


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April - June

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SANDA RAŠKOVIĆ IVIĆ
TEŠKO JE ŽENI
U MUŠKOM
RINGU, ALI
BORIM SE

Usto Ajman
Na putu
da postanemo
broj jedan u
svetu

Boško Stefanović
Ljudi nisu
trošak

Sada Radulović
Partokratija je
u našoj zemlji
napravila
svoju državu

ЖИВОТ ПОД ПОЛИЦИЈСКОМ
ЗАШТИТОМ АКО СЕ
СРЕТНЕМО, НЕ ПРА СИ!

СРПСКА ЕКОНОМИЈА
У ИЗБОРНИМ ГОДИНАМА
КОЛИКО КОШТА ДЕМОКРАТИЈА

НИН

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СУ НАРУЧИ
МОЈЕ УБИСТВО


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
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Introduction

INTRODUCTION:

Elections in the shadows of the crime section

Early parliamentary and local elections and their results marked the second quarter of 2016 in Serbia. Surprisingly, despite announcements and expectations, it seems that the elections campaign passed with a lot less ado and conflict. There was more ado and conflicts when it came to counting votes and determining final results. Hence, the final results of the elections were postponed by two weeks – from April to May.

As in the previous five trimesters, in the analyzing of this empirical content, the same methodological approach was applied. Unit of analysis was one text. The analysis itself represents a combination of two research methods: (a) analysis of content, which was directed towards “certain theoretical-hypothetical frame... which creates objective and systemic empirical content of social communications, enabling drawing of relevant conclusions on the social context in which the communication is taking place”,¹ and (b) discursive analysis, which enabled us to understand different, epistemically and methodologically immeasurable², author’s interpretative strategies and editorial policies which reflect displays of different, primarily ideological and political discursive realities, by analyzing their specific discursive meanings.

In the interpretative sense, for more convenient text organization, the analysis is, just like in the previous reports, divided into two wholes which refer to: (a) analysis of quantitative indicators collected with the help of content analysis, and (b) discursive analysis of qualitative content derived from texts which were included in the research sample.

What was so dramatic and unusual that happened during this period according to the seven dailies in Serbia? Essentially, there was no drama. The fact that Serbia was at a pre-election and post-election “standstill” is best reflected by the structure of the journalistic genres. The number of reports was increased by about 10 percent. Out of the 2106 analysed front-page texts, as much as 1550 were reports. At the same time, such domination of the report caused a decrease in the participation of news and commentary. Elections and post-election events “called for” reports that will “reveal” what really happened. Ratio of reports and commentaries speaks a lot about the type of newspapers as well (it is not necessary to investigate the preoccupation with topics). Therefore, Informer has the highest percentage of reports, Politika the lowest. In terms of commentaries, the situation is contrary.

Elections and the political climate surely contributed to the increase of percentage of unbalanced texts. A total of 76 percent of analysed texts are without balance, which represents an increase of about ten percent

1 S. Gredelj, *S onu stranu ogledala* [On the other side of the mirror], Beograd: Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije, 1986, 19

2 G. Couvalis, *The Philosophy of Science*, London, Sage Publications, 1997

in comparison to the previous period. At the same time, topics developed by the editorial staff cover about one third of all published texts on the front pages.

In comparison to the previous period, there was a certain increase of the number of texts dealing with the European Union, and a decrease of texts about Russia. However, the ratio of positive, neutral and negative texts did not change. There are still more positive texts about Russia than about the European Union. This means the "roles" of EU and Russia in the election and post-election period remained the same.

Unnamed sources are still a very important source of information with a share of 27 percent. The most frequent unnamed sources originate from the area of the justice system and police, which in this period particularly coincided with the case of the murdered singer Jelena Marjanović. Almost 70 percent of texts about this murder mention unnamed sources as their basic source of information.

This tragic event largely overshadowed the election process, because there were 228 texts on the front pages, i.e. 10.83 percent, about the murder of Jelena Marjanović. At the same time, topics about the elections, political life and activities of the Government took up 34.37 percent of texts. This was clearly a sign how topics of public importance and significance cannot "compete" with the topics which are accompanied by powerful sensationalistic charge. The media, not only print, but also electronic ones, especially TV stations, portals and social networks, use sensationalistic topics for spreading influence and popularity regardless of the objective social and economic importance and need of other topics. Expectations to establish some different media standards and units of measure in the market, but also political, match are quite unrealistic. Apart from that, we must be aware that some topics are easily and quickly conveyed from the print media onto the social networks where they live their new lives.





Sample

Sample

As stated in earlier publications, the basic idea of the project Mediameter is to try to reconstruct media reality of the dailies in Serbia, the way it can be defined considering the texts that are positioned (wholly or partially) on front pages, as various reflections of current political events and circumstances in both Serbia and the world. A sample of the dailies was composed considering two selection criteria – the largest circulation and reputation of the print media. Daily newspaper circulation data were taken from a research done by IPSOS¹. The front page is the part of the dailies which the readers connect the most with the identity/recognition of a media outlet. It is often responsible for the first impression, our potential affection or repulsion formed about some printed media. The front page comes into contact with not only the readers of that particular paper, but also the people who will perhaps never touch that paper. Through newspaper and TV advertising and shop windows, the front page reaches a wider auditorium than that forming the readers of individual dailies. The front pages, hence form, in a certain way, the public image of the newspaper which symbolizes its editorial policy, evaluative orientation and targeting of certain audiences. On account of the above mentioned reasons, the front pages of dailies from our sample were in the focus of analysis of the project Mediameter.

Texts from front pages reflect best the coordinates of editorial policies of daily print editions. Though this involves a small percentage of texts, editorial identity of a daily can be most easily identified through messages conveyed through front pages. The ratio of the total number of texts in each daily individually and the number of texts from the front pages that were included in the sample of our research are shown in the charts 1-7, for the period from 1st April to 30th June 2016.

¹ Research of the average scope of the daily print media was done for the period from January 1st 2016 to January 5th 2016, and January 7th 2016 to January 31st 2016. population: total individuals

Chart1. – Večernje novosti




Chart 2. – Informer




Chart 3. – Alo!




Chart 4. – Blic




Chart 5. – *Politika*




Chart 6. – *Danas*





Chart 7. – Kurir



The total number of analysed texts considering all seven media that are included in our research sample is 2106 and that number accounts for averagely 67,63% texts from front pages and for 3,42% of the total number of texts.

Table 1. – *Večernje novosti*

Media outlet <i>Večernje novosti</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
events	72	25	47
society	81	55	26
politics	112	112	0
economics	33	29	4
current affairs	52	36	16
reportage	25	7	18
culture	17	4	13
interview	5	2	3
world	17	16	1
life plus	18	0	18
sport	25	7	18
Belgrade News	16	2	14
doctor in the house supplement	36	9	27
spectacle	10	1	9
BGD 011	4	0	4
Belgrade stories	7	0	7
sport plus	0	0	0
TV news	4	0	4
real-life stories	4	1	3
region	0	0	0
feuilleton	3	2	1
action	0	0	0
confessions	0	0	0
second page	3	3	0
event	5	5	0
summer	1	0	1
TOTAL	550	316	234

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Table 2 – *Informer*

Media outlet: <i>Informer</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
breaking news	179	177	2
news	93	66	27
showtime	42	4	38
entertainment	1	0	1
sport	35	6	29
TOTAL	350	253	97

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Table 3 – *Alo!*

Media outlet: <i>Alo!</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
current affairs	76	73	3
news	145	98	47
v.i.p	145	72	73
sport	25	7	18
world	0	0	0
TOTAL	391	250	141

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Table 4 – Blic

Media outlet: Blic / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
series	17	8	9
Belgrade	3	3	0
society	44	16	28
economics	18	17	1
chronicle	47	38	9
culture	9	2	7
politics	71	69	2
Sport	21	2	19
real-life stories	10	0	10
world	5	3	2
topic of the day	78	73	5
topic of the week	11	8	3
in the focus	25	15	10
time machine	0	0	0
entertainment	56	1	55
TOTAL	415	255	160

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Table 5. – Politika

Media outlet: Politika / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
world	98	88	10
society	91	65	26
economics	78	67	11
politics	53	52	1
event of the day	73	72	1
culture	22	5	17
events	33	22	11
daily supplement	21	1	20
Belgrade	14	7	6
Serbia	26	16	11
readers' club	11	0	11
sport	28	6	22
topic of the week	12	10	2
personalities	11	9	2
region	15	14	1
front page	12	7	5
spectre	9	1	8
views	15	12	3
TV insert	6	0	6
feuilleton	0	0	0
consumer	4	3	1
Belgrade events	2	2	0
TOTAL	634	459	175

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Table 6 – Danas

Media outlet: Danas / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
Belgrade	3	3	0
dialogue	0	0	0
business supplement	18	14	4
Danas weekend	41	29	12
Event of the day	2	1	1
society	100	89	11
economics	35	34	1
globe	28	21	7
culture	28	11	17
interview	1	0	1
front page	31	31	0
health	10	8	2
politics	134	134	0
periscope	0	0	0
legal Danas	0	0	0
scene	8	0	8
sport	33	6	27
topic	5	2	3
scales	8	5	3
TOTAL	485	388	97

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Table 7. – *Kurir*

Media outlet: Kurir / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
society	7	3	4
economics	1	1	0
events	53	35	18
culture	3	0	3
planet	6	6	0
politics	78	71	7
sport	14	4	10
stars	59	4	55
topic of the day	68	61	7
Total	289	185	104


Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

By reviewing the presented tables 1-7, it is still noticeable that the structures of dailies follow two different logics. In other words, *Večernje novosti*, *Politika*, *Danas*, *Blic*, even *Kurir* to some extent, follow the traditional structure of daily newspapers, while *Informer* and *Alo!* deviate from this matrix to a considerable extent. In these two publications, news are the dominant section, uniting different areas, and special attention is paid to entertaining content, like information about celebrities, then showbiz and sport, which increasingly gain social and political character. Editorial strategies which were established in the previous five editions of *Mediameter* are entirely visible in the second quarter of 2016. This may be clearly seen in Charts 8-14. If one compares the results from the first and second trimester of 2016, an identical structure of the sample is still visible. However, in media that have clear division into sections, there is a noticeable increase of texts in section politics (*Večernje novosti*, *Blic*, *Politika*, *Danas* and *Kurir*), while *Informer* and *Alo!* have an increased number of texts in news/breaking news section. This trend is definitely the result of the election process, which reached its peak precisely during the second quarter of 2016.

In this content analysis, we “studied actually which ideas and images were expressed, i.e. represented... Studying representation is not aimed at testing the “truthfulness” of statements... It is not limited to commentary about whether a set of expressions accurately corresponds or describes what its alleged aim is. Actually, since the researchers focus on the process of representation, it has become clear that dealing with accuracy is misleading. Studying representation is, literally, studying the representation of production, i.e. construction ...in narrative from.”²


2 L. Rolend, *Masovne komunikacije* [Mass communications], Clio, Beograd, 1998, 258-259

Chart 8 – Večernje novosti




Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2016

Chart 9 – Informer




Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2016

Chart 10 – Alo!




Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2016

Chart 11 – Blic




Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2016

Chart 12 – Politika




Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2016

Chart 13 – Danas




Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2016

Chart 14 – Kurir



Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

If we compare the number of selected texts in the period April – June 2016 with the previous quarter, we can note an increase of 9.46%. The increase of number of selected text could be explained by increased complexity of intra-political relations, which was the result of the electoral process that took place during this period. Also, there were only two non-business days (May 1 and 2), while in the first quarter there was a triple issue printed to cover December 31 2015 and January 1 and 2 2016; double issues were printed for January 6 and 7 and for February 15 and 16 2016 as well.





Research Results

RESEARCH RESULTS

Share of journalistic genres

The second quarter of 2016 brought about a large increase in the number and share of reports, about 10% compared to the previous trimester. Pursuant to all the previous findings, the report was again the most present, making up for three quarters of all writing in the second three months of 2016, i.e. 1550 texts were written in this genre out of the 2106 analysed texts (73.6%). The biggest share of reports was again noted in *Informer* – 91.3%, whilst this genre had the smallest share in *Politika* (54.9%). The second-ranked genre, according to share, is the article with 8.88% or 187 texts. *Politika* published the highest number of articles 23.53%, while the daily *Alo!* did not publish any texts in this form. Third-ranked genre is the interview (7.45%). The highest number of texts in this form was published by *Danas* (57), while *Informer* published the least (2.37%). In the second quarter of 2016, two times less commentary and news were published compared to the previous trimester – 4.89%, i.e. 3.04%. Most commentaries were seen in *Politika* 11.11%, while *Alo!* did not have any texts in this form. Contrary to that, *Politika* published the fewest news texts, 1.31%, while *Blic* had the biggest number of texts in this genre, 5.88%. Other forms were present in about 2% of writing. Compared to the previous quarter, the ranking of genres is completely the same.

Individual share of genres in the reporting of the seven media from the sample

Genre	total number	% share
Report	1550	73.60
article	187	8.88
interview	157	7.45
commentary	103	4.89
news	64	3.04
reportage	29	1.38
other	16	0.76
Total	2106	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of journalistic genres in texts from the sample per media outlet

Genre	<i>Blic</i>	<i>Kurir</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	<i>Alo!</i>	<i>Informer</i>	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Danas</i>	Total
report	200	142	242	228	231	252	255	1550
article	10	23	21	0	2	108	23	187
interview	22	12	15	9	6	36	57	157
commentary	7	1	7	0	2	51	35	103
news	15	6	9	10	9	6	9	64
reportage	1	1	14	1	0	6	6	29
other	0	0	8	2	3	0	3	16
Total	255	185	316	250	253	459	388	2106

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Topics

In order for each text to be defined as clearly as possible, the selected texts included in the sample were classified as part of only one topic, but we also recorded other elements present in that text. This enabled us to have clear insight into the manners of reporting and approach of the media to certain topics in the previous editions of *Mediameter*. In all the research up to now, we set aside special topics of interest, and in the second quarter of 2016 we paid attention to the campaign for early parliamentary and local elections and all activities which followed after that, i.e. events which we here classified under the topic elections 2016. Second-ranked topic of interest was *murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović*.¹ Though up to now, texts from the crime section, usually had not been included in the sample, writing about this topic was included in the sample as somewhat of a paradigm of the state of things in Serbian journalism, which is characterised by various types of violations of ethical reporting principles.

Share of topics

In the period from April to June 2016, political topics again took up most space on the front pages of the dailies from the sample. Apart from political life in Serbia, which is present in 328 or 15.57% of all texts, political topics also include activities of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, activities of the Government of Serbia and activities of the President of Serbia. These four topics were present in a total of 17.8% of texts from the sample. If we add to that the topic elections 2016, the share of political

¹ Body of the singer Jelena Marjanović was found after a one-day search on April 3rd 2016. The media reported heavily on this tragic event during the entire second quarter, finding potential murderers, re-examining the role of the family in the murder and introducing new actors in the murder investigation.

topics amounts to 34.37% and it is in line with the results from the first quarter of 2016. Apart from political topics, the murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović (228 or 10.83% of all texts from the sample) attracted a lot of media attention. This topic was the most present in Kurir, Alo! and Informer. These media outlets published more texts about this topic than about political life of Serbia or elections. Most media showed interest for topics about the economy, which is the fourth-ranked topic according to presence in texts from the sample, with a share of 5.32% (112 texts). Interest for economic topics, contrary to that, was even weaker than in the previous quarter, so economics was covered in only 26 or 1.23% of texts.

Regional relations and cooperation were the next topic according to presence, with 104 or 4.94% of texts, followed by topics related to religion covered in 94 texts (4.46%). EU-related matters were considerably more present than in the previous quarter – 90 or 4.27% of texts in the second against 41 or 2.13% of texts in the first quarter of 2016. The top 10 topics are completed with the judicial system topics (57 – 2.71%), international relations (55 – 2.61%) and relations between Belgrade and Priština (45 – 2.14%).

If we review the attitude of the media towards Serbia's foreign policy, especially in relation to Russia and the European Union, this time we, as previously stated, notice a considerably larger presence of topics pertaining the EU and fewer texts discussing Russia (1.61% of texts covered Russia in the second quarter against 2.6% in the first). However, the structure of texts according to evaluative context is very similar to that of the previous quarter. Hence, the share of positive texts referring to Russia is similar to the share of negative texts discussing the EU.

Almost half of the texts written on the topic EU/EU policies was on the front pages of Politika, as many as 44 texts, out of which 22.73% were negative. This topic was more present in Danas as well (17 texts, 11.76% of negative), Informer 6 (50% negative), Kurir (5 – 60% negative) and Alo! - 1 negative text. Structure of texts about Russia and relations with that country is different. Politika ran the most texts about this topic (10 – 80% neutral), followed by Informer with 9 (66.67% positive), Večernje novosti (5), Danas (4), Blic (3), Kurir (2) and Alo! (1).

Concerning individual topics, as it has already been stated, we separately analysed texts related to the early parliamentary elections and local elections, which was presented by most media in a neutral context (86.53%). About 97% of texts in Danas and in Večernje novosti were written in neutral context, 94.29% texts in Politika, 90% in Kurir, 89.74% in Alo! and 87.93% in Blic. The only aberration, as in the previous quarter, was noted in Informer, where as much as 76.47% of writing has a clear evaluative context.

When it comes to the second topic of interest – murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović, the media published as much as 56.14% of evaluative, i.e. negative texts. When evaluating these texts, criteria for assessing the evaluative context was the attitude of the media towards the Marjanović family. The highest number of texts were published in Alo! (76), Informer (73) and Kurir (41), 29 texts were published in Blic, while in the traditionally structured dailies – Večernje novosti and Politika published 7 (71.43% negative), i.e. 2 texts. Danas did not cover this topic. In the daily Kurir, as much as about 80% of the texts were written in a negative context, in Večernje novosti 71.43%, Informer 60.27% and

Alo! 52.63%. Most texts in Blic (about 79%) were neutral, while no text written in Politika has a clear evaluative context.

If we look at the evaluative context of all 2106 selected texts in the second quarter of 2016, 36.9% of texts were evaluative – 32.1% were negative and 4.8% were positive (table 34). Referring to other topics, the biggest number of negative texts were traditionally written about regional relations (57.69%) and relations between Belgrade and Priština (40%), while about one third of negative evaluative texts were written about the political life in Serbia, the economy, religious topics and the justice system, while international relations represent about 20% negative texts. In the second quarter, somewhat higher number of positive texts about the economy was observed (19 or 16.96%) and religious topics (11 – 11.7%).

Distribution of topics and their evaluative context in the seven media outlets from the sample ²

Topic	Evaluative context in relation to topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	broj	%	broj	%	broj	%	broj	%
elections 2016	349	16.57	4	1.15	302	86.53	43	12.32
political life in Serbia	328	15.57	1	0.30	220	67.07	107	32.62
murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	228	10.83	0	0.00	100	43.86	128	56.14
economy	112	5.32	19	16.96	53	47.32	40	35.71
regional cooperation/ regional relations	104	4.94	6	5.77	38	36.54	60	57.69
matters of faith, church, religion	94	4.46	11	11.70	53	56.38	30	31.91
EU/EU policies	90	4.27	2	2.22	63	70.00	25	27.78
justice system, activities of judicial bodies	57	2.71	0	0.00	36	63.16	21	36.84
international relations	55	2.61	4	7.27	40	72.73	11	20.00
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	45	2.14	2	4.44	25	55.56	18	40.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016


² Top ten topics according to presence were presented in these tables.

Value context and number of texts about topics Russia/attitude towards Russia and EU/attitude towards EU, per media outlet

Evaluative context with reference to topic								
Media outlet/topic	total		Positive		neutral		negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Blic								
Russia/attitude towards Russia	3	1.18	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
EU/EU policies	7	2.75	0	0.00	2	28.57	5	71.43
Kurir								
Russia/attitude towards Russia	2	1.08	1	50.00	1	50.00	0	0.00
EU/EU policies	5	2.70	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
Večernje novosti								
EU/EU policies	10	3.16	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Russia/attitude towards Russia	5	1.58	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Alo!								
EU/EU policies	1	0.40	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	100.00
Russia/attitude towards Russia	1	0.40	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Informer								
Russia/attitude towards Russia	9	3.56	6	66.67	3	33.33	0	0.00
EU/EU policies	6	2.37	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
Politika								
EU/EU policies	44	9.59	1	2.27	33	75.00	10	22.73
Russia/attitude towards Russia	10	2.18	1	10.00	8	80.00	1	10.00
Danas								
EU/EU policies	17	4.38	1	5.88	14	82.35	2	11.76
Russia/attitude towards Russia	4	1.03	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Chart – Evaluative context in all media from the sample according to topics *Russia/attitude towards Russia and EU/EU policies*



Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of topic per media outletsDistribution of topics and their evaluative context in the paper *Blic*

Evaluative context with reference to the topic								
<i>Blic</i>	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
elections 2016	58	22.75	0	0.00	51	87.93	7	12.07
political life in Serbia	53	20.78	0	0.00	38	71.70	15	28.30
murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	29	11.37	0	0.00	23	79.31	6	20.69
Economy	17	6.67	0	0.00	11	64.71	6	35.29
religious matters, church, religion	17	6.67	0	0.00	7	41.18	10	58.82
justice system, activities of judicial bodies	13	5.10	0	0.00	4	30.77	9	69.23
EU/EU policies	7	2.75	0	0.00	2	28.57	5	71.43
The Hague/war crimes	6	2.35	0	0.00	1	16.67	5	83.33
new investments	5	1.96	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Economics	4	1.57	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
regional cooperation/ regional relations	4	1.57	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
police	4	1.57	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
meeting requirements/ standards for EU integrations	4	1.57	1	25.00	2	50.00	1	25.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016Evaluative context against all topics in the paper *Blic*

<i>Blic – evaluative context</i>	No. of texts	%
positive	2	0.78
neutral	164	64.31
negative	89	34.90
Total	255	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of topics and their evaluative context in the paper Kurir

Evaluative context with reference to the topic								
<i>Kurir</i>	total		Positive		neutral		negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	41	22.16	0	0.00	8	19.51	33	80.49
political life in Serbia	35	18.92	1	2.86	23	65.71	11	31.43
elections 2016	30	16.22	0	0.00	27	90.00	3	10.00
Corruption	16	8.65	0	0.00	0	0.00	16	100.00
regional cooperation/regional relations	9	4.86	0	0.00	0	0.00	9	100.00
matters of faith, church, religion	9	4.86	0	0.00	2	22.22	7	77.78
Crime	6	3.24	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
EU/EU policies	5	2.70	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
activities of the President of Serbia	5	2.70	0	0.00	0	0.00	5	100.00
The Hague/war crimes	4	2.16	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
entertainment/showbiz	4	2.16	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Evaluative context against all topics in the paper Kurir

<i>Kurir – evaluative context</i>	No. of texts	%
positive	3	1.62
neutral	86	46.49
negative	96	51.89
Total	185	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of topics and their evaluative context in the paper Informer

Evaluative context with reference to the topic								
<i>Informer</i>	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	73	28.85	0	0.00	29	39.73	44	60.27
political life in Serbia	47	18.58	0	0.00	9	19.15	38	80.85
elections 2016	34	13.44	2	5.88	8	23.53	24	70.59
Russia/attitude towards Russia	9	3.56	6	66.67	3	33.33	0	0.00
regional cooperation/ regional relations	8	3.16	0	0.00	2	25.00	6	75.00
media/freedom of media	8	3.16	0	0.00	1	12.50	7	87.50
international relations	7	2.77	0	0.00	3	42.86	4	57.14
new investments	7	2.77	5	71.43	2	28.57	0	0.00
economy	6	2.37	2	33.33	2	33.33	2	33.33
EU/EU policies	6	2.37	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
justice system, activities of judicial bodies	6	2.37	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Evaluative context against all topics in the paper Informer

<i>Informer</i>	No. of texts	%
Positive	19	7.51
Neutral	82	32.41
Negative	152	60.08
Total	253	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of topics and their evaluative context in the daily Alo!

Evaluative context with reference to the topic								
<i>Alo!</i>	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	76	30.40	0	0.00	36	47.37	40	52.63
political life in Serbia	59	23.60	0	0.00	45	76.27	14	23.73
elections 2016	39	15.60	0	0.00	35	89.74	4	10.26
matters of faith, church, religion	14	5.60	2	14.29	6	42.86	6	42.86
regional cooperation/ regional relations	8	3.20	0	0.00	1	12.50	7	87.50
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	7	2.80	0	0.00	2	28.57	5	71.43
Economy	5	2.00	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
USA/attitude towards USA	4	1.60	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
activities of the Government	3	1.20	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
The Hague/war crimes	3	1.20	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
activities of the PM	3	1.20	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
NATO/NATO integrations	3	1.20	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Sport	3	1.20	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Evaluative context against all topics in the paper Informer

<i>Alo! – evaluative context</i>	No. of texts	%
Positive	3	1.20
Neutral	152	60.80
Negative	95	38.00
Total	250	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of topics and their evaluative context in the paper Politika

Evaluative context with reference to the topic								
<i>Politika</i>	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Elections 2016	70	15.25	1	1.43	66	94.29	3	4.29
EU/EU policies	44	9.59	1	2.27	33	75.00	10	22.73
Economy	30	6.54	7	23.33	12	40.00	11	36.67
political life in Serbia	29	6.32	0	0.00	20	68.97	9	31.03
matters of faith, church, religion	27	5.88	5	18.52	20	74.07	2	7.41
regional cooperation/ regional relations	24	5.23	1	4.17	7	29.17	16	66.67
international relations	17	3.70	1	5.88	14	82.35	2	11.76
justice system, activities of judicial bodies	16	3.49	0	0.00	12	75.00	4	25.00
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	11	2.40	0	0.00	5	45.45	6	54.55
Corruption	11	2.40	0	0.00	6	54.55	5	45.45

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Evaluative context against all topics in the paper Politika

<i>Politika – evaluative context</i>	No. of texts	%
Positive	28	6.10
Neutral	313	68.19
Negative	118	25.71
Total	459	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of topics and their evaluative context in the paper Politika

Evaluative context with reference to the topic								
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
elections 2016	41	12.97	0	0.00	40	97.56	1	2.44
regional cooperation/ regional relations	27	8.54	4	14.81	8	29.63	15	55.56
Economy	26	8.23	9	34.62	14	53.85	3	11.54
political life in Serbia	23	7.28	0	0.00	22	95.65	1	4.35
matters of faith, church, religion	18	5.70	4	22.22	13	72.22	1	5.56
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	14	4.43	2	14.29	8	57.14	4	28.57
Military	13	4.11	7	53.85	4	30.77	2	15.38
The Hague/war crimes	12	3.80	0	0.00	8	66.67	4	33.33
international relations	12	3.80	3	25.00	7	58.33	2	16.67
EU/EU policies	10	3.16	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Evaluative context against all topics in the paper Večernje novosti

<i>Večernje novosti – evaluative context</i>	No. of texts	%
Positive	40	12.66
Neutral	221	69.94
Negative	55	17.41
Total	316	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Evaluative context per topics in the daily Danas

Evaluative context with reference to the topic								
<i>Danas</i>	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
political life in Serbia	82	21.13	0	0.00	63	76.83	19	23.17
elections 2016	77	19.85	1	1.30	75	97.40	1	1.30
economy	25	6.44	0	0.00	10	40.00	15	60.00
regional cooperation/ regional relations	24	6.19	1	4.17	18	75.00	5	20.83
Media/freedom of the media	18	4.64	0	0.00	14	77.78	4	22.22
EU/EU policies	17	4.38	1	5.88	14	82.35	2	11.76
Culture	13	3.35	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
justice system, activities of judicial bodies	12	3.09	0	0.00	9	75.00	3	25.00
international relations	12	3.09	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
activities of the Government	8	2.06	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
meeting requirements/ standards for EU integrations	8	2.06	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Evaluative context against all topics in the paper Danas

<i>Danas – evaluative context</i>	No. of texts	%
positive	6	1.55
neutral	311	80.15
negative	71	18.30
Total	459	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Balance

When we take into account all texts from the sample of the April-June 2016 period, it can be noticed that most of the presented topics were not treated in a comprehensive way, which is a claim confirmed by the fact that balance was present in only 21.37% of all texts, which is a decrease of around 8% in com-

parison to the previous quarter. The fewest balanced texts were this time recorded in Kurir – 4.32%, and a similar result was achieved by Informer - 4.35%. 82.4% of the texts published by Alo! are unbalanced, while that percentage in case of Politika and Večernje novosti is 76. 25.49% of the texts published by Blic are balanced, while Danas boasts 35.57%.

Although evaluative context is not present in 63.1% of all texts, when assessing the realistic picture of the media from the sample, it should be taken into account that the texts from the front pages we analysed are not comprehensive and that such, one-sided approach reflects the general state of affairs in Serbian media.

After all, balanced texts necessarily show a certain degree of reservation, which is apparently not a common occurrence in Serbian journalism. Taking sides, sometimes extremely passionately, attracts audiences, but diminishes seriousness. The focus is on the speed of reaction, rather than a detailed presentation of information, which requires research, a number of interviewees and reliable and verifiable information, with available sources of information. That is how circulation and popularity are boosted in a short time, but the same cannot be said about reputation.

Balance in relation to all topics and all seven media from the sample

Balance	Yes	No
Media outlet	%	%
<i>Kurir</i>	4.32	95.68
<i>Informer</i>	4.35	95.65
<i>Alo!</i>	17.60	82.40
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	23.42	76.58
<i>Politika</i>	23.97	76.03
<i>Blic</i>	25.49	74.51
<i>Danas</i>	35.57	64.43
Total	21.37	78.63

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Actors

Based on the analysis of the empirical material collected from the front pages, the media in Serbia are predominantly dealing with political affairs within Serbia. As many as 53.85% of the total number of actors dealt with in the selected texts from the front pages are (individually and collectively) political actors, occupying various positions in the political life in Serbia. If we add the texts talking about foreign political actors to this number, the share of political actors in the total number of actors on the front pages rises to 70.41%. The second most frequently mentioned group are various social actors, which

make up for 20.59% of our sample. Business and economic actors feature only in 4.53% of the texts.

The total distribution of actors featured in the texts used as research samples (in absolute values)

Actors					
Political actors	8983	Domestic	6870	Individual	4612
				Collective	2258
		Foreign	2113	Individual	1759
				Collective	354
Economic actors	579	Domestic	544	Individual	272
				Collective	272
		Foreign	35	Individual	4
				Collective	31
Other social actors	2627	Domestic	2540	Individual	2280
				Collective	260
		Foreign	87	Individual	60
				Collective	27
Unnamed sources					568
Total					12757

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearance of individual political actors from the **Government of Serbia** and the **President of Serbia**

Government of the Republic of Serbia and the President of Serbia	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandar Vučić	674	39.81	28	4.15	621	92.14	25	3.71
Ivica Dačić	247	14.59	0	0.00	212	85.83	35	14.17
Tomislav Nikolić	194	11.46	2	1.03	173	89.18	19	9.79
Nebojša Stefanović	107	6.32	0	0.00	106	99.07	1	0.93
Zorana Mihajlović	89	5.26	0	0.00	71	79.78	18	20.22
Rasim Ljajić	56	3.31	0	0.00	54	96.43	2	3.57
Aleksandar Vulin	52	3.07	0	0.00	50	96.15	2	3.85
Jadranka Joksimović	45	2.66	1	2.22	43	95.56	1	2.22
Nikola Selaković	41	2.42	0	0.00	40	97.56	1	2.44
Ivan Tasovac	28	1.65	0	0.00	23	82.14	5	17.86
Srđan Verbić	24	1.42	0	0.00	22	91.67	2	8.33
Aleksandar Antić	23	1.36	0	0.00	19	82.61	4	17.39
Željko Sertić	21	1.24	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
Velimir Ilić	20	1.18	0	0.00	17	85.00	3	15.00
Kori Udovički	16	0.95	0	0.00	15	93.75	1	6.25
Zlatibor Lončar	16	0.95	0	0.00	15	93.75	1	6.25
Dušan Vujović	13	0.77	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Vanja Udovičić	10	0.59	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Đorđević	10	0.59	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Snežana Bogosavljević Bošković	7	0.41	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Total	1693	100.00	31	1.83	1540	90.96	122	7.21

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Like in the previous quarter, the most present actor on the front pages of daily newspapers in Serbia was Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić, who was mostly mentioned in a neutral context (in 92.14% of the cases). He was also a topic of additional 4.15%³ positive and 3.71% negative texts. The prime mi-

³ Almost twice as much compared to the previous quarter, when only 2.42% of the texts were with positive connotation

nister appeared as an actor of texts on the front pages 674 times, which is significantly more than the runner-up, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivica Dačić, who was present in 247 texts. The highest frequency of Aleksandar Vučić's appearance, in absolute values, was recorded in *Danas* (161), *Politika* (138) and *Večernje novosti* (99). If we look at relative values, as percentages of texts where he appears as an actor in relation to the total number of selected texts from that particular newspaper, we can see that he is the most frequent actor in *Danas* (41.49%), followed by *Blic* (33.73%), *Kurir* (32.43% of texts from our sample is about Vučić), *Večernje novosti* (31.33%) and *Politika* (30.07%). The Serbian prime minister is the least frequent actor in *Informer* and *Alo!*, with 26.88% and 24.8%, respectively.

When it comes to the evaluative context, the highest percentage, as well as the number of negative texts, can be noticed in *Danas* (10.56% or 17 texts), little less in *Politika* (4 texts or 2.90%) and *Blic* (4 texts or 4.65%). The most texts with positive connotation were noticed in *Alo!* – 12.9% or 8 texts, followed by *Večernje novosti* (7), *Politika* (6), *Informer* (5) and *Blic* (2 texts with positive connotation).

Aleksandar Vučić: evaluative context in relation to a media company

Aleksandar Vučić	positive		neutral		negative		total	
positive	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<i>Blic</i>	2	2.33	80	93.02	4	4.65	86	12.76
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0.00	60	100.00	0	0.00	60	8.90
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	7	7.07	92	92.93	0	0.00	99	14.69
<i>Alo!</i>	8	12.90	54	87.10	0	0.00	62	9.20
<i>Informer</i>	5	7.35	63	92.65	0	0.00	68	10.09
<i>Politika</i>	6	4.35	128	92.75	4	2.90	138	20.47
<i>Danas</i>	0	0.00	144	89.44	17	10.56	161	23.89
Total	28	4.15	621	92.14	25	3.71	674	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Number of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić in relation to the total number of texts in individual daily newspapers

Aleksandar Vučić per media	No. of appearances	Total number of texts	% share against total number of texts
<i>Danas</i>	161	388	41.49
<i>Blic</i>	86	255	33.73
<i>Kurir</i>	60	185	32.43
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	99	316	31.33
<i>Politika</i>	138	459	30.07
<i>Informer</i>	68	253	26.88
<i>Alo!</i>	62	250	24.80

Total	674	2106	32.00
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Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

The President of the Republic of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić, who is an actor in 194 of the analysed texts is the third most frequent actor among Serbian politicians.

The highest number of texts featuring the president of Serbia were published by *Politika* (52), but the highest share in relation to the total number of texts in a particular newspaper was recorded in *Kurir* – 14.05%. The most texts about Tomislav Nikolić with negative connotation were published by *Alo!* (7) and *Kurir* (6), with a share of 50.00% (*Alo!*) and 23.08% (*Kurir*). The only positive texts about the president of Serbia were published by *Politika* (2 texts in total).

Other actors from this group are presented in a neutral evaluative context in more than 90% of the texts. Apart from the president and the prime minister, a somewhat higher number of texts with negative connotations referred to the minister of foreign affairs Ivica Dačić – 35, while the highest share of texts with negative connotation referred to Zorana Mihajlović – 20.22%.

Number of appearances of Tomislav Nikolić in relation to the total number of texts in individual media outlet

Tomislav Nikolić per media outlet	No. of appearances	total number of texts	% share against the total number of texts
<i>Kurir</i>	26	185	14.05
<i>Politika</i>	52	459	11.33
<i>Danas</i>	43	388	11.08
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	35	316	11.08
<i>Blic</i>	18	255	7.06
<i>Alo!</i>	14	250	5.60
<i>Informer</i>	6	253	2.37
Total	194	2106	9.21

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Tomislav Nikolić: evaluative context in relation to a media outlet

Tomislav Nikolić	positive		neutral		negative		total	
Media outlet	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<i>Blic</i>	0	0.00	15	83.33	3	16.67	18	9.28
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0.00	20	76.92	6	23.08	26	13.40
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0	0.00	35	100.00	0	0.00	35	18.04
<i>Alo!</i>	0	0.00	7	50.00	7	50.00	14	7.22
<i>Informer</i>	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00	6	3.09
<i>Politika</i>	2	3.85	49	94.23	1	1.92	52	26.80
<i>Danas</i>	0	0.00	41	95.35	2	4.65	43	22.16
Total	2	1.03	173	89.18	19	9.79	194	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

In comparison to the last quarter of last year, the number of appearances of actors from the opposition in the first and second quarter of 2016 has doubled (1428 in the first and 1552 in the second quarter of 2016, as opposed to 762 in the last quarter of 2015), which is undoubtedly a consequence of the current political and social affairs, i.e. extraordinary parliamentary elections.

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearance of individual politicians from the opposition

Opposition – individually	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Bojan Pajtić	197	12.69	0	0.00	138	70.05	59	29.95
Vojislav Šešelj	178	11.47	0	0.00	161	90.45	17	9.55
Boris Tadić	127	8.18	0	0.00	114	89.76	13	10.24
Saša Radulović	125	8.05	0	0.00	106	84.80	19	15.20
Čedomir Jovanović	123	7.93	0	0.00	106	86.18	17	13.82
Sanda Rašković Ivić	95	6.12	0	0.00	90	94.74	5	5.26
Boško Obradović	78	5.03	0	0.00	66	84.62	12	15.38
Nenad Čanak	57	3.67	0	0.00	52	91.23	5	8.77
Borko Stefanović	38	2.45	0	0.00	33	86.84	5	13.16
Dragoljub Mićunović	34	2.19	0	0.00	27	79.41	7	20.59
Dragan Šutanovac	29	1.87	0	0.00	22	75.86	7	24.14
Zoran Živković	29	1.87	0	0.00	24	82.76	5	17.24

Goran Ješić	27	1.74	0	0.00	14	51.85	13	48.15
Vjerica Radeta	22	1.42	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
Balša Božović	20	1.29	0	0.00	18	90.00	2	10.00
Amir Bislimi	16	1.03	0	0.00	12	75.00	4	25.00
Sulejman Ugljanin	16	1.03	0	0.00	10	62.50	6	37.50
Đorđe Vukadinović	14	0.90	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
Radoslav Milojević Kena	13	0.84	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38
Branimir Kuzmanović	12	0.77	0	0.00	9	75.00	3	25.00
Miroslav Parović	12	0.77	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Vasin	11	0.71	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Žarko Korać	11	0.71	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Marko Bastać	11	0.71	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandra Jerkov	10	0.64	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Bojan Kostreš	10	0.64	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Gordana Čomić	9	0.58	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Đurišić	8	0.52	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Petrović	7	0.45	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Pavlović	7	0.45	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Oliver Dulić	7	0.45	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Srbijanka Turajlić	7	0.45	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Jovo Ostojić	6	0.39	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Sandulović	6	0.39	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Petar Jojić	6	0.39	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Stevanović	5	0.32	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Konstantin Samofalov	5	0.32	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Milorad Mirčić	5	0.32	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Nataša Vučković	5	0.32	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Milosavljević	5	0.32	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Vesna Rakić Vodinić	5	0.32	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Vladan Glišić	5	0.32	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Pavićević	5	0.32	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00

Dušan Milisavljević	4	0.26	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Bogdanović	4	0.26	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Ninić	4	0.26	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Janko Veselinović	4	0.26	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Branislav Bogaroški	4	0.26	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Lazar Đurović	4	0.26	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Popović	4	0.26	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Nataša Mičić	4	0.26	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Nebojša Zelenović	4	0.26	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Todorić	4	0.26	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Krasić	4	0.26	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Maršićanin	3	0.19	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Maja Sedlarević	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Avram Izrael	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Jasmina Nikolić	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Jasmina Vujić	3	0.19	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Miladin Ševarlić	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milica Đurđević	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nataša Jovanović	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nemanja Šarović	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Milić	3	0.19	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Nikola Jelikić	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Slaviša Ristić	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Nikolić	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Samardžić	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Stefan Stamenkovski	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Veroljub Stevanović	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Marić	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Stefan Stamenkovski	3	0.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ostali	36	2.32	0	0.00	34	94.44	2	5.56
Total	1552	100.00	0	0.00	1337	86.15	215	13.85

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearance of individual politicians from the opposition

Government – individually	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Branko Ružić	51	8.73	0	0.00	37	72.55	14	27.45
Muamer Zukorlić	36	6.16	0	0.00	35	97.22	1	2.78
Milutin Mrkonjić	31	5.31	0	0.00	24	77.42	7	22.58
Bratislav Gašić	30	5.14	0	0.00	27	90.00	3	10.00
Ištvan Pastor	28	4.79	0	0.00	28	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Marković Palma	26	4.45	0	0.00	26	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Martinović	24	4.11	0	0.00	23	95.83	1	4.17
Igor Mirović	24	4.11	0	0.00	24	100.00	0	0.00
Novica Tončev	23	3.94	0	0.00	19	82.61	4	17.39
Dijana Vukomanović	22	3.77	0	0.00	20	90.91	2	9.09
Vladimir Đukanović	22	3.77	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Knežević	19	3.25	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Slavica Đukić Dejanović	19	3.25	0	0.00	17	89.47	2	10.53
Nenad Popović	18	3.08	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Marija Obradović	15	2.57	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Milenko Jovanov	15	2.57	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Ivana Petrović	12	2.05	0	0.00	4	33.33	8	66.67
Miroslav Lazanski	12	2.05	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Linta	11	1.88	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Vuk Drašković	11	1.88	1	9.09	9	81.82	1	9.09
Branislav Nedimović	10	1.71	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Momir Stojanović	7	1.20	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Jovičić	6	1.03	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Bečić	5	0.86	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Milan Krkobabić	5	0.86	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Predrag Marković	5	0.86	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00

Žarko Obradović	5	0.86	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Balint Pastor	4	0.68	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Borković	4	0.68	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Ljiljana Habjanović Đurović	4	0.68	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Senić	4	0.68	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dejan Backović	4	0.68	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Milun Todorović	4	0.68	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Veroljub Arsić	4	0.68	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Bogdan Obradović	3	0.51	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Šormaz	3	0.51	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Meho Omerović	3	0.51	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milovan Drecun	3	0.51	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ostali	52	8.90	0	0.00	48	92.30	4	7.70
Total	584	100.00	2	0.34	532	91.10	50	8.56

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual political actors – representatives of state bodies, agencies and institutions

State bodies, agencies and institutions – individually	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Siniša Mali	66	17.37	0	0.00	61	92.42	5	7.58
Maja Gojković	51	13.42	0	0.00	47	92.16	4	7.84
Dejan Đurđević	32	8.42	0	0.00	31	96.88	1	3.13
Marko Đurić	25	6.58	0	0.00	24	96.00	1	4.00
Zoran Babic	21	5.53	0	0.00	20	95.24	1	4.76
Goran Vesić	18	4.74	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Tanja Mišćević	17	4.47	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Radomir Nikolić	16	4.21	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Miloš Vučević	16	4.21	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Stanislava Pak	16	4.21	0	0.00	12	75.00	4	25.00
Jorgovanka Tabaković	14	3.68	1	7.14	12	85.71	1	7.14

Nikola Nikodijević	10	2.63	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Saša Obradović	9	2.37	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Andreja Mladenović	8	2.11	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Miladin Kovačević	7	1.84	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Duško Lopandić	6	1.58	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Milan Bačević	5	1.32	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Veljko Odalović	5	1.32	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Jovica Stepić	4	1.05	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Oliver Potežica	4	1.05	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Slađana Stanković	4	1.05	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Jovan Marić	3	0.79	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Suzana Paunović	3	0.79	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Marković	3	0.79	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ostali	17	4.47	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Total	380	100.00	1	0.26	358	94.21	21	5.53

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of other individual and collective political and social actors

Other actors	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Slobodan Milošević	77	19.30	0	0.00	76	98.70	1	1.30
Zoran Đinđić	52	13.03	1	1.92	51	98.08	0	0.00
Vojislav Koštunica	24	6.02	0	0.00	24	100.00	0	0.00
Vuk Jeremić	23	5.76	1	4.35	20	86.96	2	8.70
Mlađan Dinkić	19	4.76	0	0.00	17	89.47	2	10.53
Džordž Soroš	17	4.26	0	0.00	7	41.18	10	58.82
UEFA	16	4.01	0	0.00	9	56.25	7	43.75
CESID	15	3.76	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Dragica Nikolić	14	3.51	0	0.00	10	71.43	4	28.57
Jelena Milić	12	3.01	1	8.33	9	75.00	2	16.67

Dragan Đilas	10	2.51	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Nataša Kandić	10	2.51	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Crta - građani na straži	9	2.26	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Krešimir Macan	9	2.26	0	0.00	2	22.22	7	77.78
FIFA	8	2.01	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Matija Bečković	8	2.01	1	12.50	7	87.50	0	0.00
Andrej Vučić	7	1.75	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Lazarević	7	1.75	0	0.00	3	42.86	4	57.14
Ružica Đinđić	6	1.50	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
SANU	6	1.50	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Kostić	6	1.50	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Božidar Đelić	5	1.25	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Emir Kusturica	5	1.25	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ana Bekuta	5	1.25	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Mirjana Marković	5	1.25	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
Džon Alite	5	1.25	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
Džon Goti mlađi	4	1.00	3	75.00	0	0.00	1	25.00
Bogoljub Karić	4	1.00	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Porodica Gambino	4	1.00	1	25.00	2	50.00	1	25.00
Mirko Cvetković	4	1.00	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Karađorđević	3	0.75	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	399	100.00	8	2.00	339	84.96	52	13.04

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: state bodies and institutions

State bodies, agencies and institutions – collectively	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Vlada Srbije	162	31.40	4	2.47	150	92.59	8	4.94
Republička izborna komisija	49	9.50	1	2.04	48	97.96	0	0.00
Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova	46	8.91	0	0.00	40	86.96	6	13.04
Narodna skupština republike Srbije	36	6.98	0	0.00	36	100.00	0	0.00
Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova	25	4.84	0	0.00	24	96.00	1	4.00
Narodna banka Srbije	17	3.29	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
Ministarstvo finansija	13	2.52	1	7.69	9	69.23	3	23.08
Ministarstvo pravde	13	2.52	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Ministarstvo odbrane	12	2.33	1	8.33	11	91.67	0	0.00
Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja	12	2.33	0	0.00	9	75.00	3	25.00
Ministarstvo privrede	12	2.33	0	0.00	10	83.33	2	16.67
Poreska uprava Srbije	11	2.13	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
Agencija za privredne registre	8	1.55	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
kabinet predsednika RS	8	1.55	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Pokrajinska izborna komisija	7	1.36	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Ministarstvo kulture i informisanja	7	1.36	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Ministarstvo za rad, zapošljavanje, boračka i socijalna pitanja	7	1.36	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57

Kancelarija za Kosovo i Metohiju	5	0.97	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ministarstvo državne uprave i lokalne samouprave	5	0.97	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ministarstvo građevinarstva, saobraćaja i infrastrukture	5	0.97	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ministarstvo poljoprivrede i zaštite životne sredine	5	0.97	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Republički zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture	5	0.97	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Skupština grada Beograda	5	0.97	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Republički fond za penzijsko i invalidsko osiguranje	4	0.78	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Uprava za sprečavanje pranja novca	4	0.78	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Agencija za privatizaciju	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Agencija za restituciju	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Kabinet predsednika Vlade Srbije	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Agencija za osiguranje i finansiranje izvoza	3	0.58	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Direkcija za upravljanje oduzetom imovinom	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Direktorat civilnog vazduhoplovstva	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ministarstvo zdravlja	3	0.58	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ostali	12	2.33	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Total	516	100.00	7	1.35	476	92.25	33	6.40

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of domestic collective political actors:
government

Government – collectively	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Srpska napredna stranka	323	48.21	9	2.79	310	95.98	4	1.24
SPS	222	33.13	1	0.45	203	91.44	18	8.11
Savez vojvođanskih Mađara	39	5.82	0	0.00	39	100.00	0	0.00
Koalicija SPS - JS	18	2.69	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
PUPS	12	1.79	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Bošnjačka demokratska zajednica Sandžaka	8	1.19	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Partija za demokratsko delovanje	8	1.19	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
SDPS	7	1.04	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Zelena stranka	7	1.04	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
SNP	6	0.90	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Jedinstvena Srbija	5	0.75	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Nova Srbija	5	0.75	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Srbija pobeđuje, lista	4	0.60	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Pokret socijalista	3	0.45	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
SPO	3	0.45	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Total	670	100.00	10	1.49	636	94.93	24	3.58

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of domestic collective political actors:
opposition

Opposition - collectively	No.	%	Positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Demokratska stranka	237	23.92	1	0.42	200	84.39	36	15.19
Dosta je bilo	131	13.22	0	0.00	126	96.18	5	3.82
Kolicija DSS - Dveri	121	12.21	0	0.00	111	91.74	10	8.26
SRS	116	11.71	0	0.00	111	95.69	5	4.31

Koalicija Čeda-Boris-Čanak	76	7.67	0	0.00	71	93.42	5	6.58
LDP	64	6.46	0	0.00	63	98.44	1	1.56
SDP	47	4.74	0	0.00	47	100.00	0	0.00
DSS	44	4.44	0	0.00	44	100.00	0	0.00
Dveri	40	4.04	0	0.00	35	87.50	5	12.50
LSV	26	2.62	0	0.00	26	100.00	0	0.00
Levica Srbije	21	2.12	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
SDA Sandžaka	13	1.31	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Republikanska stranka	12	1.21	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Nova stranka	11	1.11	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Jedinstvena ruska stranka	8	0.81	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Zavetnici	7	0.71	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Srpsko-ruski pokret	5	0.50	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Mađarski pokret	4	0.40	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ruska stranka	3	0.30	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Savez za bolju Srbiju	3	0.30	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Za pravednu Srbiju - DS, Nova, DSHV, ŽS	2	0.20	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	991	100.00	1	0.10	920	92.84	70	7.06

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

A considerably smaller percentage of texts discussed foreign (individual and collective) political actors.

Distribution of frequency and the evaluative context of appearances of individual and collective actors:
Kosovo

Kosovo	No.	%	Positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Hašim Tači	15	18.52	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
OVK	6	7.41	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
Ramuš Haradinaj	5	6.17	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Isa Mustafa	4	4.94	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Kosovska policija	4	4.94	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00

Kosovske vlasti	4	4.94	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Albanci	4	4.94	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Fadilj Vokri	4	4.94	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Aljbin Kurti	3	3.70	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Vlasti Kosova	3	3.70	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Ostali	29	35.80	0	0.00	24	82.75	5	17.25
Total	81	100.00	0	0.00	61	75.31	20	24.69

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: Croatia

Croatia	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović	56	23.73	0	0.00	49	87.50	7	12.50
"Hrvatske vlasti"	34	14.41	0	0.00	12	35.29	22	64.71
Miro Kovač	19	8.05	0	0.00	15	78.95	4	21.05
Franjo Tuđman	15	6.36	0	0.00	12	80.00	3	20.00
Tihomir Orešković	13	5.51	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38
Milorad Pupovac	12	5.08	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Tomislav Karamarko	12	5.08	0	0.00	10	83.33	2	16.67
Zlatan Hasanbegović	12	5.08	0	0.00	7	58.33	5	41.67
Zoran Milanović	10	4.24	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Ivo Josipović	8	3.39	1	12.50	7	87.50	0	0.00
Ante Gotovina	5	2.12	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Savo Štrbac	5	2.12	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Vesna Pusić	5	2.12	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Davor Đenero	3	1.27	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Srpsko narodno vijeće	3	1.27	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vlada Hrvatske	3	1.27	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67

Gordan Markotić	3	1.27	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ostali	18	8.26	0	0.00	12	66.67	6	33.33
Total	236	100.00	1	0.43	180	76.27	55	23.30

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: Montenegro

Montenegro	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milo Đukanović	20	41.67	0	0.00	18	90.00	2	10.00
Filip Vujanović	4	8.33	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Lukšić	3	6.25	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ostali	21	43.75	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
Total	48	100.00	0	0.00	46	95.83	2	4.17

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: Federation of BiH/Republic Srpska

Bosnia and Herzegovina	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milorad Dodik	51	29.14	1	1.96	50	98.04	0	0.00
Bakir Izetbegović	24	13.71	0	0.00	19	79.17	5	20.83
Mladen Ivanić	18	10.29	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Mladen Bosić	12	6.86	0	0.00	9	75.00	3	25.00
Čamil Duraković	8	4.57	0	0.00	5	62.50	3	37.50
Alija Izetbegović	7	4.00	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Dragan Čović	6	3.43	1	16.67	5	83.33	0	0.00
Naser Orić	5	2.86	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Savez za promene u RS	5	2.86	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Vlasti Republike Srpske	4	2.29	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

Dragan Lukač	3	1.71	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Radmanović	3	1.71	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ranko Dželajlija	3	1.71	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vlasti FBiH	3	1.71	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Željka Cvijanović	3	1.71	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ostali	20	11.43	0	0.00	17	85.00	3	15.00
Total	175	100.00	2	1.14	155	88.57	18	10.29

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual and foreign political actors outside of the region: foreign politicians

Foreign politicians	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Xi Jinping	52	10.57	3	5.77	48	92.31	1	1.92
David Cameron	51	10.37	0	0.00	47	92.16	4	7.84
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	32	6.50	0	0.00	26	81.25	6	18.75
Francois Hollande	19	3.86	0	0.00	17	89.47	2	10.53
Boris Johnson	18	3.66	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
Sebastian Kurz	15	3.05	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Jeremy Corbyn	13	2.64	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Ahmet Davutoglu	10	2.03	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Marine Le Pen	10	2.03	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Petro Poroshenko	10	2.03	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Nigel Farage	9	1.83	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Đorđe Ivanov	8	1.63	1	12.50	7	87.50	0	0.00
Nicola Sturgeon	8	1.63	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Alexis Tsipras	7	1.42	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Bashar al-Assad	7	1.42	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Binali Yildirim	7	1.42	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Lajčak	7	1.42	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Nikola Gruevski	7	1.42	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Norbert Hofer	7	1.42	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0.00

Tony Blair	7	1.42	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Zaev	7	1.42	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Victor Orban	6	1.22	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Alexander Van Der Bellen	6	1.22	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Mauricio Macri	6	1.22	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Jean Marc Ero	6	1.22	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dennis Keefe	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Philip Hammond	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Yanis Varoufakis	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Manuel Valls	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dilma Rousseff	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Joe Cox	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Helen Clark	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Li Manchang	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Matteo Renzi	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Sadiq Khan	5	1.02	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Sajid Javid	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Geert Wilders	4	0.81	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Li Keqiang	4	0.81	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Bekir Bozdag	4	0.81	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Borut Pahor	4	0.81	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Danilo Turk	4	0.81	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Irina Bokova	4	0.81	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Michael Gove	4	0.81	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Heinz-Christian Strache	3	0.61	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mark Rutte	3	0.61	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Anna Soubry	3	0.61	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Michel Temer	3	0.61	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Srđan Kerim	3	0.61	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Theresa May	3	0.61	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Other	51	10.37	0	0.00	48	94.12	3	5.88
Total	492	100.00	5	1.02	456	92.68	31	6.30

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: Germany

Germany	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Angela Merkel	45	38.79	0	0.00	45	100.00	0	0.00
Frank-Walter Steinmeier	14	12.07	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Siegmar Gabriel	6	5.17	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Josip Juratović	5	4.31	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Axel Dittmann	4	3.45	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
CDU	4	3.45	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Wolfgang Schäuble	4	3.45	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Gunther Kirchbaum	3	2.59	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Peter Altmaier	3	2.59	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	28	24.14	0	0.00	28	100.00	0	0.00
Total	116	100.00	0	0.00	116	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: Russia

Russia	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Vladimir Putin	88	44.44	5	5.68	80	90.91	3	3.41
Dmitry Peskov	17	8.59	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Sergey Lavrov	10	5.05	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Authorities of Russia	9	4.55	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Medvedev	8	4.04	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Alexander Chepurin	7	3.54	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Rogozin	6	3.03	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Sergey Shoygu	5	2.53	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00

Ministry of Defence of Russia	4	2.02	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Sergey Zeleznjak	4	2.02	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Vitaly Mutko	4	2.02	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksey Pushkov	3	1.52	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	33	16.67	1	3.03	32	96.97	0	0.00
Total	198	100.00	6	3.03	188	94.95	4	2.02

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: USA

USA	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Kyle Scott	45	20.27	1	2.22	33	73.33	11	24.44
Barack Obama	35	15.77	0	0.00	34	97.14	1	2.86
Donald Trump	32	14.41	0	0.00	31	96.88	1	3.13
Hilary Clinton	20	9.01	0	0.00	19	95.00	1	5.00
Bernie Sanders	8	3.60	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Authorities of USA	8	3.60	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Daniel Serwer	5	2.25	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
US Embassy	4	1.80	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
CIA	4	1.80	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
FBI	4	1.80	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Jess Baily	4	1.80	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Joseph Biden	4	1.80	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Bill Clinton	3	1.35	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
John Kerry	3	1.35	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
David Goldfein	3	1.35	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Denis Ibišbegović	3	1.35	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Cameron Munter	3	1.35	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Michael McFoul	3	1.35	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
State Department	3	1.35	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Ted Kruz	3	1.35	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	25	11.26	0	0.00	22	88.00	3	12.00
Total	222	100.00	1	0.45	197	88.74	24	10.81

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual and collective foreign political actors: representatives of EU institutions and EU institutions

European Union	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
EU	39	15.48	1	2.56	38	97.44	0	0.00
European Commission	33	13.10	0	0.00	33	100.00	0	0.00
Michael Davenport	30	11.90	1	3.33	23	76.67	6	20.00
Johannes Hahn	17	6.75	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Jean-Claude Juncker	13	5.16	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Maja Kocijančič	12	4.76	1	8.33	10	83.33	1	8.33
Martin Schulz	12	4.76	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Donald Tusk	11	4.37	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Federica Mogherini	11	4.37	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
David McAllister	9	3.57	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
EU Delegation to Serbia	5	1.98	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Eulex	4	1.59	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
European Council	4	1.59	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Frans Timmermans, EU	3	1.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Enlargement Committee, EU Council of Ministers	3	1.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Tanja Fajon	3	1.19	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ulrike Lunaček	3	1.19	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Others	40	15.87	0	0.00	39	97.50	1	2.50
Total	252	100.00	3	1.19	239	94.84	10	3.97

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual and collective foreign political actors: representatives of OSCE and Council of Europe

OSCE, Council of Europe	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
OSCE	24	60.00	0	0.00	24	100.00	0	0.00
Council of Europe	5	12.50	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Others	11	27.50	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Total	40	100.00	0	0.00	40	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual and collective foreign political actors: representatives of UN institutions and UN institutions

UN	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
UN Security Council	10	25.00	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
UN	10	25.00	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
UNESCO	8	20.00	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Ban Ki-Moon	6	15.00	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Others	6	15.00	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Total	40	100.00	0	0.00	38	95.00	2	5.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors: NATO

NATO	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
NATO	49	79.03	0	0.00	36	73.47	13	26.53
Jens Stoltenberg	10	16.13	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Ostali	3	4.84	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	62	100.00	0	0.00	49	79.03	13	20.97

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual and collective actors: actors related to The Hague Tribunal

The Hague Tribunal	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
The Hague Tribunal	55	41.04	0	0.00	45	81.82	10	18.18
Ratko Mladić	11	8.21	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Serge Brammertz	11	8.21	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Jean-Claude Antonetti	6	4.48	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Flavia Lattanzi	5	3.73	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Florence Hartmann	5	3.73	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Theodor Meron	5	3.73	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Prosecution of the Hague Tribunal	4	2.99	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Carla Del Ponte	3	2.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Carmel Agius	3	2.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	26	19.40	0	0.00	26	100.00	0	0.00
Total	134	100.00	0	0.00	123	91.79	11	8.21

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Even at a mere glance, the frequency of appearances of certain actors on the front pages of the selected dailies from our sample, it is clearly visible that media treat matters from the domain of domestic and foreign policy with unequal interest. The fact that foreign actors are present considerably less the front pages of dailies in Serbia (23.52% compared to 76.47% of frequency of appearance of domestic political actors), speaks about the focus of domestic media on the field of internal politics.

Reasons for noticeable absence of interest for economic actors and their understanding of social, economic and political situation in Serbia and in the world remain a mystery (almost 4.53% of the total sample of actors is taken up by economic actors), which is enhanced by the narrative of numerous politicians that economic matters and economic consolidation of the country are key elements of future developmental strategies of the Serbian society.

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual economic actors

Economic actors – individual	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Miroslav Mišković	46	16.67	0	0.00	33	71.74	13	28.26
Dušan Bajatović	18	6.52	0	0.00	16	88.89	2	11.11
Milan Beko	18	6.52	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
Miodrag Kostić	13	4.71	1	7.69	11	84.62	1	7.69
Dane Kondić	10	3.62	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
David Petreus	10	3.62	1	10.00	4	40.00	5	50.00
Yu Yong, Hesteel	10	3.62	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Mišković	9	3.26	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Milo Đurašković	9	3.26	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Marko Čadež	8	2.90	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
James Hogan	6	2.17	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Petar Matijević	6	2.17	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Stanko Subotić Cane	6	2.17	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Davor Mišeljić	5	1.81	1	20.00	4	80.00	0	0.00
Filip Cepter	5	1.81	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Bogičević	5	1.81	1	20.00	4	80.00	0	0.00
Vojin Lazarević	5	1.81	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Bojan Bojković	4	1.45	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dragoljub Rajić	4	1.45	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Mile Jerković	4	1.45	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Stefan Vanoverbeke	4	1.45	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vladislav Lalić	4	1.45	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Željko Žunić	4	1.45	1	25.00	2	50.00	1	25.00
Aleksandar Obradović	3	1.09	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Perčević	3	1.09	1	33.33	2	66.67	0	0.00
Milija Babović	3	1.09	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Ateljević	3	1.09	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Vuk Hamović	3	1.09	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Drakulić	3	1.09	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Others	45	16.30	0	0.00	41	91.11	4	8.89
Total	276	100.00	6	2.17	232	84.06	38	13.77

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency of appearances and evaluative context of appearances of collective domestic economic actors

Economic actors – collective	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Steelworks Smederevo	35	12.87	0	0.00	35	100.00	0	0.00
Hesteel	30	11.03	2	6.67	28	93.33	0	0.00
Fiat Serbia	16	5.88	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Air Serbia	15	5.51	2	13.33	10	66.67	3	20.00
Mossack Fonseca	15	5.51	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Elektroprivreda Srbije	12	4.41	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Delta holding	11	4.04	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Yura	9	3.31	0	0.00	1	11.11	8	88.89
RTB Bor	7	2.57	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Belgrade Waterfront	6	2.21	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Srbijagas	6	2.21	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Jugoimport SDPR	5	1.84	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Putevi Srbije	5	1.84	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Telekom Srbija	5	1.84	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dunav osiguranje	4	1.47	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
IKEA	4	1.47	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Railways of Serbia	4	1.47	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
AIK banka	3	1.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Arabian Gold Olive Company	3	1.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Avtovaz	3	1.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Etihad	3	1.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ferostal	3	1.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Infostan	3	1.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Iskra	3	1.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
MK Group	3	1.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Chamber of Commerce of Serbia	3	1.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Tata steel	3	1.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nora	53	19.49	2	3.77	49	92.46	2	3.77
Total	272	100.00	6	2.21	250	91.91	16	5.88

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency of appearances and evaluative context of appearances of individual and collective foreign economic actors

IMF and the World Bank	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
IMF	11	35.48	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
James Roof	7	22.58	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
World Bank	7	22.58	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Others	6	19.35	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Total	31	100.00	0	0.00	30	96.77	1	3.23

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Apart from the already mentioned political and economic actors, actors from the front pages are also various other social actors, who in different ways affect social and political circumstances within the Serbian society.

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: representatives of Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organisations ⁴

Religion	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Patriarch Irinej	50	14.49	3	6.00	47	94.00	0	0.00
SPC	49	14.20	0	0.00	49	100.00	0	0.00
Alojzije Stepinac	18	5.22	0	0.00	14	77.78	4	22.22
Đokan Majstorović	13	3.77	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Pope Francis	12	3.48	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00

⁴ 280 actors from orthodox churches (Serbian, Russian and others) were recorded on the sampled front pages and 65 actors from other religious communities.

Amfilohije, Metropolitan of Montenegro and Primorje	10	2.90	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Bartholomew I (Ecumenical Patriarch)	10	2.90	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Russian Orthodox Church	8	2.32	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Irinej, Bishop of Bačka	7	2.03	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Jovan, Bishop of Slavonija	6	1.74	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Sergije, Bishop of Central Europe	6	1.74	0	0.00	1	16.67	5	83.33
Adem Zilkić	5	1.45	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Abdulah Numan, Mufti	5	1.45	1	20.00	3	60.00	1	20.00
Mitrofan, Bishop of East America	5	1.45	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Porfirije, Metropolitan	5	1.45	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Teodosije, Bishop of Kosovo	5	1.45	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Vasilije Kačavenda	5	1.45	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
Andrej, Bishop	4	1.16	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow	4	1.16	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Patriarchate of Antioch	4	1.16	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Bulgarian Orthodox Church	4	1.16	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Romanian Patriarchate	4	1.16	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Ecumenical Patriarchate	4	1.16	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Nikanor, Bishop of Banat	4	1.16	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Islamic Community of Serbia	3	0.87	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Atanasije, Bishop	3	0.87	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Franjo Komarica, Bishop of Banja Luka	3	0.87	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Jovan Marić	3	0.87	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Maksim, Bishop of West America	3	0.87	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Muhamed Jusufspahić	3	0.87	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Holy Synod of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church	3	0.87	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vatican	3	0.87	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	74	21.45	2	2.70	65	87.84	7	9.46
Total	345	100.00	6	1.74	302	87.54	37	10.72

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency of appearances of representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious communities on the front pages in different media from the research sample

Media outlet	No.	%
<i>Media outlet</i>	No.	%
<i>Politika</i>	16.67	83.33
<i>Alo!</i>	30.00	70.00
<i>Kurir</i>	33.33	66.67
<i>Blic</i>	40.00	60.00
<i>Danas</i>	44.44	55.56
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	66.67	33.33
Total %	34	66

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Distribution of frequency of appearances and evaluative context of appearances of individual and collective social actors from the media

Media	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
RTV	18	15.13	0	0.00	16	88.89	2	11.11
NUNS	14	11.76	1	7.14	12	85.71	1	7.14
Željko Cvijanović	9	7.56	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00

Dragan J. Vučićević	8	6.72	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
KRIK	8	6.72	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Slobodan Arežina	8	6.72	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Vukašin Obradović	8	6.72	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Rodić	7	5.88	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Zoran Kesić	7	5.88	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Stevan Dojčinović	6	5.04	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
BIRN	5	4.20	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Dragan Bujošević	5	4.20	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
Marina Fratućan	4	3.36	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Nada Kalkan	4	3.36	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Olivera Kovačević	4	3.36	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Srđan Mihajlović	4	3.36	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Total	119	100.00	1	0.84	103	86.55	15	12.61

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

The following table shows all actors from the media sample related to the murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović. These are members of her family, acquaintances, friends, but also personalities who were marked by investigative bodies as potentially suspicious. These actors were present on the front pages in the second quarter in 968 appearances, almost two times more than foreign politicians or state bodies and institutions, for instance.

Distribution of frequency and evaluative context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: "Murder of Jelena Marjanović"

Murder of Jelena Marjanović	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Jelena Marjanović	233	24.07	4	1.72	229	98.28	0	0.00
Zoran Marjanović	193	19.94	0	0.00	102	52.85	91	47.15
Vladimir Marjanović	107	11.05	0	0.00	64	59.81	43	40.19
Zorica Krsmanović	100	10.33	0	0.00	99	99.00	1	1.00
Jana Marjanović	83	8.57	0	0.00	82	98.80	1	1.20
Zorica Marjanović	50	5.17	0	0.00	25	50.00	25	50.00
Miloš Marjanović	42	4.34	0	0.00	17	40.48	25	59.52

Radmila Matić, "Rada from Vienna"	30	3.10	0	0.00	26	86.67	4	13.33
Uroš Marjanović	20	2.07	0	0.00	12	60.00	8	40.00
Nada Topčagić	17	1.76	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
The Marjanović family	17	1.76	0	0.00	6	35.29	11	64.71
Nebojša Rojko	15	1.55	0	0.00	13	86.67	2	13.33W
Vera, god mother of the Marjanović family	10	1.03	0	0.00	7	70.00	3	30.00
Nikola Marijoković	7	0.72	0	0.00	3	42.86	4	57.14
Sanja Marjanović	7	0.72	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Maja Krsmanović	4	0.41	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Gordana Krsmanović, aunt of the murdered singer	3	0.31	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Rojko	3	0.31	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nena Rojko	3	0.31	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
The Krsmanović family	3	0.31	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Senad Jahović	3	0.31	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	18	1.86	1	5.56	15	83.33	2	11.11
Total	968	100.00	5	0.52	740	76.45	223	23.04

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

UNNAMED SOURCES

Unnamed sources are again the second-ranked actor in terms of their share in the selected texts from the sampled front pages. This time, unnamed sources were listed 568 times, which is 26.97% of all texts, an increase of around 7% in comparison to the first quarter. This wide use of unnamed sources has been precisely established thanks to the method of quantifying unnamed sources, which we have been applying since the second edition of *Mediameter*, where we take into account not only the sources listed as unnamed by the newspaper in question, but also all those providing information which cannot be verified, regardless of the way it was introduced in the text. Naturally, this share belonging to information obtained from unnamed sources speaks more about the manner in which the seven newspapers from the sample report news than about the real need to protect the identity of the persons providing certain intelligence.

Share of "unnamed sources" in all journalistic forms in the seven media from the sample

Genre	Total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
report	1550	503	32.45
article	187	43	22.99
news	64	10	15.63
reportage	29	3	10.34
commentary	103	7	6.80
interview	157	2	1.27
other	16	0	0.00
Total	2106	568	26.97

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Share of “unnamed sources” according to analysed media outlets

Media outlet	total number of texts	unnamed sources	%
<i>Kurir</i>	185	87	47.03
<i>Alo!</i>	250	116	46.40
<i>Informer</i>	253	111	43.87
<i>Blic</i>	255	78	30.59
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	316	68	21.52
<i>Danas</i>	388	59	15.21
<i>Politika</i>	459	49	10.68
Total	2106	568	26.97

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

No. of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics, in the seven media from the sample ⁵

Topic	Total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	228	158	69.30
political life in Serbia	328	92	28.05
elections 2016	349	79	22.64
Economy	112	31	27.68

⁵ Ten topics with the highest number of unnamed sources are shown.

matters of faith, church, religion	94	25	26.60
regional cooperation/ regional relations	104	20	19.23
meeting requirements/ standards for EU integra- tions	29	16	55.17
Crime	29	14	48.28
international relations	55	12	21.82
Russia/attitude towards Russia	34	11	32.35

Source: *Mediameter* research, April - June 2016

Conclusion

As the analysis shows, there are significant differences between print media (daily newspapers) in Serbia. Those differences are primarily consequences of different degrees of professional capacities and abilities of the media themselves to produce objective, timely and relevant information. The limitations that most media in Serbia are facing are a consequence of various factors: economic situation of media, various editorial policies, socio-political atmosphere and professional competence of journalists and editors. Editorial policy is often a result of insufficient infrastructural equipment of media, incapacities of questionable competences, as well as the difficult financial situation of journalists themselves. Consequently, many media, their editors and journalists opt for the “easy way”, but flirting with or completely meeting the expectations of consumers and various centres of political and financial power, with no or very little critical and professional distance.

Even though there are no “taboo topics” and/or “taboo persons” in the Serbian media, this analysis leads to a conclusion that there are two main factors which distort the picture of reality of everyday life painted by the media in Serbia. Those factors are related to: (a) on one side exaggerated and, in the reality of everyday life, unfounded overemphasis of the importance of certain protagonists and topics, where we need to highlight those that are contributions of editors and authors; or, on the other hand, as in the case of the murder of singer Jelena Marjanović, real events, attributed with relevance blown out of proportions or with new meanings, thus suppressing socially and structurally more important topics; (b) on the other hand, the canons used to deal with various topics which promote colloquial and churlish vocabulary, triviality, mystification of the source, patterns in approaching persons and topics, which are exclusive by nature and which do not allow questioning the arguments (either for, or against), which are most often of personal nature. Personal attitudes of journalists and editors, the use of unnamed sources in the texts and the manner in which the information is construed are merely consequences of a lack of response from the public and professional journalist community to those problems. The act of ignoring such long-standing, unprofessional “journalist” practices has led to the establishment of “new hybrid trends” in Serbian journalism, characterised, among other things, by a lack of idea about responsibility for the attitudes made public. Hence, the lack of professional competence, combined with the lack of awareness of social responsibility and common decency in public speech, are becoming competitive advantages of certain media in the market existing in the dysfunctional society of Serbia.





Discourse analysis

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Versatility of newspaper approaches to the processing of a topic, multitude of mutually opposing arguments and conclusions, versatility of political opinions and evaluative directions, and above all, intense use of propaganda rhetoric is what characterises editorial columns in dailies and weeklies, as well as a large number of texts in the weeklies, which are directly connected to the front page of the weekly in the period from April to the end of June 2016.

Choosing front-page content, as essential for interpreting the content of a particular weekly, is not at all random. Front pages are considered some kind of “personal ID card” of the newspaper. It defines not only what the newspaper writes about, but often, either because of the suggestive headline or photograph, they directly or indirectly lead the readers to conclusions about certain political and wider social process, special event, political or social protagonist. At the same time, it should be underlined that weeklies are especially important because they usually form interpretative codes for understanding political actors, their concepts, decisions and practices through the texts and interviews, and often enough through the front pages. To that end, the status of journalism in weeklies is not exclusively and only connected to the issue of circulation, it has a wider and deeper meaning. This especially applies to the forming of opinions within a group of individuals who are prone to public engagement, but who are not party-defined in the narrow sense of that word. Capillary public places a certain image of the world, more precisely view of political life and society through the weeklies and columns in dailies, which contributes to the articulation and general political-evaluative profiling.

Principle and empirically sustainable diversity of approaches and content, versatility verifiable by direct review of the content of editorial columns and newspaper texts connected to the front pages confirm the attitude in the Serbian print media that there is no topic and viewpoint which is eliminated, i.e. deliberately suppressed by the activity of the political government.

Briefly, plurality of political and evaluative judgments of different levels of argumentative and rhetorical assurances confirms the thesis about the existence of the basic freedom of opinion and expression and directly refutes the attitude about the existence of censorship in the print media, more specifically in journalism, which is realised along the lines of editorial and original columns in the dailies and weeklies.

This principle and empirically verifiable statement about the condition of the print media, i.e. certain segment of journalism, represents a claim which is continuously proven and confirmed in research conducted during 2015 and 2016. This prompts the already specified conclusions about the existence of the original freedom of thought and expression and lack of government interventions in the field of journalists’ rights and freedom.

In the period from April to June, the attention of discursive analysis was caught by the following issues relevant to the political and social life in Serbia – elections, case of “Savamala” and Brexit. Each of these topics was covered through a different approach of the weeklies, offering to its readers and the general public versatile mutually contending, often debating and almost always political and evaluative positions.

Elections were the central political and social topic and they were monitored with assiduous focus on both independent journalistic coverage of the topic by the journalist or a group of journalists, and interviews in which the participants of the election process promoted their own views and challenged the political views of their opponents. The spirit of the political match and debate, which was fierce, often harsh and at times vulgar, exposed the rough propagandistic side of journalism. At the same time, the important role of publically engaged scholars in the public and political domain was confirmed, more specifically their influence over the election process and understanding of events on the domestic and international stage.

Weeklies sustained the continuity of the political and media synergy between opposition's champions and public intellectuals, both in terms of journalists, analysts, professors, artists and other authors from the area of science and art who show tendency towards public involvement. Due to the need to motivate the electorate to make a political choice, there was an expectedly higher level of presence of opposition's leaders in comparison to the members of the involved intellectual elite.

The outcome of political and media synergy is the development and constant further shaping of a mostly negative image of the government which is what took place in the period from April to June, which time-wise coincided with the completion of the election campaign, day of the elections and media-political “battle” over interpreting the elections.

“Meeting” point of opposition protagonists and intellectuals engaged in the public eye is relevant semantic and rhetorical overlapping in positions which had continuously and specifically been painting a negative picture of the government. Use of identical or relevantly similar words and expressions and conceptual constructions testifies about the mentioned omnipresent tendency of joint activism of opposition parties, the non-government sector and a considerable group of intellectuals, present in the public eye.

Radically critical weeklies have shown a nearly unprecedented level of disputing of not only the concept, decision and practical outcome of procedures in government in all spheres of political, economic and wider social life, but they showed nearly extraordinary suspicion for all parts of the election process from the campaign, to the act of voting, rounded off with the undoubtedly emphasized oppositional attitude in the interpreting of the results of the elections. With an array of rationally plausible reasons, it could be said that the pillar of democratic order in Serbia was for the first time in the last sixteen years brought into question. On the other hand, the perception of the opposition is not positive. It is also sprawling with negativity, but it is much less developed in the weeklies and editorial columns which appear in the dailies. The reason lies in the fact that most weeklies are moderately or radically anti-government.

Images of political actors are mostly negative, whether talking about the government or opposition, while interpretative codes for deciphering political decisions and processes are marked by juxtaposition, which cancels out any possibility of rational approval about their sense and meaning. Therefore, for example, the process of elections may be interpreted as fair and democratically legitimate, but it is

most often, especially in the weeklies like *Vreme* and *NIN*, depicted as disputable and democratically unfounded. In the final instance, this type of media constellation prompts claims that the outcome of different approaches is relativisation in the assessment and evaluation of political actors' actions, i.e. relevant characteristics which are typical of one social or political event and process.

Elections, which as a procedure included running of parties and coalitions, election campaign and act of voting in the period from April to June, when the process of forming government bodies began, opened the possibility of forming relevant insights into the manner and content of the perception of political actors created by weeklies and editorial columns in the dailies. Therefore, images of actors and the election process are mutually intertwining and complementing each other sense wise, which leads to the conclusion that messages about political actors can be read from the texts portraying the elections.

Case "Savamala" confirmed the already mentioned attitude about the different interpretations of one event which was intensely present in the media and wider political sphere for months. At the same time, given the number and content of texts, the incident with the demolition of buildings in Savamala in Belgrade, which happened just before the elections, confirmed the radically critical tendency in the writing of nearly all weeklies. This event copied at the same time all pre-created matrixes of interpreting the participants in the political life and it proved to be good "litmus" for deciphering the key evaluative political matrixes which dominate the public-political field and which are picked up by the weeklies.

Reporting on "Brexit" displayed all the complexity and contradiction in media's attitudes towards the problem of European integrations. Serbian journalistic, as well as political, elite showed a considerable doze of disunion over the sense and meaning of this event, which may be considered a turning point in European and world history. Also, relatively modest thematisation of this event in the domain of interpreting showed that our editorial columns and weeklies are mostly focused on local problems, and that foreign policy is second to internal policy. The tie between the local and the wider global context is not clearly articulated and processed in detail, though writing about Brexit showed clear ideological-evaluative orientation of the dailies and weeklies. Discourse analysis confirmed two more insights from the previous two research cycles. In the Serbian media, there is a dynamic connection between the text and the image, which appears either as the lead photograph on the front page or as a caricature, which has an accompanying textual explanation given the main message of the caricature, as if by some rule of thumb, is in the drawing.

Similarly, division of the weeklies to coverage of foreign policy and internal policy topics has been confirmed. The following political and journalistic orientations need to be differentiated: 1) radically critical of the government, pro-European oriented (*NIN* and *Vreme*), moderately critical of the government, pro-European oriented (*Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik*) and partially critical of the government, but with pro-Russian orientation (*Pečat*).

Image of the government and the elections – authoritarian and incompetent government and democratically disputable elections

Authoritarian government and democratically disputable elections – these are the key notions for understanding both the image of the government, and the perception of the elections in the period April to June. Critical narrative in the Serbian weeklies used on countless occasions the saga about the authoritarian government personified by Aleksandar Vučić, first man of SNS, as well as the narrative about the non-democratic election process. While painting the portrait of the government, they apply a model of nearly entirely negative, personified campaign. The model rests on the complete identification of the government with the Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić. This media political strategy relies on two points. Media personification of the government, i.e. its identification with the strongest political and institutional protagonist who is at the same time the most popular politician in Serbia, is aimed at both direct and indirect justification of the attitude of the Euro-reforming opposition about the government as extremely non-democratic and authoritarian. Partly hidden, and partly open, intention is to simplify the question of political representation of parties and leaders through a process of negative, personified campaign. Personified criticism is meant to help the citizens to more easily understand the, in this specific case, extremely negative message in the sea of information offered by the leaders.

Opposition leaders, mostly from the Euro-reforming option, were not particularly original in the election campaign. By using the interview, they sent more or less an identical message to their electorate, which they were obviously trying to motivate by constantly generating “the sound and the fury” at the current government, more specifically Aleksandar Vučić.

In that way, the leader of the Democratic Party Bojan Pajtić sees the current political moment as a moment in which the government is displayed as extremely non-democratic, prone to violating human rights, repressing political opponents, deprived of serious results, without legitimacy to take Serbia down the European path:

“... the citizens will make a final judgment about how they want to live; I do not believe they want to live in a state in which there is rule of one man, where there is no division of power because nowadays Aleksandar Vučić is legislative and executive and judicial power. A country governed by a man whose first job was prime minister is unfortunate, employment is a lot lower than before, there are a lot fewer investments, indebtedness is higher, everyone is poorer than four years ago...

The Democratic Party survived and this is a huge success, beaten and satanised, slandered more than any other political organisation, ignored, hundreds of people have been arrested, dozens of people from DS have been beaten, therefore, the fact that you and I are sitting in front of a billboard that says DS shows its vitality. Each result is better than the one we had two years ago, it is excellent given the circumstances.

To be clear; we are not living in Europe, we are living in North Korea, in two months, I will have a chance to take part in a 40-minute interview on state TV, where I will be actually able to say something, in one show on N1 and one on RTV, while Aleksandar Vučić opened the morning show on Pink on Sunday, continued to the afternoon shows on RTS, and then in the afternoon program of B92. This is not a fair political match... You and I are citizens of a country which is aspiring to be part of the European Union, but just yesterday we had a request from the social and democratic group in the European Parliament for the Government of Serbia to finally admit, so to stop lying and to admit, that there is censorship in the me-

dia, that there is violence against political opponents, to provide elementary conditions for democratic processes. We, as a country, and society will have serious problems if these democratic processes are hindered in the manner in which this has been done up to now. In that sense, if the disgruntled citizens vote in these elections, despite their irregularities, Aleksandar Vučić will fall and that is why we are urging people to vote. We know that they will lose their job if they openly declare their position, that they will be badgered, this is why people do not want to say who they will vote for, but they should vote and decisively vote against poverty, against humiliation."¹

Using similar rhetoric, and with nearly matching political message, the former president of Serbia Boris Tadić, leader of the Social-Democratic Party, appeared in the media. His strategy involved reflection which distinguishes between his period of rule and the current condition. This rhetorical figure is not at all accidental. This is a marketing strategy which shows the advantages of one product or service by directly comparing it with the competition. Aim is to cause direct approval or rejection, or to start associative regime with the receiver who will accept or reject the message.

With the aim of realising this intent, Boris Tadić says "Today, an atmosphere of fear is not a matter of personal evaluation, but it is a matter of noticing an obvious reality and that is why I am using this campaign to dispel people's fears in everyday talk with them throughout Serbia. I am talking to businessmen, who are complaining that the tax police are an instrument of political coercion, and not a system for collecting budget funds, in such circumstances they have no time to do business. I am talking to citizens who whisper to me, so that no one can hear, that they will not vote for Vučić, which is no surprise since the man who dared a few days ago to say that the people are hungry was immediately identified and taken in. Minister Stefanović says that this man was taken in for preventive reasons, but it is obvious that this is prevention of freedom of thought and expression, which are the foundation of each democratic society. I am proud to say that during my short presidential term, the citizens did not fear me or the government, which shows we respected basic human rights and built a true democratic society. SNS is ruling with dictatorship of fear and blackmail.

First, they dramatically increase poverty level in the country with their incompetent policies, and then they manipulate with the impoverished citizens by blackmailing them with jobs or other privileges. Citizens of Serbia have been brought into the position that they are not voting to choose between different policies, but to fight for their own survival. This is why it is important that the citizens choose freedom over fear already in these elections because they do have a choice."²

Though messages of Tadić and Pajtić are mutually not different, their joint appearance in the elections was not possible, so parallel to creating an extremely negative image of the government, clear messages about political unity of them and their parties', more precisely coalition, lists appear.

Apart from the non-democratic political template and practice, image of Vučić and his reign has been

1 Bojan Pajtić, "Samo glas za DS nije bačen glas" [Only vote for DS is not a wasted vote] interviewed by Jelka Jovanović, *Novi magazin*, No. 259, p. 18-19

2 Boris Tadić "Ponosan sam što me se građani nisu plašili" [I am proud of the fact that the citizens were not afraid of me] interviewed by Jelka Jovanović, *Novi magazin*, No. 259, p. 22



Vreme, 21. 4. 2016.

formed by numerous texts which quite harshly and in a politically radical manner challenge his governing and the course of the election process.

Apart from disputing Aleksandar Vučić as the political leader of Serbia, his associates have also been “targeted,” especially those who obtained their diplomas from private universities; this was done in the form of direct challenging or suggestive indirect questioning. Since SNS came into office, there has been a constant tendency among the enlightened part of the public to question the knowledge and scientific titles acquired in private universities, despite the fact that most of such higher education institutions have been accredited by the competent university and state authorities, despite the fact that many teachers from state universities regularly moonlight at these institutions. Academic Dušan Teodorović is a classic example of this school of thought that diplomas of politicians from private faculties should be questioned by default, making his own doubts a lethal political and rhetorical “weapon” for challenging his political opponents. He puts the motif of an “incompetent state official” in the centre of discourse, “We have an absurd situation that the faculty from private universities is being employed by state administration, and since this is not much of a faculty, the state administration will also be of such poor quality.”³

A message similar to that of Teodorović may be found in a text which does not speak about the functioning of the state administration, but about the prerequisites for the scientific and technological progress of the country and its accelerated economic development. In the text “Substance,” journalist Mijat Lakićević underlines the poor human resources in the government, criticizing it for not including knowledgeable people. This lack is nearly fatal. It cancels the possibility of accelerated progress in the 21st century. At the same time, the government is thought to be responsible to a considerable extent for the lack of quality staff, “At the start of the 21st century, Serbian companies are technologically backward, without production programs, without a market. But most importantly, the answer to the question what substance is: substance is knowledge. Substance is in people’s heads. And those who had anything in their heads left either their companies or Serbia. Therein lies the substantial connection between Vučić and Dačić, whether they are mutually loyal or not.”⁴

Fight against crime and corruption and striving to jump start the economy and improve the social and economic position of the widest layers of the population – these are the key points of the political program of SNS and at the same time basic expectations of the largest number of citizens of Serbia. At first glance, by skilfully (ab)using facts and manipulating numbers with the aim of disputing results of Vučić’s policies, some of the weeklies, especially *Vreme* in cooperation with the organization CINS, question all the previous endeavours and results of the government led by Aleksandar Vučić.

In the text “End of the line, bro,” journalist of *Vreme* Radmilo Marković shows the frailty of the previous efforts of the Government of Serbia, by emphasizing the problem of reforms of public enterprises and strict demands of IMF when it comes to freezing salaries and pensions until the end of 2017. Though mapping and discussing economic problems of a country is desirable, it is interesting that this discus-

3 Dušan Teodorović, “Srbiju će upropastiti lažne diplome i doktorati,” [False diplomas and PhDs will be the death of Serbia] interviewed by Ivana Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, No. 1319

4 Mijat Lakićević, “Supstanca,” [Substance] *Novi magazin*, No. 260, p.7

sion was launched three days before the elections, in the very finish of the campaign, when parties are trying to incite positive expectations of citizens, especially those of poor citizens who mostly depend on money from the budget. On the other hand, favourable fiscal parameters from the start of 2016 implied, as they are now also suggesting, that the strict condition of freezing salaries in the public sector and pensions may to an extent be relativized, by gradually increasing them up to the limit which is budget sustainable. Also, the mentioned text shows propensity of the author to demonstrate the economic unsustainability of Vučić's hints about the near and visible progress in the life of a large part of the population by emphasizing the problem of public enterprises by stringent insisting on the harshness of conditions about the maintaining the already-reduced salaries and pensions. Strategy of providing arguments in this text is at a higher level than sheer propaganda, it rests on direct or indirect merger of unfavourable evaluations and numerically measurable parameters from the different institutions, like the Fiscal Council, reports of the Ministry of State Administration and Local Self-Government and reports by IMF.

"In the release of IMF after its visit (this refers to the visit of IMF's delegation to Belgrade – author's comm.) it is emphasized that the government's plan is ambitious, but the required plan of reducing the number of employees is behind, and reforms of public enterprises are crucial for the improvement of competitiveness, growth and employment in Serbia. Year 2016 is critical for reforms in EPS (power distribution company), Srbijagas, Railways of Serbia, and the new government will have to act quickly in order to solve some of the strategic state companies which have joined the program...Therefore, this is the end of the line, at least if we stay on the path which the Government of Serbia chose in the past four years, unless they chew into the matters successfully avoided by all government since 2000, "painful and unpopular reforms" must become even more painful during this and next year."⁵

Following the same methodological template of fragmentary reading of reports of relevant economic and state institutions, Marković points to the avoiding of the government to implement a process of rationalization of the number of employees in the state administration and local self-government, as well as a delay in the solving of structural problems in an array of large public enterprises, like RTB Bor, chemical complex comprising Pančevo-based Nitrogen plant, MSK and the Refinery, company Galenika and Simpo, mine Resavica and others, „Solving the problem of companies which are generating losses for the state, which are weight around the state's neck, is essential, along with the acceleration of the restructuring program and dismissals in large public energy and road companies. Omissions in these areas may seriously compromise fiscal aims and growth, it is said in the third review."⁶

In a similar context and with an identical message, the author of the text uses the analysis of the Fiscal Council and relevant ministers in charge of rationalization of public expenditures.

As an integral part of the writing about the Government of Serbia during the election campaign, positions which refute progress in terms of growth of the gross domestic product surfaced. This topic gained importance because economic parameters suggest that Serbia will have a greater growth of GDP, than the envisaged.

5 Radmilo Marković, "Nema dalje, rođače," [End of the line, bro] *Vreme*, No. 1320

6 Idem

Since the not-so-small part of the critically positioned media consider all positive news about Aleksandar Vučić's policies unacceptable, it resorted to the process of relativisation of specific positive trends. Therefore, in the editorial column, implications of a positive trend in the economy are subjected to irony and relativized by Dragoljub Žarković without factual basis, showing an extremely biased political attitude, "But why are they meddling in god's work. Vučić said, "If proper rain falls two times in July and early August, the growth rate may go up to 2.8 percent," According to him, this will be one of the biggest growth rates in the region, even in Europe, hence, next year, Serbia will go for the growth rate of 4 to 4.5 percent. Shortly before this, he said that we will be two times stronger than the Germans, even Boris Tadić noticed that this was ridiculous."⁷

Far more specific in the forming of a negative image of Aleksandar Vučić and SNS in the area of economics is the journalist of the weekly *Vreme* Milan Milošević, who sees the average growth rate in Vučić's Serbia over the past four years as extremely moderate with continuity of delaying serious and difficult reforms, "His measurable results are very moderate: measured by the growth of GDP, the four years of his reign brought, according to the data from the World Bank, stagnation of +0.3 percent. Level of debt of Serbia increased and is nearing the critical limit, while his government claimed that it was working precisely on maintaining a sustainable level of debt. Liquidation of large systems of big loss-makers is still ahead of him."⁸

With the same urge for relativisation which leads to annulment of any success of Vučić's government, through their collocutor Ljuba Jurčić, president of the Society of Economists of Croatia, the weekly *NIN* undermines the very thought of any positive trends in the Serbian economy, "There are more than 20 countries in the world today, with growth rates above seven percent and at that rate, they will double their gross domestic product in 10 years. Some of these countries have poorer infrastructure and less educated population than Serbia and Croatia, which ended the previous year with GDP growth rate of less than one percent. Both Serbia and Croatia have the resources, people, infrastructure and capacities for two-three times bigger production than the existing one, so it is a disgrace and insult to the citizens when officials brag about the growth rates of two or three percent."⁹

Apart from economics, the fight against organized crime and corruption is also questioned. In a comprehensive "investigative" project, news network CINS tried to show the humble results of the state's battle against corruption. The research strives to show that the battle against corruption is more of a media and political spectacle than a serious action of the state aimed at establishing law and order in the country. Implicitly, it is suggested to the reader and the public that the battle against corruption is inefficient, that it is in the function of politicians' ratings, "CINS' research shows that, though the fight against corruption is reiterated as a priority of each government in the last ten years, in practice, it is reduced to media announcements and on-camera arrests. They are followed by a large number of criminal

7 Dragoljub Žarković, "Suđenje Miškoviću-Daj šta daš ili kako ovi na vlasti tvrde da neće da se mešaju u pravosuđe, sve se nadaju da će da padnu dve dobre kiše i da budemo bolji od Nemaca," [Miskovic's trial – Whatever or how the guys in power claim that they will not meddle in the justice system, hoping for rain to fall two times and to make us better than the Germans] *Vreme*, No. 1329

8 Milan Milošević, "Tuga pobednika," [Winner's grief] *Vreme*, No. 1321

9 Ljuba Jurčić, "Sramota je hvaliti se rastom od dva odsto," [It is shameful to boast with a 2 percent growth] interview with Milan Ćulibrk, *NIN*, 2.06.2016, p. 32

charges, but a lot fewer indictments and even fewer convictions. If a conviction does happen, these are usually suspended sentences. "Petty" corruption is processed much more often."¹⁰

Having created both directly and indirectly the negative image about the work of the Government in the field of economics or battle against crime, one must also point to the bleak image of reality in local self-governments, where the Progressives won a majority of over fifty percent. With this approach, a double effect was to be reached. On one side, the aim was to send out a message to the citizens of other local environments about how the Progressives come into office and what is the outcome of the reign of SNS. On the other side, the indirect message is what happens when SNS has a majority of more than 50 percent no matter the representation, with the aim of creating an association of some sort of social, economic, legal and every other possible chaos if the Progressives secure such a majority of more than 50 percent in Parliament.

In the text dedicated to the Municipality Mionica, where SNS has a majority of more than fifty percent, in a satirical and ironic context and politically atrocious sense, the reporter from *Vreme* speaks about the rule of the strongest party in Serbia, depicting it as truly incompetent to solve everyday issues of the citizens. At the same time, that same government is portrayed as morally dubious, both from the viewpoint of acquiring current positions, and from the viewpoint of performance, which is deprived of competence for improving the public good. In the text "The one traffic light is not working – Mionica, a place where the SNS future has arrived," Dragan Todorović first points to the problems with the progressives' victory on the local elections. Victory happened, according to the author, in a politically unacceptable manner – by bribing the impoverished population and intimidating. Actors of the mentioned political dirty jobs were the brother of the Prime Minister of Serbia, Andrej Vučić and the controversial businessman Zvonko Veselinović, "Progressives really outdid themselves in order to achieve a record-setting result, the people were given groceries, couches, stoves, country roads were covered for free with the stone from the quarry in Struganik which was leased by the businessman Zvonko Veselinović, during the campaign and election day, activists of SNS were brought from various sides, led by Andrej Vučić, who was seen in the company of the well-known businessman Panić. There were also minor "inconveniences" on election day when the Democrats' candidate for mayor Milan Gavrilović was beaten up by about ten short-haired, uniformed boys."¹¹

The problematically acquired government of SNS acts quite arbitrarily and to the detriment of the citizens of Mionica. Two negative occurrences are related to this action – appointing of incompetent staff and incompetence to solve specific everyday problems. Symbol of the latter is the broken traffic light. There is plenty of evidence for the former, according to the reporter of *Vreme* Dragan Todorović, "The only traffic light in the small town has not been fixed since the elections, people with bought diplomas are appointed as heads of public enterprises and institutions. Mayor and deputy mayor were asked to show their diplomas in the Assembly. The same goes for the director of the public cleaning enterprise since he previously did not have a high school diploma, but all of the sudden he now has some university degree. All such enquiries were ignored.

10 Ivana Jeremić and Milica Stojanović "Spektakl pred kamerama, muk u sudnicama" [On-camera spectacle, silence in the courtroom], *Vreme*, No. 3414

11 Dragan Todorović, "Ne radi jedini semafor," [The one traffic light is not working] *Vreme*, No. 1318

People are being employed, but without competitions, like in the Valjevo-based “Krušik”, where the director is somehow related to Toma Nikolić. It is sufficient to put the signature of the mayor of the municipality on the note with the name of the candidate, that is the “competition.”¹²

If the government of Aleksandar Vučić in the last weeks of the campaign and the few weeks after the elections was to be described, the description and evaluation of the government would be extremely negative. Authoritarian leader, uninclined towards democracy, arbitrary and party-affiliated appointments in the public service, weak or no results, piles of difficult challenges in the social and economic sphere which are by its “nature” and effects practically banning any possibility of positive writing about the government, endemic lack of freedom of press to which the atmosphere of fear and wider social apathy is linked. In a word, image of Serbia is the image of a hostage in a no-way-out situation.

Elections – intense political war between protagonists of uneven powers and reputations

Still, the central spot in the writing of weeklies was given to the elections. Writing is systematic, detailed and comprehensive. As such, it included all aspects of the election process, including the opening of many questions which had been deliberately neglected outside the, strictly speaking, election campaign. These are issues of sufficient representation of all parts of Serbia in the Parliament, two-tier threshold for coalitions and parties, regularity of the list of voters, manner of financing parties, level of awareness of citizens taking part in the election process and similar. All this basically legitimate and general political issues were not opened by chance during, and especially after the elections. The aim was to indirectly cast a shadow over the political legitimacy of the winner by opening these issues and further elaborating on them.

In the analysis and evaluative assessment, interpretation of the political profiles in the process was unavoidable, consideration of their potentials and chances, course of the election campaign with the discussion about the possible directions of politics after the elections.

It should be noted that once again undermining of the democratic legitimacy of the winner was in the epicentre of newspaper writing, under the influence of the opposition and with a clear political intent. This kind of approach has been manifested with dramatic, and at times tense, elaborating of the conditions under which the elections are taking place, with a detailed analysis of voting day and work of the Republic Electoral Committee.

After the counting of the votes, a kind of fight for interpreting the elections followed. Also, during the forming of the Assembly, an entire arsenal of critical writing appeared with reference to the atmosphere of the work in the Assembly, with constant proving that the current assembly represents the peak of

¹² Idem

political decadence in recent parliamentary history of Serbia.

Radically critical media, as if following a professional rule of thumb with a clear political orientation, relinquished Vučić and SNS' democratic legitimacy and the European orientation during and after the election campaign. Apart from this, media that have a certain level of understanding for the government in the domain of interior affairs, like the weekly *Pečat*, or the media that openly support Vučić, such as *Informer*, in its editorial and important associates' columns, prompted the anti-state behaviour of the opposition, lack of political and moral sensibility, lack of opposition's stronghold among the electorate and readiness to unconditionally cooperate with the West. Through the prism of the weekly press and editorial columns, the elections were shown as a political battle in the trenches, vocabulary of the claims and counterclaims, where often the rhetorical suggestiveness, most clearly manifested in the hermetic attitudes and personal and political labelling superseded rational and critical writing and discussion.

“Forever” repeating the same – Aleksandar Vučić in the election campaign

In texts which directly covered the campaign, leader of SNS, Aleksandar Vučić, was shown in most weeklies with the same negative charge that accompanied the reporting and interpreting of the campaigning activities. It is understood that the pre-election activities of the PM himself and leader of SNS and the circumstances under which the campaign took place were in the focus of texts.

If the image of Vučić's participation in the elections was to be put in a nutshell, it would boil down to the slogan “Domination of an authoritarian leader in unfair election conditions.” Vučić's campaign was designed to constantly address the average voter with whom this politician has an ambivalent relationship - attracting and rejecting. Vučić strived in the campaign to fulfil or to incite positive expectations with the average voter. On the other hand, he is repulsed by such a voter, “Those who know Aleksandar Vučić, the past, the present, and, as it seems, the future Prime Minister of Serbia, are spreading the rumour that the secret of his success is in the flawless knowledge of the average citizen of Serbia. In the knowledge, but also despise, as they say, because he is asking for the vote of those he finds repulsive.”¹³ As the journalist Zora Drčelić presumes, Vučić's largely socially-economic activism in the campaign has an empathy-developing component. Media use of the social development is one of the reminders of the paroles from the age of socialism “There is no rest while the renewal lasts.”¹⁴

Special role in Vučić's campaign, journalist Zora Drčelić ironically notices, was cast to the symbol of a corner stone, biblical symbolism of which is reflected in the building of the church of Christ, according to God's plan. Ironic gesture in writing here becomes a tool of mockery and belittling, and in the final sense, of the rejection of the idea that Vučić and SNS could build anything, more specifically, do anything constructive or positive for Serbia. The story about the corner stone is used either as a metaphor for the

13 Zora Drčelić, “Šta čeka Srbiju,” [What awaits Serbia] *Vreme*, No. 1320

14 Idem

ironic depiction of Vučić's idea about Serbia's progress, or as a symbol of the use of public resources with the aim of promoting him and the coalition led by him.

That the campaigning Vučić is treated as an authoritarian "master of using" the media is confirmed by the analysis of his slogan, too. At the same time, an authoritarian personality confirming itself in victories and domination over the political competitors who enjoys in a state of media inequality and legal irregularity is presented.

In terms of the former, slogan of SNS "United, we can do anything," is interpreted as a paraphrase of the American campaign and the English expression which clearly points to the authoritarian political nature, "Vučić took over to an extent the known English phrase (which Pink Floyd developed on its album *The Wall*) "United we stand, divided we fall," combined with Obama's first victory slogan "Yes, we can." It is possible, but seems unlikely, that among the main target groups of SNS are connoisseurs of English rock music and the US 2008 elections. "Vučić's slogan is more aligned with his own political nature: "unite," i.e. gather under himself as much power as possible, take up as wide a political field as possible, establish yourself and affirm yourself as a leader more, i.e. as an authoritarian leader who "can do it all." Vučić has not been elected to speak in his own name or in the name of his party, or to represent only the will of the voters – his ambition was and is to hold under him the entire state and government. This is confirmed by these elections themselves, unnecessary, as we said, because he already has quite a comfortable majority now."¹⁵

Vučić's intense campaigning style is based on the corporate advantage over other competitors in the election race. The advantage is convincing, and its source is money, "Money dictates the number of billboards – Vučić there beats all others combined with at least 10 to 1 – and the media and propaganda space before the elections will not change anything, except reshuffle a few rounds. Not so important ones, anyway. Because, Vučić not only holds the entire deck in his hand, but also dictates the rules of the game."¹⁶

Factual superiority of Vučić and the Progressives which is implied in this text is further developed as part of the idea about, the mildly put, problematic legitimacy of the current elections. In that context, apart from the mentioned story about the number of billboards, topic of presence of parties in the electronic media was opened. In order to create an image of inequality of the participants, and therefore undermine the democratic legitimacy of the elections as a whole, various insufficiently precise and credible sources were quoted, as their findings were politically "beneficial."

For example, in the weekly *NIN*, journalist Vera Didanović writes, "According to analysis of reporting of electronic media with a national frequency of the agency Kliping, in the period from 1st to 7th April, for example, share of election candidates was extremely uneven. To the advantage of the ruling SNS, of course – 3,828 seconds were allocated to them and their partners, which is nearly three times more than the second-ranked coalition around SPS (1,365 seconds). Opposition could have been left out, but still it was present, so they have nothing to complain about: coalition SDS-LDP-LSV got 1,225, DS 1,194,

15 Novica Milić, "Čitanje izbora," [Reading the elections] *Novi magazin*, No. 260, p. 15

16 Idem, p. 21



Nedeljnik, 28. 4. 2016.

DSS-Dveri 835 seconds. Those that did not blink a lot could have seen the movement "It's enough" (28 seconds) or the Alliance of Vojvodina's Hungarians (20 seconds) – which is, analysts noticed, less than the little known Russian Party which got 66 seconds of air time. About the inequality, as one of the key conditions for the legitimacy of the elections, can be spoken even less when taking into account the media share of the members of the Government, who gladly apply the proven recipe of using state functions to send pre-election messages. If we look at it that way, members of the Progressive coalition "won" as much as 61.5 percent, while the entire opposition had to be squeezed into 29.9 percent of the political program aired in the central news shows."¹⁷

Disproportion in the media which was emphasized by the opposition politicians and radically critical media was not the only objection to SNS and the election process. A story about the lack of serious election topic and dialogue and debate of the key political persons and parties was added to the narrative about the inequality in the presenting of the participants of the election race was added. So, the already mentioned Vera Didanović, journalist of *NIN*, observes that the 2016 election match is without a clear theme nationwide, as well as that the media presentation of parties, especially the ruling one, due to the intensity and detailed coverage, the electronic media remind us of reality programs, "If the elections were scheduled out of party interests, as analysts believe, personal bickering is a logical substitute for the lack of topic which would give the voters a sense of public interest."¹⁸

Parallel with the already mentioned topics in the approach to the problem of election conditions, the supposed "tabloidization" of public opinion polls during the election campaign was developed as a thesis, as well. Reasons for developing an implicitly negative stereotype about the public opinion pollers lie in the results of the polls which are often published during the campaign. In the spring of 2016, during the various polling cycles, which were conducted by various and competing agencies in the market, two findings were essential – domination of the Progressives and struggle for survival of all opposition lists, except for SRS.

NIN wrote about the phenomenon of "tabloidization" of public opinion polls with the obvious aim of presenting the research as propaganda tools of the government and to at the same time try to prove that it is impossible to accept the government of SNS without tendentious manipulation of the researchers and the media, unequal treatment of the opposition in the media, pressures on the citizens, and various forms of irregularities on the legal and institutional and concrete political level. In a word, a network of notions needs to be created in the heads of the readers in order to present the vote for SNS as a result of coercion or misconception or both. In the context of such notion schemata, the citizens of Serbia neither live nor could they ever live in democratic order if the leading party is SNS.

Current state is pseudo-democratic, or purely formally democratic, without any socially founded and institution-based content. In the alleged pseudo-democracy, even the public opinion polls are an instrument for party propaganda and idolizing of the leader. Life in the alleged pseudo-democracy rests on the fear of the citizens, and fear of the citizens, according to the opinion of the journalist Dragana Pejović, leads to dishonesty, "Quality of the polls is affected also by the numerous fears with which Serbian

17 Vera Didanović, "Rijaliti pobeđuje," [Reality wins] *NIN*, No. 3407, p. 16

18 Idem, p. 16

voters have been battling for years, even the latest – fear of the fact that on the other side of the line, they can hear on daily basis a voice asking whether they will vote for SNS. Perhaps it is human to be dishonest and say – yes.”¹⁹

The elections were questioned in various ways. Arguments against the legitimacy of the elections may be divided into arguments which had been placed before and after the day of the vote. The collection of these arguments could be called an array of arguments devised in order to democratically delegitimize the elections.

De-legitimization of the elections had several mutually connected motives and possible outcomes. Opposition politicians used it either as a pre-arranged alibi for failure, or as a motivation for the “sleeping” part of the electorate.

Apart from that, argumentation about the de-legitimization of elections after the day of the vote was used for re-activating the idea about the united opposition and for a wider context of civil gathering, cause of which was the illegal demolition of a few buildings in the Belgrade-based settlement Savamala. Special supplement to this process of media de-legitimization of the elections is the war around the interpretations of the results. These political and media episodes show just how high and extremely surprising level of relativisation in the apprehension of mathematically precise and politically more than clear ratio of power in the electorate and system institutions is.

In terms of disputing the legal aspect of the election process, the problem appeared with the alleged existence of falsified candidate lists. In the text with a bombastic headline “It’s already irregular,” reporter of *Vreme* Tanja Tagirov writes, “Republic Electoral Committee allowed falsified lists among the ballots, the ballots were cut in some private print company in Borča, voters in the diaspora have nowhere to vote, lists of voters are not in order.”²⁰

At the same time, the publically expressed idea that police could possibly in civilian clothes monitor the voting process and prevent incidents was interpreted as a form of political and psychological repression, i.e. as evidence that the elections were endemically irregular even before they happened.

Apart from the certain doze of irregularity which this measure could potentially have, it demonstrates that Minister Nebojša Stefanović is a bad connoisseur of police work, as Miloš Vasić, journalist of *Vreme*, says in the text “Supervision over the blind box.” “Number of abuses of the voting process on the spot is limited: riots and violent behaviour; attempt to throw in more ballots brought in advance; false IDs or attempts to vote more than once which should be prevented with the control with the ultra-violent lamp, etc. All these violations are solvable efficiently through intervention of the electoral committee, controller and – if necessary – by calling the local police. All this was devised in order to keep the electorate as free as possible, I would say “extraterritorial” in comparison to the executive power which is there to help in extreme cases which we described. Cooperation of the police in the transporting of ballots to the places where the votes will be counted exists and there were no objections to that; but if the Minister was talking about that, he did not have to – that already exists. It is still unclear where he

19 Dragana Pejović, “Velika borba malih brojeva,” [Big battle of little numbers] *NIN*, No. 3407, p. 9

20 Tanja Tagirov, “Već je neregularno,” [It is already irregular] *Vreme*, No. 1320

got that unfortunate idea about the presence of the police at polling stations, but it is futile to get into that: he has had various ideas...Minister of Interior obviously has not got a clue about the police trade, let alone parliamentary democracy: this is something becoming of Nušić's county chiefs, radical village haranguers or secret police specialists from 1946."²¹

As some sort of rounding up of the entire story about the irregularity of the elections, a text about the irregular voters' list which is a consequence of the tardiness of state institutions appeared. This circumstance was shown as the state's negligence which casts a shadow over the democratic procedure, and the situation around the number of voters, more specifically the level of participation of the citizens in the political process seems confusing. Burden of responsibility is upon the current government, and its certain victory at this moment seems problematic.

Supporting the thesis about the "dreadful sins" of the Serbian state, i.e. the disputable character of the Serbian democracy, comparison with Afghanistan is made, "Stubborn ignoring of the fact that it is not the nominal 7,131,787 citizens that live in Serbia, but minus those who have permanently settled in the diaspora, which represents an impairment of the election and all relevant analysis, macroeconomic and demographic projections. In the total number of the population of the Republic of Serbia on the day of the census in 2011, citizens who were out of the country for work or residence abroad for at least a year were not included, or those absent less than one year with the expressed intent of staying abroad for more than one year. Also, students away at schools abroad were not included in the total population provided they did not come at least once a week to Serbia, regardless of the length of their absence out of the country... It is simply incredible that in Afghanistan, a country without considerable voting tradition and under threat of Taliban terror, on the parliamentary elections held this same year, turn out exceeds 60 percent, unlike in peace-time Serbia with regular election conditions, where merely 53 percent of citizens voted."

It is especially interesting and politically provocative the manner in which the results of the elections were interpreted. Coalition list around SNS "Serbia winning" got 48.3 percent of the votes, i.e. a few tens of thousands of votes more than in the previous elections, but due to the fact that more opposition lists made it to Parliament, they will actually have considerably less MPs than prior to 2014 (131 instead of 158). Socialists came in second with 80,000 votes less and a smaller influence in Parliament, since they have 18 mandates in the current assembly of Parliament of Serbia. Serbian Radical Party came back to Parliament with nearly 300,000 votes. DS remained in Parliament with nearly an identical number of votes. Coalition Tadić-Jovanović – Čanak kept its parliament status, but it won far fewer votes than individual or coalition parties of the same political orientation won in 2014. DSS-Dveri and Movement "It's enough" of the former Minister Saša Radulović entered the Parliament, then the minority party SVM, party of mufti Zukorlić and Sandžak's leader Sulejman Ugljanin. Parliament is more heterogeneous in terms of ideology, politically more representative in the sense of values, but it is still ideologically dominated by pro-European parties and SNS. At the same time, SNS won convincingly in most Serbian municipalities, but also took over provincial government in Vojvodina, the last strongpoint of the Democrats.

Elections had their mini post-election crisis. Namely, during election night, there were doubts about the status of two electoral lists – list DSS-Dveri and coalition LDP, LSV, SDS. After the counting and

21 Miloš Vasić, "Nadzor nad ćoravom kutijom," [Supervision over the blind box] *Vreme*, No. 1319

announcing of the preliminary incomplete data of the Republic Electoral Committee, both lists were under the threshold of five percent for lack of a small number of votes. Fear of “stealing” votes appeared in polling stations where elections were repeated. These two lists together with the Democratic Party and the Movement “It’s enough” organized a joint rally four days prior to the repeated voting. Both lists entered Parliament, though the Progressives won even more convincingly in all polling stations. The act of uniting of the opposition got different and contradicting interpretations.

Results were not without interpretation which more than clearly brought about different approaches and political orientations of the print media. In the writing of critical media, it is clearly seen what it means to accent certain statistical parameters in the desired political key for their political and evaluative orientation. Hence, the Editor in Chief of the radically critical paper *Vreme*, Dragoljub Žarković, categorically claims, “Vučić has a hard time of accepting defeat, and loss of mandates despite the coalition’s fortifying by PUPS is objectively an announcement of the end of popularity of this party, no matter how much their ventriloquists

claim that the scheduling of early republic elections was in function of obtaining a more convincing victory on the provincial and local elections.”²²

This opposition weekly continuously insists on the position that Vučić, despite the higher result in numbers compared to 2014, lost the elections, and therefore pointed to the nervousness in the ranks of the current government, “Noticeable nervousness with those who won the most votes may be explained only by the fact that they are not happy with the election result. The entire point of scheduling the elections was to confirm the political superiority of the Serbian Progressive Party and to relax its position in relation to others. This obviously did not work.”²³

A similar message, however, with a lot more sense of political reality, was sent by the journalist of *Novi magazin* Jelka Jovanović, “Early parliamentary elections and regular provincial and local elections confirmed that Aleksandar Vučić is a politician who won the trust of by far the biggest number of citizens, while his SNS is a leading party on all levels. Still, the victory though great is not at all a triumph, since the ruling coalition lost the previous convincing majority, and SNS itself fell below the simple majority.”²⁴

The poet Matija Bećković also commented on the elections, in his own typical manner with a dose of cynicism and open radical distancing from the current government. In an interview for the weekly *NIN*, he said that democracy is a “chance for us to look at the same face on all TV screens,” implying the high level of presence of Aleksandar Vučić on TV, at the same time confirming the position of a larger part of the Serbian elite in terms of the negative obsession with Aleksandar Vučić, whatever he may be doing, as their key political orientation. About the regularity of the elections, Bećković made an ironic remark, “Maybe the only thing missing was a blind box for the opposition.”²⁵ The negative evaluation of the elec-

22 Dragoljub Žarković, “Izborni dribling u narodnom šesnaesteru,” [Election dribbling in the people’s penalty area] *Vreme*, No. 1312

23 Jovana Gligorijević, “Bes, bahatost i glasački listići” [Fury, arrogance and ballots], *Vreme*, No. 1322

24 Jelka Jovanović, “Mala razlika, velika promena,” [Slight difference, major change] *Novi magazin*, No. 261

25 Matija Bećković, “Samo je falila čorava kutija za opoziciju,” [The only thing missing was a blind box for the opposition] interviewed by Radmila Stanković, *NIN*, No. 3409, p. 16

tions and their essential irregularity was linked to the quite logical, and from Bečković expected, distancing from the pro-European policies of Aleksandar Vučić. Again, moralising and pseudo-common-sense patriotism was at work, which is seen from the following quote, "Would it not be more accurate if we said that the West is dictating Vučić's policies, and not vice versa. This can be heard even in the advertisements for children. That is why no one is holding anything against him. When it comes to theatre troupes, and not political parties, when it comes to professional actors, and not politicians. And when it comes to theatre repertoires, and not political programs. The director is the one casting the parts and it is up to him who will play which part. Prime Minister was playing the role of a nationalist in the previous theatre season, and this season he is a mondialist. He is not a great actor, but he is far better than I thought. All in all, he is not responsible for what he is saying. As no actor is ever responsible for the things he said as Richard the Third or did as Othello."²⁶

Semantically overlapping with the messages of Matija Bečković, but with a journalistic sharpness which is different than the poetic imagination and innate incisiveness, journalist Vera Didanović pointed to the disputable character of the elections, to the shadow which has allegedly been cast over their democratic legitimacy, "Probably, with hindsight, the April elections will not be remembered by the ranking of the parties, but by the fact that the thing that looked like an undoubted achievement of October 5th was lost – holding free elections with no reason to distrust the obtained result. Though it is true that in 2012, the Progressives restored the term "election fraud," but it did not stick around for too long, since as soon as they got into office they forgot about the fate of the sack with the ballots which raised the temperature between the two rounds of presidential elections. This time, it seems, precisely the doubting of the regularity of the elections is the element which united the government and the opposition and the crazed citizens."²⁷

Pointing to the irregularity, to the lack of realization of Vučić's party and political ambitions is concluded with the pseudo-theoretical construction about the "immaturity of mass" running from responsibility and risk and showing loyalty to the leader. A kind of paraphrase of Fromm's thought about escaping freedom was presented in the popular science form by Professor Zoran Stojiljković, PhD, from the Faculty of Political Sciences, "I do not want to say that the citizens of Serbia have a non-democratic attitude, but they have a proto-democratic one. We would like to pick a host that "covers" all our risks. This is a kind of marriage of convenience, as long as we have some benefits out of that marriage, or the "host" is successfully and convincingly lying to us, much better than the others, and we believe him and avoid the thing that is called risk... It is evident that our people are authoritarian. A marriage of convenience is precisely what the authoritarian structure wants, but no one is naïve here. Then, there is the tradition of forgetting quickly: swearing in and then relinquishing and killing former monarchs and political leaders. The short journey from "apple of my eye" and the nation's most beloved son to the "biggest annihilator of the Serbian people" is only evidence how these episodes interchange."²⁸ This evaluation of Stojiljković completes the narrative about pseudo-democracy as the main trait of the political order in Serbia.

²⁶ Idem, p. 17

²⁷ Vera Didanović, "Čista pobjeda, sumnjiv rezultat," [Clean victory, suspicious result], *NIN*, No. 3409, p. 9

²⁸ Zoran Stojiljković, "Birački brak iz računa," [Electoral marriage of convenience], interviewed by Tamara Skrozza, *Vreme*, No. 1321

Different, a lot more balanced, view of the results of the elections was given in the weekly *Pečat*. Unlike journalists of *Vreme*, who all emphasized the failure of the government, in the text "Night of the long elections," journalist Nikola Vrzić concisely and precisely comments on the position of Vučić and SNS, "Aleksandar Vučić, the president of the Serbian Progressive Party, won and lost at the elections held on April 24th. The former happened thanks to the Serbian people, the latter thanks to the Belgian Victor D'Hondt. Or maybe the American Kyle Randolph Scott?"²⁹

Confusion around the election results was clearly recognized and described by the editor of the weekly *Pečat*, Milorad Vučelić, "If some foreigner or traveller was to suddenly drop by Serbia and see the programs of TV stations during election night and night of April 24th, he would need quite a bit of effort and focus in order to understand that on the elections held that day Aleksandar Vučić won convincingly and with an incredibly high result of nearly fifty percent of citizens' votes. But how could you even know that when some TV and radio studios, led by RTS, were simply seized by the representatives of the yellow parties and their activists in the widest possible diapason and spectre where no shade of yellow was missing. They were more or less in some lame way, with an aroma of false education which was supposed to hide the triviality of their "ideas", interpreting the will of the citizens, and with total absence of attention and relation towards facts and the winner. They were dedicated to arbitrary speculations about everything and anything and longingly rooting for some of their favourites to pass the threshold, or not to and so to become the centre of all attention. By the way, almost everyone found some livelihood within Vučić's government. Perhaps they shed some of their skin to that end, but their spots remained."³⁰

Still, outside the realism in the assessment of the results of the elections by the editor and journalist of *Pečat*, attitude about the outcome of the elections is such that SNS did not do well in the elections, despite the higher number of votes than in 2014 and contrary to the fact that during the two years in office, government of Aleksandar Vučić, Government of Serbia was implementing savings measures, trying to repair regional relations and actively taking part in the process of solving the Kosovo issue as part of the Brussels Agreement.

To sum up, "non-democratic," "unsuccessful" authoritarian government organized elections with no special and serious political cause under circumstances which were radically unequal. Repression, media manipulation and use of public resources are the main characteristics of the election process in the eyes of most Serbian weeklies. It should also be emphasized that the result of the elections, which was to the advantage of SNS and Vučić, was shown in a bit of an intellectually perverse way as a defeat.

Political bias and ideological exclusivity, and above all the model of a negative personified campaign directed towards Aleksandar Vučić, showed how easily and simply numbers and elementary political logic can be relativized in democratic order. Precisely the elementary political logic of the democratic order clearly states, "The winner of the elections is the one who forms the Government." As witnessed by the entire domestic and international public, the Government was formed by SNS and Vučić in coalition with SPS and with the support of SZM and the Bosnian party led by Muamer Zukorlić. Number of MPs was convincingly on Vučić's side, 163 compared to 62 who were against it and 25 MPs who did

29 Nikola Vrzić, "Noć dugih izbora," [Night of the long elections], *Pečat*, No. 418

30 Milorad Vučelić, "Šta to ima Skot a nema Čepurin?" [What does Scott have that Chepurin does not?], *Pečat*, No. 418

not vote. Every unbiased observer understands who the winner of the elections is. It is interesting that, though opposition-oriented, the weekly *Nedeljnik*, reflecting on the regularity of the elections, noted that international election observers saw the elections as fair and correct. Therefore, outside the negativistic storyline about the pseudo-democracy which is at the core of the critical discourse, "At the elections and during the election campaign, numerous irregularities were recorded, but in the overall score they did not affect the authenticity of the election results. This is the summarized conclusion of the international observers. Most objections, when it comes to the elections themselves, was the manner and speed of counting votes."³¹

Opposition and the elections – struggling for survival in the ruthless political match

Image of the opposition in the weeklies and editorial columns of the dailies is far more complex and depicted on several planes. With dailies and weeklies that are critical of the winners of October 5th – *Informer* and *Pečat* – the image of the opposition is extremely negative. There are no interviews with the Euro-reformatory opposition in the mentioned print media, and very small, nearly no, space is opened for Vučić's anti-European opposition made of DSS and Dveri. Šešelj and SRS do not have the same status, but they certainly are not and cannot be favourites of these media outlets. However, unlike the winners of October 5th, the Radicals are free of political stigma. Also, image of the opposition is extremely negative in terms of nearly all political issues, including the issue of political and every other credibility of opposition leaders, by reminding the readers of the period when they were in office or by debating their positions, open or hidden agenda. Apart from that, weeklies like *Vreme*, *NIN*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik*, give unequivocal support to the opposition. This support is not varying in terms of content, but intensity. With radically critical weeklies, the intensity of this support to the opposition is stronger and measured not only with the providing of media space for the positions and interpretations of opposition leaders, but with the strength and radicalism of the negative campaign against Aleksandar Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party.

Unlike in the *Informer* and *Pečat*, opposition leaders get huge media space for presenting and elaborating on their viewpoints, politically and media-wise closing the possibility of influence of the argumentation and rhetoric of the government, not only with the scarce reading audience of weeklies, but primarily, they limit the influence of the government over the capillary public. The conflict of Vučić and the "elite" is partially based on this and such media and political constellation.

In conditions of democratically disputable political order, in circumstances where there is an inclination of "the government to root out the opposition," to be against the government is not enough, it needs to be opposed with "fresher" ideas and more active competing with topics inconvenient for the gov-

31 Jelka Jovanović, "Mala razlika, velika promena," [Minor difference, major change], *Novi magazin*, No. 261, p. 19

ernment." But despite such lacking, in circumstances in which the political life is taking place, media "heroisation" of opposition activism is done indirectly, since the opposition is facing existential threats, "Even Vučić as such deserves bolder opponents with fresher ideas, more persistent in the competing of topics inconvenient for the government. This way, the project of rooting out opposition is implemented continuously whether it is gagging with censorship and threats, financial exhaustion or banal fact that there have been no opposition activities for months, no releases which would invoke an immediate response from SNS. This pendulum hanging over the head of the opposition is used for whole-hearted additional threats, so Minister of Interior Stefanović competing in the arrogance championship goes for the title by stating that the police in civilian clothing will also be in charge of monitoring these elections so that when his controllers "cuff someone, the peoples will see that it is the actual police." We remember a lot of things, but even in Milošević's dimmest era, this never crossed anyone's mind. This is not just a devastation of institutions, or even the institution of a more or less fair election match – but this is a sheer existential threat. This is why Vučić's satisfaction with the fact that no one suffered bodily injuries in this election campaign, is perceived by many citizens as a potential threat, because it seems that violence got the right to vote, but he is the only one saving us from this."³²

In accord with the mentioned search for mitigating circumstances for the politically moderate opposition action is the attitude of Srbijanka Turajlić saying that the opposition parties were left without financial resources in a skilful play of the government and that is why they are not competitive in the campaign. Therefore, the aim of the opposition is not to win, but to disable absolute primate of Vučić, "The trouble is that most parties are without financial resources which have been reduced for them through skilful play of the government so they cannot even try to be worthy opponents to the government. The question, however, is whether the citizens are aware that the scariest thing for a country is when one man or one interest group have absolute power in it. Are they aware that by voting they would have a chance to at least reduce the level, amount and intensity of absolute power in Serbia today? Maximum to be reached at this point can only be to prevent Aleksandar Vučić from forming the government on his own. It is irrelevant whether he wants or does not want to form a broader coalition after the elections, what's important at this moment is that he be forced to call someone in a coalition. Maybe this could have a medicinal effect on him. It will surely have one on us."³³

Similar reasoning about the prospects of the opposition is offered by Vesna Pešić who says, "I expect good results to be shaking up the autocratic government of Aleksandar Vučić, that he does not get the majority, but that he has to look for a coalition partner."³⁴

To sum up, the existing leaders of the opposition are not glorified here, but they are also not criticized seriously. Media "service" for these protagonists involved merciless and detailed attacks against Vučić and building of an alibi story in case of their very likely failure, which largely happened after completing the counting of votes and the announcement of the election result by the Republic Electoral Committee.

32 Zora Drčelić, "Šta čeka Srbiju," [What awaits Serbia], *Vreme*, No. 1320

33 Idem

34 Idem

Still, promotion of opposition action followed after the *ad hoc* uniting between election day and the holding of repeated elections on some polling stations. Exaltation over the alleged spontaneous uniting of the opposition for the sake of “democracy” may be seen in the text of the MP of DSS-Dveri and the editor of *Nova srpska politička misao*, Đorđe Vukadinović. He follows the logic of attaching stigma to Vučić which serves as some sort of ritual initiation in the society of “protectors of freedom and democracy” and boosts the prospects of opposition activism, “False, i.e. artificially imposed political ravine which would normally take years to overcome, the democratic opposition crossed in less than 24 hours thanks to Vučić’s megalomania. The thing that Vučić used to scare “his” people and mobilize his voters – “everyone will unite against me” – became a reality, mostly thanks to his own paranoia and political greediness. Opposition leaders and little leaders, who – with the exception of Radulović – had reasons to fear for their political survival after these elections, became a “new strength” overnight, radiant with “new energy.” And that is – without joking and irony – that new quality which may even more than the (un)expected entering of certain opposition lists in parliament bring new dynamics in the dying, close-to-one-party Serbian political life. Who cannot see this is either politically blind – or working for Vučić.”³⁵

As it has already been implied, a completely different image of the opposition is given in the weekly *Pečat*. Milorad Vučelić clearly puts forward his position about the condition in the opposition. His criticizing is sharp and ideological, “One of the most unusual election campaigns since the introduction of the multi-party system is ending. Serbia has never had such feeble and unconvincing opposition. None of them thought about anything else but how to pass the threshold and to somehow remain a part of the political life. You could not hear any proposals or any other critical debate. The yellow opposition told its old tales and mentioned some solutions which brought the country literally to the edge of the precipice. They would like to finish it off by insisting on the application of known poisonous drugs. They added to that an endless list of empty and false promises, out of which the only credible ones were that they would take Serbia to NATO and recognize Kosovo.”³⁶

In this short paragraph, the opposition is depicted as politically weak, deprived of serious stronghold in the electorate, without significant program solutions, prone to easy and devastating fixes, and finally prone to accepting the independence of Kosovo and membership in NATO. All these qualifiers supplement the widely spread negative perception of the widest layers about the weak leaders as unnecessary, about the spite towards political hypocrisy, and finally negative preferences towards the independence of Kosovo and membership in NATO.

Unlike the stated text in the paper *Vreme* which discusses achievements of the united opposition in the prevention of “election fraud,” there are critical texts about this act, which present the opposition extremely negatively. Negative labelling is done on two counts – ideology and cause for uniting.

As a uniting factor, the weekly *Pečat* and the daily *Informer*, mention foreigners, i.e. foreign ambassadors, primarily the US Ambassador Scott. At the same time, union of the opposition is presented as an example of political inconsistency and ideological confusion resorted to by weak political actors, “Photograph from the repeated election night in which exhilarated over barely making it past the threshold

35 Đorđe Vukadinović, “Strasna nedelja,” [Passionate week], *Vreme*, No. 1322

36 Milorad Vučelić, “Srbiji treba jaka vlada,” [Serbia needs a strong government], *Pečat*, No. 417



Pečat, 6. 5. 2016.

Boško CIA Obradović, Yellow Sanda, Bojan Brioni Pajtić and Bankruptcy Radulović applaud each other is most solid proof of absolute nonsense of what is today referred to as opposition in Serbia. This is, let me be clear, not politics any more. This is pure trade. Trade without any principles or ideas, trade in which everything boils down to personal interests. Because, what other than dirty cash could explain the alliance of left-wingers and right-wingers, passionate European-unionists and arrogant Russophiles, gays and those whose politics boil down to: Kill, slaughter, let there be no fags?! I would like to ask who gave up on what in that new DOS and who agreed to what? Is Bojan Brioni Pajtić now an advocate of Serbia's joining the ODKB (military alliance gathered around Russia) or have Boško CIA Obradović and Yellow Sanda become overnight fans of the EUR and the NATO?! Have perhaps Boško CIA Obradović and Bankruptcy Radulović become fags overnight and decided to support the position of ČBČ coalition that gay couples should be allowed to adopt children in Serbia?! And how is it that Yellow Sanda forgot all her claims about DOS' robberies which sucked the blood out of Serbs and Serbia?! Is it not that Čeda, Boris and Pajtić, and Bankruptcy Radulović were the direct accomplices in that great DOS robbery of this country?!³⁷

Also, inconsistency as a characteristic of opposition politicians is clearly recognized by the act of entering the Parliament and verifying mandates for which the opposition previously claimed were a result of alleged election fraud. Parallel to the negative ideological descriptors, opposition was given a notorious determinant of a political group which strives towards destabilizing the country and introducing social uncertainty, "Since they did not manage to cause street riots with their lies about election fraud and the terrible regime terror on Sunday, April 24th – partly because of their stupidity, but mostly thanks to the intelligence of the people – the united DOS quasi-patriotic block with ample support of the yellow media, immediately started the operation of "early de-legitimization of the elections" (term from the textbook on civil revolutions). And that is why they are bombing us all over the place with news about the opposition that is "stronger than ever"?! And that is why they are categorizing Vučić's MPs on RTS and in the patriotische zeitung *Blic* as his, Ljajić's, Karić's. And that is why they are imposing the topic of presidential elections one year in advance. And that is why that whale-like editor of *Dnevnik 2* is explaining to us how the situation in Serbia is the same today as in 1996 before the big civil riots against Slobodan Milošević?!³⁸

As part of the story about uncertainty on the social and political plan, Vučićević uses the example of Macedonia where nearly endemic political instability rules, conflict of government and opposition and paralysis of institutions. Macedonian example is valuable for Serbia which needs to support the future strong government of Aleksandar Vučić with the aim of preserving political stability, democracy and national freedom. At the same time, through the writing about Macedonian opposition led by Zaev, direct and undoubted parallel is drawn with the Serbian opposition which is, supposedly, to overthrow Vučić and form a weak coalition government in the shadow of the West, "the West is planning to relocate their bigger problems and internal instabilities to the Balkans, by causing a chain reaction of controlled conflicts. Their aim is not only to transfer the crisis to the "backyard" but also to solve their economic, political and emigrant problems over the backs of the "lower European races". Still, the most important thing is that the Americans and European-unionists are demonstrating today in Macedonia the racist concept

37 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Politika trgovine," [Trade politics], *Informer*, 07. 05. 2016, p. 3

38 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Mržnja," [Hatred], *Informer*, 30. 04. 2016, p. 3

of international politics which has already been applied in the Middle East and the North of Africa, and now we see it being transferred to the Balkans. According to this concept, there are countries which are not worthy of democracy, there are nations that are not allowed to decide on their destinies. Hence, in Macedonia, it is not at all important that the majority of Macedonians supports President Ivanov and PM Gruevski. It was decided in Brussels and Washington that Soros' pal Zoran Zaev should rule that country and now they are instilling this in the heads of Macedonian voters through street riots. Of course, none of this would be possible if Western moguls had not previously divided Macedonians, if they had not convinced them through strictly controlled media that what is best for them is worst. What am I trying to say? Well, that our fate is currently best seen from the shoes of the Macedonians. Because, on Sunday, April 24th, we are deciding between chaos and stability, future and past, government which rules and government which serves. Or perhaps you think that Krešimir Macan – personal PR of Tuđman, accomplice in the most horrible Ustasha crimes committed against Serbs in the nineties – came to Serbia by accident to finish off the election campaign of DS?"³⁹

Aim of this text is to at the same time show the opposition as a factor of instability in the country and as operators instructed by the West. Two motives affecting the voters are in play. Opposition is not authentically Serbian, it is working and advocating on behalf of and for the account of foreigners, and opposition is a political option leading the country to a state of uncertainty, which automatically incites fear and repels voters from it.

One more motive deterring citizens for opting for the opposition appears in Vučićević's writing. This is the lack of moral credibility of opposition leaders based on the circumstance that they were in a considerably better financial position during their time in office than this was the case before.

As Vučićević puts it, politics are an instrument for the former political elite to become rich, according to the opposition leaders. High level poverty and objectively scarce living opportunities represent fuel for anti-government campaigns. Precisely these campaigns generate either fury or disappointment or indifference with the opposition voters, and they may motivate voters to prevent reinstatement of corrupt political elite comprising winners of October 5th. The specified positions, which have been released after Borko Stefanović criticized the current government, i.e. political and economic customer service of Vučić's oligarchy, are confirmed by the following quote from the text of the Editor in Chief of *Informer*, "Well, why does not he tell us, for example, what he knows about the origin of Dragan Šutanovac's property, son of a construction worker Pera, who entered politics from a little flat in Mirijevo, and now boasts a wealth worthy of Russian tycoons? Or to share with us knowledge about the origin of the money with which Balša Božović paid for his winter holiday in the Maldives? Or perhaps he should say in his next TV appearance the stuff he talks about in cafes about the origin of the millions-worth cash with which Pajić is paying for his campaign?!"⁴⁰

Unlike the image of the government and Aleksandar Vučić, which is dominantly determined in certain weeklies and newspaper columns, there are two sides to the images of the opposition. Many print media outlets give some sort of credit of trust to opposition leaders and parties (except for Šešelj's Radicals). Whether it is about the more than decent space for interviews which are central texts in the newspapers, or the merciless criticizing of the government, which is particularly practiced by two most reputable

39 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Makedonski rat," [Macedonian war], *Informer*, 16. 04. 2016, p. 3

40 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Društvo, Borko..." [Guys, Borko...], *Informer*, 09. 04. 2016, p. 3

weeklies *Vreme* and *NIN*. Even when talking about criticizing the opposition, criticism does not involve re-examining policies and moral integrity of the leader, but it refers to the current lack of strength of the opposition to seriously compromise Vučić and SNS.

Maybe the best indicator of this position is exaltation over the temporary opposition's commitment and political illusion about the smaller strength of SNS in Parliament. Despite the lower number of MPs, SNS is undisputed while Vučić is pretty lonely on the top of the list of the most popular politicians. On the other hand, opposition is portrayed extremely negatively in the media that are radically critical of it, with a language full of bitterness, rage and personal disqualifications. Motifs which are intertwining in the content of critical writing are really strong and prominent in the everyday judgment of citizens about the political circumstances in the country. Opposition as a group destabilizing the country under the influence of a foreign, more specifically Western factor, opposition as the inauthentic representative of the people, opposition as a collection of people who consider politics to be privileges, opposition deprived of moral credibility and burdened with the responsibility for the fatal mistakes in transition. What is common in the criticism of the opposition is corruption, lack of moral credibility and fatal deficit of patriotism.

During the election campaign, images of the key actors remained dominantly negative. Elections made the negative content of texts even more intense and specific. Debate or labelling are the main genres in the writing of print media, interview also kept an important role in the structuring of print media, especially weeklies, while there was no room for dialogue.

The “Savamala” Case – Dusk of the legal state or a new attempt to destabilize Serbia?

In Savamala settlement in Belgrade, not far from Sava Bridge, on a piece of land on which a residential-business complex “Belgrade Waterfront” is being and should be built, in the night between April 24 and 25, a group of masked and armed people demolished several illegally built structures by using construction machinery and by applying moderate forms of repression over passers-by and residents of that part of Belgrade, it is said in the release by the authority representatives. Though the election night was dramatic because the work of the Republic Electoral Commission (RIK) was being disputed by the opposition, the Savamala case became very soon one of the central political topics that occupied media space.

The “Savamala” case, the solving of which is still ongoing, has revealed a harsh counter-approach of journalists' viewpoints as to the evaluation and the assessment of its background, nature of the very case and the epilogue that it might have. It is curious, however, that the “Savamala” case is, in principle, unacceptable to both current authorities and opposition. Unacceptability of this case in principle is relativized in view of its political and legal and broader media contextualization. On one hand, representatives of opposition and of citizens' initiatives and a part of radical critics in the media assert that the

“Savamala” case represents a dusk of the legal state, confirming voluntarism of authorities. On the other hand, media close to authorities argue that media-political dramatization of the “Savamala” case is a part of a broader project of Serbia’s destabilization which began in the election night and has continued via strong local and foreign support to activists who are engaged in de-legitimization of Vučić’s authority. These two interpretations were prevailing in the press. Considering the fact that there are more critically-oriented journalists in the print media, the opposition’s interpretation of the Savamala case has been elaborated in detail and therefore it has a stronger impact on print media readership.

Exceptionally great publicity is given in critically-oriented media to views of independent institutions: to the Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection and to the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection. This great publicity went along with turning their social figures into media heroes. In absence of trustworthy opposition politicians, representatives of independent supervising bodies, whose either direct or indirect support was ensured by the Progressives in power, became nominees for political leaders of the opposition. The role of the press in generating positive images of Saša Janković and Rodoljub Šabić is apparent and beyond any doubt. Front pages, long interviews, continuous written reproduction of their views and arguments have assigned exceptional importance to these two important actors in this fragile democratic order.

Media coverage of the Savamala case disclosed all negative stereotypes about current authorities: authoritarianism, voluntarism, violence, violation of law and human rights, a sense of personal, proprietary and broader social insecurity. All of the mentioned qualifications and descriptions of the social state emerged in this case, just like they were emerging numerous times in all other circumstances over past two and a half years.

Creation of negative media image in the press about Savamala events encompassed several mutually related issues: political, legal, and symbolic-marketing.

The qualifying of Savamala case from political perspective could be reduced to a coinage – destructive voluntarism of authorities. This coinage is quite evident from a glance at the writing of the press about this case. Among lots of examples of such political evaluations of the deplorable event in Savamala, the most endeavouring examples confirming this idea are detected in a text titled “Whose city is it” by journalist of the *Vreme* weekly Jovana Gligorijević. In the wake of Savamala events, she wrote: “This regime has been especially distinguished by impertinence and voluntarism, in every occasion which has not been dealing with negotiations on accession to the European Union. Agreements on Air Serbia and on “Belgrade Waterfront” have never been fully presented to public; autocracy and carelessness cost dearly the entire town of Obrenovac during the floods in 2014; when in March 2015 a helicopter crashed and six adult persons and a baby died, the prime minister said he was taking the blame upon himself and he would “not give away” the ministers of defence and health, Gašić and Lončar, respectively... Ignoring vandalism in Savamala and insisting on illegally built structures is only another manifestation of autocracy.”⁴¹

In much the same spirit, the destructive character of authorities in the Savamala case will also be con-

41 Jovana Gligorijević, “Čiji je grad,” [Whose city is it], *Vreme*, No. 1324

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firmed by Radomir Lazović, an activist of the initiative “Don’t Drown Belgrade”, who in an interview titled “Authorities demolishing anything in their path” accuses current authorities explicitly and categorically: “The focus of the story of Belgrade Waterfront must be on why authorities are using our money to prepare a city construction site and then to give it away to their close friends and partners so they could build buildings and make profit from them by means of our money too. Through our work we have revealed outrageous and intolerable things that public must be informed about, things that we must not neglect and which must get an epilogue in a form of responsibility.”⁴²

Understandably, Lazović did not miss to mark Aleksandar Vučić as the one to blame for situation in the society, namely a man whose political activities have antagonized the society, who has suspended all institutions and who has prevented the dialogue in the media and in the society: “The first thing that Vučić did after he started ruling the media was to cancel the dialogue. If there is no dialogue, there is no democracy either. We are completely enclosed in small separate worlds, not interfering with each other, hating each other... So, we are not going to deal with ideological reconciliations, we know what we are, but the idea of resistance to this kind of ruling is beyond all of us in particular. However, one of our tasks is to show how this democracy restriction is not characterizing these or those authorities but rather it is deep-rooted in such a system which is based on tight party and economy-oriented interests.”⁴³

The act of demolition is an inevitable outcome of the stated media-political and broader social constellation as proof of the first-degree social decadence and at the same time it is an appeal for resistance to all layers of society. Following the events in Savamala, two more levels of the story about the demolition of structures have been emphasized – research of the issue of responsibility and legal aspects of the very act of the demolition. Apart from the perpetrators of the demolition act, who and whose instructors have not been identified yet, the field of responsibility has been broadened through a series of good reasons to city authorities as well. However, while expanding the field of responsibility, some of Euro-reforming oriented media together with the Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection were focused on the head of the Ministry of Interior Nebojša Stefanović: “The demolition in Savamala included several various structures: state and non-state and several vertical levels of authority as well. Hence, the responsibility of city authorities is undeniable. Yet it is not sufficient. For such a business was not possible without knowledge and assistance of the police minister.”⁴⁴ We can read the same view in a text titled “Police as an accomplice to crime”, published in the *Novi magazin* on May 12, 2016. The text represents a summary of the Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection Saša Janković’s report which is summed up in the following: “The Ombudsman concluded irrefutably that the police knew what was going on in Savamala and that they did not react deliberately.”⁴⁵

The mapping of the line of responsibility matches the formulation of the nature of law violation, on which the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection Rodoljub Šabić says: “No structure may be demolished in that way. If a state respects its own laws, even the least

42 Radomir Lazović, “Vlast ruši sve što joj se nađe na putu,” [Authorities demolishing anything in their path], *Vreme*, No. 1326

43 Idem

44 Sandra Petrušić, “Nebojša Stefanović glavni fantom iz Savamale,” [Nebojša Stefanović – main phantom of Savamala], *NIN*, No. 3416, p.16

45 L.M., “Policija saučesnik u zločinu,” [Police as an accomplice to crime], *Novi magazin*, No. 263, str.22

legally built structures should be demolished by concluding the factual state, scheduling the demolition, and providing the owner with enough time to secure their movable assets, rather than destroying them together with the structure. It should not be done at night and not by people wearing balaclavas. So, it is absolutely irrelevant if the property is illegal, just like it is irrelevant to know who it belongs to, as speculated by the media now; the question of property belonging to either you or someone else is settled before the court in an arranged country. Secondly, a good portion of that property had undoubtedly a status indicating that no proceeding was initiated for its demolition, not to mention a legally valid decision. Thirdly, the question of responsibility is up to the state, especially after the prime minister's statement which indicated rather clearly, though not sufficiently, who backed the operation. If the perpetrator remains obscure, we are left with the provision of the Law on Contracts and Torts which says that the state is bound to prevent the damage incurred as a consequence of violence and terror; accordingly, it is clear again who is to pay.⁴⁶ Šabić's message is clear. The Savamala case shows that the state proved to be unable to secure fundamental human rights and the state of citizens' peace and that it will have to pay for the vandalism of unidentified perpetrators of the demolition act. Whoever is in the background of the demolition of Savamala structures has made immeasurable and unquestionable damage.

The roles of Šabić and Janković in the Savamala case are beyond any doubt important for work of state institutions authorized to issue valid opinion and to take certain legally prescribed steps, but as far as media reporting is concerned about their activities there is a strong tendency of presenting them as citizens' leaders of high moral integrity and of undisputable democratic capacity. This tendency to present Janković and Šabić as media-political heroes is evident from headlines in numerous weeklies and in not a small number of dailies in Serbia. However, the front page of *Nedeljnik* weekly, where Šabić and Janković are called "defenders of civil society", is the most impressive of all. A journalistic ode to Janković and Šabić is most clearly seen in *Vreme* weekly where they are identified with guardians of order and law in an explicitly non-democratic state: "Rodoljub Šabić and Saša Janković have nothing on their side. They could have laws perhaps if it wasn't for the fact that in this country it is enough to have a dredger and a balaclava to crush the law. Without them, the citizens of Serbia do not have anyone on their side either."⁴⁷

Highlighting of their role as guardians of law and citizens has an undoubtedly political connotation because it is happening along with critical discourse on non-democratic and voluntaristically-oriented authorities whose true face is seen best in the Savamala affair. This affair, as assumed by a journalist of *Vreme* weekly Jovana Gligorijević, is serious enough to result in "shower of resignations and government overthrowing," "Our problem is the fact that our scandals and affairs are not small while in some other countries they result in government overthrows, showers of dismissals, while actors are decent enough to withdraw from public and political life."⁴⁸

After political and legal analysis of the case, it was necessary to find an adequate symbol of authorities which can express effectively or represent their ruling. A symbol which could replace the multitude,

46 Rodoljub Šabić, "Država ruši, država i plaća štetu," [State demolishes, state pays for the damages], interview with Jelka Jovanović, *Novi magazin*, No. 268, p.19

47 Jovana Gligorijević, "Bekovski par građanskog društva," [The quarterbacks of civil society], *Vreme*, No.1326

48 Idem

sum up the essence and the practice of ruling. The balaclava was the choice. Description of authority as a rule of balaclavas was made in paradoxical manner through legally-political critical interpretation of the former president of the Supreme Court Zoran Ivošević. Summing up the message of the state to the citizens regarding the Savamala case, Ivošević said resolutely, "If this can happen to people in Savamala, we are all at risk then and the Savamala scandal and violence can happen to all of us. It is practised whenever there is urgency and necessity, with or without balaclavas, and that is a rule of the people. It is becoming a worrying phenomenon and neither any deadlines nor contracts can be more important than the rule of law. An assertion that the passivity of the police was a part of a plan to perform the clearance of the land for the purpose of Belgrade Waterfront project at night in two hours of suspending the rule of law is becoming growingly convincing with each new day of seeking unsuccessfully the perpetrators of violence in Savamala. People rule wherever the rule of law is missing, either with or without balaclavas, and since they are responsible for the Savamala scandal, it would be considered appropriate to issue a public apology, not only to victims of the violence but to all citizens who live in fear that Savamala could happen to them one day as well."⁴⁹

Using the expression "the rule of people with balaclavas" to mark authorities is an attempt to attach negative branding to current authorities. The balaclava, a special police cap covering the face of a police officer, is showing the two sides of authorities. Its symbolism perceived within the context of the Savamala case in general can be interpreted in the following way: authorities are violent and non-transparent, they are not acting in accordance with either written or unwritten rules but with will and discretion of those who are exercising it; it is neither predictable nor responsible and that is why it is dangerous and violent, causing people's fears and manipulating them, doing it under the mask.

A completely different interpretation of the Savamala case appeared in the press which was ready to affirm all or most of the steps taken by current authorities. Initial position regarding deplorable events in this quarter of Belgrade is the same. The Savamala case is intolerable.

However, no matter how much they discussed the unacceptability of the demolition act, the texts in *Informer* daily and in *Pečat* weekly clearly indicate the broader international context. It is determined by aspirations of Western powers, the USA in particular, to strengthen citizens' initiatives headed by the "Don't Drown Belgrade" initiative and to make them large-scale through headlines in the press, reports and TV shows in electronic media. The objective of citizens' movements in association with a series of media and journalists is to delegitimize Aleksandar Vučić's authority, to introduce tensions of high political stress into a public field and eventually to overthrow current authorities.

According to assumptions of *Informer* and the *Pečat*, authorities should be overthrown for their close relations to Russia, for its failure to completely fit into political military alliance, such as the NATO, the EU and the USA before all, and due to their principally political and territorial concessions to peoples who live in Serbs' and Serbia's neighbourhood.

In geopolitical terms, the entire story of the demolition in Savamala is far more than a municipal, city or

49 Zoran Ivošević, "Vladavina ljudi u fantomkama," [Rule of people in balaclavas], interview with Tatijana Tagirov, *Vreme*, No. 1329

national problem; the Savamala case is interpreted in profound geopolitical terms which are too often inclined to creative “interpretations” of international relations and arbitrariness with respect to sense and meaning of some interior political processes and social tendencies. However, no matter how difficult it is to defend the anti-Savamala discourse from the perspective of rational criticism, it has a clear use value in a propaganda war. It is controlling people's fears almost systematically when it comes to uncertainty brought by protests and any interference of foreigners with Serbia's interior affairs.

If active manipulation with rooted anti-American orientation of not a small percentage of the population is added, one is left with the impression that the anti-Savamala discourse is basically efficient from the propaganda aspect. It establishes and maintains continuously negative tension against opposition actors, primarily among a substantial part of citizens supporting current authorities. In the same manner, fierce discussions, the use of “harsh words and expressions”, are distracting not a small number of citizens from active participation in political life. These effects are accomplished through texts which are always abundant in dramatization of given events or processes, through writing in which the story has a simple and transparent plot at first sight but which is narrated by using almost brutal vocabulary on the verge or even beyond the verge of decency.

An example of political dramatization “with a flavour” of harsh words and expressions is clearly perceived in the column by Dragan J. Vučićević, written regarding the protests that were inspired by the Savamala events. The editor of the *Informer* says clearly in his column, fully aware and exaggerating, but often conveying a very realistic political message: “This summer Serbia will face political and media chaos which has not been seen since summer 2000. Western powers will not lack the means and will not regret spending millions for the purpose of resetting our country to a position of a subservient vassal of Brussels and Washington. What we have been reading, watching and listening for more than a month is only a beginning. The goal of imposing a chaos around Savamala – a forced “Balaclava” scandal in which it is almost concluded that Aleksandar Vučić himself demolished the illegally built structures in Hercegovačka Street in the post-election night – is but “early de-legitimization of the winner of elections”, as advised in manuals for the execution of “coloured revolutions”.⁵⁰

A brief excerpt from Dragan J. Vučićević's text shows how anti-Savamala discourse is functioning. Where critics of authority insist on the importance and the significance of the Savamala affair, the opposite side insists on incomparably less importance of the very act of the demolition. Likewise, instead of an idea of authentic citizens' protest, it becomes evident that this was an instructed and well directed movement backed by interests of powerful western countries, the USA and the EU above all, and eventually, the goal of this media and political commotion is to delegitimize Vučić's authority which is the first step to overthrow him.

A motif of Aleksandar Vučić's downfall was used in further discussions between Vučićević and *Pečat* and the representatives of public consisting of critics and opposition parties who supported the protest, either practically or verbally.

The anti-Savamala narrative “is fuelled” by the thesis of interference from the outside as a key generator

50 Dragan Vučićević, “Ili oni ili Srbija,” [It's either them or Serbia], *Informer*, 05.06.2016, p.3

of the protest. For the purpose of supporting an idea of foreign influences, more or less convincing analogies are made by using examples of citizens' protests from other parts of the world. It is already stated that the *Informer* mentioned the Macedonian example. Two more destinations were also introduced in this game – Egypt and Libya.

Analogy with Egypt is indicative as a rhetoric means in discussions with opponents. Its purpose is to undermine the credibility of protests, by pointing out to its character and objectives. Egyptian movement "Kefaya (Enough)" emerged as a sort of "conjoined twin" to the citizens' initiative "Don't Drown Belgrade". According to assertions of the *Pečat* journalist Nikola Vrzić, this movement was established in a manner similar to that of current citizens' initiative in Belgrade, while entire political and media support to citizens' initiatives across the world is a product of the strategic plan of the USA to spread their diffuse influence and to establish and maintain their dominance. In contribution to this statement, Vrzić mentions some important documents of the US administration: "Three years before Arabian Spring, in 2008, RAND Corporation created a monography about "Kefaya!" movement ("Enough!" – sounds familiar, doesn't it?), "a case study for *grassroots* reform initiatives" sponsored by the US Defence Department or, to put it more precisely, by the Rapid Reaction Technology Office within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, within the Alternative Strategy Initiative. Now, read carefully: "The Alternative Strategy Initiative includes a research of creative use of the media, radicalization of youth (...) mobilization of dissatisfied sectors of domestic population and alternative movements", says the beginning of this study of RAND Corporation.

It is important to notice that this research was carried out within the US security complex, "The research was carried out by RAND Institute for national defence research, Research and Development Centre sponsored by the Office of Secretary of Defence, General Staff Department, Joint Battle Command, Naval Infantry, defence agencies and defence Intelligence community under the contract W74V8H-06-C-0002."⁵¹

Having analysed various documents and facts describing the state of affairs in politically instable societies subject to various political conflicts outside institutions and within them, Vrzić concludes that the American influence is crucial for the occurrence and the strengthening of civic movements and their political role in lots of instable countries: "It is completely clear that Americans were backing the protest in Egypt (and in Tunisia, Syria and all other countries stricken by Arabian Spring as well, but which has not reached the Saudi Arabia and similar countries of that part of the world that are ruled by the undisputed, and still necessary, American allies. Surely the people there are quite satisfied, so there is no American engagement), and now, behind these protests in Serbia. Their signature mark gives them away; the facts give them away."⁵²

Use of the analogy with Libya echoed even more strongly and stirred up the public, especially political and diplomatic circles. Namely, in the settling of accounts of civilian protests in the region, television N1, critical towards the government of Aleksandar Vučić, used the coinage "balance of the Balkan spring." Close associate of Aleksandar Vučić and Vice-President of SNS Nebojša Stefanović reacted to the term "Balkan spring" on his Twitter account, "American N1 is wishing for the Balkan spring in Serbia. The Arab

51 Nikola Vrzić, "Kad počinje balkansko proleće," [When does the Balkan spring start], *Pečat*, No. 425, p.6-7

52 Idem, p. 8

one was not enough for them ("Or would they rather Vučić ended up like Gadafi?" and finally ("At least you are honest and it is good that we know what you want").

This "slip-up" unleashed an entire avalanche of writing according to which the stake in the protests was far higher than the dismissal of all those responsible for the Savamala scandal. The stake was the overthrow of the government in a peaceful and non-violent manner. Dragan J. Vučićević writes about this explicitly, "They only want Vučić's head. Because that head prevents them from stealing, lying and cheating without punishment. That head took down their system in which they owned everyone and everything. That head threatens to make Serbia a serious legal state in which all of them will have to, sooner or later, answer to the law. However, there is one, at least for now, big unsolvable problem for them. In order to bring back DOS-istic mafia to Serbia, yellow politicriminals supported by Davenport and that Scott must forcefully, under the October 5th or Ukrainian scenario, snatch power; or kill Aleksandar Vučić! There is no third way. Just like there is no chance for the majority in Serbia to support the biggest crooks and darkest swindlers."⁵³

In the entire media and political ado around the Savamala case, the other side took part as well, by directly answering the media challenge which initiated the launch of the term "Balkan spring." In the text "Who needs the Balkans spring" published in *Vreme*, defence of the legitimacy of the protest of the civic initiative "Let's not drown Belgrade" is based on the special high regard of civil activists and unconditional, quite non-critical acceptance of each letter from the release of the US Embassy. Apart from the wider contextualization of the case which rests on the complex geopolitical optics where the West-East conflict breaks, Jovana Gligorijević says that Serbia is in Europe, "The entire ado started with the illegal demolition of facilities in place of which the Belgrade Waterfront, the most favourite offspring of this government is supposed to spring up. Let us remind you, realization of this project is enabled with Middle-Eastern capital. Media freedoms, numerous laws have already been sacrificed at the altar called the Belgrade Waterfront, but now with the demolition in Hercegovačka street, even the Constitution was suspended, as Ombudsman Janković said. Perhaps Vučić is ready to take a detour from the European path for the sake of the investors from the East, but he must take into account two things. One is related to the thing he is very proud of: safety of investing in Serbia. But, safety of investing must not supersede the safety of citizens, and that is precisely what happened in Hercegovačka during the night of April 25th. The second fact that Vučić and all other local politicians need to remember is that Serbia may not be in the European Union, but it is in Europe."⁵⁴

In a radical polemic tone towards the current government, in the intent to protect the writing of his weekly with reference to the case of Savamala, journalist Nikola Tomić politically attacked the government with categorical and fierce accusations. In the centre of his position, identification of the current government with the order generating fear and media darkness, "Case of Savamala, threats to Zoran Kesić and accusations at the expense of *NIN* prove that rule of law has been compromised in Serbia, that individuals take it upon themselves to usurp power by abusing their functions and even by committing crimes, that freedom of writing and professional journalism require courage. It is not all dark in Serbia, it

53 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Otimanje vlasti," [Snatching power], *Informer*, 11. 06. 2016, p. 3

54 Jovana Gligorijević, "Kome treba balkansko proleće" [Who needs the Balkan spring], *Vreme*, No. 1328

is not all black. But it is twilight, and it is grey.”⁵⁵

Unlike reporter Jovana Gligorijević, who reminded us of the European geopolitical dimension of Serbia, the already quoted Nikola Vrzić, with respect to the case of Savamala and the wider geopolitical context calls for the turning towards China and Russia and abandoning of the European path, “This Balkan drama is nearing its climax. To avoid its turning into a tragedy, it is necessary for the current government to leave its current positions – because there is no way back from there – and we need to be smart enough at least not to fall for other people’s ducks, and to be aware that our Western friends are not as powerful today as we are used to, and along with all this, they are facing an earthquake in the form of Brexit, which is to say time is our advantage like never before, and in that whole process we should get specific help from our real friends. On Friday, as we said, Xi Jinping is coming, the PM of Russia Dmitry Medvedev will also come soon. Welcome and we are glad to have you.”⁵⁶

Two different, mutually immeasurable interpretations of one event such as the case of Savamala have shown that Serbian press is a significant participant in the ruthless political battle which continuously puts polemic tension in the focus, and spins primarily inside a vicious circle of claims and counter-claims. Space for rational discussion is narrow, nearly non-existent and hermetic nature of starting bases, positions, arguments and conclusions seems like fatal. Harsh political opposition and tense public atmosphere are reproduced on the journalistic plain, which develops and further enhances such contradictions.

“Brexit” – evaluatively neutral and factually based journalistic observation of the beginning of the end of EU

On June 23rd 2016, the citizens of the United Kingdom voted on the referendum about their country’s leaving the EU. This was the first European referendum bearing clear contours of a radical political issue. As such it was to resolve two important issues at the same time: status of the United Kingdom, as one of the most powerful countries of the world, and status of the EU, as the most powerful supranational creation in the modern world. After an intense and dramatic campaign marked by one murder, harsh polemics, deficit of rationality and multitude of propaganda tricks, the Brits decided.

Their answer was negative. After forty-three years, the position of the Brits was clear – “No” to the European Union. Seventeen million and fourteen thousand Brits or 51.9 percent voted for the new course of the United Kingdom in foreign policy. A considerable number, 48.1 percent or sixteen million and one hundred thousand voters supported their country’s stay in the EU.

Serbian weeklies allocated a sound amount of attention to this extraordinary historic event. Two weeklies, *Vreme* and *Novi magazin*, dedicated their front pages and an accompanying series of texts and in

55 Nikola Tomić, “Vladavina straha,” [Rule of fear], *NIN*, No. 3417, p. 3

56 Nikola Vrzić, “Kad počinje balkansko proleće,” [When does the Balkan spring begin], *Pečat*, No. 425, p. 10-11



Novi magazin, 30. 6. 2016.

this way confirmed their professionalism in the approach to the topic consequences of which are of importance for the entire world, EU, region, West Balkans and Serbia.

Perhaps two headlines of Serbian weeklies confirmed all the complexity of historical and political topics and dilemmas unleashed by Brexit. For example, *Novi magazin* marked Brexit as the biggest quake “after the fall of the Berlin Wall,” while *Vreme* observed a key dilemma of British and European politics “Brexit and the European Union: and what now?” Stating the crisis of the European project, the weekly *Vreme* writes, “Referendum of 23rd June 2016, during which Brits voted with 52:48 for their country to leave the European Union is probably the most far-reaching event after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9th November 1989 and the collapse of USSR after the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev on 25th December 1991, just over a quarter century ago.”⁵⁷

In journalistic depictions of the campaign surrounding Brexit, the key arguments of one and the other side, pointed to a deep division within the English society itself which is both evaluative and class-social, but also established along the country-city lines. On one side, the less educated members of rural Britain, the poor and people prone to ethnic and racial distancing proved an undoubted tendency to cast away the EU and vote for sovereign Britain. On the other side, the more educated, wealthier, cosmopolitan-oriented citizens voted for Britain to stay in the EU. Basic division in the British society is symbolically presented as a division between a cosmopolitan and an “Englander.” Also, latent and open possibilities and real political discord between England and Wales, which is mostly for Brexit, and Scotland and North Ireland, which are for staying in the EU.

Though there was no strong evaluative reflection about the British “No” to the EU, journalists of the Serbian weeklies did not miss out on the opportunity to point to the political and media inconsistencies and moral hypocrisy of the British politicians. These omissions were especially noted in analogy with the similar texts of the British dailies and weeklies. So, on the plain of factual analysis, it could be seen that a lot of the promises made to the supporters of Brexit were a tool for convincing disgruntled voters to opt against EU, and less political stories which can have a concrete stronghold and practical realization in the social reality. 350 million pounds of the money which Britain gave to the EU will not be paid to the British budget and directed towards improving the state sponsored health care and schooling, Britain will not be the sovereign guardian of its borders, so the inflow of citizens searching for Great Britain will not be stopped, as advocates of Brexit explained. In addition to this, it was reported that “Many from that camp said in TV surveys on Friday that they did not think that Britain will leave EU, but they just wanted to express their protest about the state of things in society. About half a million of supporters of exit said that they would vote to stay on a repeated referendum, but it is too late now.”⁵⁸

With an array of good reasons, political responsibility of David Cameron, former PM of Britain, was emphasized. This dimension of Brexit was precisely and very critically depicted by Julijana Mojsilović, “Perhaps Charles De Gaulle was right to an extent when he vetoed Britain’s joining of Euro-integrations on two occasions, saying that they have a “deeply instilled” animosity towards the European model and that they are more interested in their ties with the US. In the election campaign, he collects votes for

57 Milan Milošević, “Od Grexita do Brexita,” [From Grexit to Brexit], *Vreme*, No. 1330

58 Dejan Anastasijević, “Velika zbrka u Briselu,” [Huge mess in Brussels], *Vreme*, No. 1330

leaving the EU unless his terms are fulfilled. EU fulfils all the major terms, Cameron changes his tune and starts agitating to stay. And instead of cancelling the referendum - he could not do this because of the "rebels" in his own Conservative Party who wanted to leave – he even moved it up – and failed. But successfully shook up the country, Europe, even the world. Only three days after about 1,200,000 more Brits voted to exit, already more than 3,000,000 signed the petition to have a new referendum! And Cameron announces his resignation (in three months), and though he is still Prime Minister, he says he cannot take part in the talks about settling the accounts because he was against leaving! EU rushes Britain to start proceedings – only it can – but Cameron says he does not want to, just yet! We cannot think of any politician of a serious and several centuries long democracy who behaved in this way. He divided the party, divided the opposition which was mostly for staying, he divided the nation, divided Europe, opened the door for other exits, practically forced Scotland out – we will see what will happen with North Ireland – to finally leave the UK, which it failed to do on a recent referendum, he weakened the pound, infuriated the EU which does not want to wait for the new prime minister for the start of at least two-years long divorce talks. Along the way, he upset Washington, too."⁵⁹

Parallel with pointing fingers to all controversial referendum campaigns, confused stand of Cameron, potential of Brexit to initiate similar processes across the European continent was shown quite realistically. This circumstance was especially important if one takes into account that according to demographic parameters, supporters of Brexit are relevantly similar to the supporters of populist anti-European movements, as well as the supporters of Donald Trump in America. Vladan Marjanović, foreign policy commentator of *NIN*, remarks, "First, without one of member of the "big four" (the three remaining are Germany, France and Italy), not only will EU change, but it is facing a tough struggle to preserve its own identity and sense, even to survive – but for this, it must be said, it cannot blame British voters, but mostly itself. And secondly, that in the long run, the United Kingdom itself will have a hard time of preserving its known form. It remains to be seen to whose detriment will the tectonic movements happen; it will take years probably to make a final judgment about that."⁶⁰

Serbian weeklies depicted authentically all the plots, confusion and controversy surrounding Brexit. What was missing is the direct evaluative analysis of this act. This lack is somewhat understandable. British (mis)fortunes are British, and a bit less European, and least of all Balkan-related topics. At the same time, there was not even a hint of connecting Brexit with the European path of Serbia.

59 Julijana Mojsilović, "Kameronov bumerang," [Cameron's bumerang], *Novi magazin*, No. 270, p. 7

60 Vladan Marjanović, "Ne igraj na Engleze," [Don't bet on the English], *NIN*, No. 3418, p. 8

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About
authors

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Public Policy Institute is a regional think-tank organization that operates in the Western Balkans region through the work of its branch offices in Belgrade, Podgorica and Ljubljana. By promoting public dialogue and constructive solutions, Public Policy Institute contributes to the efforts of the Western Balkan countries to become equal, reliable and progressive partners in the process of European integrations and mutual relationships. After the initial research and analysis of social and media context in the countries of the Western Balkans, the Institute has developed and implemented a series of media related projects, including: Role of the media in the process of securitisation in the Western Balkans, Civil Response to Clientelism in the media - MEDIA CIRCLE, NATO Reach Out - media monitoring and Role of the media in monitoring of R1325 in Montenegro.

EBART Media Archive is privately owned company established in 2000. Its main activity is archiving print media data in e-format. The print media archive consists of up-to-date material dating back to 2003, and more than 3 million print media reports from sources with national coverage. EBART is also specialized for media analysis, basic quantitative and qualitative analyses, comparing media treatment of specific keywords, as well as complex content analyses according to BBC methodology. EBART Media Archive is unmatched in the region with its unique media reports database, and 12 years of media research experience. This media database allows for the overall study of long-term media presence.

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