



Analysis of the print media in Serbia  
July - September

# Quarterly **MEDIAMETER**

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# Introduction

VELIMIR ĆURĀUS KAZIMIR

## INTRODUCTION:

### Secret formula of success

In comparison to the prior quarters, less reporting on politics in the everyday media life undoubtedly marked the 11th edition of the Quarterly Mediameter, for the period July - September 2017. This, of course, does not mean that politics and political confrontations on the front pages of daily newspapers were not present; on the contrary, saturation with political issues represents just a “time-out” before the new conflicts and affairs arise. The summer, especially the summer holidays, have not influenced the content of newspapers in such way in recent years. It seems that the formation of a new Serbian Government, its presentation and the beginning of Assembly’s work, were welcomed without great controversy and debate.

Instead of the central theme that would dominate the media space, we had a perplexed picture of reality composed of fragments of politics, crime, regional conflicts, entertainment and gossip.

A small number of texts resulted in less reports. Reports are, of course, still the most represented journalistic genre. The largest number of articles written in this genre were noted in *Informer*. At the same time, most of the interviews were observed in *Danas*. This undoubtedly testifies about the variety of journalistic and editorial strategies in approaching reality around us.

News pieces are disappearing from the front pages. Who needs the news in the newspapers in the Internet era? This is a trend that prevails. *Politika* and *Danas* are leading in the number of published comments placed on the front page. This shows the difference between a tabloid and a traditional newspaper in certain ways. The role of reports is crucial for depicting the value orientation of the newspaper. The largest number of negative reports in *Kurir* and *Informer* quite clearly show the commitment and character of these newspapers. Restraint in reporting probably has its price in the acquisition of media influence.

Articles are becoming the carriers of value judgments and preferences. Most of the articles that were included in the sample survey in the third quarter of 2017 were written in a negative context, 66.3% of them. If we add the 2.9% of positively connoted texts written in this genre form, clear value judgement is observed in 69.2% of the articles (about 15% more than in the previous quarter).

Compared to the previous quarter, it is not surprising that there is an increase in unbalanced reporting. When the media actively take positions, then the number of unbalanced articles naturally increases. The fact that almost all the analyzed texts from *Informer* and *Kurir* are unbalanced seems somewhat anecdotal.

A quarter of texts are designed in the newsrooms. This means that they have no direct cause, ie. event being reported on. Almost half of thus designed texts are negatively connoted. By the frequency of occurrence, the first place belongs to the texts on political life in Serbia, followed by the events related to Kosovo, economy, regional relations, and speculations about the murder of singer Jelena Marjanović.<sup>1</sup>

Global issues, whatever this means, had low levels of presence in the analyzed period. There were only 35 texts on Russia, and even less on European Union - only 31. It is interesting that in this quarter, there was not a single negative or critically intoned article on Russia. Most of the texts, nearly 60 percent, were positively connoted. On the European Union, however, over 20 percent of the published texts were negative and 10 percent positive. This is, undoubtedly, a trend with a strengthening tendency in the last two years.

As for the main actors of our media and daily newspapers, a major change took place at the top of the list. The first position still sovereignly belongs to the President of the Republic of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić, who was mentioned about three times more often than the new Prime Minister Ana Brnabić. The third place belongs to Ivica Dačić, who has held the second place for a long time. Tomislav Nikolić, the former president of Serbia, is marginalized in terms of media, with only 53 appearances in the newspapers.

In relation to the Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, newspapers were mostly neutral. The exception is *Kurir*, which published 34 articles in this quarter, out of which 12 were negative connotations. *Danas* published 34 texts in total, out of which three texts were negative. There is obviously a certain reticence from the media’s side and the expectance of the first 100 days of the new Government to pass.

As for the opposition, media wrote most frequently about the leader of the Movement of Free Citizens Saša Janković - a total of 175 articles - out of which about 20 percent of them were negatively intoned. He was followed by Vuk Jeremić, Boris Tadić, Dragan Šutanovac, and then everyone else. The percentage share of negative texts about Vuk Jeremić, Dragan Šutanovac and Saša Janković is almost equal.

Donald Trump is again the most represented foreign statesman, before Vladimir Putin and Angela Merkel. Unlike Putin and Merkel, who had no negative evaluations, Trump was portrayed in a negative tone as well.

Unnamed sources – a permanent phenomenon without which one cannot imagine news reporting in Serbia, especially about exciting topics from the areas of politics, crime, justice and entertainment. If we compare the data related to the balance of stories designed in newsrooms and the reference to unnamed sources, we get the secret formula of every successful tabloid. Serbian newspapers are certainly no exception, but it is little comfort for those who strive for media professionalism and high standards of journalism.

<sup>1</sup> The arrest of the husband of murdered Jelena Marjanović made this topic prominent for the majority of newspapers. Only few of the papers avoided to address this case on the front page.

As in the previous ten calendar quarters, the same methodological apparatus was applied in the analysis of the empirical data. A single text was chosen for the subject of analysis. Analysis itself represents the combination of two research methods: (a) content analysis, which was guided by a „specific theoretical and hypothetical frame... creating an objective and systematic empirical collection of the social communication content, which enables the formation of relevant conclusions about the social context in which the communication takes part,”<sup>2</sup> and (b) a discourse analysis which enabled us to understand various, epistemologically and methodologically immeasurable,<sup>3</sup> authors’ interpretative strategies and editorial policies which reflect perceptions of different, primarily ideological and political, discourse realities, by analyzing their specific discourse meanings.

In the interpretative sense, in order to offer better coherence of the text, the analysis is, as in the previous reports, divided into two wholes which refer to: (a) analysis of quantitative indicators collected using content analysis; and (b) discourse analysis of the qualitative content excerpted from texts which were included in the research sample.

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2 S. Gredelj, *S onu stranu ogledala* [On the other side of the mirror], Beograd: Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije, 1986, 19

3 G. Couvalis, *The Philosophy of Science*, London, Sage Publications, 1997.

2



Sample



ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN


## Sample

As stated in earlier publications, the basic idea of the project *Mediameter* is to try to reconstruct media reality of the dailies in Serbia, the way it can be defined considering the texts that are positioned (wholly or partially) on front pages, as various reflections of current political events and circumstances in both Serbia and the world. A sample of the dailies was composed considering two selection criteria – the largest circulation and reputation of the print media. Daily newspaper circulation data were taken from a research done by IPSOS.<sup>1</sup> The front page is the part of the dailies that the readers connect the most with the identity/recognition of a media outlet. It is often responsible for the first impression, our potential affection or repulsion formed about some printed media. The front page comes into contact not only with the readers of that particular paper, but also the people who will perhaps never touch that paper. Through newspaper and TV advertising and shop windows, the front page reaches a wider auditorium than that forming the readers of individual dailies. The front pages, hence form, in a certain way, the public image of the newspaper which symbolizes its editorial policy, evaluative orientation and targeting of certain audiences. On account of the above-mentioned reasons, the front pages of dailies from our sample were in the focus of analysis of the project *Mediameter*.

Texts from front pages reflect best the coordinates of editorial policies of daily print editions. Though this involves a small percentage of texts, editorial identity of a daily can be most easily identified through messages conveyed through front pages. The ratio of the total number of texts in each daily individually and the number of texts from the front pages that were included in the sample of our research are shown in the charts 1-7, for the period from July 1<sup>st</sup> to September 30<sup>th</sup> 2017.


<sup>1</sup> Research of the average scope of the daily print media was done for the period from February 17<sup>th</sup> to April 15<sup>th</sup> 2017 and April 17<sup>th</sup> to April 30<sup>th</sup> 2017, population: total individuals

Chart 1. – *Večernje novosti*



Source: Mediameter research,  
July - September 2017

Chart 2. – *Informer*



Source: Mediameter research,  
July - September 2017

Chart 3. – *Alo!*




Chart 4. – *Blic*




Chart 5. – *Politika*




Chart 6. – *Danas*





Chart 7. – Kurir



The total number of analysed texts considering all seven media that are included in our research sample is 1991 and that number accounts for averagely 56.72% texts from front pages and for 3.25% of the total number of texts.

Table 1. – Večernje novosti

<i>Večernje novosti</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
chronicle	113	33	80
society	98	76	22
politics	102	102	0
economics	44	37	7
current affairs	42	24	18
reportage	24	5	19
culture	22	4	18
interview	18	12	6
world	21	13	8
sport	47	3	44
Belgrade news	10	6	4
supplement	1	0	1
reflector	11	3	8
neighbours	1	0	1
foto-trace	2	0	2
real-life stories	1	0	1
events	9	9	0
in memoriam	2	0	2
testimony	1	0	1
TOTAL	569	327	242

Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017



**Table 2. – Informer**

<i>Informer/ section</i>	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
breaking news	126	125	1
news	126	53	73
showtime	70	4	66
entertainment	1	0	1
sport	50	0	50
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>373</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>191</b>

Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

**Table 3. – Alo!**

<i>Alo!/section</i>	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
current affairs	65	63	2
news	209	118	91
v.i.p	108	6	102
sport	59	5	54
world	6	2	4
interview of the week	4	3	1
Belgrade	2	1	1
reportage	3	0	3
advices	2	0	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>458</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>260</b>

Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

**Table 4. – Blic**

<i>Blic/section</i>	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
current affairs/in- terview	11	9	2
reportage	1	0	1
Serbia in 21 <sup>st</sup> century	7	6	1
society	72	30	42
chronicle	46	10	36
woman	2	0	2
culture	9	0	9
politics	76	76	0
sport	78	2	76
destinies	3	0	3
world/planet	9	7	2
topic of the day	76	65	11
people	3	0	3
in focus	3	2	1
dossier	2	0	2
entertainment	62	1	61
remembrance	1	0	1
Blic foundation	2	0	2
economy	9	9	0
everything about the Exit	1	0	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>473</b>	<b>217</b>	<b>256</b>

Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

**Table 5. – Politika**

<i>Politika</i> /section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
world	36	18	18
society	91	19	72
economics	39	32	7
politics	15	15	0
event of the day	21	17	4
culture	35	6	29
chronicle	31	12	19
daily supplement	56	5	51
Serbia	30	10	20
sport	43	0	43
topic of the week/day	35	21	14
reading room	4	0	4
personalities	3	1	2
region	6	4	2
front page	237	235	2
spectre	3	0	3
colorful page	1	0	1
views	6	6	0
consumer	22	13	9
Belgrade events	16	3	13
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>730</b>	<b>417</b>	<b>313</b>

Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

**Table 6. – Danas**

Danas/section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
business supplement	13	11	2
special supplement	12	8	4
Danas weekend	39	16	23
Event of the day	4	4	0
society	83	76	7
economy	56	54	2
globe	43	30	13
culture	31	10	21
interview	3	0	3
front page	65	64	1
politics	114	114	0
Belgrade	4	2	2
sport	26	1	25
last page	14	9	5
dialogue	5	5	0
pomodoro	2	2	0
scales	1	1	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>515</b>	<b>407</b>	<b>108</b>

Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

Table 7. – Kurir

Kurir/section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
news	204	197	7
interview	3	3	0
planet	2	1	1
chronicle	61	24	37
society	1	0	1
stars	73	4	69
culture	7	1	6
Belgrade	5	0	5
sport	20	0	20
topic of the day	5	4	1
supplement	9	9	0
in memoriam	2	0	2
TOTAL	392	243	149


Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

By reviewing the presented tables 1-7, it is still noticeable that the structures of dailies follow two different patterns. In other words, *Večernje novosti*, *Politika*, *Danas* and *Blic* follow the traditional structure of daily newspapers, while *Informer* and *Alo!* deviate from this matrix to a considerable extent, as in previous trimesters. In previous two quarters, newspaper *Kurir* has also joined this group of media. This newspaper now publishes the majority of selected texts in the section news,<sup>2</sup> which, as in *Informer* and *Alo!*, encompasses various areas.

Editorial strategies that were established in the previous ten editions of Mediameter are entirely visible in the third quarter of 2017, as it may be clearly seen in Charts 8-14.


<sup>2</sup> From May 2017 in the newspaper Kurir, a section appears under that name. Since then, the existing sections: *society*, *economy* and *politics* are merging into the *news* column.

Chart 8. – Večernje novosti



Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017


Chart 9. – Informer



Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017




Chart 10. – *Alo!*




Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

Chart 12. – *Politika*




Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

Chart 11. – *Blic*




Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

Chart 13. – *Danas*



Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

**Chart 14. – Kurir**

Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

If we compare the number of selected texts for third quarters of 2017, 2016 and 2015, we can note that similar number of texts was published during corresponding period of 2017 and 2016 (1991 and 2012 respectively), while the number of selected texts in third quarter of 2015 was 8% higher then the corresponding one in 2017 – or in total 2172 texts.

Apart from the focus on political developments, the selected texts related to the situation in the region and Kosovo topics. In this quarter, the media have also paid a great deal of attention to the topics from the criminal chronicle.

**Table 8 – Number of selected texts by quarter**

	2015	2016	2017
First quarter	1360	1924	2403
Second quarter	1673	2106	2091
Third quarter	2172	2012	1991
Fourth quarter	2177	2251	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7382</b>	<b>8293</b>	

Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

# 3



Research  
results



ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN

RESEARCH RESULTS

Share of journalistic genres

In the third quarter of 2017, the share of Reports in the total number of analyzed texts was further decreased for about 3%, and amounted to 71.87% or 1431 texts. The largest share of the reports was again observed in *Informer* - 95.05%, while this time the lowest number was noted in *Kurir* - 52.26%. The Interview and the Article, observed in 13.86% and 8.9% of texts respectively, follow them. Articles are most present in *Kurir* – 43.21% or 105 texts – and *Politika* – 26.14% or 109 texts, while the paper that did not have any articles this quarter is *Alo!*. The largest number Interviews is recorded in *Danas* (48 or 11.79%), and the lowest in *Informer* – around 1%. The next genre for representation is the Commentary - 5.22% (104 texts), while the share of News is almost identical as in the previous period - 1.31% or 26 texts. Reports are present in only 0.45% or 9 texts, while the participation of other forms (such as hybrid genres or feuilleton) is negligible and significantly reduced compared to the previous quarter. In the third quarter of 2017, the order of representation of genres is the same as in the first period of 2017, while in comparison with the second quarter, their participation has been significantly changed.

Individual share of genres in reporting of seven media from the sample

Genre	Total number	%
Report	1431	71,87
Article	276	13,86
Interview	140	7,03
Commentary	104	5,22
News story	26	1,31
Reportage	9	0,45
Other (hybrid forms, feuilleton)	5	0,25
total	1991	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

Distribution of journalistic genres in texts from the sample, per media

Genre	<i>Alo!</i>	<i>Blic</i>	<i>Danas</i>	<i>Informer</i>	<i>Kurir</i>	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	total
report	178	173	276	173	127	229	275	1431
article	0	3	34	2	105	109	23	276
interview	14	19	48	2	6	32	19	140
commentary	1	20	34	1	2	40	6	104
news	5	1	7	4	1	5	3	26
reportage	0	0	4	0	2	2	1	9
other	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	5
total	198	217	407	182	243	417	327	1991

Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

Share of journalistic forms in texts from the sample, per media outlet

Genre	<i>Alo!</i>	<i>Blic</i>	<i>Danas</i>	<i>Informer</i>	<i>Kurir</i>	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	total
report	89,90	79,72	67,81	95,05	52,26	54,92	84,10	71,87
article	0,00	1,38	8,35	1,10	43,21	26,14	7,03	13,86
interview	7,07	8,76	11,79	1,10	2,47	7,67	5,81	7,03
commentary	0,51	9,22	8,35	0,55	0,82	9,59	1,83	5,22
news	2,53	0,46	1,72	2,20	0,41	1,20	0,92	1,31
reportage	0,00	0,00	0,98	0,00	0,82	0,48	0,31	0,45
other	0,00	0,46	0,98	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,25
total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, July - September 2017

Topics

In order for each article to be defined as clearly as possible, the selected writings that make up the sample are classified under a single topic, but nevertheless, all relevant elements present in these articles have been accounted for. This gave us a clearer insight into the manner of how the news is provided and into the approach of the media to certain topics in the previous issues of the *Mediameter* too. Articles covering local crime news, as well as the writings relating to the murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović, were again included into the sample, as an example of the paradigm of the state of Serbian journalism, which is marked by various kinds of disrespect for the ethical principles of reporting.

## Topic prominence

Political topics took significantly less space on the front pages of seven media from the sample in the period from July to September 2017 than in the previous quarter. The topic *political life in Serbia*, which in the second quarter was the prevailing in 30.37% (635) of the inscription, in the third trimester is represented in 16.83% or 335 texts. The remaining political topics, *activities of the Government of Serbia* (2.01% - 40 articles), *activities of the President of the Government of Serbia* (0.75% - 15) and *activities of the President of Serbia* (3.06% - 61) are represented in another 5.82% (116) texts. In the third quarter, internal political issues were represented in 22.65% (451) of the texts, which is 12.36% less than in the previous quarter.<sup>1</sup> The second topic by frequency is the economy, which was reported in 216 or 10.85% of the articles (about 3% more than in the previous quarter), followed by events related to the region (166 - 8.34% of all texts from the sample) and Kosovo (149 - 7.48%). When it comes to the topic of regional cooperation/relations in the region, its character is still unchanged - as many as 56.63% of the texts are negatively connotated, while the situation with the topics related to Kosovo is somewhat different, that is, this time dominated by neutrally connotated texts (71.14%). The focus of the media was again on the murder of singer Jelena Marjanović, the fifth theme according to the occurrence, which was recorded on 103 cover pages (5.17% of texts). Although there have been no significant breakthroughs in the investigation over a prolonged period, this media-designed topic has, to a lesser extent, survived on the front pages of the analyzed daily newspapers from April 2016<sup>2</sup> to mid-September 2017, when media interest regarding this case again suddenly increased as a result of the arrest of Zoran Marjanović, husband of Jelena Marjanović.<sup>3</sup> Most of the media published information and speculations regarding the arrest of Marjanović during the second half of September on all of their front pages.<sup>4</sup>

As far as foreign policy issues are concerned, the interest of the media is this time directed towards international relations (86 texts - 4.32%). The top ten topics covered *social issues / social policy* - 77 or 3.87% of articles, media (64 - 3.21%), activities of the president of Serbia (61 - 3.06) and the judiciary (54 texts - 2.71%).

If the context of the 1991 selected texts in the third quarter of 2017 is evaluated, 40.88% of texts are connotated - 5.32% positive and 35.56% negative (about 4% more compared to the previous period). Of all the above-mentioned topics, the majority of negative connotations were traditionally referring to the media - 62.5% (40). The majority of negative texts were written on topics related to social policy<sup>5</sup> (55.84%) and regional relations (56.63%). In connection with the murder of singer Jelena Marjanovic, about 40% of negative texts were published.<sup>6</sup> About a third of negative texts were written about political life (32.24%) and econ-

omy (31.94%), while also negative are 29.63% of the texts on the judiciary, 21.31% on the activities of the president of Serbia and 23.26% on international relations. The only topic on which a slightly larger number of positive texts was written is the economy (22 - 10.19%), 5 positive articles were written about the activities of the president of Serbia, 4 on regional topics and 3 on international relations.

Topics related to Russia and the European Union are mentioned in a very small number of texts - 35 (1.76%), or 31 (1.56%). They are only 16th (Russia / attitude towards Russia) and 19th (EU / EU policy) subject according to the representation in the texts from the sample. In the third quarter of 2017, no negatively connotated or critical text was written about Russia. The analyzed media content is mostly positively intoned (57.14%), while the remaining texts are neutral. About the EU the predominantly neutral texts were written (67.74%), with 22.58% negative and 9.68% of positively connotated texts.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The topic "internal politics" was present in 34.4% of texts in the first and 35.01% in the second quarter of 2017.

<sup>2</sup> Jelena Marjanović was murdered on April 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2016.

<sup>3</sup> On September 15th 2017, Zoran Marjanović was arrested on suspicion of killing Jelena Marjanović, an hour after he returned home after leaving the reality show "Cooperative", where he spent several days.

<sup>4</sup> Papers *Kurir*, *Informer* and *Alo!*, in the period from September 16th to September 30th 2017, published texts related to the murder of Jelena Marjanović on every front page, while *Blic* dealt with this topic only one day less, from September 17th to September 30th, because on 16th September birthday issue of these newspapers was published.

<sup>5</sup> The daily newspapers criticized social policy in general, and in particular the attitude of centers for social work and other state institutions towards the beneficiaries of the services of these social welfare institutions in negatively intoned inscriptions. The analyzed texts were created as a result of the killing of two women and children, committed during the month of July by former spouses, precisely at the premises of the centers for social work.

<sup>6</sup> When evaluating these articles, the criterion for assessing the value context was the relationship of media towards the Marjanović family.

<sup>7</sup> Negatively connotated articles on the EU / EU policy were published in *Politika* (5), *Informer* and *Večernje novosti* (1); positively intoned - in *Politika* (2) and *Danas* (1)

	Value context with reference to the topic							
<b>All media</b>	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Political life in Serbia	335	16,83	1	0,30	226	67,46	108	32,24
Economy	216	10,85	22	10,19	125	57,87	69	31,94
Regional cooperation	166	8,34	4	2,41	68	40,96	94	56,63
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Pristina	149	7,48	1	0,67	106	71,14	42	28,19
murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	103	5,17	0	0,00	41	39,81	62	60,19
International relations	86	4,32	3	3,49	63	73,26	20	23,26
Social policy/social issues	77	3,87	1	1,30	33	42,86	43	55,84
Media/ Media freedoms	64	3,21	0	0,00	24	37,50	40	62,50
Activities of the President of Serbia	61	3,06	5	8,20	43	70,49	13	21,31
System of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	54	2,71	1	1,85	37	68,52	16	29,63

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Value context in all media in relation to the topic *Russia/ Attitude towards Russia* and *EU /EU policy*

	Value context with reference to the topic							
<b>All media</b>	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Russia/ Attitude towards Russia	35	1,76	20	57,14	15	42,86	0	0,00
EU /EU policy	31	1,56	3	9,68	21	67,74	7	22,58


Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Value context in relation to all the topics in all seven media

Total	No.	%
Positive	106	5,32
Neutral	1177	59,12
Negative	708	35,56
<b>total</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>100,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Graph 15 - Value context in all media from the sample with reference to topics *Russia/relations with Russia* and *the EU /the European Union policy*



Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

## Distribution of topics according to media

**Blic**Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Blic*

<b>Blic</b>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Political life in Serbia	45	20,74	1	2,22	40	88,89	4	8,89
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Priština	30	13,82	0	0,00	27	90,00	3	10,00
Economy	26	11,98	1	3,85	15	57,69	10	38,46
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	16	7,37	0	0,00	9	56,25	7	43,75
Regional cooperation	12	5,53	0	0,00	5	41,67	7	58,33
Social policy/social issues	10	4,61	0	0,00	4	40,00	6	60,00
International Relations	8	3,69	0	0,00	5	62,50	3	37,50
System of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	8	3,69	0	0,00	7	87,50	1	12,50
Activities of the Government of Serbia	6	2,76	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Activities of the President of Serbia	5	2,30	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00

Izvor: Istraživanje *Medijametar*, jul – septembar 2017.Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Blic*

<b>Blic</b>	No.	%
Positive	4	1,84
Neutral	169	77,78
Negative	44	20,28
<b>total</b>	<b>217</b>	<b>100,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017**Kurir**Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Kurir*

<b>Kurir</b>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Political life in Serbia	43	17,70	0	0,00	17	39,53	26	60,47
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	25	10,29	0	0,00	0	0,00	25	100,00
Corruption	20	8,23	0	0,00	1	5,00	19	95,00
Police	18	7,41	0	0,00	0	0,00	18	100,00
Social policy/social issues	16	6,58	0	0,00	1	6,25	15	93,75
Media/Media freedoms	15	6,17	0	0,00	0	0,00	15	100,00
Activity of the President of Serbia	13	5,35	0	0,00	1	7,69	12	92,31
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Pristina	12	4,94	0	0,00	3	25,00	9	75,00
Economy	11	4,53	0	0,00	0	0,00	11	100,00
Activities of the Government of Serbia	10	4,12	0	0,00	1	10,00	9	90,00

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Kurir*

<b>Kurir</b>	No	%
Positive	0	0,00
Neutral	39	16,05
Negative	204	83,95
<b>total</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>100,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

**Informer**Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Political life in Serbia	35	19,23	0	0,00	3	8,57	32	91,43
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	22	12,09	0	0,00	16	72,73	6	27,27
Regional cooperation	19	10,44	0	0,00	2	10,53	17	89,47
Media/Media freedoms	13	7,14	0	0,00	1	7,69	12	92,31
USA/ Attitude towards USA	12	6,59	1	8,33	3	25,00	8	66,67
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Pristina	12	6,59	0	0,00	4	33,33	8	66,67
Economy	11	6,04	1	9,09	7	63,64	3	27,27
International relations	9	4,95	0	0,00	5	55,56	4	44,44
Hague/war crimes	6	3,30	0	0,00	1	16,67	5	83,33
Crime	5	2,75	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
Entertainment	5	2,75	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	No	%
Positive	12	6,59
Neutral	59	32,42
Negative	111	60,99
<b>total</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>100,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017**Alo!**Distribution of topics and their value context in the daily *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Political life in Serbia	71	35,86	0	0,00	49	69,01	22	30,99
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	27	13,64	0	0,00	13	48,15	14	51,85
Regional cooperation	21	10,61	0	0,00	9	42,86	12	57,14
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Priština	13	6,57	0	0,00	10	76,92	3	23,08
Economy	11	5,56	2	18,18	5	45,45	4	36,36
Activities of the Government of Serbia	7	3,54	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Hague/war crimes	5	2,53	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
International Relations	4	2,02	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
Russia/relation towards Russia	4	2,02	1	25,00	3	75,00	0	0,00
Social policy/social issues	4	2,02	0	0,00	0	0,00	4	100,00
Activity of the President of Serbia	4	2,02	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	No.	%
Positive	5	2,53
Neutral	129	65,15
Negative	64	32,32
<b>total</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>100,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

**Politika**Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Economy	68	16,31	10	14,71	37	54,41	21	30,88
Regional cooperation	51	12,23	3	5,88	14	27,45	34	66,67
International relations	34	8,15	3	8,82	24	70,59	7	20,59
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Pristina	24	5,76	0	0,00	13	54,17	11	45,83
Political life in Serbia	23	5,52	0	0,00	16	69,57	7	30,43
Economy	18	4,32	3	16,67	13	72,22	2	11,11
System of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	16	3,84	0	0,00	7	43,75	9	56,25
Russia/relation towards Russia	15	3,60	0	0,00	9	60,00	6	40,00
Social policy/social issues	15	3,60	1	6,67	8	53,33	6	40,00
EU/EU policy	14	3,36	2	14,29	7	50,00	5	35,71

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	No	%
Positive	44	10,55
Neutral	234	56,12
Negative	139	33,33
<b>total</b>	<b>417</b>	<b>100,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017**Večernje novosti**Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	Value context in relation to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Regional cooperation/ relation in the region	36	11,01	0	0,00	14	38,89	22	61,11
Kosovo/ Belgrade relations with Priština	33	10,09	1	3,03	25	75,76	7	21,21
Economy	31	9,48	8	25,81	20	64,52	3	9,68
Political life in Serbia	23	7,03	0	0,00	21	91,30	2	8,70
Activities of the President of Serbia	21	6,42	1	4,76	20	95,24	0	0,00
Russia/relation towards Russia	15	4,59	9	60,00	6	40,00	0	0,00
International relations	15	4,59	0	0,00	11	73,33	4	26,67
Social policy/social issues	14	4,28	0	0,00	8	57,14	6	42,86
Crime	10	3,06	0	0,00	9	90,00	1	10,00
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	10	3,06	0	0,00	0	0,00	10	100,00
Education	10	3,06	0	0,00	8	80,00	2	20,00

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	No.	%
Positive	37	11,31
Neutral	214	65,44
Negative	76	23,24
<b>total</b>	<b>327</b>	<b>100,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017



**Danas**

Value context in relation to the topic in daily paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	Value context in relation to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Political life in Serbia	95	23,34	0	0,00	80	84,21	15	15,79
Economy	58	14,25	0	0,00	41	70,69	17	29,31
Media/freedom of media	29	7,13	0	0,00	22	75,86	7	24,14
Regional cooperation/ relation in the region	25	6,14	1	4,00	22	88,00	2	8,00
Kosovo/ Belgrade rela- tions with Priština	25	6,14	0	0,00	24	96,00	1	4,00
Social policy/social issues	15	3,69	0	0,00	11	73,33	4	26,67
International relations	15	3,69	0	0,00	15	100,00	0	0,00
Local Government	14	3,44	0	0,00	7	50,00	7	50,00
System of justice, activi- ties of judiciary bodies	13	3,19	0	0,00	11	84,62	2	15,38
Education	11	2,70	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Value context in relation to all the topics in the daily paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	No.	%
Positive	4	0,98
Neutral	334	82,06
Negative	69	16,95
<b>total</b>	<b>407</b>	<b>100,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

**Balance**

When we take into account all the texts from the sample for the period July-September 2017, it can be noticed that most of the topics presented were not treated in a comprehensive manner, as evidenced by the fact that the balance is present in only 17.63% of all texts, 2% less than in the previous quarter. The least balanced texts were recorded in newspaper *Informer* - 1.65% or 3 out of 182 entries, while in *Kurir* 2.47% or 6 out of 243 texts were balanced (almost 6% less in comparison with the previous quarter). Daily *Alo!* published 15.66% of comprehensive texts (around 9% less than previously), *Politika* 16.31%, followed by *Blic* (31.8%), *Večernje novosti* (23.55%) and *Danas* (23.83%).

Although the value context is not expressed in 59.12% of all texts, consideration must be given to the fact that the vast majority of texts from the cover pages we have analyzed are not comprehensive, and that one-sided approach reflects the general situation in the Serbian media.

Balanced texts, of course, necessarily show some degree of restraint, which, obviously, does not represent a particularly widespread phenomenon in Serbian journalism. Taking sides, which is sometimes very passionate, attracts the audience but reduces seriousness. This is about the speed of the reaction, not the detailed and rational information required by the research, a larger number of interlocutors and reliable and verifiable data, along with available information sources. In this way, circulation and popularity are gained in a short time, but not a reputation.

The balance in relation to all the topics and all seven media from the sample

All media	Yes		No	
media	%	No.	%	No.
<i>Informer</i>	1,65	3	98,35	179
<i>Kurir</i>	2,47	6	97,53	237
<i>Alo!</i>	15,66	31	84,34	167
<i>Politika</i>	16,31	68	83,69	349
<i>Blic</i>	31,80	69	68,20	148
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	23,55	77	76,45	250
<i>Danas</i>	23,83	97	76,17	310
<b>total</b>	<b>17,63</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>82,37</b>	<b>1640</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

## Actors

Media in Serbia, at least according to the analysis of the empirical material collected from the front pages, mainly deal with political events within Serbia. Even 49.12% of the total number of actors covered by selected texts from the front pages are (individual and collective) political actors who occupy different positions within the political life of Serbia. If we add this number to the texts that speak of foreign political actors, the percentage of the participation of political actors in the total number of actors on the headlines rises to 67.19%. The second group by frequency of occurrence is different social actors, which make up almost a fifth (19.99%) of our sample. Economic actors are the protagonists of the texts on the covers in only 9.08% of cases

Total distribution of actors appearing in the texts which are a part of sampled research (expressed in absolute numbers)

Actors					
Political actors	8649	Domestic	6087	Individual	4261
				Collective	1826
		Foreign	2562	Individual	1968
				Collective	594
Economic actors	1169	Domestic	1126	Individual	399
				Collective	727
		Foreign	43	Individual	11
				Collective	32
Other social actors	2573	Domestic	2551	Individual	1789
				Collective	762
		Foreign	22	Individual	18
				Collective	4
Unnamed source					480
Total					12871

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

### Distribution of frequency and value context of appearance of individual political actors from the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the President of the Republic of Serbia

The Government and the President of the Republic of Serbia	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Aleksandar Vučić	691	39,00	14	2,03	621	89,87	56	8,10
Ana Brnabić	228	12,87	4	1,75	209	91,67	15	6,58
Ivica Dačić	161	9,09	3	1,86	153	95,03	5	3,11
Aleksandar Vulin	123	6,94	0	0,00	96	78,05	27	21,95
Nebojša Stefanović	113	6,38	0	0,00	98	86,73	15	13,27
Zorana Mihajlović	87	4,91	0	0,00	76	87,36	11	12,64
Zoran Đorđević	46	2,60	0	0,00	42	91,30	4	8,70
Rasim Ljajić	45	2,54	0	0,00	45	100,00	0	0,00
Mladen Šarčević	36	2,03	0	0,00	36	100,00	0	0,00
Goran Knežević	35	1,98	0	0,00	32	91,43	3	8,57
Branko Ružić	34	1,92	0	0,00	31	91,18	3	8,82
Jadranka Joksimović	24	1,35	0	0,00	24	100,00	0	0,00
Nela Kuburović	23	1,30	0	0,00	23	100,00	0	0,00
Branislav Nedimović	22	1,24	0	0,00	21	95,45	1	4,55
Zlatibor Lončar	22	1,24	0	0,00	21	95,45	1	4,55
Dušan Vujović	17	0,96	1	5,88	16	94,12	0	0,00
Aleksandar Antić	15	0,85	0	0,00	15	100,00	0	0,00
Slavica Đukić Dejanović	13	0,73	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Vladan Vukosavljević	10	0,56	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Goran Trivan	10	0,56	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Nenad Popović	8	0,45	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Vanja Udovičić	5	0,28	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Milan Krkobabić	4	0,23	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
<b>total</b>	<b>1772</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>1,24</b>	<b>1608</b>	<b>90,74</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>8,01</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

As in the previous quarter, the most frequent actor on the front pages of daily newspapers was Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, about who media from our sample reported predominantly neutral (in 89.87% of cases). About 2.03% (14)<sup>8</sup> of positive and 8.10% (56) of negative texts were written about him. The President of Serbia, as the protagonist of the texts on the front pages, appears 691 times, which is significantly higher than the second ranked actor, Prime Minister Ana Brnabić,<sup>9</sup> who is present in 228 texts and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivica Dačić (161 text).

When it comes to the value context in which the media talk about Aleksandar Vučić, the largest share, as well as the number of negative texts are again present in the *Kurir* (39.45% or 43 entries) and *Danas* (7.74% or 13 entries). Apart from these daily newspapers, negative connotations are not recorded in other media. The highest number of positive texts was published in *Večernje novosti* (7), and then in *Alo!* and *Informer* (2 each) and one in the newspapers *Blic*, *Danas* and *Politika*.

The highest frequency of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić, expressed in absolute numbers, is evidenced in the newspapers *Danas* (168), *Večernje novosti* (110), *Kurir* (109) i *Politika* (107). Expressed in relative numbers of the percentage share of articles in which he appears as an actor, with relation to the total number of selected articles from the same individual newspaper, we can see he is the most prominent actor in *Kurir* (44,86%) and *Danas* (41,28%), followed by dailies *Alo!* (33,84%), *Večernje novosti* (33,64) and *Blic* (33,18). The smallest share of articles which have the President of Serbia as an actor is found in the newspaper *Politika* (25,66%).

Aleksandar Vučić: Context value with reference to the media

Aleksandar Vučić	Positive		Neutral		Negative		total	
Media	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<i>Alo!</i>	2	2,99	65	97,01	0	0,00	67	100,00
<i>Blic</i>	1	1,39	71	98,61	0	0,00	72	100,00
<i>Danas</i>	1	0,60	154	91,67	13	7,74	168	100,00
<i>Informer</i>	2	3,45	56	96,55	0	0,00	58	100,00
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0,00	66	60,55	43	39,45	109	100,00
<i>Politika</i>	1	0,93	106	99,07	0	0,00	107	100,00
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	7	6,36	103	93,64	0	0,00	110	100,00
total	14	2,03	621	89,87	56	8,10	691	100,00

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

8 About 50% less than in the previous quarter when a total of 30 positive texts were recorded. The number of positive texts on this level was recorded in the last quarter of 2016, when there were 16 positive connotations.

9 Ana Brnabić was appointed Prime Minister at the end of the second quarter of 2017 - June 29th, 2017, when the new Government of the Republic of Serbia was also constituted.

Number of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić in respect of total numbers of texts in particular dailies

Aleksandar Vučić per media	No. of appearances	Total no. of texts	% share against total no. of texts
<i>Kurir</i>	109	243	44,86
<i>Danas</i>	168	407	41,28
<i>Alo!</i>	67	198	33,84
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	110	327	33,64
<i>Blic</i>	72	217	33,18
<i>Informer</i>	58	182	31,87
<i>Politika</i>	107	417	25,66
total	691	1991	34,71

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Prime Minister Ana Brnabić is the protagonist in 228 (12.87%) of analyzed texts and is the second according to the frequency of appearances among individual political actors from the Serbian political scene.

The highest number of negative texts about Ana Brnabić is recorded in the daily newspaper *Kurir* (12), in which the largest percentage of negative connotations (35.29%) is also recorded. Negatively intonated inscriptions are also present in the daily *Danas* (3), and these are the only two media in which negative texts are published. Positively connoted articles on the current prime minister were published three papers: *Alo!* (2 texts), *Blic* (1) and *Politika* (1).

*Politika* (52) and *Danas* (46) have published most of the articles in which the Serbian Prime Minister was the actor, but *Kurir* (13.99%) and *Alo!* (13.13%) have the highest share in relation with the total number of articles in the media.

Other actors from this group are in 90.74% of texts presented in a neutral value context. In addition to the president and prime minister, a slightly larger number of negative connotations was recorded with Aleksandar Vulin (27), Nebojša Stefanović (15) and Zorana Mihajlović (11).

Number of appearances of Ana Brnabić in respect of total numbers of texts in particular dailies

Ana Brnabić per media	No. of appearances	Total no. of texts	% share against total no. of texts
<i>Kurir</i>	34	243	13,99
<i>Alo!</i>	26	198	13,13
<i>Blic</i>	28	217	12,90
<i>Politika</i>	52	417	12,47
<i>Danas</i>	46	407	11,30
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	35	327	10,70
<i>Informer</i>	7	182	3,85
<b>total</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>11,45</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Ana Brnabić: Context value with reference to the media

Ana Brnabić media	positive		neutral		negative		total	
	broj	%	broj	%	broj	%	broj	%
<i>Alo!</i>	2	7,69	24	92,31	0	0,00	26	100,00
<i>Blic</i>	1	3,57	27	96,43	0	0,00	28	100,00
<i>Danas</i>	0	0,00	43	93,48	3	6,52	46	100,00
<i>Informer</i>	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00	7	100,00
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0,00	22	64,71	12	35,29	34	100,00
<i>Politika</i>	1	1,92	51	98,08	0	0,00	52	100,00
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0	0,00	35	100,00	0	0,00	35	100,00
<b>total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1,75</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>91,67</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>6,58</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>100,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

In the third quarter of 2017, we recorded 1220 appearances of opposition actors which is a result similar to the previous trimester (1243). The most common opposition leaders were Saša Janković (175 tekstova), Vuk Jeremić (95) i Boris Tadić (95). Most negative articles were written about Saša Jankovića (39 – 22,29%) and Vuk Jeremić (20 – 21,05%). In the second quarter of 2017 one positively connoted text was written about the representatives of the opposition (0.08%).

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearance of individual political actors from **the opposition**

Opposition- individual	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Saša Janković	175	14,34	1	0,57	135	77,14	39	22,29
Vuk Jeremić	95	7,79	0	0,00	75	78,95	20	21,05
Boris Tadić	95	7,79	0	0,00	87	91,58	8	8,42
Dragan Šutanovac	86	7,05	0	0,00	69	80,23	17	19,77
Boško Obradović	67	5,49	0	0,00	60	89,55	7	10,45
Vojislav Šešelj	55	4,51	0	0,00	52	94,55	3	5,45
Čedomir Jovanović	40	3,28	0	0,00	38	95,00	2	5,00
Saša Radulović	37	3,03	0	0,00	31	83,78	6	16,22
Sanda Rašković Ivić	35	2,87	0	0,00	34	97,14	1	2,86
Borko Stefanović	34	2,79	0	0,00	34	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Živković	31	2,54	0	0,00	28	90,32	3	9,68
Bojan Pajtić	27	2,21	0	0,00	16	59,26	11	40,74
Milan Stamatović	20	1,64	0	0,00	19	95,00	1	5,00
Sreto Malinović	19	1,56	0	0,00	19	100,00	0	0,00
Konstantin Samofalov	19	1,56	0	0,00	19	100,00	0	0,00
Saša Mirković	18	1,48	0	0,00	13	72,22	5	27,78
Ljubiša Preletačević Belj	18	1,48	0	0,00	18	100,00	0	0,00
Nenad Čanak	16	1,31	0	0,00	15	93,75	1	6,25
Janko Veselinović	16	1,31	0	0,00	16	100,00	0	0,00
Balša Božović	15	1,23	0	0,00	15	100,00	0	0,00
Miloš Jovanović	14	1,15	0	0,00	14	100,00	0	0,00
Dijana Vukomanović	11	0,90	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Marinika Tepić	10	0,82	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Goran Ješić	10	0,82	0	0,00	6	60,00	4	40,00
Vjerica Radeta	10	0,82	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Miroslav Parović	9	0,74	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandra Jerkov	9	0,74	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Đorđe Vukadinović	9	0,74	0	0,00	8	88,89	1	11,11
Radoslav Milojević Kena	9	0,74	0	0,00	8	88,89	1	11,11

Aleksandar Popović	7	0,57	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Nikola Jovanović	7	0,57	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Bojan Kostreš	7	0,57	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Sulejman Ugljanin	6	0,49	0	0,00	2	33,33	4	66,67
Dragoljub Mićunović	6	0,49	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Dušan Pavlović	6	0,49	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Milorad Mirčić	6	0,49	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Milovan Bojić	5	0,41	0	0,00	3	60,00	2	40,00
Janko Baljak	5	0,41	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
Nataša Mičić	4	0,33	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Gordana Čomić	4	0,33	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Tatjana Macura	4	0,33	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Vladan Glišić	4	0,33	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Dragan Popović	4	0,33	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Branislav Lečić	4	0,33	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Čičak	3	0,25	0	0,00	0	0,00	3	100,00
Goran Ćirić	3	0,25	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Oliver Dulić	3	0,25	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Dušan Duda Ivković	3	0,25	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Vesna Rakić Vodinelić	3	0,25	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Dušan Teodorović	3	0,25	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	114	9,34	0	0,00	113	99,12	1	0,88
<b>total</b>	<b>1220</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0,08</b>	<b>1078</b>	<b>88,36</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>11,56</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual political actors representing the position.

Position - individual	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Vladimir Đukanović	31	12,06	0	0,00	26	83,87	5	16,13
Bogoljub Karić	17	6,61	0	0,00	14	82,35	3	17,65
Miodrag Linta	14	5,45	0	0,00	14	100,00	0	0,00
Andrej Vučić	13	5,06	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Muamer Zukorlić	12	4,67	0	0,00	11	91,67	1	8,33
Darko Glišić	12	4,67	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Milenko Jovanov	12	4,67	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Dragan Marković Palma	11	4,28	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Vuk Drašković	10	3,89	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Igor Bečić	8	3,11	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandar Martinović	8	3,11	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Marijan Rističević	8	3,11	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Radomir Nikolić	8	3,11	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Orlić	7	2,72	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Miroslav Lazanski	7	2,72	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Milovan Drecun	6	2,33	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Milutin Mrkonjić	6	2,33	0	0,00	5	83,33	1	16,67
Predrag Marković	5	1,95	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Marija Obradović	4	1,56	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Dragan Popović	3	1,17	0	0,00	1	33,33	2	66,67
Ivica Tončev	3	1,17	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Novica Tončev	3	1,17	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Dubravka Filipovski	3	1,17	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	46	17,90	0	0,00	42	91,30	4	8,70
<b>total</b>	<b>257</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>93,77</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>6,23</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual political actors: **representatives of State bodies, agencies and institutions**

State bodies, agencies and institutions	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
others	92	21,35	0	0,00	74	80,43	18	19,57
Siniša Mali	62	14,39	2	3,23	56	90,32	4	6,45
Tomislav Nikolić	53	12,30	0	0,00	49	92,45	4	7,55
Marko Đurić	51	11,83	0	0,00	47	92,16	4	7,84
Goran Vesić	32	7,42	0	0,00	25	78,13	7	21,88
Nikola Selaković	20	4,64	0	0,00	20	100,00	0	0,00
Miloš Vučević	20	4,64	0	0,00	20	100,00	0	0,00
Maja Gojković	16	3,71	0	0,00	15	93,75	1	6,25
representative of CSR	14	3,25	0	0,00	14	100,00	0	0,00
Biljana Popović Ivković	12	2,78	0	0,00	7	58,33	5	41,67
Veljko Odalović	10	2,32	0	0,00	8	80,00	2	20,00
Zoran Stanković	9	2,09	1	11,11	8	88,89	0	0,00
Jorgovanka Tabaković	8	1,86	0	0,00	7	87,50	1	12,50
Milovan Drecun	6	1,39	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Andreja Mladenović	5	1,16	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Igor Mirović	4	0,93	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Dušan Spasojević	4	0,93	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Marko Blagojević	4	0,93	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Ivica Kojić	3	0,70	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
Dejan Pavićević	3	0,70	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Tanja Mišević	3	0,70	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>431</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0,70</b>	<b>381</b>	<b>88,40</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>10,90</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual political actors: **representatives of local governments**

Representatives of local governments	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Aleksandar Šapić	29	29,00	0	0,00	26	89,66	3	10,34
Bogdan Laban	6	6,00	0	0,00	1	16,67	5	83,33
Boško Ničić	5	5,00	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Veroljub Stevanović	5	5,00	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
others	55	55,00	0	0,00	51	92,73	4	7,27
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>87,00</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution and frequency and value context of appearances of individual political actors: **representatives of military and police**

Military and police	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Bratislav Gašić	22	19,82	0	0,00	14	63,64	8	36,36
Novica Antić	18	16,22	0	0,00	18	100,00	0	0,00
Veljko Mijailović	10	9,01	1	10,00	9	90,00	0	0,00
Dijana Hrkalo	8	7,21	0	0,00	0	0,00	8	100,00
Vladimir Rebić	7	6,31	0	0,00	6	85,71	1	14,29
Ljubiša Diković	5	4,50	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandar Đorđević	5	4,50	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Marko Parezanović	3	2,70	0	0,00	0	0,00	3	100,00
others	33	29,73	0	0,00	31	93,94	2	6,06
<b>total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0,90</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>79,28</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>19,82</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017



Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of **other** individual political and social actors

Other	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Slobodan Milošević	72	18,90	0	0,00	71	98,61	1	1,39
Dragan Đilas	43	11,29	0	0,00	32	74,42	11	25,58
Zoran Đinđić	32	8,40	0	0,00	32	100,00	0	0,00
Maja Đorđević	26	6,82	0	0,00	26	100,00	0	0,00
Marko Nikolić	23	6,04	0	0,00	7	30,43	16	69,57
Olga Lovrić	21	5,51	0	0,00	21	100,00	0	0,00
Vojislav Koštunica	21	5,51	0	0,00	21	100,00	0	0,00
Milan Lovrić	21	5,51	0	0,00	11	52,38	10	47,62
Mlađan Dinkić	11	2,89	0	0,00	10	90,91	1	9,09
Sergej Trifunović	10	2,62	0	0,00	4	40,00	6	60,00
Mirjana Marković	10	2,62	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
others	9	2,36	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Dušan Kovačević	8	2,10	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Mirko Cvetković	8	2,10	0	0,00	7	87,50	1	12,50
SANU	7	1,84	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Slavko Ćuruvija	7	1,84	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Kostić	6	1,57	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Svetlana Ražnatović	6	1,57	0	0,00	5	83,33	1	16,67
Vesna Pešić	5	1,31	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Emir Kusturica	4	1,05	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Beba Popović	4	1,05	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Jelena Karleuša	4	1,05	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Nataša Kandić	4	1,05	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
CIRSD	4	1,05	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Vlado Georgijev	3	0,79	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
Jelena Mačić	3	0,79	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
Božidar Đelić	3	0,79	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Siniša Kovačević	3	0,79	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Ivan Tasovac	3	0,79	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>381</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>332</b>	<b>87,14</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>12,86</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **state bodies and institutions**

State bodies, agencies and institutions	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Government of Serbia	229	26,94	3	1,31	202	88,21	24	10,48
Ministry of Interior	77	9,06	0	0,00	68	88,31	9	11,69
Serbian authorities	41	4,82	0	0,00	13	31,71	28	68,29
Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Policy	35	4,12	0	0,00	29	82,86	6	17,14
National Bank of Serbia	35	4,12	0	0,00	33	94,29	2	5,71
Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development	33	3,88	0	0,00	33	100,00	0	0,00
Ministry of Defence	31	3,65	0	0,00	28	90,32	3	9,68
National Assembly of Serbia	28	3,29	0	0,00	26	92,86	2	7,14
Ministry of Justice	28	3,29	0	0,00	28	100,00	0	0,00
Center for social issues	27	3,18	0	0,00	23	85,19	4	14,81
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	27	3,18	0	0,00	25	92,59	2	7,41
Ministry of Economy	26	3,06	0	0,00	25	96,15	1	3,85
Tax Administration	23	2,71	0	0,00	11	47,83	12	52,17
Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection	16	1,88	0	0,00	15	93,75	1	6,25
Ministry of Finance	15	1,76	0	0,00	14	93,33	1	6,67
Ministry of Health	13	1,53	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Business Registers Agency	13	1,53	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Ministry of Culture and Information	11	1,29	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Office of the Government of Serbia for KiM	11	1,29	0	0,00	9	81,82	2	18,18
Ministry of State Administration and Local Government	10	1,18	0	0,00	9	90,00	1	10,00
Republic Statistical Authority	9	1,06	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Ministry of Construction, Traffic and Infrastructure	9	1,06	0	0,00	7	77,78	2	22,22

Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunication	7	0,82	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Prime Minister's Cabinet	7	0,82	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Customs Direction	6	0,71	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
City of Belgrade	6	0,71	0	0,00	4	66,67	2	33,33
President's Cabinet	6	0,71	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
National Employment Service	5	0,59	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
RFZO	4	0,47	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
SMATSA	4	0,47	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Republic fond for health insurance	4	0,47	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Restitution Agency	3	0,35	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Commissariat for refugees	3	0,35	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
National council for cooperation with Russia and China	3	0,35	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
RIK	3	0,35	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	42	4,94	0	0,00	41	97,62	1	2,38
<b>total</b>	<b>850</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0,35</b>	<b>743</b>	<b>87,41</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>12,24</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **military and police**

Military and police	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Serbian Armed Forces	31	28,97	1	3,23	28	90,32	2	6,45
BIA	27	25,23	0	0,00	22	81,48	5	18,52
others	14	13,08	0	0,00	13	92,86	1	7,14
Serbian Military Union	13	12,15	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Serbian Police Union	12	11,21	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
"Belgrade police"	6	5,61	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Military Security Agency	4	3,74	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0,93</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>91,59</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7,48</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **opposition**

Position	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
SNS	253	71,27	1	0,40	217	85,77	35	13,83
SPS	48	13,52	0	0,00	48	100,00	0	0,00
Socialists' Movement	16	4,51	0	0,00	11	68,75	5	31,25
United Serbia	10	2,82	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
SDPS	8	2,25	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
SPO	6	1,69	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
PUPS	5	1,41	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
SVM	4	1,13	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
others	5	1,41	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>355</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0,28</b>	<b>314</b>	<b>88,45</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>11,27</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective actors: **opposition**

Opposition- parties	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
DS	153	30,42	0	0,00	143	93,46	10	6,54
PSG	89	17,69	0	0,00	83	93,26	6	6,74
Dveri	52	10,34	0	0,00	50	96,15	2	3,85
SRS	38	7,55	0	0,00	38	100,00	0	0,00
Enough is enough	37	7,36	0	0,00	36	97,30	1	2,70
LDP	31	6,16	0	0,00	31	100,00	0	0,00
SDS	30	5,96	0	0,00	29	96,67	1	3,33
DSS	23	4,57	0	0,00	23	100,00	0	0,00
New party	18	3,58	0	0,00	17	94,44	1	5,56
LSV	13	2,58	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Serbian Left	5	0,99	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
New Serbia	4	0,80	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Sandžak SDA	3	0,60	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
others	7	1,39	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>503</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>481</b>	<b>95,63</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>4,37</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective actors: **Kosovo**

Kosovo	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Ramuš Haradinaj	56	12,58	0	0,00	40	71,43	16	28,57
Hašim Tači	55	12,36	0	0,00	52	94,55	3	5,45
Serbian list	35	7,87	1	2,86	28	80,00	6	17,14
KLA	19	4,27	0	0,00	12	63,16	7	36,84
Oliver Ivanović	16	3,60	0	0,00	16	100,00	0	0,00
Albin Kurti	15	3,37	0	0,00	13	86,67	2	13,33
Bedžet Pacoli	15	3,37	0	0,00	12	80,00	3	20,00
KFOR	14	3,15	0	0,00	14	100,00	0	0,00
Self-determination movement	12	2,70	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Isa Mustafa	12	2,70	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
“Kosovo authorities”	10	2,25	0	0,00	7	70,00	3	30,00
Kadri Veselji	10	2,25	0	0,00	9	90,00	1	10,00
Kosovo Government	9	2,02	0	0,00	7	77,78	2	22,22
Goran Rakić	9	2,02	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Special court for KLA crimes	9	2,02	0	0,00	8	88,89	1	11,11
UNMIK	8	1,80	0	0,00	7	87,50	1	12,50
Dalibor Jeftić	8	1,80	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Euleks	8	1,80	0	0,00	6	75,00	2	25,00
Daut Haradinaj	6	1,35	0	0,00	3	50,00	3	50,00
Kosovo security forces	5	1,12	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
Azem Vlasi	5	1,12	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Edita Tahiri	5	1,12	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
Kosovo police	5	1,12	0	0,00	2	40,00	3	60,00
Slavko Simić	4	0,90	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
Enver Hodžaj	4	0,90	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
ROSU	3	0,67	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
Kosovo Assembly	3	0,67	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	85	19,10	0	0,00	80	94,12	5	5,88
<b>total</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0,22</b>	<b>382</b>	<b>85,84</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>13,93</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Croatia**

Croatia	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Andrej Plenković	34	13,55	0	0,00	28	82,35	6	17,65
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović	29	11,55	0	0,00	23	79,31	6	20,69
Milorad Pupovac	20	7,97	0	0,00	20	100,00	0	0,00
Croatian authorities	14	5,58	0	0,00	3	21,43	11	78,57
Franjo Tuđman	11	4,38	0	0,00	9	81,82	2	18,18
Croatian Government	10	3,98	0	0,00	4	40,00	6	60,00
Savo Štrbac	8	3,19	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Ante Gotovina	6	2,39	0	0,00	3	50,00	3	50,00
HDZ	6	2,39	0	0,00	2	33,33	4	66,67
Branimir Glavaš	3	1,20	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
Ivo Josipović	3	1,20	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Ante Pavelić	3	1,20	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	104	41,43	0	0,00	85	81,73	19	18,27
<b>total</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>76,89</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>23,11</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Montenegro**

Montenegro	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Milo Đukanović	10	16,39	0	0,00	8	80,00	2	20,00
Andrija Mandić	6	9,84	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Duško Marković	6	9,84	0	0,00	4	66,67	2	33,33
Democratic front	4	6,56	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
others	35	57,38	0	0,00	33	94,29	2	5,71
<b>total</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>90,16</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>9,84</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Federation of BiH**

BiH	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Milorad Dodik	35	28,69	1	2,86	34	97,14	0	0,00
Bakir Izetbegović	14	11,48	0	0,00	11	78,57	3	21,43
Alija Izetbegović	11	9,02	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Dragan Čović	7	5,74	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Čamil Duraković	5	4,10	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Naser Orić	4	3,28	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
Željka Cvijanović	4	3,28	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Denis Zvizdić	4	3,28	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Mladen Ivanić	4	3,28	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Dragan Mektić	3	2,46	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	31	25,41	0	0,00	29	93,55	2	6,45
<b>total</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0,82</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>94,26</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4,92</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Macedonia**<sup>10</sup>

Macedonia	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Zoran Zaev	29	50,00	0	0,00	20	68,97	9	31,03
Ivan Stojković	8	13,79	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Nikola Gruevski	3	5,17	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
VMRO–DPMNE	3	5,17	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Đorđe Ivanov	2	3,45	0	0,00	2	100,00	0	0,00
others	13	22,41	0	0,00	10	76,92	3	23,08
<b>total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>79,31</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>20,69</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

<sup>10</sup> In the first two quarters of 2017, there was a noticeable increase in the number of actors from Macedonia. Media interest in events in Macedonia has risen sharply after holding parliamentary elections in that country on December 11th, 2016, after which Macedonia entered a period of prolonged political instability. During this period, it was noteworthy that the media in Serbia reported on events with certain value positions, because a significant number of texts were connotated (eg in the previous quarter as much as 15% of texts, 42 negative and 1 positive). It is interesting to note that in the previous quarter, the most negative connotations were written about Zoran Zaev (29.69%) and Talat Jafari (42.86%), and that about Djordje Ivanov was reported exclusively in a neutral context. In this quarter, the largest number of negative texts were written about Zoran Zaev (as much as 9 and 31.03% respectively).

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual foreign political actors outside the region- **foreign politicians**

Foreign political actors	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	30	10,07	0	0,00	30	100,00	0	0,00
Emmanuel Macron	27	9,06	0	0,00	27	100,00	0	0,00
Kim Jong Un	19	6,38	0	0,00	19	100,00	0	0,00
Edi Rama	16	5,37	0	0,00	16	100,00	0	0,00
Xi Jinping	13	4,36	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Theresa May	7	2,35	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Miro Cerar	7	2,35	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Bojko Borisov	6	2,01	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Viktor Orban	5	1,68	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
Bashar al Assad	5	1,68	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
Mariano Rajoy	5	1,68	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Carles Puigdemont	5	1,68	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
Alexis Tsipras	4	1,34	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Shinzō Abe	4	1,34	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Li Machang	4	1,34	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Petro Poroshenko	4	1,34	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Richard Holbrooke	4	1,34	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
Sebastian Kurz	4	1,34	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Peter Siarto	3	1,01	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Robert Fico	3	1,01	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	123	41,28	0	0,00	123	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>298</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>294</b>	<b>98,66</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1,34</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual foreign political actors outside the region: **Germany**

Germany	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Angela Merkel	54	35,53	0	0,00	54	100,00	0	0,00
Martin Schulz	13	8,55	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
AfD	7	4,61	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Sigmar Gabriel	7	4,61	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
CDU	6	3,95	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Gerhard Schröder	5	3,29	0	0,00	3	60,00	2	40,00
Frank Walter Steinmeier	3	1,97	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	57	37,50	0	0,00	57	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>98,68</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1,32</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: **Russia**

Russia	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Vladimir Putin	91	33,58	3	3,30	88	96,70	0	0,00
Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Centre	30	11,07	6	20,00	24	80,00	0	0,00
Alexander Chepurin	20	7,38	0	0,00	20	100,00	0	0,00
Sergey Lavrov	16	5,90	0	0,00	16	100,00	0	0,00
Maria Zakharova	9	3,32	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Dmitry Rogozin	9	3,32	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Sergey Shoygu	8	2,95	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Russian authorities	6	2,21	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Sergei Zheleznyak	5	1,85	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Russia's Ministry of Foreign affairs	4	1,48	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Dmitry Medvedev	4	1,48	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Konstantin Kosachev	3	1,11	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Dmitry Peskov	3	1,11	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	63	23,25	4	6,35	59	93,65	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>271</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>4,80</b>	<b>258</b>	<b>95,20</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: **USA<sup>11</sup>**

USA	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Donald Trump <sup>1</sup>	122	26,64	0	0,00	115	94,26	7	5,74
Mike Pence	32	6,99	0	0,00	28	87,50	4	12,50
US Congress	17	3,71	0	0,00	16	94,12	1	5,88
Barack Obama	16	3,49	0	0,00	16	100,00	0	0,00
"American administration"	14	3,06	0	0,00	13	92,86	1	7,14
Pentagon	13	2,84	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Rex Tillerson	12	2,62	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
James Matis	11	2,40	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Melania Trump	11	2,40	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Kyle Scott	11	2,40	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
State Department	10	2,18	0	0,00	9	90,00	1	10,00
"American authorities"	10	2,18	0	0,00	7	70,00	3	30,00
Hoyt Brian Yee	10	2,18	0	0,00	8	80,00	2	20,00
Hillary Clinton	9	1,97	0	0,00	7	77,78	2	22,22
CIA	7	1,53	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
US Embassy	6	1,31	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Bakari Henderson	6	1,31	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Bil Clinton	5	1,09	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
John McCain	5	1,09	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
FBI	4	0,87	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Republican Party	4	0,87	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
George Soros	4	0,87	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
USAID	3	0,66	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
Joe Biden	3	0,66	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Democratic Party	3	0,66	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Bernie Sanders	1	0,22	0	0,00	1	100,00	0	0,00
others	109	23,80	0	0,00	97	88,99	12	11,01
<b>total</b>	<b>458</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>422</b>	<b>92,14</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>7,86</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

<sup>11</sup> As in the previous few quarters, we see an increasing number of actors from the United States (458). In the previous quarter we recorded 565 appearances, and in the first quarter of 2017, 763 appearances. Although in the last two quarters this number is declining slightly, it is still significantly higher than in previous periods.

**Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign political actors: representatives of EU institutions and EU institutions**

EU	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
EU	47	21,36	1	2,13	43	91,49	3	6,38
European Commission	39	17,73	0	0,00	38	97,44	1	2,56
Federica Mogherini	29	13,18	1	3,45	28	96,55	0	0,00
David McAlister	24	10,91	0	0,00	24	100,00	0	0,00
Jean Claude Juncker	15	6,82	0	0,00	15	100,00	0	0,00
“European authorities”	11	5,00	0	0,00	10	90,91	1	9,09
Donald Tusk	8	3,64	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Johannes Han	8	3,64	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
European Parliament	8	3,64	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
EU Delegation in Serbia	4	1,82	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
European Investment bank	4	1,82	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Maja Kocijančič	3	1,36	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	20	9,09	0	0,00	20	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0,91</b>	<b>213</b>	<b>96,82</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2,27</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

**Distribution of frequency and value context of individual and collective foreign political actors: OSCE and Council of Europe representatives**

Human Rights	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
European Court for Human Rights	5	31,25	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
European Council	4	25,00	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
OEBS	4	25,00	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
others	3	18,75	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

**Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign political actors: representatives of UN institutions and UN institutions**

UN	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
United Nations	19	30,16	0	0,00	19	100,00	0	0,00
UNESCO	16	25,40	0	0,00	16	100,00	0	0,00
UN Security Council	15	23,81	0	0,00	15	100,00	0	0,00
António Guterres	8	12,70	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
others	5	7,94	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

**Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors: NATO**

NATO	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
NATO	58	82,86	0	0,00	46	79,31	12	20,69
Jens Stoltenberg	5	7,14	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
others	7	10,00	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>82,86</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>17,14</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

**Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective actors: actors related to The Hague Tribunal**

The Hague Tribunal	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Hague tribunal	24	31,17	0	0,00	17	70,83	7	29,17
Ratko Mladić	20	25,97	0	0,00	20	100,00	0	0,00
Radovan Karadžić	11	14,29	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Momčilo Krajišnik	5	6,49	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Dragan Vasiljković – kapetan Dragan	4	5,19	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Serge Brammertz	3	3,90	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
others	10	12,99	1	10,00	8	80,00	1	10,00
<b>total</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1,30</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>87,01</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11,69</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017



Already from this cursory review of the frequency of the appearance of individual actors on the front pages of the selected printed daily newspapers from our sample, it is clearly noticed that the media treat issues from the domain of internal and external politics with unequal interest. The fact that foreign actors on the cover of daily newspapers in Serbia are present in a significantly smaller percentage (29.62% in relation to 70.37% of the frequency of appearance of domestic political actors) speaks of the focus of domestic media on the field of internal politics, which often takes the appearance of fiction in interpretations of individual daily newspapers, about which there were more words in the part of the analysis, which deals with interpretative strategies in the media processing of certain topics. The reasons for a noticeable lack of interest for economic actors and their understanding of the social, economic and political situation in Serbia and the world remains enigmatic (only 9.08% of the total sample of actors are economic actors), the only thing is that in the narratives of many politicians economic issues and economic consolidation of the country are referred to as key elements of future development strategies of the Serbian society.

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective **economy/economic actors**

Economic actors - individually	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Miroslav Mišković	28	7,02	0	0,00	22	78,57	6	21,43
Miodrag Kostić	13	3,26	0	0,00	9	69,23	4	30,77
Marko Mišković	12	3,01	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Dobrosav Bojović	11	2,76	0	0,00	5	45,45	6	54,55
Marko Čadež	10	2,51	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Milo Đurašković	9	2,26	0	0,00	8	88,89	1	11,11
Zoran Babić	8	2,01	0	0,00	7	87,50	1	12,50
Ivica Todorić	8	2,01	0	0,00	6	75,00	2	25,00
Zoran Drobnjak	7	1,75	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Igor Brnabić	6	1,50	0	0,00	2	33,33	4	66,67
Milojica Marković	5	1,25	0	0,00	3	60,00	2	40,00
Predrag Ranković Peconi	5	1,25	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Milan Beko	5	1,25	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Milorad Grčić	5	1,25	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Blagoje Spaskovski	4	1,00	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
Aleksandar Obradović	4	1,00	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
Zoran Pantelić	3	0,75	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Petar Matijević	3	0,75	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Nikola Petrović	3	0,75	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00

Miroslav Bogičević	3	0,75	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
Stanko Subotić Cane	3	0,75	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Nebojša Atanacković	3	0,75	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	241	60,40	1	0,41	211	87,55	29	12,03
<b>total</b>	<b>399</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0,25</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>85,21</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>14,54</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective **domestic economic actors**

Economic actors	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Fiat	79	10,87	2	2,53	70	88,61	7	8,86
Fiat – striker's council	40	5,50	1	2,50	37	92,50	2	5,00
Electrodistribution of Serbia	25	3,44	0	0,00	25	100,00	0	0,00
Goša	25	3,44	0	0,00	24	96,00	1	4,00
RTB Bor	20	2,75	0	0,00	20	100,00	0	0,00
Galenika	16	2,20	0	0,00	16	100,00	0	0,00
Air Serbia	16	2,20	0	0,00	10	62,50	6	37,50
Agrokor	14	1,93	0	0,00	14	100,00	0	0,00
Nikola Tesla Airport	14	1,93	0	0,00	12	85,71	2	14,29
Roads of Serbia	12	1,65	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Smederevo Iron-works	12	1,65	1	8,33	11	91,67	0	0,00
Hestil	12	1,65	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Ikea	11	1,51	5	45,45	6	54,55	0	0,00
Energoprojekt	11	1,51	0	0,00	10	90,91	1	9,09
Etihad	9	1,24	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Belgrade Waterfront	9	1,24	0	0,00	4	44,44	5	55,56
MBA – Ratko Mitrović nisko-gradnja	7	0,96	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Gorenje	7	0,96	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Prointer	7	0,96	0	0,00	2	28,57	5	71,43
Commerce Chamber of Serbia	7	0,96	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00

Delta holding	7	0,96	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Thermal power plant Kolubara	6	0,83	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Asseco	6	0,83	0	0,00	2	33,33	4	66,67
Gasprom	6	0,83	1	16,67	5	83,33	0	0,00
NIS	6	0,83	0	0,00	4	66,67	2	33,33
Commercial bank	6	0,83	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
PKB	6	0,83	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Srbijagas	5	0,69	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
AIK bank	5	0,69	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
NALED	5	0,69	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Merkator S	5	0,69	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Pošte Srbije	5	0,69	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Sberbank	4	0,55	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Railway of Serbia	4	0,55	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
Electric Network of Serbia	4	0,55	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Jura	4	0,55	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Pančevo nitrogen plant	4	0,55	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Frikom	4	0,55	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
FAP Priboj	4	0,55	1	25,00	3	75,00	0	0,00
RBV	3	0,41	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Banka Intesa	3	0,41	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
EBRD	3	0,41	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Jugoimport SDPR	3	0,41	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
Leoni factory	3	0,41	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Corridors of Serbia	3	0,41	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Dunav insurance	3	0,41	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Telekom of Serbia	3	0,41	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	254	34,94	1	0,39	237	93,31	16	6,30
<b>total</b>	<b>727</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1,65</b>	<b>662</b>	<b>91,06</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>7,29</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective **foreign economic actors**

MMF/World Bank	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
IMF	22	51,16	1	4,55	20	90,91	1	4,55
World Bank	7	16,28	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
James Ruf	7	16,28	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Sebastian Sosa	4	9,30	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
other	3	6,98	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2,33</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>95,35</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2,33</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

In addition to already mentioned political and economic actors, the protagonists are also various other social actors, who in different ways influence the social and political situation within the Serbian society. Based on the collected empirical material, we divided them into:

(a) representatives of independent and independent governmental bodies and institutions, (b) political, social, economic, security and other analysts, (c) representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations (d) actors from the media, (e) representatives of judicial authorities, (f) lawyers and protagonists of various court proceedings, (h) media protagonists and other scandals and (i) actors from the past.

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of independent bodies**

Independent bodies	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Anti-Corruption Agency	35	27,13	0	0,00	33	94,29	2	5,71
Rodoljub Šabić	21	16,28	0	0,00	21	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Pašalić	12	9,30	1	8,33	9	75,00	2	16,67
REM	10	7,75	0	0,00	9	90,00	1	10,00
Securities Commission	7	5,43	0	0,00	5	71,43	2	28,57
Miloš Janković	7	5,43	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Fiscal council	6	4,65	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Jelisaveta Vasilić	5	3,88	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Brankica Janković	3	2,33	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00

Anti-Corruption Council	3	2,33	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Dušan Slijepčević	2	1,55	0	0,00	2	100,00	0	0,00
State Audit Institution	2	1,55	0	0,00	2	100,00	0	0,00
others	16	12,40	0	0,00	16	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0,78</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>93,8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5,43</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages in different media from the research sample

Media/analysts	No.	%
<i>Informer</i>	218	31,05
<i>Kurir</i>	131	18,66
<i>Danas</i>	118	16,81
<i>Politika</i>	99	14,10
<i>Alo!</i>	53	7,55
<i>Blic</i>	42	5,98
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	41	5,84
<b>Total</b>	<b>702</b>	<b>100,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic and social actors:  
**analysts**

Analysts	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Dragomir Anđelković	36	5,13	0	0,00	36	100,00	0	0,00
Nebojša Krstić	29	4,13	0	0,00	23	79,31	6	20,69
Branko Radun	17	2,42	0	0,00	17	100,00	0	0,00
Ljubodrag Savić	14	1,99	0	0,00	13	92,86	1	7,14
Milojko Arsić	12	1,71	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Toma Fila	12	1,71	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Milan Kovačević	12	1,71	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Čedomir Antić	11	1,57	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Dejan Vuk Stanković	11	1,57	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Dušan Janjić	11	1,57	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00

Božidar Prelević	10	1,42	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Saša Borojević	10	1,42	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Zlatko Nikolić	10	1,42	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Ljubomir Madžar	10	1,42	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Marko Nicović	10	1,42	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Boban Stojanović	9	1,28	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Božidar Delić	9	1,28	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Ivošević	8	1,14	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Milivojević	8	1,14	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Vladislav Jovanović	8	1,14	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Pejić	8	1,14	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Dragan Dobrašinović	8	1,14	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Bojan Klačar	8	1,14	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Momir Stojanović	8	1,14	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Dušan Proroković	7	1,00	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Ratko Božović	7	1,00	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Draško Đenović	7	1,00	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Mahmud Bušatlija	7	1,00	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Dejan Gavrilović	7	1,00	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Cvijetin Milivojević	7	1,00	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Ivan Nikolić	7	1,00	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Stojiljković	7	1,00	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Živadin Jovanović	7	1,00	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Mario Spasić	6	0,85	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandar Popov	6	0,85	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Vojislav Stanković	6	0,85	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandar Radić	6	0,85	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Mladen Kovačević	6	0,85	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Dobrovoje Radova- nović	6	0,85	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Dragovan Milićević	6	0,85	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Orhan Dragaš	6	0,85	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandra Joksi- mović	5	0,71	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Goati	5	0,71	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00

Nemanja Nenadić	5	0,71	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Milan Prostran	5	0,71	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Ljuban Karan	5	0,71	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Dževad Galijašević	5	0,71	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Dragišić	5	0,71	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Danilo Šuković	5	0,71	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Vuletić	4	0,57	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Jovo Bakić	4	0,57	1	25,00	3	75,00	0	0,00
Svetozar Vujačić	4	0,57	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Dragan Đukanović	4	0,57	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Predrag Petrović	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Bogoljub Milosavljević	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Goran Rodić	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Milan Mijalkovski	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Grubišić	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Vlade Radulović	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Gligorov	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	225	32,05	2	0,89	223	99,11	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>702</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0,43</b>	<b>692</b>	<b>98,58</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency of appearances of representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious communities on the front pages of difference media from the sample

Media/ religion	No.	%
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	36	30,00
<i>Politika</i>	26	21,67
<i>Alo!</i>	18	15,00
<i>Blic</i>	18	15,00
<i>Informer</i>	9	7,50
<i>Kurir</i>	7	5,83
<i>Danas</i>	6	5,00
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and religious organizations** <sup>12</sup>

Religion	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Serbian Orthodox Church	36	30,00	1	2,78	35	97,22	0	0,00
Patriarch Irinej	19	15,83	1	5,26	18	94,74	0	0,00
Alojzije Stepinac	11	9,17	0	0,00	8	72,73	3	27,27
Pope Francis	7	5,83	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	6	5,00	1	16,67	5	83,33	0	0,00
Bishop of Backa Irinej	4	3,33	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Bishop Teodosije	4	3,33	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
Catholic church	4	3,33	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Jovan, Bishop of Slavonia	3	2,50	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Porfirije, Metropolitan of Zagreb and Ljubljana	3	2,50	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	23	19,17	0	0,00	23	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2,50</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>94,17</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3,33</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective social domestic actors from **the media** <sup>13</sup>

Media	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Kurir	41	7,54	2	4,88	21	51,22	18	43,90
Adrija medija grupa	32	5,88	0	0,00	32	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandar Rodić	31	5,70	0	0,00	13	41,94	18	58,06
UNS	23	4,23	0	0,00	21	91,30	2	8,70
NUNS	23	4,23	0	0,00	20	86,96	3	13,04
TV Pink	21	3,86	0	0,00	17	80,95	4	19,05
Dejan Anđus	17	3,13	1	5,88	12	70,59	4	23,53
Vukašin Obradović	17	3,13	1	5,88	15	88,24	1	5,88
Slaviša Lekić	17	3,13	0	0,00	16	94,12	1	5,88

<sup>12</sup> There were 98 participants from Orthodox churches (Serbian, Russian and others) and 22 participants from other religious communities on the cover of the media from the sample.

<sup>13</sup> The actors who were the subject of the writing of other media, that is, the media companies that were reported by other media were presented.

Stevan Dojčinović	17	3,13	0	0,00	17	100,00	0	0,00
Željko Mitrović	16	2,94	0	0,00	15	93,75	1	6,25
Dragan J. Vučićević	16	2,94	0	0,00	16	100,00	0	0,00
Informer	14	2,57	0	0,00	10	71,43	4	28,57
Milomir Marić	14	2,57	0	0,00	14	100,00	0	0,00
RTS	12	2,21	0	0,00	8	66,67	4	33,33
KRIK	11	2,02	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
TV N1	11	2,02	0	0,00	10	90,91	1	9,09
Milorad Vučelić	8	1,47	0	0,00	7	87,50	1	12,50
Vladimir Radomirović	6	1,10	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
NIN	6	1,10	0	0,00	4	66,67	2	33,33
TV B92	6	1,10	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Dragoljub Draža Petrović	6	1,10	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Ratko Dmitrović	6	1,10	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Nedim Sejdinović	5	0,92	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Večernje novosti	5	0,92	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Danas	5	0,92	0	0,00	3	60,00	2	40,00
Blic	5	0,92	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Politika	5	0,92	2	40,00	3	60,00	0	0,00
Željko Cvijanović	4	0,74	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Group against the media blackout	4	0,74	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Ljiljana Smajlović	4	0,74	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
TV Prva	4	0,74	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Dragan Bujošević	3	0,55	0	0,00	0	0,00	3	100,00
Nedeljnik	3	0,55	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
Radisav Rodić	3	0,55	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
TV Happy	3	0,55	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
CINS	3	0,55	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
Dinko Gruhonjić	3	0,55	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
others	114	20,96	2	1,75	102	89,47	10	8,77
<b>total</b>	<b>544</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1,47</b>	<b>452</b>	<b>83,09</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>15,44</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

During the collection of empirical material, a significant presence of actors in connection with the activities of the judicial and investigative bodies was noted on the cover pages. The actors from this group are shown as representatives of judicial authorities (254), lawyers (150) and other protagonists of current or completed court / investigative proceedings (110).

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective domestic social actors: **representatives of judicial bodies**

Judicial system	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Higher Public Prosecutor in Belgrade	42	16,54	0	0,00	39	92,86	3	7,14
Higher Court in Belgrade	36	14,17	0	0,00	35	97,22	1	2,78
Court of Appeals in Belgrade	18	7,09	0	0,00	15	83,33	3	16,67
Prosecution for Organized Crime	15	5,91	0	0,00	15	100,00	0	0,00
First Basic Public Prosecutor in Belgrade	13	5,12	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Commercial Court in Belgrade	8	3,15	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Special Court in Belgrade	6	2,36	0	0,00	5	83,33	1	16,67
Constitutional Court	6	2,36	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Third Primary Court in Belgrade	5	1,97	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
High Council of Judiciary	5	1,97	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
State Council of Prosecutors	4	1,57	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Second Primary Court in Belgrade	3	1,18	0	0,00	1	33,33	2	66,67
State Attorney	3	1,18	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
First Primary Court in Belgrade	3	1,18	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Administrative Court	3	1,18	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	84	33,07	0	0,00	81	96,43	3	3,57
<b>total</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>94,88</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>5,12</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **lawyers**<sup>14</sup>

Lawyers	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Veljko Delibašić	17	11,33	0	0,00	17	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Gajić	12	8,00	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Borivoje Borović	8	5,33	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Predrag Savić	7	4,67	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Vojin Biljić	6	4,00	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Zdenko Tomanović	5	3,33	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
Zora Dobričanin Nikodinović	3	2,00	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	92	61,33	0	0,00	90	97,83	2	2,17
<b>total</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>98,00</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2,00</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **actors of court proceedings and investigations**

Actors of court proceedings and investigations	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Aleksandar Stanković Sale Mutavi	12	10,91	0	0,00	4	33,33	8	66,67
Darko Šarić	6	5,45	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Nenad Vučković	6	5,45	0	0,00	1	16,67	5	83,33
Ljubiša Buha Čume	5	4,55	0	0,00	2	40,00	3	60,00
Željko Ražnatović Arkan	5	4,55	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Veljko Belivuk Velja Nevolja	5	4,55	0	0,00	2	40,00	3	60,00
Željko Rutović	4	3,64	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Milan Radonjić	3	2,73	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Dejan Milenković Bagzi	3	2,73	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00

<sup>14</sup> Some lawyers in the texts of the media from the sample played the role of analysts, and are therefore shown in that group of actors.

Milorad Ulemek Legija	3	2,73	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
Ratko Romić	3	2,73	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Sreten Jocić Joca Amsterdam	3	2,73	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
others	52	47,27	0	0,00	49	94,23	3	5,77
<b>total</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>78,18</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>21,82</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

The following table shows all the actors who were linked by the media with the murder of singer Jelena Marjanović, as well as members of her family, acquaintances and friends.<sup>15</sup>

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **"The murder of Jelena Marjanović"**

The murder of Jelena Marjanović	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Jelena Marjanović	105	22,39	0	0,00	104	99,05	1	0,95
Zoran Marjanović	102	21,75	0	0,00	56	54,90	46	45,10
Vladimir Marjanović	47	10,02	0	0,00	33	70,21	14	29,79
Jana Marjanović	41	8,74	0	0,00	41	100,00	0	0,00
Marjanović family	29	6,18	0	0,00	16	55,17	13	44,83
Miloš Marjanović	28	5,97	0	0,00	18	64,29	10	35,71
Nenad Šipka	26	5,54	0	0,00	26	100,00	0	0,00
Zorica Krsmanović	26	5,54	0	0,00	26	100,00	0	0,00
Zorica Marjanović	20	4,26	0	0,00	12	60,00	8	40,00
Rada Matić	11	2,35	0	0,00	10	90,91	1	9,09
Zorica Mitrović	4	0,85	0	0,00	2	50,00	2	50,00
others	30	6,40	0	0,00	26	86,67	4	13,33
<b>total</b>	<b>469</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>78,89</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>21,11</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

<sup>15</sup> In the third quarter of 2017, the number of actors associated with this case increased approximately 9 times compared to the previous quarter (469 in the third, compared to 54 in the second period). The largest presence of actors from this group has so far been noticed in the 2nd quarter of 2016, when there were 968 of their appearances on the cover pages, almost twice as many as foreign politicians or state bodies and institutions.



Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **“Savamala”**

Savamala	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Inicijativa Ne davi-mo Beograd	21	60,00	0	0,00	20	95,24	1	4,76
Radomir Lazović	6	17,14	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Dobrica Veselinović	3	8,57	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	5	14,29	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>97,14</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2,86</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Events related to sports workers and have socially political connotation are still the subject of media interest. Therefore, we recorded 29 front page appearances of actors related to sports clubs and organizations events.

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **Sports**

Sports	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Slaviša Kokeza	9	31,03	0	0,00	2	22,22	7	77,78
FC Red Star	5	17,24	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
Miloš Vazura	5	17,24	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Nebojša Čović	4	13,79	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Zvezdan Terzić	3	10,34	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	3	10,34	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
<b>total</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0,00</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>68,97</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>31,03</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **actors from the distant past**

The past	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Josip Broz Tito	21	67,74	2	9,52	18	85,71	1	4,76
Dragoljub Mihailović	4	12,90	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
others	6	19,35	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>100,00</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6,45</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>90,32</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3,23</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

## UNNAMED SOURCES

In the selected front page articles from the sampled media, unnamed sources have also been the second most prominent actor. This time there were 514 instances of quoting anonymous sources, or rather 24.11% captions, which was almost identical to the results from the previous quarter (24.58%).

The widespread usage of unnamed sources has been precisely determined thanks to the manner of qualifying anonymous sources, which we have been applying since the second *Mediameter* issue, so as to not only classify those sources which the very media has defined as anonymous, but also those who provide information that cannot be verified, no matter the manner in which they have been incorporated into an article. Of course, the presence of information gained from anonymous sources speaks more about the manner of the reporting done by the seven media found in our sample, than about the actual need of protecting the identities of the individual who provide certain information.

As Matt Carlson, in his book “On the Condition of Anonymity” has said: “Journalism is woven into the fabric of our environment, and in turn is based on it, meaning that it can never be an objective observer, as it is claimed...These sorts of questions are better answered through an approach that recognizes the culture of unnamed sources as a *culture*. This view steers an inquiry into unnamed sources away from frequency and implementation, toward issues of meanings that we share and patterns of collective interpretation between journalists, sources and the public. The securing of anonymity is not just a question of technique. It is, actually, a request for a certain type of imagining of relations between these three sides.”<sup>16</sup>

A news form that contains the largest number of information obtained from an unnamed source is a report. Of the 1431 texts written in this form, 400 or 27.95% contains anonymous sources. Although the largest share of unnamed sources is recorded in the reportages, the number of texts in this form, and therefore unnamed sources, is negligible (3).

Share of “unnamed sources” in all journalistic forms, in seven media from the sample

Genre	Total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Report	1431	400	27,95
Article	276	67	24,28
News	26	6	23,08
Commentary	104	4	3,85
Reportage	9	3	33,33
other	5	0	0,00
interview	140	0	0,00
<b>total</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>24,11</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

<sup>16</sup> M. Carlson, *On the condition of anonymity*, Urbana, Chicago, Springfield, University of Illinois Press, 2011, 7

The largest share, as well as the number of articles that contain information obtained from anonymous sources in relation to the total number of published articles in an individual media, was recorded in *Informer* (50.55% or 92 texts). The next newspaper, which uses unnamed sources is *Alo!* (35.00% - 69), followed by *Kurir* (33.74%), *Blic* (25.81%), *Večernje novosti* (21.71%) and *Politika* (15.35%). A little less texts that rely on this form of obtaining information are recorded in *Danas* (11.3% - 46).

#### Share of unnamed sources per analyzed media outlets

Media outlet	Total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
<i>Informer</i>	182	92	50,55
<i>Alo!</i>	198	69	34,85
<i>Kurir</i>	243	82	33,74
<i>Blic</i>	217	56	25,81
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	327	71	21,71
<i>Politika</i>	417	64	15,35
<i>Danas</i>	407	46	11,30
<b>total</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>24,11</b>

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

The highest number of texts containing information from anonymous sources was recorded in texts where the topic was *political life in Serbia* (335 or 28.66%). In accordance with the findings from the previous quarters, the largest share of anonymous sources was recorded in the texts that come from the chronicle. Around 60% of the stories about the murder of Jelena Marjanović contain information obtained in this way, as is the case with topics dealing with crime (51.52%) and police (44.44%).

Number of texts containing information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the seven media from the sample <sup>17</sup>

Topic/All media	Total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Political life in Serbia	335	96	28,66
Economy	216	67	31,02
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	103	62	60,19
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	166	35	21,08
Social issues / social policy	77	18	23,38
Crime	33	17	51,52
Police	36	16	44,44
Kosovo/Belgrade and Pristina relations	149	15	10,07
System of Justice/ judiciary bodies activities	54	14	25,93
USA/relation towards USA	47	13	27,66
Media/freedom of media	64	13	20,31

Source: *Mediametar* research, July - September 2017

<sup>17</sup> Ten topics with the largest number of unnamed sources are displayed.

## Conclusion

The eleventh issue of the Quarterly Mediameter was confronted with a situation that hasn't given a single key event nor a dominant topic. It not only reflected the number of texts in general but a number of texts focused on the political life in Serbia which were of a highest interest. Reports still dominate. This quarter recorded an increase in the number of disbalanced texts in spite of the decrease in headlines which contain political life in Serbia. Thus, political events in Serbia are not the only partiality generator whilst high percentage of texts created in editorial offices and the ones that rely on unknown sources, use a picturesque way to express seriousness and the well grounded trait of texts. The actors from the political life are still in lead. The changes in representation of characters in the texts are the consequence of political positions changes of the same actors, not the constitutionalized political media. Differences and divisions in media also are noticable. They are not divided on tabloids and newspapers, critical and pro Government, but according to their "affinity choices". The attitude towards Russia and EU in addition to the region as a whole is becoming the indicator for deeper divisions.

## (Footnotes)

1 Donald Tramp is the most represented foreign actor in the third period of 2017, which was the case in the first quarter of this year. In the remaining 9 quarters, during which this research was carried out within the framework of the Mediamater project, the most frequent foreign political actor was Vladimir Putin.

4



Discourse  
analysis

DEJAN VUK STANKOVIĆ

## DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Research of the columns in newspapers and relevant articles from the weeklies, confirmed that there is an undoubtedly present critical attitude towards the key players, events, political, economic and wider social processes in Serbia. The actual presence of freedom of thought and expression manifests itself on three levels: the readiness of editors to research and write about each remotely relevant political, economic, cultural or other socially important topic, pluralism of journalistic genres and approaches, and finally the existence of various political and value judgments.

The presence of freedom of thought and speech, calls into question the stand that the state controls the media and the establishment maintains the monopoly on the interpretation of the actors, events and political processes. The argument about the relatively small circulation of weeklies and most of daily newspapers is not relevant to qualitative content analysis of texts published and circulated in the media sphere. On the contrary, phenomenon of “virality” of news holds a special position in the modern world, this possibility of its dynamic sharing via social networks, whose influence, slowly but surely threatens to become equal, if not higher than conventional mass electronic media. Also, articles published in the weekly or daily newspapers serve as an interpretive matrix accepted by both politicians in the institutions of the system but as well the powerful electronic media.

By its structure, that is, the content, weeklies, like daily newspapers, give special emphasis to domestic politics. Internal political developments dominate the content of the weeklies, regardless of whether the state of society is regular or in the election campaign.

In general, the image of political actors, government and the opposition, is determined in the predominantly negative context. There is a strong tendency for bias and in complete denial of actors that are present on the political scene. In addition to the negative image of the actors, there is also a kind of constant tendency to adopt a categorical tone in expression or accusatory way of thought and speech, which is also testimony to the attitude of the author, and a reflection of tense and conflicting atmosphere in the public-political field.

As for the weeklies, there is a significant asymmetry in the treatment of political actors. Opposition actors and their way of thinking dominates in all the weeklies, with the exception of the weekly *Pečat*, whose specific journalistic universe combines nostalgia for the 90's, criticism of liberalism and capitalism and affirmation of Putin's Russia.

One should also note the visible similarity, and often the alignment of attitudes, between journalists and editors and the interviewees coming from the opposition circles. Weeklies, therefore, do not have only an interpretative or informative role, but also a political activist one. Moreover, they are, together with television, and intellectual elite, a reflection of the the dynamic and basically pluralist nature of democratic political process.

Interviews as a journalistic genre have a special role in the structure of weekly newspapers. With columns and analytical articles related to the individual topics from the political, economic and social life, this genre is the most common. The effect of the political and value-based messages in weekly newspapers and editorial columns, aside from the verbal, is also set in the visual experience, namely the experience of images. If the front page is the identity of a newspaper, then to understand its message it is of paramount importance to understand its front page, or more precisely its visual aspect.

The front page most usually has a large photo of the interviewee, which bears an uncanny resemblance to a campaign poster, or a photo from everyday political and social life that is, almost by a rule, politically and socially negatively connoted. A compound of the visual and graphic on the front page is intended to initiate interest for the content in the interview, but also to indicate to the reader, directly or indirectly, the correctness of ideology, or political orientation of the paper. Radically critical discourse of the government is formed and reproduced through a synergy of views of opposition leaders, public intellectuals and journalists of either daily or weekly newspapers. This kind of media-political approach and practice is deeply rooted in the multi-party system and is not a specialty of our region. The focus of writing is on the challenging, bringing into question, discreditation of the political opponent, and less on the concrete solutions and alternative concepts.

In the period July - September critical discourse dealt primarily with Aleksandar Vučić, the President of the Republic of Serbia and most popular political leader in the country. Compared to previous periods, the research detected the transfer of the focus to the personal level, primarily moral and psychological, while the political and institutional profile of Vučić was placed second. Paralelly with the narrative of degradation, there was a fierce controversy over some aspects of Vučić policy, such as economy and foreign policy. Similar to the previous periods, malicious metaphors and constrained false analogy were used to support different attitudes to Vučić's policy. Negative obsession with Vučić was particularly manifested in the rejection of the idea of internal dialogue on Kosovo. Almost countless articles were written in order to undermine these ideas, with the aim to prove and show that there is no possibility of a democratic political culture and practice in Serbia.

Attitude towards opposition is more complex and expansive. Part of the print media, such as the weekly *Pečat* and the daily *Informer*, adopted a strongly critical, almost incriminating matrix in analytical interpretation of the operation of the opposition. The opposition, primarily Euro-reformative, is undermined in their democratic legitimacy and moral credibility, with almost permanent questioning of their patriotism. In addition to the radically critical attitude towards those who criticize the government, there is a tendency to observe the opposition and its performance from the point of incapability to overthrow the hated government. This kind of interpretation of oppositional action is followed by any good-intentioned advice on how to stand on the path of “Aleksandar Vučić's dictatorship” and apotheosis of opposition engagement as the only correct moral position in the public.



In addition to the undoubted dynamic and controversial political atmosphere, weeklies and many editorial columns in newspapers show a visible tendency for polemics between the media. In sharp political conflict, the media are not displaced as a social factor with own purpose of existence and functioning. Moreover, they do not merely convey certain messages, they also contribute to the vibrant, sharp, somewhat exhausting social and daily political debate.

Weeklies can be divided in two categories. According to the criterion of division common in a democratic society, they should be separated into the ones close to the ruling party's ideology, and those that are moderately or radically critical of the same. In Serbia, this criterion for division cannot be used consistently for the simple reason that all weeklies in Serbia are either partially or completely critical of the party in power. Weekly *Pečat* falls under the category of partially critical of the authorities, because of its open criticizing of the government's pro-European foreign policy under the Vučić's rule. However, this weekly shows strong critical stance towards moral credibility, axiological orientation and political views of the 5th October winners.

On the other hand, weeklies like *NIN*, *Vreme*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* fall under the category of completely critical of the government. There is however a difference in the tone of criticism. While *Vreme* and somewhat *NIN* (especially the domain of domestic politics and economics) are completely, directly and fiercely criticizing the government, weeklies *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* apply a more moderate tone in expressing critical views. Their level of accusing and labeling is far lower than in the cases of *Vreme* and *NIN*.

Another classification that can be applied to the weeklies is their foreign policy orientation. *Vreme*, *NIN*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* are more or less pro-European. On the other hand, the weekly *Pečat* clearly emphasizes the anti-Western and pro-Russian stance, intended to support the nationalist discourse, close to the one which was dominant in wars in the 1990s.

**Image of the Government- image of Aleksandar Vučić - does not accept democratic institutions and practices, a politician without any economic results, media controller, the ultimate manipulator and a political figure unworthy of politics.**

The image of the current government in the analyzed print media is the image of Aleksandar Vučić. This correspondence between the individual, a group and an entire institutional system is obvious and is constructed from a series of interconnected reasons and with a clear epilogue: to make Aleksandar Vučić a synonym with a set of negative characteristics that can be attributed more to political life of interconnected political- national, moral, psychological and cultural levels. Through the prism of identification with a series of negative determinants, Vučić repeatedly appears as an authoritarian leader without democratic-liberal capacity, Machiavellian politician and an exemplary media manipulator, a psychologically unstable person, devoid of self-control and ruled by irrational impulses that pose a danger to the society.



NIN, 21st September 2017



Personification in creating the image of the government achieves two media-politically relevant effects. First confirms the initial assumption of personalized, self-preserving, tyrannical Vučić's government, the second transfers the critical tone, and makes it easier reader, who is the ultimate recipient of political and value messages, to receive the message.

It is a false reality in which there is no place for enlightened values, where the government is chaos, where there is a deficit of rationality that is constantly renewed. To support a disorganized and fictional character of reality, namely the splitting of reality in the "parallel worlds" as a defining principle of reality, testifies the position in the article by Jovana Gligorijević, the journalist of the weekly "*Vreme*: "In the five years, since the change of government in Serbia, essential changes can be counted on the fingers of one hand. However, on the superficial level, so much has accumulated, that we can quite comfortably live in a parallel reality. "<sup>1</sup>

In almost same spirit, with an unconcealed aspiration to be a representative pseudomethaphysics that explains the current political and broader social and historical moment, the leader of the Movement of Free Citizens, Saša Janković, says: "This is all a lie. Investments are a lie, GDP is a lie, jobs are a lie, factories are lies, passing out in the studio is a lie, and bots are lies. When all is built on falsehood then your power is a lie. The government would destroy itself in the mutual struggle for wealth, but for us even another day is too long. "<sup>2</sup> Not much different political reality is described by the deputy Editor in Chief of *NIN*, Vesna Mališić, who says that "the whole our reality is composed of completely false notions formed around the topics, and about all the people who re in the political orbit controlled by the current government". For her, of course, "equally deserving are the leading paramedia, the Serbian parliament and the politicians. United forces turned Serbia into a fair of intolerance and threw it into a quicksand slander and disqualification, believing that, as in a reality program, this is the way to construct and control the citizens' support. Their verbal orientation towards EU is in no alignment with their actual performance."<sup>3</sup>

However, the culmination of a pessimistic attitude towards reality, a kind of moralistic-rhetorical exhibition with a strong understanding of infantile policies, was identified in the attitude of the director Goran Marković, a member of the Movement of Free Citizens: "It's worse than the nineties. Then there was a consensus about the enemy, the dark force that is pushing us to war. Intellectual people were aware of what was going on. And now, in complete misery (not just poverty), the number of these people decreased, most had fled, and those who remained locked the doors of their houses and wait. For what? For someone to make it all right? That will never happen."<sup>4</sup>

In the broader negative context in which Serbia resides, there is an almost "eternal" question of the nature of political system. Despite the constitutional setting and political practice which confirms that Serbia has reached a certain, not so rudimentary level of development of democratic and liberal institu-

tions and practices, comments and interviews in almost all Serbian weeklies, make great effort to show and prove the opposite.

Thus a poet and member of SANU, Matija Bećković, when referring to the President of Serbia and the current political situation in Serbia, emphasizes the negative image Aleksandar Vučić, amended with the moralistic charge of eternal corruption of political elites. Bećković's remarks about the current President of Serbia are presented in an essentially conditional, conventional wisdom, but also in a never proven thesis that the termination of the broadcast of the "Impression of the Week" in 2015, whose author and host Olja Bećković, is Vučić's doing: "There are a few examples that the highest position in the state is used for dealing with one woman. And even fewer instances of provocation of journalists, actors, singers, writers, musicians into a battle of 'who is stronger'. Him- with the army, secret services and the police, or them without anything and anybody. We have a new one-party pluralism on the scene. One political party with many names. Over time, almost all the Serbian democratic post communist constructions are beginning to look like a pumpkin pigsty. Rotating until all grab as much as they can during their five minutes. Who's next, has nothing to do with the people, let alone with my life. No one serious belongs there. Therefore everyone who could, moved away as much as they could."<sup>5</sup>

The negative characterization Vučić's reign, the scientific attempt to explain the thesis, was also rather far-reaching by the journalist of the weekly *NIN*, Dragana Pejović. Referring to the principle of separation of authority, and the actual situation in Serbia, she said that the authorities in Serbia are being misused by the ruling party, namely its leader Aleksandar Vučić, who is also the president of Serbia: "Constitutional lawyers are disappointed that Vučić cut the constitutional custom and kept a presidential function in the party. These two functions, if you read the Constitution, are strictly incompatible. Presidential function is incompatible with any other public function. Incorporating actual presidential and prime minister's function in one person, leads to monocefality. The President who is also head of the ruling party (in which, as in others, discipline is strict) will soon rule the National Assembly by the party's legal mechanisms of obedience. As ministers, the MPs will also listen to the President, because he is their boss, and not according to the law, regulations and authorizations. In fact, only the authority of the President in relation to the Government is to propose a mandatary, and to the Parliament (not) to sign the laws adopted by it." <sup>6</sup>

That political reality in Serbia indeed functions, either voluntarily, or spontaneously, confirms the columnist for *Danas* and *Nedeljnik*, Zoran Panović. In one of his many published articles in the period July-September, the journalist writes: "We have become a society where common sense once again became a scarce commodity. The government, which is the most responsible, treats the opposition as an internal enemy. Although it has an electoral legitimacy (despite serious democratic deficits in recent presidential elections) Vucic's government often gives the impression of the revolutionary one (tends to be rounded at each level)."<sup>7</sup>

1 Jovana Gligorijević, „Zapisi sa ruba pameti [Writings from the edge of reason],“ *Vreme*, No. 1383, p. 20

2 Saša Janković, „Spasiću Vučića da ne završi kao Čaušesku [I will save Vučić so that he doesn't end up like Causes-cue],“ interview with Danica Vučinić, *NIN*, No. 3482, p. 10

3 Vesna Mališić, „Grmljavina [Thunder],“ *NIN*, No. 3480, p. 3

4 Goran Marković, „Život u vladavini apsolutne laži [Life in the absolute lie],“ *Vreme*, No. 1390, p. 10

5 Matija Bećković, „Mentalno zdravlje je najskuplja srpska reč [Mental health is the most expensive Serbian word],“ interview with Radmila Stanković, *NIN*, No. 3478

6 Dragana Pejović, „Kakav Ustav, zna se ko je šef [What about Constitution? The boss knows],“ *NIN*, No. 3473, p.20.

7 Zoran Panović, „Opozicioni anarhizam [Opposition Anarchism],“ *Nedeljnik*, No. 293, p. 18

Some of the former officials of the Democratic Party directly support the thesis about the political repression of opponents conducted by the current government led by Aleksandar Vučić. At the same time, there is an indirect thesis that democracy was on the rise during their reign. The aim is to show the value and political differences, to encourage nostalgia for a “golden era of democracy in the era of the Democratic Party,” and to introduce former voters of this once powerful political party into the arena. All these motives and intentions of propaganda, can be detected from the following quote of the interview with Oliver Dulić, minister of ecology in the coalition government from 2008-2012, led by the member of the Democratic Party, Dr. Mirko Cvetković. Oliver Dulić, indirectly accepting Panović’s vocabulary and the way of thinking says: “Only at that time there was no spilling of the water, swearing, physical fights and expulsion of MPs in the Parliament. From that position I left without creating any animosity. Although I feel great hatred from the present government, the opposition at the time, I do not understand what causes this. I was more than correct with the people that today want to cause me harm. It seems that this is their nature I have no other explanation. Most people eventually get tired of evil and the hatred disappears, but these guys are in a really good shape. It is enough to say that they had no obstacle to create a modern European right-wing party, as they called themselves then. At the time when they were created, they were not persecuted, media lynched, denied of funding, their mandates seized, threatened ... If the methods of treatment of the opposition in the media and some institutions that currently in use were, even only partially applied then, SNS would not exist. We were different after all.”<sup>8</sup>

In a similar manner, the leader of the opposition Movement of Free Citizens, Saša Janković claims that the government does not only treat political opponents as internal enemies, but it also continuously provokes conflicts and uses them as the basis for survival, “Progressive power permanently builds conflict because this is where it is at home, threatening and thus surviving. Instead of dialogue about diversity, they are in the business of ‘winning over the opponents’. Even as the Ombudsman I warned of this. Mottled train, withdrawal of ambassadors, all this has a purpose of creating conflict and manipulation...” In support of the intent to construct a negative image of the government as particularly prone to repression, which seeks to eliminate political opponents, Janković offers the never proven story that came from the anonymous security sources- the incident at a political rally shortly after the presidential elections: “After the presidential elections I did not come to the student demonstrations, and now is the time to say it, because I knew that the scenario was being prepared – that Molotov cocktails would be thrown at shops and that I would be photographed in the crowd with titles saying that “Janković causes chaos” and that this would finally justify violence against demonstrators. Who were not ready. Aleksandar Vučić has a subconscious scenario in which he lights everything on fire around him, as Nero in Rome. I guess he thinks that this is the way for history to remember him. Three years ago, I told him that I will be the one to save him not to suffer the fate of Ceausescu. No one should end up like that; no good future is built on the remains of that.”<sup>9</sup>

What is also indicative is the discourse of propaganda analogies that establish this identification of Aleksandar Vučić with distinctly negative personas, such as Nero, decadent Roman emperor, and Nico-

8 Oliver Dulić, „Spreman sam da idem u zatvor [I am ready for prison],” interview with Nenad Čaluković, *Nedeljnik*, br. 293, p. 23

9 Saša Janković, „Spasiću Vučića da ne završi kao Čaušesku [I will save Vučić so that he doesn't end up like Causescu],” interview with Danica Vučinić, *NIN*, No. 3482

la Ceausescu, Romania’s communist dictator, who was executed after a coup in the late eighties. This kind of propaganda discourse substitutes for the rational critical, factual, compelling and consistent value approach, which should aim mapping the key deficiencies of government. This way, the criticism of works on the principle of continuous playback of political and moralistic idiosyncrasies which place the negative obsession Aleksandar Vučić in the very center. These analogies are just a few examples. The fashion of labeling is present in many interviews and articles. Their motivation and desired outcome lies on the thesis of the radical delegitimization of the presidential elections, which subsequently includes the street as a legitimate level of political life. An example of this attitude is outlined in the position of the supporter of the candidate Sasa Janković, an actor Sergej Trifunović: “What president ?! Of which country? The first definition of the state is to have clearly defined boundaries; this is where we fail instantly. We have no boundaries. Second, the head of state who stole the elections with a turnout of 55 per cent ... they are deliberately making people sick of politics so they could manipulate with them. So, it's not my president, I'm sorry, I will not call him the president of this country. Maybe Prece-dnik of this country.”<sup>10</sup>

In a similar grim tone, highly politicized, without much rationality and with a deficit of tolerance and moral considerations, director Janko Baljak, also an activist of the Movement of Free Citizens, said that Vučić’s government is full of bandits, devoid of democratic capacities, steeped in crime and corruption, and prone to the strange system of values: “This is not a joke. Their press releases and news, people think it’s njuz net. It’s ugly. We lost our country. It is a private company of Aleksandar Vučić, his brother and the crew, little we know, but we’ll find out. If this was a theater play it would be an absurd comedy, really good stuff for a Monty Python movie ... His transformation was a trick for fools, a cosmetic transformation. He hasn’t moved from the radical mindset and this shows when he gets annoyed, then you see Šešelj’s best students. This sadistic sense of humor, I will not say against political opponents because Vučić does not consider them political opponents - for him they are scum, idiots, and morons.”<sup>11</sup>

In order to avoid the objection that the interviews are personally passionate and as such politically irrelevant, Baljak and Trifunović resort to mimicry. This rhetorical maneuver is intended to appear not as an expression of moralistic and ideological idiosyncrasies, but as a description of political reality dominated by moral confusion and political chaos. So Janko Baljak says: “I do not hate him. I hate the system of values that he established. I hate Serbia, in which he is the president. I hate relationships, moral values that are based on fear, poltroons, demagogy, cult of personality, backed by a huge emptiness.”<sup>12</sup>

In the same self-refuting manner, that proves the opposite of what he actually claims, the actor Sergej Trifunović, resolutely says: “I do not hate anybody, I do not hate Vučić and his gang, whatever I may think of them. I just have contempt for them; see them as greedy and arrogant bunch of thieves. I think that some should be hospitalized, some put in prison, some for example, sprinkled with tar and feathers and forced to walk through Belgrade.”<sup>13</sup>

10 Sergej Trifunović, „Srušen je i mnogo jači lik [We took down an even stronger guy],” interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3480, p. 19

11 Janko Baljak, „Zavisimo od volje jednog čoveka [We depend on the will of one man],” interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3475, p. 19

12 Ibid, p. 20

13 Sergej Trifunović, „Srušen je i mnogo jači lik [We took down an even stronger guy],” interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3480, p. 21



Novi magazin, 6th July 2017

Subject of sarcastic analysis of the political and psychological aroma, was the announcement of the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, that he would not run for another term. Like the “prophet”, Editor of *Vreme* Dragoljub Žarković, saw through the falsehood in Vučić’s announcement, calling him a political demagogue, and his immediate associates greedy political potentates who want to remain in power at all costs: “He has created expectations of a better life, and until this is achieved has no right to withdraw in his splendid isolation of self-love, into his historical success that no instrument can measure. All this, dear gentlemen, is an act and Vučić will never abdicate and give up the party machinery that guarantees him power. Even if he wanted, his party will not let him: they have just climbed the horse, and he holds the stealing reigns, the cash has just started to rotate, power has only lightly touched them, they have only just got the jobs they know nothing about... and they perform them with an amazing ease.”<sup>14</sup>

The culmination of political and moralistic attacks stems from an interview with the president of the People’s Party, the unsuccessful presidential candidate from the previous elections and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk Jeremić. This opposition political activist, identified the current, democratically-elected Serbian president, Aleksandar Vučić, with a criminogenic football fan - a hooligan.

In an interview for the weekly newspaper *NIN*, political leader Vuk Jeremić “diplomatically abstained” says: “Everything he does just reflects his hooligan mindset, and the system of values of which the physical violence is a legitimate component. It is the matrix of behavior which he propagates and transmits to all pores of society. With every passing day, month and year of this elemental political disaster, we sink deeper and deeper.”<sup>15</sup>

It is not possible, or it is highly unlikely that you will defeat the hooligan, violent and authentic “undemocratic power” in elections. For political change, much more is needed. Inasmuch, the suggestion of the already mentioned Goran Marković, that elections as a procedure of distributing political power should be avoided, acts as a practical outcome of a joint “critical” enterprise that brings together journalists, engaged intellectuals and leaders of the opposition. Marković about his idea of political struggle says the following: “I believe more and more that such elections, with one single candidate who has won in advance, are completely absurd. I do not believe in the change of power in a game in which he is the only one who sees the cards, and the rest do not even know the rules of the game which is being played. It is necessary to put pressure on the government to agree to the elemental fair conditions of the elections or not participate in them. This is, I know, very difficult when Europe, for its own selfish interests, is supported by a man who, openly, violates the elementary human rights embodied in the founding charter of the European Union. By the way, the ‘foreign mercenary’ phrase, which Vučić constantly uses, mostly refers to him.”<sup>16</sup>

14 Dragoljub Žarković, „Istorijski uspesi – eno ga Pens još kroz otvorena vrata Bele Kuće maše put aerodroma Dulles International. Javite potpredsedniku da je predsednik stigao kući [Historical success – There waves Pence through the open door of White house heading for Dulles International. Tell the president that the president has come home],” *Vreme*, No. 1385, p. 4

15 Vuk Jeremić, „Vučić se ponaša kao huligan [Vučić behaves like a hooligan],” interview with Olja Bećković, *NIN*, No. 3481, p. 14

16 Goran Marković, „Život u vladavini apsolutne laži [Life in the absolute lie],” *Vreme*, No. 1390, p. 14

Immediately after assuming office as president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić announced the launch of an internal dialogue on Kosovo with a goal to reaching a solution that would be acceptable for the broadest layers of Serbian society, with prior agreement with all relevant social participants. Although the dialogue is basically a democratic idea, this initiative has become controversial for almost all political and social participants who define themselves as advocates of democratic values and practices.

Headlines in the print media in the period from July to September more than unequivocally suggest the basis for the tendency that Aleksandar Vučić is always and everywhere denied any original democratic capacity. The main reasons for rejecting the idea of internal dialogue are the treatment of political rivals by the current government in public and the absence of debate on other issues that, according to the opinion of the political leaders of the opposition and their media followers.

The largest number of articles on the topic of internal dialogue represents more or less a variation of the two aforementioned reasons for which the initiative of the Serbian president is unacceptable. From this approach, it becomes clear that the negative obsession with Aleksandar Vučić is more important than the presentation of views on Kosovo by relevant political participants and media employees. Examples of this sort of media tendency are numerous. Thus, Dragoljub Mićunović, president of the Political Council of the Democratic Party, said in an interview for the newspaper *Vreme*: “The dialogue means that you have a democratic atmosphere in which people are equal, so dialogue, just like an agreement or a treaty, is not possible without the equality of parties participating in it. Otherwise, if one side is strong and imposes its will, then there is no dialogue, only dictation and ordering remain. That’s why it is mandatory for democratic societies to sustain a dialogue, because, therefore, they equally accept the topic and status of the one they are talking to. Do we have a necessary democratic atmosphere for internal dialogue? While the president of the Serbian Progressive Party calls for a dialogue, the information service of that party, after a minute of expression of the opposition’s opinion on TV, sends a statement of the destructive contents that the author showered with insults. In this matter, the Vice President of the Serbian Progressive Party may have gone too far, with an imprudent attack on the former president of the state and now the president of an opposition party. The problem of our political culture is that it is dominated by a monologue trying to turn into a ‘command’, as in the army, where only one voice is heard, and the rest are not. The dialogue, let me say it again, is possible if you have decent and equal citizens. Secondly, we have never been free from the hatred of intolerance.”<sup>17</sup>

In a somewhat more straightforward and in a way that is more understandable to a reader, the editor of *Vreme*, Dragoljub Žarković, refutes Vučić’s idea of internal dialogue, justifying his attitude with the fact how the Serbian Progressive Party and Vučić himself treat political opponents. It is clear, the “sharp analytical eye” and the unmistakable intuition of this columnist were never bothered by the way in which Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party were treated by political opponents and opposition media. From the principle of unilateral approach and bias in conclusion, Žarković can express the following view: “Those with whom it would be normal to talk with he calls thieves, rascals, Vlachs, racketeers, and whatnot, and expects that they will, as the sacrificial lambs, submissively obey ritual slaughtering in order that he, as the supreme witchdoctor after a thorough examination of the battered animals, de-

17 Dragoljub Mićunović, „Nema dijaloga na lažima [No dialogue with lies],” interview with Ivan Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, No. 1387, p. 12

termines whether good times are ahead of us or we are about to face a new qualm in which our ‘rascals’ (read: children) will again give their lives for the celestial kingdom which Vučić already visited once and established that there was nothing more visible than Šešelj’s stomach. So if Vučić really cares about dialogue, he has to establish it with political parties in Serbia, and not with ordered partners, otherwise inclined to internal dialogues only if it is profitable.”<sup>18</sup>

A certain amount of hesitation concerning the importance of the internal dialogue on Kosovo was brought out in an interview with *Vreme*, by a retired Serbian Army officer and now opposition activist, Sreto Malinović. However, the initial suspicion is easily overcome, with strong opposition charges, which, as in the case of the previously mentioned journalists and politicians, are obvious. A slightly longer quotation from the interview shows how the initial dilemma has been overcome by a strong anti-Vučić attitude. His reflection on the issue of internal dialogue is presented in “This is a question of the interests of our state and the issue of the status of our non-Albanian citizens in Kosovo and Metohija. Thinking as a soldier, it may be wrong to leave to the president, whatever he may be, regardless of how he treated us, to make some difficult decisions by himself. Anyone in power in this political situation, in the region and in the world, would have to do some unpopular things for our people and our country. That’s one aspect. On the other hand, everything that has happened over the past five years, all contracts, agreements, deals, all communication with the public and society, has come down to the monologue of one man. As one would say - you ordered music, drinks, you did what you wanted, and now, everybody has to pay the bill. He wants to transfer the mortgage to people who were so much scorned, labeled in different ways. This is another aspect, and the question is how much this internal dialogue would really be a dialogue, and how much of the internal dialogue of the President. The popular series ‘Monologue with the Prime Minister’ will be replaced by the ‘Inner Presidential Dialogue’ series. All that remains is to see a list of statistics. The climate on our public scene is not healthy; it’s made so by those who run it. Go on and explain to families of missing persons from Kosovo and Metohija that this Serbian list whose victory Marko (Đurić) celebrates with the trumpets will enter the government of Ramuš Haradinaj, the creator of the Yellow House. The host of the Yellow House. You see how cruel it looks when the force makes those big patriots from the tavern to do all the dirty work.”<sup>19</sup>

With much less dilemma, extremely opposed and sharply critical, completely in the manner of opposition’s devastating political nihilism, already quoted director, Janko Baljak expresses his attitude on the internal dialogue on Kosovo. In an interview with the radically opposing weekly newspaper *NIN*, not choosing his words, he says: “It’s a shame that on the day when he calls for a dialogue on Kosovo, at the same time he has this savage, frustrated, dreadful interview with *Pink*. Who will talk with you, man, when you only listen to yourself, ask and answer questions by yourself, and do not let the journalist utter anything?”<sup>20</sup>

18 Dragoljub Žarković, „Platforma unutrašnjeg dijaloga: Ako je Vučiću zbilja stalo do dijaloga o statusu Kosova, on mora da ga uspostavi sa političkim strankama u Srbiji, a ne sa naručenim partnerima [Internal dialogue platform: If Vučić really cares about dialogue on the status of Kosovo, he must establish it with political parties in Serbia, not with ordered partners],” *Vreme*, No. 1386, p. 4

19 Sreto Malinović. „Igre bez granica kafanskih patriota [Games Without Borders of Patriots From Pubs],” interview with Radoslav Čebić, *Vreme*, No. 1388, p. 24

20 Janko Baljak, „Zavisimo od volje jednog čoveka [We depend on the will of one man],” interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3475, p. 21



The presentation of critical views on the issue of internal dialogue on Kosovo, which served to prove the many-time launched thesis about Vučić as a politician inclined to perfidious manipulations, can be concluded with a quotation from the text of *NIN* journalist Vesna Mališić who openly reproduces the standpoint of the opposition parties skillfully hiding behind high moral customs and journalistic freedoms and professionalism: "What dialogue can we speak of in the atmosphere where media and political firing units are repeating all the weapons that are available against anyone who dares to say a critical word, proving in such a way devotion and loyalty to the President of the state while at the same time reinforcing their own armchair or position. How can there be a dialogue if it is abolished in a parliament that looks more like a punitive expedition that verbally lynches any dissonant voice that is heard; when the regulatory bodies come to the authorities instead of protecting citizens and institutions. When it is tried without a trial, charged and adjudicated in the media, when for any disagreement conviction, revenge, punishment or retribution are immediately received. And when the presumption of innocence is only a mere paragraph of the law, a legal decoration that should show how much we have harmonized Serbia with Europe in the papers, but in reality it is violated by the media, politicians and the President of the state. How can a dialogue be established when the support is constantly measured, and the defenders of the character and work of the President are counted, and triumphs the immature political competence in which the successes of this government are constantly compared to the failures of all the previous ones."<sup>21</sup>

If the critical undermining of the dialogue was to prove a significant deficit of democracy in the actions of President Aleksandar Vučić, the thesis on tacit support of the European Union to his politics for Kosovo aims to fully prove that the first man of Serbian politics is a completely controversial political figure from a democratic point of view. At the same time, this thesis shows the readiness of the European Union to sacrifice the values of democracy, freedom and justice with the expectation of lasting security stability in the Western Balkans. Vučić's co-operation over Kosovo implies European tolerance for the deficit of democracy in Serbia. It is about the trade of the Serbian authorities of European bureaucrats that is destroying European values, and leaves the authentic Euro-reform opposition tacitly either to repression of power or to marginalization by the omnipotent authorities.

The narrative about the geopolitical shiftiness of the West and the acceptance of the anti-liberal populist Vučić is undermining the prospects for Serbia's modernization and preserving the unbearable state of affairs in politics, economy and society in Serbia. The privileged status of Vučić was "earned" by gradual institutional-political relocation of Kosovo from Serbia, while he was given "free hands" as compensation in relation to political power, the media, and public resources. Real concessions on Kosovo, Vučić, as suggested by almost dogmatic opposition beliefs, compensates with the hysterical pro-Russian propaganda intended for his electorate, as well as the "media lynch" against political opponents. In its implicit conclusion, the narrative of the opposition points to the following: while Kosovo leaves, Vučić strengthens his leverage of power, controlling through the media fears and expectations of the largest part of the population. This often told opposition saga of political upheavals with the West and the current President of Serbia got a strong coverage in the weekly newspapers in the period from July to September.

The politically "dishonorable" pact of Vučić and the European Union is the subject of numerous columnists and interviewees. For the purposes of illustrating the aforementioned opposition narrative on the

21 Vesna Mališić, "Dijalog u minskom polju [Dialogue in the minefield]," *NIN*, No. 3475, p. 3

complicity of the West in the implementation of the "dictatorship" in Serbia, several citations from the abundance of the researched material will be extracted. The already quoted Sergej Trifunović prophesies to Vučić, but also to the fate of Kosovo and Serbia: "... I think this team will very successfully and skillfully lower itself when Vučić keeps all the promises given to Merkel. When he recognizes Kosovo, does the task for which he is brought to power, they will remove him themselves, that is, they will help us to take him down."<sup>22</sup>

In the same manner as Trifunović, opposition leader Saša Janković is indignant over the European Union's politics, striving to sharply criticize, understand the European Union, and offer her a way out of a morally and politically unsustainable position: "The European Union makes a historic mistake. It is going astray, pretending not to see the birth of a dictatorship, following the logic of less resistance. And maybe they really think that we deserve nothing else than the caricature of democracy, but the fact that some of them expect us to agree with that is offending. Whenever Han, Kurz, or anyone else comes and says that he is fascinated by how well we are doing, confidence in the European Union drops by at least one percent. People do not like having their intelligence insulted. The politics in which you humor the wrong one, and putting the allies on ice thinking that they will forgive you when your priorities are changed is shortsighted. When they finally realize that that which is bad from the beginning does not improve with the length of time, they will again start helping the opposition and non-governmental organizations, Vučić will become hysterical and start arresting for this, and we are again, oh joy, back on the street. I would like us to avoid that. Western diplomats cannot fully, logically, understand the circumstances in Serbia, their coordinate system is different."<sup>23</sup>

Aleksandar Vučić's coming to power and maintenance of it within the broader geopolitical movements in the Western Balkans, as motive in the interpretation of political processes in the country, is also seen by Vuk Jeremić. Jeremić even thinks that to the West, the political profile of Aleksandar Vučić, is appropriate because the authoritarian leader who perfectly fulfills their demands represents an optimal solution for the protection of Western interests. Instead of a patriotic and democratically oriented leader, the West wants a warden who is obedient and who requires the obedience of those he governs. Unlike Janković, Jeremić does not show understanding of the "different coordinate system" of Western politicians, but declaratively, as he always does, defies because the need to flatter the patriotic part of the electorate: "There is an impression that there are a number of Western politicians who are interested to make The Balkans serve as the 'buffer zone' between Europe and the Middle East. Bearing in mind the events from that place, it is natural to expect that in the future, there will be an escalation of the crisis, such as that of refugees in 2015. That is why it is necessary to form a continental lobby, where it will be possible to absorb all potential shocks. Why would they need democracy and freedom of speech in such a place? Here the democratic order is a surplus - only the manager is needed, and Aleksandar Vučić meets all the characteristics of an efficient camp manager. That's why they turn a blind eye to his ruthless excesses."<sup>24</sup>

22 Sergej Trifunović, „Srušen je i mnogo jači lik [We took down an even stronger guy]," interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3480, p. 20

23 Saša Janković, „Spasiću Vučića da ne završi kao Čaušesku [I will save Vučić so that he doesn't end up like Causes-cue]," *NIN*, No. 3482

24 Vuk Jeremić, „Vučić se ponaša kao huligan [Vučić acts like a hooligan]," *NIN*, No. 3481, p. 13

As part of the narrative on the Vučić-European Union foreign politics pact, the story of Serbia's successes in relations with the countries of the region has developed. This circumstance is supported by a vast number of European officials, and the fact is that in the case of two disputes with Croatia over the past two years, the European Union has stuck to Serbia rather than its member country. Nevertheless, even an indisputable step forward is contested by Jeremić's attitude towards regional politics as a show for the Serbian people. Namely, the current government, in addition to persistently insisting on its own successes, (mis)uses citizens' aspiration for certainty and security in relation to the neighboring states and people. The goal is to present oneself as the exclusive protector of the nation in comparing the strengths with other neighboring, as a rule, rival nations. A mixture of cooperation and rivalry in relations between Serbia and its neighbors is merely an opiate for the people which Jeremić so clearly wants to neutralize and clearly demystify: "The main characteristic of our regional politics is the artificial creation of crises for the needs of the regime media. Instead of pursuing serious politics, spy soap operas are designed with a goal to make those who directed them also solve them a few days later, to show themselves as peacemakers and guarantors of stability in the Balkans."<sup>25</sup>

A large space in weekly newspapers is dedicated to the sharp criticism of the economic politics of the Government of the Republic of Serbia. In accordance with the methodological principle of personalization of criticism and writing about economic results, is aimed at reviewing the economic and political decisions and attitudes of the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić. This view of the government's economic politics is also justified by the fact that the current Serbian government, led by Ana Brnabić, is pursuing the politics of continuity with the former, whose current prime minister was the current president.

The main points of criticism are the low GDP growth, the politics of subsidies to foreign investors and, finally, the position of workers in the labor market. The critique is written according to a model that consistently stresses deficiencies and neglects or diminishes any positive shifts. It is interesting that the weekly newspapers of European-reformist and market-based commitments put on the side or silence any positive results of economic developments observed by the IMF or the World Bank. The goal of writing is obviously to inflict political damage on the government. Economic issues are viewed from the perspective of daily politics, or more precisely, daily political propaganda.

In the manner of ironic emphasizing of shortcomings and harsh criticism of the authorities, the editor of the weekly newspaper *NIN*, Milan Ćulibrk, on the issue of social product growth and increase, writes: "Can such promises of a 'record' increase in wages and pensions be fulfilled and who will in a couple of months tell the citizens the bad news? Who will be surprised, and who will be offended? And who will be guilty in the eyes of citizens if there is no promised raise? Vučić or Brnabić? The one who promised the moon, or whoever admits that all of it was like Potemkin's villages? And is it not this perhaps the key reason why Ana Brnabić became the Prime minister? Vučić's promises of an average salary of 440, 450 or 500 Euros by November (this does not apply to December, because then, half the January salary is paid in advance) can only be realized if Governor Jorgovanka Tabaković cuts the rate to 80 dinars for one Euro. I hope she did not take this as a serious advice. But what

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, p.10

if she did? Here, I'll admit: it was just an insane joke. Although to me as well as every sixth person from the voters list, a stronger dinar is more convenient, until we return loans indexed in Euros."<sup>26</sup>

Similar, almost symmetrical view of economic politics is emphasized by Radmilo Marković, a journalist of *Vreme*. His intention is to show the futility of the politics of increasing salaries and pensions. At the same time, there is a negative attitude towards institution building and the rule of law. Consciously ignoring the circumstances of Serbia's progress on the World Bank's "Doing Business List" and the higher level of investments than projected according to the indicators of National Bank of Serbia, Marković draws critical writing from a primarily rational level to the level of intense controversy. It is clear that his "own" attitude is "covered" by a quote from the blogger Slaviša Tasić, making, thus, his presentation obtain a supposedly scientific form: "You can use short-term measures to pump such indicator. The easiest way to do this is by state consumption through borrowing. State consumption is a major component of GDP and additional spending, hiring or raising wages in the public sector through state borrowing can already increase GDP in the short term," Tasić writes, among other things, on the blog 'Market Solution' (August 9). It is clear that Vučić will by disproportionately increasing wages and pensions (10% is mentioned, and the growth of the economy is, as we saw, only close to two) increase the imports far more than production. This will, consequently, increase the trade deficit which will have to be covered somehow, which will furthermore continue to increase debts and ultimately the public debt. The thing Vučić will certainly not do - which would undoubtedly increase GDP growth - is strengthening the institutions and the rule of law in order to significantly increase private investments, and the overall relationship between investments and GDP, from the level of depreciation to a quarter of GDP."<sup>27</sup>

On the same spiritual-political frequency, with the columnists of *NIN* and *Vreme* is the leader of the Free Citizens Movement, Saša Janković, who sharply criticizes the state of economic growth in Serbia. In addition to the economic critique, Janković is disdainful towards democracy in Serbia, seeking in an utterly vague way the stronghold of the ancient philosopher Socrates and the phantom term "Socrates' curse": "We have the lowest economic growth in Europe, and the man in power shamelessly claims that it is the highest. The decent people in front of the TV screen cannot figure out that someone is lying so brutally and they trust him. We are victims of the Socratic curse. 25 centuries ago, Socrates said that, when democracy prevails, if there is no way to prevent thieves and bastards from coming to power in a democratic way, greater tyranny than all monarchies and autocracy together will be established. We in Serbia are living it."<sup>28</sup>

In the manner of the journalistic and political paradigm of the necessity of "criticizing everything existing," a radically negative attitude about the politics of government is registered in the writing of Petrica Đaković. He is questioning the politics of state subsidies to investors without a previous reflection on the comparative experience of countries that are at a similar stage of economic development as Serbia: "In the ten years of implementing anti-economic policies of subsidies to foreign investors, the government has changed, but Serbia's strategic goal, to be a country of exploited and cheap labor force

<sup>26</sup> Milan Ćulibrk, „Kule i gradovi ili Potemkinova sela [Towers and towns or Potemkin villages],“ *NIN*, No. 3476, p. 3

<sup>27</sup> Radmilo Marković, „Kraj naprednjačke bajke [The End of the Progressive Fairytale],“ *Vreme*, No. 1391

<sup>28</sup> Saša Janković, „Spasiću Vučića da ne završi kao Čaušesku [I will save Vučić so that he doesn't end up like Causes-cue],“ *NIN*, No. 3482



that pays with its own money to be exploited - remains unchanged – a country of non-freedom and socio-economic blackmail that generates political vassalage.”<sup>29</sup>

A special type of critical review of the socio-economic situation with a review of their moral and socio-psychological consequences is given by the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the *NIN*, Vesna Mališić. Her critical attitude is linked to the front page of the weekly newspaper *NIN*, where Serbia is identified with the Nazi Auschwitz camp: “Shut it, at least you have social and pension. Put up with it. Pretend. Nod your head. Do not stand out. Try to make an individual strategy on how to survive. Try to become invisible if you do not want to be close to those who decide on your life. Because if you lose your job in the country of Serbia, which every day in every way progresses more and more, you will not find another one so easily. And that means you will not literally be able to survive, let alone pay a loan or educate children. It is a sword that affects the life of an individual and threatens every time he is tempted to be more human than an employee. Even when one thinks he’s looking for the rights he is entitled to by law. The fear of losing a job has always been a guardian of the order. That is why all the prognoses of those who believed that the tragic social position of the workers would cause unrest in large scale, fell into the water. And paradoxically, the basis of every populist government was made up precisely by the ones who are leading the most difficult lives.”<sup>30</sup>

It is interesting to note that in the interpretation of economic and social conditions in Serbia, two mutually exclusionary thoughts and political forms were used - socialist and non-liberal. When it is necessary to bring into question legal solutions to labor relations and labor market conditions, critics such as Vesna Mališić use leftist ideas about the dignity of workers and social injustice that they are currently experiencing. On the other hand, when the Serbian government decides to stimulate consumption through a politics of increasing wages and pensions, as Radmilo Marković’s text shows, critical discourse will reach for attitudes which are an integral part of neoliberal economic theory and practice. Critical eclecticism in the domain of interpretation of economic and social issues shows not only the absence of a consistent critical form but also suggests that the primary motive and goal of journalistic writing is to undermine the government’s move in propaganda manner.

## The image of the opposition - without political legitimacy, morally controversial, patriotically unconvincing, or weak, but historically and politically necessary; victim of repression of the regime that has a chance for a new beginning

Unlike the government, the image of the opposition in weekly newspapers and editorial columns is depicted in a more complex way. On the one hand, in certain media which are close to the government, the opposition is tagged with negative value, politically and morally condemned with a significant dose of

euphoria and sharp, categorical and disqualifying judgments. On the other hand, certain, primarily critical-minded media open up the space for the explication and articulation of oppositional views, indirectly or directly supporting them in a fierce political struggle with power.

And in the period after the presidential elections, the relation between the treatment of the opposition and the government is identical, when we talk about the quantity of media space in the print media. Unlike the current government that is significantly present in news columns in daily and weekly newspapers, the opposition is much less a subject of dealing within journalistic circles, especially those who fulfill their professional engagement in weekly newspapers. The reasons for such an opposition status are many. Among them, it seems that two are the most important. Firstly, the influence of the opposition on the dynamics of the outcome of political processes in the country is not great. The government has a convincing majority both in the Assembly and in the public opinion. Secondly, a great number, or rather, almost all weekly newspapers in a specific sense, are critically oriented towards the authorities. Their thematic orientation is that the opposition, in the comments and editors’ columns, more or less comes down to several descriptive, mostly critical remarks. At the same time, the orientation on the critique of the government, on its own, entails a little space devoted to a critical analysis of the period in which the opposition was occupying the positions of the government.

Critical position towards the opposition is most present in the daily newspaper *Informer*, especially in the columns, by Dragan J. Vučićević, editor-in-chief of this daily newspaper. Columns and writing of the *Informer* and the column of the main and responsible person Dragan J. Vučićević are of particular importance for understanding the negative image of the opposition. Vučićević’s columns in the moral-political sense problematize participants on the opposition scene, the same way they critically treat the opposition media and non-governmental organizations, with almost unavoidable reflection on the period of the rule of the winners of the 5<sup>th</sup> October demonstrations. The basic theses of these theses could be summarized in the following three mutually related moments that form the approach of this author: 1) the current opposition has no moral credibility (because of the highly corrupt political class which it consists of) and the political capacity to lead the state due to the failure of the transition in Serbia; 2) in the opposition oriented media, and among the print media, which make the majority, the current government is being attacked without a serious rational reasoning and with one sole aim to overturn it as soon as possible; 3) in the media that support the current opposition there is undoubted discrimination of all non-direct opponents of Vučić’s authority.

For the understanding of the media-political scene in Serbia, the writing of the editor-in-chief of *Informer* is relevant because of three interrelated reasons. Firstly, the style of writing and the content of messages from his texts are such that he maintains an interest in politics in the lower educated layers who mainly buy and read tabloids and are very loyal voters in the electoral process. Secondly, *Informer* is important for the current government, because every week, every day, it deals with the re-examination of negative attitudes and media-political images that are created and continuously reproduced by critically-minded media. And finally, *Informer* is the leader of the daily newspapers in creating a negative image of the current opposition as a political participant.

The characteristic style of Vučićević’s writing, or more precisely, the description of the opposition as a political protagonist involves a review of the period of the year 2012 which is marked negatively, morally

29 Petrica Đaković, „Ugovori o nedelu [Contracts about misdeeds],“ *NIN*, No. 3473, p. 24

30 Vesna Mališić, „Čuti, trpi, klimaj glavom [Shut up, suffer, nod your head],“ *NIN*, No. 3473, p. 4

and psychologically condemned and politically disqualified: "Do you remember that commercial 'Go in, get out and it's done'? It was a TV spot of one foreign bank, forcing naive customers to make-believe favorable cash-loans. That was the motto which had the yellow dosist bandits elaborated to perfection, those who had ruled this unfortunate country until 2012. You go into the state bank, take as much as you want and you're done - you never return a dinar to the state, you steal all the money, and in the public you play the part of important and successful businessmen. The plundering of state banks through 'non-refundable loans' was a generally accepted practice, a business model of a yellow parasite provisory (just remember 'Agrobanka'). Such a system of state looting, for the sake of personal and party interests of kleptomaniac quasilites, have also been financed by the media that have held the Serbs for years in a state of collective delirium."<sup>31</sup>

Exactly that transition from 2000 to 2012 enabled the acquisition of great material wealth by the political elite gathered in the parties of the winners of the 5<sup>th</sup> October. The spread of suspicion regarding the way of acquiring the great wealth of politicians is one of the most convincing and strongest motives in his critique of moral and political profile. Vučićević reaches for the motive for moralistic criticism of the personal wealth of politicians when he writes about the leader of the Democratic Party, Dragan Šutanovac. What follows is the coming to light of the personal and strong moralistic dimension of his style of writing: "When Dragan Šutanovac, the son of the late decent and honest construction worker Pera Šutanovac, a former minister and a deputy who entered high politics from Mirijevo's one-room apartment with previous work experience of the bouncer in the 'Trezor' club, has 300,000 Euros cash invented in a verdict by a commission in the First Basic Court in Belgrade in only two bank accounts; when, from the same verdict, we find that besides the penthouse near the Temple of St. Sava on Vračar, which is worth millions and cash in the bank he also has artistic paintings and expensive watches; and when *Informer* afterwards, according to all the rules of the journalistic craft, asks: Šule, where did you find the dough when in your life you never did anything other than politics?"<sup>32</sup>

In Vučićević's vision, the opposition liberal, deprived of moral credibility and authentic public support, is inclined to call for an extra-institutional form of political struggle that does not exclude the possibility of violent overthrows if conditions are created for it: "Supported by the tycoon-Brussels-Washington millions, put up to it by Western ambassadors, driven by a chronic complex of higher values, the valiant Serbian opposition will try to take politics at all costs to the streets. Since they understand that in fair, democratic elections, at least in the next five years - somewhat thanks to their nonsense, somewhat thanks to the collective Serbian mind - they have no chance, they will create a media-political state of emergency in the coming autumn/winter season in order to forcefully try to, already in spring, take over the government in Belgrade. The criminal plan, which was utterly elaborated around midnight this Tuesday, was elaborated in the Dedinje residence of the flamboyant gay Ambassador and it includes radical methods. Not only demonstrations and walks – they know that they cannot count on a critical mass of people - but the methods of a special war as it was led not so long ago in Ukraine and Macedonia."<sup>33</sup>

According to Vučićević's opinion, the tendency towards accepting violent methods of political struggle is convergent with the inability of the oppositions to develop a concrete political program, even at the

31 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Medijska pljačka [Media plunder],“ *Informer*, 02. 08. 2017, p. 5

32 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Šule, pazi keš! [Šule, watch the cash!],“ *Informer*, 12. 08. 2017, p. 5

33 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Zlo i naopako [To Hell And Gone],“ *Informer*, 02. 09. 2017, p. 5

level of local elections for the city of Belgrade. This incompetence is endemic and shows that the true motive of the opposition is reduced to gaining privileges that come with the position in government, in the capital: "A hysteria about the question of whether the dire opposition will come out in Belgrade in the spring elections, in one, two, three or even more columns is another concrete proof that the thing that is here known as the opposition, has no political, state, national plan or program, that there is no idea other than the idea of taking power by all means and at all costs. And that power, to be clear, is only necessary so that it would, as at the time of the dosistic parastatal provision, turn Belgrade and Serbia into a personal and party prey."<sup>34</sup>

In a negative image of the opposition, journalists close to the government's internal politics, such as Milorad Vučelić, include the boycott of the internal dialogue on Kosovo initiated by Aleksandar Vučić. Instead of actively participating in this important state and national business, the vast majority of opposition leaders took on the displaying of their attitudes on the social network Twitter. Twitter, no matter how powerful a medium of spreading messages, according to Vučelić, is not and cannot be a substitute for participation in a debate that is of key importance for the state. Vučelić describes a sort of political and media deviation that points to the hermetic nature of opposition's view of things and practices in the following way: "A very special contribution to the internal dialogue on Kosovo and the Serb issue in the Balkans is given by a yellow or civic political opposition. This contribution is expressed only and exclusively in tweets. The Twitter is limited to one hundred and forty "characters" (letters), and this exactly corresponds to the fullest extent of their overall capabilities. In that given space, they place everything they know and are capable of."<sup>35</sup> Twitter, i.e. the virtual world, is evidence that the opposition has neither political capacity nor patriotic responsibility.

In an extremely realistic, somewhat austere tone, the situation in the opposition is described by Čedomir Jovanović, leader of the opposition Liberal Democratic Party. For Jovanović, the opposition in Serbia does not exist. It has neither ideological nor personnel or organizational ability to articulate the alternative to Vučić. Under the name of the opposition, says this experienced political worker, we will have to understand only the group of Vučić's adversaries who have inherited ideological and media matrices from the nineties. Their weakness is in the lack of ability to understand the current political trends and articulate programmatic and concrete political moves: The opposition in Serbia does not exist. There are people in power and people who are not in power. They share opinion on many issues ... Today; people do not need politics, nor the parties. We are talking about the rule of law and dictatorship. So when did Serbia become a dictatorship? Only when Saša Janković had served the entire second term. And when he failed to agree with Vučić for the third or for a place in the Constitutional Court ... What could more motivate Vučić's voters than Janković's message: 'You will end up like Ceaușescu and his team.' How did those who killed Ceaușescu end up? Through this, the ego-trip of Janković and those provincial existential motives, and of course the need of his friends from the BIA, who always advise him on what to do. Even if they try, by all means, to make me join that coalition, I could not enter here."<sup>36</sup>

34 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Opoziciono pišanje po zdravoj pameti [The Opposition Pissing on the Sane Mind],“ *Informer*, 16. 09. 2017, p. 5

35 Milorad Vučelić, „Tvit [Tweet],“ *Pečat*, No. 485

36 Čedomir Jovanović «Vučić has more authority than Germans in 1941» [Vučić ima vlasti više nego Nemci 1941 godine] an interview with Nenad Čaluković and Jovan Radovanović, *Nedeljnik*, 28.9.2017, p. 35

Similar to the model of critical writing that exists and relates to the government, there is a critical writing model that assigns a strong negative value component to political participants of the opposition. From the moral imperfection of opposition activists, the absence of original democratic legitimacy, the inability to understand events and historical processes, concluding with the lack of the original political skill in making programs and suggestions of concrete political action.

In contrast to the aforementioned understandings of the opposition which are extremely negative, there are also points of view that tactically deal with opposition's political reasoning and practice. In this context, mistakes are noted in order to have them corrected and provide sometimes bitter lessons, in order to get the opposition, together with one part of the engaged public, to act politically more convincingly and more realistically. Zoran Petrović, who should be considered to be such an interpreter, a journalist of the newspaper *Danas* and a columnist of *Nedeljnik*, writes the following: "By stating that Vučić can only lead a 'dialogue' about the peaceful handover of power, Janković puts the Serbian president in the position of Polish General Jaruzelski. But Janković had to seek a 'round table' between the government and the opposition (which was partly a Polish model of exit from communism) over the electoral conditions before the presidential elections which the opposition entered the way fools rush in where angels fear to tread. The public opinion polls the opposition found generally offensive and took it arrogantly as an act of collaboration with Vučić. They have also easily dropped a leverage of boycott, which would make sense in Belgrade elections only if they are bound by a referendum on the change of the Constitution."<sup>37</sup>

In the absence of direct support for the opinion of the opposition and action by the press artisans, the points of views of opposition leaders have emerged, who by definition have to spread optimism among voters in parallel with a negative narrative about the government. Thus, the leader of the Free Citizens' Movement, Saša Janković, regarding the election in Belgrade claims: "Belgrade is our city, Serbia is our country. Vučić took them away with lies and violence, he is aware of this, and therefore he is afraid and defends himself with fabrications. We will beat him and return the smiles to the faces of people."<sup>38</sup>

Dragan Šutanovac spoke to the citizens in a similar tone. What is interesting and indicative is the tone of his display that evokes the spirit of the struggle against Slobodan Milošević, referring to the unfavorable political circumstances for the opposition of that time and the victory that came by the end of that year, which was, for Serbia, a turning point: "He will really try to 'crush' it, he will spend an enormous amount of money, abusing all the functions that exist in the state, he will do everything to save the government in Belgrade. But I think we still have a chance to win. So, if we were conducting this interview in June 2000, we would be saying the same thing; that Sloba will 'crush' it, and we know how that ended. Things turn overnight. We won then, we will win again."<sup>39</sup>

There is a strong overlap between the opinions of some engaged intellectuals and opposition leaders, can also be seen in the attitude of the actor Sergej Trifunović. He evokes memories of the fight against

37 Zoran Petrović, „Opozicioni anarhizam [Opposition Anarchism],“ *Nedeljnik*, No. 293, p. 18

38 Saša Janković, „Ne bavimo se kolonama i kombinacijama [We do not deal with columns and combinations],“ interview with Ivana Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, No. 1392, p. 11

39 Dragan Šutanovac, „Vučić mi nudio da napustim DS [Vučić offered me to leave the Democratic Party],“ *NIN*, No. 3472, p. 14



Vreme, 7th September 2017



the autocratic regime of Slobodan Milošević, hoping that Vučić will fall as Milošević fell. Unlike the 1990s, when Milošević was seen as an embodiment of political and historical evil, nowadays people are blinded by a negative attitude towards Vučić, that they perceive Milošević as being stronger and more politically straightforward: “We came to the point that has in 1996-1997, brought out 300,000 people to the streets, and a much stronger and more dangerous figure was demolished. I did not believe that I would ever say this, but Milošević is in comparison to them, a gentleman.... He has 700,000 members, which is a tenth of the number of people in Serbia. It will fall apart like a soap bubble when these people decide to let it go down the drain. Now, finally, we should have demonstration on 6th of October, which means lustration, a ban on dealing with politics to all who take part in this. And, when someone serious comes to the position of Minister of Interior Affairs to deal with their files, let’s see what was going on ... Then we can talk about the development and reform of Serbia. And also about democracy.”<sup>40</sup>

Trifunović’s oppositional fire is a combination of a sorrowful recollection of hopeful political youth and the anger of the righteous, which also implies the dramatization of political circumstances and the necessity to satisfy the need for freedom with moral purification of the nation and political vengeance. We can end the depiction of the image of the opposition with one more nostalgic reminder. Nostalgia sounds like a substitute for factual powerlessness and a gradual germination of hope into a political shift. The so-called romantic moment of nostalgia carries a longing for a better past as the basis for a better future. In this context, it is important to come up with an attitude of the difference between the morally bad current government and the former that was morally more perfect. These motifs can be identified in an interview with former Minister of Ecology Oliver Dulić: “Boris Tadić is the greatest gentleman among all Serbian presidents. I’ve been proud many times for having him as my president. For a country with many traumas of the past, in the circumstances of the worsening social and economic breaks, unresolved status issues and strategic determinations in which direction Serbia should go, he was like a good cure, to calm down, to direct, to bring society into a safe harbor. He made a mistake in leaving the Democratic Party, especially at the moment when the party bled openly; same way as the Democratic Party has made the mistake that it gave him up, naively believing that it would help it achieve better results in the elections. If he had remained, today there would be no dilemma who is not only the leader of the opposition, but perhaps the results of the presidential elections would be completely different, despite the almost impossible conditions in which the opposition is campaigning and acting politically.”<sup>41</sup>

40 Sergej Trifunović, „Srušen je i mnogo jači lik [We took down an even stronger guy],” interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3480, p. 23

41 Oliver Dulić, „Spreman sam da idem u zatvor [I am ready for prison],” interview with Nenad Čaluković, *Nedeljnik*, br. 293, p. 27

## An addition on polemics among the media - a sharp and eternal conflict of irreconcilable political opponents

Similar to political participants who are in the “eternal political trenches”, the media in Serbia, lead a ruthless rhetorical struggle over the reputation and honor of the profession. The division into the ones which are radically opposed to the government and those who are close to the government directly reflects on their relations. Each side of the dispute shows the other one in an extremely negative way, leaving no possibility of establishing a rational and minimal tense space for the establishment of criteria and mutual respect in the journalistic profession. The reasons for the journalistic disputes are deep and numerous. For the most part, they are induced by diverse political positions and financial arrangements. The following quotes show how they see each other. Thus, Nedim Sejdinović, president of the Independent Journalists Association of Vojvodina, speaking about the state of the media, dominated by tabloids, such as Dragan J. Vučićević’s *Informer*, categorically states: “Vučićević is a symbol of our moral collapse, and he is the mirror image of Aleksandar Vučić. The way in which he runs the media is the same as the way Vučić leads the country. In fact, through these two and Željko Mitrović we can see what will be the logical end of the long-lasting negative selection. When you have a society in which all values are inverted, when someone who is a cheater in our society is presented as a resourceful man, when you see that someone who has become a de facto criminal became a hero, then you have at the top of the state or at the top of the influential media, or at the top of institutions - people who represent tragic caricatures of the duties they are performing. When you are choosing the best swindler, you choose the one who is the biggest cheat, who is the best and the least.”<sup>42</sup>

In spite of editorial politics and political orientation of the newspaper, Sejdinović insisted on the brutal political intervention of the government on the media market, caricaturing the state’s aspiration to withdraw from the media, which is indicated in the current legislation and standards of the European Union: “As an editor or journalist in Serbia, you have two options. First, to be part of the system of government, in that corrupt system you have to participate in creating a mythical, great ruler and his successful politics, that is, creating a fairy tale for citizens. If you consent to this, you will receive money from the state on various bases, not only through competitions, public companies, special contracts, but also from commercial companies, whether domestic or foreign. In addition, there are institutions that make direct contracts with obedient journalists. You are required to get rid of the “myth about the journalistic profession” and to do some sort of PR (public relations). Many of our colleagues have agreed to this, and many of our colleagues are doing this their whole lives. If you do not consent to this, you do not receive money from the state, you lose the opportunities in competitions, you lose advertisements, you cannot survive on the market, with various inspections being sent to you, court trials are conducted, you are exposed to threats, attacks, blackmails, messengers are sent over to you in order to tell you to calm down, to take a chill pill. As a media, you are very often exposed to the question of whether you will survive at all. So, you either choose a comfortable, conformist path on which you deny journalism or this other path. And politics decides on all of it. And no matter how much we are struggling to leave the state out of the media,

42 Nedim Sejdinović, „Politika šibicarenja [Politics of Swindling],” interview with Ivana Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, No. 1384, p. 27

the state is completely in the media, now more than ever. For the simple reason that, no media in this country rests on the market.”<sup>43</sup>

It is understood that a review of the state of affairs in the media among the critics is not possible without a negative obsession with Aleksandar Vučić. Vučić’s “destructive” action was recognized in the editorial politics and quality of the oldest newspaper in the Balkans, *Politika*. This sort of attitude, based on the surplus of journalistic expression with the flavor of superficial theorizing, is quoted by Teofil Pančić, a journalist of *Vreme*: “We know that with the replacement of Ljiljana Smajlović - with whom I do not share, I believe, not one single belief, attitude, a view on a recent history and the present - Aleksandar Vučić (namely, Lj. S. herself will not deny that he personally drove her away), specifically left the *Politika* to accelerated degeneration, not because someone else would not know how to edit those newspapers, far from it, but because nobody should edit them. The idea is, to specify, that it should not be regulated by anyone, and especially nobody from *Politika*. Of course, someone has to sign it, but this formal problem is easily solved by the appointment of someone by the name of Nobody, and for his deputy and the core of close associates several copies of the elastic Nothing. As it is written, so let it be done. Okay, but why? Eh, why: so that *Politika* would turn into nothing, that is, into a formless molasses of unsurpassed and unconvincing babbling, which everything else that Vučić and the gang had control over was previously transformed into. *Politika* is only a symptom. Those people who make it do not actually exist, although there probably are heaps of proteins that have IDs with proper names written on them. The editor-in-chief is Aleksandar Vučić. The one who writes that filthiness on Monday is also Aleksandar Vučić. Vučić is also the correspondent of *Politika* from Čačak, Vučić is also an ‘orthodox thinker’, and the author of the horoscope, and a writer of readers’ letters, and bewildered aunt in the buffet of *Politika*, if it still exists. *Politika* is only the most recent victim of the Black Hole of Nothingness. The Radio Television of Serbia should be prepared. Let’s not fool ourselves; the whole Serbia should be prepared...”<sup>44</sup>

Dragan Šutanovac, the leader of the Democratic Party, often tends to raise the subject of the editorial policies in electronic media, particularly that of RTS. As the leader of one of the most dominant political parties, confronted with a generally weak opposition, Šutanovac is concerned with the inadequate presence of the opposition in electronic media, especially in the case of RTS. He states: “The state of RTS pains me more than what Pink is doing. RTS should strive to be the Serbian BBC, and not merely a refined version of Pink. RTS has only one television show left in which two political opponents are supposedly confronted. As a general rule, there are two regime officials, one of which belongs to an oppositional party. Nonetheless, the interviewer wears an earpiece through which she is instructed on how to lead the interview. I am certain that if a private owner buys a national broadcasting corporation, they are obligated to recognize the interest of the people to be informed, at least to a minimal degree.”<sup>45</sup>

43 Ibid, p. 25

44 Teofil Pančić, „Glasovi iz crne rupe [The Voices from the Black Hole],“ *Vreme*, No. 1388, p. 1

45 Dragan Šutanovac, „Vučić mi nudio da napustim DS [Vučić offered me to leave the Democratic Party],“ *NIN*, No. 3472, p. 14

There are countless written accounts on the tendency in the Serbian mediasphere to be monopolized by the government. However, there are two prominent views on media dictatorship in the world of big production that explore this topic further. One of those is the “prophetic” view of Zlatko Čobović, a journalist working for *Vreme*, a weekly news magazine. Čobović talks about the state of Novosti, a joint-stock company, which is state-controlled. According to him, what was once a giant in the print media industry, will either disappear, or become reduced to a tabloid at the hands of the Serbian Progressive Party (SPS). His view is summarized in one of his quotes: “The government’s solution to the privatization of the Novosti company, to one of the twenty-four controversial privatizations, would be forcing the company into bankruptcy, or nationalizing it for the second time by converting its debt into state-owned capital. Furthermore, *Večernje Novosti*, once a reputable and influential daily newspaper, is to be shut down after sixty-four years of publishing. As an alternative, it could possibly be merged with one of the existing political propaganda bulletins of the SPS, published under the guise of daily newspaper.”<sup>46</sup>

Vranjske LLC is a particular case. The company simply ceased with their publishing due to the lack of market success and debt owed to the state. This case should have been a call for corporate political mobilization. As many cases that came before, this one had been widely politicized.

We can interpret the writings of Jovana Gligorijević in this spirit as well, as an attempt to hyperpoliticize the case. Gligorijević blames the state, i.e. the government, for the collapse of private media in the media industry. She says: “*Nedeljnik* and *Vranjske* web portals no longer exist. For weeks, the tax collection agency and many others have been visiting the editorial offices, and the company that publishes the weekly newspaper is being forced into bankruptcy. Vukašin Obradović, the director and the main editor of the newspaper, has started a hunger strike. *Vranjske* newspapers have been published for twenty-three years. During that time, 1069 issues have been printed. The government is directly to blame for what has happened to Vranjske LLC. In theory, the government has no ownership over the media, but in practice, it exerts its pressure on the media like never before. The government created an atmosphere in which anyone who does not stand firmly by them and theirs is an enemy, especially if they are a journalist. The foreign diplomats and the European officials are also to blame. They pat us on the shoulder saying that the question of freedom of the press will eventually be opened for discussion, but it never is - perhaps, merely as a side note. The owners, the editors and the journalist in the media world are to blame as well. All of those who agreed to become the tools for political propaganda. However, Vukašin Obradović is not one of them. That is why Serbian press is in need of a Vukašin Obradović, of someone who is as untainted and as honest as he is. Notwithstanding, it would take more than just one person. We need many more of those like Vukašin if we want to survive.”<sup>47</sup>

On the other hand, pro-government media, such as *Informer*, are very eloquent in their writing about the lack of professionalism of the oppositional media in their approach and interpretation of political players, events and processes. The editor of *Informer*, Dragan J. Vučićević, holds the belief that the criticism of the Serbian government is motivated by an intense and lasting hatred towards

46 Zlatko Čobović, „Hronologija državne otimačine [Chronology of state theft],“ *Vreme*, No. 1395, p. 18

47 Jovana Gligorijević, „Cena slobodnog novinarstva [The price of free press],“ *Vreme*, No. 1394

President Aleksandar Vučić. Vučićević writes: "Tirke once told me that to aspire to do serious journalism in Serbia, is the same as aspiring to climb a ladder to the Moon. It is all right to have the wish, the will and the want to do it, but some things are simply not achievable. I recall these words of Bogdan Tirnanić every time I go through a reputable Serbian newspaper, one of those presented to the public as non-tabloid, serious and highly professional. Those newspapers contain nothing but hatred, pure and passionate hatred towards President Aleksandar Vučić. If you doubt my word, I dare you to take up *Danas*, or the weekly magazines *NIN* and *Vreme*, and to find any kind of a valid argument, any kind of criticism based on expertise, or born of a constructive desire to fix or improve the way things work in Serbia. There is nothing of the sort! All that 'serious' press, and their electronic versions, from the CIA TV N1 and *Peščanik*, to *Insajder*, all they contain is hatred - putrid hatred directed at one man."<sup>48</sup>

According to Vučićević's commentary, the oppositional media does not only suffer an unhealthy and negative obsession with President Aleksandar Vučić, but they are also endorsing inappropriate social scandals. An example of such a scandal would be the cover of *NIN*, which compares the status of workers in the Serbian industry to the Auschwitz concentration camp. According to the editor of *Informer*, the *NIN* cover is a paradigm of the political inconsistency and of moral hypocrisy of the Serbian liberal elite. Vučićević states: "The cover page of *NIN* weekly magazine, on which they compare Serbia to the Nazi extermination camps, foreign investors to the SS, and Serbian workers to the victims of the Holocaust, is not only a horrendous scandal and the pinnacle of passionate quasi-political mindlessness and debasement – but above all, the cover is the final proof of the perverted nature of the Serbian media realpolitik. When you have Belgrade editors - particularly those who have been proclaiming themselves as members of the top professional elite, and as the measure of ethics and morality, for the past few decades – in the context of daily political conflict, doing something that is simply not done in a civilized word; when they shamelessly take advantage of the misfortunes the Jewish people suffered during the Second World War, they prove themselves not to be independent and free journalists, but rather passionate propagandists blinded by their own sick hatred."<sup>49</sup>

The dynamics of the media life moves in a direct opposition to the attitudes held towards the profession itself. Political players see each other exclusively in a negative light, and the media world functions by that same principle as well. As a consequence, the existence of different editorials results in mutually exclusive and discrepant interpretations of political players, events and processes. This fundamental conflict seems to be developing into a necessary political one – one that will last.

48 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Ozbiljno novinarstvo [Serious journalism],“ *Informer*, 15. 07. 2017, p. 5

49 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Kad Srbiju proglase za nacistički logor! [When Serbia is declared a Nazi camp!],“ *Informer*, 22. 07. 2017, p. 5



NIN, 20th July 2017



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About  
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## ABOUT AUTHORS

**Public Policy Institute** is a regional think-tank organization that operates in the Western Balkans region through the work of its branch offices in Belgrade, Podgorica and Ljubljana. By promoting public dialogue and constructive solutions, Public Policy Institute contributes to the efforts of the Western Balkan countries to become equal, reliable and progressive partners in the process of European integrations and mutual relationships. After the initial research and analysis of social and media context in the countries of the Western Balkans, the Institute has developed and implemented a series of media related projects, including: Role of the media in the process of securitisation in the Western Balkans, Civil Response to Clientelism in the media - MEDIA CIRCLE, NATO Reach Out - media monitoring and Role of the media in monitoring of R1325 in Montenegro.

**EBART Media Archive** is privately owned company established in 2000. Its main activity is archiving print media data in e-format. The print media archive consists of up-to-date material dating back to 2003, and more than 3 million print media reports from sources with national coverage. EBART is also specialized for media analysis, basic quantitative and qualitative analyses, comparing media treatment of specific keywords, as well as complex content analyses according to BBC methodology. EBART Media Archive is unmatched in the region with its unique media reports database, and 12 years of media research experience. This media database allows for the overall study of long-term media presence.

**Velimir Ćurgus Kazimir** was born in Novi Sad in 1948. Since 2002, he is the director of the Ebart Media Archive, the unique media documentation center in Serbia. He was a journalist and editor of the cultural section of *Politika* newspapers from 1988 to 1996. He is one of the founders of the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia. He authored several books of prose and essays on culture and cultural policy. His works have been translated into English, French, German, Spanish, Polish and Japanese. He has won the International Prize for essay of the journal *Lettre Internationale* in Weimar in 2000. He's member of the Serbian PEN Center since 1987. He has edited several books on the relationship between politics and the media. He is author of several projects in the field of research, media and culture. He conducted studies of the media scene in Serbia and the influence of media on the political and social reality in particular.

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