

A close-up, slightly blurred photograph of a computer keyboard with red backlighting. The keys are dark, and the red light glows from beneath them, creating a moody, tech-oriented atmosphere. The focus is on the middle section of the keyboard, showing keys like 'U', 'I', 'K', 'B', and 'N'.

Analysis of the print media in Serbia
October - December

Quarterly **MEDIAMETER**

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INTRODUCTION

VELIMIR ČURĞUS KAZIMIR

INTRODUCTION:

Necessity or decision?

The twelfth issue of the Quarterly Mediameter is a good time to look back over the past three years and what was happening in the leading daily newspapers in Serbia. This means that the research and analyzes that we have done in these three years are not only comparable, but open the possibility to see with certainty the direction in which journalism and the media in Serbia are going to.

In all twelve calendar quarters, the same methodological apparatus was applied in the analysis of the empirical data. A single text was chosen for the subject of analysis. Analysis itself represents the combination of two research methods: (a) content analysis, which was guided by a „specific theoretical and hypothetical frame... creating an objective and systematic empirical collection of the social communication content, which enables the formation of relevant conclusions about the social context in which the communication takes part,”¹ and (b) a discourse analysis which enabled us to understand various, epistemologically and methodologically immeasurable,² authors’ interpretative strategies and editorial policies which reflect perceptions of different, primarily ideological and political, discourse realities, by analyzing their specific discourse meanings.

In the interpretative sense, in order to offer better coherence of the text, the analysis is, as in the previous reports, divided into two wholes which refer to: (a) analysis of quantitative indicators collected using content analysis; and (b) discourse analysis of the qualitative content excerpted from texts which were included in the research sample.

The criticisms that we experienced regarding the presentation of the eleventh issue, which did not deal with the analysis and the results themselves, but rather the political and media scene in Serbia, and especially the relationship between the authorities and the media, convinced us that the freedom of the media and the democratization of the whole society needs accurate data on the character of certain newspapers, the degree of professionalism and ethics of journalists and editors, and the answer to question why so many published articles are unbalanced, with data from unnamed sources. Why, finally, some topics are simply completely erased or ignored in the newspapers? Concentration of texts related

¹ S. Gredelj, *S onu stranu ogledala* [On the other side of the mirror], Beograd: Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije, 1986, 19

² G. Couvalis, *The Philosophy of Science*, London, Sage Publications, 1997.

to political life does not allow to widen the aspect and develop a serious dialogue on the life problems and future of citizens of Serbia.

In the analyzed quarter (last three months of 2017) we see that nothing new and dramatic did not happen. The indicators are similar to those of the previous months. Reports are still convincingly the most popular genre on the front pages. What is always a little surprising is that the reports are in significant numbers valued, primarily negative. In *Danas* and *Blic*, neutral or negatively connotated reports dominate, and the absence of positively connotated reports can be interpreted as some kind of cautiousness to the topics that are placed on the first page.

Balance is still the weak side of our journalism. The other side rarely appears or is hidden for some another time. The domination of political issues is certainly one of the causes of this defect, since taking political sides is obviously part of editorial policy. The period we are processing is full of indications of the next elections (in Belgrade), although the elections have not yet been called. That’s why more and more opposition politicians that are expected to be candidates in these elections are present. This is the calm before the storm!

In the absence of a leading topic – because the elections are still not actual – the remains of the already discussed topics are used: everyday political life, economic activities, the region, Russia, the USA... and the investigation of the murder of Jelena Marjanović. The actors keep their schedule. On the convincing first place is Aleksandar Vučić, followed by Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, and then Ivica Dačić. Politics, corruption and crime generate the largest number of texts with data derived from unnamed sources. And that’s to be expected! And then follows the immense list of interpreters of reality in the form of political analysts. Some newspapers could not be printed without them.

There are less news the more analysts and reports are present. In three years, they have decreased from about 13 to 1.25 percent. What are the daily newspapers that have abolished news from their headlines? Necessity or decision? Judge for yourself.

2



Sample

ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN


Sample

As stated in earlier publications, the basic idea of the project *Mediameter* is to try to reconstruct media reality of the dailies in Serbia, the way it can be defined considering the texts that are positioned (wholly or partially) on front pages, as various reflections of current political events and circumstances in both Serbia and the world. A sample of the dailies was composed considering two selection criteria – the largest circulation and reputation of the print media. Daily newspaper circulation data were taken from a research done by IPSOS.¹ The front page is the part of the dailies that the readers connect the most with the identity/recognition of a media outlet. It is often responsible for the first impression, our potential affection or repulsion formed about some printed media. The front page comes into contact not only with the readers of that particular paper, but also the people who will perhaps never touch that paper. Through newspaper and TV advertising and shop windows, the front page reaches a wider auditorium than that forming the readers of individual dailies. The front pages, hence form, in a certain way, the public image of the newspaper which symbolizes its editorial policy, evaluative orientation and targeting of certain audiences. On account of the above-mentioned reasons, the front pages of dailies from our sample were in the focus of analysis of the project *Mediameter*.

Texts from front pages reflect best the coordinates of editorial policies of daily print editions. Though this involves a small percentage of texts, editorial identity of a daily can be most easily identified through messages conveyed through front pages. The ratio of the total number of texts in each daily individually and the number of texts from the front pages that were included in the sample of our research are shown in the charts 1-7, for the period from October 1st to December 31st 2017.


¹ Research of the average scope of the daily print media was done for the period from February 17th to April 15th 2017 and April 17th to April 30th 2017, population: total individuals

Chart 1. – *Večernje novosti*



Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2017

Chart 2. – *Informer*



Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2017

Chart 3. – Alo!




Chart 4. – Blic




Chart 5. – Politika




Chart 6. – Danas





Chart 7. – *Kurir*

The total number of analysed texts considering all seven media that are included in our research sample is 2167 and that number accounts for averagely 60.56% texts from front pages and for 3.63% of the total number of texts.

Table 1. – *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
chronicle	89	31	58
society	100	75	25
politics	105	105	0
economics	32	31	1
current affairs	50	20	30
reportage	10	3	7
culture	29	6	23
interview	27	25	2
world	31	30	1
sport	45	4	41
Belgrade news	7	4	3
topic of the day	28	28	0
reflector	5	0	5
events	8	8	0
TOTAL	566	370	196

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Table 2. – *Informer*

<i>Informer</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
breaking news	162	160	2
news	116	55	61
showtime	78	2	76
sport	62	1	61
TOTAL	418	218	200

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Table 3. – Alo!

<i>Alo!</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
current affairs	70	70	0
news	209	146	63
v.i.p	107	4	103
sport	45	2	43
world	3	3	0
interview of the week	6	3	3
Belgrade	15	7	8
advices	1	0	1
series	2	1	1
TOTAL	458	236	222

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017**Table 4. – Blic**

<i>Blic</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
current affairs/interview	8	7	1
society	81	38	43
chronicle	63	28	35
woman	3	0	3
culture	8	0	8
politics	79	79	0
sport	50	1	49
destinies	4	0	4
world/planet	6	3	3
topic of the day	85	69	16
people	3	1	2
in focus	1	0	1
dossier	2	1	1
entertainment	54	3	51

Blic foundation	3	0	3
economy	16	4	12
Belgrade	2	1	1
phenomena	2	0	2
TOTAL	470	235	235

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017**Table 5. – Politika**

<i>Politika</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
world	61	35	26
society	73	13	60
economics	26	24	2
politics	19	19	0
event of the day	14	12	2
culture	23	1	22
chronicle	23	10	13
daily supplement	87	4	83
Serbia	25	15	10
sport	27	0	27
topic of the week/day	48	14	34
reading room	13	0	13
region	9	9	0
front page	273	273	0
views	11	11	0
consumer	23	7	16
Belgrade events	9	4	5
TOTAL	764	451	313

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Table 6. – Danas

<i>Danas</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
business supplement	10	10	0
special supplement	11	2	9
Danas weekend	24	7	17
Event of the day	6	6	0
society	101	95	6
economy	49	49	0
globe	26	21	5
culture	24	7	17
interview	5	5	0
front page	63	63	0
politics	113	113	0
Belgrade	3	3	0
sport	17	2	15
last page	13	10	3
dialogue	10	10	0
pomodoro	2	1	1
confrontation	5	5	0
scales	2	2	0
TOTAL	484	411	73


Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017**Table 7. – Kurir**

<i>Kurir</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
news	88	76	12
interview	5	5	0
planet	11	10	1
chronicle	94	41	53
society	30	14	16
politics	58	58	0
stars	66	3	63
culture	7	2	5
sport	14	1	13
topic of the day	41	36	5
supplement	4	0	4
TOTAL	418	246	172


Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

By reviewing the presented tables 1-7, it is still noticeable that the structures of dailies follow two different patterns. In other words, *Večernje novosti*, *Politika*, *Danas* and *Blic* follow the traditional structure of daily newspapers, while *Informer* and *Alo!* deviate from this matrix to a considerable extent, as in previous trimesters. In these two newspapers the *news* are the dominant rubric, which unites various areas, such as society, economy and politics, while special attention is given to entertainment content, such as information on show business and sports, which increasingly acquire a socio-political character. Although the structure of the *Kurir* was similar to the *Informer* and *Alo!* during the greater part of 2017, in the fourth quarter, a large number of sections are visible (such as the *politics* or the *topic of the day*), i.e. return to a structure similar to that traditionally established daily newspaper is noticeable.


Editorial strategies that were established in the previous ten editions of *Mediameter* are entirely visible in the fourth quarter of 2017, as it may be clearly seen in Charts 8-14.

Chart 8 – Večernje novosti


Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2017

Chart 9 – Informer


Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2017

Chart 10 – Alo!


Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2017

Chart 11 – Blic

Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2017


Chart 12 – Politika

Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2017

Chart 13 – Danas

Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2017

Chart 14 – Kurir



Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2017

If we compare the number of selected texts for 2015 (7382), 2016 (8293) and 2017 (8652) we can notice a clear trend in the increase in the number of analyzed texts (see Table 8). The increase in the number of texts that make up the sample is related primarily to the fact that 2015 was not an elective year, while in 2016 extraordinary parliamentary elections were held. In 2017, elections were held for the president of the Republic of Serbia, and in the last quarter of the previous year, the activities of political parties related to the upcoming elections in Belgrade were visible. Considering that the focus of *Mediameter* is primarily on socio-political events and that this is one of the key criteria for selecting texts, it is precisely the cause of a significant increase in the number of entries in the sample, especially in relation to 2015.

Table 8 – Number of selected texts by quarter

	2015	2016	2017
First quarter	1360	1924	2403
Second quarter	1673	2106	2091
Third quarter	2172	2012	1991
Fourth quarter	2177	2251	2167
TOTAL	7382	8293	8652

Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2017

Table 9 gives an overview of the percentage participation of texts that entered the survey sample in relation to the total number of texts in all analyzed media in the four quarters of 2017.

Table 9 - Percentage participation of texts that entered the survey sample, compared to the total number of texts in all analyzed media in all four quarters of 2017

Media	% of selected texts in 2017			
	IV quarter	III quarter	II quarter	I quarter
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	3.67	2.43	2.93	3.78
<i>Informer</i>	3.69	2.90	3.46	4.02
<i>Alo!</i>	3.52	3.15	3.75	4.20
<i>Blic</i>	2.49	2.05	2.50	3.69
<i>Politika</i>	4.35	4.08	4.31	5.47
<i>Danas</i>	5.13	5.42	7.31	8.24
<i>Kurir</i>	2.71	3.53	3.38	3.51

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017, Mediameter April - June 2017, Mediameter July - September 2017 and Mediameter October - December 2017

3



RESEARCH RESULTS

ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN

RESEARCH RESULTS

Share of journalistic genres

In the last quarter of 2017, the share of Reports in the total number of analyzed texts was increased for about 3%, and amounted to 75.27% or 1631 texts. The largest share of the reports was again observed in *Informer* - 96.33%, while this time the lowest number was noted in *Politika* – 61.2%. The Article and the Interview, observed in 10.06% and 9.32% of texts respectively, follow them. The largest number of Interviews is recorded in *Večernje novosti* (48 or 12.97%), and the lowest in *Informer* – around 2.29%. The next genre for representation is the Commentary – 3.46% (75 texts), while the share of the News is slightly decreased in comparison with the previous period - 1.25% or 27 texts. Reports are present in only 0.51% or 11 texts, while the participation of other forms (such as hybrid genres or feuilleton) is negligible. In the fourth quarter of 2017, the order of representation of genres is the same as in the first and third period of 2017.

Individual share of genres in reporting of seven media from the sample

Genre	Total number	%
Report	1631	75,27
Article	218	10,06
Interview	202	9,32
Commentary	75	3,46
News story	27	1,25
Reportage	11	0,51
Other (hybrid forms, feuilleton)	3	0,14
total	2167	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of journalistic genres in texts from the sample, per media

Genre	<i>Alo!</i>	<i>Blic</i>	<i>Danas</i>	<i>Informer</i>	<i>Kurir</i>	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>
report	201	212	299	210	151	276	282
article	0	3	23	0	76	92	24
interview	26	17	47	5	16	43	48
commentary	1	2	35	1	0	30	6
news	8	0	4	2	2	5	6
reportage	0	0	1	0	1	5	4
other	0	1	2	0	0	0	0
total	236	235	411	218	246	451	370

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of journalistic genres in texts from the sample, per media

Genre	<i>Alo!</i>	<i>Blic</i>	<i>Danas</i>	<i>Informer</i>	<i>Kurir</i>	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>
report	85,17	90,21	72,75	96,33	61,38	61,20	76,22
article	0,00	1,28	5,60	0,00	30,89	20,40	6,49
interview	11,02	7,23	11,44	2,29	6,50	9,53	12,97
commentary	0,42	0,85	8,52	0,46	0,00	6,65	1,62
news	3,39	0,00	0,97	0,92	0,81	1,11	1,62
reportage	0,00	0,00	0,24	0,00	0,41	1,11	1,08
other	0,00	0,43	0,49	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

If we look at the representation of genres during all four quarters of 2017, we can notice that almost three quarters of selected texts were written in the form of reports (73.4% - 6351 texts), which is, compared to 2016, an increase of about 4% (69.47%). On the other hand, news presence in 2017 was more than twice as low as in 2016, amounting to 1.51% or 131 texts (versus 3.66% or 298 texts in 2016). The trend of reducing the share of news on the cover pages of the media from the sample is present since 2015, when the average representation of texts in this genre was 9.89%.¹

Individual participation of genres in reporting of seven media from the sample in all four quarters of

¹ Representation of the news genre in 2015: I quarter – 12.72%, II – quarter 11.89%, III – quarter 8.7%, IV – quarter 6.25%.
In 2016: I quarter 5.98%, II quarter 3.04%, III quarter 3.23%, IV quarter 2.4%;
In 2017: I quarter 2.33%, II quarter 1.05%, III quarter 1.31%, IV quarter 1.25%;

2017

Genre	Total number	%
report	6351	73,40
article	954	11,03
interview	732	8,46
commentary	367	4,24
news	131	1,51
reportage	117	1,35
total	8652	100,00

Source: Research *Mediameter* January - March 2017, *Mediameter* April - June 2017, *Mediameter* July - September 2017 and *Mediameter* October - December 2017

Topics

In order for each article to be defined as clearly as possible, the selected writings that make up the sample are classified under a single topic, but nevertheless, all relevant elements present in these articles have been accounted for. This gave us a clearer insight into the manner of how the news is provided and into the approach of the media to certain topics in the previous issues of the *Mediameter* too. Articles covering local crime news, as well as the writings relating to the murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović, were again included into the sample, as an example of the paradigm of the state of Serbian journalism, which is marked by various kinds of disrespect for the ethical principles of reporting.

Topic prominence

In the period October-December 2017, all political issues were present in a total of 523 or 24.13% of texts from the sample: *political life in Serbia* in 417 or 19.24% of articles, *activities of the Government of Serbia* in 2.17% - 47 articles, *activities of the President of Serbia* 1.94% 42 and *activities of the President of the Government of Serbia* 0.78% - 17 texts. Compared to the previous quarter, domestic politics are somewhat more present on the cover of seven daily newspapers, but the interest of the media on this subject is still significantly reduced compared to the first and second quarters of 2017.²

In the last quarter of 2017, the remarkable attention of the media was focused on events related to the clarification of the murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović,³ that is, it was another topic according to

² The theme in the field of internal politics was present in 34.4% of texts in the first, 35.01% in the second quarter, while in the third quarter of 2017, the participation of texts that talked about topics in this area was significantly reduced and amounted to 22.65%.

³ Jelena Marjanović was killed on April 2nd, 2016.

the presence, present in 175 or 8.08% of the articles. In the third quarter, the increase in the number and participation of texts can be explained by the arrest of Zoran Marjanović, husband of Jelena Marjanović,⁴ while in the fourth focus was on investigative actions, in particular the hearings conducted by the Prosecution. Negative portrayal and speculation about the possible involvement of other members of the Marjanović family in the murder, as well as information that uncontrollably leaked from the investigation, were the backbone of these inscriptions. For the last three months of 2017 *Alo!* wrote about the case on two thirds of the front cover pages (60 articles), *Informer* published 56, *Kurir* 29, *Blic* 20, *Večernje novosti* 8 and *Politika* 2 texts, while *Danas* was the only media that did not deal with this topic.

When it comes to the topic of *regional cooperation/relations in the region* (141 texts - 6.51%), we recorded slightly less occurrence compared to the previous quarter, but the way media coverage of regional relations remains unchanged – as much as 58.29% of texts are negatively connotated. Fourth topic in the fourth quarter is the economy, about which the media wrote almost twice less texts compared to the third quarter (124 or 5.72% of the fourth quarter versus 216 or 10.85% in the third period); texts related to the Hague Tribunal (106 - 4.89%) and international relations (84 - 3.88%) are next in line. The media published 73 texts (3.37%) in relation to Russia, 70 (3.23%) on topics related to the US or relations between Serbia and the United States, while 67 (3.09%) were written on military topics. About Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština, there are significantly fewer texts compared to the last quarter, so this time, this is only the tenth topic in terms of presence, about which the media from the sample have published 66 texts or 3.05%

If the value context of 2167 selected texts is observed in the fourth quarter of 2017, 40.66% of texts are connotated - 7.29% positive and 33.36% negative. The most negative texts were written in connection with the murder of singer Jelena Marjanović (58.29%)⁵ and, as already mentioned, on regional topics - 58.16% (82). Exactly half of the texts written about the United States has negative context, and between 30% and 40% of negative connotations are written about the Hague Tribunal, the economy, international relations and Kosovo issues. A quarter of the articles on political life in Serbia are also negative. In the fourth quarter of last year, there were also several positive connotations. As in the previous quarters, significantly higher participation of texts in a positive tone was observed when it comes to issues related to Russia (45.21%) and the army (41.79%)

The topics related to the European Union are again mentioned in a very small number of texts - 36 (1.66%). The most are neutral ones - 61.11%, with 33.33% negative and 5.56% of positively connotated texts. On the other hand, the daily newspapers *Večernje novosti* (12 articles), *Politika* (10), *Informer* (7) and *Kurir* (3) wrote about Russia in a positive context, while one negative text was recorded in *Blic* and *Alo!*

Distribution of topics and their value-orientation in seven sampled newspapers⁶

⁴ On September 15th, 2017, Zoran Marjanović was arrested on suspicion of murdering Jelena Marjanović, an hour after he returned home after leaving the reality show "Zadruga", where he spent several days.

⁵ When evaluating these articles, the criterion for assessing the value context was the relationship between the media and the family Marjanović.

⁶ In all the tables that relate to the fourth quarter of 2017, the ten most common topics are presented.

All media	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Political life in Serbia	417	19,24	2	0,48	311	74,58	104	24,94
murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	175	8,08	0	0,00	73	41,71	102	58,29
Regional cooperation	141	6,51	4	2,84	55	39,01	82	58,16
Economy	124	5,72	10	8,06	68	54,84	46	37,10
Hague / war crimes	106	4,89	0	0,00	64	60,38	42	39,62
International relations	84	3,88	8	9,52	49	58,33	27	32,14
Russia/ attitude towards Russia	73	3,37	33	45,21	38	52,05	2	2,74
USA/ attitude towards USA	70	3,23	5	7,14	30	42,86	35	50,00
Army	67	3,09	28	41,79	36	53,73	3	4,48
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Pristina	66	3,05	0	0,00	45	68,18	21	31,82


Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Value context in relation to all the topics in all seven media

All media	No.	%
Positive	158	7,29
Neutral	1286	59,34
Negative	723	33,36
total	2167	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Value context in all media in relation to the topic *Russia/ Attitude towards Russia and EU /EU policy*



Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Regarding the selection of topics throughout 2017, the media paid the most attention to *political life in Serbia* (2165 or 38.24% of all the texts in the sample), and the second topic of interest, which was published in a significantly smaller number of texts, was *economy* (661 - 11.68%). The following are the topics regarding Kosovo, which are present in 527 (9.31%) texts, while the fourth theme according to the representation is the murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović, with 319 articles published on the cover pages (5.64%). Regional relations are presented in one text less (318 or 5.62%) and they are the fifth topic.

Distribution of topics and their value context in seven media from the sample for all four quarters of 2017⁷


All media	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Political life in Serbia	2165	38,24	13	0,60	1668	77,04	484	22,36
Economy	661	11,68	67	10,14	383	57,94	211	31,92
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Priština	527	9,31	1	0,19	273	51,80	253	48,01
murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	319	5,64	0	0,00	140	43,89	179	56,11
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	318	5,62	7	2,20	128	40,25	183	57,55

Source: Research *Mediameter* January - March 2017, *Mediameter* April - June 2017, *Mediameter* July - September 2017 and *Mediameter* October - December 2017

The relation of the media towards Russia and the EU remained unchanged in 2017. Topics related to Russia were presented equally in the positive (48.13%) and neutral context (48.66%), while the negative texts were extremely low - only about 3%. About the EU the majority of texts were written in neutral tone (about 74%), while about 6% of the texts were positive and close to 20% were negatively connotated.

⁷ The table presents the five most common topics.

Value context in all media from the sample according to Russia / attitude towards Russia and EU / EU policy for all four quarters of 2017



Source: Research *Mediameter* January - March 2017, *Mediameter* April - June 2017, *Mediameter* July - September 2017 and *Mediameter* October - December 2017

Distribution of topics according to media

Blic

Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Political life in Serbia	49	20,85	1	2,04	45	91,84	3	6,12
Economy	23	9,79	0	0,00	6	26,09	17	73,91
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	20	8,51	0	0,00	10	50,00	10	50,00
System of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	16	6,81	0	0,00	13	81,25	3	18,75
Activities of the Government of Serbia	12	5,11	0	0,00	9	75,00	3	25,00
Army	11	4,68	1	9,09	10	90,91	0	0,00
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	10	4,26	0	0,00	6	60,00	4	40,00
USA/ attitude towards USA	9	3,83	0	0,00	8	88,89	1	11,11
Hague/war crimes	8	3,40	0	0,00	6	75,00	2	25,00
Crime	8	3,40	0	0,00	7	87,50	1	12,50
Activities of the President of Serbia	8	3,40	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	No.	%
Positive	2	0,85
Neutral	180	76,60
Negative	53	22,55
total	235	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Kurir

Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Political life in Serbia	54	21,95	0	0,00	35	64,81	19	35,19
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	29	11,79	0	0,00	3	10,34	26	89,66
Corruption	26	10,57	0	0,00	0	0,00	26	100,00
Hague/war crimes	18	7,32	0	0,00	11	61,11	7	38,89
International relations	11	4,47	1	9,09	8	72,73	2	18,18
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	10	4,07	1	10,00	2	20,00	7	70,00
USA/ attitude towards USA	8	3,25	3	37,50	3	37,50	2	25,00
Activities of the Prime Minister of Serbia	8	3,25	0	0,00	2	25,00	6	75,00
Crime	8	3,25	0	0,00	2	25,00	6	75,00
Social policy/social issues	7	2,85	2	28,57	1	14,29	4	57,14

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	No	%
Positive	15	6,10
Neutral	96	39,02
Negative	135	54,88
total	246	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Informer

Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	56	25,69	0	0,00	18	32,14	38	67,86
Political life in Serbia	43	19,72	0	0,00	10	23,26	33	76,74
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	14	6,42	0	0,00	1	7,14	13	92,86
Russia/attitude towards Russia	13	5,96	7	53,85	6	46,15	0	0,00
USA/ attitude towards USA	13	5,96	1	7,69	3	23,08	9	69,23
Hague/war crimes	10	4,59	0	0,00	0	0,00	10	100,00
Army	9	4,13	4	44,44	5	55,56	0	0,00
International relations	8	3,67	0	0,00	4	50,00	4	50,00
Economy	7	3,21	1	14,29	4	57,14	2	28,57
NATO/NATO integration	6	2,75	0	0,00	0	0,00	6	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	No	%
Positive	18	8,26
Neutral	62	28,44
Negative	138	63,30
total	218	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Alo!

Distribution of topics and their value context in the daily *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Political life in Serbia	84	35,59	0	0,00	71	84,52	13	15,48
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	60	25,42	0	0,00	32	53,33	28	46,67
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	10	4,24	0	0,00	4	40,00	6	60,00
Hague/war crimes	10	4,24	0	0,00	8	80,00	2	20,00
Russia/attitude towards Russia	8	3,39	1	12,50	6	75,00	1	12,50
System of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	6	2,54	0	0,00	3	50,00	3	50,00
Army	6	2,54	4	66,67	2	33,33	0	0,00
Crime	5	2,12	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Activity of the President of Serbia	5	2,12	1	20,00	4	80,00	0	0,00
International relations	5	2,12	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	No.	%
Positive	12	5,08
Neutral	157	66,53
Negative	67	28,39
total	236	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Politika

Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	41	9,09	2	4,88	17	41,46	22	53,66
Economy	40	8,87	8	20,00	21	52,50	11	27,50
International relations	29	6,43	3	10,34	14	48,28	12	41,38
Political life in Serbia	25	5,54	0	0,00	18	72,00	7	28,00
Kosovo/relations of Belgrade and Priština	21	4,66	0	0,00	11	52,38	10	47,62
Economy	20	4,43	2	10,00	15	75,00	3	15,00
Social policy/social issues	19	4,21	3	15,79	8	42,11	8	42,11
Declaration of Catalan independence	19	4,21	0	0,00	16	84,21	3	15,79
Army	17	3,77	11	64,71	5	29,41	1	5,88
USA/attitude towards USA	16	3,55	0	0,00	7	43,75	9	56,25
EU/EU politics	16	3,55	0	0,00	13	81,25	3	18,75

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	No	%
Positive	65	14,41
Neutral	257	56,98
Negative	129	28,60
total	451	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Večernje novosti

Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	Value context in relation to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	40	10,81	0	0,00	10	25,00	30	75,00
Hague/war crimes	30	8,11	0	0,00	12	40,00	18	60,00
Russia/attitude towards Russia	23	6,22	12	52,17	11	47,83	0	0,00
Political life in Serbia	23	6,22	0	0,00	18	78,26	5	21,74
Kosovo/relations of Belgrade and Priština	22	5,95	0	0,00	17	77,27	5	22,73
International relations	17	4,59	4	23,53	6	35,29	7	41,18
USA/attitude towards USA	16	4,32	1	6,25	3	18,75	12	75,00
Army	15	4,05	7	46,67	8	53,33	0	0,00
Economy	14	3,78	0	0,00	12	85,71	2	14,29
Activity of the President of Serbia	14	3,78	0	0,00	14	100,00	0	0,00
Declaration of Catalan independence	14	3,78	0	0,00	9	64,29	5	35,71

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	No	
Positive	40	10,81
Neutral	209	56,49
Negative	121	32,70
total	370	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Danas

Value context in relation to the topic in daily paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	Value context in relation to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Political life in Serbia	139	33,82	1	0,72	114	82,01	24	17,27
Economy	32	7,79	0	0,00	25	78,13	7	21,88
Media/freedom of media	23	5,60	0	0,00	15	65,22	8	34,78
Local Government	20	4,87	0	0,00	13	65,00	7	35,00
Hague/war crimes	18	4,38	0	0,00	17	94,44	1	5,56
System of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	16	3,89	0	0,00	13	81,25	3	18,75
Regional cooperation/relation in the region	16	3,89	1	6,25	15	93,75	0	0,00
Activities of the Government of Serbia	12	2,92	0	0,00	6	50,00	6	50,00
Education	12	2,92	0	0,00	7	58,33	5	41,67
Culture	11	2,68	0	0,00	9	81,82	2	18,18
Economy	11	2,68	0	0,00	9	81,82	2	18,18

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Value context in relation to all the topics in the daily paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	No	%
Positive	6	1,46
Neutral	325	79,08
Negative	80	19,46
total	411	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Balance

When we take into account all the texts from the sample for the period October - December 2017, it can be noticed that most of the topics presented were not treated in a comprehensive manner, as evidenced by the fact that the balance is present in only 16.89% of all texts, 1% less than in the previous quarter. The least balanced texts were recorded in newspaper *Informer* - 1.83% or 4 out of 218 entries, followed by Alo! with 8.47% (almost twice less in comparison with previous quarter) and Kurir – 8.94% (about 6% more balanced texts). Certain change in editorial policy is evident in *Večernje novosti*, with 15.68% of balanced texts, i.e. 8% less than in previous quarter.⁸ *Politika* (18.4%), *Danas* (23.11%) and *Blic* (35.74%) follow.

Although the value context is not expressed in 59.34% of all texts, consideration must be given to the fact that the vast majority of texts from the cover pages we have analyzed are not comprehensive, and that one-sided approach reflects the general situation in the Serbian media. Balanced texts, of course, necessarily show some degree of restraint, which, obviously, does not represent a particularly widespread phenomenon in Serbian journalism. Taking sides, which is sometimes very passionate, attracts the audience but reduces seriousness. This is about the speed of the reaction, not the detailed and rational information required by the research, a larger number of interlocutors and reliable and verifiable data, along with available information sources. In this way, circulation and popularity are gained in a short time, but not a reputation.

⁸ The change in editorial policy can be discussed if two parameters are considered - value context (which in the case of *Večernje novosti* was increased by 9% compared to the previous quarter) and the balance.

The balance in relation to all the topics and all seven media from the sample

All media	Yes		No	
media	%	No.	%	No.
<i>Informer</i>	1,83	4	98,17	214
<i>Alo!</i>	8,47	20	91,53	216
<i>Kurir</i>	8,94	22	91,06	224
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	15,68	58	84,32	312
<i>Politika</i>	18,40	83	81,60	368
<i>Danas</i>	23,11	95	76,89	316
<i>Blic</i>	35,74	84	64,26	151
total	16,89	366	83,11	1801

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

During the whole of 2017, the smallest share of the balanced texts was recorded in the daily *Informer* (2.29%), while the daily *Blic* published 29.72%, that is, the most comprehensive inscriptions compared to all other media from the sample.

Balance in relation to all topics and all seven media from the sample for all four quarters of 2017

All media	Yes		No	
media	%	No.	%	No.
<i>Informer</i>	19	2,29	811	97,71
<i>Kurir</i>	54	5,52	924	94,48
<i>Alo!</i>	150	16,89	738	83,11
<i>Politika</i>	330	18,62	1442	81,38
<i>Danas</i>	409	23,90	1302	76,10
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	368	25,56	1072	74,44
<i>Blic</i>	307	29,72	726	70,28
total	1637	18,92	7015	81,08

Source: Research *Mediameter* January - March 2017, *Mediameter* April - June 2017, *Mediameter* July - September 2017 and *Mediameter* October - December 2017

Actors

Media in Serbia, at least according to the analysis of the empirical material collected from the front pages, mainly deal with political events within Serbia. Even 46.96% of the total number of actors covered by selected texts from the front pages are (individual and collective) political actors who occupy different positions within the political life of Serbia. If we add this number to the texts that speak of foreign political actors, the percentage of the participation of political actors in the total number of actors on the headlines rises to 70.60%. The second group by frequency of occurrence is different social actors, which make up 19.74% of our sample. Economic actors are the protagonists of the texts on the covers in only 6.66% of cases.

Total distribution of actors appearing in the texts which are a part of sampled research (expressed in absolute numbers)

Actors					
Political actors	10255	Domestic	6821	Individual	4836
				Collective	1985
		Foreign	3434	Individual	2581
				Collective	853
Economic actors	950	Domestic	904	Individual	377
				Collective	527
		Foreign	46	Individual	4
				Collective	42
Other social actors	2814	Domestic	2801	Individual	2117
				Collective	684
		Foreign	13	Individual	13
				Collective	0
Unnamed source					505
Total					14524

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearance of individual political actors from **the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the President of the Republic of Serbia**

The Government and the President of the Republic of Serbia	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Aleksandar Vučić	673	36,60	10	1,49	643	95,54	20	2,97
Ana Brnabić	193	10,49	2	1,04	181	93,78	10	5,18
Ivica Dačić	189	10,28	1	0,53	186	98,41	2	1,06
Aleksandar Vulin	171	9,30	0	0,00	159	92,98	12	7,02
Nebojša Stefanović	113	6,14	0	0,00	112	99,12	1	0,88
Zorana Mihajlović	112	6,09	2	1,79	101	90,18	9	8,04
Nela Kuburović	39	2,12	0	0,00	39	100,00	0	0,00
Rasim Ljajić	38	2,07	1	2,63	37	97,37	0	0,00
Nenad Popović	33	1,79	0	0,00	31	93,94	2	6,06
Aleksandar Antić	30	1,63	0	0,00	30	100,00	0	0,00
Jadranka Joksimović	30	1,63	0	0,00	30	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Đorđević	27	1,47	0	0,00	27	100,00	0	0,00
Mladen Šarčević	25	1,36	0	0,00	25	100,00	0	0,00
Milan Krkobabić	23	1,25	0	0,00	12	52,17	11	47,83
Dušan Vujović	21	1,14	0	0,00	20	95,24	1	4,76
Zlatibor Lončar	19	1,03	0	0,00	19	100,00	0	0,00
Branko Ružić	19	1,03	1	5,26	18	94,74	0	0,00
Slavica Đukić Dejanović	19	1,03	0	0,00	19	100,00	0	0,00
Vladan Vukosavljević	18	0,98	0	0,00	11	61,11	7	38,89
Goran Knežević	17	0,92	0	0,00	17	100,00	0	0,00
Branislav Nedimović	14	0,76	0	0,00	13	92,86	1	7,14
Goran Trivan	8	0,44	0	0,00	7	87,50	1	12,50
Vanja Udovičić	8	0,44	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
total	1839	100,00	17	0,92	1745	94,89	77	4,19

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

As in the previous quarter, the most frequent actor on the front pages of daily newspapers was Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, about who media from our sample reported predominantly neutral (in 95.54% of cases). About 1.49% (10)⁹ of positive and 2.97% (20) of negative texts were written about him. The President of Serbia, as the protagonist of the texts on the front pages, appears 673 times,

⁹ About 25% less than in the previous quarter, when a total of 40 positive texts were recorded, but more than in the last quarter of 2016, when only 16 positive connotations were recorded.

which is significantly higher than the second ranked actor, Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, who is present in 193 texts and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivica Dačić (189 texts). The highest frequency of the appearance of Aleksandar Vučić, expressed in absolute numbers, is recorded in daily newspapers *Danas* (176), *Politika* (111) and *Večernje novosti* (108). Expressed in the relative numbers of the percentage participation of the texts in which he appears as an actor, and in relation to the total number of selected texts from the same individual newspapers, we see that he is the most present in *Danas* (42.82%), and then in the daily newspapers *Blic* (34.89%) and *Alo!* (30.51%). The smallest share of the texts in which the president of the Serbian Government / President of Serbia is the actor, is recorded in the newspapers *Informer* (24.31%) and *Politika* (24.61%).

When it comes to the value context, the biggest share, as well as the number of negative texts, are again present in *Danas* (10.80% or 19 entries). Except in these daily newspapers, a negative connotated text appears only in the daily *Blic*. The highest number of positive texts were published in the *Alo!* - 5.56% or 4 texts, followed by *Danas* (2), and *Večernje novosti*, *Politika*, *Kurir* and *Informer* with one positively connoted text.

Aleksandar Vučić: Context value with reference to the media

Aleksandar Vučić	Positive		Neutral		Negative		total	
Media	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<i>Alo!</i>	4	5,56	68	94,44	0	0,00	72	100,00
<i>Blic</i>	0	0,00	81	98,78	1	1,22	82	100,00
<i>Danas</i>	2	1,14	155	88,07	19	10,80	176	100,00
<i>Informer</i>	1	1,89	52	98,11	0	0,00	53	100,00
<i>Kurir</i>	1	1,41	70	98,59	0	0,00	71	100,00
<i>Politika</i>	1	0,90	110	99,10	0	0,00	111	100,00
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	1	0,93	107	99,07	0	0,00	108	100,00
total	10	1,49	643	95,54	20	2,97	673	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Number of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić in respect of total numbers of texts in particular dailies

Aleksandar Vučić per media	No. of appearances	Total no. of texts	% share against total no. of texts
<i>Danas</i>	176	411	42,82
<i>Blic</i>	82	235	34,89
<i>Alo!</i>	72	236	30,51
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	108	370	29,19
<i>Kurir</i>	71	246	28,86
<i>Politika</i>	111	451	24,61
<i>Informer</i>	53	218	24,31
total	673	2167	31,06

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Prime Minister Ana Brnabić is the protagonist in 193 (10.49%) of analyzed texts and is the second according to the frequency of appearances among individual political actors from the Serbian political scene.

The highest number of negative texts about Ana Brnabić is recorded in the daily newspaper *Kurir* (7), in which the largest percentage of negative connotations (21.88%) is also recorded. Negatively intoned inscriptions are also present in the daily *Danas* (3), and these are the only two media in which negative texts are published. Positively connoted articles on the current prime minister were published two papers: *Blic* (1) and *Politika* (1).

Politika (37) and *Danas* (40) have published most of the articles in which the Serbian Prime Minister was the actor, but *Blic* (14.47%) and *Kurir* (13.01%) have the highest share in relation with the total number of articles in the media.

Other actors from this group are in 94.89% of texts presented in a neutral value context. In addition to the president and prime minister, a slightly larger number of negative connotations was recorded with Aleksandar Vulin (12), Milan Krkobabić (11), Zorana Mihajlović (9) and Vladan Vukosavljević (7).

Number of appearances of Ana Brnabić in respect of total numbers of texts in particular dailies

Ana Brnabić per media	No. of appearances	Total no. of texts	% share against total no. of texts
<i>Blic</i>	34	235	14,47
<i>Kurir</i>	32	246	13,01
<i>Danas</i>	40	411	9,73
<i>Politika</i>	37	451	8,20
<i>Alo!</i>	18	236	7,63
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	28	370	7,57
<i>Informer</i>	4	218	1,83
total	193	2167	8,91

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Ana Brnabić: Context value with reference to the media

Ana Brnabić	positive		neutral		negative		total	
media	broj	%	broj	%	broj	%	broj	%
<i>Alo!</i>	0	0,00	18	100,00	0	0,00	18	100,00
<i>Blic</i>	1	2,94	33	97,06	0	0,00	34	100,00
<i>Danas</i>	0	0,00	37	92,50	3	7,50	40	100,00
<i>Informer</i>	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00	4	100,00
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0,00	25	78,13	7	21,88	32	100,00
<i>Politika</i>	1	2,70	36	97,30	0	0,00	37	100,00
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0	0,00	28	100,00	0	0,00	28	100,00
total	2	1,04	181	93,78	10	5,18	193	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

In following table is an overview of the most frequent actors of the members of the Government of the Republic of Serbia for all four quarters of 2017. The President of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, is the most numerous actor on the cover of daily newspapers with a total of 3042 appearances, with the highest number of positive (92) and negative (151) texts being written. The highest percentages of negative connotations were recorded in the case of former President Tomislav Nikolić (11.98%) and former Minister of Labor and Social Affairs and current Minister of Defense Aleksandar Vulin (10.35%).

The most represented actors in the group **Government and the President of the Republic of Serbia** in all four quarters of 2017

The Government and the President of the Republic of Serbia	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Aleksandar Vučić	3042	38,75	92	3,02	2799	92,01	151	4,96
Ivica Dačić	843	10,74	5	0,59	807	95,73	31	3,68
Ana Brnabić	635	8,09	15	2,36	594	93,54	26	4,09
Tomislav Nikolić	526	6,70	2	0,38	461	87,64	63	11,98
Aleksandar Vulin	483	6,15	0	0,00	433	89,65	50	10,35

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

In the fourth quarter of 2016, 1490 appearances of opposition actors were recorded. This number was significantly increased in the first quarter of 2017, when the 1981 appearance of opposition figures was recorded. In the second and third quarters of 2017, this number is again returning to values from the end of the previous year (1243 in the second and 1220 in the third). In the fourth quarter of 2017, we have again recorded the growth of the number of opposition actors initiated by the announcement of the Belgrade elections (1490). The most represented opposition leaders are Saša Janković (201 text), Dragan Đilas (133) and Vuk Jeremić (122). The most negative texts written about this three opposition actors: Saša Janković (45), Dragan Đilas (38) and Vuk Jeremić (17). No positive texts were written about the representatives of the opposition in the last quarter of 2017.

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearance of individual political actors from **the opposition**

Opposition- individual	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Saša Janković	201	13,49	0	0,00	156	77,61	45	22,39
Dragan Đilas	133	8,93	0	0,00	95	71,43	38	28,57
Vuk Jeremić	122	8,19	0	0,00	105	86,07	17	13,93
Vojislav Šešelj	89	5,97	0	0,00	86	96,63	3	3,37
Dragan Šutanovac	87	5,84	0	0,00	80	91,95	7	8,05
Boris Tadić	78	5,23	0	0,00	73	93,59	5	6,41
Boško Obradović	50	3,36	0	0,00	44	88,00	6	12,00
Aleksandar Šapić	46	3,09	0	0,00	38	82,61	8	17,39
Čedomir Jovanović	44	2,95	0	0,00	37	84,09	7	15,91
Zoran Živković	36	2,42	0	0,00	35	97,22	1	2,78

Dušan Teodorović	34	2,28	0	0,00	34	100,00	0	0,00
Saša Radulović	33	2,21	0	0,00	31	93,94	2	6,06
Srđan Škoro	28	1,88	0	0,00	28	100,00	0	0,00
Balša Božović	19	1,28	0	0,00	18	94,74	1	5,26
Ljubiša Preletačević Beli	18	1,21	0	0,00	17	94,44	1	5,56
Miloš Jovanović	18	1,21	0	0,00	18	100,00	0	0,00
Slavica Janković	17	1,14	0	0,00	15	88,24	2	11,76
Borko Stefanović	17	1,14	0	0,00	16	94,12	1	5,88
Nenad Čanak	16	1,07	0	0,00	14	87,50	2	12,50
Bojan Pajić	14	0,94	0	0,00	10	71,43	4	28,57
Aida Ćorović	12	0,81	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Đorđe Vukadinović	12	0,81	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Sanda Rašković Ivić	12	0,81	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Marinika Tepić	11	0,74	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Radoslav Milojević Kena	11	0,74	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Vesna Rakić Vodinić	10	0,67	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Vjerica Radeta	10	0,67	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Nikola Jovanović	9	0,60	0	0,00	8	88,89	1	11,11
Janko Baljak	9	0,60	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Miroslav Aleksić	8	0,54	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Velimir Ilić	8	0,54	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Momir Stojanović	8	0,54	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Srbijanka Turajlić	8	0,54	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Dušan Duda Ivković	8	0,54	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Božidar Prelević	8	0,54	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Sulejman Ugljanin	7	0,47	0	0,00	2	28,57	5	71,43
Sreto Malinović	7	0,47	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Milan Stamatović	7	0,47	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Goran Ješić	7	0,47	0	0,00	6	85,71	1	14,29
Gordana Čomić	7	0,47	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Dijana Vukomanović	6	0,40	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Čedomir Antić	6	0,40	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Vladan Glišić	6	0,40	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Gajić	6	0,40	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Nemanja Šarović	6	0,40	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00

Konstantin Samofalov	5	0,34	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Petar Jojić	5	0,34	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Dušan Pavlović	5	0,34	0	0,00	3	60,00	2	40,00
Žarko Korać	4	0,27	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Dobrica Veselinović	4	0,27	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Miroslav Parović	4	0,27	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Nataša Jovanović	4	0,27	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Janko Veselinović	4	0,27	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandra Jerkov	4	0,27	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Radomir Lazović	3	0,20	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Milovan Bojić	3	0,20	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Krasić	3	0,20	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Veroljub Stevanović	3	0,20	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Dragoljub Mićunović	3	0,20	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Stefan Stamenkovski	3	0,20	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Milorad Mirčić	3	0,20	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	121	8,12	0	0,00	117	96,69	4	3,31
total	1490	100,00	0	0,00	1327	89,06	163	10,94

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Following table gives an overview of the most common opposition actors in all four quarters of 2017. The most prominent actors from the opposition on the cover of our daily newspapers were Saša Janković with 875 appearances (17.94% in negative context) and Vuk Jeremić with 641 appearances (18.56% in negative context).

The most represented actors among the opposition members in the four quarters of 2017

Opposition- individual	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Saša Janković	875	15,96	4	0,46	714	81,60	157	17,94
Vuk Jeremić	641	11,69	0	0,00	522	81,44	119	18,56
Vojislav Šešelj	441	8,04	2	0,45	420	95,24	19	4,31
Boris Tadić	354	6,46	0	0,00	333	94,07	21	5,93
Boško Obradović	288	5,25	0	0,00	261	90,63	27	9,38

Source: Research *Mediameter* January - March 2017, *Mediameter* April - June 2017, *Mediameter* July - September 2017 and *Mediameter* October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual political actors representing the position

Position- individual	No.	%	Posi- tive	%	Neu- tral	%	Nega- tive	%
Vladimir Đukanović	25	6,94	0	0,00	24	96,00	1	4,00
Dragan Marković Palma	24	6,67	0	0,00	23	95,83	1	4,17
Aleksandar Martinović	22	6,11	0	0,00	21	95,45	1	4,55
Milutin Mrkonjić	21	5,83	0	0,00	20	95,24	1	4,76
Miroslav Lazanski	17	4,72	1	5,88	16	94,12	0	0,00
Milenko Jovanov	14	3,89	0	0,00	14	100,00	0	0,00
Darko Glišić	14	3,89	0	0,00	14	100,00	0	0,00
Nikola Šainović	13	3,61	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Vuk Drašković	13	3,61	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Orlić	11	3,06	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Miodrag Linta	10	2,78	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Đorđe Milićević	9	2,50	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Radomir Nikolić	9	2,50	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Bogoljub Karić	9	2,50	0	0,00	8	88,89	1	11,11
Veroljub Arsić	8	2,22	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Andrej Vučić	7	1,94	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Meho Omerović	7	1,94	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Marijan Ristićević	7	1,94	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Ivica Tončev	6	1,67	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Muamer Zukorlić	6	1,67	0	0,00	5	83,33	1	16,67
Dragan Šormaz	6	1,67	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Zagrađanin	5	1,39	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Dubravka Filipovski	5	1,39	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Milovan Drecun	4	1,11	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Miroslav Čučković	4	1,11	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Marija Obradović	4	1,11	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Novica Tončev	4	1,11	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Marinković	3	0,83	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Marko Atlagić	3	0,83	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00

Boško Ničić	3	0,83	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Momo Čolaković	3	0,83	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Ivana Petrović	3	0,83	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Predrag Marković	3	0,83	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	58	16,11	0	0,00	58	100,00	0	0,00
total	360	100,00	1	0,28	353	98,06	6	1,67

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual political actors: **representatives of State bodies, agencies and institutions**

State bodies, agencies and institutions - individual	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Siniša Mali	80	17,62	2	2,50	76	95,00	2	2,50
Maja Gojković	62	13,66	0	0,00	59	95,16	3	4,84
Tomislav Nikolić	59	13,00	0	0,00	47	79,66	12	20,34
Goran Vesić	39	8,59	0	0,00	39	100,00	0	0,00
Marko Đurić	35	7,71	0	0,00	34	97,14	1	2,86
Jorgovanka Tabaković	19	4,19	0	0,00	18	94,74	1	5,26
Miloš Vučević	16	3,52	0	0,00	16	100,00	0	0,00
Nikola Selaković	13	2,86	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Stanković	8	1,76	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Nikola Nikodijević	7	1,54	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Igor Mirović	7	1,54	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Tanja Mišević	5	1,10	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Jovan Vorkapić	4	0,88	0	0,00	2	50,00	2	50,00
Biljana Popović Ivković	3	0,66	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Stanislava Pak	3	0,66	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Milovan Drecun	3	0,66	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Marko Blagojević	3	0,66	1	33,33	2	66,67	0	0,00
others	88	19,38	1	1,14	86	97,73	1	1,14
total	454	100,00	4	0,88	428	94,27	22	4,85

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution and frequency and value context of appearances of individual political actors: **representatives of military and police**

Military and police - individual	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Bratislav Gašić	15	12,30	0	0,00	14	93,33	1	6,67
Ljubiša Diković	14	11,48	1	7,14	13	92,86	0	0,00
Ranko Živak	7	5,74	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Novica Antić	7	5,74	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Rebić	4	3,28	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Momčilo Vidojević	3	2,46	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Veljko Mijailović	3	2,46	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	69	56,56	1	1,45	61	88,41	7	10,14
total	122	100,00	2	1,64	112	91,80	8	6,56

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of **other** individual political and social actors

Other	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Slobodan Milošević	127	31,75	0	0,00	124	97,64	3	2,36
Zoran Đinđić	49	12,25	0	0,00	49	100,00	0	0,00
Vojislav Koštunica	23	5,75	0	0,00	22	95,65	1	4,35
Mirjana Marković	20	5,00	0	0,00	19	95,00	1	5,00
Josip Broz Tito	18	4,50	0	0,00	18	100,00	0	0,00
SANU	18	4,50	0	0,00	18	100,00	0	0,00
Mlađan Dinkić	15	3,75	0	0,00	11	73,33	4	26,67
Sergej Trifunović	10	2,50	0	0,00	9	90,00	1	10,00
Nataša Jeremić	9	2,25	0	0,00	7	77,78	2	22,22
Dragica Nikolić	8	2,00	0	0,00	3	37,50	5	62,50
Vesna Pešić	8	2,00	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Biljana Srbljanović	8	2,00	0	0,00	7	87,50	1	12,50
Emir Kusturica	7	1,75	1	14,29	6	85,71	0	0,00
Mirko Cvetković	7	1,75	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Sonja Biserko	7	1,75	0	0,00	5	71,43	2	28,57
Nataša Kandić	6	1,50	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00

Dušan Kovačević	5	1,25	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Marko Nikolić	5	1,25	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Kostić	5	1,25	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Predrag Gojković	5	1,25	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Svetlana Ceca Ražnatović	5	1,25	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Jelena Karleuša	4	1,00	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Božidar Đelić	4	1,00	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Borka Pavićević	4	1,00	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Igor Jurić	4	1,00	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Slavko Ćuruvija	4	1,00	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Ivan Tasovac	3	0,75	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Veran Matić	3	0,75	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Maja Đorđević	3	0,75	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Humanitarian law center	3	0,75	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Siniša Kovačević	3	0,75	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
total	400	100,00	1	0,25	379	94,75	20	5,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **state bodies and institutions**

State bodies, agencies and institutions	No.	%	Posi- tive	%	Neu- tral	%	Nega- tive	%
Government of Serbia	178	23,42	5	2,81	166	93,26	7	3,93
Ministry of Interior	84	11,05	0	0,00	79	94,05	5	5,95
National Assembly of Serbia	40	5,26	0	0,00	33	82,50	7	17,50
Ministry of Defence	39	5,13	1	2,56	38	97,44	0	0,00
Ministry of Construction, Traffic and Infrastructure	29	3,82	0	0,00	29	100,00	0	0,00
National Bank of Serbia	28	3,68	0	0,00	27	96,43	1	3,57
Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development	24	3,16	0	0,00	24	100,00	0	0,00
Ministry of Finance	23	3,03	0	0,00	23	100,00	0	0,00
Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Policy	22	2,89	0	0,00	21	95,45	1	4,55
Ministry of Health	22	2,89	0	0,00	22	100,00	0	0,00
Ministry of Justice	20	2,63	0	0,00	20	100,00	0	0,00

Serbian authorities	18	2,37	1	5,56	14	77,78	3	16,67
President's Cabinet	17	2,24	0	0,00	17	100,00	0	0,00
Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection	16	2,11	0	0,00	15	93,75	1	6,25
Ministry of Culture and Information	15	1,97	0	0,00	13	86,67	2	13,33
City of Belgrade	14	1,84	0	0,00	8	57,14	6	42,86
Ministry of Economy	13	1,71	0	0,00	12	92,31	1	7,69
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	12	1,58	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Prime Minister's Cabinet	10	1,32	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Business Registers Agency	10	1,32	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Ministry of State Administration and Local Government	9	1,18	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunication	8	1,05	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Center for social issues	8	1,05	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Ministry of Mining and Energy	7	0,92	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Tax Administration	7	0,92	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Republic fund PIO	6	0,79	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Republic fund for health insurance	5	0,66	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
Republic Statistical Authority	5	0,66	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Customs Direction	5	0,66	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Property Directorate	4	0,53	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Office for Kosovo and Metohija	4	0,53	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
National council for cooperation with Russia and China	4	0,53	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Energy Agency	3	0,39	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Ministry for EU integration	3	0,39	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Ministry of Youth and Sport	3	0,39	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Office for Cooperation with Russia and China	3	0,39	0	0,00	1	33,33	2	66,67
others	42	5,53	0	0,00	38	90,48	4	9,52
total	760	100,00	7	0,92	712	93,68	41	5,39

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **military and police**

Military and police	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
BIA	63	39,13	0	0,00	60	95,24	3	4,76
Serbian Armed Forces	61	37,89	7	11,48	54	88,52	0	0,00
others	10	6,21	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Military Security Agency	8	4,97	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Serbian Military Union	7	4,35	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Serbian Police Union	4	2,48	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
SBPOK	4	2,48	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
SAJ	4	2,48	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
total	161	100,00	7	4,35	151	93,79	3	1,86

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **opposition**

Position	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
SNS	247	58,53	5	2,02	235	95,14	7	2,83
SPS	92	21,80	0	0,00	90	97,83	2	2,17
PUPS	24	5,69	0	0,00	18	75,00	6	25,00
United Serbia	21	4,98	0	0,00	21	100,00	0	0,00
SDPS	11	2,61	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Socialists' Movement	10	2,37	0	0,00	9	90,00	1	10,00
SPO	5	1,18	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
SVM	4	0,95	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
SNP	4	0,95	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Strength of Serbia Movement	3	0,71	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
others	1	0,24	0	0,00	1	100,00	0	0,00
total	422	100,00	5	1,18	400	94,79	17	4,03

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective actors: **opposition**

Opposition- parties	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
DS	151	23,93	0	0,00	143	94,70	8	5,30
PSG	114	18,07	0	0,00	101	88,60	13	11,40
Dveri	59	9,35	0	0,00	58	98,31	1	1,69
People's Party	58	9,19	0	0,00	54	93,10	4	6,90
SRS	37	5,86	0	0,00	37	100,00	0	0,00
Enough is enough	37	5,86	0	0,00	36	97,30	1	2,70
New party	32	5,07	0	0,00	31	96,88	1	3,13
SDS	26	4,12	0	0,00	25	96,15	1	3,85
Initiative: Let's not drown Belgrade	25	3,96	0	0,00	25	100,00	0	0,00
LDP	25	3,96	0	0,00	24	96,00	1	4,00
DSS	22	3,49	0	0,00	21	95,45	1	4,55
LSV	19	3,01	0	0,00	18	94,74	1	5,26
Serbian Left	11	1,74	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Movement for Turnaround	5	0,79	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
New Serbia	5	0,79	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Sandžak SDA	3	0,48	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	2	0,32	0	0,00	2	100,00	0	0,00
total	631	100,00	0	0,00	599	94,93	32	5,07

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

A significantly lower percentage of texts from the cover page refers to foreign (individual and collective) political actors and political actors from Kosovo (only 23.64% of the total number of actors). The protagonists of these texts are more often individual actors (in 75.16% of cases) than those collective (24.83%).

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective actors: **Kosovo**

Kosovo	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Ramush Haradinaj	62	19,81	0	0,00	48	77,42	14	22,58
Hashim Thaçi	44	14,06	0	0,00	35	79,55	9	20,45
KLA	22	7,03	0	0,00	15	68,18	7	31,82
Serbian list	17	5,43	0	0,00	17	100,00	0	0,00
Goran Rakić	15	4,79	0	0,00	15	100,00	0	0,00
KFOR	13	4,15	0	0,00	12	92,31	1	7,69
Unmik	11	3,51	0	0,00	9	81,82	2	18,18
Behgjet Pacolli	10	3,19	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
"Kosovo authorities"	9	2,88	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Oliver Ivanović	8	2,56	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Kadri Veseli	7	2,24	0	0,00	4	57,14	3	42,86
Daut Haradinaj	7	2,24	0	0,00	2	28,57	5	71,43
Special court for KLA crimes	6	1,92	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Eulex	5	1,60	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Albin Kurti	4	1,28	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Kosovo police	4	1,28	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Dalibor Jeftić	3	0,96	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Alliance for the Future of Kosovo	3	0,96	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	63	20,13	0	0,00	54	85,71	9	14,29
total	313	100,00	0	0,00	263	84,03	50	15,97

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Croatia**

Croatia	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Franjo Tuđman	27	13,57	0	0,00	20	74,07	7	25,93
Andrej Plenković	26	13,07	0	0,00	23	88,46	3	11,54
Ante Gotovina	22	11,06	0	0,00	17	77,27	5	22,73
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović	22	11,06	0	0,00	18	81,82	4	18,18

Milorad Pupovac	10	5,03	0	0,00	9	90,00	1	10,00
Croatian authorities	8	4,02	0	0,00	2	25,00	6	75,00
Croatian police	6	3,02	0	0,00	5	83,33	1	16,67
Ante Pavelić	5	2,51	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Stjepan Mesić	5	2,51	0	0,00	3	60,00	2	40,00
Ivo Josipović	5	2,51	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Government of Croatia	4	2,01	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
HDZ	4	2,01	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
Savo Štrbac	3	1,51	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	52	26,13	0	0,00	41	78,85	11	21,15
total	199	100,00	0	0,00	158	79,40	41	20,60

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Montenegro**

Montenegro	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Milo Đukanović	10	31,25	0	0,00	8	80,00	2	20,00
Democratic front	2	6,25	0	0,00	2	100,00	0	0,00
Nebojša Medojević	2	6,25	0	0,00	2	100,00	0	0,00
others	18	56,25	0	0,00	18	100,00	0	0,00
total	32	100,00	0	0,00	30	93,75	2	6,25

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Federation of BiH**

BiH	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Milorad Dodik	97	23,72	0	0,00	97	100,00	0	0,00
Bakir Izetbegović	59	14,43	0	0,00	39	66,10	20	33,90
Naser Orić	48	11,74	0	0,00	23	47,92	25	52,08
Mladen Ivanić	27	6,60	0	0,00	27	100,00	0	0,00
Dragan Čović	24	5,87	0	0,00	24	100,00	0	0,00
Alija Izetbegović	19	4,65	0	0,00	13	68,42	6	31,58
Prosecution of BiH	10	2,44	0	0,00	9	90,00	1	10,00

Presidency of BiH	8	1,96	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Valentin Incko	8	1,96	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Igor Crnadak	7	1,71	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Biljana Plavšić	6	1,47	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Dragan Mektić	4	0,98	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Dragan Čavić	3	0,73	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
SDA	2	0,49	0	0,00	2	100,00	0	0,00
SDS	1	0,24	0	0,00	1	100,00	0	0,00
others	86	21,03	0	0,00	80	93,02	6	6,98
total	409	100,00	0	0,00	351	85,82	58	14,18

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Macedonia**

Macedonia	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Zoran Zaev	16	28,07	0	0,00	12	75,00	4	25,00
Nikola Gruevski	10	17,54	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
SDSM	8	14,04	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
VMRO-DPMNE	7	12,28	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
DUI	4	7,02	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Talat Xhaferi	3	5,26	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	9	15,79	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
total	57	100,00	0	0,00	53	92,98	4	7,02

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual foreign political actors outside the region- **foreign politicians**

Foreign political actors	No.	%	Posi- tive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	58	12,21	0	0,00	58	100,00	0	0,00
Carles Puigdemont	44	9,26	0	0,00	41	93,18	3	6,82
Mariano Rajoy	37	7,79	0	0,00	37	100,00	0	0,00
Emmanuel Macron	25	5,26	1	4,00	24	96,00	0	0,00
Edi Rama	13	2,74	0	0,00	12	92,31	1	7,69

Viktor Orban	11	2,32	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Kim Jong Un	10	2,11	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Alexis Tsipras	10	2,11	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Bojko Borisov	9	1,89	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Xi Jinping	8	1,68	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Bashar al Assad	7	1,47	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	6	1,26	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Boris Johnson	6	1,26	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Petro Poroshenko	5	1,05	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Sebastian Kurz	5	1,05	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Viktor Yanukovich	5	1,05	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Alexander Lukashenko	5	1,05	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Miloš Zeman	4	0,84	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Catherine Ashton	4	0,84	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Ilir Meta	4	0,84	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Li Keqiang	4	0,84	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Theresa May	4	0,84	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Heinz-Christian Strache	3	0,63	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Li Machang	3	0,63	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Fidel Castro	3	0,63	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Fethullah Gülen	3	0,63	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
Peter Siarto	3	0,63	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	176	37,05	0	0,00	164	93,18	12	6,82
total	475	100,00	1	0,21	457	96,21	17	3,58

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual foreign political actors outside the region- **Germany**

Germany	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Angela Merkel	30	30,30	0	0,00	29	96,67	1	3,33
Axel Dittmann	6	6,06	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Wolfgang Schäuble	5	5,05	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
German authorities	4	4,04	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
CDU	4	4,04	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Martin Schulz	4	4,04	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00

AfD	3	3,03	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	43	43,43	0	0,00	35	81,40	8	18,60
total	99	100,00	0	0,00	90	90,91	9	9,09

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: **Russia**

Russia	No.	%	Posi- tive	%	Neu- tral	%	Nega- tive	%
Vladimir Putin	167	36,30	12	7,19	155	92,81	0	0,00
Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Centre	47	10,22	0	0,00	47	100,00	0	0,00
Sergey Lavrov	35	7,61	0	0,00	35	100,00	0	0,00
Sergey Shoygu	30	6,52	1	3,33	29	96,67	0	0,00
Alexander Chepurin	23	5,00	1	4,35	21	91,30	1	4,35
Dmitry Rogozin	14	3,04	0	0,00	14	100,00	0	0,00
Russian authorities	11	2,39	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Dmitry Peskov	10	2,17	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Vitaly Churkin	9	1,96	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Maria Zakharova	6	1,30	1	16,67	5	83,33	0	0,00
Russia's Ministry of Russia	4	0,87	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Russia's Ministry of Foreign affairs	3	0,65	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	101	21,96	1	0,99	97	96,04	3	2,97
total	460	100,00	16	3,48	440	95,65	4	0,87

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: **USA**¹⁰

USA	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Donald Trump	100	18,42	1	1,00	87	87,00	12	12,00
Hoyt Brian Yee	58	10,68	0	0,00	48	82,76	10	17,24
Kyle Scott	34	6,26	0	0,00	28	82,35	6	17,65
Rex Tillerson	25	4,60	0	0,00	25	100,00	0	0,00
State Department	21	3,87	0	0,00	19	90,48	2	9,52
CIA	21	3,87	0	0,00	16	76,19	5	23,81
"American authorities"	19	3,50	0	0,00	15	78,95	4	21,05
US Embassy	18	3,31	0	0,00	17	94,44	1	5,56
Barack Obama	14	2,58	0	0,00	14	100,00	0	0,00
FBI	11	2,03	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
US Congress	11	2,03	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
George Soros	10	1,84	0	0,00	6	60,00	4	40,00
Pentagon	10	1,84	0	0,00	8	80,00	2	20,00
"American administration"	9	1,66	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Bill Clinton	9	1,66	0	0,00	7	77,78	2	22,22
USAID	8	1,47	0	0,00	7	87,50	1	12,50
Mike Pence	8	1,47	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Hillary Clinton	7	1,29	0	0,00	5	71,43	2	28,57
James Matis	7	1,29	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Condoleezza Rice	5	0,92	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
George Bush	4	0,74	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
William Montgomery	4	0,74	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
US Embassy in Sarajevo	3	0,55	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Joe Biden	3	0,55	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	124	22,84	0	0,00	114	91,94	10	8,06
total	543	100,00	1	0,18	481	88,58	61	11,23

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

¹⁰ And in this, as in the previous quarters, we see an increased number of actors from the United States (543). In the third quarter of 2017 we recorded 458 appearances from the USA, in the second 565, in the first quarter of 2017, 763 appearances. In the last quarter of 2016, the number of actors from the United States was multiplied by 871 in relation to the third (396) and the second quarter of 2016 (222).

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign political actors: **representatives of EU institutions and EU institutions**

EU	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
EU	66	22,15	1	1,52	60	90,91	5	7,58
European Commission	49	16,44	0	0,00	40	81,63	9	18,37
Federica Mogherini	35	11,74	0	0,00	34	97,14	1	2,86
Jean Claude Juncker	21	7,05	0	0,00	21	100,00	0	0,00
Maja Kocijančič	18	6,04	0	0,00	18	100,00	0	0,00
European Parliament	16	5,37	0	0,00	15	93,75	1	6,25
"European authorities"	13	4,36	0	0,00	11	84,62	2	15,38
Donald Tusk	10	3,36	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Sem Fabrizi	9	3,02	0	0,00	8	88,89	1	11,11
Johannes Han	7	2,35	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
David McAlister	5	1,68	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
European Investment bank	4	1,34	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
EU Delegation in Serbia	3	1,01	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	42	14,09	0	0,00	39	92,86	3	7,14
total	298	100,00	1	0,34	274	91,95	23	7,72

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of individual and collective foreign political actors: **representatives of human rights organizations and Council of Europe representatives**

Human Rights	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
OEBS	19	52,78	0	0,00	19	100,00	0	0,00
International court of justice in Hague	3	8,33	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	14	38,89	0	0,00	14	100,00	0	0,00
total	36	100,00	0	0,00	36	100,00	0	0,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign political actors: **representatives of UN institutions and UN institutions**

UN	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%	No.
United Nations	39	43.33	0	0.00	39	100.00	0	0.00
UN Security Council	23	25.56	0	0.00	23	100.00	0	0.00
UNESCO	12	13.33	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
António Guterres	4	4.44	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
others	12	13.33	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
total	90	100.00	0	0.00	89	98.89	1	1.11

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors: **NATO**

NATO	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
NATO	115	79,86	0	0,00	92	80,00	23	20,00
Jens Stoltenberg	19	13,19	0	0,00	19	100,00	0	0,00
others	10	6,94	0	0,00	7	70,00	3	30,00
total	144	100,00	0	0,00	118	81,94	26	18,06

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective actors: **actors related to The Hague Tribunal**

The Hague Tribunal	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Ratko Mladić	118	25,60	3	2,54	112	94,92	3	2,54
Hague tribunal	94	20,39	0	0,00	71	75,53	23	24,47
Radovan Karadžić	36	7,81	0	0,00	35	97,22	1	2,78
Slobodan Praljak	29	6,29	0	0,00	25	86,21	4	13,79
Vladimir Lazarević	26	5,64	5	19,23	21	80,77	0	0,00
Serge Brammertz	16	3,47	0	0,00	15	93,75	1	6,25
Jovica Stanišić	13	2,82	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Carmel Agius	12	2,60	0	0,00	11	91,67	1	8,33
Franko Simatović	12	2,60	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Momčilo Krajišnik	10	2,17	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Jadranko Prlić	7	1,52	0	0,00	5	71,43	2	28,57
Neboša Pavković	7	1,52	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00

Veselin Šlivančanin	6	1,30	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Theodor Meron	4	0,87	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Geoffrey Nice	3	0,65	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	68	14,75	0	0,00	64	94,12	4	5,88
total	461	100,00	8	1,74	414	89,80	39	8,46

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Already from this cursory review of the frequency of the appearance of individual actors on the front pages of the selected printed daily newspapers from our sample, it is clearly noticed that the media treat issues from the domain of internal and external politics with unequal interest. The fact that foreign actors on the cover of daily newspapers in Serbia are present in a significantly smaller percentage (33.48% in relation to 66.51% of the frequency of appearance of domestic political actors) speaks of the focus of domestic media on the field of internal politics, which often takes the appearance of fiction in interpretations of individual daily newspapers, about which there were more words in the part of the analysis, which deals with interpretative strategies in the media processing of certain topics. The reasons for a noticeable lack of interest for economic actors and their understanding of the social, economic and political situation in Serbia and the world remains enigmatic (only 6.54% of the total sample of actors are economic actors), the only thing is that in the narratives of many politicians economic issues and economic consolidation of the country are referred to as key elements of future development strategies of the Serbian society.

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective **economy/economic actors**

Economic actors - individually	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Miroslav Mišković	30	7,96	0	0,00	22	73,33	8	26,67
Mira Petrović	19	5,04	0	0,00	2	10,53	17	89,47
Ivica Todorović	13	3,45	0	0,00	10	76,92	3	23,08
Marko Mišković	8	2,12	0	0,00	7	87,50	1	12,50
Blagoje Spaskovski	8	2,12	0	0,00	2	25,00	6	75,00
Zoran Drobnjak	7	1,86	0	0,00	6	85,71	1	14,29
Dušan Bajatović	6	1,59	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Babić	5	1,33	0	0,00	4	80,00	1	20,00
Dragan Šolak	5	1,33	0	0,00	1	20,00	4	80,00
Milo Đurašković	5	1,33	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Milan Beko	4	1,06	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00

Miodrag Kostić	4	1,06	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Milorad Grčić	3	0,80	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Ratomir Todorović	3	0,80	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksej Miler	3	0,80	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	254	67,37	0	0,00	233	91,73	21	8,27
total	377	100,00	0	0,00	315	83,55	62	16,45

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective **domestic economic actors**

Economic actors	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Pošte Srbije	23	4,36	0	0,00	13	56,52	10	43,48
RTB Bor	20	3,80	0	0,00	16	80,00	4	20,00
Electrodistribution of Serbia	18	3,42	0	0,00	18	100,00	0	0,00
Roads of Serbia	15	2,85	0	0,00	14	93,33	1	6,67
Fiat	13	2,47	0	0,00	12	92,31	1	7,69
Railways of Serbia	11	2,09	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Agrokor	11	2,09	0	0,00	9	81,82	2	18,18
Corridors of Serbia	10	1,90	0	0,00	9	90,00	1	10,00
Galenika	10	1,90	0	0,00	9	90,00	1	10,00
Commercial bank	9	1,71	0	0,00	6	66,67	3	33,33
Nikola Tesla Aeroport	8	1,52	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Gazprom	8	1,52	1	12,50	7	87,50	0	0,00
NALED	8	1,52	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Smederevo Ironworks	8	1,52	0	0,00	7	87,50	1	12,50
Srbijagas	8	1,52	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Traffic Institute CIP	7	1,33	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Pančevo nitrogen plant	7	1,33	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Delta holding	7	1,33	1	14,29	6	85,71	0	0,00
Goša	7	1,33	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Commerce Chamber of Serbia	7	1,33	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Air Serbia	7	1,33	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
NIS	6	1,14	3	50,00	2	33,33	1	16,67
SBB	5	0,95	0	0,00	1	20,00	4	80,00

Petrohemija	5	0,95	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Telekom Serbia	5	0,95	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Hestil	5	0,95	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Keep Light	5	0,95	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Merkator S	5	0,95	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Ikea	5	0,95	1	20,00	3	60,00	1	20,00
Dipos	4	0,76	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
OTP Bank	4	0,76	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
ŽOS Trnava	4	0,76	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
MSK Kikinda	4	0,76	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
MBA - Ratko Mitrović nisko-gradnja	4	0,76	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Etihad	3	0,57	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
CRBC	3	0,57	1	33,33	2	66,67	0	0,00
MK group	3	0,57	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Poštanska štedionica	3	0,57	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Huawei	3	0,57	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Vojvođanska banka	3	0,57	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Ski resorts of Serbia	3	0,57	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Resavica	3	0,57	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	220	41,75	16	7,27	185	84,09	19	8,64
total	527	100,00	23	4,36	455	86,34	49	9,30

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective **foreign economic actors**

MMF/World Bank	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
IMF	20	43,48	0	0,00	19	95,00	1	5,00
World Bank	17	36,96	0	0,00	16	94,12	1	5,88
James Ruf	4	8,70	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
others	5	10,87	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
total	46	100,00	0	0,00	44	95,65	2	4,35

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

In addition to already mentioned political and economic actors, the protagonists are also various other social actors, who in different ways influence the social and political situation within the Serbian society. Based on the collected empirical material, we divided them into:

(a) representatives of independent and independent governmental bodies and institutions, (b) political, social, economic, security and other analysts, (c) representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations (d) actors from the media, (e) representatives of judicial authorities, (f) lawyers and protagonists of various court proceedings, (h) media protagonists and other scandals

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of independent bodies**

Independent bodies	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Anti-Corruption Agency	31	24,22	0	0,00	30	96,77	1	3,23
Fiscal council	15	11,72	0	0,00	15	100,00	0	0,00
Rodoljub Šabić	11	8,59	1	9,09	10	90,91	0	0,00
National council for high education	8	6,25	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Jelisaveta Vasilčić	6	4,69	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
KoNUS	5	3,91	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
REM	5	3,91	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Pašalić	4	3,13	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Brankica Janković	4	3,13	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Pavle Petrović	3	2,34	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandar Lipkovski	3	2,34	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	33	25,78	0	0,00	31	93,94	2	6,06
total	128	100,00	1	0,78	124	96,88	3	2,34

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic and social actors:
analysts

Analysts	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Dragomir Anđelković	53	7,58	0	0,00	53	100,00	0	0,00
Branko Radun	30	4,29	0	0,00	30	100,00	0	0,00
Toma Fila	29	4,15	0	0,00	29	100,00	0	0,00
Nebojša Krstić	21	3,00	0	0,00	21	100,00	0	0,00
Bojan Klačar	20	2,86	0	0,00	20	100,00	0	0,00
Božidar Spasić	16	2,29	0	0,00	16	100,00	0	0,00
Dušan Janjić	15	2,15	0	0,00	15	100,00	0	0,00
Ljubodrag Savić	14	2,00	0	0,00	14	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Pejić	13	1,86	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Orhan Dragaš	12	1,72	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Živadin Jovanović	12	1,72	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Vladislav Jovanović	11	1,57	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Milivojević	11	1,57	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandar Radić	11	1,57	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Dejan Vuk Stanković	10	1,43	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Milan Antonijević	10	1,43	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Milojko Arsić	9	1,29	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandra Joksimović	9	1,29	0	0,00	9	100,00	0	0,00
Saša Borojević	8	1,14	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Stojiljković	8	1,14	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Ljubomir Madžar	8	1,14	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandar Popov	8	1,14	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Marko Nicović	7	1,00	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Ivan Nikolić	7	1,00	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Vladimir Vuletić	7	1,00	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Boško Jakšić	7	1,00	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Dušan Proroković	6	0,86	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Dragišić	6	0,86	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Cvijetin Milivojević	5	0,72	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Vlade Radulović	5	0,72	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Ivošević	5	0,72	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00

Boban Stojanović	5	0,72	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Darko Trifunović	5	0,72	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Milan Kovačević	5	0,72	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Božidar Delić	5	0,72	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Goran Rodić	5	0,72	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Zlatko Nikolić	5	0,72	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Ratko Božović	4	0,57	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Tibor Varadi	4	0,57	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandra Janković	4	0,57	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Ljuban Karan	4	0,57	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Ivan Ninić	4	0,57	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Dobrovoje Radovanović	4	0,57	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Rade Veljanovski	4	0,57	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Zlatko Minić	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Dževad Galijašević	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Mario Spasić	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Svetozar Vujačić	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Predrag Petrović	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Milenko Kreća	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Nemanja Nenadić	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Mahmud Bušatlija	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Mladen Kovačević	3	0,43	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	221	31,62	0	0,00	221	100,00	0	0,00
total	699	100,00	0	0,00	699	100,00	0	0,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages in different media from the research sample

Media/analysts	No.	%
<i>Informer</i>	203	29,04
<i>Kurir</i>	115	16,45
<i>Danas</i>	97	13,88
<i>Politika</i>	84	12,02
<i>Blic</i>	76	10,87
<i>Alo!</i>	66	9,44
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	58	8,30
total	699	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and religious organizations**

Religija	broj	%	pozitivan	%	neutralan	%	negativan	%
Serbian Orthodox Church	36	28,13	0	0,00	33	91,67	3	8,33
Patriarch Irinej	20	15,63	0	0,00	20	100,00	0	0,00
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	9	7,03	0	0,00	5	55,56	4	44,44
Pope Francis	8	6,25	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Bishop of Bačka Irinej	7	5,47	0	0,00	6	85,71	1	14,29
Jovan, Bishop of Šumadija	6	4,69	0	0,00	5	83,33	1	16,67
Alojzije Stepinac	5	3,91	0	0,00	2	40,00	3	60,00
others	37	28,91	0	0,00	34	91,89	3	8,11
total	128	100,00	0	0,00	113	88,28	15	11,72

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency of appearances of representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious communities on the front pages of difference media from the sample

Media/ religion	No.	%
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	37	28,91
<i>Alo!</i>	29	22,66
<i>Politika</i>	28	21,88
<i>Danas</i>	10	7,81
<i>Blic</i>	9	7,03
<i>Kurir</i>	8	6,25
<i>Informer</i>	7	5,47
total	128	100,00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective social domestic actors from **the media**¹¹

Media	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
TV Pink	21	5,53	0	0,00	13	61,90	8	38,10
RTS	20	5,26	0	0,00	18	90,00	2	10,00
Milorad Vučelić	18	4,74	0	0,00	18	100,00	0	0,00
TV N1	17	4,47	0	0,00	11	64,71	6	35,29
Milomir Marić	14	3,68	1	7,14	13	92,86	0	0,00
<i>Informer</i>	14	3,68	0	0,00	6	42,86	8	57,14
NUNS	12	3,16	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Željko Mitrović	11	2,89	0	0,00	10	90,91	1	9,09
UNS	11	2,89	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Slaviša Lekić	10	2,63	0	0,00	9	90,00	1	10,00
Dragan Bujošević	9	2,37	0	0,00	7	77,78	2	22,22
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	9	2,37	2	22,22	7	77,78	0	0,00
Grupa protiv medijskog mraka	7	1,84	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Dragan J. Vučićević	7	1,84	0	0,00	6	85,71	1	14,29
KRIK	6	1,58	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00

¹¹ The actors who were the subject of the writing of other media, that is, the media companies that were reported by other media were presented.

Vukašin Obradović	6	1,58	0	0,00	5	83,33	1	16,67
Jugoslav Ćosić	5	1,32	0	0,00	3	60,00	2	40,00
Stevan Dojčinović	5	1,32	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Politika	5	1,32	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
NDNV	4	1,05	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Dragoljub Draža Petrović	4	1,05	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
Danas	4	1,05	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
Tamara Skrozza	4	1,05	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Nedim Sejdinović	4	1,05	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Kurir	4	1,05	0	0,00	2	50,00	2	50,00
Željko Cvijanović	3	0,79	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Njuznet	3	0,79	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Milan Ćulibrk	3	0,79	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
Dinko Gruhonjić	3	0,79	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	137	36,05	1	0,73	121	88,32	15	10,95
total	380	100,00	4	1,05	324	85,26	52	13,68

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

During the collection of empirical material, a significant presence of actors in connection with the activities of the judicial and investigative bodies was noted on the cover pages. The actors from this group are shown as representatives of judicial authorities (256), lawyers (158) and other protagonists of current or completed court / investigative proceedings (141).

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective domestic social actors: **representatives of judicial bodies**

Judicial system	No.	%	Posi- tive	%	Neutral	%	Nega- tive	%
Higher Public Prosecutor in Belgrade	48	18,75	0	0,00	47	97,92	1	2,08
Higher Court in Belgrade	29	11,33	0	0,00	28	96,55	1	3,45
Prosecution for Organized Crime	18	7,03	0	0,00	18	100,00	0	0,00
Court of Appeals in Belgrade	13	5,08	0	0,00	11	84,62	2	15,38
State Council of Prosecutors	12	4,69	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
High Council of Judiciary	11	4,30	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00

Vladimir Vukčević	11	4,30	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
First Basic Public Prosecutor in Belgrade	10	3,91	0	0,00	9	90,00	1	10,00
Special Court in Belgrade	9	3,52	0	0,00	8	88,89	1	11,11
Constitutional Court	7	2,73	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Prosecution for war crimes	5	1,95	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
State Attorney	4	1,56	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
First Primary Court in Belgrade	4	1,56	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
Commercial Court in Belgrade	3	1,17	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
others	72	28,13	0	0,00	70	97,22	2	2,78
total	256	100,00	0	0,00	248	96,88	8	3,13

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **lawyers**¹²

Lawyers	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Branislav Tapušević	12	7,59	0	0,00	12	100,00	0	0,00
Veljko Delibašić	11	6,96	0	0,00	10	90,91	1	9,09
Predrag Savić	10	6,33	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
Branko Lukić	8	5,06	0	0,00	8	100,00	0	0,00
Zdenko Tomanović	7	4,43	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Borivoje Borović	7	4,43	0	0,00	7	100,00	0	0,00
Goran Petronijević	5	3,16	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandar Zarić	4	2,53	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
others	94	59,49	0	0,00	93	98,94	1	1,06
total	158	100,00	0	0,00	156	98,73	2	1,27

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

¹² Some lawyers in the texts of the media from the sample played the role of analysts, and are therefore shown in that group of actors.

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **actors of court proceedings and investigations**

Actors of court proceedings and investigations	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Željko Ražnatović Arkan	12	8,51	0	0,00	10	83,33	2	16,67
Milorad Ulemek Legija	11	7,80	0	0,00	11	100,00	0	0,00
Darko Šarić	8	5,67	0	0,00	7	87,50	1	12,50
Luka Bojović	7	4,96	0	0,00	5	71,43	2	28,57
Aleksandar Stanković Sale Mutavi	6	4,26	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Rodoljub Radulović Miša Banana	3	2,13	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandar Zdravković	3	2,13	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Maja Adrovac	3	2,13	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
Radomir Marković	3	2,13	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
others	85	60,28	0	0,00	71	83,53	14	16,47
total	141	100,00	0	0,00	121	85,82	20	14,18

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

The following table shows all the actors who were linked by the media with the murder of singer Jelena Marjanović, as well as members of her family, acquaintances and friends. In the fourth quarter of 2017, these actors were present in 924 appearances, almost double the number of foreign politicians or government agencies and institutions, for example. It is interesting that in the year 2017, a total of 1530 appearances of the actors on this topic were recorded on the front pages of daily newspapers.

Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **"The murder of Jelena Marjanović"**

The murder of Jelena Marjanović	No.	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Jelena Marjanović	177	19,16	0	0,00	177	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Marjanović	170	18,40	0	0,00	96	56,47	74	43,53
Vladimir Marjanović	93	10,06	0	0,00	70	75,27	23	24,73
Jana Marjanović	75	8,12	0	0,00	75	100,00	0	0,00
Miloš Marjanović	66	7,14	0	0,00	57	86,36	9	13,64
Zorica Marjanović	59	6,39	0	0,00	53	89,83	6	10,17
Zorica Mitrović	35	3,79	0	0,00	25	71,43	10	28,57
Marjanović family	32	3,46	0	0,00	21	65,63	11	34,38

Teodora Krsmanović	31	3,35	0	0,00	31	100,00	0	0,00
Zorica Krsmanović	28	3,03	1	3,57	27	96,43	0	0,00
Nenad Šipka	20	2,16	0	0,00	20	100,00	0	0,00
Uroš Marjanović	17	1,84	0	0,00	16	94,12	1	5,88
Vera Vukomanović	15	1,62	0	0,00	13	86,67	2	13,33
Rada Matić	15	1,62	0	0,00	15	100,00	0	0,00
Ljubica, sister of Zorice Krsmanović	4	0,43	0	0,00	4	100,00	0	0,00
others	87	9,42	0	0,00	86	98,85	1	1,15
total	924	100,00	1	0,11	786	85,06	137	14,83

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

UNNAMED SOURCES

In the selected front page articles from the sampled media, unnamed sources have also been the second most prominent actor. This time there were 505 instances of quoting anonymous sources, or rather 23.3% of texts, which was quite close to the results from the previous quarter (24.11%).

The widespread usage of unnamed sources has been precisely determined thanks to the manner of qualifying anonymous sources, which we have been applying since the second *Mediameter* issue, so as to not only classify those sources which the very media has defined as anonymous, but also those who provide information that cannot be verified, no matter the manner in which they have been incorporated into an article. Of course, the presence of information gained from anonymous sources speaks more about the manner of the reporting done by the seven media found in our sample, than about the actual need of protecting the identities of the individual who provide certain information.

As Matt Carlson, in his book "On the Condition of Anonymity" has said: "Journalism is woven into the fabric of our environment, and in turn is based on it, meaning that it can never be an objective observer, as it is claimed...These sorts of questions are better answered through an approach that recognizes the culture of unnamed sources as a *culture*. This view steers an inquiry into unnamed sources away from frequency and implementation, toward issues of meanings that we share and patterns of collective interpretation between journalists, sources and the public. The securing of anonymity is not just a question of technique. It is, actually, a request for a certain type of imagining of relations between these three sides."¹³

¹³ M. Carlson, *On the condition of anonymity*, Urbana, Chicago, Springfield, University of Illinois Press, 2011, 7

A news form that contains the largest number of information obtained from an unnamed source is a report. Of the 1631 texts written in this form, 449 or 27.53% contains anonymous sources.

Share of "unnamed sources" in all journalistic forms, in seven media from the sample

Genre	Total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Report	1631	449	27,53
Article	218	50	22,94
Reportage	11	2	18,18
News	27	3	11,11
Commentary	75	1	1,33
Interview	202	0	0,00
other	3	0	0,00
total	2167	505	23,30

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

The largest share, as well as the number of articles that contain information obtained from anonymous sources in relation to the total number of published articles in an individual media, was recorded in *Informer* (41.74% or 91 texts), while the highest number of articles containing anonymous sources was found in the paper *Alo!* - 98 (41.53%). The next newspaper, which uses unnamed sources is *Kurir* (37.4% - 92), followed by *Blic* (34%), *Večernje novosti* (14%), *Danas* (11.44%) and *Politika* (around 10%).

Share of unnamed sources per analyzed media outlets

Media	Total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
<i>Informer</i>	218	91	41,74
<i>Alo!</i>	236	98	41,53
<i>Kurir</i>	246	92	37,40
<i>Blic</i>	235	80	34,04
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	370	52	14,05
<i>Danas</i>	411	47	11,44
<i>Politika</i>	451	45	9,98
total	2167	505	23,30

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

During 2017, seven analyzed media used anonymous sources in 23.93% (2070) of texts from the front pages. Most of this kind of information was used by *Informer* (43.86% or 364 texts), while at least amount of anonymous sources was on the covers of *Politika* (14%) and *Danas* (13.38%). Number in the participation of unnamed sources in other media see following table.

Share of unnamed sources per analyzed media outlets in all four quarters of 2017

Media	Total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
<i>Informer</i>	830	364	43,86
<i>Alo!</i>	888	315	35,47
<i>Kurir</i>	978	334	34,15
<i>Blic</i>	1033	293	28,36
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	1440	287	19,93
<i>Politika</i>	1772	248	14,00
<i>Danas</i>	1711	229	13,38
Total	8652	2070	23,93

Source: Research *Mediameter* January - March 2017, *Mediameter* April - June 2017, *Mediameter* July - September 2017 and *Mediameter* October - December 2017

The largest number of articles containing information from anonymous sources speaks about the *murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović*. Of the 175 texts focusing on this topic, as many as 117 or 66.86% contain anonymous sources. A large number of non-originated sources is also present in the texts that talk about *political life in Serbia* (109 or 26.33%)

Number of texts containing information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the seven media from the sample¹⁴

Topic/All media	Total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	117	175	66,86
Political life in Serbia	109	414	26,33
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	31	133	23,31
Economy	29	119	24,37
Corruption	18	36	50,00
Russia/attitude towards Russia	17	66	25,76
Crime	15	31	48,39
USA/attitude towards USA	13	66	19,70
Activities of the Governemnt of Serbia	11	45	24,44
Army	11	67	16,42
Kosovo/Belgrade and Priština relations	11	63	17,46
International relations	11	83	13,25

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2017

Conclusion

The last quarter of 2017 does not differ significantly from the previous periods covered by the analysis of seven daily newspapers. A total of 8652 texts was analyzed, 2167 of them in the last quarter. Reports are still the most prominent genre on the front pages. After the report, articles and interviews follow. From the structure of the genres present in the newspapers, it's easy to see the differences in editorial policies. When we compare the structure of genres, balance, use of data from unnamed sources, and a combination of themes, the picture of the newspapers becomes truly comprehensive. In this quarter, there was not a strong, dominant topic that would give the tone to all newspapers. There is a noticeable increase in the presence of opposition parties as some kind of introduction to the election campaign. News is still in retreat in relation to other genres. Negative value connotation becomes a kind of world view.

¹⁴ Ten topics with the largest number of unnamed sources are displayed.

4



DISCOURSE
ANALYSIS

DEJAN VUK STANKOVIĆ

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Intensive political and value disputes in the anticipation of Belgrade elections

Strong rhetoric, highly charged political debate, constant deficit of rationality, ease of placing labels, discussion on the verge (or below) the level of decency, lack of possibility to establish any realistic portrait of political reality- in short: a society in deep trenches. These are the main, so to say, ever-present features of weekly and daily newspapers in Serbia in the period from October to December 2017.

Similar to previous analysis, this one too can be started with a standard assessment of print media, particularly editorial columns and weekly newspapers. In the field of print journalism, primarily among the weeklies, there were no “prohibited” or “untouchable” topics whatsoever. All the important issues were covered and from a variety of different, often completely opposing angles. The result of many different forms and content of journalistic writing is a lively media scene with diverse points of view on identical issues, regardless of whether it refers directly to the actors, events or the political, economic or wider social events. The actual presence of political, value and journalistic pluralism is a testimony of the existence of freedom of thought and speech, as well the freedom of expression, in this specific form of journalism. In fact, the freedom of authors to write down (or draw) any ideas or attitudes they might have is present in all forms and genres. Besides, various political orientations are represented, ranging from the radical right to the radical left. In short, in the relevant, analyzed weeklies, neither censorship nor self-censorship is present. This fact is important, mostly for two reasons, which frankly speaking, are not in the sphere of politics. First, any statement or interpretive model that relates to the events, actors and socio-historical processes is legitimate in Serbia’s public sphere. Interpretive codes, on the other hand, have the power to spread on the Internet, and consequently, often trigger events that are a leading cause for many TV reports and interviews.

The outcome of journalistic pluralism is the portrayal of subjects, which is as if by some unwritten rule, dominantly negative. The treatment of topics is deeply rooted in the personal standpoint of the author, or the political orientation of the journalist or the editorial board they belong to. In most weeklies, the dominant negative obsession is directed at the personality of the President of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, while the opposition is constantly questioned on the grounds of moral and political legitimacy.

Creation of the negative image of actors and diametrically opposing interpretations of political, economic, social and historical processes, occur as a result of journalistic treatment of certain specific social and political topics or as conclusions of numerous interviews with relevant or less relevant subjects.

From the perspective of topics, last quarter of 2017 was dominated by local topics from political life, interpreted in the pre-election political context. Stronger rhetoric and tendency for harsh political and evaluative assessments, has manifested in an extremely critical narrative, as a „warm up“ for the upcoming election campaign in Belgrade. In weeklies, as usual, an extremely high level of criticism towards the current government was detected, especially towards the most prominent actor, the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić. The attitude towards the government in most weeklies, as well as the largest number of editorial columns in daily newspapers was negatively intoned and differed only by the orientation of the editorial board.

Among the journalistic genres, the interview holds a significant place. The interviewees are selected according to their political stands, which almost always correspond to the political orientation of the editorial board. There is a noticeable pattern of interviewees’ repetition, and the aim is to intensify the effect of the message, in both value and political sense. Repetition makes a certain interpretation relevant in the public space. This is another important feature of the weeklies. They have a significant political impact. Unfortunately, the outcome is a deeply divided public scene. The frequency of repetition of the same message communicated from different subjects, which is then repeated, creates a pattern of readers’ reactions and finally unquestionable beliefs. “Fixating” the image of the actor or an event is one of the most common weapons in the political and propaganda war. “Fixating” the image is a process in which, and thanks to whom, one subject remains “frozen” in time despite their potential and actual transformations or the changes in the political, economic, social and historical circumstances.

This rigid pseudo-intellectual matrix operates according to the permanently assigned roles. Actors are portrayed as the “good” or “bad” guys in public space. Morally and politically acceptable “positive” attributes are ascribed to a particular group of political figures and organizations, while negative ones are irrevocably and unquestionably assigned to the opposite side- the permanently “unfit ones”. At the heart of the conflict in the public-political field is the Manichean division of the media and political elite. In the spirit of this moral and political division, one can say that all of the weeklies are in fact – biased. In their bias, they are very clear and sharp, and therefore, very irrational.

The conflict of events, processes and actors interpretations is so vivid, that rationality, which is supposed to characterize democratically constituted public, cannot exist neither as a useful illusion nor a regulatory mechanism in the process of written or visual selection of reports.

Thus we live in the ambience where anyone can be against anyone, motivated by „their own“ reasons which are rarely detectable in the in depth analysis, and where the arguments of the „other side“ rarely serve any purpose. The spirit of argumentation in the Serbian weeklies, especially the columns and interviews, is characterized by radicalism, political defamation of the opponent and first-class moral exclusivity.

At the same time, the repetition of one and the same message leads to the rigidity of the editorial policy. From this point, it is easy to form an image about the actor, process or a specific event. Repetition of the message and unhidden tendency to form a concrete image shows the importance of print media as a tool for political communication, more precisely, a weapon in the constant political war among the actors on Serbian political scene. The rigidity of a specific media also shows the intention to skip the debate on certain issues and go straight into the „judgmental“ mode of portraying actors, processes or events.

The front page also holds an important place, especially in the weeklies, for its message is constructed both visually and verbally in the form of election poster (most often: an image of the actor with a concise and direct headline from the interview or the image of an actor with a message which should form the reader's opinion). In the weeklies, for example in *NIN* the cartoon caricature also plays a significant role. This dynamic unity of a drawing and words serves a strong political-propaganda message. Another important feature of headlines in weeklies and editorial columns is the rhetorical match in the opinions and attitudes of the editorial board and the subjects being interviewed. This tendency shows that print media are most usually a sophisticated tool in the political battle, especially in the sphere of construction and maintenance of the image.

There are several possible ways to classify the weeklies, among which, for the purposes of this analysis, we will be mentioning two. According to the criterion of division that is common and usually present in a democratic society, the classification should entail the ones close to the government and ones that are critical towards it. In Serbia, this criterion cannot be consistently applied since most weeklies only belong to the disapproving category. Weekly *Pečat* falls under the category of partially critical of the authorities, because of its open criticizing of the government's pro-European foreign policy under the Vučić's rule. However, this weekly shows strong critical stance towards moral credibility, axiological orientation and political views of the 5th October winners

On the other hand, weeklies like *NIN*, *Vreme*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* fall under the category of completely critical of the government. There is however a difference in the tone of criticism. While *Vreme* and somewhat *NIN* (especially the domain of domestic politics and economics) are completely, directly and fiercely criticizing the government, weeklies *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* apply a more moderate tone in expressing critical views. Their level of accusing and labeling is far lower than in the cases of *Vreme* and *NIN*.

Another classification that can be applied to the weeklies is their foreign policy orientation. *Vreme*, *NIN*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* are more or less pro-European. On the other hand, the weekly *Pečat* clearly emphasizes the anti-Western and pro-Russian stance, intended to support the nationalist discourse, close to the one which was dominant in wars in the 1990s.

Image of the Government - President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić - authoritarian, manipulative, abuser of the security services, holds the monopoly over media, does not respect the basic principles of the Constitution and Democracy, rules according to mafia principles, has no strategic vision in foreign policy; Vučić's government: a symbol of cultural decadence and hooliganism.

In weekly newspapers and editorial columns, the description of the current government and all its parts is usually equated with Aleksandar Vučić, as its most prominent protagonist. The overwhelming majority, or almost all Serbian weeklies, has evaluated Aleksandar Vučić in this last quarter in a mostly negative tone. His name is linked to the concept of authoritarian rule with the elements of "clientelistic mafia principle", his governing discharged from any stable ideological or geopolitical orientation, and his power devoid of consistency in accepting the democratic standards or respect for the Rule of Law and the Constitution. Parallel to radically critical liberal-democratic narrative, the political scene is viewed from the perspective of extreme cultural decadence and nihilism. Historical and cultural disintegration of Serbia, in the age dominated by Vučić, is a logical product of his unscrupulous rule and his authoritarian persona. This type of personalized and extremely judgmental analysis is widely present in Serbian

weekly newspapers.

Description and judgment of the government's work is placed in the broader context of negative socio-historical tendencies that are naturally associated with a particular type of political order and a system of government. Prof. Dr. Vladeta Janković, one of the influential members of the once powerful Democratic Party of Serbia, who was among the so-called „holders of democratic revolution" in the political upheaval in 2000, provides a very negative assessment of the Serbian state and society: "Perhaps there are no more sanctions, imminent threats of war or shortage of food, but poverty is visible at every step, economic and street crime is flourishing, and dissatisfaction is felt at every corner. As before, maybe even more now, their people are arrogant, privileged in every aspect and in everything, the parliamentary majority is terrorizing and humiliating the opposition, the social differences are equally crude, there are even more Potemkin's villages, and the only difference is that the journalists are not being killed yet. Brain drain has dramatic consequences because entire generations of the most gifted freed space for the second best ones. It seems that the current government lies more shamelessly than the one from the nineties. Finally, many protagonists of Milošević's epoch are on the stage – Vučić, Dačić and Šešelj..."¹

Stevan Filipović, a director, though somewhat bitterly and resentfully, concretely presents an extremely negative political and moral dimension of the times we live in. He shows his view of the current political, social and media aspect in one of his many (political) hostile "activist" interviews: "What Udba and secret services were to Milošević, Pink and Informer are now to Vučić. The way Milošević controlled the country by the method of the old school autocrats, Vučić controls the process of the retardation of the public sphere by means of chaos he creates in the tabloids and TV shows. Marić is to him what Dnevnik 2 was to Sloba. Reality shows do exist everywhere in the world, but I have never heard of them being a political instrument of the ruling crew to this extent. Here it is outspoken. We have an example a murder of a woman used as an instrument. Seriously postmodern, but a degradation is a cancer that eats everything."²

The media political degradation of the society depicted by Janković and Filipović has a moral dimension. It is about Serbia described as a country of a complete corruption ruled by "a horrific moral crookedness and incompetence". This view of the current state is described by a writer Marko Vidojković, who says "All the aspects of the society are completely corrupted. We reached a fiscal stability by cutting salaries and pension and then hired buddies close to the government who from panel beaters and ceramists turned into ministers! Incompetence and corruption drove a hawthorn stake through this country's heart. If I were to be absolutely objective I would have to be a pessimist, but it would be identical to giving up on life only because you know you will die one day. The same applies to the life in this country."

A decadent vision of the society and the state demonstrated by Marko Vidojković, semantically and rhetorically converges the sage about the absurdity of the current political and historical moment. The narrative about the senselessness of the present, with the tone of daily politics and street slang is recognized in the interview with the resigned follower of the Movement of Free Citizens, an actor Branislav Trifunović, who says: "We live the absurdity as if it was a completely normal thing. If one was to write a play about us, a play whose characters were inspired by the current government characters – that

1 Vladeta Janković, „Moje obraćanje Vučiću [My appeal to Vučić]," an interview with Nenad Čaluković, *Nedeljnik*, No. 299

2 Stefan Filipović, „Srbija je Eldorado za beskrupulozne [Serbia is El Dorado for the unscrupulous ones]", interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3484, p. 2

is Santos, Doctor Death, the Slime and other people with funny names – I don't think that even Duško Kovačević would succeed in it! The absurd is a logical consequence of a matrix, intimidation and red herring is thoroughly and successfully performed by the government. This government knows how to rule the people. Somebody studied us well in a psychological, sociological and every other way. They are constantly warning us that it is going to be even worse, that for example 'the yellow ones' are coming back, that the calamity is coming back, so people believe that the yellow ones are the worst. It is true that they made many mistakes and wrong things, but it is much less than what the current government is doing. They insult our intelligence; they insult me as a man with their lies, their steamy promises, with the screen behind which they create opportunities to earn themselves some money. We have a stress imposed on us about how our former Minister of Information who had an average grade 9.44 is constantly being attacked; he is either a victim of a gun set up in Jajinci, or his car is crashed, he is attacked by the Americans, aliens and American television, while alas, he is a friend to everyone."³

Tatjana Mandić Rigonat, a director and a transparent opposition to the current government, also demonstrates in her presentation that the idea is to convince a reader into endemic and often present absurdity of the sequence of events on the political as well as the social scene. She directly states, without any hesitation: "These times for me feel like times of hopelessness, existential despair and bankruptcy of ideals and illusions. During the '90s culture was not so ruined and artists were not so degraded. These days the government has the need to humiliate people like Sergej Trifunović for example, only because he has a different opinion and expresses it. There used to be a coexistence of multiple parties and serious debates. We used to live in the sphere of dialogues and nowadays we live in the sphere of cursing, monologues and brutal tabloid retribution."⁴

Tatjana Mandić Rigonat's words point to two different moments – the decadent spirit of time and anti-democratic order. Here observation about the character of the government leads to the ever-present topic of the weeklies- the question about the nature of the political order in Serbia. Primarily, this question is implicitly observed as a structurally functional question. Specifically, it addresses the defining principle, the structure of the order and the way it functions. Naturally, very rarely this question complies with scientific transparency and precision, but through the way it sounds in the headlines and interviews one can conclude that we are preoccupied with this topic.

Among many headlines about the nature and the function of the Serbian government, there is a specific attitude in the weekly *NIN*: "The law has never been in the way of the progressive government movement to privatize the country, but now by using new laws and regulations they decided to centralize their power in the army, the police, The Security Intelligence Agency, education and law. However, it is a fact that by their decision to make a large net of apparatchicks and loyal voters legally acceptable, we are only left with the conclusion that it is going to be even worse. It is our duty to fight against harmful laws."⁵

3 Branislav Trifunović, „Od ovih gorih nema [There are no worse people than these],“ an interview with Sonja Čirić, *Vreme*, No. 1402, p. 32

4 Tatjana Mandić Rigonat, „Podanici čine kralja [Servants make the king],“ a talk with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, No. 3487, pp. 18-19

5 Stefan Slavković, „Legalizacija apsolutizma [Legalisation of absolutism],“ *NIN*, No. 3485, p. 12

In a direct and unequivocal way, a professor doctor Vesna Rakić Vodinelić elaborates on her attitude about authoritarian government-a political order ruled by the will of one man whose power is not limited by the Constitution, law or democratic rules: "Though previously an excellent student, our current President never practiced law professionally. What did Aleksandar Vučić adopt as his professional law and political credo from the extensive law matter he excellently learned? Respect of the Constitution, rule of the rights, division of power, civil rights? Unfortunately, learning and adopting the learned in order to practice it in life are not the same thing. When someone who was in the government for four years (first the Vice President, then the President) arbitrarily decides to call for elections and overthrow his own government two times, though it was not asked by anyone or voted as distrusted, nor shaken in any way, then this man does not respect the Constitution. When Vučić (in any of his political roles) blames someone for something, marks someone as a criminal or publicly criticizes verdicts-avoiding legality-or when he decides to 'stand for' his Ministers, he does not respect the rule of the rights and division of power. When he publicly discriminates journalists and the media because of their assumed political attitudes, he violates civil rights, non-discrimination law and freedom of speech. When he publicly points a finger at the responsible one for the destruction at Savamala and then 'generously' let's judicial authorities deal with it, only because he wouldn't know what to do with it ("He wouldn't lower himself to be a witness at the court!) – it means he does not respect the Constitution and the law from the high position he has occupied so far."⁶

So, the regime we live in, judging by the above stated authors, is an authoritarian regime with illiberal economy policy which is deeply unrighteous, prone to imposing, reproduction and spread of the socially-economical reasons among the population. It is unfair at its basis, alienated from a common man; it affirms, promotes and defends the interests of the political-financial oligarchy. In a recognizable tone that combines oppositional moralism and traces of scientific knowledge, a sociologist Jovo Bakić describes the current government lead by Vučić as having utterly negative values: "...modern authoritarian regimes use multi-party systems as a façade. Therefore there are opposition parties, but they are under the control of the ruling, authoritarian regime. This kind of opposition you can blackmail, which is Vučić's favorite thing to do, the same way he blackmails his political partners who are his potential rivals. The best rivals are the ones who can never harm you and this is only possible if you blackmail them. The same applies to the opposition; the best opposition is the one that can't harm you because you have something to blackmail them with. It is the methodology developed and successfully implemented by Vučić: "Parallel to the concentration of the power in the hand of one man, there's been going on a Machiavellian political practice based on blackmail, fear and a constant control of the media." Together with the stated political characteristics, the rule of Aleksandar Vučić has its own, already suggested, basically unrighteous socio-economical aspect. In relation to that Bakić adds: "People who are in favor of capitalism don't see that the neoliberal ideology and authoritarian systems are very compatible. First neoliberal regime was Pinochet's in Chile. But don't take this literally – I'm not only talking about authoritarian systems, but also about authoritarian politics that perfectly go along with neoliberal regimes. In that sense, Vučić is pulling it off excellently because he promotes neoliberal ideology, which implies plundering women in labor and pensioners and giving it to the rich and multinational companies. The poor is financing the rich."⁷

6 Vesna Rakić Vodinelić, „Petparačke priče [Pulp Fiction],“ *Vreme*, No. 1401, p. 18

7 Jovo Bakić, „Autoritarni režim tigra od papira [The Authoritarian regime of the paper tiger],“ an interview with Jovana Gligorićević, *Vreme*, No. 1399

Vreme, 26th October 2017

The question of the nature of the current political order also drew attention of a politicologist and a former oppositional politician, Vladimir Pavićević. Pavićević is trying to draw a parallel between Milo Đukanović, a political leader of Montenegro in the past three decades and the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić. The purpose of the comparison is the creation of impression with readers about the existence of the “apparent” similarities in the undemocratic patterns of opinion and practice between these two influential politicians in the region: “The basic and the apparent similarity is the accumulation of the power in the hands of one man, and it doesn’t even have to be supported by the authority coming from an institution. Vučić is the most powerful political figure no matter which position he occupies and there is no question about it. The same goes for Đukanović in Montenegro. In both countries, the rule of the law is not treated the way it is expected by the Constitution, so together with the lack of respect toward institutions it creates an impression of idling in a semi-democracy. In my opinion we have to go to the next level and create necessary conditions for the complete, consolidated democracy.”⁸

How science can be instrumentalized, that is, decontextualized from its original field we are about to be shown by Božo Prelević, a member of Saša Janković’s MFC and a long time standing political activist who is also a spirited supporter of the 5th October elite. His attempt to depict the current Serbian government with the darkest colors is combined with a note on scientific theory of fascism. Thus, Pelević naively believes that the conceptual scheme of a political theory can be taken for granted and mechanically applied to any concrete, “suitable” example. An example of an unskilled and superficial use of science for the sake of propaganda can be seen in the following part of his interview: “I seriously think there are traces of fascism here. A politicologist Lawrence Britt defined a few characteristics of its early signs and these are: nationalism, civil rights degradation, identification of enemies or culprits, police superiority, widespread sexism, control of the mass media, obsession with national security, interlace of religion and government, protected corporate power, suppressed workers power, contempt towards intellectuals and artists, obsession with criminals and punishments, merciless overuse of family bonds and corruption and fake elections. If we remove widespread sexism to some extent and the fact that interlace between religion and government is not important because of Kosovo, everything else did turn on the alarms in Serbia. That is way the citizens are to ones who have to win the elections. This is the point of what I advocate.”⁹

An artist Biljana Srbijanović also contributes to all these different interpretations of the nature, structure and practice of the current political order. She identifies Vučić’s rule with a totalitarian political order, assuming that, or quite the opposite missing the point that the term totalitarian political regimes implies regimes such as Hitler’s in Germany or Stalin’s in the former USSR. The demonstration of the frivolous and resonant typological determination of the government can be noticed in her following statement: “Here we have a master of the retention of the power, even if he had to change his appearances 500 times. He has a totalitarian tone and a whole net that he rules by considering all the rest being worse than he is. Đinđić had too much respect for people around him to treat them as cattle. I can’t recall that Đinđić banned or censored the media. Quite on the contrary, he was assassinated, among many, because the media created such conditions that couldn’t increase his security after the attempted assassination at the Limes hall.”¹⁰

8 Vladimir Pavićević, „Tavorimo u poludemokratiji [Idling in semi-democracy],” an interview with Ivana Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, No. 1407, p. 19

9 Božo Prelević, „Režim protiv naroda [The regime against its people],” an interview with Filip Švarm, *Vreme*, No. 1403

10 Biljana Srbijanović, „Ne diže spomenik Đinđiću Vučić, već država [It was not Vučić who created Đinđić’s monument, it was the state],” *Vreme*, No. 1400

After everything above stated, it still remains unclear as to whether the current political order is neoliberal, authoritarian, semi-democratic or fascist and nothing resolves this even when you add to it another dimension by raising a political commotion and creating a revolt with readers (apart from the confusion of terminology and arbitrariness). It is about characterizing Vučić's rule as populist. In a strange way, this regime "of willfulness, brutal power and accompanying media manipulation" is a regime that is directly supported by and directly communicates with its people?!

The President of Democratic Party's political board, prof. dr. Dragoljub Mićunović also contributes to this creation of chaos of meaning and confusion of terminology. Apart from everything above stated, with the specific aim to completely deny a democratic element in the current government, this experienced socio-political laborer considers that the current government is utterly populist: "We have this phenomenon as consequence of conversion: the current government collapsed together with the collapse of the Greater Serbian nationalistic concept, after which they adopted European orientation while staying populistically aligned people of the 'old regime' when it comes to their acts and internal politics. The characteristic of every populist regime is 'clearing the space' with different promises and deceit and creating an illusion that all the good things come from them. In order to succeed in it, you need to have 'an enemy', an external danger that helps you get the forces in formation, but also 'an internal enemy' whom you slander, smear and accuse without evidence, devastating them in every way. Dragging brutally the marketing into politics is also a specific phenomenon. In politics nowadays you can praise your 'merchandise' more than on the economic market where there is at least some quality control. This government doesn't want to be controlled; it doesn't even like being asked question, such as about Savamala. What to expect from a dialogue if they only want you to patronize them? Montesquieu says 'Government always has a tendency to narrow', and when it is constantly narrowing, it ends up in the 'hands of one man' who has to be the best and the smartest and it is a sign to us that democracy vanished into the thin air. That is how 'one man's cult' is created, no matter if it is left or right."¹¹

The idea of one man's rule and one man's cult is wrapped up with the analysis the communicative aspect of its function. A director, Tatjana Mandić Rigonat, contributes to the discussion about the nature of the government. By juggling theatrical motifs, she tries to pin the current government negative features, while ascribing its main protagonist a monological and exclusive way of communication with other political figures and the public in general: "We used to live in the sphere of dialogues and nowadays we live in the sphere of cursing, monologues and brutal tabloid retribution. A monologue is a confession of the soul and it only makes sense in the theater or in loneliness when one deeply questions one's emotions and consciousness. In the political life, a monologue is an ego-monodrama, a narcissistic gesture of disrespect towards the public and the citizens as it serves for the sake of propaganda. It is a serious sign of the authoritarian tendencies in anyone who uses it. The public is confined to the role of an infantile brat, while the monologist scolds and teaches, or praises it, depending on his mood and the need, until it takes grotesque comic-tragic proportions. By speaking about Vučić we build his cult. This is all happening by the rules of the theater: an actor does not play the king – the king's power is formed by all the others on the stage with their relation towards his majesty. Servants are the ones who make the king. It is very dangerous being the king's fool because the fool gets to say to the king what he does wrong."¹²

Parallel to the complete verbal devastation of the current government, all the ones who are here

¹¹ Dragoljub Mićunović, „Drsko falsifikovanje petog oktobra [Shameless forging of the 5th October],“ *Novi Magazin*, No. 336, p. 19

¹² Tatjana Mandić Rigonat, „Podanici čine kralja [Servants make the king],“ an interview with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, No. 3487, p. 19



Novi Magazin, 5th October 2017

and now “servants” are spoken about reproachfully with nostalgic reminiscence of the times of the rule of the 5th October winners lead by Boris Tadić. In the well-known manner of the propaganda speech, the already quoted Tatjana Mandić Rigonat, makes a final difference between the Boris Tadić’s Serbia and the Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbia. Her manichaestic division wherein Vučić is the embodiment of political evil and Tadić the embodiment of the moral good is related to our public space and the current state that characterizes it: “With all the disappointment, during Boris Tadić the public space was pacified. There was no this chaotic war of curses lead through the tabloids. If we were to follow the tabloids, we wouldn’t know who we are in war with, Croatia, Bosnia or Kosovo, while at the same time Vučić is the figure of peace and stability in the Balkan. This is the schizoid situation we live in because ambiguous messages make people crazy. This primitivization of the people done by the media is unforgivable. People are confined to animalistic measures, from the life’s pallet different colors and shades are being removed and we are asked to make up our minds about who we are. They are trying to persuade us that we are not valuable and can’t love our country if we don’t think like the ruling nomenclature.”¹³

The summary of the most of the already mentioned motifs of the government criticism can be found in the interview that indicates the return into the world of politics of Dragan Đilas, a former leader of Democratic Party (DP) and the mayor of Belgrade. At the very core of the mentioned criticism is deeply personalized relationship towards Aleksandar Vučić, colored by the primeval sense of revulsion towards his moral and psychological profile, his rule as well as the values he is trying to defend and affirm. Vučić’s personality, his party membership, and his relation towards European values and finally the media are controversial too: “But when you notice his ways of giving a speech, his disrespect to anybody else’s opinion, his need to be surrounded by suck ups who will bow to his deity, you notice that there are no European values there. Vučić doesn’t need the judiciary, he gives sentences by himself. ‘I won’t give you Gašić, I will give you Gašić, I won’t give you Lončar, I will give you Lončar, I know that gendarmes beat my brother, I know who demolished Savamala, but I won’t tell you.’ This is a self-centered disregard of the judiciary system, but also of the Parliament, where he has his Ministers who vote when Maja Gojković hits the bell. Yelling at the journalists is a direct disrespect to the media, calling the opposition the names such as scumbags, losers and good-for-nothings is a direct personal offense and a deep anti-European disrespect of the people and the civil rights. When he was proclaimed the most European person, the awards should have been immediately returned.”¹⁴

A former leader of DP believes that Vučić’s rule is based on fear and an economic blackmail of employees due to lack of economic creation: “There is no economy, the greatest number of people works in public institutions. They are all afraid of being fired or hope to get a job since they are the party’s members. I don’t know what is the appropriate term for this kind of a regime, but I call it shame.”¹⁵

In addition to the determination of the nature of the government, apart from different (pseudo) scientific terminology used to increase persuasion power of the messages, many metaphors are used with the aim to depict the current government as authentically as possible. Thus a *Vreme* journalist, Dragoljub Žarković in relation to the case of tycoon Miroslav Mišković clearly states that the government in Serbia functions worse than a street gang. Žarković’s contribution to the dialogue and a pro-

¹³ Ibid, p. 20

¹⁴ Dragan Đilas, „Zašto se vraćam u politiku [Why I am back in politics],“ an interview with Olja Bečković, No. 3494, p. 13

¹⁵ Dragan Đilas, „Moramo da zaustavimo propadanje Beograda [We must stop the decay of Belgrade],“ an interview with Nenad Čaluković, *Nedeljnik*, No. 301, p. 23



Nedeljnik, 19th October 2017

motion of a rationally critical point of view is demonstrated in the following quote: "A street gang will usually put a choice before its victim-money or life. Our gang has an intention to take both, money and life. Judging by the current state of affairs, they are making Mišković participate in the process before the Special court, which resembles a conspiracy and a crime of infinite proportions, though he was already freed from those allegations. He personally stated that he couldn't take such a torment. Also, they won't give him back his money."¹⁶

Reaffirmation of Miroslav Mišković as a public persona and a businessman is in correlation with the view of Aleksandar Vučić by the above-mentioned journalist of the weekly *Vreme*. In his alleged political irrationality, the first man of Serbian politics often acts against his own interest. He did the same thing in the case of Miroslav Mišković. According to the opinion of a journalist Radmilo Marković, poorly prepared trial together with a strong anti-campaign lead against one of the wealthiest Serbs, caused the opposite effect from the one Vučić expected. "However, since the arrest-though at first sight paradoxical – his public image bloomed thanks to – again paradoxically – Aleksandar Vučić. He went through purgatory and the media chevy chase and came out of it with (partially) liberating sentence. As the Minister Selaković said 'something that a few years ago was unimaginable actually happened'. Vučić persecution caused Miroslav Mišković to seem almost likeable."¹⁷

The view of the current government did not remain within the scope of the basic principles of its structure and function, but adopted different instances of disagreement on the level of the concrete politics. This disagreement became all-inclusive with the aim to prove the basic incompetence of the government to rule the country and to deny its democratic legitimacy and point to its anti-European political orientation.

The question of freedom of speech has posed a very touchy question around which many swords have been clashed in the media and in the public too. Though the Constitution, the laws and the public practice all witness the diversity of political opinions, critically oriented part of the publicity constantly reproduces the narrative about the media repression as a means of rule of those who have a political power. The explicit criticism of the government when it comes to the presence of freedom of speech in the media we can notice in the text of the chief editor of the weekly *Vreme*, Dragoljub Žarković who says: "The specific problem in Serbia, like in everything else, is that the government, the ruling party, or better said this one man want to have a monopoly on the freedom of speech, and this kind of hooliganism is being applied through different modes, the favorite of which is labeling. By the public labeling, he manipulates the public and degrades the possibility of 'internal dialogue' to a pre-arranged and directed dialogue with all the 'informers' of Serbia. If this continues and it seems it will, one day he will wake up all smeared and stuck up in the noodles he cooked himself."¹⁸

An additional part to the media repression sage comes from Momir Stojanović, a former clerk at the Ministry of Defense and a member DPP, who openly claims that the independent journalists in Serbia are a subject to tapping and spying: "Security Service is exclusively functioning as a party's private army. This is not paranoia; our reality is that all journalists, leaders of the opposition parties and editors of the media are tapped. It is inherent to an autocratic system of rule to know everything that goes on

16 Dragoljub Žarković, „Mišković, Đilas i 'Vreme' – Kad se udruže 'Informer' i Vučić, eto ti odmah ili državnog udara ili udara na slobodu medija [Mišković, Đilas and 'Vreme' – When 'Informer' and Vučić unite here comes either a state coup or an attack on the media freedom],“ *Vreme*, No. 1397, p. 4

17 Radmilo Marković, „Slučaj Mišković [The Mišković Case],“ *Vreme*, No. 1396, p. 8

18 Dragoljub Žarković, „Mišković, Đilas i 'Vreme' – Kad se udruže 'Informer' i Vučić, eto ti odmah ili državnog udara ili udara na slobodu medija [Mišković, Đilas and 'Vreme' – When 'Informer' and Vučić unite here comes either a state coup or an attack on the media freedom],“ *Vreme*, No. 1397, p. 5

in the country and that everything must be 'under control'. I don't think that Cvijić's laptop is stolen by accident, and those were not plain criminals; it was well planned. I am sure that the government knew what he was working on, so he must have gone too far with his research for those who rule Serbia.”¹⁹

With the specific purpose to construct an absolutely negative image of the government and the President of Serbia, weeklies have been dealing with Serbia's foreign affairs and their effect. This aspect of Vučić's politics until recently was mostly approved by his critics, but through the time the critics of this aspect of his rule "woke up" too. A journalist of the weekly *Vreme*, Dejan Anastasijević in realization of his poetic and political intention, expresses the opinion about how Serbia's foreign affairs are based on the personal relations between the statesmen and an improvised diplomacy, which makes it absolutely, deprived of any orientation. This conclusion is a result of an observation, not of an analysis of the government and the parliament documents or the diplomatic practice of the state authorities, specifically embassies and consular offices. But, this deliberate lapse at the basis of the problem was created thanks to the pre-arranged conclusion about the futility of the foreign affairs and their constant ramble. As a cause for the stated opinion, Anastasijević gives the example of Catalonia and the country's reaction to it.

"In serious countries foreign affairs do not depend on personal relations, but rather on strategic interests and institutions. Serbia's foreign affairs and security do not have functional strategy, so it compensates it through brotherly diplomacy and improvisation. One such example of improvisation was the sloppy attempt to use the crisis in Catalonia to get the European Union to revise its attitude on Kosovo, which Spain dissuaded them from at the last moment – the country whose integrity Serbia allegedly supports. We remain with the gloomy conclusion that the people who lead Serbia and who for years have been trying to persuade us that we have never been this good and that our standard is improving more than ever in the newer history, started believing it themselves and now they are transferring their illusions on foreign affairs too. In their imagination, Serbia is the ruling regional force, a reputable player on the international scene and a global of peace and stability. And imagination, as children writers once noticed, can do a lot. That is, until it is smacked by reality.”²⁰

With the similar tone but quite a lot more malice, a journalist of *Vreme* Jovana Gligorijević paid attention on one detail from the Turkish President Recep Tayyip's visit to Serbia. It is about the analysis of an informal event that took place during the gala dinner prepared in the honor of this prominent guest from Turkey when the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, Ivica Dačić, took a microphone and sang. This anecdote created a space for a strong criticism and mockery in a part of the public, which was not only directed against Ivica Dačić as the Minister, but also against the foreign affairs of Serbia in general. Gligorijević says: "What is all that singing, wiggling and singing out of tune for? What did Serbia gain from it, what horrific ultimatum is there in front of us, what kind of danger are we in, to cause the first man of Serbia's democracy to make a fool out of himself every time some of the foreign statesmen come here deliberately or accidentally? During the last five years we haven't been under any catastrophic threat that could justify the humiliation of the Foreign Affairs Minister. Let's get this straight, it is one thing when a politician makes a desperate move to save the very lives of their citizens, but it is a completely different thing when they take a microphone and wiggle in order to impress an investor who will hire a few hundreds of people and who will receive money to give them paychecks from the very country whose representatives humiliated themselves in order to get him to invest in the first place. In a small country with a half-competent and half-authoritarian government which judging by our politicians has

19 Momir Stojanović, „Nije paranoia da prate novinare [It is not paranoia that the journalists are being followed],“ an interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3489, p. 30

20 Dejan Anastasijević, „Na krilima mašte [On the wings of imagination],“ *Vreme*, No. 1398, p. 16

nothing to show off with, a man should be happy when at the end of the day someone sticks a banknote on his sweaty forehead. Does he feel like a man after that; is this the government or a committee for the folklore performance preparation for senior officials? If this is still a country or a red lantern street can be read between the lines. Whoever says it is or writes it is, is not objective, is the country's enemy and should be ashamed."²¹

During the period between October and December in 2017, the motif of stabilocracy as the basis of pro-European inclination and the government's image was refined. The critic's narrative which uses the term of stabilocracy is based on the belief that the change of the society according to European standards with the Aleksandar Vučić's government is not possible, as well as, that Aleksandar Vučić's maintenance of power is either a product of the interest of the West who wants to have a political figure at the Balkan which would control any potential conflict in the region, or a product of the carelessness of the government in the liquidation of the potential competition. These motifs in the government's criticism and creation of a negative image, is concisely expressed by the leader of Movement of Free Citizens, Saša Janković: "From the school of radical philosophy stems the idea that Serbia is the heart of the world and that the more our neighboring countries are our enemies, the more they are unstable is better for us. We are damaged by the Europe's belief that by patronizing any country that from time to time threatens to start warfare, it will bring permanent peace and prosperity. When Vučić and the opposition were against Europe, almost 70% of the population voted for the European Union. Now that he is allegedly for it and has an absolutistic power, less than 50% of population is for it too. The destructive politics of the so called stabilocracy rehabilitated the worst ideologies of blood and soil from the 1930s and the 1990s of the last century and empowered this red and black coalition to keep us hostages."²²

Completely aligned with Janković's philosophy of analysis and the accompanying attitude is the view of a *Vreme* journalist, Zora Drčelić who clearly says that there is continuity between the current government and Šešelji's and Milošević's coalition from the 1990s war. Allegedly, the matching point was the way of the rule, so every change of the course in the internal and foreign politics is fictional and inauthentic: "The heirs of the red and black coalition of the 1990s took back the rule and they only change the ideology so that they would be internationally accepted. The government-media machinery of the '90s was just a little bit upgraded but remained truly unchanged."²³

The allusion at the red and black coalition sends us back to the 1990s of the last century and the rule of Socialist Party of Serbia and Serbian Radical Party, the two parties that are in the public associated with deviation of the values and the practice of the democratic-liberal order that Serbia tried to create. As a *Vreme* journalist Slobodan Georgiev claims, a similar situation exists nowadays when it is questionable whether the current government would accept the election results if they weren't in their favor. In that sense, the current situation is a result of a historical regression in the democratic process, a situation in which the Constitution and its political practice is being undermined, "many politicians, analysts and researches claimed that the biggest heritage of the 5th October is the fact that elections are free and that nobody would think of scamming them. However, 17 years later, there are renewed doubts as to whether the whole process is a scam and a set up: starting with the electorate lists, campaign principles and vote counting. Serbia is at the beginning of the multi-party democratic order: the ones who rule accepted the notion of opposition only because it is a norm of the world they depend upon,

21 Jovana Gligorijević, „Bakšiš politika [Tips politics],“ *Vreme*, No. 1398, p. 7

22 Saša Janković „Vučiću, pusti se Slavice i kukavičkih spletki, stani naspram mene kao čovek i ponašaj se muški i ljudski [Vučić, give up on Slavica and cowardly scams and face me like a man],“ an interview with Nenad Čaluković, *Nedeljnik*, No. 307, p. 27

23 Zora Drčelić, „Probudite se, pobogu! [Wake up, for the love of god!],“ *Vreme*, No. 1397, p. 9

not the need of the society to be pluralized and free, while the ones who are the opposition struggle for the air and believe that the very next elections are when they are going to win over the government. This request is similar to the request the opposition used to have after the '80s multi-party system's establishment."²⁴

In the printed media there is a strategy of the attack at Vučić by attacking his closest associates. At the nexus of this media political activity were mostly two figures – Prime Minister Ana Brnabić and Defense Minister Aleksandar Vulin.

In most of the printed media, Ana Brnabić is represented as a dependent political persona stripped of credibility; a political figure serving as a mask for the Vučić's absolutistic power. Being only a manifestation of Vučić's political superiority, she was ascribed with all the negative stereotypes that characterize Aleksandar Vučić – starting with bad economic results to the media freedom suppression. A text containing this indication and written by the rules the mentioned media-political formula, is Dimitri Borov's text written in regard to a hundred days of work of Serbian Government. Writing about Ana Brnabić, Boarov says: "In the last hundred days since (July, 28th) the 'new' Serbian Government with Ana Brnabić was chosen, she didn't even managed to draw simple contours of her own identity, so the people of Serbia literally take her as Vučić's government in which sit 'the authorities' of his executive power. Truly, when it comes to its human resources, those are almost the same people from Vučić's former government that by no means in a hundred days or in a lifetime could be pulled together and improved even by a person more experienced than Brnabić. Earlier Vučić covered for his team by an insatiable hyperactivity and self-promotion and when he transferred to the position of the President it via facti was let loose, so nowadays with the fights among the ministers it contributes to the confusion in the country in which the very new President feels like a leader who doesn't have enough opportunity 'to communicate directly with his people'. The new Serbian government and its Prime Minister embarrassed themselves the greatest when it comes to the relation with the media and its freedom, specifically in the case of the closure of *Vranjske novine* which were deliberately burdened by the tax administration. In regard to this case, the government publicly and secretly, directly and indirectly, open-handedly helps the media that praises its success and hides it failure."²⁵

Simultaneously with the attacks against Vučić that are indirectly done through the disapproval of the Prime Minister Brnabić, the opposition leaders, the so called pro-European block also question Vučić's acceptance of the western political, economic and other social values. According to them, Vučić's evolution from a radical to a progressive, from a nationalist to a Europe-oriented politician is not true and authentic, but rather a marketing trick and a "partnership" attempt with the political leaders of the West. What hides behind the superficial closeness with the West, is Vučić with anti-western and pro-Russian orientation; an authoritarian politician prone to repression who actually never accepted the values and the practice of the western democracy. What Vučić deliberately hides, especially in the media, Aleksandar Vulin, pro-Russian oriented Defense Minister prone to rough statements against his neighbors, directly and unambiguously points out. Vulin is Vučić's exemplary media-political "stunt", an ideological avatar of sorts, who conveys everything that hidden and real in Vučić's political persona. Aleksandar Vulin is Aleksandar Vučić's ventriloquist; he says everything 'Aca the Serb' would like to say

24 Slobodan Georgiev, „Crvene linije srpske opozicije [Red lines of Serbian opposition],“ *Vreme*, No. 1397, p. 13

25 Dimitrije Boarov, „Ništa novo u podnožju Olimpa [Nothing new at the foothill of Olympus],“ *Vreme*, No. 1396, p. 13

if he didn't have to play a modern European face of Serbia, lightly touching his modern glasses frame. Neither of them ever understood the West but as CIA representatives. Vučić thinks that the West exists only in the form of 'the spies that want to remove him from the government'; while on the other side he runs to embrace them believing that the electorate doesn't see or understand it. Vulin believes that the day is coming when Aleksandar Vučić will finally say in Russian: 'Putin, we love you, you are everything to us!' It is not going to happen because neither Putin nor Russia needs it. All those infantile defenders of Russia, who are in fact defenders of the Russian interest in Serbia, do not understand that Putin is a serious politician and a statesman who would never risk his country's position for the sake of Serbia. The worst thing that can happen to a man is to resemble Vučić in his words, politics or attitude and we must not forget this."²⁶

The elections in Belgrade are observed as an opportunity, an open road towards changes that are about to happen to Serbia. "The dark rule of a dictator Vučić" is about to be questioned by the opposition's impending victory: "The pyramid of robbery, evil, regression and authoritarian rule will start crumbling. The top of that pyramid is the elections in Belgrade."²⁷

Just like the president of the Left wing of Serbia, Borislav Stefanović, a director Tatjana Mandić Rigonat expresses a high level of intolerance and anger in her public speech, with serious accusations towards everything related or unrelated to the current government. Her rage towards the city's government is intensive and completely corresponds with the editorial policy of the radical criticism of *NIN*: "Everywhere you look you will see illegal construction; you will never know how all the construction of all those residential-business buildings are financed. Who buys those when we know how people live? And these are constantly erected all over the city. Belgrade Waterfront is being erected too and suddenly we hear the story about money laundering through arms trade. Whoever takes a possession of that money is the boss, while the boss of our lives sees the rule as his private, family and criminal business."²⁸

The creation of the negative image of the government possessed no strong critical distance while having a high level of contempt stemming from the cultural racism. The contempt towards the government members is of no political but of culturally educational nature, which makes it clear that the politicians are not observed politically, but rather through the use of a critical pattern and all the possible matrixes with the aim to discredit them: "This government opened the door wide to all the bad students craving status and wealth. Knowledge is degraded; the ambition for education is thoroughly discouraged, party's membership after a few-decade process triumphed over professions. Politicians are better artists than artists themselves and know-it-alls in all spheres. At the example of Belgrade embellishment we can see how it looks when the eminent aesthetes become investors and politicians with megalomaniac passion. That pile built in Knez Mihajlova Street – Rajić mall is an illustration of the continuous attack at the body and soul of this city. That mall is as ugly as the Belgrade Waterfront buildings, but it is less talked of since it is not this government's child."²⁹

Simultaneously with the emphasis of the importance of elections in Belgrade and negative description of the values and conditions of life in the city, a never-ending narrative about the unequal con-

ditions of the elections is being created. The mentioned narrative actually has the purpose to strengthen dissatisfaction with the political life in Serbia and furthermore to pose an alibi for negative election results. Also, this matrix opens a possibility to legitimize the denial of the results of street elections. Dragan Đilas, a candidate for the Major of Belgrade position says: "There are no conditions for fair elections with today's media and electorate lists in Belgrade in which there the names of people who don't even live in Belgrade. There are no conditions for fair elections in the place where there is blackmail and bribery, in the place where the Judiciary for five years hasn't sentences anyone for the beating of the opposition activists, the place where Zelja rules, where the police arrests for the sake of the government's campaign. People live in this city and they don't see. They only understand that a person, who doesn't see and doesn't care about Belgradians, closed half of Branko's Bridge, Roosevelt's Street, half of Gazela Bridge, Slavija and Boulevard of Liberation. They understand that the government banned a million of good things, and brought two million of bad things."³⁰

The quoted attitude of Dragan Đilas holds a significant dose of political radicalism, whose outcome can be the transfer of political problems to the non-institutional plane - the plane of protest in the streets – where, according to some unwritten rule, a civil rebellion would begin, followed by a demand for the replacement of the entire government. Đilas's deviation from the current Belgrade government is open and clear and it refers to several different dimensions in the work of the Belgrade administration. Nevertheless, the most striking part of his presentation is the one in which the negative image of the current government is being built on the bad and incompetent administration of the city of Belgrade, deprived of a serious vision of the development of the main city.

"I do not support those who have by leading Belgrade created an unsafe city in which criminals are the masters of life and death, I do not support those who want to spend hundreds of millions and billions of citizen's money on projects like the metro that leads "from nowhere to nowhere", the city on the water that was supposed to be already built, in which, besides the cafes and promenades, there is nothing... I do not support those who stopped building kindergartens and schools and replaced it with the construction of shopping centers, those who abolished free textbooks, aid for pensioners, stopped the project for building a center for autistic children in the Denkova gardens ... I do not support those who reduce aid for women who recently gave birth, from fifty to ten thousand and they praise that act ... In short, I do not support people who do not know how to work and who behave arrogantly due to their ignorance, saying falsehood every day causing damage to the city we live in."³¹

Vesna Rakić Vodinelić, candidate for the municipal assembly for the Belgrade City Assembly will confirm that the period of the Progressive Party will be the decadent period. In a furious rush of political aggression and routine propagandistic imagination, she says: "Under the rule of Siniša Mali, this city has suffered humiliations in various areas. Life in the city has become cruel and difficult. It's not just a matter of repairing the streets when it is obviously a bad time for that, it's a complete neglect of some cultural institutions, it's also this ridiculous New Year's lighting that was put up in October, it is the offer for the New Year's Concert to a member of the Serbian Progressive Party, Aca Lukas... after everything we've experienced with Mali and Goran Vesić, somehow it seems that in his time everything was better."³²

26 Borko Stefanović, „Vulin je Vučićev glas srca [Vulin is the voice of Vučić's heart],“ an interview with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, No. 3489, p. 11

27 Ibid, p. 13

28 Marko Vidojković, „Other nam je malo do potpune propasti [There is little time until the complete doom],“ an interview with Dragan Jovičevićem, *NIN*, No. 3486, p. 19

29 Tatjana Mandić Rigonat, „Podanici čine kralja [Servants make the king],“ an interview with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, No. 3486, page 18.

30 Dragan Đilas, „Zašto se vraćam u politiku [Why I am back in politics],“ an interview with Olja Bečković, No. 301, p. 11

31 Dragan Đilas, „Moramo da zaustavimo propadanje Beograda [We must stop the decay of Belgrade],“ an interview with Nenad Čaluković, *Nedeljnik*, No. 301, p. 21

32 Vesna Rakić Vodinelić, „Bilo koja vlast je bolja od ove [Any government is better than this one],“ an interview with Zoran Preradović, *NIN*, No. 3491, p. 10

NIN, 7th December 2017

What is interesting is a significant level of convergence between political assessments related to the government of the Serbian Progressive Party and allegedly a cultural matrix that manifests itself through popular music whose protagonist is folk singer Aleksandar Vukosavljević, better known as Aca Lukas. Hand in hand, the model of folk culture and the authority of the Progressive coalition in Belgrade are being observed. Negative political branding of the Serbian Progressive Party implies both the unity of the moment of culture and politics.

The culmination of the desire and the need to make every move by the authorities regarding the Belgrade elections politically absurd, even if it was in the domain of foggy announcement, appears in the text of the journalist of *NIN* Vera Didanović, which clearly indicates a deeply morally controversial relationship between President Vučić and current Mayor Siniša Mali: "If we start from the fact that it has become usual that the outcome is contrary to what Aleksandar Vučić announces, it might happen that despite all the affairs which involve him, Siniša Mali will be 'seen' as the mayor of Belgrade in another term. Provided, of course, that comprehensive electoral engineering, assisted by the work of the opposition on its own self-cancellation, brings results and enables for the Progressive Party the re-formation of authority in the capital. Even if he does not enter history, Siniša Mali (together with Vučić, after all) has already largely earned a place in – social psychology. Namely, in 'democratic countries' it is difficult to find a comparable example of the survival of a high official marked by such a great number of affairs so that he was not forced to deviate from political life-or at least to retreat into the background of the scene, where it is also possible to pull strings."³³

In addition to challenging Aleksandar Vučić from the perspective of liberal-democratic criticism and cultural exclusivism, another criterion for observing his correctness is added. It's about patriotism and state nationalism. For the editor of *Pečat*, Nikola Vrzić, the patriotic attitude towards Kosovo is the acceptance of the political logic and practice of the former leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia, Vojislav Koštunica who entered the fatal conflict with the West on the issue of Kosovo. At the same time, resolving the Kosovo problem in the context of European integration and approaching America is indirectly identified with the national betrayal:

"America wants to reconcile itself historically with Serbia by permanently occupying it. Will Aleksandar Vučić act as Vojislav Koštunica did, or as Boris Tadić? Namely, Serbia was already in this situation in 2007, when they faced us with an order to sign the Ahtisaari's plan on Kosovo's supervised independence. The government of Vojislav Koštunica rejected this order, as it is known, and therefore the architects of Kosovo's independence had to resort to violations of international law and the unilateral proclamation of Kosovo's independence, which they cannot legalize without the consent of Serbia. His rejection of the independence of Kosovo, thanks to which he will be enlisted as a statesman in the Serbian history who put the interests of his country and people above his personal ones, Vojislav Koštunica paid with his own political fate. It is a big loss for Serbian politics but a small price for defense of the country. This example tells us that Aleksandar Vučić is now in the same position before the same choice, between the state and himself, because not all of us, but he alone will suffer if he opposes the Americans. The big question is whether he will at all, if he acts as Koštunica did, and not as Boris Tadić who has worked hard to legalize Kosovo's independence as far as he dared, from the acceptance of EU-LEX to the relocation of the dialogue in Brussels, it is a great question, then, if he acts like Koštunica and he doesn't have to do anything more than that, pay the price that Koštunica did. From the parliamentary majority that Vučić has, through the mood of the people to the mood of Russia and China and the unrest

33 Vera Didanović, „Kompletni idiot ili ponovo gradonačelnik [The complete idiot or once more a mayor],“ *NIN*, br. 3493, p. 11

of the West – all this shows that, faced with a new Ahtisaari's plan in the form of Condoleezza Rice and old American blackmails, Aleksandar Vučić had to act as Vojislav Koštunica did. Then again if he acts like Boris Tadić did, despite all the reasons for the contrary, Vučić's fall will be so much deeper."³⁴

The image of the opposition - between the lack of political-moral legitimacy and the constant attempt to return to the area of political relevance.

The image of the opposition in weekly newspapers and editorial columns of daily newspapers is far more complicated and is presented at several different levels. In daily newspapers and magazines that criticize the winners of the revolution on the 5th of October, such as *Informer* and *Pečat*, the image of the opposition is extremely negative. In the aforementioned print media there are no interviews of members of the so-called European reform opposition, and a very small, almost no space, is open to the so-called anti-European opposition to Vučić, in which we can classify the Democratic Party of Serbia and the Movement of the Dveri. Also, while it is notable that the leader of Serbian Radical Party, Vojislav Šešelj and the Serbian Radical Party itself do not have the same status, they are not, however, the "favorites" of these media. However, unlike the winners of the revolution on the 5th of October, the radicals are not politically stigmatized. Similarly, the image of the opposition is extremely negative for almost all political issues, including the issue of political and any other credibility of the opposition leaders, which seems to be a reminder of the period when they were in power, or polemic with their attitudes. On the other hand, weekly newspapers such as *Vreme*, *NIN*, *Novi Magazin* and *Nedeljnik* give the opposition unambiguous support, which does not differ much from the content of support, but rather by its intensity. With radically critical weekly newspapers, the intensity of support for the opposition is greater, and it is not measured only by providing the space for attitudes and interpretations of opposition leaders, but also by the strength and radicality of the negative campaign against Aleksandar Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party. Unlike *Informer* and *Pečat*, opposition leaders get a lot of space in weekly newspapers to present and explain their views, which politically and via media prevent the possibility of the influence of the arguments and rhetoric of power. In this way, it affects not only the (scarce) reading audience of weekly newspapers, but, above all, it tends to narrow down the influence of the authorities to so-called, capillary public. From this sort of media-political constellation, the conflict between Vučić and the "elite" partly arises.

The complexity of the image of the opposition is reflected in a different approach to the problem of its action and potential. Pro-government print media, first of all, the daily newspapers *Informer*, and somewhat *Pečat*, disagree on its performance and potential. At the same time, the opposition weekly newspapers, especially those radically critical of the authorities, such as *Vreme* and *NIN*, most often ascertain public or political impotence, but also develop a discourse showing democratic defects of the order, occasionally heroizing its actions. It is striking that in these details, characteristic for weekly newspapers, there is almost no critical remark on the functioning of the Euro-reform opposition from the time it was in power. This kind of "forgetting" is not accidental, but it is consciously chosen, since critical weekly newspapers are an active factor in party polemics, a kind of intellectual supplement in the difficult and exhausting struggle of political actors in Serbia.

A special contribution to the negative value presentation of the opposition parties has the newspaper *Informer*, both texts appearing in the daily edition, as well as editorial columns by Dragan J. Vučićević. Vučićević's columns in the moral-political sense problematize actors on the opposition scene, and treat in a critical way the opposition media and non-governmental organizations, with almost

unavoidable reflection on the period of power of the winners of the revolution on the 5th October. The main characteristics of Vučićević's attitudes can be summarized in several interrelated moments: 1) the current opposition has no moral credibility (because of the high level of corruption of the political class it is made of) and the political capacity to lead the state (due to the failure of the transition in Serbia); 2) in opposition-minded media, which is the majority of print media, the current government is attacked without serious rational reasoning and with only one goal: to have it overthrown as soon as possible; 3) in the media that support the current opposition there is an undoubted discrimination of all who are not open opponents of Vučić's authority.

Vučićević's criticism of the Serbian opposition scene is equally aimed at the opposition as a factor of political life, but also to the media that are extremely critical of the authorities. His criticism is always based on ad hominem, meaning that is strictly personalized, which is in the function of conviction. By highlighting psychological characteristics, some participants in the political life are stigmatized which makes them unworthy of any function in society.

For the understanding of the media-political scene in Serbia, the writing of the editor-in-chief of *Informer* is relevant for several reasons. The open and direct style of writing and the content of the messages support the interest in the politics of the lower classes of the Serbian society. Also, the daily newspaper *Informer* deals with the re-examination of negative attitudes and media-political images that are created and continuously reproduced about the current government by the critically minded media. And finally, *Informer* is the leader amongst daily newspapers, in creating a value-negative image of the present opposition as a political actor.

Among Vučić's starting points in thinking is the understanding of the political opposition as a kind of "network" of various related organizations and public figures, that is to say, a broader notion than of political opponents in parliament. We can conclude that it is about the alliance of parties, NGO sector, the media, and a certain number of public intellectuals. Another assumption is the specific understanding of politics, which Vučićević attaches to the opposition leaders and their political media allies. The politics is for opposition leaders, in Vučićević's vision, an instrument for the enrichment of the former political elite. In conditions of high poverty and objectively scarce life chances, such an understanding of the opposition is the fuel of the campaign of the current government. Precisely such campaigns are capable of producing rage, disappointment or indifference with voters of the opposition, and have the potential to motivate voters to prevent the restoration of a corrupt political elite embodied in the winners of the revolution on the 5th October.

The next assumptions of Vučićević's interpretation of the opposition, as a political actor, are the surplus of its patriotism, the anti-Russian attitude and the undisputed loyalty to the Western authority. In the name of coming to power and showing loyalty to Western states, according to the editor-in-chief of *Informer*, the opposition parties are ready to do everything necessary at a given political moment, starting from launching various media campaigns to acts aimed at destabilizing Serbia as a state.

Within the narrative about the loyalty to the West, there are two mutually connected moments: the absence of any coherent nationally responsible policy and distance towards Russia, which acts as a figure of ally of Serbia in many respects. One of Dragan J. Vučićević's permanent theses is on the auto chauvinism of members of the Euro-reform political and media elite in Serbia. The attitude of the Euro-reformist is self-hate, or more precisely radical rejection of cultural-traditional values and customs, the uncritical acceptance of Europeanism, the rejection of the Serbian state politics, but also a powerful contempt for the ordinary man. In the writer's vision of the editor of *Informer*, this kind of attitude is syn-

34 Nikola Vrzić, „Malo sutra [That'll be the day],“ *Pečat*, No.499, p. 6

onymous with what is unacceptable and politically exceeded; moreover, it is also something that needs to be publicly demystified and forcefully politically suppressed.

It is precisely the combination of a radical nihilist criticism of the Euro-reformers and the imperative of their political elimination; we can read from the following sentences. It is important to note that Vučićević is reaching for this matrix regardless of the specific events. Specifically, by constant repetition, one particular, in this case negative image, about the political actor is retained. In the spirit of the aforementioned, Vučićević writes: "The constant need to destroy and humiliate ourselves. Masochistic enjoyment in projecting the idea that we Serbs are the worst and always blamed for everything, and our Serbia is a terrible country in which only the ones who must, the ones who have not managed to flee in time have to live. The sick need to accuse and condemn ourselves in advance, with a default understanding of all the evil of others directed towards us and our children, because we, ourselves, are guilty of mischief, we have provoked it and earned it. More or less this is what the message inbox looks like, a set of basic ideas of a second-Serbian self-styled elite. This is the basis of a pathological, hateful policy that is most accurately described by 'pissing on graves' and 'hanging on lampposts'."³⁵

A similar matrix that connects the accusation for a national betrayal at the expense of opposition leaders and critical media who, under the boundaries of conventional jurisdiction, the editor of the tabloid *Informer* sent at a time when part of the public protested about the participation of General Lazarević, former Hague defendant, the activities of the Military Academy of the Army of Serbia. Vučićević used this circumstance to express the anger, with flavor of insulting curses. The legitimization of cursing in the public space is in the function of provoking a revolt with a common reader of newspapers, but also for the presentation of a political rival and media of the opposite political and editorial orientation as absolutely unacceptable: "Fuck all those who have been 'deeply disturbed' in the past two weeks by the lecture of the general Vladimir Lazarević at the Military Academy. Fuck off all of you second-Serbian haters, all of you suckers of the Soroš-Šiptar tits, all of you cock suckers and the servants of the American-Hague-Eurounion, all of you 'independent' political and media experts, screw each and every single one of you, shame on you, sell out shits, the worst and the lowest degenerates, the most terrible scum, disgusting, nasty cunts... General Lazarević bothers you, you say?! Does a hero who in 1999 defended Serbia in Kosovo from the military and technically superior NATO Pact bother you?! A hero who, with his brilliant tactics and military skills, saved thousands of lives and almost complete military equipment and weapons after a full 78 days of hellish, crazed, criminal bombardment bothers you?! The general worthy of the famous Serbian generals of the Great War, whose defense strategy is being studied in Russian, but also US military academies?!"³⁶

A critical shift towards the state's appreciation of the Hague defendant for Vučićević is a proof of betrayal of opposition leaders. Critique of Lazarević was identified with the direct support of the exonerated Hague defendants Ante Gotovina, Ramuš Haradinaj, Naser Orić. Accusing the discourse of Vučićević's manuscript has in itself an element of direct "undermining" of the patriotism of the opposition leaders, and at the same time it points to a kind of complicity with the aforementioned dark figures from the previous bloody conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia:

35 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Politika mržnje i kultura kukanja [The politics of hate and the culture of whining],“ *Informer*, 21.10.2017, p. 7

36 Dragan J. Vučićević, „General heroji i ljudske pizde [Hero general and human cunts],“ *Informer*, 4.11.2017, p. 7

"And you corrupt and sold out rascals, are not bothered by the cutthroat Ramuš Haradinaj, the one who had slaughtered with his own hand, personally raped, and now with the will of your NATO Pact and your European Union has been appointed prime minister of the fake state of Kosovo?! And you, goddamn bastards, are not bothered by the foe Ante Gotovina, the one who has, alongside with Tuđman, banished 250,000 and killed more than 3,000 innocent Serbs in operation 'Oluja' (Storm), and now he is the adviser of the Croatian National Security Agency?! And you are not bothered, you nasty bastards, by the villain Naser Orić, the one who boasted how he gauged out eyes and cut necks of Serbs, and now he is celebrated in Bosnia as a national hero?! You, Janković, and you, Šutanovac, and you gentlemen from the patriotism of the cunning, racketeering bulletins, the CIA television, all of you, that is, who would prohibit General Vladimir Lazarević – fuck off! The majority of Serbia, thank God, will never again believe in your terrible lies."³⁷

Possible national betrayal is not the only topic used to discredit the opposition and create a negative image about it. Numerous topics fill the pages of the government-friendly media. One such topic is Belgrade's election. For *Informer*, they are evidence of opposition demagoguery that arises from the absence of its true critical self-reflection, and from a profound, powerful and effective political motive – a constant and intense struggle for power. Also, the lack of credibility is emphasized in the text "Battle for Belgrade" by Dragan J. Vučićević, the editor of *Informer*: "Belgrade's elections are fateful. This is not my claim. Dragan Đilas and Saša Janković are saying this. They say that if they, joined by Vuk Pozderac Jeremić, win elections, the honey and milk will flow through the capital streets. Children will go to kindergartens for free, receive textbooks for free, we will have thirteenth salary and fourteenth pension, mothers who recently gave birth will receive hundreds of thousands of dinars from the city budget, they will build us a metro, new kindergartens, schools, health centers ... Heaven on Earth. But if – God forbid, by any means - these other people win, these disgusting progressives of Vučić's that will be the end of the world as we know it. If, therefore, most of the citizens of Belgrade accepts a story according to which they are better, more capable, for all of us and our children more useful, those who, during their time indebted Belgrade for 1.2 billion Euros and brought it to the verge of bankruptcy; if the majority in the capital trusts that they will build us a subway, the ones who could not even make the underground garbage cans properly."³⁸

Lack of credibility is accompanied by a lack of vision of development projects that should improve the life of the capital. The vote for the opposition, if the aforementioned is interpreted consistently, is a vote for the immoral leader and the lack of a political program. In the author's text of the editor of *Informer* dedicated to the leader of the Free Citizens Movement, Saša Janković, the defects of the analyzed leader are similarly emphasized. The controversial character of Janković's leadership position is derived from the analysis of his mental state. The straightforward discredit of a political opponent is distracted from the level of political struggle to other levels. The reduction of politics to the psychological or psychiatric level was carried out of the propaganda reasons of radical discrediting: "If Janković is now in a hotel room in the center of Vienna, struggling with stress and anger, because he has faced the problems of opposition politics, then what will he do tomorrow or the day after tomorrow when he, God forbid, gets his hands on some important state function?! The matter is more than serious, because history teaches us what kind of catastrophes were caused to the states, peoples, even the entire continents and planets, by abnormal and unscrupulous people who came to power under unhappy circumstances. However, all this about Saša Grčić (little cramp) Janković would be much clearer if, finally, after a quarter of the century, the truth of the terrible murder in his apartment from his pistol would be confirmed. Saša

37 Ibid, p. 7

38 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Bitka za Beograd [The battle for Belgrade],“ *Informer*, 23. 12. 2017, p. 5

Grčić Janković, a man who for almost 25 years is covering the murder of Predrag Gojković, a student – if there were any morals, laws, rights and justice – he should not have been allowed to get the position of leader of the opposition. But that is on everybody else's conscience and not *Informer's*."³⁹

The subject of Vučićević's criticism, as in the previous analyzed period, is the way of approaching and selecting the topics that are discussed about or written about more detailed in the public. An affair about the existence of parallel security services which is promoted by the leader of the movement "It is enough!" Saša Radulović remained unmet by the anti-government and critical media. Moreover, none of the editors of the so-called critical media were interested in it. This type of oversight, Vučićević said, is deliberate and fundamentally dangerous: "The leader of 'It is enough!' Saša Radulović claims that in January 2014, he was threatened by the protector of the people Saša Janković in the Cabinet of the Minister of Economy who told him that he is coming in the name of 'a parallel security service established by Democratic Party, more powerful than the state service' (!?) and asked him not to resign, because it is very important for the 'general thing' to remain in Vučić's government and that he is damaging the system from the inside!? No prosecutor, no important politician, almost no media other than *Informer* was interested in this scandal. As if nothing happened!?! And in every normal, democratic state, a country that has the ambition of being truly a state of law, such claims would cause a socio-political earthquake. Can you, then, imagine that in one Germany, Great Britain or France, or any other serious state this sort of claim remains only at the level of one and a half front page?! You cannot. The episode 'Radulović-Janković', except that it definitely proves the absence of an independent prosecutor's office, which will not recover from the 'yellow reform' for a long time, is actually the most picturesque display of the remarkable essence of that which today in Belgrade falsely presents itself as a journalist and editorial elite. Those who today dominantly control the Serbian media actually perceive themselves as social-political workers of the Kardelj-Tito type whose job is not to inform, but to educate, who do not deal with information, but propaganda. Such people see themselves as political commissars, whose mission is to guard the character and work of their favorite opponents. That is precisely why, these days in the most brutal way they have been censoring the negative news about their favorite Saša Janković, and most aggressively attack everybody, even the comrades who they recently deemed favorite, who dare say that the opposition emperor is naked. And not only naked, but he seems to be dangerously insane."⁴⁰

The political critique of the opposition option did not remain without the personal discredit of the opposition action. It is reflected in the moral, to a certain extent incompetent, medical observation, which, despite the lack of scientific support, sounds receptive to the ordinary reader, often prone to the frivolous use of medical concepts. The writing effect is personal discredit, for political purposes.

Although discrediting is strongly politically motivated, it is factually based, especially given the constant attention of *Informer* in relation to social networks, primarily Twitter where it often shows freedom of expression that has caricatural or extreme nihilistic effects not only for the public in general, but also for actors who use Twitter for their promotion. In the context of the persistence of the Twitter nihilism of the opposition, communication of the politically engaged actor Sergej Trifunović in this virtual community is often exposed. He often expresses the bad side of the opposition's political-moral exclusivism – moral and cultural racism, which is maintained and "fed" by the spirit of division into "culturally exalted" and "simple", to "higher" and "lower" in political, moral and cultural terms. Simultaneously with the use of metaphors, Trifunović allows the development of narratives about the opposition as a political group that seeks to take power in a non-institutional way. "Sergej Trifunović is, an actor,

39 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Grčić [Little cramp],“ *Informer*, 18. 11. 2017, p. 7

40 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Paralelna služba [Parallel service],“ *Informer*, 2.12.2017, p. 5

indeed. He has had many good roles, achievements by which he is remembered and recognized throughout the region. And he has been rewarded, and praised and respected. And the fact that he 'is pissing on graves' and indirectly calls for the murder of the aforementioned Vučić, that he threatens anyone he does not like, and that he promises hanging on lampposts on Terazije, well that is quite alright, that is what is implied, and it is contributing to his professional reputation. When today and here, right, anybody dares to say at least one nice word about the current government, when anyone publicly voices any fact that does not support the hater's fatalistic theory that today the situation in Serbia is really the worst, then this person is immediately proclaimed as mercenary, toothless jerk, sandwich-eater, suck-ups... And without any difference and without any pardon. Yellow media-political scumbag elite shamelessly attacks even such unquestionable greatness as world champion Ivana Španović. She was, let us recall, treated with the worst epithets, the grossest lies were made up about her only because she dared to publicly state the fact that the state of Serbia systematically, financially supports top athletics!?!"⁴¹

The subject of Vučićević's fierce criticism is the idea of gathering the opposition on the joint opposition list. The blade of his criticism manifests itself through the moralistic attitude towards the opposition parties that merge solely because of the struggle for power, not because they are governed by common political principles. The narrative about the opposition is deeply personalized and shaped into negative identifications or recognizable allusions. Vučićević's contemplation of the opposition is not based solely on propaganda constructs, but is often based on the motives of some opposition parties and parties in power, about their opposition counterparts. Since they are generally of negative value, it is legitimate to ask the question about the meaning and reasons for their gathering, which the editor-in-chief of *Informer* does: "Just as it is horrible that in a desperate attempt to gain power in Belgrade, those who were talking the worst until recently about each other, joined together and did everything to break each other's necks. Jeremić, let us recall, said that Đilas's bridge on Ada was a terrible robbery because of which someone would have to grease the chains!?! Đilas kicked him out of the Democratic Party shortly afterwards on account of being arrogant, rotten and corrupt... Janković said that Đilas was a tycoon and 'Vučić's Trojan horse', which is now publicly confirmed by academician Dušan Teodorović, founder of the Movement of the free citizens, unquestionable authority and a moral vertical of the so-called other Serbia. On all that, now some editors and journalists would tell publicly what was Dragan Đilas privately saying about Saša Janković (the abuse of private conversations for the purpose of the campaign was legalized recently precisely by Đilas), so right then would only be clear that there are absolutely no principles, ideas nor plans for the benefit of Belgrade and Belgrade citizens. There is only one thing – interest. The bare interest of tycoons and yellow scum-elite that includes seizing the city and state cash registers. Luckily, in the end it all depends on us."⁴²

Unlike the extremely negative interpretation of the opposition political actors who represent the course of the Euro reform and radically criticize the nature and way of functioning of Vučić's authority, which characterizes the writing of journalist Dragan J. Vučićević, there are also different views in print media, with a more tinted description of oppositional activity and the opposite value of the connotation of it.

In the spirit and letter, positive texts about the opposition, the presence of advocacy-activist types of journalism is noticeable. In this kind of journalistic approach, the opposition as a political actor, is observed in two ways: either through the prism of its (in)ability to question the authorities, or, through the public glorification of any proceedings of the opposition parties, assessing them as acts of historical

41 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Kontrapamet [Counter intellect],“ *Informer*, 9.12.2017, p. 5

42 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Bitka za Beograd [The battle for Belgrade],“ *Informer*, 23.12.2017, p. 5

and/or political necessity and adulthood, made in the context of the country's necessary progress. Even rare critic tones, have "the wind in the back", in creating a politically more capable and mature group, since they have, as a pretext and subtext, a narrative of a deeply undemocratic political leadership led by Aleksandar Vučić, the leader of the Serbian Progressive Party. In a word, access to the opposition oscillates between tactical issues related to the performance and assessment of the chance with the necessary affirmative interpretation of their actions, through the creation of (auto)heroism of opposition's actions, concluding with nostalgia for the "old, good nineties" when the opposition was more attractive to the media and in a political-symbolic way more powerful than it is today. Nevertheless, every kind of positive context of oppositional action necessarily goes along with the diagnosis of the state in which it is, and it is a state of constant political intersection.

Traditional Euro-reform parties inevitably become part of history, while on the political scene slowly, but inevitably, a platform for a serious and relevant political settlement with the Serbian Progressive Party is formed. This view is noticeable in the text of the journalist Dragoljub Žarković, who, regarding the situation in the opposition, writes: "The traditional scene from the end of the past and the first decade of this century has been thoroughly swept, and into that vacuum flew in Saša Janković and Vuk Jeremić (and Dragan Đilas is being pushed into it by them) with the eyes and the hopes of the opposition public being mostly kept on the first one mentioned because of the results in the presidential election, which are far from impressive, but were better than the other pretenders to the throne.

What is happening to them today is nothing new and unexpected. The critical phase was created at the moment when they grew from the movement to a party of serious intentions, and a circle of the like-minded people turned into a device with clear hierarchical rules. Honestly, I do not believe that they believe that they can defeat Vučić's army and resist the power which comes from the authorities, but they, and rightly so, hope that they can from the movements and groups gathered around the leaders become parliamentary parties, the especially because the tide on the scene is big. I think that this is their only goal in this round of electoral competition, at least the only one that's realistic. They would probably find it convenient if Vučić was to announce general parliamentary elections, because the big question is whether they are stronger now than they will be in two years."⁴³

Unlike Žarković, who quite realistically looks at the current situation on the opposition political scene, Zora Drčelić, a journalist of the weekly newspaper *Vreme*, recognizes the heroic dimension of the engagement of opposition leader Saša Janković and other oppositionists, but also of independent media, public intellectuals and NGOs critically minded towards the current government: "Some new activists, movements, parties (Ne da(vi)mo Beograd (Let's not drown Belgrade), students, Saša Janković's Movement of Free Citizens, the rest of the opposition and independent journalists) despite all obstructions of the regime-media mob of the Serbian Progressive Party, have achieved at least one thing – they have made visible some of the biggest improprieties of this government in the past five years. And in such a distribution of power and power, it is something, but it is still - insufficient."⁴⁴

The key theme of the opposition - the presence in one or more columns in the run-up to the Belgrade elections was the subject of various inscriptions, comments and interviews. Assuredly sceptic

43 Dragoljub Žarković, „Škoro ništa novo: opanjkanje dečija bolest opozicije u nastajanju i zgrčenost zbog manjka organizacije i vremena, a viška – hobista [Škoro (almost) nothing new: badmouthing a childhood illness of the opposition in the emergence and frustrations due to the lack of organization and time, and the surplus – of the hobbyist],“ *Vreme*, No. 1404, p. 5

44 Zora Drčelić, „Probudite se, pobogu! [Wake up, for God's sake!],“ *Vreme*, No. 1397

of the possibility of opposition unification, Jovo Bakić says: "In a camp that talks about one column, there are many who think like me, but they still talk about that one column. But there is another thing: there are a significant number of voters who could never vote for Dragan Šutanovac, so again one column is missing. And the problem is not only Dragan Šutanovac, but also the whole pleiad that leads the Democratic Party. It is absolutely amazing how they managed to get such people out to the surface from a very good human resource base. Then, if Dragan Đilas becomes a candidate for the mayor of Belgrade, again you'll have people who do not want to vote for him. So the story of one column is pointless and it has no stronghold in reality. It would be violence against political ideas and, therefore, completely unnecessary. Instead, everyone should try to develop their program as clear as possible and present it to citizens. Of course, this is not easy under the terms of the media blockade imposed by the authoritarian regime, but it is the only option at the moment. The problem is how to organize it and how to exclude a false opposition, such as the Liberal Democratic Party, or how to exclude the one who repels the voters because of the personal composition."⁴⁵

Parallel with the need to classify the real and false opposition, the print media gradually constitute awareness of the limited effectiveness of movements and civic initiatives, which largely occupy the space of former traditional opposition parties. Thusly, in his efforts to offer a picture of the "opposition political formation of the future," Zoran Panović, the columnist of *Nedeljnik* and the daily newspaper *Danas* shows the limitations of the concept of critique of partocracy and populism, proposing to the opposition, of course, indirectly, political elitism: "Fashionable struggle against 'partocracy' and 'populism' has only led to one – that you do not have either a party or a leader in the opposition. The very idea of uniting the opposition in the soul is populist. Vučić can be removed from power only by populism. Populism is like cholesterol: it can be both bad and good. The goal, method and ideological filling are important. Risks are always great, because populism is a dangerous toy for someone who does not know how to handle it or uses it to strengthen the personal authority of the Problem, and for Veljo's 'new beginnings' that came after Vučić. When they talk about one column, people recall the nineties, but then the conditions were different. In addition, it was necessary that Vuk Drašković be removed to make the Democratic Opposition of Serbia."⁴⁶

Writing about the opposition did not go without one, almost inevitable, theme. It is about the texts that speak about the opposition as a victim of regime media brutality. When it comes to this topic, the dominant attitude is that all opposition parties are victims and sufferers. The key is to demonize the government and point to the personal sacrifice of every member of the opposition, a participant in political life, given the alleged risk involved in dealing with politics. The status of a victim was given to everyone, including a powerful media worker and former leader of the Democratic Party Dragan Đilas, a man whose business success went hand in hand with the rise of political power in the period of the Democratic Party's rule. "What outpoured on the political and media scene since Dragan Đilas announced that he would run for the mayor of Belgrade, could be compared only with the tsunami of the accusations and feces that were spilled over Tomislav Nikolić after he had announced his desire to participate again in running for the president of Serbia... However, this thing with Đilas seems that it will last until the Belgrade elections, which are only in March. A sickening atmosphere in a society that has been created for five years, and whose basic mantra is that anyone who does not admire the leader or utters some remark about the authorities is an enemy, an adversary of progress, a thief, a traitor, a tycoon, as if he is completely getting out of control. This inevitably happens when the creation and maintenance

45 Jovo Bakić, „Autoritarni režim tigra od papira [Authoritarian regime of the paper tiger],“ an interview with Jovana Gligorićević, *Vreme*, No. 1399, p. 15

46 Zoran Panović, „Ko je sad baba Simana? [Who's grandmother Simana now?],“ *Nedeljnik*, 30.11.2017, p. 18

of such an atmosphere is the only method of governance, with Münchhausen-like lies about the present and future successes that the Combined Impact on Đilas is going through several lines - the order of hatred, such as Vulin, the order of theft and other improprieties."⁴⁷

In the same spirit, the weekly newspaper *Vreme* used one, so to speak, media trick. It is about constructing an image of Dragan Đilas as a victim of the disgraceful campaign of the current government. The presupposition of the creation of the victim's halo, which should be linked to Đilas's character, rests on the strengthening of the opposites between a brave, courageous, successful and enlightened candidate such as Đilas, who is also a lighthouse in general darkness, and the machinery of "media evil" yoked to maintain Vučić's (self)authority. The image of Đilas as a victim, persecuted, stigmatized, endangered, in contradiction with his financial, media and in some sense political power, given the fact that after years of absence from political life he became leader and candidate for mayor, supported by a certain number of opposition parties, "critical media" and groups of intellectuals.

What a fable about the regime media evil machine and the upstanding Đilas looks like can be seen in the following quotation: "There is no more prominent ruling caste member who did not comment on this occasion and threw a stone in the direction of a future candidate, with the serving of trustworthy analysts and the media led by *TV Pink*, *Informer*, *Dnevni telegraf*, *Večernje novosti*... To find out who fell deepest in the septic tank in which the Serbian political scene turned into thanks to the present government seems like an impossible job with regard to competition, but there are candidates who stand out, the obsessive desire to close every hole and take everything from the kindergarten to the presidency, from Mionica to Belgrade. In addition, Belgrade is a golden goose and the government does not want to leave anything at risk, and when the scale is raised to the level that each winning less than absolute is treated as a defeat, then they thread carefully. There are probably personal hatreds towards Đilas because he has twice in direct election duels defeated Vučić, who came to the stadium to treat the elections in local communities as a matter of life and death, let alone in Belgrade."⁴⁸

In addition to the already mentioned matrix of victimization of Đilas, it is necessary to notice a rough political distortion of reality, when interpreting the outcome of political struggles in Belgrade. Both in 2008 and 2012, Đilas only indirectly became a winner, since he both times made a political agreement with the Socialist Party, United Serbia and the PUPS (The Party of United Pensioners). He could never, even if he wanted, to beat Aleksandar Vučić directly. Namely, according to the law, elections for the city of Belgrade are proportional to the election system.

In fact, according to this system, it is voted for the parties, and the winner is the one who independently forms the majority or forms the majority in agreement with the other parties. In the first case, the winner is direct, with strong political legitimacy and unquestioning authority. In the second case, one can become the winner indirectly, with very often, politically, and especially morally debatable coalition arrangements that lead to the parody of the ideological consistency of governments. Thus, in 2008, the Socialist Party of Serbia and a coalition around it primarily formed government with the former party of Aleksandar Vučić, the Serbian Radical Party in the city of Belgrade. After the political grandeur overturn for which it can be reasonably assumed that it is the product of the influence of the powerful states of the West and the local rich, the agreement is canceled. The idea of the national reconciliation of the two Serbia, Milošević's and Đinđić's, came to the scene, and the Socialists and the coalition around the Democratic Party, led by Boris Tadić, formed the government at the level of the Republic and the city of Belgrade.

47 Momir Turudić, „Kombinovani udar na Đilasa [The combined attack on Đilas],“ No. 1407, p. 12

48 Ibid, p. 13

However, in rare cases the political and moral reflection in the analysis of social and political life was not missing. Stevan Filipović, already cited director, who is close to the Movement of the Free Citizens, and to Saša Janković, points out that it is not enough to be against the regime of Aleksandar Vučić, but a significant dose of civic courage and competence is necessary to participate in a political debate and formulate a concrete political program: "Every fool who is against Vučić, although being against him is considered to be a minimal civilization imperative (against this supervisor, not against him personally), therefore, any idiot who is on this 'our' side, no matter how big of a manipulator, uneducated, vulgar or banal, suddenly becomes 'super' and becomes a 'dissident'. This is our problem. The return to the pre-political era, there are no serious political issues, it all comes down to whether you are for or against Vučić. The opposition cannot be built solely on that. Who are these people? Do they have any attitudes, some policy for which I will vote? I want to see consistency in that, openness to public debate, not closing down in parties and tiny calculations. Even a child in elementary school can note that this is creepy. But what next, I cannot now talk about Vučić eternally. Vučić just needs to be removed."⁴⁹

At the same time, Filipović notes that the aggravating circumstance of the present political moment is that the current government uses very harsh methods in the fight against the opposition. These are the methods that came out of the very nature of the authoritarian political order. "Vučić is trying to defeat the opposition in every possible way, using all the mechanisms ever invented in the history of dictatorship and autocracy, but the problem is in the people on the other side of the fence."⁵⁰

Tinting the image of opposition in print media is also recognizable by providing space for different versions of oppositional thinking and action. The common denominator of all opposing thoughts is to encourage faith in the victory of the opposition, which also represents the campaign leader. A very loud advocate of an optimistic attitude of the opposition is also the leader of the movement "It is enough!" Saša Radulović. Among other things, he also analyzed the situation in the opposition before the upcoming elections, striving to establish value-political selection and filtering among the opposition. Similar to the quoted sociologist Jovo Bakić, Radulović is unwavering and unquestionable.

Radulović is realistically aware of the diversity of oppositional attitudes, but also, by his example, shows the entire complexity of the presentation of attitudes of the opposition in the media. The space in the media was provided, namely, by means of an accentuated anti-Vučić attitude. The space in the media is guaranteed by promoting faith in the possibility of winning of the opposition. Regardless of the circumstances in the public opinion, this optimistic setting is supported in order to get the opposition voters to go and vote by dramatization of the electoral process. At the same time, the attitude of the inevitability of the conflicts between the opposition parties is legitimized by the fact that within the opposition there is a need for political and ideological differentiation. Namely, the "real" of the "false" opposition should be separated. The concretization of this way of thinking, whose advocate Saša Radulović, the leader of the movement "It is enough!", is visible in the spirit and text of his interview: "The opposition voters in Belgrade are the majority because the Serbian Progressive Party has weakened. The only damage that can occur is if some opposition voters choose not to vote. Therefore, the greatest damage would be that Đilas runs for mayor and that new people stand behind him. There is a widespread damage to the abstainers who will not vote in order to get Kurta down and put on Murta. Đilas was a bad mayor. The fact that he was better than Siniša Mali has nothing to do with the fact that he employed people based on the fact that they belonged to his party, that he controlled the media, had business links with Vučić, that he had signed harmful secret contracts. And when you say

49 Stefan Filipović, „Srbija je Eldorado za beskrupulozne [Serbia is an El Dorado for the unscrupulous],“ an interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3484, p. 24

50 Ibid, p. 24

the opposition, it's not like there is a political group called the opposition, which has a common program, principles, values, and goals, and then as such suffers damage. In the parliamentary democracy, the parties compete for the trust of voters with their programs, people and political attitudes. The political opponents of the movement 'It is enough!' are all parties that have participated in the abuse of public resources. There are the Serbian Progressive Party, the Socialist Party of Serbia and the entire ruling coalition. These include Šapić, Đilas, and many other politicians. The two are the biggest hope of the Serbian Progressive Party that, despite falling ratings, will retain power in Belgrade. Just as the Liberal Democratic Party made that possible for them in Vračar."⁵¹

In critically minded media towards the authorities that have openly anti-government attitude, the possibility of elaborating the meaning of activism in politics has been opened. Activism should be understood exclusively as support for the struggle for the "opposition thing". It is always a matter of the sense of the struggle that is the struggle against the progressive power.

"I think that only by fighting can things be solved. I do not see any other way. I am most disappointed that there have been no significant reactions since the start of drastic changes in the media, the abolition of emissions, the release of people, the deprivation of finances and unfair competition. No reactions from the media, civil society, or society in general. And it's like that thing with the University. If the media itself, and then the whole society do not defend freedom, it means that we do not really need it that much. So you tell to the unscrupulous authorities: "Here you go." Probably any government in the world, except those who are very aware that media freedom primarily benefits them, would abolish the freedom of the press. But they do not dare, they know that they can pay for it dearly, to embitter both the press and the citizens. There was no one here who got enraged, and that's what made me angry."⁵²

The motive of nostalgia for the nineties goes together with an activist attitude and a radical criticism of the present state. Dubravka Stojanović, a historian, explicitly says this, confirming the thesis of a final and deep division not only in party life, but also among engaged or public intellectuals. Just as politicians, public intellectuals are also in deep political-media "trenches": "I think that political change is not possible without a change in the media. And this government knows well, more precisely - it recalls the 1990s. Because it's not true that we are going back to the nineties! Well, it would be ingenious to return to the nineties! Then we had Studio B and B92. The mighty 'Borba', 'Naša Borba' and 'Vreme'! There was a lot of courage and opportunities, and even money. If we were to 'return to the nineties', there would be a chance to talk about political change, which is why the government is trying to suffocate that. But, the media cannot be the only one to understand what is happening, and citizens just pretend that it has nothing to do with them. There is not a minimum of consciousness there. Even if all who disagree with the authorities begin to buy 'Danas' and 'Vreme', for example! Were there 600,000 people who voted for Saša Janković? Imagine half of them just starting to buy newspapers! It would be a minimum of consciousness, but I don't see even that."⁵³

Unlike the created image of the government, the image of the opposition in the print media is significantly more complex. The dominant critical attitude towards the opposition is emphasized in the daily newspaper *Informer*. *Informer* depicts the opposition, especially the Euro-reform one, as already mentioned, in an extremely negative way. The lack of democratic legitimacy, scarce patriotism and the

lack of moral credibility, with program confusion, are the main motives for critically evaluating the opposition. The language of strong and reckless insults against the opposition leaders directly places them in the position of the culprit. Writing of *Informer* is accentually propagandist and extraordinarily useful for the "progressive thing". On the other hand, in the media who are critical towards the authorities, the opposition is like a "favorite" child for whom there is always explanation and support. This support is, in the case of the weekly newspapers *Vreme* and *NIN*, stable and concrete. It arises through the continuity of radically critical, and occasionally condemnatory, blade directed at the authorities, in order to destroy its legitimacy and authority. Obsession with Vučić from the so-called "critical journalists" consistently converges with a certain way of thinking and acting specific to certain leaders of the opposition. Semantic and rhetorical overlapping of journalistic conclusions and oppositional attitudes is self-evident. Another way of support is reflected in the relevant allocation of space to opposition leaders and public figures that follow and supplement the opposition public discourse. The third and final layer of support concerns the proposal for the action-organizational correction of the performance of the opposition.

To these levels of support should be added the visual identity of almost every weekly newspaper in Serbia, with the exception of the weekly newspaper *Pečat*, which reminds of a kind of political poster i.e. another form of addressing for pre-election purposes. The suggestion is complete. It is realized through the image of the leader of the opposition or public figure close to the opposition, critical social and political messages.

Despite the number of printed media, and their different value orientation, it is obvious that there is no intention of transmitting facts and clarifying information. Their ambition is to define the value context of political life and patent the thought codes for understanding the complex and strained social and political reality. The image of actors, events and processes is largely negative. The authorities are especially negatively depicted. The opposition is approached with unhidden approval and often, excess of tolerance. Observed through the prism of printed media, the political reality in Serbia is a permanent "war of all against all".

51 Saša Radulović, „Zašto sam ćutao [Why I have kept my mouth shut],“ an interview with Nenad Čaluković, *Nedeljnik*, 30.11.2017, p. 27

52 Dubravka Stojanović, „Zašto bi se neko borio za nas ako se sami ne borimo za sebe [Why would someone fight for us if we do not fight for ourselves],“ an interview with Tamara Skrozza, *Vreme*, No. 1404, p. 14

53 Ibid, p. 15

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ABOUT
AUTHORS

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Public Policy Institute is a regional think-tank organization that operates in the Western Balkans region through the work of its branch offices in Belgrade, Podgorica and Ljubljana. By promoting public dialogue and constructive solutions, Public Policy Institute contributes to the efforts of the Western Balkan countries to become equal, reliable and progressive partners in the process of European integrations and mutual relationships. After the initial research and analysis of social and media context in the countries of the Western Balkans, the Institute has developed and implemented a series of media related projects, including: Role of the media in the process of securitisation in the Western Balkans, Civil Response to Clientelism in the media - MEDIA CIRCLE, NATO Reach Out - media monitoring and Role of the media in monitoring of R1325 in Montenegro.

EBART Media Archive is privately owned company established in 2000. Its main activity is archiving print media data in e-format. The print media archive consists of up-to-date material dating back to 2003, and more than 3 million print media reports from sources with national coverage. EBART is also specialized for media analysis, basic quantitative and qualitative analyses, comparing media treatment of specific keywords, as well as complex content analyses according to BBC methodology. EBART Media Archive is unmatched in the region with its unique media reports database, and 12 years of media research experience. This media database allows for the overall study of long-term media presence.

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