstovi sa naslovnica (videti **tabelu 47** i **tabele 53, 54, 55, 56 i 57**, koje govore o distribuciji učestalosti pojavljivanja pojedinih individualnih i **tabele 58, 59, 60 i 61**, koje govore o distribuciji učestalosti pojavljivanja kolektivnih domaćih političkih aktera). Ukoliko ovom broju pridružimo i tekstove koji govore o inostranim političkim akterima, procenat učešća političkih aktera u ukupnom broju aktera na naslovnica raste do 72.21%. Druga grupa po učestalosti pojavljivanja su različiti društveni akteri koji čine 16.20% našeg uzorka. Privredni i ekonomski akteri su protagonisti tekstova sa naslovnica tek u 8.38% slučajeva (videti **tabelu 47**).

Media in Serbia, at least according to the analysis of the empirical material collected from the covers, mainly deal with political events within Serbia. Individual and collective political actors, who occupy different positions within the political life of Serbia, account for 42.93% of the total number of actors on selected headlines. If we add to this number the texts that speak of foreign political actors, the percentage of the participation of political actors in the total number of actors on the headlines rises to 72.21%. The second group by frequency of occurrence is different social actors that make up 16.20% of our sample. Industrial and economic actors are the protagonists of texts on the front page in only 8.38% of cases.

Total distribution of actors appearing in the texts which are a part of sampled research (expressed in absolute numbers)

Actors					
Political actors	8727	Domestic	5188	Individual	3694
				Collective	1494
		Foreign	3539	Individual	2691
				Collective	848
Economic actors	1013	Domestic	953	Individual	240
				Collective	713
		Foreign	60	Individual	7
				Collective	53
Other social actors	1958	Domestic	1907	Individual	1362
				Collective	545
		Foreign	51	Individual	27
				Collective	24
Unnamed sources					386
Total					12084

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearance of individual political actors from **the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the President of the Republic of Serbia**

The Government and the President of the Republic of Serbia	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Aleksandar Vučić	680	41.09	27	3.97	640	94.12	13	1.91
Ivica Dačić	189	11.42	2	1.06	187	98.94	0	0.00
Ana Brnabić	171	10.33	4	2.34	164	95.91	3	1.75
Nebojša Stefanović	99	5.98	0	0.00	99	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Vulin	93	5.62	1	1.08	88	94.62	4	4.30
Zorana Mihajlović	72	4.35	0	0.00	66	91.67	6	8.33
Siniša Mali	51	3.08	0	0.00	50	98.04	1	1.96
Rasim Ljajić	43	2.60	1	2.33	40	93.02	2	4.65
Mladen Šarčević	33	1.99	1	3.03	30	90.91	2	6.06
Zoran Đorđević	30	1.81	0	0.00	30	100.00	0	0.00
Vladan Vukosavljević	29	1.75	0	0.00	28	96.55	1	3.45
Aleksandar Antić	28	1.69	0	0.00	28	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Popović	28	1.69	1	3.57	27	96.43	0	0.00
Zlatibor Lončar	21	1.27	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
Nela Kuburović	18	1.09	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Slavica Đukić Dejanović	17	1.03	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Ružić	15	0.91	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Jadranka Joksimović	10	0.60	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Branislav Nedimović	9	0.54	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Krkobabić	5	0.30	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Knežević	5	0.30	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Trivan	5	0.30	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Vanja Udovičić	4	0.24	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>1655</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>2.24</b>	<b>1586</b>	<b>95.83</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>1.93</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

As in the previous quarter, the most frequent actor on the front pages of daily newspapers in Serbia was Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, about which the media from our sample report predominantly neutral (in 94.12% of cases). About 3.97% (27) positive and 1.91% (13) texts with negative connotation were written about him. The President of Serbia, as the protagonist of the texts on the cover, appears 680 times, which is significantly higher than the second ranked actor, Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić, who is

present in 189 articles and Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, who is present in 171 texts. The highest frequency of the appearance of Aleksandar Vučić, expressed in absolute numbers, is recorded in daily newspapers *Danas* (171), *Večernje novosti* (129) and *Politika* (95). Expressed in the relative numbers of the percentage participation of the texts in which he appears as an actor, and in relation to the total number of selected texts from the same individual newspapers, we can see that he is the most present in *Danas* (38.43%) and *Kurir* (35.62%). The smallest participation of texts in which the actor is the president of Serbia is recorded in the daily *Politika* (18.52%)

When it comes to the value context, the largest share, as well as the number of negative texts, are again present in *Danas* (7.60% or 13 texts). The highest number of positive texts was published in *Alo!* – 9 or 14.29%, followed by *Kurir* with 6 (7.69%), while 5 positively connotated texts were recorded in *Informer* – 7.58% and *Večernje novosti* (3.88%) each.

Aleksandar Vučić: Context value with reference to the media

Aleksandar Vučić	Positive		Neutral		Negative		total	
Media	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<i>Alo!</i>	9	14.29	54	85.71	0	0.00	63	100
<i>Blic</i>	0	0.00	78	100.00	0	0.00	78	100
<i>Danas</i>	0	0.00	158	92.40	13	7.60	171	100
<i>Informer</i>	5	7.58	61	92.42	0	0.00	66	100
<i>Kurir</i>	6	7.69	72	92.31	0	0.00	78	100
<i>Politika</i>	2	2.11	93	97.89	0	0.00	95	100
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	5	3.88	124	96.12	0	0.00	129	100
<b>total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>3.97</b>	<b>640</b>	<b>94.12</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>1.91</b>	<b>680</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Number of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić in respect of total numbers of texts in particular daily newspapers

Aleksandar Vučić per media	No. of appearances	Total no. of texts	% share against total no. of texts
<i>Danas</i>	171	445	38.43
<i>Kurir</i>	78	219	35.62
<i>Blic</i>	78	233	33.48
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	129	402	32.09
<i>Informer</i>	66	214	30.84
<i>Alo!</i>	63	222	28.38
<i>Politika</i>	95	513	18.52
<b>total</b>	<b>680</b>	<b>2248</b>	<b>30.25</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018



Premijerka Ana Brnabić je protagonistkinja u 171 (10.33%) analiziranih tekstova i treća je prema učestalosti pojavljivanja među individualnim političkim akterima sa političke scene Srbije (videti **tabelu 48**). U trećem kvartalu 2018. godine napisana su 3 negativno konotirana teksta o Ani Brnabić, u dnevnom listu *Danas*. Pozitivno konotirane tekstove o aktuelnoj premijerki objavila su tri lista: *Politika* (2 teksta), *Alo!* i *Informer* (po 1) (videti **tabelu 51**).

Prime Minister Ana Brnabić is the protagonist in 171 (10.33%) analyzed texts and the third overall according to the frequency of appearances among individual political actors from the political scene of Serbia. In the third quarter of 2018, three negatively connoted texts were written about Ana Brnabić, in the daily newspaper *Danas*. Positively connoted articles on the current prime minister were published in three papers: *Politika* (2 texts), *Alo!* and *Informer* (one each).

Najveći number tekstova u kojima je akterka premijerka Srbije, objavili su dnevni listovi *Večernje novosti* (42), *Danas* (35) i *Politika* (31). Najveće učešće tekstova u odnosu na ukupan number tekstova u mediju zabeleženo je u *Blicu* (11.59%) i *Večernjim novostima* (10.45%) (**tabela 52**).

The majority of the articles in which the Serbian Prime Minister's is the main actor has been published in *Večernje novosti* (42), *Danas* (35) and *Politika* (31). The largest share of texts in relation to the total number of texts in the media was recorded in *Blic* (11.59%) and *Večernje novosti* (10.45%).

Ana Brnabić: Context value with reference to the media

Ana Brnabić	positive		neutral		negative		total	
Media	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<i>Alo!</i>	1	7.14	13	92.86	0	0.00	14	100
<i>Blic</i>	0	0.00	27	100.00	0	0.00	27	100
<i>Danas</i>	0	0.00	32	91.43	3	8.57	35	100
<i>Informer</i>	1	11.11	8	88.89	0	0.00	9	100
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00	13	100
<i>Politika</i>	2	6.45	29	93.55	0	0.00	31	100
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0	0.00	42	100.00	0	0.00	42	100
<b>total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2.34</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>95.91</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1.75</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Mediameter research, July – September 2018

Number of appearances of Ana Brnabić in respect of total numbers of texts in particular daily newspapers

Ana Brnabić per media	No. of appearances	Total no. of texts	% share against total no. of texts
<i>Blic</i>	27	233	11.59
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	42	402	10.45
<i>Danas</i>	35	445	7.87
<i>Alo!</i>	14	222	6.31
<i>Politika</i>	31	513	6.04
<i>Kurir</i>	13	219	5.94
<i>Informer</i>	9	214	4.21
<b>total</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>2248</b>	<b>7.61</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Other actors from this group are in 95.83% of texts presented in a neutral value context. The largest number (6) and participation (8.33%) of negative connotations was recorded in the case of Zorana Mihajlović.

In the third quarter of 2018, there was a slight increase in the number of occurrences of opposition actors – 932 compared to 844 in the previous quarter. However, this is still significantly lower than the noticeable increase in the number of opposition parties in the first quarter of 2018 (1781), which was spurred by activities related to the Belgrade elections. In this quarter, the most prominent opposition actor was Dragan Đilas with 132 appearances, followed by Vuk Jeremić (91) and Vojislav Šešelj (62). The highest number of negative texts, expressed in absolute numbers, were written about Dragan Đilas (29), then about Vuk Jeremić (23) and Boško Obradović (15). Regarding the more represented opposition actors, the highest percentage participation of negative connotations is present with Sulejman Ugljanin (50%), Vjerica Radeta (35.71%) and Boško Obradović (26.79%). Not a single positive text was written about the representatives of the opposition in the third quarter of 2018.

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearance of individual political actors from **the opposition**

Opposition- individual	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Dragan Đilas	132	14.16	0	0.00	103	78.03	29	21.97
Vuk Jeremić	91	9.76	0	0.00	68	74.73	23	25.27
Vojislav Šešelj	62	6.65	0	0.00	58	93.55	4	6.45
Saša Janković	58	6.22	0	0.00	45	77.59	13	22.41
Boško Obradović	56	6.01	0	0.00	41	73.21	15	26.79
Boris Tadić	47	5.04	0	0.00	45	95.74	2	4.26
Vjerica Radeta	28	3.00	0	0.00	18	64.29	10	35.71
Čedomir Jovanović	28	3.00	0	0.00	23	82.14	5	17.86
Milan Stamatović	24	2.58	0	0.00	23	95.83	1	4.17

Zoran Lutovac	23	2.47	0	0.00	22	95.65	1	4.35
Sulejman Ugljanin	22	2.36	0	0.00	11	50.00	11	50.00
Borko Stefanović	18	1.93	0	0.00	15	83.33	3	16.67
Zoran Živković	17	1.82	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
Miloš Jovanović	14	1.50	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Šutanovac	13	1.39	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Velimir Ilić	13	1.39	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38
Janko Veselinović	12	1.29	0	0.00	9	75.00	3	25.00
Nenad Čanak	12	1.29	0	0.00	10	83.33	2	16.67
Sanda Rašković Ivić	11	1.18	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Zelenović	10	1.07	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Aleksandar Šapić	10	1.07	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Stefan Stamenkovski	8	0.86	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Bojan Pajtić	8	0.86	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Goran Čirić	7	0.75	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Balša Božović	7	0.75	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Kostić	7	0.75	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Marinika Tepić	7	0.75	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Tatjana Macura	6	0.64	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Vladan Glišić	6	0.64	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Parović	6	0.64	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Jovanović	6	0.64	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Petrović	5	0.54	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Radoslav Milojević Kena	5	0.54	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Gordana Čomić	5	0.54	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Vukadinović	5	0.54	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Čedomir Antić	4	0.43	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Aleksić	4	0.43	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Sreto Malinović	4	0.43	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dragoljub Mićunović	4	0.43	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubiša Preletačević Beli	4	0.43	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Srđan Nogo	3	0.32	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Branislav Mihajlović	3	0.32	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Goran Ješić	3	0.32	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandra Jerkov	3	0.32	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dejan Nikolić	3	0.32	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Radomir Lazović	3	0.32	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Saša Mirković	2	0.21	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	100.00
others	103	11.05	0	0.00	93	90.29	10	9.71
<b>total</b>	<b>932</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>787</b>	<b>84.44</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>15.56</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual political actors representing **the position**

Position - individual	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Darko Glišić	28	9.27	0	0.00	28	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Đukanović	19	6.29	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Linta	15	4.97	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Milutin Mrkonjić	15	4.97	0	0.00	13	86.67	2	13.33
Muamer Zukorlić	13	4.30	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Milovan Drecun	13	4.30	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Bogoljub Karić	11	3.64	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Dragan Marković Palma	9	2.98	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Milenko Jovanov	8	2.65	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Darko Bulatović	8	2.65	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Martinović	7	2.32	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Vuk Drašković	6	1.99	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Marijan Ristićević	5	1.66	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Andrej Vučić	5	1.66	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Lazanski	5	1.66	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Milutin Jeličić Jutka	4	1.32	0	0.00	0	0.00	4	100.00
Novica Tončev	4	1.32	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Marinković	3	0.99	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ivica Tončev	3	0.99	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Milićević	3	0.99	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dubravka Filipovski	3	0.99	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Orlić	3	0.99	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Radomir Nikolić	3	0.99	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67

Momo Čolaković	3	0.99	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	106	35.10	0	0.00	97	91.51	9	8.49
<b>total</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>283</b>	<b>93.71</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>6.29</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual political actors: **representatives of State bodies, agencies and institutions**

State bodies, agencies and institutions - individual	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Marko Đurić	85	21.04	1	1.18	84	98.82	0	0.00
Goran Vesić	43	10.64	0	0.00	40	93.02	3	6.98
Tomislav Nikolić	39	9.65	0	0.00	29	74.36	10	25.64
Maja Gojković	33	8.17	0	0.00	33	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Selaković	17	4.21	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Radojičić	16	3.96	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Jorgovanka Tabaković	14	3.47	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Milovan Drecun	13	3.22	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Miloš Vučević	7	1.73	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Veljko Odalović	7	1.73	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Mirović	6	1.49	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Stanković	5	1.24	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Biljana Popović Ivković	3	0.74	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Rajko Ristić	3	0.74	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Spasojević	3	0.74	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	110	27.23	0	0.00	104	94.55	6	5.45
<b>total</b>	<b>404</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>95.05</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>4.70</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution and frequency and value context of appearances of individual political actors: **representatives of military and police**

Military and police - individual	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Bratislav Gašić	13	13.40	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubiša Diković	12	12.37	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Mojsilović	9	9.28	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Veselin Milić	4	4.12	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Petar Cvetković	3	3.09	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
ostali	56	57.73	0	0.00	56	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of **other** individual political and social actors

Others	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Slobodan Milošević	93	29.06	0	0.00	89	95.70	4	4.30
Zoran Đinđić	42	13.13	1	2.38	41	97.62	0	0.00
Sonja Biserko	21	6.56	0	0.00	17	80.95	4	19.05
Vojislav Koštunica	20	6.25	0	0.00	18	90.00	2	10.00
Nataša Kandić	17	5.31	0	0.00	12	70.59	5	29.41
SANU	12	3.75	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Đuro Đurović	10	3.13	0	0.00	0	0.00	10	100.00
Mirjana Marković	9	2.81	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Sergej Trifunović	9	2.81	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Mlađan Dinkić	7	2.19	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Vesna Pešić	7	2.19	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Emir Kusturica	7	2.19	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0.00
Jelena Milić	6	1.88	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Svetlana Ražnatović	6	1.88	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Vladimir Kostić	6	1.88	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Lazar Ristovski	5	1.56	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Ivanka Popović	5	1.56	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dragica Nikolić	5	1.56	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Filip David	5	1.56	1	20.00	4	80.00	0	0.00

Siniša Jasnić	5	1.56	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
Mirko Cvetković	4	1.25	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Vujović	4	1.25	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Humanitarian law center	4	1.25	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Jurić	4	1.25	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Veran Matic	4	1.25	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ana Bekuta	3	0.94	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.94</b>	<b>286</b>	<b>89.38</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>9.69</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **state bodies and institutions**

State bodies, agencies and institutions	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Government of Serbia	163	25.39	1	0.61	158	96.93	4	2.45
Ministry of Interior	59	9.19	0	0.00	58	98.31	1	1.69
Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development	31	4.83	0	0.00	31	100.00	0	0.00
National Bank of Serbia	30	4.67	0	0.00	30	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Construction, Traffic and Infrastructure	30	4.67	0	0.00	30	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Policy	27	4.21	0	0.00	26	96.30	1	3.70
National Assembly of Republic of Serbia	26	4.05	0	0.00	23	88.46	3	11.54
Ministry of Justice	24	3.74	0	0.00	24	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Defence	23	3.58	0	0.00	23	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Health	20	3.12	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Economy	17	2.65	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunication	17	2.65	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Culture and Information	14	2.18	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Finance	14	2.18	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Tax Administration	12	1.87	0	0.00	10	83.33	2	16.67
Business Registers Agency	11	1.71	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Public Administration and Local Self-Government	10	1.56	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00

Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection	10	1.56	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	10	1.56	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
City of Belgrade	8	1.25	2	25.00	6	75.00	0	0.00
RFZO	6	0.93	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Office for Kosovo and Metohija	5	0.78	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Republic fund PIO	5	0.78	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
National employment agency	4	0.62	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Administration of the Treasury	4	0.62	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Privatisation agency	3	0.47	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Youth and Sport	3	0.47	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Prime Minister's Cabinet	3	0.47	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Mining and Energy	3	0.47	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
President's Cabinet	3	0.47	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Customs direction	3	0.47	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	44	6.85	0	0.00	41	93.18	3	6.82
<b>total</b>	<b>642</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.47</b>	<b>625</b>	<b>97.35</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>2.18</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **military and police**

Military and police	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Serbian Armed Forces	60	56.60	6	10.00	53	88.33	1	1.67
Security Intelligence Agency	20	18.87	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian Police Union	6	5.66	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Military Security Agency	3	2.83	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	17	16.04	1	5.88	16	94.12	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6.60</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>91.51</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1.89</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018



Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **position**

Position	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
SNS	159	68.24	1	0.63	148	93.08	10	6.29
SPS	44	18.88	0	0.00	42	95.45	2	4.55
SDPS	8	3.43	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
SPO	5	2.15	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Socialists' Movement	5	2.15	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
PUPS	4	1.72	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
SNP	4	1.72	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
United Serbia	3	1.29	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	1	0.43	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.43</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>93.99</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>5.58</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective actors: **opposition**

Opposition- parties	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Alliance for Serbia	85	17.10	1	1.18	76	89.41	8	9.41
DS	74	14.89	0	0.00	71	95.95	3	4.05
Dveri	46	9.26	0	0.00	44	95.65	2	4.35
People's party	41	8.25	0	0.00	40	97.56	1	2.44
DSS	40	8.05	0	0.00	38	95.00	2	5.00
SRS	36	7.24	0	0.00	34	94.44	2	5.56
PSG	33	6.64	1	3.03	32	96.97	0	0.00
SDS	18	3.62	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
LDP	17	3.42	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Enough is enough	17	3.42	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian Left	12	2.41	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
LSV	11	2.21	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
New party	11	2.21	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
SDA Sandžak	7	1.41	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Movement for Turnaround	7	1.41	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
SPAS	6	1.21	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00

Initiative: Let's not drown Belgrade	5	1.01	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Citizen's block 381	5	1.01	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
New Serbia	5	1.01	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
others	21	4.23	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>497</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0.40</b>	<b>475</b>	<b>95.57</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>4.02</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective actors: **Kosovo**

Kosovo	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Hashim Thaçi	177	21.43	0	0.00	143	80.79	34	19.21
Ramush Haradinaj	106	12.83	0	0.00	82	77.36	24	22.64
KFOR	62	7.51	0	0.00	53	85.48	9	14.52
Behgjet Pacolli	49	5.93	0	0.00	43	87.76	6	12.24
Kadri Veseli	46	5.57	0	0.00	23	50.00	23	50.00
Oliver Ivanović	40	4.84	0	0.00	40	100.00	0	0.00
OVK	38	4.60	0	0.00	17	44.74	21	55.26
Serbian list	33	4.00	0	0.00	33	100.00	0	0.00
ROSU	21	2.54	0	0.00	15	71.43	6	28.57
Fatmir Limaj	21	2.54	0	0.00	19	90.48	2	9.52
Kosovo police	19	2.30	0	0.00	12	63.16	7	36.84
Rada Trajković	16	1.94	0	0.00	13	81.25	3	18.75
Kosovo security forces	11	1.33	0	0.00	7	63.64	4	36.36
Goran Rakić	11	1.33	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Albin Kurti	8	0.97	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Unmik	7	0.85	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Special court for KLA crimes	6	0.73	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Euleks	6	0.73	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Milan Radojčić	6	0.73	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dalibor Jeftić	5	0.61	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Kosovo Government	5	0.61	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Agim Çeku	3	0.36	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
"Kosovo authorities"	3	0.36	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00

Kosovo Special Prosecution	3	0.36	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Enver Hoxhaj	3	0.36	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	121	14.65	3	2.48	112	92.56	6	4.96
<b>total</b>	<b>826</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.36</b>	<b>671</b>	<b>81.23</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>18.40</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Croatia**

Croatia	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Kolinda Grabar Ki-tarović	39	16.39	0	0.00	24	61.54	15	38.46
Marko Perković Tompson	34	14.29	0	0.00	14	41.18	20	58.82
Andrej Plenković	24	10.08	0	0.00	22	91.67	2	8.33
Savo Štrbac	17	7.14	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Franjo Tuđman	15	6.30	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Ante Gotovina	14	5.88	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
Ante Pavelić	13	5.46	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Milorad Pupovac	7	2.94	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
"Croatian authorities"	5	2.10	0	0.00	0	0.00	5	100.00
Vlada Hrvatske	4	1.68	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
HDZ	3	1.26	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	63	26.47	0	0.00	54	85.71	9	14.29
<b>total</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>77.73</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>22.27</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Montenegro**

Montenegro	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Milo Đukanović	40	27.03	0	0.00	26	65.00	14	35.00
Duško Marković	19	12.84	0	0.00	16	84.21	3	15.79
Andrija Mandić	6	4.05	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
DPS	6	4.05	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Jelena Stanišić	4	2.70	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Democratic front	3	2.03	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Medojević	3	2.03	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	67	45.27	0	0.00	53	79.10	14	20.90
<b>total</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>76.35</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>23.65</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Federation of BiH**

BiH	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Milorad Dodik	82	35.34	2	2.44	80	97.56	0	0.00
Bakir Izetbegović	16	6.90	0	0.00	10	62.50	6	37.50
Mladen Ivanić	15	6.47	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Željka Cvijanović	10	4.31	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Government of RS	9	3.88	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Naser Orić	9	3.88	0	0.00	6	66.67	3	33.33
Denis Zvizdić	7	3.02	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
SNSD	6	2.59	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Mektić	6	2.59	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Crnadak	5	2.16	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Alija Izetbegović	4	1.72	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Intelligence and Security Agency of BiH	4	1.72	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
SDS	4	1.72	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Ministry of Internal Affairs of RS	3	1.29	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
SDA	3	1.29	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
BiH Presidency	3	1.29	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	46	19.83	0	0.00	42	91.30	4	8.70
<b>total</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0.86</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>90.95</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>8.19</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Macedonia**

Macedonia	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Zoran Zaev	14	45.16	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
VMRO-DPMNE	3	9.68	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
SDSM	2	6.45	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Ivanov	2	6.45	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
others	10	32.26	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
<b>total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>93.55</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6.45</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign political actors

Foreign political actors	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Emmanuel Macron	40	10.28	0	0.00	40	100.00	0	0.00
Xi Jinping	31	7.97	1	3.23	30	96.77	0	0.00
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	24	6.17	0	0.00	23	95.83	1	4.17
Edi Rama	15	3.86	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Sebastian Kurz	15	3.86	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Alexis Tsipras	13	3.34	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Viktor Orban	13	3.34	1	7.69	12	92.31	0	0.00
Li Keqiang	11	2.83	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Theresa May	9	2.31	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Boyko Borissov	7	1.80	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Li Manchang	7	1.80	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0.00
Bashar al Assad	7	1.80	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Petro Poroshenko	4	1.03	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Denis Keefe	4	1.03	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Fethullah Gülen	4	1.03	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
"Chinese authorities"	4	1.03	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Kim Jong Un	4	1.03	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Tonny Blair	4	1.03	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Benjamin Netanjahu	3	0.77	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	3	0.77	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

others	167	42.93	0	0.00	162	97.01	5	2.99
<b>total</b>	<b>389</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.77</b>	<b>378</b>	<b>97.17</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2.06</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual foreign political actors outside the region: **Germany**

Germany	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Angela Merkel	78	72.22	0	0.00	77	98.72	1	1.28
Gerhard Schröder	5	4.63	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Heiko Maas	2	1.85	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
others	23	21.30	0	0.00	23	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>99.07</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.93</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: **Russia**

Russia	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Vladimir Putin	145	46.18	5	3.91	123	96.09	0	0.00
Sergey Lavrov	30	9.55	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Alexander Chepurin	25	7.96	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Maria Zakharova	20	6.37	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Medvedev	11	3.50	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Peskov	9	2.87	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
“Russian authorities”	7	2.23	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Sergey Shoygu	5	1.59	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Sergei Skripal	4	1.27	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Russian-Serbian humanitarian center in Niš	3	0.96	1	12.50	7	87.50	0	0.00
Dmitry Rogozin	3	0.96						
Russia's Ministry of Foreign affairs	3	0.96	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
others	49	15.61	0	0.00	23	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>314</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>2.80</b>	<b>346</b>	<b>96.92</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.28</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: **USA**

USA	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Donald Trump <?>	166	32.11	3	1.81	158	95.18	5	3.01
Bill Clinton	24	4.64	0	0.00	19	79.17	5	20.83
Kyle Scott	23	4.45	0	0.00	22	95.65	1	4.35
John Bolton	20	3.87	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Barack Obama	12	2.32	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Mike Pompeo	11	2.13	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
State Department	11	2.13	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Greg Delawie	11	2.13	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
George Bush	11	2.13	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
CIA	11	2.13	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
Hillary Clinton	10	1.93	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Madeleine Albright	10	1.93	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
James Mattis	9	1.74	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Wess Mitchell	8	1.55	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
US Administration	8	1.55	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
US Congress	6	1.16	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Mike Pence	5	0.97	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
US Embassy	5	0.97	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
George Soros	5	0.97	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
"American authorities"	5	0.97	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
US Embassy in Priština	5	0.97	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Pentagon	5	0.97	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Melania Trump	4	0.77	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
New York Times	4	0.77	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Democratic Party	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
USAID	3	0.58	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Jared Kushner	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
John McCain	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	116	22.44	0	0.00	112	96.55	4	3.45
<b>total</b>	<b>517</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.58</b>	<b>488</b>	<b>94.39</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>5.03</b>

Source: Mediameter research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign political actors: **representatives of EU institutions and EU institutions**

EU	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
EU	152	41.64	2	1.32	141	92.76	9	5.92
Federica Mogherini	46	12.60	0	0.00	46	100.00	0	0.00
Johannes Han	36	9.86	0	0.00	36	100.00	0	0.00
European Commission	31	8.49	1	3.23	29	93.55	1	3.23
Maja Kocijančič	20	5.48	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Jean Claude Juncker	17	4.66	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
European Parliament	15	4.11	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Council of Europe	5	1.37	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Sem Fabrizi	4	1.10	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
European Investment Bank	4	1.10	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
David McAlister	3	0.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Donald Tusk	3	0.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	29	7.95	0	0.00	28	96.55	1	3.45
<b>total</b>	<b>365</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.82</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>96.16</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3.01</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of individual and collective foreign political actors: **representatives of human rights organizations and Council of Europe representatives**

Human Rights	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
OSCE	7	26.92	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
European court for human rights	6	23.08	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Council of Europe	5	19.23	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
others	8	30.77	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
<b>total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>96.15</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3.85</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018



Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign political actors: **representatives of UN institutions and UN institutions**

UN	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
United Nations	62	55.36	0	0.00	62	100.00	0	0.00
UN Security Council	27	24.11	0	0.00	27	100.00	0	0.00
António Guterres	9	8.04	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
UNESCO	4	3.57	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
UNHCR	1	0.89	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
others	9	8.04	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors: **NATO**

NATO	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
NATO	130	88.44	0	0.00	117	90.00	13	10.00
Jens Stoltenberg	8	5.44	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
others	9	6.12	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>91.16</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>8.84</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective actors: **actors related to The Hague Tribunal**

The Hague Tribunal	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Hague tribunal	18	20.93	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
Ratko Mladić	17	19.77	2	11.76	15	88.24	0	0.00
Radovan Karadžić	10	11.63	1	10.00	9	90.00	0	0.00
Neboša Pavković	3	3.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Veselin Šljivančanin	3	3.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Teodor Meron	3	3.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	32	37.21	1	3.13	31	96.88	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4.65</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>94.19</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.16</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Already from this cursory review of the frequency of the appearance of individual actors on the front pages of the selected printed daily newspapers from our sample, it is clearly noticed that the media treat issues from the domain of internal and external politics with unequal interest. In the third quarter,

foreign political actors account for 40.55% of all political actors, compared to 59.44% of the incidence of domestic political actors.

Economic actors in the third quarter of 2018 constitute 8.38% of the total sample of actors, which, compared to the previous quarter, represents an increase of about 1.5% or, expressed in absolute numbers 270.

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective **economy/economic actors**

Economic actors - individually	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Dragan Šolak	12	5.00	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Miroslav Mišković	12	5.00	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Cvetan Vasilev	8	3.33	0	0.00	0	0.00	8	100.00
Nebojša Atanacković	8	3.33	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Babić	7	2.92	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Kostić	6	2.50	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Bajatović	5	2.08	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Beko	5	2.08	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitar Đurović	4	1.67	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Stanko Subotić Cane	4	1.67	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Drobnjak	4	1.67	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Blagoje Spaskovski	3	1.25	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Seničić	3	1.25	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	159	66.25	1	0.63	145	91.19	13	8.18
<b>total</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.42</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>89.58</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>10.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective **domestic economic actors**

Economic actors	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
RTB Bor	44	6.17	0	0.00	44	100.00	0	0.00
Electrodistribution of Serbia	24	3.37	0	0.00	23	95.83	1	4.17
Smederevo Ironworks	17	2.38	1	5.88	16	94.12	0	0.00
Corridors of Serbia	15	2.10	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
PKB	14	1.96	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Telekom Serbia	14	1.96	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Fiat	13	1.82	1	7.69	12	92.31	0	0.00

Al Dahra	11	1.54	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Srbijagas	9	1.26	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
NIS	9	1.26	0	0.00	2	22.22	7	77.78
Traffic institute CIP	9	1.26	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Air Serbia	9	1.26	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Nitrogen plant Pančevo	8	1.12	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Hesteel	8	1.12	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Commerce Chamber of Serbia	7	0.98	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Tesla Aeroport	7	0.98	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
MK group	6	0.84	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Ski resorts of Serbia	6	0.84	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Agrokor	6	0.84	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Commercial bank	6	0.84	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Roads of Serbia	5	0.70	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Hemofarm	5	0.70	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Petrochemistry	5	0.70	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
SBB	5	0.70	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Belgrade Waterfront	5	0.70	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Resavica	4	0.56	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
MSK Kikinda	4	0.56	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Viktorija group	4	0.56	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Azvirt	4	0.56	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Gazprom neft	4	0.56	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Telenor	4	0.56	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Eksim bank	4	0.56	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Galenika	4	0.56	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Rio Tinto	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Unicredit bank	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Delta holding	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Shandong company	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Poštanska štedionica	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Huawei	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Etihad	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Railways of Serbia	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Association of banks of Serbia	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Waterworks	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Lidl	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
CRBC	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
NALED	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Sberbank	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
ostali	372	52.17	3	0.81	358	96.24	11	2.96
<b>total</b>	<b>713</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0.70</b>	<b>685</b>	<b>96.07</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>3.23</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective **foreign economic actors**

IMF/World Bank	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
IMF	29	48.33	0	0.00	29	100.00	0	0.00
World Bank	18	30.00	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Sebastian Sosa	4	6.67	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Christine Lagarde	3	5.00	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	6	10.00	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

In addition to already mentioned political and economic actors, the protagonists are also various other social actors, who in different ways influence the social and political situation within the Serbian society. Based on the collected empirical material, we divided them into:

(a) representatives of independent and independent governmental bodies and institutions, (b) political, social, economic, security and other analysts, (c) representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations, (d) actors from the media, (e) representatives of judicial authorities, (f) lawyers and protagonists of various court proceedings, (h) media affairs protagonists and (i) actors from the past

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of independent bodies**

Independent bodies	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Anti-Corruption Agency	22	30.99	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
Rodoljub Šabić	10	14.08	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Fiscal council	8	11.27	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
REM	6	8.45	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Social and economic council	4	5.63	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Anti-Corruption Council	3	4.23	1	33.33	2	66.67	0	0.00
others	18	25.35	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.41</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>95.77</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2.82</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Analysts (experts) have special role in the texts on the front pages of the media from the sample, and the media treat them in a neutral context as much as 99.3% of the texts. During the entire third quarter of 2018, the analyzed daily newspapers significantly promoted the views of these experts, so their opinion was represented 568<sup>2</sup> times. The largest share and the number of analysts represented was recorded in *Informer*.

Distribution of the frequency of the appearance of analysts on the covers in different media from the survey sample

Media / Analyst	No.	%
<i>Informer</i>	183	32.22
<i>Danas</i>	105	18.49
<i>Kurir</i>	73	12.85
<i>Blic</i>	62	10.92
<i>Politika</i>	54	9.51
<i>Alo!</i>	46	8.10
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	45	7.92
<b>total</b>	<b>568</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

<sup>2</sup> This is a significant increase from the previous quarter when analysts on the cover of the analyzed daily newspapers were present in 390 texts.

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic and social actors:  
**analysts**

Analysts	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Dragomir Anđelković	41	7.22	0	0.00	40	97.56	1	2.44
Nebojša Krstić	17	2.99	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Savić	16	2.82	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Janjić	16	2.82	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Dejan Vuk Stanković	12	2.11	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Boban Stojanović	12	2.11	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Dževad Galijašević	12	2.11	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Radun	12	2.11	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Orhan Dragaš	11	1.94	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Božidar Spasić	11	1.94	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubomir Madžar	11	1.94	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Kovačević	11	1.94	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Ljuban Karan	11	1.94	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Vladislav Jovanović	10	1.76	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Radić	10	1.76	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Mahmud Bušatlija	10	1.76	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Draško Đenović	10	1.76	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Dragišić	8	1.41	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Nicović	8	1.41	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Milivojević	8	1.41	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Bojan Klačar	8	1.41	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Živadin Jovanović	7	1.23	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Milojko Arsić	7	1.23	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Pejić	6	1.06	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Proroković	6	1.06	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Vlade Radulović	6	1.06	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Nikolić	6	1.06	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Saša Borojević	6	1.06	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Nemanja Nenadić	6	1.06	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Božidar Delić	6	1.06	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Gajić	5	0.88	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Ratko Božović	4	0.70	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

Vladimir Goati	4	0.70	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Zlatko Nikolić	4	0.70	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Prostran	4	0.70	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Rodić	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Popov	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Borivoje Borović	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Jovo Bakić	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Dobrašinović	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mladen Kovačević	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Boško Jakšić	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Stojiljković	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Toma Fila	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Đukanović	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Matić	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Vuletić	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Srđan Cvetković	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Bojan Dimitrijević	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandra Joksimović	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	181	31.87	0	0.00	180	99.45	1	0.55
<b>total</b>	<b>568</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>564</b>	<b>99.30</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0.70</b>

Source: Mediameter research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency of SOC representatives and other religious communities on the covers in different media from the survey sample

Medij/religija	number	%
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	120	27.97
<i>Politika</i>	94	21.91
<i>Alo!</i>	63	14.69
<i>Danas</i>	56	13.05
<i>Kurir</i>	33	7.69
<i>Informer</i>	32	7.46
<i>Blic</i>	31	7.23
<b>total</b>	<b>429</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Mediameter research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and religious organizations**

Religion	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
SPC	90	20.98	0	0.00	87	96.67	3	3.33
Patriarch Irinej	58	13.52	0	0.00	58	100.00	0	0.00
Sava Janjić	41	9.56	0	0.00	32	78.05	9	21.95
Amfilohije, Metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral	31	7.23	0	0.00	29	93.55	2	6.45
Teodosije, bishop	21	4.90	0	0.00	20	95.24	1	4.76
Atanasije, bishop of Mileševa	19	4.43	0	0.00	14	73.68	5	26.32
Filaret, bishop	13	3.03	0	0.00	9	69.23	4	30.77
Russian Orthodox Church	11	2.56	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus'	8	1.86	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral	8	1.86	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Bartholomew, Patriarch of Constantinople	6	1.40	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Pope Francis	6	1.40	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Patriarch Pavle	6	1.40	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Irinej, bishop of Bačka	5	1.17	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Montenegrin Orthodox Church	5	1.17	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Macedonian Orthodox Church	5	1.17	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Alojzije Stepinac	4	0.93	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Lavrentije, bishop of Šabac	3	0.70	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Miraš Dedeić	3	0.70	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Roman Catholic Church	3	0.70	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	83	19.35	0	0.00	76	91.57	7	8.43
<b>total</b>	<b>429</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>394</b>	<b>91.84</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>8.16</b>

Source: Mediameter research, July – September 2018



Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective social domestic actors from **the media**<sup>3</sup>

Media	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Željko Mitrović	18	10.40	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
TV Pink	13	7.51	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
RTS	10	5.78	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
TV N1	9	5.20	0	0.00	6	66.67	3	33.33
NUNS	8	4.62	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Informer	7	4.05	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Dragan Bujošević	6	3.47	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
UNS	5	2.89	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
NDNV	5	2.89	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan J. Vučićević	4	2.31	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Zoran Kesić	4	2.31	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Večernje novosti	3	1.73	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Kurir	3	1.73	1	33.33	2	66.67	0	0.00
Danas	3	1.73	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Politika	3	1.73	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	72	41.62	0	0.00	71	98.61	1	1.39
<b>total</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.58</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>93.06</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>6.36</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

During the collection of empirical material, a significant presence of actors in connection with the activities of the judicial and investigative bodies was noted on the cover pages. The actors from this group are shown as representatives of judicial authorities (197), lawyers (162) and other protagonists of current or completed court / investigative proceedings (137).

<sup>3</sup> The actors who were the subject of the writing of other media are presented, that is, the media company that were reported by other media.

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective domestic social actors: **representatives of judicial bodies**

Judicial system	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Higher Court in Belgrade	36	18.27	0	0.00	36	100.00	0	0.00
Court of Appeals in Belgrade	32	16.24	0	0.00	32	100.00	0	0.00
Higher Public Prosecutor in Belgrade	19	9.64	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Prosecution for Organized Crime	9	4.57	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Second Basic Public Prosecutor in Belgrade	5	2.54	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Commercial court in Belgrade	4	2.03	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
High Council of Judiciary	4	2.03	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Special Court in Belgrade	3	1.52	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Judges' Association of Serbia	3	1.52	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Supreme Court of Cassation	3	1.52	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	79	40.10	0	0.00	74	93.67	5	6.33
<b>total</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>97.46</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2.54</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **lawyers**<sup>4</sup>

Lawyers	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Dragoslav Miša Ognjanović	24	14.81	0	0.00	24	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian Bar Association	11	6.79	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Zora Dobričanin Nikodinović	9	5.56	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Zdenko Tomanović	4	2.47	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Petronijević	3	1.85	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Predrag Savić	3	1.85	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	108	66.67	0	0.00	108	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

<sup>4</sup> Some lawyers in the texts of the media from the sample played the role of analysts, and are therefore shown in that group of actors.

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **actors of court proceedings and investigations**

Actors of court proceedings and investigations	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Luka Bojović	22	16.06	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Bojović	8	5.84	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Šaranović	7	5.11	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Darko Šarić	7	5.11	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Zvezdan Jovanović	5	3.65	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Milorad Ulemek Legija	4	2.92	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Branislav Šaranović	3	2.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Željko Ražnatović Arkan	3	2.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	78	56.93	0	0.00	73	93.59	5	6.41
<b>total</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>96.35</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3.65</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

The following table shows all the actors who were linked by the media with the murder of singer Jelena Marjanović, as well as members of her family, acquaintances and friends. In the third quarter of 2018, these actors were present in 226 appearances. It is important to note that this case, although there are no significant breakthroughs in its solution, persists on the covers since April 2016, when the murder took place.

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **"The murder of Jelena Marjanović"**

The murder of Jelena Marjanović	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Zoran Marjanović	57	25.22	0	0.00	44	77.19	13	22.81
Jelena Marjanović	56	24.78	0	0.00	56	100.00	0	0.00
Jana Marjanović	38	16.81	0	0.00	38	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Marjanović	13	5.75	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Teodora Krsmanović	12	5.31	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Šipka	11	4.87	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Uroš Marjanović	11	4.87	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Miloš Marjanović	8	3.54	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Zorica Marjanović	8	3.54	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Milica Marjanović	6	2.65	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
others	6	2.65	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>93.36</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>6.64</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors protagonists of **sports** affairs

Sport	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
FC Red Star	11	23.40	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Zvezdan Terzić	6	12.77	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Čović	4	8.51	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
FC Partizan	4	8.51	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
others	22	46.81	0	0.00	20	90.91	2	9.09
<b>total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>95.74</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4.26</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors from the **past**

Past	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Josip Broz Tito	20	41.67	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Dragoljub Mihailović	8	16.67	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Nedić	4	8.33	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ivo Andrić	3	6.25	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	13	27.08	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

## UNNAMED SOURCES

In the selected front page articles from the sampled media, unnamed sources have also been the second most prominent actor. This time there were 386 instances of quoting anonymous sources, or rather 17.17% of texts, which represents a decrease of about 2% in comparison to the results from the previous quarter (19.46%).

The widespread usage of unnamed sources has been precisely determined thanks to the manner of qualifying anonymous sources, which we have been applying since the second *Mediameter* issue, so as to not only classify those sources which the very media has defined as anonymous, but also those who provide information that cannot be verified, no matter the manner in which they have been incorporated into an article. Of course, the presence of information gained from anonymous sources speaks more about the manner of the reporting done by the seven media found in our sample, than about the actual need of protecting the identities of the individual who provide certain information.

As Matt Carlson, in his book "On the Condition of Anonymity" has said: "Journalism is woven into the fabric of our environment, and in turn is based on it, meaning that it can never be an objective observer, as it is claimed...These sorts of questions are better answered through an approach that recognizes

the culture of unnamed sources as a *culture*. This view steers an inquiry into unnamed sources away from frequency and implementation, toward issues of meanings that we share and patterns of collective interpretation between journalists, sources and the public. The securing of anonymity is not just a question of technique. It is, actually, a request for a certain type of imagining of relations between these three sides.”<sup>5</sup>

A news form that contains the largest number of information obtained from an unnamed source is a report. Of the 1721 texts written in this form, 349 or 20.28% contains anonymous sources.

Share of “unnamed sources” in all journalistic forms, in seven media from the sample

Genre	Total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Report	1721	349	20.28%
News	40	7	17.50%
Article	151	26	17.22%
Reportage	32	1	3.13%
Commentary	104	3	2.88%
other	28	0	0.00%
Interview	172	0	0.00%
<b>total</b>	<b>2248</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>17.17%</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

The largest number, as well as the participation of texts containing information obtained from unnamed sources, in relation to the total number of published articles, is recorded in *Blic* (30.47% or 71 texts). The second is *Informer* (28.5% - 61), followed by *Alo!* (22.97% - 51), *Kurir* (22.83% - 50), *Danas* (14.38% - 64), *Večernje novosti* (9.95% - 40) and *Politika* (9.55% - 49)

Share of unnamed sources per analyzed media

Media	Total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
<i>Blic</i>	233	71	30.47%
<i>Informer</i>	214	61	28.50%
<i>Alo!</i>	222	51	22.97%
<i>Kurir</i>	219	50	22.83%
<i>Danas</i>	445	64	14.38%
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	402	40	9.95%
<i>Politika</i>	513	49	9.55%
<b>total</b>	<b>2248</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>17.17%</b>

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

5 M. Carlson, *On the condition of anonymity*, Urbana, Chicago, Springfield, University of Illinois Press, 2011, 7

The largest number of texts containing information from anonymous sources (75) was recorded when it comes to *Kosovo*, however, the largest share of unnamed sources in relation to the total number of articles published on a topic was observed when it comes to the texts concerning the *murder of singer Jelena Marjanović*. Of the 58 texts focusing on this subject, as many as 51.72% contain anonymous sources.

Number of texts containing information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the seven media from the sample<sup>6</sup>

Topic/All media	Total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Kosovo/Belgrade and Priština relations	349	75	21.49%
Political life in Serbia	274	46	16.79%
Economy	190	39	20.53%
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	58	30	51.72%
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	164	16	9.76%
System of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	66	14	21.21%
Social issues / social policy	67	11	16.42%
International relations	87	10	11.49%
USA / attitudes towards USA	61	9	14.75%
Activities of the Presidents of Serbia	78	8	10.26%

Source: *Mediameter* research, July – September 2018

## Conclusion


The topics covered by print media on their cover pages during the third quarter of 2018 differed somewhat from the usual matrix. The decline in interest for internal policy issues – the functioning of the position, opposition, their mutual relations and increasing interest in relations between Belgrade and Priština, and generally, issues related to the situation in Kosovo, a slight increase in interest in economic issues... are only some of the coordinates of this new curved matrix, within which, for the first time since the start of the Quarterly Mediameter project, we note that *political life in Serbia* is not the most common topic.

<sup>6</sup> Ten topics with the largest number of unnamed sources are presented.



4





# Discourse Analysis

# DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

## **Serbia in the whirlwind of fierce political and media battles**

The “trench war” between Serbian print media continued with the same intensity and scope as in previous periods. Although it is often during the election campaigns that the media space becomes filled with fierce political controversies and radical denial of any political actors, political conceptions and political decisions, it can be said that the current context of opposing attitudes, practices and value-orientated orientations is equivalent, if not higher than during political campaigns. Intense debate, filled with various rhetorical tactics and categorical intonation in the presentation of attitudes, determines the approach and style of Serbian weeklies and editorial columns.

Images of political actors and interpretations that are supposed to describe political, economic and other processes are dominantly negative, inclined to emphasize the fallacies of political actors. Almost as by some unwritten rule, the texts continuously point to negative motivation, elaboration and outcomes of political decisions and processes. The reality presented from the angle of the weekly press is intoned with political and value-based nihilism towards the current Government. General socio-historical and political-economic decadence – this is the conclusion that the persistent and tireless journalistic work draws.

Although the above-stated assessment of media work is not original, it should be pointed out that the critical discourse emphasizes two extremely negative and politically provocative moments – madness and fascism. The Government, and generally the whole social situation, is described as madness, abnormality, deviation from common sense, lack of any meaning. On the other hand, the political order is hastily, easily, and simply marked as fascist. The irrationality of reality along with the politically radical, morally problematic and historically dangerous systematization of political order produces a critical discourse filled with continuous production and reproduction of propaganda narratives. Indicators of political propaganda narratives are present in both the written word and the image. A suggestive image and its “signature” in the form of the front page of a weekly newspaper, or the cover page with the image of a political leader of the opposition or an engaged intellectual is the backbone of the identity of weekly newspapers. The story associated with the front page represents the elaboration of the main message, with a clear aim of explaining, justifying and, if necessary, recommending the message as a basis for the formation of political opinion and action.

At the centre of critical narratives is the negative obsession with Aleksandar Vučić, the current president of Serbia, who has been repeatedly and permanently assigned negative epithets, regardless of the job he has done or the project he started. The moral judgment and political condemnation of the first man of Serbian politics is portrayed as a proof of journalistic virtue and represents a moral and political imperative of journalism. In order for a journalist to gain the epithet of a professional, he always has to question, show or think of fallouts in Vučić’s rule.

In their writing, journalists are allowed to be eclectic. Namely, a journalist, and even editorial staff, does not have to be consistent in their liberal, leftist or conservative orientation. The ideological profile of the story or even the entire orientation of the newspaper is subject to modification depending on the needs of the political moment. The only thing that is important is to constantly and tirelessly question every President's or one of his closest associates' moves. The tendency of "media pressure on every issue" is noticeable also in the writing about the second most important factor of political life – the opposition – only to much smaller extent and exclusively in a negative context in pro-Government daily newspapers.

Content-wise, stories that critically challenge the opposition, its personnel, decisions and ideas have a distinctively negative tone. They are pervaded by moralizing, patriotic suspicion, and impose a conclusion on the political, moral, and every other type of insufficiency of the opposition for the complex and risky business of leading the state and implementing reforms in society.

General conclusion about Serbian weekly newspapers and editorial columns is unchanged. Images of political actors are predetermined and extremely negative. To challenge a political competitor or competition is more important than to affirm one's own point of view. The journalist on the other hand, has the ultimate task to find and emphasize the illogicalness of the decision, the lack of a solution, relativize the positive statistics, and ultimately, play the "dedicated journalist" card in order to politically encourage those that are dissatisfied with the Government's work, or to reinforce the belief in the moral, political or any other inadequacy of the opposition.

Beyond the general presentation of the approaches, argumentation, rhetoric and conclusions of journalistic stories and interviews, the analysis has established and confirmed some clearly visible manners of the print media way of functioning. In the sphere of print journalism, especially in the weeklies, there were no "forbidden" or "untouchable" topics. Many important topics were covered in many different, often sharply conflicted ways and diametrically opposite starting points. The outcome of this form and the content of journalistic writing results with vast presence of many different views on the identical topic, whether it directly refers to actors or political, economic and wider social events.

Presence of political pluralism and number of angles and topics written about, testifies to the existence of freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of opinion in this specific socially and politically relevant form of journalism. Namely, it is possible to publish and write whatever comes to journalist's mind and thus send various types of messages. In addition, various political orientations are represented, ranging from the radical right to the left. In the analysed relevant weekly magazines there is no censorship or self-censorship. This circumstance is important for two reasons which, strictly speaking, are not from the sphere of politics.

Firstly, in Serbia, it is possible to legitimize any claim or interpretation model in relation to events, actors and socio-historical processes in the public field. Secondly, in the domain of print media, there is no censorship or media dictatorship by the Government or any other centre of power. Thirdly, the significance and influence of stories themselves is much greater than the circulation of daily or weekly newspapers. Moreover, the general impression is that articles, interviews and editorial columns are sent viral through social networks. Therefore, the interpretive codes tend to have the potential

for continuous expansion on the Internet, and consequently, are a baseline for numerous television programs or interviews. It is necessary to emphasize two characteristics of weekly press particularly.

Namely, structure-wise, there has been a significant presence of the interview as a journalistic genre. The interviewees are selected according to the political-value criteria which correspond to the orientation of the members of the editorial board. There is a noticeable and pronounced tendency of repetition of interviewees with the aim of intensifying the effect of the message, both in value and political sense. Often, these are the prominent individuals in their professions, but there are also those who wish to represent themselves as such. This is mostly about a desire to position certain public figures (singers and actors, for example) as role models with their civic stance which is almost in all cases negatively intoned against the Government. It is a skilful transfer of social recognition to the domain of politics, a precise example of the fact that propaganda goes "hand in hand" with advocacy journalism. This kind of public sphere modelling turns the public landscape into an endless space of constant disputes and never-ending conflict with high intensity. Content-wise, majority of messages from the interview (which is, as by rule, conceptually linked to the front page) is repeated according to the already prepared a political-value matrix established by the editorial board of the weekly or daily newspapers.

Repetition of the media message is at the core of its control in the public space. This is another important feature of the weekly press. The message has a significant political impact – its outcome is the creation of environment characterized by sharpened divisions. The frequency of repetition of the same message, communicated by various interviewees, creates a pattern of reactions and feelings with the readers who finally form rigid stands. "Fixating" the image of the actor or an event is one of the most common weapons in the political and propaganda war. "Fixating" the image is a process in which, and thanks to whom, one subject remains "frozen" in time despite their potential and actual transformations or the changes in the political, economic, social and historical circumstances.

This rigid pseudo-intellectual matrix operates according to the permanently assigned roles. Actors are portrayed as the "good" or "bad" guys in public space. Morally and politically acceptable "positive" attributes are ascribed to a particular group of political figures and organizations, while negative ones are irrevocably and unquestionably assigned to the opposite side – the permanently "unfit ones". At the heart of the conflict in the public-political field is the Manichean division of the media and political elite. After analysing the print media in Serbia, and in the spirit of this moral and political division, one can say that all of the weeklies are in fact – biased. In their bias, they are very clear and sharp, and therefore, very irrational.

The conflict of events, processes and actors interpretations is so vivid, that rationality, which is supposed to characterize democratically constituted public, cannot exist either as a useful illusion nor a regulatory mechanism in the process of written or visual selection of reports. Thus we live in the ambience where anyone can be against anyone, motivated by „their own“ reasons which are rarely detectable in the in-depth analysis, and where the arguments of the „other side“ rarely serve any purpose. The spirit of argumentation in the Serbian weeklies, especially the columns and interviews, is characterized by radicalism, political defamation of the opponent and first-class moral exclusivity.

At the same time, the repetition of one and the same message leads to the rigidity of the editorial policy. From this point, it is easy to form an image of the actor, process or a specific event. Repetition

of the message and unhidden tendency to form a concrete image shows the importance of print media as a tool for political communication, more precisely, a weapon in the constant political war among the actors on Serbian political scene. The rigidity of a specific media also shows the intention to skip the debate on certain issues and go straight into the „judgmental” mode of portraying actors, processes or events.

The front page also holds an important place, especially in the weeklies, for its message is constructed both visually and verbally in the form of election poster (most often: an image of the actor with a concise and direct headline from the interview or the image of an actor with a message which should form the reader's opinion). In the weeklies, for example in *NIN* the cartoon caricature also plays a significant role. This dynamic unity of a drawing and words serves a strong political-propaganda message. Another important feature of headlines in weeklies and editorial columns is the rhetorical match in the opinions and attitudes of the editorial board and the subjects being interviewed. This tendency shows that print media are most usually a sophisticated tool in the political battle, especially in the sphere of construction and maintenance of the image.

There are several possible ways to classify the weeklies, among which, for the purposes of this analysis, we will be mentioning two. According to the criterion of division that is common and usually present in a democratic society, the classification should entail the ones close to the Government and ones that are critical towards it. In Serbia, this criterion cannot be consistently applied since most weeklies only belong to the disapproving category. Weekly *Pečat* falls under the category of partially critical of the authorities, because of its open criticizing of the Government's pro-European foreign policy under the Vučić's rule. However, this weekly shows strong critical stance towards moral credibility, axiological orientation and political views of the 5th October winners. On the other hand, weeklies like *NIN*, *Vreme*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* fall under the category of completely critical of the Government.

While in *Vreme*, and to some extent in *NIN*, there is a full, concrete and severe critique of Government (especially in the domain of domestic politics and economics), a more moderate tone in the expression of critical views is expressed in *Novi Magazin* and *Nedeljnik*. They “accuse” and “label” the personality far less than it is the case with the first two, according to many, most influential Serbian weeklies *Vreme* and *NIN*.

Another classification that can be applied to the weeklies is their foreign policy orientation. *Vreme*, *NIN*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* are more or less pro-European. On the other hand, the weekly *Pečat* clearly emphasizes the anti-Western and pro-Russian stance, intended to support the nationalist discourse, close to the one which was dominant in wars in the 1990s.

## Image of the Government – authoritarian, fascist, mad, amoral, clientelist, undemocratic, without results in the sphere of economy, extremely and utterly manipulative, promotes primitivism and vulgarism.

Presentation of the most common messages about the Government that are diffusely spread in weekly newspapers and editorial columns, should begin with the examination of the broader picture of the socio-historical, political and cultural reality formed in the above-listed media.

The general image of the society is negatively determined. Serbian society is shown as deeply and fatally decadent, with almost no progressive and enlightened areas of life. All events and processes are depicted as morally controversial and politically unacceptable. Most of the messages are treated as false and everything that happens is destructive to the very social substance. Of course, the assumption is that such a deeply controversial reality is produced by a morally corrupt society and in many ways, immature elite in power led by the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić. Cartoonist Dušan Petričić is among the loudest public figures to emphasize the negative image of the society we live in. Known for his cute children's drawings and caricatures, known to the wider public as a sharp opponent of Slobodan Milošević's regime, now he is one of the most popular critics of the current Government. Petričić expresses his attitude decisively and directly, using the suggestive words and expressions in the attempt to initiate indignation and spirit of revolt among ordinary readers and members of the social elite: "It's been some six years that we have lived in a completely crooked state and I have a terrible problem to draw any sort of regularity here, whether by statement or cartoons. Nothing here is regular. There are no normal relationships. This is no longer a political society. It is a corrupt, criminal, abducting, aggressive, at times a fascist society. My caricatures fight against non-civilization, against the Stone Age into which we have sunk."<sup>1</sup>

The above quotation, stating the "fatality" of the situation in the society, points to the view that Serbia is a country without any regularity, in which a normal life is considered impossible; it is a socially decadent, politically and morally corrupt country where life is unbearable and subject to indignation and deep moral condemnation. Hence many disqualifying expressions, such as "non-civilization", "stone age" ... In a similar spirit, with the focus on the Government's activity Predrag Koraksić Corax further evaluates. He identifies the Government in Serbia with grasshoppers ravishing the fields of grain. The decadent face of the political elite, (engaged) artist Predrag Koraksić Corax expresses in the following words: "When I recall past times, back when I was in high school, the grasshoppers attacked Šumadija. They attacked twice; they were called 'gubari'. They ravished the land, they ate even the leaves. This is how I imagine this Government; it reminds me exactly of that story of the attack of the grasshoppers from my youth."<sup>2</sup>

The combination of personal experience from youth and current political perception is an attempt to

1 Dušan Petričić in Gordana Nonin article, „Karikature od naših života, [The caricatures of our lives],“ *Novi magazin*, No. 379, p. 18

2 Predrag Koraksić Corax in Gordana Nonin article, „Karikature od naših života [The caricatures of our lives],“ *Novi magazin*, No. 379, p. 19



2<sup>nd</sup> August 2018



make the message a suggestive one, and its bearer 'a man of people'. The merging of personal and political culminates with a vivid metaphor that gives even a more suggestive meaning.

The destructive dimension of politics is diverse and multi-layered. It takes all pores of society, culture and everyday life. The destruction of life caused by politics goes parallel with its significance. In Serbia, politics is the most important and most lucrative job. It is destructive for the world of values, especially when political opponents are in power. A socially engaged writer, the prototype of an enlightened moralist, Filip David, says: "Here politics are above life, power is over public interest and it supports primitivism and prostitution, as well as prostitution language; manipulations and abuses have become a lifestyle. Where politics are above life, where power is above the public interest and manipulations and various forms of abuse have become a lifestyle, there can be no talk of any form of dignity, especially not the one coming from politicians. Dignity is, like honesty, morality, self-awareness, built into the personality of individuals or it is not."<sup>3</sup> The demolition of moral, aesthetic and all other social values stems from the absence of a key organizational-functional unit of every society – the state. Dejan Mijač, one of the many public intellectuals who is extremely friendly to the previous Government, clearly speaks of the alleged lack of statehood in Serbia: "There is no state. This is a robbery organization! You instruct, of course, to talk about the state, but which state?! Where's the state?! Here?! The state is lost. Today there are firms and corporations and their associations, their unit is an organization, not a state."<sup>4</sup>

The phenomenon of state diminishing is not only a local phenomenon, it is global, it corresponds to the spirit of the times: "It is the same in the strongest countries of the world, such as America. You have Trump chasing his tail, in Russia Putin chasing his tail. Here tycoons are doing as they please, there it is the bankers. Therefore, there is no state. It's gone. Whoever doesn't see it, I'm sorry, but the state does not exist. This game is completely clear; He must play that game, he cannot just accept responsibility, even though he is the most responsible at this time. He will not give up his position, with Serbia or without it."<sup>5</sup>

In the spiritual cord with Filip David and Dejan Mijač, painter Raša Todosijević puts the local socio-cultural and political (lack of) opportunities into the forefront. In an interview Todosijević speaks of a state without justice and local politicians who humiliate the people with small and temporary economic benefits: "When the state does not protect justice, resistance is an obligation. But when people are humiliated to such an extent that the scene outside the Jagodina's feud Palma office looks like a part of a modern performance, not a modern Serbian reality, it seems that among people there is no strength even for resistance."<sup>6</sup>

The obsession of Serbian artists with politics is best reflected in public speech and the engagement of one of the best Serbian directors, Goran Marković. In a recognizable radical and angry political

---

3 Filip David, „Vlast nam radi o glavi [This Government is destroying us],“ interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3524, p. 22

4 Ibid, p. 22

5 Ibid

6 Raša Todosijević, „Živimo u muzeju bahatosti [We live in the museum of recklessness],“ *NIN*, No. 3533



30. АВГУСТ 2018. / БРОЈ 3531 / 299 RSD

ДРЖАВА ПОДРЖАЛА  
КАМП НА ЗЛАТИБОРУ  
ДРЖ'ТЕ ЛОПОВА!

КОРИДОР 10  
ЈЕДНА КОСИНА ПАЛА, НЕК  
СЕ СПРЕМЕ ЈОШ ЧЕТИРИ

ЕКСКЛУЗИВНО  
АЛЕКСАНДАР ПЕЈН  
ФИЛМАЦИЈЕ СУ КАО ФАРМЕРИ

83 ГОДИНЕ  
ТРАДИЦИЈЕ

НИН

ОЉА  
БЕЉКОВИЋ

МИЛАН ЛАНЕ ГУТОВИЋ  
**НАКАЗНИ РЕЖИМИ  
ПРОИЗВОДЕ ПОДАНИКЕ**

9 770027 668002 03531 >

Austria 4,00 EUR	Denmark 39,00 DKK	Netherlands 4,00 EUR	Norway 45,00 NOK
France 3,50 EUR	G. Britain 2,20 GBP	Hrvatska 30,00 KN	Slovenija 4,00 EUR
Belgium 4,00 EUR	BH & RM	Makedonija 249,00 DEN	Switzerland 6,00 CHF
Croatia 2,99 EUR	Greece 3,00 EUR	Germany 4,00 EUR	Sweden 60,00 SEK

www.nin.co.rs  
facebook.com/ninonline  
twitter.com/NedeljnikNIN

30<sup>th</sup> August 2018

manner, he reflects on the current political moment, arguing that it is impossible to overthrow the current Government in the elections. Marković's suspension reached a peak when he demanded mass rebellion. Rebellion is the act of revolt, a protest against the existing political and wider social status, but also is the only possible way to overthrow the current Government. The suspension of democracy in the name of victory over the hideous non-democratic order is explained in the following quote from Marković's interview in weekly *NIN*. Marković explicitly says: "This cannot be solved by any alliance and opposition agreements, but by rebellion. I no longer believe in any peaceful change in the elections. There is no time for new theft of the elections and new four-year fraud-based mandates. People need to get out in the streets. I do not have to remind you that I speak as a 72-year-old man. I do not care what will happen in thirty years, I would like to experience a change. People will rebel. Whether it will be about Kosovo, or some starlet caught in adultery with I do not know who, it is irrelevant. It is important that the moment of rebellion sparks, that the people start uprising."<sup>7</sup>

In the spirit of the idea that Serbia is the worst of all possible worlds, *NIN* journalist Zoran Preradović considers the political and wider social situation as a combination of irrationality, hysteria and fundamental moral decadence: "Perhaps this whole pathology that floods the public space in Serbia would be fun for someone if it was not so necrophillic, clearly reminding us of who they are and how all those who have something against their starlets (political and other), their secret contracts, public money launderings, suspicious investors, digitization of septic holes, fake PhDs and their mass robberies, their appalling fountains and crony economy – will end up. This malignant shallowness of Vučić's hysteria is only the tip of the narrative built for decades about Serbia as a great and powerful Balkan Prussia. We saw how this ended in past and not just on the football field. This nasty concept deliberately overlooks the most important thing – every indication of normality is a very dangerous, slippery terrain that could end their careers. They do not want to hear about the father of four who committed suicide because of the debt for electricity of 11,000 dinars, about the fact that every fourth citizen of Serbia is poor – which is the biggest discrepancy in Europe in terms of social difference, about priests who deal drugs while bishops are tearing their beards, about the fact that some ministers have decades of guaranteed prison for shameless robbery, about the young and educated who are fleeing the country. They do not even care about the war of drug cartels in the streets of Belgrade."<sup>8</sup>

The use of terms such as "necrophilia," "hysteria," or constructions such as "any indication of normality is abnormally dangerous" or lightheaded playing with normal-abnormal comparison, shows that a critic of the current political moment is somewhat infantile, especially when listing all social shortcomings in order to enhance the perception of fatal despair among readers. The goal is to make the reality seem not only the worst possible, but to evoke the repulsion of the reader, flirting very superficially, but also seductively with contrasts: right-wrong, evil-good, poor-rich, abnormal- normal. The abuse of the colloquial term 'madness' for political purposes represents the highlight of the, so-called, 'critical discourse'. In proving the irrationality of socio-historical and political reality, one cannot go any further. Madness is deviation from common sense, but it is also morally disturbing and unacceptable.

---

7 Goran Marković, „Vreme je za pobunu [It is time to rebel],“ interview with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, No. 3530, p.27

8 Zoran Preradović, „Delija sa Andrićevog Venca [Delija from Andrićev Venac],“ *NIN*, No. 3525, p. 31

Different uses of the term “madness”, which describes, explains, and evaluates the current state of things in Serbia, is by far one of the favourite motives in Serbian media. One of the versions of ‘madness and politics’ in today’s Serbia is shown in the game of words with a “deep” political message launched by Milan Lane Gutović, a comedian and a former candidate of the opposition Democratic Party of Serbia for the mayor of Belgrade. In an interview with Olja Bečković, by using the term “Laza” he clearly alludes to the hospital for psychiatric illness “Laza Lazarević” in Belgrade. Supporters and holders of positions in the current Government or persons close to it, according to Gutović’s assessment, are “ready” for treatment in a psychiatric hospital for severe mental illnesses.

Labelling of political opponents as “serious lunatics” relates to an above-analysed matrix, which is, to a large extent, a manifestation of powerlessness that Vučić’s opponents feel and is used to create a radically negative image of him. The core of Gutović-Bečković dialogue is visible in this part of the interview, published in the opposition weekly NIN. The key words for understanding are precisely: “for Laza”. These words should point to a place where political opponents belong: “Why would I repent and apologize to anyone? Indeed, he is not my president, and he really is for Laza. And it turned out that he is not the only one. The Director of the Television gave money for the movie, he too is for Laza. By purchasing tickets for the unexisting movie, many municipal presidents have shown that they are for Laza. As if it was an infection – (word game in Serbian zaraza-zalaza). Healthy regimes shape citizens, and the sick ones shape slaves.”<sup>9</sup>

Behind the seemingly subtle satirical game of words lies serious political labelling and undeniable hate speech. Political diversity in this country is deprived of its true meaning- critical thinking supported with the arguments; here it is labelled as insanity. This complete disregard for different opinion just seems to take us two steps back. Stigmatization with words like – insanity – followed by a charge of crime or national treason constitutes not only symbolic positioning, but also the requirement for exclusion, elimination and finally “deletion” of the opponent. This media-political strategy of converting political opponents into lunatics is exposed as an uncovered and non-sanctioned hate speech, because as can be seen in the examples above, freedom of expression is unlimited and rarely comes with responsibility for the spoken or written word. Political hate speech, which is based on the notion of madness and which holds a pronounced moralistic charge and a cultural racist sign is recognized in the following quotation from the already mentioned interview with the writer Filip David. By using a powerful pathogen of resentment “at this place”, he establishes a “link” between universal social and political madness and every form of profit: “If we were to become a normal country, then the authorities would lose their benefits. In this way, in fact, our Government is working against us. If you have a society where a thief is not punished, where primitivism and prostitution are not criticized, if you have a Government that supports the rebellious, ragging language of reality shows, then people slowly begin to understand: to become something, I must enter that party and behave how they behave. I must be dishonest so that the other dishonest ones don’t consider me a fool for being honourable and honest.”<sup>10</sup>

9 Milan Lane Gutović, „Nakazni režimi proizvode podanike [Devious regimes produce slaves],” interview with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, No. 3531, p. 17

10 Filip David, „Vlast nam radi o glavi [This Government is working against us],” interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3524, p.23

An environment that is “on the dark side” of normal, the destruction of all that is meaningful, active and destructive nihilism revived and channelled by primitivism and resentment towards everyone, especially in a refined and sublime sense, destruction of an organized and efficient state, stimulation of robbery, corruption and all other relevant forms of social immorality, undoubtedly fit into the broader context of the narrative about the current Government and its first man, Aleksandar Vučić. The image of Vučić as a political actor can therefore not be different. Every political person is “the fate of his time,” originating from a different circle of circumstances, some of which are found, inherited, and others partially produced by his actions or inactions. It is the same with the current president of Serbia, but also with his many, furious and loud critics.

## Image of the Government – fascist, authoritarian, violent, manipulative, clientelist, disoriented in Foreign Policy, lacking clear Foreign Policy orientations and achievements.

The negative obsession with the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić is intense, it is expressed in layers and variety of ways. It is present in the range from pseudo-psychological analysis of his personality, to the attempts to determine the nature of his political order. In the already recognizable manner that easily combines irony and political labelling, the Editor in Chief of *Vreme*, describes Vučić’s as an omnipresent phenomenon in political and social life: “Vučić is the only omnipresent actor of political, social, and even sports events- he supposedly called the Red Star trainer and told him to move the defense more towards the opponent’s goal. I do not believe in that, but I would not be surprised if it had happened. Hence, he is present on both ‘the iron and the oven’ and now he even led the entire nation, deeply anesthetized by the trauma of Kosovo, into the ecstatic belief that this Kosovo mission planned for September 9<sup>th</sup> will be a new, upgraded version of Gazimestan, which, incidentally, we have paid for expensively.”<sup>11</sup>

In the same spirit and manner, almost identical to Dragoljub Žarković, the situation in Serbia is evaluated by the leader of the opposition party Union for Serbia, Dragan Đilas, who says: “Aleksandar Vučić is a symbol of everything in this country; he is the personification of this autocratic regime. He is Belgrade Waterfront and Air Serbia and companies where people work for 200 euros; Kosovo and highways and agriculture; in one word, he is everything. And then they tell us – the Union is against Vučić. Come on people, we are not against him personally, we are against what he and his regime are doing. When we say Vučić, we also say Rističević, Vulin, Stefanović, Zelja ... Because there is no difference between them.”<sup>12</sup>

---

11 Dragoljub Žarković, „Breg i Muhamed – O Grdelici, dživdžvanima, srpskom i kosovskom parlamentu i zahtevu Vučića da ga prate dve ekipe na turneji [Hillock and Muhammad – About Grdelica, sparrows, Serbian and Kosovan Parliament and Vučić’s request to be accompanied by two teams on tour]“, *Vreme*, br. 1444, str. 4

12 Dragan Đilas, „Samo zajedno možemo izvući Srbiju iz ambisa [Only together we can pull our Serbia from the black hole]“, interview with Filip Švarn, *Vreme*, No. 1439, p. 7.

The discourse in which Vučić is identified as an all-powerful controller of political and social life initiated a discussion about the nature of this political order in all the weekly newspapers. This discussion tends to produce a supposedly more rational and more reliable answer to the question of the political and wider social situation in Serbia.

In this context, journalists and opposition leaders are also the contributors. Relative similarity or even identical semantic rhetoric connects both groups. Thus, the leader of the Civil Bloc 381, former Ombudsman Saša Janković, claims that this is an extremely undemocratic order, run by manipulations, conflicts and destruction of democracy: "Vučić is frenetically destroying it (democracy) because his life, that is, his power (all the same) is impossible in a democracy. He just does not believe in democracy; he is afraid of it. Is it any one really shocked by this having in mind that he is an authentic Serbian Radical, the best student of a convicted war criminal? ... While spilling his well-learned desirable phrases to the international community, for six years he has been injecting an unprecedented propaganda with the aim of raising nationalism among people and creating an atmosphere of latent conflict. Eventually, they will serve him as an excuse not to do what he has committed to, or to do it formally (with Ana Brnabić's signature), but to remain a 'factor of stability'. For he thinks that he holds the lighter for the fire of conflict that he has so carefully prepared. He is also holding Republic of Srpska as another card of potential conflict in its hands. Conflict is his natural habitat, he is creating it in order to manipulate and blackmail with it. That's why he postpones the 'solution'. Because when he utters it once, it cannot differ much from what he had promised, but even that will be just an empty word on paper. Even if he signs the solution that we gave long time ago, he will devour it of any meaning through his actions."<sup>13</sup>

In a quote from the interview with Boris Tadić, Vučić is described as a morally unscrupulous figure who manages international conflicts, but also as a person deprived of political courage to represent a certain political option consistently. His policy is deprived of substance, reduced to media manipulation and real-life hesitation. At the same time, in terms of internal policy, Tadić notices that Vučić behaves without any political and real scruples: "Only the naive admire this technique. They say - he's a skilled politician. But this can be done by anyone with such a moral structure – ready to do everything and achieve his personal goals by manipulating the media and the public with the help of characterless and miserable ministers. This is the true character of political power in Serbia for the last six years. His character is dangerous to the future of this country. Why? Because this man has no problem with looking directly at people's eyes and lying to them. He is constantly manipulating, like when he is calling for peace with Albanians, he is provoking Croatia saying that 'checkerboard' has never flared in Knin. Vučić is a trafficker of human souls and all these are terrible testimonies about his character. He says that he will not arm Serbs, while at the same time he brags about Serbia's weapons as an implicit threat to the region. It's a fake policy with sixteen faces, and our citizens will have to pay a high price for it in the future."<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Saša Janković, „Pucanje režimskog kruga obmana i laži [Breaking the regime's circle of lies and deceits],“ interview with Radmila Marković, *Vreme*, No. 1440, p. 9

<sup>14</sup> Boris Tadić, „Laž, magla i lažni patriotizam [Lies, fog and fake patriotism],“ interview with Filip Švarn, *Vreme*, No. 1445, p. 14



The alleged moral distortion of Aleksandar Vučić, together with the authoritarian personality structure and repressive-manipulative political practice, as well as the lack of consistent management of regional and foreign policy are Boris Tadić's key objections to the current Government and its first man. Tadić's criticism is explicit and straight-forward. By criticizing the president of Serbia in this manner, he is questioning the current Government from democratic legitimacy standpoint. With this political propaganda manoeuvre, the former president of Serbia undercuts the opportunity to learn about the transformation of Aleksandar Vučić into a pro-European reformer who communicates in a balanced manner with neighbouring states. In Tadić's vision, the image of Vučić is fixed and determined once for all- in a negative tone. Furthermore, Vučić's negative image is not only at the level of his political concept or the decisions he makes, it is also on a strictly personal level. This can easily be confirmed by the presence of the negative obsession with the president of Serbia as the driving force of all criticism. Negative attitudes about the ruling party peak precisely in the narrative about its fascist character, more precisely, the practice of governance applied by the Serbian Progressive Party and its leader.

The labelling of the Serbian Progressive Party as a fascist organization is one of the most characteristic places in critical discourse, appearing primarily in the weeks during the investigated period. The explicit equalization of the current political order dominated by SNS with fascists is visible in an interview with a former president of the Provincial Government of Vojvodina and former leader of the Democratic Party, Bojan Pajtić. Pajtić uses different elements in his critical narrative, starting from the facts that characterize the current life in Serbia, through the elements of (pseudo) political science, concluding with the language of "problematic" analogies that are a sort of a glazing on the cake of his exposition: "When we talk about the intensity of lynch, then it was more intense, as there were more physical attacks. We literally came to the point where in the elections for the local municipality, people from the opposition were beaten up- mostly from the Democratic Party, but also from other parties, even from the SPS. SPS members endured some serious physical attacks in local elections but did not dare to report it. However, in the meantime, a number of institutions were destroyed, they destroyed defense mechanisms, certain media, replaced some people - Janković was the Ombudsman at the time ... Now there are much less incidents since the power is absolute... Any Government can decide to build such a state - to create a mafia structure, engage mobs to buy votes, scare the media. Tadić could do that without any problems, in three to six months. It's just a matter of decision - did you make a decision to create a decent, democratic, modern society, with all the mistakes you make along the way, or to create a mafia structure that you plan to rule till the end of time with the intention to use all possible instruments, legal and illegal, in order to remain in power. Any Government can do that ... We are dealing with a regime that is fascist in its habitus. And that is not too strong of a word at all. <sup>15</sup>

In order to further reinforce his own view of the current Government, Pajtić resorted to the analogy with Italian fascism, thus creating a false, but at the first moment a suggestive idea, stressing that his view of the fascist character of the present Government is a product of "deep" knowledge of history and politics: "...only those that know nothing about history and politics can say that it is too strong

---

<sup>15</sup> Bojan Pajtić, „Šta je ovo, ako nije fašizam [What is this if not fascism],“ interview with Radmilo Marković, *Vreme*, No. 1445, p. 21

of a word. It is absolutely Fascism, in all its forms – populism, physical assault on those who think differently, complete usurpation of media and economic resources, the atmosphere in parliament, even the rhetoric they use. In Italy, at the gatherings of the opposition, fascists spilt human faeces on the speakers to completely humiliate them. That's not what party activists are doing anymore, but it is what Vučićević and the rest of them are.”<sup>16</sup>

Zoran Lutovac, a politician and leader of the opposition Democratic Party, also participated in the discussion about the nature of current political order. His rhetoric is milder than Pajtić's to a certain extent, and less frustrated than with Tadić, but his views undoubtedly tell us that we live in an undemocratic political order: “Democracy in Serbia is nowadays called the institutionalized system of power in which, through irregular elections, individuals close to the authoritarian acquire formal legitimacy and factual power to decide on everything... The undeveloped political culture, the failed rule of law, the low level of freedom of speech and media freedoms, the underdeveloped and weak institutions, the concentration of power in the hands of one man, established partocracy, widespread corruption – all those are systemic problems in which our state and the society as a whole, continue to exist.”<sup>17</sup> Instead of analysing the widely known stereotype, many times used by Vučić's opponents, the so-called “stabilocracy” as a type of political order that is appropriate to the current political moment in Serbia, Lutovac opts for an innovative approach in analysing social reality by introducing the concept of “labilocracy” – which, in fact does not have a real meaning nor content, but has the rhetorical appeal. In typological sense, his “invention” is recognized in the following quote from the author's article in the newspaper *Vreme*: “It is clearly visible that Serbia is far from a stable democratic state. Nevertheless, Serbia is referred to as “stabilocracy”, which creates confusion as it points to stability, but not the stability of democratic institutions and the rule of law, but of political and security conditions. Stabilocracy refers to the order in which both democratic and liberal values are suppressed in order to reach this level of stability ... it would be more appropriate to call such an order a ‘labilocracy’: the order of under-developed rule of law with a democracy façade, devoid of its true meaning. It is the order built on unstable foundations since it depends on the rating and goodwill of the authoritarian and the support he receives from the powers larger than him, instead of the independent institutions and the balance of liberal and democratic principles and practices.”<sup>18</sup>

Saša Janković has traditionally played an important role in his efforts to “thoroughly and meticulously” analyse the character of Vučić's authority. He has been trying to make a clear distinction between his own political position and the position of the current head of state. Janković presents himself as a decisive, civic-oriented, European politician with modernization and enlightenment capacity. Contrary to him, we are looking at a politically overstated, nationalist-minded, essentially anti-European politician in the image of Vučić. The President of Serbia is not only a synonym for the worst values and practices in the moral sense, but also the patron of media manipulation, political hatred and social hypocrisies embodied in the reality shows. Janković's discourse is offered in the form of comparisons, whereby certain personalities from public life are represented as symbols of cultural deformation, depravity and immorality.

---

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p. 22

<sup>17</sup> Zoran Lutovac, „Labilokratija [Labilocracy],“ *Vreme*, No. 1445

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p. 22

A fatal, deep and irreconcilable political distance towards Vučić and the SNS is followed by a cultural-racist message, a strong distinction between a minority of “superior” and “noble” and “others”, culturally “inferior” and “lower”: “Kosovo: Milošević’s policy. Region: Šešelj’s. Europe: Vučelić. Youth: Arkan style. Economy: Kardelj. Media: Portal Standard. As far as Alliance for Serbia is from ‘them’, the closer it will be to us. Our program does not aim to change only Vučić, but also the course of Serbia’s history of failures; we want to pull out that insecure, blurry, inert Serbia that has allowed the worst, without shaming it. We are not condemned to be at the bottom of Europe, but we are responsible if we choose to stay there. In the last hundred years we had four dictatorships and short periods of preparation for them. We, GB 381, offer people the opportunity to try life in civilized Serbia: because we have tried everything so far and we still haven’t gotten there. Most importantly, not with Vučić.”<sup>19</sup>

This description of Aleksandar Vučić should be added to the Serbian president’s continuous tendency to produce security crisis in the media and raise political tensions in the country, striving to further dramatize the already fragile political climate. It is a blend of media manipulation and real-politik flirting with existential uncertainties, security risks and corresponding interpretations of regional and wider international relations. This “problematic” aspect of Vučić’s policy is further analysed by Dragoljub Žarković, Editor-in-Chief of *Vreme* who says: “The aim of his performance on the immediate danger of war, threats of new exodus and ‘Oluja’, is to secure his leadership position and bring him victory in the elections. We had one ‘Aleksandar the Uniter’, now is the time for ‘Aleksandar the Saviour’, and this is the role that Vučić plays perfectly, every day. In that sense, it is meaningless to quote what was said on Saturday at a Council, on Tuesday when he addressed the nation, or in a letter to Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija... He has already presented himself as a martyr crucified on the cross of the Serbian Golgotha and enters the election race with one hundred steps of advantage over the ‘multilayer agencies’. The mechanism has become predictable long ago: first, the crisis is being pumped, it causes fear among the people, invokes war scenarios led by ‘multi-layered agents’ and then it blows out like a soap bubble and we return to the footsteps in Vučić’s battle for “every meter of Kosovo”, making it all appear more and more like those aggressive commercials that promise cash loans if you come to the bank tomorrow at the latest.”<sup>20</sup>

The negative image of Aleksandar Vučić is almost traditionally associated with the criticism of his Kosovo policy. In order to create a negative image of Vučić, the igman of the Visoki Dečani monastery Sava Janjić discusses the idea of demarcation between Serbs and Albanians, arguing that the idea of demarcation accepts separatism and ethno-nationalism as well as ethnic cleansing in its very core and is against all European values and practices that affirm multi-ethnic tolerance and the rule of law: “Particularly worrying is the formulation of the demarcation between ‘Serbs and Albanians’, which automatically means that where ones live the others will not and vice versa. This is a retrograde model in line with the policy of ethnic cleansing during the wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, so it is no wonder that aside from Mr. Vučić and Mr. Thaci who interpret it each one in their own way, an active

---

19 Saša Janković, „Otklon od Rusije i građanska Srbija na Zapadu [Avert from Russia, civic Serbia belongs in the West],” interview with Nenad Čaluković, *Nedeljnik*, No. 347, p. 24

20 Dragoljub Žarković, „Sednica Saveta za nacionalnu zajebanciju – Vučićeva bitka za ‘metar Kosova’ sve više liči na agresivne reklame koje obećavaju keš kredite ukoliko najkasnije sutra dođete [Meeting of the Council for national fuckary – Vučić’s battle for the ‘every meter of Kosovo’ starts to resemble aggressive commercials that promise cash loans if you come in tomorrow, the latest],” *Vreme*, No. 1440, p. 4



support for this policy of division is given by one of the ideologists of the idea of ethnic cleansing on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Vojislav Šešelj. It is even more tragic and worrying that this dangerous idea is supported by some international representatives, who fail to see how this will detrimentally affect the region and entire Europe, creating an additional precedent that will push it even more towards separatism and extreme nationalism... Instead of working on strengthening the rule of law and the protection of human, religious and property rights, the negotiators, together with their mediators, have accepted this idea of ethnic demarcation as legitimate, regardless of the fact that this would seriously jeopardize the life of minority population and their cultural heritage and would constitute a dangerous turning point in the creation of ethnically and religiously 'clean' territories in the Balkans and wider in Europe. What contributed to the suffering of hundreds of thousands of people in 1990s, including the tragedies in Srebrenica and Krajina after secret agreements of Milošević and Tudjman on the division of territory, is now becoming a reality and even receiving support in some international circles who want a quick fix strategy, regardless of the negative consequences that would occur sooner or later."<sup>21</sup>

Janjić's direct involvement of Vučić in the narrative and practice of the war-torn, anti-European nineties is further supplemented by the development of the thesis on the various deficits that are present in the politics of the current president of Serbia and the Government. Janjić's statement against the idea of demarcation is paradigmatic for the so-called "liberal part" of the Serbian public. His criticism of the President's Kosovo policy is not the only criticism that could be heard immediately after Vučić's speech in Kosovska Mitrovica. The challenging of Vučić's approach and proposals for resolution of the Kosovo crisis come from the right conservative political and ideological spectrum. For the Editor of the weekly *Pečat*, Ljiljana Bogdanović, President's (occasional) quoting of the theoretician of literature and culture Radomir Konstantinović, the author of the influential work 'Philosophy of the Village' is least to say, controversial.

Vučić's quoting of this author, who is remarkably anti-nationalist, raises doubts about the righteousness of president's train of thought, as it raises the issue of a moral and political position on Kosovo: "In his address (President Aleksandar Vučić's speech) possibly the most important thing is that he analyses state of the national spirit (the president does not target minor political groups or extreme 'spiritual enclaves,' but as he says, part of Serbia) from the perspective of a well-known glossary that sees the national character as a sad provincial grotesque. Namely, the president quotes a theoretician who has characterized the Serbian national core in an extremely harsh way: attributing provinciality and limitations as its main features. Does this precise moment – quoting of the 'Philosophy of the Village', the 'book with the secret code to our destiny', make his speech a turning point in the political program and the ideological guidelines of the Serbian president?

Is Vučić really convinced that Konstantinović and his value system can methodologically and substantially send an empowering message to the citizens? As far as the public is concerned, the conceptual constellation of the writer of the 'Philosophy of the Village' was never Vučić's cup of tea! Quoting the writer of the 'Philosophy of the Village' in the way that his discourse is understood as an unquestionable

21 Sava Janjić, „Razgraničenje je model u skladu sa politikom etničkog čišćenja [Demarcation is the model which corresponds to the policy of ethnic cleansing],“ interview with Filip Švarn and Slobodan Gerogriev, *Vreme*, No. 1443, p. 6

historical truth about the spiritual status of Serbs is a risky job, especially if lectured by the highest-ranking politician who aspires for absolute authority. Let me remind you that by opting for this direction, he chooses to focus on the point of view which emphasizes the spirit of the village as the ontological characteristic of one nation, determining the consciousness of those people as the pre-modern barbaric 'substrate' concealed on the edge of civilization! As part of this mental map construct, the developmental genesis is inherently followed: the village gives birth to nationalism, which by definition turns to fascism! By embracing Konstantinović's ideological core, Vučić implies that the dogma about the Serbian mentality which is provincial in its very core – is essentially right? Is he overlooking the simple fact that this also means that he as a democratically elected president was actually elected by the will of the people who are, 'analytically and wisely' described as barbaric? In addition to these remarks, I would advise a more careful handling of a book which is almost a biblical basis for ideological and political concepts that are supposed to be far away from his political and party program, as well as Serbian national interests interpreted in a reasonable and responsible manner."<sup>22</sup>

For the critical discourse to be as rationally convincing and grounded as possible, public intellectuals, those of emphatically oppositional political orientation, came to "aid" the editorial board. Among them was Srđan Milošević, associate of INIS (Institute for the recent history of Serbia). Milošević utilized his knowledge of history for the paradigm on the lacks of Vučić's rule.

Historian Srđan Milošević thereby attempted to put forward a precise clarification of Vučić's politics, not by seeking its strictly (pseudo-scientific definition, as is the proclivity of numerous other opponents of the ruling party, but rather by focusing on the practice. His reflections, therefore, are a combination of insight into facts and an implicit and/or explicit value judgment in terms of daily politics. A combination of scientific dedication in "pondering the logic" of facts and political evaluation thereof, leads to a conclusion already "canonized" by oppositional leaders like Vuk Jeremić and Dragan Đilas. Vučić is described, in paraphrase, as a rampant autocrat who, through media manipulation encloses all strata of the electorate, hovering between the conservative-nationalistic pro-Russian option and a pro-European reformist one. In foreign politics, he is prepared for a concession of Kosovo to gain EU support, but also to deter western countries from supporting his opposition. In essence, he is described as a constructor of authority, devoid of any essential ideological and political orientation, and the regime often becomes a mirror image of the "dark nineties". Similarly, to Boris Tadić, the historian Milošević also sees a lack of substance in Vučić's politics: "Vučić's politics is hard to even describe and make it sound consistent, let alone explain it with a clear strategic objective. It is a series of actions all of which are characteristic political paradoxes, volunteerism with only one red outline: extending the rule. The more the nationalistic politics, or at least such rhetoric enables it, the better, and if not, there are other ways. In one place he refrains and retreats, in another an old 'radical' resurfaces. That is the viewpoint of defensive nationalism: abandon all that must be abandoned in order to save what can be saved from that ideological ballast and all with one goal – extending the rule. Of course, all who get their hands on authority strive to keep it, but for that end, Vučić is prepared for the most various of contradictions."<sup>23</sup>

---

22 Ljiljana Bogdanović, „Bič božiji [God's whip],“ *Pečat*, No. 536, p. 3

23 Srđan Milošević, „Vlast i opozicija: sukobi na desnici [Government and opposition: conflict on the right side],“ interview with Mijat Lakičević, *Novi magazin*, No. 381-382, p. 18

Milošević, like many members of the opposition who share his view, is telling us that the West needs Vučić as an “old radical” for solving the Kosovo issue. It is about a “political interest marriage”. Because of Vučić’s alleged cooperation regarding Kosovo, the West is tolerating his anti-democratic and anti-liberal exercise of authority. This politics, more precisely, politically vacant premise, is generally a reflection of what is considered the so-called critical discourse in Serbia. The given hypotheses are there to simultaneously point to at least three things: The political hypocrisy of the West, Vučić as an anti-democrat and heroism of oppositional engagement. The third suggesting that actions by the opposition are burdened by obstructions from the “dictatorial” authority and fraudulent western partners. Therefore, the often present lack of result in the opposition’s effort should be regarded with benevolence and patience, as under the given circumstances, when everything is working against the opposition, any result is worthy of admiration.

Milošević’s conditioning by stereotypes in interpreting the relation between the Government and the West is apparent in the following excerpt from an interview: “The fact that he is needed by the West overcasts the absence of democracy in Serbia, a criterion with decreasing value in Europe generally. Everything is a matter of political tactics. Even what looks like a strategic solution is solely for the aforementioned purposes and can be viewed through the described lens: relations with the EU is a depressed marriage out of interest, the EU is in support of all Serbia’s enemies, including Kosovo, and Russia is a friend, a brother and a Slavic should, but if we do not join the EU, the children of Serbia will be ‘the hungriest in the region’. That’s about the narrative... as regards foreign politics, to an extent to which every Government in Serbia is, unfortunately, dependent on these factors, which it largely is – Vučić is trying to please both sides, while probably fearing the loss of either one side’s support, or both. When it comes to internal affairs, however, things are much easier – the last very successful ‘apology’ of Vučić’s so-called ‘notorious’ measures is his political credit from the nineties.”<sup>24</sup>

Apart from proving that the ruling order is totalitarian and undemocratic, with individuals from the ruling party being described as incompetent, immoral and insane, at times there was a need to consider the psychological motives that drive the first man of Serbian politics. A “psychoanalytical” approach was thus made by critical journalist Miloš Vasić.

In his recognizable manner, one that connects political “acuity” and a captivating street slang, Vasić points to the Serbian president’s vanity, recognizing it as (virtually) the only actuator of his own politics: “For years people have been asking themselves why Vučić is so concerned and worried when he has already got the electoral support that he keeps mentioning. It would seem that there’s more to it than his insatiable vanity and insecurity. This Kosovo steed which he keeps riding has not particularly been distinguished: it looks more like an old, lame-legged nag. Aleksandar Vučić has fooled himself into promising a little something every now and then, and more often than not, a little nothing to hold onto. The ‘Inner dialogue’ and ‘Distinction’ are examples of that nothing. Not knowing what to do, he dances on a melting iceberg. He has let himself lose control over the church, which is not a minor lapse and one surely uncharacteristic of any of his predecessors. He just has to be cocky and give his opinion, or even legal verdict on everything. Perhaps that’s why he cares for praise, admiration and support and seeing people whine around him. The vanity of vanities, as Crnjanski would put it.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p.19

And in efforts to please him, the Vučićević's and others from that frog quire ribbit as one. And what's worse – it pays off."<sup>25</sup>

By drawing the focus on the psychology of A. Vučić, a great contribution is made to creating the desired image of the ways of exercising authority. As a crucial actor in the public political domain, Vučić is portrayed as an incomplete and deficient personality, part of the legacy of the nineties – time of the totalitarian and undemocratic regime of Slobodan Milošević.

The central focus of the current critique of Vučić's rule is also his relation with the media. According to numerous critics of the regime, for Vučić, the media represents a resource of particular interest, while strictly divided into pro-Government and anti-Government. Accordingly, they either enjoy the privileges, or face a certain kind of punishment. This image of the Government can be truly reconstructed in an interview with journalist Gordana Suša: "Vučić has been doing this from day one. He has shed his 'radical' uniform, only to put on a 'progressive' one, but he's kept the radical rhetoric. Also, he alone is entitled to this kind of speech, only from time to time letting Vulin, Jovanov and those alike to say the things he thinks, but which is not convenient for himself to say at a given moment. We mustn't forget that when he came to power, Vučić spoke of starting negotiations for Kosovo, signed the Brussels agreement and thus gained the support of the better part of pro-European Serbia. Now he strives to gather both them and the radical electorate, which he took over from Vojislav Šešelj... When I mentioned the destruction of everything independent, I mean journalism as well. Almost all media has become his sycophant. Whenever he breathes in or out, it's broadcast on Pink, Happy or Studio B. Outside of the sneaky media, we're left with but a handful of oases, which I refer to as the civil informative sector, such as *Vreme*, *NIN*, the daily *Danas*, a few portals like 'Peščanik', or 'Autonomije', cable television N1... and that's it. Vučić has simply taken control of all others and has effectively killed the journalistic profession. Besides, he was like that when he was minister of information and broadcasting when the inquisition law was invented to destroy the media. It is still done today, just a little differently – through depriving the independent media of advertisements and commercials, and of state support as well. The latter is a scandal in and of itself – accepted on tenders are the media that have broken the most professional codes and standards, but are closely tied with Vučić and are, in fact, party propaganda media in the worst possible way. In addition, with his daily pressure and presence in the media, Vučić has managed to brainwash the public and deprive them the ability of telling fact from fiction."<sup>26</sup>

Vučić's "autocratic" model of ruling implies a fatal and final division of the media into those who are either "for" or "against" his politics. Monetary distribution is also conducted in accordance with this deep and irrevocable division.

It is a magic mix of clientelism, political similarity and the constant need for political orientation: "Vučić has built his own media fortresses, providing them with loans and state support. It was easier for him than to go for the public media, given that in 2006. Media laws were adopted in complete

---

25 Miloš Vasić, „Vučićeva Osmá sednica [Vučić's Eighth session],“ *Vreme*, No. 1442

26 Gordana Suša, „Homogenizacija i diferencijacija na naprednjački način [Homogenization and differentiation in Progressive way],“ interview sa Filip Švarm, *Vreme*, No. 1442, p. 21

02. АВГУСТ 2018. / БРОЈ 3527 / 299 RSD

НА МЕТИ ЕКСТРЕМИСТА  
ТУЖИОЦИМА ЗА РАТНЕ  
ЗЛОЧИНЕ ПРЕТЕ СМРЋУ

ЈАНИС ВАРУФАКИС  
ТРАГЕДИЈА С  
МНОГО КРИВАЦА

СРПСКИ КОРИДОРИ  
ПО ТИТОВИМ  
СТАЗАМА

83 ГОДИНЕ  
ТРАДИЦИЈЕ

# НИН

ОЉА  
СЕРГЕЈЕВИЋ

АЛЕКСАНДАР ШАПИЋ  
УЛЕТЕЛИ СМО У  
ПОТПУНО ЛУДИЛО

## ФАБРИКА МРЖЊЕ



## ПРЕДСЕДНИКОВИ УДАРНИЦИ



9 770027 668002

Austria 4.00 EUR	Denmark 29.00 DKK	Netherlands 4.00 EUR	Norway 45.00 NOK
France 3.50 EUR	G. Britain 2.20 GBP	Hrvatska 30.00 KN	Slovenija 4.00 EUR
Belgium 4.00 EUR	BH 5 KM	Makedonija 249.00 DEN	Switzerland 6.00 CHF
Crna Gora 2.99 EUR	Greece 3.00 EUR	Germany 4.00 EUR	Sweden 60.00 SEK

www.nin.co.rs  
facebook.com/ninonline  
twitter.com/NedeljnikNIN

2<sup>nd</sup> August 2018

compliance with European legislation and conventions. What I mean is that, had he gone for the public media, he'd have been labelled as a dictator in the EU, and that was right when he'd just charmed them. So, Vučić established his own media and since then has constantly called out RTS, even though they've been very obedient to him. Is it normal that his interview in the Daily News lasts longer than the Daily News itself? It isn't normal and that's what's happening on RTS itself."<sup>27</sup>

The issue of media freedom i.e. lack thereof, is a meeting point between journalists and certain political, predominantly oppositional circles. The rhetorical and semantical similarity in the statements of the famous journalist Gordana Suša and leader of the Democratic party Zoran Lutovac is apparent in the following quote from his text in the journal *Vreme*: "The establishment media is such that it supports single-mindedness, prosecuting free thinking and contaminating the atmosphere in society. If they were to emit Carbon dioxide, they'd be less toxic than they are now, when they release their informative content. We are the only country to put the media out of the chapter 'Environmental protection' in their place – the chapter on freedom and rule of law."<sup>28</sup>

A contribution to the discussion on the media "freedom" in Serbia under reign of Aleksandar Vučić was also given by a *NIN* journalist, Sandra Petrušić. She stigmatizes the Government-tied media, labelling them as the "hate factory". This phrase describes the way the pro-Government media works and whose only objective is the negative campaign against political competition. This negative obsession with Government-tied media is present in the following quote from her column: "There is only one factory in Serbia working 24/7 and exceeding the norm at that – and that is the president's hate factory. Its secret to success lies not only in the devotion of individuals, but also whole institutions like the assembly or the church, manufacturing collective hate as the new normality. In Serbia, profit isn't made from cornerstones single-handedly set by the president for factories to spring from, neither from existing factories which couldn't feed a canary, let alone workers' families, but rather from manufacturing hate in the hate factory, a single edifice founded by Vučić with the intention of working non-stop during his rule and which has also, judging by the elapsed week, achieved outstanding results."<sup>29</sup>

In addition to Government stigmatization through identifying with madness, fuelling the widespread belief about the Serbian President's autocracy, the saga about the "lack" of media "freedom" and manipulations, and accusations of running an incompetent global and regional foreign policy, a familiar media campaign of "remembrance" began again in July 2018 – September 2018, triggered primarily by the Serbian President's speech in Kosovo in September 2018 and many other more or less important events, like the court case of Vesna Pešić against the current minister of internal affairs Nebojša Stefanović or the court ruling delivered to Mirjana Marković, wife of the former Serbian and SRY president Slobodan Milošević.

The positive referral given to Slobodan Milošević in the speech of President Vučić stirred up negative reactions, attributing the so-called "conceptual" errors to Vučić, including implications and refer-

---

27 Ibid, p. 20

28 Zoran Lutovac, „Slobodni građani i medijske neslobode [Free citizens and lack of freedom in media],“ *Vreme*, No. 1442

29 Sandra Petrušić, „Predsednikovi udarnici [President's hitmen],“ *NIN*, No. 3527, p. 18

ences to the speech of Slobodan Milošević in Gazimestan. The editor in chief of *Nedeljnik* Veljko Lalić says, "So today, when Aleksandar Vučić in his, as he called it, Anti-Gazimestan speech, refers to Milošević as a great politician who had good intentions but outlived his time (almost comparing him to 'Draža'), the question cannot remain unanswered which good intentions of Milošević he had in mind. Perhaps the murder of his political mentor Ivan Stambolić and attempting twice to murder his political opponent Vuk Drašković (fascinated by the classified information Serbian security intelligence agency 'UDBA' had been feeding him with, he even announced that the topic would be spoken of publicly)? Or burning to the ground the former parts of his own country by refusing in The Hague to discuss the possibility of establishing a confederation which would have preserved some form of SFRY? For having let Tuđman, a more educated man, trick him into the political division of Bosnia which opened several fronts, with consequences still hovering over our heads? The futile war in Croatia and Slovenia? Or what he did with 'Legija' in Kosovo? Not having stopped the outrageous bombing of Sarajevo which he was aware of unlike, as he claimed, Srebrenica? All the likes of 'Arkan' and 'Ceca' who changed the mind-set of this nation? Destroying our culture and the whole course of history, which makes him one of the greatest known world dictators, and putting Serbian politics under the complete influence of the Serbian security intelligence agency 'DB'? Hyperinflation or battle tanks he used as protection against his own people in Belgrade on March 9<sup>th</sup>? The murder of Slavko Ćuruvija, or the innocent boys killed in café 'Panda', which, as Vučić also announced, will be published however painful it is, even though we know that the same shotgun killed the Albanian professor in Peć."<sup>30</sup>

Lalić's political "assimilation of Vučić to Milošević" was supplemented with the establishment of parallelism between the role in the past on one side, and present status and current Government on the other. The analogy is not at all accidental. It is used so as to identify the Government with the hard period of sanctions, wars, and political repression from the 90s, while the journalist's mission is to devastate the present by reviving the past.

The newspaper article, written by journalist Tamara Skrozza about the court sentence ruled against Mirjana Marković for instigating abuse of authority of the former Secretary of Serbian Government Živka Cica Knežević, clearly points out that the court sentence was inappropriate, thereby emphasizing the moral and political baggage attached to the name of Mirjana Marković especially in view of similar actions of power abuse made by some persons in the current Government. Skrozza's reasoning is fuelled by unproven assumptions paired with pseudo legal logic and distinct judgments of political value, which forms incendiary political propaganda rhetoric aimed at identifying the current Government with the rule of Slobodan Milošević. With this in mind, Skrozza writes: "An appropriate punishment for Mirjana Marković – not only for the apartment – would be the demonstration of the rule of law, a clear sign that all the 'Mirjanas' and 'Slobodans' would ultimately pay for what they had done. Especially as at this moment the same crimes are committed and some other 'Cicas' now give apartments as present to nannies, bodyguards, waiters and other servants to the ruling caste. When a woman is delivered a one-year prison sentence for instigating a secretary to give a flat to a nanny as present, it is no more than a mild prison sentence; below the legal minimum, but with certain mitigating circumstances. However, if the woman is Mirjana Marković, the secretary worked in the Serbian Government, and the nanny was employed to take care of Marko Milošević Junior, it depicts

30 Veljko Lalić, „Milena, žena koje nema“ [Milena, the missing woman] *Nedeljnik*, No. 349, p.4



the misery which Serbia has found itself in, mirrors the decades of political decay, and symbolizes memory loss which has cost us a lot."<sup>31</sup> With a lot of pretence and a modest legal background, Tamara Skrozza thus gives her memorable contribution to jurisprudence.

The campaign of remembrance, led week after week by the critical media as if it was a ritual, also involved the politician and engaged intellectual Vesna Pešić. Her own court case against the Serbian Progressive Party member Nebojša Stefanović caused her rhetorical 'tsunami' against the current Government, which bears, as she seems to think, fundamental resemblance to the ultranationalist and violent radicals from the 1990s: "We all know how the radicals behaved both in the recent history and during the 1990s, and we know that their president was convicted of a war crime. Their members who lead Serbian Progressive Party and the country are undoubtedly least interested in the rule of law, freedom and rights of citizens, but I do not know how their president is protected and which type of immunity he uses. Vučić and his clique are obviously beyond reproach, as protected as 'the polar bears', regardless of what the law does or does not allow. Serbia has established an absolutely privileged group of people close to Vučić and the Government, who are allowed to do whatever they want without any consequences. What I mean is that there is no legal equality of citizens; there are only the privileged and the vulnerable whose rights have been extremely relativized. We now have a president who openly insults citizens to the point of 'name calling'".<sup>32</sup>

An important part of the 'campaign of remembrance' is the alleged political mimicry of the president of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić, which is to be unspooled, scrutinized, and finally unequivocally and irrevocably rejected: "Vučić used the so-called acceptance of the past mistakes, put on the 'European suit' and promised to solve the problem of Kosovo, so that he could get the support from the West. Using false promises, false battle against corruption, manipulations, partisan recruitment, mass clientelism, media control and massive nationalist credit, Vučić succeeded in expanding his body of voters to the absolute majority of those who do not abstain from voting. Civic Serbia has been abandoned from the outside and torn apart from the inside, so it seems that Vučić and his corrupt governing clique are a measure of Serbian reality."<sup>33</sup>

Besides the campaign of remembering the radical political affiliation of Serbian Progressive Party and the accompanying moralistic remarks referring to the reputed democratic-liberal deficits within the current Government, Vesna Pešić also insists on the Government's clientelist and corruptive nature. This critical remark has, like so many others, been recursive, repeated daily or weekly, and represents one of the main principles of critical thought in Serbia.

There is a substantial level of overlap between certain journalists and politicians regarding corruption as well as clientelism. The editor-in-chief of *Vreme*, Dragoljub Žarković, repeats the attitudes of Vesna Pešić when he writes about a clientelist model of economy. According to Žarković, economic clientelism is an investment barrier to the unwelcome businessmen - the statement which he

<sup>31</sup>Tamara Skrozza, „Suze koje su najavljivale krv“ [The tears that announced blood] *Vreme*, No. 1435, p. 7

<sup>32</sup>Vesna Pešić, „Neoradikalno davljenje Srbije“ [Neo-radical choking of Serbia], interview with Ivana Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, No. 1441, p. 20

<sup>33</sup>Isto, p. 21



arguments by the halted business plans of the most famous prisoner of Vučić's era, businessman Miroslav Mišković: "No one is crazy enough to invest if he is not 'good with the Government', if he is not 'their man', especially not if the Serbian Progressive Party Government is against him. Three of Mišković's projects have been held in the drawers of different offices (not to mention the benevolent offer for Sava Center), preventing investments that largely surpass what was paid for PKB."<sup>34</sup>

Žarković expresses more than a reasonable doubt about corruption in his text which analyses problems caused by the construction of the highway route through the Canyon of Grdelica. Žarković generally and lightly uses certain irregularities in the professional procedures and negligence in the project management to accuse the current Government of corruption: "We report that we have paid for pre-projecting 11 times and for construction works 3 times, but since the money is not theirs - the worry is only ours, and I promise you there will be no 'demarcation' between negligence and expertise, honesty and theft (BIA was reported to have taken the case)."<sup>35</sup>

Regular discussion topics include the analysis of work of the Serbian prime minister Ana Brnabić and the project "Belgrade Waterfront". Ana Brnabić is seen as an "anomaly" in the political life. The attitude is supported by the well-known thesis on the alleged collision between the appointed constitutional and legal authority and reality where the "real" prime minister is the president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić. This political circumstance is pointed out by Milan Ćulibrk, editor-in-chief of the weekly *NIN*: "By summoning all the citizens to support president Vučić, prime minister Ana Brnabić actually did the worse thing than Bosko Obradović – she indirectly called for the overthrow of the constitutional order, since the Government policies are established and run by the Government, and not the president."<sup>36</sup>

According to many, the nickname "Ficus tree prime minister" suits the current prime minister of Serbia, being the subject without political subjectivity who accepted to be dictated by her political mentor, the president of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić. This tendency in political practice is elaborated by Vera Didanovic, the journalist for the weekly *NIN*: "Although Serbia did not change much in the past year, the prime minister did. Having begun her duty as somewhat of an insecure fumbler, the mainly digital prime minister soon learned how to defend the indefensible. The insecure fumbler, easily caught unprepared by the media, or the so-called 'economic' prime minister who should have first attempted to improve the conservative, xenophobic image of our country as the first openly gay politician in Serbia, quickly mastered the dramatic interpretation designed by her role model Aleksandar Vučić. Determination with which she defended 'her' proposal to appoint Sinisa Mali as the minister of finances showed just how much she improved as a politician to suit the best interests of Serbian Progressive Party. She stated without hesitation that he was a team player, one who does not shy away from hard work or criticism, and does not quit because of alleged affairs and difficult decisions made in the best interest of the citizens of Serbia. Without any discomfort, she 'ruled' instead of all the institutions

34 Dragoljub Žarković, „Ne gazi me stalno: Od Gazimestana do Kine, o babi, peraćima prozora, prodaji PKB-a i Parastosu u klubu Privrednika [Do not step on me constantly: from Gazimestan to China, the grandmother, window washers, sale of PKB and the memorial service at the Economic Club],” *Vreme*, No. 1446, p. 4

35 Dragoljub Žarković, „Zidanje Skadra na Grdelici – ni u komedijama iz doba nemog filma nije bilo smešno kad neko neko tri puta uzastopce nagazi na grabulje pa ga držalja svaki put opali po glavi [Building of the Skadar on Grdelica - even in the comedies from the era of silent film, it was not funny when someone hits the rake three times in a row and every time the shaft falls on his head],” *Vreme*, No. 1442, p. 4

36 Milan Ćulibrk, „Ana nije tu [Ana is not here],” *NIN*, No. 3530, p.3

responsible to provide answers to numerous affairs attached to the name of Siniša Mali - from the scandalous demolition in Savamala, the plagiarised PhD thesis, 24 apartments in Bulgaria, off-shore companies, to the price of 83,000 euros paid for the Christmas tree."<sup>37</sup>

The role of the Prime Minister – a political extra – was given to Ana Brnabić deliberately, with a touch of paradox, which she testifies through her political attitude and behaviour. Ana Brnabić is not only the “wannabe” Prime Minister, but also a person that is finally and irrevocably politically inferior to the President of Serbia, regardless of the Constitutional and legal authorities. This observation of paradox accompanied with the disrespect of character and capacity of the Prime Minister is included in the opinion of Nadežda Milenković, marketing expert and political activist: “Prime Minister’s act includes techniques that are taught at NGO seminars. These non-emotional, boring PC statements, sentences with no impact, sentences you don’t know what to do with. How can I put it, she will never replace Vučić. But I guess this is why she was brought there.”<sup>38</sup>

“Belgrade Waterfront” was a topic that took a significant portion of attention in the analysed period. The critical public used the stated topic as an argument proving the thesis on non-existence of the rule of law. This is a well-known “mantra” repeated by public figures that persistently contradicts rationality and respect of legal procedure. In this context, the leading topic of the narrative are the non-transparent contracts concluded between the construction company “Eagle Hills” from the United Arab Emirates and the City of Belgrade and the state of Serbia, that are, supposedly, damaging for the citizens of Serbia, especially of the capital city. Among a number of articles related to Belgrade Waterfront, an article written by Sandra Petrušić, published in *NIN* magazine, provides sound indication and pragmatism, explicitly developing the position on the asymmetry between the investor’s profit and the profit of citizens of Belgrade, the City of Belgrade and the state of Serbia. At the same time, in this article, she strongly emphasizes the class divisions among the citizens of Belgrade and Serbia established by the Belgrade Waterfront project for the purpose of proving the damaging character of the construction in question. “Did Mohamed Alabbar enchant the Serbian President to that extent that he voluntarily threw the entire treasure the Serbian capital acquired in centuries at his feet or is it just a shady money transfer is the question quite irrelevant for the result of the story with a sad ending – Belgrade simply does not belong to its citizens anymore. First, the rule of law was taken from them in order to announce a commercial deal as a project of national significance (it will employ 4,000 people that will, we speculate, serve the elite as waiters and cleaners of the Belgrade Waterfront), and to remove the non-elite from the area without any consequences. Then, the view belonging to us all was resold to the first order citizens, since, in the future, they will be the only ones looking at the river, while the rest of us will be looking at concrete skyscrapers. Additionally, all property of the Sava amphitheatre was ceded to Belgrade Waterfront, worth approximately 30 million euro, including the Railway Station, while the citizens were casted God knows where to catch trains in humiliating conditions, in case they still believe they have the right to travel. And then, just last week, we received the newest, unfortunately not the last, ingenious news: the bridge on river Sava is too noisy for the elite, so it will be moved to another location, between Ada Ciganlija and the housing blocks of New

---

37 Vera Didanović, „Kad padne mrak [When darkness falls],” *NIN*, No. 3530, p. 10

38 Nadežda Milenković, “Svi pojavni oblici predsednice Vlade [All Shapes and Forms of the Prime Minister],” interview with Jovana Gligorijević, *Vreme*, no. 1436, p. 18

Belgrade (it can clatter there, no problem), and for the inhabitants of buildings where the first tenants were moved in by the President and the Prime Minister in person, a new, modern, expensive and silent one will be provided. The Government decided to remove the noisy and ugly bridge and replace it with a new one, so much quieter, and, naturally, more expensive in order to enable the inhabitants of Belgrade Waterfront to enjoy their elite buildings. The view, railway station and the rule of law, that were the property of all citizens once, are already wrapped in a present."<sup>39</sup>

## Image of the Opposition – Between a Radical Lack of Political Credibility and the Challenge of “Constant” New Beginnings

The image of the opposition in weeklies and editor's columns in daily newspaper is far more complex and presented from several aspects. In daily newspapers and weeklies that are critical towards the so-called “Winners of the 5<sup>th</sup> October”, such as *Informer* and *Pečat*, the image of the opposition presented is extremely negative. Also, these daily newspapers lack the interviews of members of the so-called Euro-Reform opposition, with very small, almost non-existing space left for the members of the so-called Anti-European opposition, including DSS and Dveri. Likewise, it is evident that Šešelj and SRS do not enjoy the status of the rest of opposition parties, in the sense of omission of direct criticism, although, they are surely not the “favourites” of these media. Actually, unlike the Winners of the 5<sup>th</sup> October, the Radicals are not stigmatized in these media. Similarly, the articles on opposition bear a very negative connotation on almost all political issues, including the issue of the political and any other type of credibility of opposition leaders. This is achieved by reminding of the period when certain current opposition leaders were in power, and often in the form of open attacks on their positions, values, direct or hidden intentions, or political practice. On the other hand, weeklies such as *Vreme*, *NIN*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* provide an unequivocal support to the representatives of the opposition, with different intensity, but, in essence, the same. In this sense, in radically critical weeklies, the intensity of support for the opposition is higher and visible not only through the expression of attitude and opinions of the leaders of the opposition, but also through the power and radical character of the campaign against Aleksandar Vučić and the Srpska Napredna Stranka [Serbian Progressive Party]. Unlike *Informer* and *Pečat*, the opposition leaders have significant space to present and explain their positions in these magazines, enabling explication of positions and opinions contrary to the argumentation and rhetoric of the Government. This impact is undoubtedly extended to the readers of the given weekly and the capillary public. This current media and political constellation is partially “responsible” for the smouldering conflict between Vučić and the “elite”.

The complexity of the image of the opposition is seen in different approaches to the problem of its activity and potential. Pro-Governmental print media, primarily the daily newspapers *Informer* and *Pečat*, to some extent, observe their activities as well as potential as disputable. At the same time, opposition weeklies, especially the ones severely critical towards the Government, such as *Vreme* and *NIN*, usually state the public, that is, political infirmity, with a discourse that points to the demo-

<sup>39</sup> Sandra Petrušić, “Turbo Folk elitizam [Turbo Folk Elitism],” *NIN*, No. 3529, p. 18

cratic deficits of the order, with the deliberate heroization of opposition's endeavours. In the weekly newspapers mentioned, despite the detailed and extensive analysis, the omission of or fragments of the critical review of the results of the Euro-Reform opposition from the period of power is obvious. This type of oblivion is no accident, it is deliberate, considering the fact that critical weeklies are an active participant in the inter-party debates, that is, they aspire to become a sort of an "intellectual supplement" in a hard and exhausting struggle between the political actors in Serbia.

A special role in attaching a connotation of negative value to the parties of the opposition is given to *Informer*, with its articles in their daily editions and editorial columns of Dragan J. Vučićević. Vučićević's columns color the actors of the opposition scene as problematic in moral and political sense and criticize opposition media and NGOs, with almost unavoidable reflection on the period of power of the Winners of the 5<sup>th</sup> October. The basic thesis could be summarized in the following statements: 1) current opposition has no moral credibility (due to highly corrupted political class comprising it) and political capacity to lead the country because of the failure of transition in Serbia, 2) in the media favouring the opposition, being the majority of print media, the current Government is under attack with no serious rational explanation and with only one goal, to remove it as soon as possible, 3) in the media supporting current opposition there is a doubtless discrimination of all those not directly confronted with Vučić's rule.

Vučićević's criticism of the Serbian opposition is equally targeted towards the opposition as the factor of the political life, and the media that are extremely critical towards the Government. His criticism is always *ad hominem*, strictly personalized with the goal of attaining higher persuasiveness. This is why a certain individual is stigmatized, its moral and psychological profile is underlined so that such person is often described as non-worthy of any public function.

For understanding the political and media scene in Serbia, writing of the editor in chief of *Informer* is relevant for at least three mutually connected reasons. First, the style of writing and the content of messages from the articles of the *Informer's* editor maintain interest for politics with socially lower levels of society, for which it is presumed they read tabloids, and at the same time, they are considered loyal voters in the election process. Further, *Informer* is very important for this Government, because, day in day out, week in week out, it questions negative attitude and media and political images created and continuously reproduced by media critical towards the Government. Finally, *Informer* is the leader among daily newspapers in creating a negative value image of the current opposition as the political actor in Serbia.

The starting presumptions of Vučićević's writing include the understanding of the political opposition that is not limited to the political parties voting against the Government's political decisions, laws and other initiatives and proposals. The notion is wider, representing a network of mutually different organizations and public figures, in line with this perspective. We are, therefore, talking about the parties, and the representatives of the NGO sector, media, and intellectuals known to public, as well. Vučićević often attributes specific understanding of politics to the opposition leaders and their political and media allies. For leaders of the opposition politics represents an instrument for enrichment of the former political elite. This kind of understanding of the opposition represents the fuel for the campaign of the current Government and media close to it in the conditions of high poverty

and objectively scarce opportunities. It is exactly these campaigns that produce rage, that is, disappointment or even inferiority with the opposition voters, with a clearly visible power to influence the citizens supporting current Government to prevent restoration of the so-called corrupt political elite comprised of the Winners of the 5<sup>th</sup> October.

The following presumption of Vučićević's interpretation of the opposition as a political actor is the deficit of its patriotism, anti-Russian position and unquestionable loyalty to Western powers. For the purpose of winning the elections and showing loyalty to Western countries, in the opinion of the editor in chief of *Informer*, the opposition parties are ready to do all that is necessary in a given political moment, from starting different media campaigns to adopting certain acts that are the presumption of further destabilization of Serbia as a country, within their boundaries, naturally.

Within the narrative on the loyalty to the West two mutually connected claims are used: on the alleged absence of coherent nationally responsible policy and distance towards Russia, that is considered secret and constant ally of Serbia from ancient times. A few examples from the articles published in *Informer* illustrate all the stated characteristics of the anti-opposition discourse. Extensive interpretation of the term opposition in an aforementioned manner and, as such, linking it to the struggle between parties, regardless of whether these are actual parties or some other real or potential rivals of the Government, understanding politics as an instrument for personal enrichment, serious accusations beyond the conventional public decency, exclusive tone in moral judgement, and personal, moralistic questioning of actions of opposition and public figures in general all comprise a complex vision, formed to remain deeply impressed into the conscious of the reader. Following the logic of this matrix, in their minds, they can form significant and almost hermetical rejection of the members of the opposition and public figures that think differently.

Deep distance and aversion so difficult to overcome towards one side, formed due to moral and political tardiness of the opposition in a broader sense, provides (naturally) space for the focus on the opposite side. Aforementioned presumptions of Vučićević's writing, as well as conclusions derived from it, are clearly visible in the following quote from his article dedicated to the status of the Serbian opposition and media. Intense criticism referring to the lack of moral credibility is complemented with the attitude on the disputable patriotic drive of opposition parties and the critical media: "Putting national interest before personal will never happen for Tycoon Djilas, Vuk Pozderac Jeremić, Sale The Gunman Janković and other riders of the apocalypse from DOS? It is impossible to expect Belgrade media to become Serbian media? Unfortunately, I agree. And this is why, I am afraid, we are doomed. But, as great Pasić would say, I hope we will not perish..."<sup>40</sup>

Serbian opposition is driven by obsessive personal interest put in front of the interest of Serbia and its citizens, and this aspect of the opposition, according to Vučićević, represents its key characteristic. Opposition leaders are ready to do anything in the name and for the account of such goal, claims Vučićević. It goes without saying that from the perspective of opposition leaders coming into power does not include democratic elections, which is especially underlined by the *Informer's* editor in chief:

---

40 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Mala šansa na koju moramo da zaigramo [Small chance we must take]," *Informer*, 19th August 2018, p. 5

“Actually, it would be best to put our country back into the status of private property of the same crooks from DOS and their tycoon and media partners that systematically robbed Serbia after the 5<sup>th</sup> of October and brought it to the edge of total disaster. There, this is the logic of the Serbian opposition whose leaders are Tycoon Djilas, Vuk Pozderac Jeremić, Boško Ljotić Obradović, Saša The Gunman Janković... Their plan and program, their ideology is actually robbery. They want to take the power with the aid of foreigners – because they can never win it fair and square in the elections – so that they could take the money and stuff it into their fat asses. All they are interested in is cash. Damn, filthy cash. And, as simple as that sounds, this is the beginning and the end of every story. This is the basis of their juicy lies, the ones about Kosovo, economy, the country.”<sup>41</sup>

In addition to endemic incapacity of opposition leaders to accept the priority of general over person as well as the lack of tendency towards the consistent acceptance of democratic political principles and practice, the leaders of the opposition, primarily Boško Obradović, leader of the Dveri Movement, in line with this perspective, are characterized by the union of political amateurism, ideological confusion and moral corruption. Persuasive presentation of negative attributes given to the opposition leader is obvious in the following quote from one extremely critical column written on the opposition, from a multitude of them. It should be noted that Vučićević is categorical as a columnist and that he uses suggestive language that goes beyond the principles of conventional decency: “Boško Obradović finally made it. This professional scrub from Čačak always spoke of his life goal to enter the history books, to be remembered by some great deed. Boškić will surely be remembered, no doubt, as the first Ljotić supporter in history supporting faggot marriages and allowing gays to adopt children. It’s not funny, I am serious. Boško Ljotić Obradović is the litmus test of the Serbian real politics. The politics that has become common trade in the last couple of months. Small trade actually, market place trade founded on the old, well known, carnival ring tossing game. With Boško and his crew, everything goes, and nothing is sacred. Boškić is ready to betray all around him, even himself just to get his hands on any function. He, who was, just yesterday, a passionate supporter of Ljotić’s theory of blood and soil and as such a dedicated opponent of ‘sick faggots that walk around the center of Belgrade’ (his quote, naturally), he who, just yesterday, accused the tycoon Đilas that he is the biggest thief that ever was in the Serbian politics, he who called Vuk Pozderac Jeremić the traitor of Kosovo that set the border on Jarinje and Brnjak with Tadić, this person that ‘he’ was, is, today, in coalition with the faggots, the thief and the traitor.”<sup>42</sup>

Political transformation of Boško Obradović for the purpose of formation of the opposition union cannot be allowed from a moral perspective, since the opposition is disputable in every aspect. The power of denying credibility of the leader of Dveri is equivalent to the power of denying Euro-Reform moves of Vučić by the critical media. What Vučićević stipulates to a great extent is the fact that the opposition is not only united by the desire for materialistic wealth of its leaders, but also a strong, deeply irrational and anti-political affectation – hatred towards the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić. Hatred toward Vučić is the binding tissue of opposition parties, which are deprived of credible members and clear programs. Yearning for power and animosity towards the democratically select-

41 Dragan J. Vučićević, “Otimačina kao jedina politika [Robbery as the Only Policy],” *Informers*, 25th August 2018, p. 3

42 Dragan J. Vučićević, “Boško dokaz: Vučić će vladati do 2020 [Boško Evidence: Vučić Will Rule Until 2020],” *Informers*, 04th August 2018, p. 5

ed President are the only things that bond different opposition activists, and Vučić is, according to Vučićević's political view, the only reformist, guarantor of wellbeing of the majority of the population, the unifier and the protector of interest of Serbs and Serbia, skilful and pragmatic negotiator within the domain of politics and economy.

Hatred as the motive for opposition activism is described through the example of a vulgar twitter message of Željko Veselinović related to the Prime Minister Ana Brnabić. In this tweet, Dragan J. Vučićević notes all the amateurism, irrationality, weakness and moral misery of the opposition: "When this ox Željko Veselinović threatens the Prime Minister Ana Brnabić with rape, this may be attributed to the individual moronic character of the so-called leader of the so-called union. But, when this disgusting threat of his is justified by tycoon Đilas and when he rejects the demand of his allies to remove Veselinović from the seat of the Chairman of 'Alliance for Serbia', this is the overwhelming evidence of the fact that the entire opposition of Serbia has transformed into hatred nowadays. Dangerous, pathological hatred. There is nothing more there – no program, no ideas, no ideology, any kind of principle. No! Just plain hatred. Sick hatred towards the President Aleksandar Vučić and the system which no longer allows them and their crooked and tycoon deals. Irrational hatred, blind for any argument, hatred that refuses to see the obvious and hatred best described by aforementioned Željko Veselinović when he said that Prime Minister should be locked in a room with a 'well-endowed African-American just out of jail'!?"<sup>43</sup>

A critical remark on account of Veselinović's tweet was stated by the editor of *Nedeljnik*, Veljko Lalić. He clearly states the inappropriateness and political damage of such political address, at the same time, stipulating, that the messages, such as the one from Veselinović, erase the politically and morally relevant difference between the Government and the opposition. Moreover, tolerance for Veselinović transforms the political associations into mafia: "It's not about the rape, it was not even a topic, it is about a mass of uncontrolled primitivism of the pro-civil opposition that a normal person cannot even imagine. Let alone say. Or write. I cannot comprehend the fact that Đilas did not throw him out in a second, or that Vuk Jeremić did not leave the movement until he is removed, I see this as the continuation of Vučić's tragic mantra 'I will not give you Gašić', where everybody acts as if he is some kind of mafia brother, not Government."<sup>44</sup>

As it turned out, Lalić was almost the only example of hate speech disapproval of the politician from the opposition aimed at the Prime Minister Ana Brnabić. Primitivism, sexism, racism included in his tweet are ignored, and, in a sense, politically and morally abolished. Similar to the "reaction" of the Alliance for Serbia was the "reaction" of critical media. Silence was loud, especially when we consider the noise certain critical media made in analogue cases that sporadically appeared on the other side. But it is not only the silence on the tweet of the politically irrelevant Željko Veselinović what points to the political bias of a number of opposition media. They also took the task of "criticism", they often practice instead of the opposition, primarily weeklies such as *NIN* and *Vreme*. Their headlines and articles, as shown in the previous chapter, rhetorically and politically correspond to the positions, even program documents of the opposition. Stated weeklies also provide sufficient room to opposi-

43 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Otimanje Srbije [Kidnapping of Serbia]," *Informer*, 29th September 2018, p. 5

44 Veljko Lalić, "Mezimica [Favorite]," *Nedeljnik*, no. 350, p. 4



**SAŠA JANKOVIĆ:**  
ODGOVOR NIKOLI KOJU  
**Ja nisam**  
**deo stada**

**DRAGAN DILAS:**  
AKO JE ČERČIL MOGAO SA STALJINOM  
DA SRUŠI FAŠIZAM, MOGU I JA SA  
BOŠKOM DA RUŠIM VUČIĆA

**POKLON**  
SVIM ČITAOCIMA  
**Original**  
magazin

**Nezavisnik**  
6. SEPTEMBAR 2018. 100 DINARA

**DRAGAN**  
**BUJOŠEVIĆ**

**OVO JE VREME**  
**KRETENIZACIJE**  
**I MEDIJA I DRUŠTVA**

Da je Tijanić uradio ovo što smo mi u poslednje tri godine, teško da bi iko u Srbiji došao do reči. I to u vreme - kako ga je on najavio - bahatosti, neznanja, lošeg ukusa i modernih tehnologija koje su svakom idiotu omogućile da misli da je Hegel...

O RADIO-TELEVIZIJI SRBIJE, RIJALITIJAMA, MEDIJIMA, KRITIKAMA VLASTI I OPOZICIJE, NADIMKU „ŽUTI BUJKE“, „NEMANJIĆIMA“, LAZI RISTOVSKOM, „REGLERIMA“ I NOVINARSKOJ KARIJERI OD „POLITIKE“ DO RTS-a...

6<sup>th</sup> November 2018



tion leaders to articulate their ideas and criticize the Government, although this is usually reduced to hyper motivated indignation and hatred towards the Government induced by own failure. Self-projecting excellence in the actions of the opposition and support for opposition unity, alongside the well-known anti-regime narrative are the main characteristics of statements of opposition leaders regarding themselves and the politics in Serbia.

Moral excellence of the opposition political engagement together with the auto-heroism can be seen in interviews of Vuk Jeremić, President of the People's Party, and Saša Janković, leader of the Free Citizen Movement. It is a magnificent mixture of narcissism, self-pity and awareness on excellence and own mission in history. Thus, Vuk Jeremić explicitly states his own political self-awareness in the interview given to Olja Becković in *NIN*: "I am well aware that by deciding to become the loudest critic of accelerated criminalization of Serbia I have put my head on the platter. But, when I make a decision, I do not calculate, and I always see it through. If I were to show fear, how could I call on others to be brave."<sup>45</sup>

The stake in the political engagement of Vuk Jeremić is the ultimate one – his physical survival. Regardless of the risk his "mission" envisages, as one can interpret, his resilience and dedication to be a political winner remains and survives. Own moral excellence is stipulated by moral purity compared to the main political opponent. Hence, when speaking of himself and Vučić, Jeremić states that they are individuals with different motives and values. On one side, Jeremić sees himself as a moral person dedicated to common good: "By the way, one of the reasons Vučić is treating me in such a savage manner is the fact that I did not even allow him to try to ask something in return for such a nomination. The awareness that he cannot speak to me in such a primitive manner, as he is used to with the general majority of people involved in politics here, is deeply troubling for him. Simply put, we have essentially different set of values – as it was in the 90's, it is so today."<sup>46</sup>

Similar vision of own political course and engagement is shared by Saša Janković. In addition to moral excellence he really cares about the historic mission that was (self-assigned to him and the Free Citizen Movement: "Opposition is currently despised. I have entered the politics not as part of the Government, but as opposition, deliberately, in these hard times. The regime is making it hard, but the ones that are supposedly not the regime are helping. The media is another story. All of them are the same – is the image sent to the population. However, I believe that the civil Serbia will feel this moment, that it will wake from resignation and lethargy, and that it will move forward. This is its historic responsibility. Serbia must never again be something shameful, with hands tied, enslaved, with its soul sold to the devil. Serbia can be a civil country, or it can be as it is today... we are not here to change Vučić, but the future, to make it different from the past. Pretentious? Take is as you wish, but we are big as our ideas are brave and big."<sup>47</sup>

45 Vuk Jeremić, "Nema za šta da strahujem, a Vučić? [I Have Nothing to Fear, How About Vučić?]," interview with Olja Becković, *NIN*, no. 3524, p. 10

46 Vuk Jeremić, "Nema za šta da strahujem, a Vučić? [I Have Nothing to Fear, How About Vučić?]," interview with Olja Becković, *NIN*, no. 3524, p. 11

47 Saša Janković, "Pucanje režimskog kruga obmana i laži [Cracking of the Regime Circle of Deceit and Lies]," interview with Radmilo Marković, *Vreme*, no. 1440, p. 10

The idea of the unification of the opposition was strongly supported, primarily by the critical weeklies. In the first instance, significant space was given to the opposition leaders prone to this solution to precisely and clearly define and clarify it. In many cases, such intent was not realized due to the uninformed criticism of Government and lack of relevant, alternative ideas. However, regardless of this fact, the aid of reporters and analysts was not lacking for this political agenda.

In addition to the mission of “saving” Serbia by removing “autocratic” rule of Aleksandar Vučić, the Alliance for Serbia, through its association, is trying to secure the organizational and technical preparation for future elections and the lack of the (ominous) scenario of mutual confrontation due to the “dispersion” of votes and consequential inability to pass the census. The Alliance for Serbia, in line with aforementioned, is identified with a specific center of political power with a mission to neutralize the justified primate of power in the elections to come with its activities.

In this sense, from the perspective of the Alliance for Serbia, the reason to unite would be the passing of census for the accomplishment of a noble goal that cannot be reached in any other way. “We are completely aware that the ruling party will come out to any elections with 10-15 percent advantage due to votes acquired by payments, pressure, false ballots... When you add media that brings 10-15 percent more, minimum, you realize that the support of citizens for this Government is equal to the percentage won reduced by 25-30 percent. Our response to that, if we decide to participate in the elections, will be strong organization that will neutralize election theft to the maximum, liberate people from fear and offer a series of concrete proposals, realization of which will bring better life for everyone.”<sup>48</sup>

In the spirit of transparent, clear political marketing, the reporter from *Vreme* justified the formation of the opposition coalition of the Alliance for Serbia, remembering the nineties and the “heroic effort” to unify the opposition at that time in a “mythical battle” with Slobodan Milošević and extremely powerful SPS, JUL and SRS from that period. “Foundation of the Alliance for Serbia is surely the reaction to a long-term whisper present in public related to the organization of the opposition into a famous ‘one line’. Previous experience teaches us that this block has all the prerequisites for success, but the opponent is somewhat different... The question of all questions is which one of these two lines has bigger chance for success. If we look at the history of political alliances from the beginning of a multi-party system in Serbia, the chances are more on the side of the Alliance for Serbia since it is created on a recipe of the ‘Zajedno’ coalition and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia: it has the pragmatic leader, Dragan Đilas, ready for compromise who pays for this feature with the lack of favor from the public (just like Zoran Đinđić did), it includes a wide range of ideologies, most of which are on the ‘right’ (Srpski pokret obnove and the Građanski savez Srbije were members of the Zajedno coalition) and, just like DOS, despite the claims that it is not so, it is not the alliance for a certain politics or value, it is against the regime of Aleksandar Vučić. As much as non-functional this is in the long run, the history teaches us that the unification of political options is more efficient and stronger when it is ‘contra’ and not ‘pro’.”<sup>49</sup>

Positions of Dragan Đilas, leader of the Alliance for Serbia, and the reporter of *Vreme* magazine Jovana Gligorijević, are statistically supported by the political analyst and the opposition MP, Đorđe Vu-

---

48 Dragan Đilas, “Ako je Čerčil mogao sa Staljinom da sruši fasizam, mogu i ja sa Boškom Obradovićem da rušim Vučića [If Churchill could destroy fascism with Stalin, I can fight Vučić with Boško Obradović],” *Nedeljnik*, no. 347

49 Jovana Gligorijević, “Nova snaga stara meta [New Power Old Target],” *Vreme*, no. 1444, p. 7

kadinović. Vukadinović's, we can fairly say, favorite "intellectual exercise" is to use numbers to make, allegedly, political constellation of powers uncertain, which culminates at the start of the realization of the idea on the gathering of the opposition: "Regardless of how sceptical you may be, rightfully so, toward the current offer from the opposition, as well as current forms of organization of the opposition – strategic unification of the 'real opposition' actually has no real alternative. Because, finally, it is these 10-15 percent of non-decided voters, but very strong anti-Government voters, that will decide whether on the next Parliament elections the anti-Vučić opposition will have decent and respectable 35-37 percent (strong third) or if they will end up on modest twenty percent. It will take a true miracle for anything more than that, which is not too realistic. And why is that so is something that cannot be understood without the combined insight into the deeply authoritative nature of the current regime, as well as the devastating media image and the educational structure of the Serbian electoral body. We cannot say this is news to us. But this research confirms such findings once more."<sup>50</sup>

Zora Drčelić, a critical reporter, presented herself as the extreme political apologist at the moment the political competition decided to mention the issue of the Kosovo policy of the Alliance for Serbia. Her political bias reached the point in which she identified the "democratic capacity" of Serbia with the power and the credibility of this colorful, heterogeneous political coalition: "Labelling the Alliance for Serbia, done with so much ease by Vučić, Tadić, Jovanović and Janković all together, and by Western diplomats at the end, all for their own reasons, has only one goal – delegitimization of the democratic potential of the new united opposition force. And it is not unexpected. Here, danger lies elsewhere, something the Western diplomats do not understand, since they do not live here."<sup>51</sup>


In the period from July 2018 to October 2018 the public life in Serbia is characterized by the negative images of political actors, both the Government and the opposition. Both actors are dominantly described in the context of intensive political struggle. The key word for understanding the described period is challenging. Critical articles of reporters are, in content and rhetoric, similar to the positions of the direct participants in the political life, primarily, political parties. Critical attitude of reporters towards the Government, in most part, is identical to the positions of the opposition politicians and parties. On the other hand, when we are talking about the so-called pro-Government media, that is, daily newspapers that went through the analysis (*Informer*), almost full harmony with the positions of the ruling parties, primarily SNS, is clear.

The spirit of the heated political debate thus significantly surpasses the rational political debate, based on the exchange of rational argumentation. The public in Serbia, observed from the viewpoint of print media is the battleground of endless "wars" whose participants include media and relevant political actors. Having aforementioned in mind, at this moment, it is not possible to reach consent on key issues for the country and the society. The spirit of rivalry and irrational suppressed the spirit of tolerance and constructivism almost in full. Pluralism of media perceptions creates high level of tension and polarization between media, complementary to the conflict within the institutions of the system and outside of it.

50 Đorđe Vukadinović, "Da li su naučene gorke lekcije [Are the Bitter Lessons Learned]," *Vreme*, no. 1438

51 Zora Drčelić, "Vučić i primese fasizma [Vučić and a Touch of Fascism]," *Vreme*, no. 1438, p. 8

5



# ABOUT AUTHORS

## ABOUT AUTHORS

**Public Policy Institute** is a regional think-tank organization that operates in the Western Balkans region through the work of its branch offices in Belgrade, Podgorica and Ljubljana. By promoting public dialogue and constructive solutions, Public Policy Institute contributes to the efforts of the Western Balkan countries to become equal, reliable and progressive partners in the process of European integrations and mutual relationships. After the initial research and analysis of social and media context in the countries of the Western Balkans, the Institute has developed and implemented a series of media related projects, including: Role of the media in the process of securitisation in the Western Balkans, Civil Response to Clientelism in the media - MEDIA CIRCLE, NATO Reach Out - media monitoring and Role of the media in monitoring of R1325 in Montenegro.

**EBART Media Archive** is privately owned company established in 2000. Its main activity is archiving print media data in e-format. The print media archive consists of up-to-date material dating back to 2003, and more than 3 million print media reports from sources with national coverage. EBART is also specialized for media analysis, basic quantitative and qualitative analyses, comparing media treatment of specific keywords, as well as complex content analyses according to BBC methodology. EBART Media Archive is unmatched in the region with its unique media reports database, and 12 years of media research experience. This media database allows for the overall study of long-term media presence.

**Velimir Ćurgus Kazimir** was born in Novi Sad in 1948. Since 2002, he is the director of the Ebart Media Archive, the unique media documentation center in Serbia. He was a journalist and editor of the cultural section of *Politika* newspapers from 1988 to 1996. He is one of the founders of the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia. He authored several books of prose and essays on culture and cultural policy. His works have been translated into English, French, German, Spanish, Polish and Japanese. He has won the International Prize for essay of the journal *Lettre Internationale* in Weimar in 2000. He's member of the Serbian PEN Center since 1987. He has edited several books on the relationship between politics and the media. He is author of several projects in the field of research, media and culture. He conducted studies of the media scene in Serbia and the influence of media on the political and social reality in particular.

**Isidora Jarić, PhD.** Born in Belgrade, Serbia in 1970. Graduated and earned PhD at The Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Sociology, University of Belgrade. Assistant Professor at Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Sociology, University of Belgrade. Associate of The Institute of Sociology and Social Research, engaged in researching and examining global characteristics and transformations within Serbian society. Editor of two proceedings: *Bologna reform of higher education in Serbia: Problems, doubts, fears and expectations of the teaching staff at the University of Belgrade* (Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory Filip Višnjić and IP, Belgrade, 2010) and *Politics of Parenthood* (Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade, 2015).

**Danica Laban.** Born in Belgrade, Serbia in 1976. She is media analyst, journalist and communicator. She has obtained MA in journalism at the Faculty of political sciences in Belgrade. Worked on numerous projects, which had represented visibility, training and research as its media components. She has collaborated with national and international organizations and institutions such as the Council of Europe (CAR project 2011 - 2012), UN Women (projects in the field of social – economic empowerment of women, 2012), the Office for Human and Minority Rights, NGO Praxis/ERT, HINT, NELI. She also worked on the evaluation of media for Strategic Marketing/IPSOS, for the purpose of the BBC Trust. In 2006 she founded Jigsaw Communication Agency, under which she operates today. During her career she was also a journalist and editor in RTS, BK TV and TV Politika.

**Dejan Vuk Stanković, PhD.** Born in Belgrade, Serbia in 1973. Graduated and earned PhD at The Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Belgrade. Currently, he teaches philosophy, ethics and philosophy of education at The Teachers Training Faculty, University of Belgrade. From 2000 to 2003 he was scholar at the The Institute for Philosophy and Social studies. From 2004 to 2006, he worked for Marten Board International, a Serbian private company specialized for the market research and public polls. He was agency main pollster and political analyst. From 2006 until today, Dejan Vuk Stanković is an independent political analyst, comments political and social life in Serbia and region of Western Balkans for various TV and radio stations, as well as for print media.

#### **Data entry and processing:**

**Predrag Bajić,** PhD candidate, Faculty of Political Science

**Milica Oros,** graduated journalist, Faculty of Political Science

**Katarina Vukajlović,** graduated journalist, Faculty of Political Science

**Veljko Gluščević,** PhD candidate, Faculty of Philosophy



MEDIAMETER