



Analysis of the print media in Serbia
October - December

QUARTERLY MEDIAMETER


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Content

- 1** Velimir Ćurgus Kazimir:
INTRODUCTION
- 2** Isidora Jarić, Danica Laban:
SAMPLE
- 3** Isidora Jarić, Danica Laban:
RESEARCH RESULTS
- 4** Dejan Vuk Stanković:
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
- 5** **ABOUT AUTHORS**



Otetili

GDE JE DŽULIJAN ASANŽ?

RES

TEOTO

TEOTO

week

MARIO VARGAS LJOSA EKSKLUZIVNO ZA NEDELJNIK

MARIO VARGAS LJOSA EKSKLUZIVNO ZA NEDELJNIK

Istorija neće oprostiti Kastru, iako sam mu ja davno oprostio

Nedeljnik



VLADIMIR REBIĆ

Prvi intervju novog direktora policije

ORUŽJE KOD VUCICEVE K NIJE OSTAVL SLUČAJNO

18

OSAM MESTI OD RUŠENJA U SAVAMALU BEGRAD NA VODI, ISTINA NA LEDU

НИН

РАСПРОДАЈА МЕДИЈА ЈОШ МАЛО ПА НЕСТАЛО



САША ЈАНКОВИЋ ЈЕДНА ОД НАЈБОЉИХ ММО И

Intervju: Boris Tadić Kako je Jeremić obavestio Krgu

Sirija Kraj bitke za Aleppo

REME



RADIKALI, NAPREDNJACI, TA JOŠ JEDNO UBIJANJE ZORANA

POZADI POLITIČ POZAD

Siniša Mali prvi put o Savamalu osveti SAD, Apostolski o nov

1



Introduction

VELIMIR ČURGUS KAZIMIR

INTRODUCTION:

From Elections to Elections

With the last calendar quarter (September – December) of 2016, we have not only covered the whole year, but also gained a much more precise and clearer picture of the role and significance of the daily press in Serbia. Politics has the absolute priority and domination over all of the other topics and areas of everyday life. The fact that in Serbia election campaigns start long before the very Election Day is determined represents both the extreme politicization of the media, as well as the outspoken and silent expectations of the public itself. This is best illustrated by the popularity of the newspapers that follow this editorial policy, which is obviously not receding.

Attitude towards the regional topics is continually negative, and far from being dependent only on the regular memorial manifestations in the vein of “Srebrenica” and “Oluja”. Even though the Serbian media, naturally, do not lead the foreign policy, they certainly have a significant influence on the formation of the public opinion and the public's expectations regarding the decision makers. It is interesting that the decreasing enthusiasm for the region is accompanied by the increase in judiciary, police force and crime related topics. Criminal acts and their perpetrators receive an undeservedly high publicity.

In such a constellation of topics and interests it is difficult to find personas that impress with their consistency and unrelenting morals and principals. Even if they do appear, most often they bear the burden of tendentious political interpretations. The journalists believe less and less in their work, since the appropriate response is lacking. Expiration date of sensational stories is getting shorter, even though it may seem like they are gaining in strength.

The fact that best characterizes the year 2016 is that one quarter of all published front page texts deals with various plots of local political scene, which are most often, either directly or indirectly, connected with endless electoral processes. Everything else is pushed aside, economy, culture, socially significant topics...even the elections that are going on around us, like those in America, inside the media discourse of Serbian daily newspapers take on only a single function: to be connected in some form with our incoming, future elections.

As in the previous seven calendar quarters, the same methodological apparatus was applied in the analysis of the empirical data. A single text was chosen for the subject of analysis. Analysis itself represents the combination of two research methods: (a) content analysis, which was guided by a „specific theoretical and hypothetical frame... creating an objective and systematic empirical collection of the social communication content, which enables the formation of relevant conclusions about the social context in which the communication takes part,”¹ and (b) a discourse analysis which enabled us to understand various, epistemologically and methodologically unmeasurable,² authors' interpretative strategies and editorial policies which reflect perceptions of different, primarily ideological and political, discourse realities, by analyzing their specific discourse meanings.

In the interpretative sense, in order to offer better coherence of the text, the analysis is, as in the previous reports, divided into two wholes which refer to: (a) analysis of quantitative indicators collected using content analysis, and (b) discourse analysis of the qualitative content excerpted from texts which were included in the research sample.

1 S. Gređelj, *S onu stranu ogledala* [On the other side of the mirror], Beograd: Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije, 1986, 19

2 G. Couvalis, *The Philosophy of Science*, London, Sage Publications, 1997.

2



Sample

ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN


SAMPLE

As stated in earlier publications, the basic idea of the project *Mediameter* is to try to reconstruct media reality of the dailies in Serbia, the way it can be defined considering the texts that are positioned (wholly or partially) on front pages, as various reflections of current political events and circumstances in both Serbia and the world. A sample of the dailies was composed considering two selection criteria – the largest circulation and reputation of the print media. Daily newspaper circulation data were taken from a research done by IPSOS.¹ The front page is the part of the dailies that the readers connect the most with the identity/recognition of a media outlet. It is often responsible for the first impression, our potential affection or repulsion formed about some printed media. The front page comes into contact not only with the readers of that particular paper, but also the people who will perhaps never touch that paper. Through newspaper and TV advertising and shop windows, the front page reaches a wider auditorium than that forming the readers of individual dailies. The front pages, hence form, in a certain way, the public image of the newspaper which symbolizes its editorial policy, evaluative orientation and targeting of certain audiences. On account of the above-mentioned reasons, the front pages of dailies from our sample were in the focus of analysis of the project *Mediameter*.

Texts from front pages reflect best the coordinates of editorial policies of daily print editions. Though this involves a small percentage of texts, editorial identity of a daily can be most easily identified through messages conveyed through front pages. The ratio of the total number of texts in each daily individually and the number of texts from the front pages that were included in the sample of our research are shown in the charts 1-7, for the period from 1st October to 31st December 2016.


¹ Research of the average scope of the daily print media was done for the period from May 3rd 2016 to June 30th 2016, population: total individuals

Chart 1 – *Večernje novosti*



Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2016

Chart 2 – *Informer*



Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2016

Chart 3 – *Alo!*




Chart 5 – *Politika*




Chart 4 – *Blic*




Chart 6 – *Danas*





Chart 7 – Kurir



The total number of analysed texts considering all seven media that are included in our research sample is 2251 and that number accounts for averagely 63.78% texts from front pages and for 4.02% of the total number of texts.

Table 1 – Večernje novosti

Media outlet <i>Večernje novosti</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
chronicle	74	20	54
society	78	59	19
politics	108	108	0
economics	53	47	6
current affairs	47	29	18
reportage	25	12	13
culture	18	11	7
interview	17	14	3
world	34	27	7
confession	1	1	0
sport	11	2	9
Belgrade News	19	1	18
supplement	51	1	50
reflector	8	1	7
show business	1	0	1
neighbours	1	1	0
jubilee	1	0	1
traffic law	1	1	0
real-life stories	1	0	1
region	0	0	0
feuilleton	1	0	1
action	0	0	0
confessions	0	0	0
second page	1	0	1
event	11	9	2
in memoriam	0	0	0
TOTAL	562	344	218

Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2016

Table 2 – *Informer*

Media outlet: <i>Informer</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
breaking news	178	177	1
news	113	63	50
showtime	67	2	65
entertainment	0	0	0
sport	39	2	37
TOTAL	397	244	153

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2016Table 3 – *Alo!*

Media outlet: <i>Alo!</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
current affairs	90	89	1
news	191	122	69
v.i.p	84	9	75
sport	27	2	25
world	3	2	1
series	1	0	1
action	4	2	2
TOTAL	400	226	174

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2016Table 4 – *Blic*

Media outlet: <i>Blic</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
series	5	2	3
interview	16	12	4
reportage	3	1	2
feuilleton	9	0	9
woman	2	0	2
society	145	67	78
supplement	26	0	26
phenomenon	3	0	3
chronicle	50	20	30
culture	21	9	12
politics	80	80	0
sport	50	2	48
real-life stories	6	0	6
world	23	19	4
topic of the day	103	97	6
topic of the week	2	1	1
in the focus	3	0	3
we explore	1	1	0
confession	1	1	0
entertainment	55	0	55
TOTAL	604	312	292

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2016

Table 5 – *Politika*

Media outlet: <i>Politika</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
world	49	42	7
society	35	20	15
economics	31	28	3
politics	15	15	0
event of the day	17	17	0
culture	25	12	13
chronicle	26	20	6
daily supplement	38	0	38
Belgrade	4	2	2
Serbia	28	20	8
readers' club	13	0	13
sport	9	1	8
topic of the week	2	0	2
personalities	2	1	1
region	7	6	1
front page	357	310	47
spectre	10	1	9
views	2	2	0
tonight in Belgrade	1	1	0
feuilleton	2	1	1
consumer	7	4	3
Belgrade events	1	1	0
child	1	0	1
colorful page	1	0	1
TOTAL	683	504	179

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2016Table 6 – *Danas*

Media outlet: <i>Danas</i> / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
business supplement	12	11	1
special supplement	27	4	23
Danas weekend	39	23	16
Event of the day	0	0	0
society	78	71	7
economics	52	50	2
globe	47	41	6
culture	37	13	24
interview	7	4	3
front page	67	65	2
health	3	1	2
politics	106	106	0
Novi Sad	1	1	0
Belgrade	2	2	0
scene	1	1	0
sport	21	3	18
topic	8	8	0
scales	3	2	1
TOTAL	511	406	105

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2016

Table 7 – Kurir


Media outlet: Kurir / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
news	31	31	0
chronicle	88	33	55
culture	5	1	4
topic of the day	35	31	4
planet	15	12	3
sport	7	2	5
stars	78	4	74
interview	7	7	0
politics	85	84	1
society	17	6	11
USA elections	4	4	0
Total	372	215	157

Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2016

By reviewing the presented tables 1-7, it is still noticeable that the structures of dailies follow two different logics. In other words, *Večernje novosti*, *Politika*, *Danas* and *Blic* follow the traditional structure of daily newspapers, while *Informer* and *Alo!* deviate from this matrix to a considerable extent, as in previous trimesters. The new development is that, since the middle of last quarter, *Kurir* has joined the ranks of newspapers mentioned above. In these three publications, *news* are the dominant section, uniting different areas,² and special attention is paid to entertaining content, like information about celebrities, then showbiz and sport, which increasingly gain social and political character. Editorial strategies that were established in the previous six editions of Mediameter are entirely visible in the fourth quarter of 2016, as it may be clearly seen in Charts 8-14.


² Since May 2016, *Kurir* features a new section titled *news*, which comprises all socio-political and economic issues, i. e. the existing sections *society*, *economy* and *politics* are combined into newly formed section. Although this sections remained visible, *Kurir* nonetheless abstains from clear sectoral division.

Chart 8 – Večernje novosti




Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2016


Chart 9 – Informer




Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2016

Chart 10 – *Alo!*


Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2016

Chart 11 – *Blic*


Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2016

Chart 12 – *Politika*

Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2016

Chart 13 – *Danas*

Source: Mediameter research, October - December 2016

Chart 14 – *Kurir*

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2016

If we compare the number of selected texts in the period January – March (1924)

April – June (2106), July – September (2012) and October – Decembar (2251) of 2016 with the same period of 2015, we can note an increase of 41.47% in the first quarter of 2016 compared to same period of 2015 (1360), regardless of the same number of non-working days (there was a triple issue printed to cover December 31 2015 and January 1 and 2 2016; double issues were printed for January 6 and 7 and for February 15 and 16 2016 as well); an increase of 25.89% in second quarter compared to the same period of 2015 (1673), and decrease of 7.95% in third trimester in comparison to same period of 2015 (2172), and repeated increase of number of selected texts in the fourth quarter of 2016 of 3.4% compared to fourth quarter of 2015. The total increase of selected texts in 2016 compared to 2015 of 12.34% could be explained by growing complexity of internal political relations, which is certainly caused by elections, i.e. preelection activities in the first and second quarters of 2016. Although there were less texts in the third quarter than in the same period of the previous year, the last quarter recorded an increase, which is due to several factors – forthcoming presidential elections in Serbia, the elections in the United States, developments in Montenegro, as well as numerous legal and investigative procedures that have occupied the front page of seven analyzed newspapers.

Number of selected texts by quarter

Time period	2015	2016
First quarter	1360	1924
Second quarter	1673	2106
Third quarter	2172	2012
Fourth quarter	2177	2251
Total	7382	8293

Source: *Mediameter* research, October - December 2016

Comparison of percentage of texts that are included in the sample survey, compared to the total number of texts in all analysed media in all four quarters of 2016

Media outlet	% of selected texts in 2016			
	IV quarter	III quarter	II quarter	I quarter
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	2.77	2.77	2.69	2.55
<i>Informer</i>	3.92	3.31	3.88	3.69
<i>Alo!</i>	3.86	2.53	3.13	2.83
<i>Blic</i>	3.14	2.74	2.43	1.99
<i>Politika</i>	5.50	5.15	4.70	3.91
<i>Danas</i>	7.23	5.95	5.72	5.49
<i>Kurir</i>	2.79	2.20	2.27	2.21


Source: *Mediameter* research January – March 2016, *Mediameter* April – June 2016, *Mediameter* July – September 2016 and *Mediameter* October - December 2016

Comparison of number of texts from front pages that were not included in sample in all media during four quarters of 2016

Media outlet	Texts from front pages that were not included in sample for 2016			
	IV quarter	III quarter	II quarter	I quarter
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	218	251	234	240
<i>Informer</i>	153	171	97	90
<i>Alo!</i>	174	162	141	205
<i>Blic</i>	292	242	160	214
<i>Politika</i>	179	224	175	187
<i>Danas</i>	105	121	97	109
<i>Kurir</i>	157	128	104	125
Total	1278	1299	1008	1170

Source: *Mediameter* research January – March 2016, *Mediameter* April – June 2016, *Mediameter* July – September 2016 and *Mediameter* October - December 2016

3



Research Results

ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN

RESEARCH RESULTS

The prominence of journalistic genres

In the last calendar quarter of 2016, the report is once again the most prominent journalistic form in the sample texts in all of the seven analyzed media, while the prominence of this journalistic form again being on the rise, this time taking up 71.79% or 1616 articles. The largest percentage of reports has again been recorded in *Informer* – 93.85%, while the smallest percentage of this genre is recorded in *Politika* – 61.31 %, which is almost identical to the findings of the previous quarter (*Informer* – 93.33%, *Politika* – 61.28%). The second most prominent form is the news article, making up a total 11.37% of written articles. The largest percentage of news articles is once more recorded in *Kurir*, 29.3%, while this time the daily newspaper *Alo!* had no articles belonging to this journalistic form. The third genre most prominent is the interview (8.35%), with the greatest number of articles belonging to this genre, have been published by *Danas* (58), and the least has been published by *Informer* (7 or 2.87%). The commentary is in the fourth place, by prominence, (5.06%), with the largest presence being in *Politika* (11.31%), while the newspapers *Kurir*, *Večernje novosti* and *Alo!* had no articles in this form. The presence of actual news on the front pages has decreased for each quarter so that only 2.4% or 54 analyzed texts were written in this form – the highest number appearing in *Blic* (5.13%), while the front pages of the *Kurir* had none. In the analyzed daily newspapers there were also 20 coverages, representing only 0.89% of articles found in the sample (see more in the tables). In relation to the previous two quarters, the order of how prominent each genre is, has remained unchanged in the fourth quarter.

Individual prominence of genres in the seven sampled media

Genre	Total number	%
report	1616	71.79
News article	256	11.37
interview	188	8.35
commentary	114	5.06
News	54	2.40
coverage	20	0.89
other forms	3	0.13
Total	2251	100.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of journalistic forms in the sample texts, according to the media

Genre	<i>Blic</i>	<i>Kurir</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	<i>Alo!</i>	<i>Informer</i>	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Danas</i>	Total
Report	246	137	221	209	229	309	265	1616
article	3	63	85	0	3	72	30	256
interview	27	13	25	9	7	49	58	188
commentary	17	0	0	0	1	57	39	114
news	16	0	6	8	4	9	11	54
coverage	0	2	7	0	0	8	3	20
other forms	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Total	312	215	344	226	244	504	406	2251

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Prominence of journalistic forms in the sample texts, according to the media

Genre %	<i>Blic</i>	<i>Kurir</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	<i>Alo!</i>	<i>Informer</i>	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Danas</i>	Total
report	78.85	63.72	64.24	92.48	93.85	61.31	65.27	71.79
article	0.96	29.30	24.71	0.00	1.23	14.29	7.39	11.37
interview	8.65	6.05	7.27	3.98	2.87	9.72	14.29	8.35
commentary	5.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.41	11.31	9.61	5.06
news	5.13	0.00	1.74	3.54	1.64	1.79	2.71	2.40
coverage	0.00	0.93	2.03	0.00	0.00	1.59	0.74	0.89
other forms	0.96	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.13
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

If we compare the research results from all of the four quarters, we can see that, apart from the first quarter of 2016, when the prominence of the report in relation to the other journalistic forms was 63.31%, the prominence of the report is around and above 70%. The prominence of articles, interviews, and commentaries is, with a few exceptions, mostly similar, but, on the other hand, the presence of the news on the front pages has receded drastically – from 12.72 % in the first quarter of 2015,¹ all the way down to 2.4% in the fourth calendar quarter of 2016 (additional information on the number and the percentage of the prominence of reports, news, news articles, interviews and commentaries in the previous quarters can be found in the following tables).

The prominence of report in relation to the total number of articles and the total number of reports in the sample texts according to the quarters

Genre - report	IV quarter	III quarter	II quarter	I quarter
%	71.79	69.18	73.6	63.31
total	1616	1392	1550	1218

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

¹ The prominence of the news genre in 2015: I quarter- 12.72%, II – quarter 11.89%, III – quarter 8.7%, IV – quarter 6.25%.

The prominence of news in relation to the total number of articles and the total number of news in the sample articles by each quarter

Genre - news	IV quarter	III quarter	II quarter	I quarter
%	2.40	3.23	3.04	5.98
total	54	65	64	115

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

The prominence of news articles in relation to the total number of texts and the total number of articles in the sample articles by each quarter

Genre – news article	IV quarter	III quarter	II quarter	I quarter
%	11.37	12.28	8.88	11.49
total	256	247	187	221

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

The prominence of interviews in relation to the total number of texts and the total number of interviews in the sample articles by each quarter

Genre - interview	IV quarter	III quarter	II quarter	I quarter
%	8.35	7.46	7.45	8.52
total	188	150	157	164

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

The prominence of commentaries in relation to the total number of articles and the total number of commentaries in the sample articles by each quarter

Genre - commentary	IV quarter	III quarter	II quarter	I quarter
%	5.06	6.31	4.89	8.21
total	114	127	103	158

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Topics

In order for each article to be defined as clearly as possible, the selected writings that make up the sample are classified under a single topic, but nevertheless, all relevant elements present in these articles have been accounted for. This gave us a clearer insight into the manner of how the news is provided and into the approach of the media to certain topics in the previous issues of the *Mediameter* too. In all of the research so far we have been selecting the topics with special significance, and in the fourth quarter of 2016, we kept track of writings relating to the upcoming presidential elections (topic: *political scene in Serbia*, element: *presidential elections*) and the events in Montenegro, following the topic that the media most often called as *The Attempted Coup in Montenegro* (topic: *political scene in Montenegro*, element: *The Attempted Coup in Montenegro*). Articles covering local crime news, having social and political significance, as well as the writings relating to the murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović, were again included into the sample, as an example of the paradigm of the state of Serbian journalism, which is marked by various kinds of disrespect for the ethical principles of reporting.

Topic Prominence

In the period of October – December 2016, political topics once again took up the larger part of front page space of the daily newspapers in the sample. Apart from the *political scene in Serbia*, which is present in as much as 516 or 22.92% of all articles, political topics also include *activities of the Government of Serbia*, *activities of the Prime Minister* and *activities of the President of Serbia*. These four topics are present in 26.12% of total articles, which is the same result found in the third quarter. Events relating to the region are, as in the previous quarters, very prominent on the front pages of the analyzed media. This topic is present in 5.46% or 123 published articles, which is less than half of the presence found in the previous quarter. However, the character of those articles remains the same – predominantly negative (59.35% of articles have a negative connotation). In relation to the previous quarter, there is a significant rise in the number of articles writing about the activities of judiciary institutions, present on 104 front pages (4.62%), and the number of these texts is on the rise from one quarter to the next. Most of the media shows interest in agricultural topics, which are at the fourth place by presence in the sample articles, with a prominence of 4.44% (100 articles), which is a bit less when compared to the third quarter of 2016. The topics of interest that follow the previous ones in the seven analyzed daily newspapers are *international relations* and *Russia/attitude towards Russia*, with the presence of 4.31% or 97 articles, followed by elections in the USA (4.09% or 92 articles) and *police* (89 – 3.95%). *The economy* is more present than in the previous quarters, with a presence of 70 front page articles (3.11%), while the topic of *Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština* has a numerical presence of 65 or 2.89% articles. In the fourth quarter, the violent clashes between the football gangs, the arrests and criminal persecution of criminal elements and similar topics take up more space on the front pages, and if we add to that the texts relating to the murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović (51 or 2.27% of the articles), these kinds of topics represent nearly 11% of all the sampled writing.²

If we look at the value contexts in the 2251 selected articles in the fourth quarter of 2016, 38.16% of writings were given value connotations – 32.34% negative and 5.82% positive. Of all the mentioned topics, the highest number of negative articles were written about regional relations – 59.35%, and the relations between Belgrade and Priština were evaluated as being written in the same negative manner

² Texts from the crime section were sampled only if deemed socially and politically significant (like the murders of the leaders of the football fan gangs, discovery of weapons in Jajinci, and such).

(52.31%), with the difference being that 5.46% of articles about regional relations were written with a positive connotation, while, when writing about Kosovo, the context is negative or neutral. Concerning the topic of *industry*, 49% of the articles had a value context (41% negative, 8% positive). A little more than the third of the articles with negative context dealt with the *political scene in Serbia* (35.47%) and judiciary topics (37.5%), while between 20% and 30% of articles with negative connotations wrote about *international relations*, *police* and *economy*. A considerably different approach can be seen when most of the media wrote articles about the relations between Serbia and Russia, or topics dealing with Russia in general, where a third (34.02%) or 33 articles have a positive connotation.

Topic distribution and their value context in the seven sampled media³

Topic	Value context in relation to topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	516	22.92	2	0.39	331	64.15	183	35.47
regional cooperation/regional relations	123	5.46	6	4.88	44	35.77	73	59.35
judiciary topics	104	4.62	0	0.00	65	62.50	39	37.50
industry	100	4.44	8	8.00	51	51.00	41	41.00
international relations	97	4.31	3	3.09	68	70.10	26	26.80
Russia/attitude towards Russia	97	4.31	33	34.02	55	56.70	9	9.28
elections in the USA	92	4.09	9	9.78	70	76.09	13	14.13
police	89	3.95	1	1.12	63	70.79	25	28.09
economy	70	3.11	6	8.57	49	70.00	15	21.43
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	65	2.89	0	0.00	31	47.69	34	52.31

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

³ All of the tables show ten of the most prominent topics.

Value context in relation to all the topics and all the seven sampled media

Total	number	%
positive	131	5.82
neutral	1392	61.84
negative	728	32.34
Total	2251	100.0

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

During the whole of 2016 (in the presented sample of 8239 articles), political topics were the most prominent – *political scene in Serbia* and the 2016 *elections*, that together made up more than a quarter of the sample (26.96% or 2236 articles). Turbulent events in the region were covered in 6 or 7.33%, while the *industry* was the dominant topic in 448 or 5.4% of the writings.

Topic distribution and their value context in the seven sampled media for all four quarters in 2016⁴

	Value context in relation to topic							
All media	total		positive		neutral		negative	
Topic	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	1551	18.70	16	1.03	987	63.64	548	35.33
2016 Elections	685	8.26	7	1.02	573	83.65	105	15.33
regional coop- eration/regional relations	608	7.33	17	2.80	241	39.64	350	57.57
industry	448	5.40	35	7.81	254	56.70	159	35.49
international relations	342	4.12	10	2.92	250	73.10	82	23.98

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

As it was already pointed out, in the fourth quarter we paid special attention to the topic *political scene in Serbia* in our analysis, if the element *presidential elections* was present. A total of 4 articles were published that spoke about the presidential elections, or nearly 40% of the article with a political context contained this element. Most of these texts were found in *Danas* and *Kurir* – 36 each or 17.65%, followed by *Blic* and *Informer* (31 articles each – 15.2%), *Alo!* with 29 (14.22%), *Večernje novosti* – 23 (11.27%), while *Politika* afforded the least amount of space to this topic with 18 or 8.82 written articles, which, among other things, wrote about the presidential elections in Serbia. The character of these articles shows a dramatic departure only in *Informer*, where 83.87 of writings has a negative connotation. A smaller number of negative texts is evidenced in *Politika* (22.22%) and *Kurir* (19.44%), while the rest of

⁴ The table shows five of the most prominent topics.

the media wrote about this topic from a neutral standpoint in more than 90% of writings. Texts with positive connotations were not present on the front pages.

The prominence and value context for the topic *political scene in Serbia*, if the element *presidential elections* is present, for the seven sampled media

Political scene in Serbia/presidential elections	Value context in relation to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
<i>Danas</i>	36	17.65	0	0.00	35	97.22	1	2.78
<i>Kurir</i>	36	17.65	0	0.00	29	80.56	7	19.44
<i>Informer</i>	31	15.20	0	0.00	5	16.13	26	83.87
<i>Blic</i>	31	15.20	0	0.00	30	96.77	1	3.23
<i>Alo!</i>	29	14.22	0	0.00	28	96.55	1	3.45
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	23	11.27	0	0.00	22	95.65	1	4.35
<i>Politika</i>	18	8.82	0	0.00	14	77.78	4	22.22
Total	204	100.0	0	0.00	163	79.90	41	20.10

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Even though the articles writing about the *attempted coup in Montenegro* were relatively few in number (31), a completely different approaches of the media towards this topic was evidenced. The daily newspaper *Informer* took a negative standpoint in relation to the Montenegro Government, and showed understanding for the arrested Serbian citizens (all of the texts had a negative connotation towards the Montenegrin officials), with *Večernje novosti* and *Alo!* (66.67% texts with negative connotation), *Kurir* (50%) and *Blic* (40%) adopting a similar position. On the other hand, the daily newspapers *Danas* and *Politika* did not express editorial staff attitudes in relation to this topic.

The prominence and value context for the topic *political scene in Montenegro*, if the element *attempt of coup in Montenegro* is present, for the seven sampled media

Political scene in Montenegro/attempt of coup in Montenegro	Value context in relation to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	9	29.03	0	0.00	3	33.33	6	66.67
<i>Danas</i>	5	16.13	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
<i>Blic</i>	5	16.13	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
<i>Informer</i>	4	12.90	0	0.00	0	0.00	4	100.00
<i>Kurir</i>	4	12.90	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
<i>Alo!</i>	3	9.68	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
<i>Politika</i>	1	3.23	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	31	100.0	0	0.00	15	48.39	16	51.61

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

If we take a look at the attitude of the media towards the foreign policy of Serbia, and especially in relation to Russia and the European Union, topics in connection with Russia are significantly more prominent (97 or 4.31% versus 57 or 2.53%). However, the manner in which the media treats these topics is completely different even in the last quarter of 2016. Only in the media published by *Ringier Axel Springer (Blic, Alo!)* can articles critically discussing the topic *Russia/attitude towards Russia* be found (3 or 50%, and 6 or 40% respectively), while all of the other media write neutrally (*Danas*) or positively, with the following distribution: *Kurir* – 55.56%, *Informer* 52.17%, *Večernje novosti* 41.18% and *Politika* 39.13%. Most of the articles published about the EU in *Politika* (15 out of 28 or 53.37%), three articles apiece in *Večernje novosti* and *Informer*, and one text apiece in *Kuriru* and *Alo!* also carry a negative tone. Only two positive texts were written on the EU – one apiece in *Danas* and *Politika*.


Value context and the number of articles on the topics *Russia/attitude towards Russia* and *the EU/relations with the European Union*, according to the media

Media/topic	Value context in relation to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
<i>Blic</i>								
The EU/ Politics of the European Union	1	0.32	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Russia/attitude towards Russia	6	1.92	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
<i>Kurir</i>								
Russia/attitude towards Russia	9	4.19	5	55.56	4	44.44	0	0.00
The EU/ Politics of the European Union	2	0.93	0	0.00	1	50.00	1	50.00

<i>Večernje novosti</i>								
Russia/attitude towards Russia	17	4.94	7	41.18	10	58.82	0	0.00
The EU/ Politics of the European Union	12	3.49	0	0.00	9	75.00	3	25.00
<i>Alo!</i>								
Russia/attitude towards Russia	15	6.64	0	0.00	9	60.00	6	40.00
The EU/ Politics of the European Union	1	0.44	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	100.00
<i>Informer</i>								
Russia/attitude towards Russia	23	9.43	12	52.17	11	47.83	0	0.00
The EU/ Politics of the European Union	5	2.05	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
<i>Politika</i>								
Russia/attitude towards Russia	23	4.56	9	39.13	14	60.87	0	0.00
The EU/ Politics of the European Union	28	5.56	1	3.57	12	42.86	15	53.57
<i>Danas</i>								
Russia/attitude towards Russia	4	0.99	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
The EU/ Politics of the European Union	8	1.97	1	12.50	7	87.50	0	0.00
All media								
Russia/attitude towards Russia	97	4.31	33	34.02	55	56.70	9	9.28
The EU/ Politics of the European Union	57	2.53	2	3.51	32	56.14	23	40.35

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Graph – Value context in all of the sampled media in relation to the topics of *Russia/attitude towards Russia* and *the EU/the politics of the European Union*



Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution according to the media

BlicDistribution of topics and their value context in the newspaper *Blic*

Blic	Value context in relation to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	86	27.56	0	0.00	64	74.42	22	25.58
judiciary topics	24	7.69	0	0.00	12	50.00	12	50.00
elections in the USA	20	6.41	0	0.00	17	85.00	3	15.00
industry	19	6.09	0	0.00	10	52.63	9	47.37
activities of the Government of the Republic of Serbia	16	5.13	0	0.00	10	62.50	6	37.50
police	16	5.13	0	0.00	8	50.00	8	50.00
economy	15	4.81	0	0.00	13	86.67	2	13.33
regional cooperation/ regional relations	9	2.88	0	0.00	6	66.67	3	33.33
international relations	9	2.88	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	8	2.56	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
crime	8	2.56	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
political scene in Montenegro	8	2.56	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016Value context in relation to all of the topics in the newspaper *Blic*

Blic	number	%
positive	2	0.64
neutral	232	74.36
negative	78	25.00
Total	312	100.0

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016**Kurir**Distribution of topics and their value context in the newspaper *Kurir*

Kurir	Value context in relation to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	83	38.60	0	0.00	36	43.37	47	56.63
murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	20	9.30	0	0.00	7	35.00	13	65.00
police	17	7.91	0	0.00	7	41.18	10	58.82
crime	10	4.65	0	0.00	1	10.00	9	90.00
Russia/attitude towards Russia	9	4.19	5	55.56	4	44.44	0	0.00
elections in the USA	8	3.72	3	37.50	5	62.50	0	0.00
judiciary topics	6	2.79	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
entertainment/celebrity news	5	2.33	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
health institutions	5	2.33	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
political scene in Montenegro	5	2.33	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
terrorism and the Islamic State	5	2.33	0	0.00	0	0.00	5	100.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016Value context in relation to all of the topics in the newspaper *Kurir*

Kurir	number	%
positive	9	4.19
neutral	86	40.00
negative	120	55.81
Total	215	100.0

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

InformerDistribution of topics and their value context in the newspaper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	Value context in relation to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	63	25.82	2	3.17	14	22.22	47	74.60
Russia/attitude towards Russia	23	9.43	12	52.17	11	47.83	0	0.00
regional cooperation/regional relations	22	9.02	0	0.00	2	9.09	20	90.91
international relations	22	9.02	1	4.55	8	36.36	13	59.09
murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	14	5.74	0	0.00	11	78.57	3	21.43
police	9	3.69	1	11.11	5	55.56	3	33.33
the USA/relations with the USA	8	3.28	2	25.00	2	25.00	4	50.00
army	7	2.87	4	57.14	3	42.86	0	0.00
media/freedom of the media	7	2.87	0	0.00	0	0.00	7	100.00
NATO / NATO integrations	7	2.87	1	14.29	0	0.00	6	85.71

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016Value context in relation to all of the topics in the newspaper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	number	%
positive	29	11.89
neutral	78	31.97
negative	137	56.14
Total	244	100.0

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016**Alo!**Distribution of topics and their value context in the newspaper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	Value context in relation to the topic							
	Total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	84	37.17	0	0.00	60	71.43	24	28.57
Russia/attitude towards Russia	15	6.64	0	0.00	9	60.00	6	40.00
regional cooperation/regional relations	12	5.31	0	0.00	2	16.67	10	83.33
murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	11	4.87	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
crime	10	4.42	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
judiciary topics	7	3.10	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
issues of faith, church and religion	7	3.10	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
elections in the USA	7	3.10	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
social issues/social policies	6	2.65	1	16.67	4	66.67	1	16.67
police	6	2.65	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
political scene in Montenegro	6	2.65	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016Value context in relation to all of the topics in the newspaper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	number	%
positive	2	0.88
neutral	161	71.24
negative	63	27.88
Total	226	100.0

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

PolitikaDistribution of topics and their value context in the newspaper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	Value context in relation to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	47	9.33	0	0.00	32	68.09	15	31.91
judiciary topics	35	6.94	0	0.00	21	60.00	14	40.00
elections in the USA	34	6.75	2	5.88	22	64.71	10	29.41
industry	31	6.15	4	12.90	12	38.71	15	48.39
The EU/ Politics of the European Union	28	5.56	1	3.57	12	42.86	15	53.57
international relations	28	5.56	2	7.14	18	64.29	8	28.57
economy	27	5.36	4	14.81	18	66.67	5	18.52
regional cooperation/ regional relations	24	4.76	4	16.67	11	45.83	9	37.50
Russia/attitude towards Russia	23	4.56	9	39.13	14	60.87	0	0.00
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	22	4.37	0	0.00	7	31.82	15	68.18

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016Value context in relation to all of the topics in the newspaper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	number	%
positive	51	10.12
neutral	290	57.54
negative	163	32.34
Total	504	100.0

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016**Večernje novosti**Distribution of topics and their value context in the newspaper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	Value context in relation to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	34	9.88	0	0.00	31	91.18	3	8.82
regional cooperation/ regional relations	34	9.88	2	5.88	6	17.65	26	76.47
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	17	4.94	0	0.00	6	35.29	11	64.71
Russia/attitude towards Russia	17	4.94	7	41.18	10	58.82	0	0.00
police	16	4.65	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
judiciary topics	15	4.36	0	0.00	13	86.67	2	13.33
infrastructure	14	4.07	1	7.14	12	85.71	1	7.14
industry	12	3.49	3	25.00	8	66.67	1	8.33
The EU/ Politics of the European Union	12	3.49	0	0.00	9	75.00	3	25.00
international relations	12	3.49	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
issues of faith, church and religion	12	3.49	3	25.00	9	75.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016Value context in relation to all of the topics in the newspaper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	number	%
positive	36	10.47
neutral	218	63.37
negative	90	26.16
Total	344	100.0

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Danas

Distribution of topics and their value context in the newspaper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	Value context in relation to the topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	119	29.31	0	0.00	94	78.99	25	21.01
industry	30	7.39	1	3.33	19	63.33	10	33.33
media/freedom of the media	23	5.67	0	0.00	14	60.87	9	39.13
regional cooperation/regional relations	19	4.68	0	0.00	16	84.21	3	15.79
economy	18	4.43	0	0.00	12	66.67	6	33.33
international relations	17	4.19	0	0.00	15	88.24	2	11.76
culture	14	3.45	0	0.00	12	85.71	2	14.29
activities of the Government of the Republic of Serbia	13	3.20	0	0.00	7	53.85	6	46.15
judiciary topics	13	3.20	0	0.00	9	69.23	4	30.77
fulfillment of the demands/standards for the integration into the EU	13	3.20	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Value context in relation to all of the topics in the newspaper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	number	%
positive	2	0.49
neutral	327	80.54
negative	77	18.97
Total	406	100.0

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Balance

When we take into consideration all of the sampled articles for the period of October – December 2016, it is noticeable that most of the prominent topics were not comprehensively analyzed, evidenced by the fact that balance is present in only 20.97% of total writings, being almost identical to the results from the previous quarter (20.43%). The articles with the least amount of balance have been found in the newspaper *Informer*, 3.28% or 8 out of 244 articles, with a similar result found in *Kurir*, where 6.98% or 15 out of 215 articles are balanced. The newspaper *Politika* has 5% fewer balanced articles in the fourth quarter, so that in this newspaper only 17.26% or 87 articles are unbiased. These are followed by *Alo!* with 78.32% of unbalanced articles, *Blic* (73.08%), *Večernje novosti* (71.8%), while the largest number of balanced articles has been found in *Danas*, 32.51%, which is still a very small percentage of unbiased articles.

Even though the value context is not present in 61.84% of the total articles, when making an overview of the actual state of the sampled media, we should certainly consider the fact that the majority of the front page articles that were analyzed are not objective, and that such a one-sided approach paints a clear picture of the general state of the media in Serbian.

If we look at the results concerning the text balance for the whole of 2016, it can be concluded that, in general, the reporting approach in all of the seven analyzed media is not comprehensive – only 22.8% is balanced. This is particularly present in the newspapers *Informer* and *Kurir* (4.51% and 7.66%, respectively, of objective texts), while a bit larger number of objective articles can be seen in the newspaper *Danas* – 32.51%.

Balanced texts, ultimately, necessarily demonstrate a certain degree of restraint, which, obviously, is not a notion widely spread in Serbian journalism. Taking sides, which can be quite passionate, attracts readership, but reduces relevance. The emphasis is on reacting quickly, quite the opposite of the detailed and rational presentation of information which demands research, a great number of interviewees and reliable and traceable data, with accessible information sources. This tendency quickly increases circulation and popularity, but it does not increase respectability.

Balance in relation to all of the topics and all the seven sampled media

Balance	yes		no	
media	number	%	number	%
<i>Informer</i>	8	3.28	236	96.72
<i>Kurir</i>	15	6.98	200	93.02
<i>Politika</i>	87	17.26	417	82.74
<i>Alo!</i>	49	21.68	177	78.32
<i>Blic</i>	84	26.92	228	73.08
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	97	28.20	247	71.80
<i>Danas</i>	132	32.51	274	67.49
Total	472	20.97	1779	79.03

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Balance in relation to all of the topics and all the seven sampled media for all of the four calendar quarters in 2016

Balance media	yes		no	
	number	%	number	%
<i>Informer</i>	42	4.51	890	95.49
<i>Kurir</i>	57	7.66	687	92.34
<i>Alo!</i>	186	21.83	666	78.17
<i>Politika</i>	433	23.04	1446	76.96
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	343	27.11	922	72.89
<i>Blic</i>	292	28.00	751	72.00
<i>Danas</i>	538	34.09	1040	65.91
Total	1891	22.80	6402	77.20

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Actors

Serbian media, at least according to the analysis of the empirical material collected from the front pages, primarily focus on the political events in Serbia. As much as 50.21% of the total number of actors mentioned in the sampled texts from the front pages consists of (individual and collective) political actors keeping various political functions in the Serbian political scene. If we add articles that write about foreign political actors to this number, the percentage of the presence of political actors on the front pages rises to 75.82%. The second group according to the frequency of appearance are various social actors that make up 16.48% of our sample. Industry and economic actors appear as front page protagonists only in 3.58% (see the following table).

The total distribution of actors that appear in the texts sampled for the research (expressed in absolute numbers)

Actors					
Political actors	10076	Domestic	6672	Individual	4985
				Collective	1687
		Foreign	3406	Individual	2748
				Collective	658
Industry/economical actors	476	Domestic	445	Individual	159
				Collective	286
		Foreign	31	Individual	10
				Collective	21

Other social actors	2191	Domestic	2179	Individual	1871
				Collective	308
		Foreign	12	Individual	8
				Collective	4
Unnamed source					546
Total					13289

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual political actors from the **Government of the Republic of Serbia and the President of the Republic of Serbia**

The Government and the President of the Republic of Serbia	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandar Vučić	782	37.65	16	2.05	737	94.25	29	3.71
Tomislav Nikolić	316	15.21	0	0.00	291	92.09	25	7.91
Ivica Dačić	246	11.84	1	0.41	230	93.50	15	6.10
Nebojša Stefanović	159	7.66	0	0.00	156	98.11	3	1.89
Aleksandar Vulin	112	5.39	0	0.00	104	92.86	8	7.14
Zorana Mihajlović	96	4.62	0	0.00	92	95.83	4	4.17
Rasim Ljajić	63	3.03	0	0.00	61	96.83	2	3.17
Zoran Đorđević	42	2.02	0	0.00	42	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Vujović	31	1.49	0	0.00	31	100.00	0	0.00
Zlatibor Lončar	28	1.35	0	0.00	28	100.00	0	0.00
Mladen Šarčević	27	1.30	0	0.00	27	100.00	0	0.00
Slavica Đukić Dejanović	27	1.30	0	0.00	26	96.30	1	3.70
Aleksandar Antić	25	1.20	0	0.00	25	100.00	0	0.00
Ana Brnabić	24	1.16	1	4.17	23	95.83	0	0.00
Nela Kuburović	22	1.06	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0
Jadranka Joksimović	21	1.01	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Knežević	18	0.87	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Vladan Vukosavljević	17	0.82	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Branislav Nedimović	12	0.58	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00

Vanja Udovičić	6	0.29	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0
Milan Krkobabić	3	0.14	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Total	2077	100.00	18	0.87	1971	94.90	88	4.23

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Same as in the previous quarter, the most prominent actor on the front pages of the daily newspapers in Serbia was the Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić, towards whom the media from our sample was mostly neutral (in 94.25% of cases). He also appears in 2.05% (16) positive and 3.71% (29) negative articles. The Prime Minister appears as the protagonist of 782 front page articles, which is considerably more than the second-ranked actor, the President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić, who appears in a total of 316 articles, and the third-ranked actor, the Foreign Affairs Minister Ivica Dačić, is present in only 246 articles. The highest frequency of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić, expressed in absolute numbers, is evidenced in the newspapers *Danas* (170), *Politika* (137) and *Večernje novosti* (119). Expressed in relative numbers of the percentage share of articles in which he appears as an actor, with relation to the total number of selected articles from the same individual newspaper, we can see that he is the most prominent actor in *Danas* (41.87%), followed by *Kurir* (39.53%) and *Alo!* (37.17%). The smallest share of articles which have the Prime Minister of the Serbian Government as an actor is found in the newspaper *Politika* (27.18%).

When we are talking about the value context, the biggest share, as well as the number of negative articles, is again evidenced in *Danas* (13.53% or 23 writings). Apart from this newspaper, articles with a negative connotation have been also found in *Blic* (5.88% or 6 texts). The largest number of articles with positive connotations were published in the newspaper *Informer* – 7.06% or 6 texts, followed by *Politika* (4), *Večernje novosti* (2), *Alo!* (2) and *Kurir* (2).

Aleksandar Vučić: Value context in relation to the media

Aleksandar Vučić	positive		neutral		negative		total	
media	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
<i>Blic</i>	0	0.00	96	94.12	6	5.88	102	13.04
<i>Kurir</i>	2	2.35	83	97.65	0	0.00	85	10.87
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	2	1.68	117	98.32	0	0.00	119	15.22
<i>Alo!</i>	2	2.38	82	97.62	0	0.00	84	10.74
<i>Informer</i>	6	7.06	79	92.94	0	0.00	85	10.87
<i>Politika</i>	4	2.92	133	97.08	0	0.00	137	17.52
<i>Danas</i>	0	0.00	147	86.47	23	13.53	170	21.74
Total	16	2.05	737	94.25	29	3.71	782	100.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Number of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić in relation to the total number of articles in individual daily newspapers

Aleksandar Vučić according to the media	number of appearances	total number of texts	% share in relation to the total number of texts
<i>Danas</i>	170	406	41.87
<i>Kurir</i>	85	215	39.53
<i>Alo!</i>	84	226	37.17
<i>Informer</i>	85	244	34.84
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	119	344	34.59
<i>Blic</i>	102	312	32.69
<i>Politika</i>	137	504	27.18
Total	782	2251	34.74

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

The President of the Republic of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić, protagonist of 316 (15.21%) analyzed articles, is in the second place according to the frequency of appearance of the individual political actors on the Serbian political scene.

The largest number of articles in which the President of Serbia appears as an actor have been published in the newspapers *Večernje novosti* and *Politika* (58 each), but the biggest share in relation to the total number of articles in the individual media is in *Kurir* – 21.86%. The largest number of articles with a negative connotation towards Tomislav Nikolić have been found in the newspaper *Blic* (12 texts), followed by *Alo!* (6), *Danas* (5) and *Politika* (2), which represents the share of 23.53% (*Blic*), 19.35% (*Alo!*), 8.77% (*Danas*) and 3.45% (*Politika*) of negative writings. In this quarter, same as in the previous one, there was not a single published positive text on the current President of Serbia.

The remaining actors from this group are in almost 95% of the texts represented in a neutral value context. Apart from the President and the Prime Minister, a little bit higher number of texts with a negative connotation concerns Ivica Dačić – 15⁵ and Aleksandar Vulin (8 texts with a negative connotation).

Number of appearances of Tomislav Nikolić in relation to the total number of articles in individual daily newspapers

Tomislav Nikolić according to the media	number of appearances	total number of texts	% share in relation to the total number of texts
<i>Kurir</i>	47	215	21.86
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	58	344	16.86
<i>Blic</i>	51	312	16.35

5 Compared to 21 text with a negative connotation in the previous, third calendar quarter of 2016, and 35 texts with a negative connotation in the second calendar quarter.

<i>Danas</i>	57	406	14.04
<i>Alo!</i>	31	226	13.72
<i>Politika</i>	58	504	11.51
<i>Informer</i>	14	244	5.74
Total	316	2251	14.04

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Tomislav Nikolić: Value context in relation to the media

Tomislav Nikolić	positive		neutral		negative		total	
media	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
<i>Blic</i>	0	0.00	39	76.47	12	23.53	51	16.14
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0.00	47	100.00	0	0.00	47	14.87
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0	0.00	58	100.00	0	0.00	58	18.35
<i>Alo!</i>	0	0.00	25	80.65	6	19.35	31	9.81
<i>Informer</i>	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00	14	4.43
<i>Politika</i>	0	0.00	56	96.55	2	3.45	58	18.35
<i>Danas</i>	0	0.00	52	91.23	5	8.77	57	18.04
Total	0	0.00	291	92.09	25	7.91	316	100.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

If we look at all of the articles that make up the sample of our research (8239), the greatest presence and the number of the front page articles, when considering the group *the Government and the President of the Republic of Serbia*, belong to Aleksandar Vučić (2747 or 33.12% of the total number of sampled texts). There are a total 114 (4.15%) of negative and 79 (2.88%) positive writings. With the second-ranked actor, Ivica Dačić (958 or 11.55%), there is a slightly larger share of articles with a negative connotation (10.33% - 99), while the current President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić is present in 940 of articles (11.33%), 82 of which are negative. Dačić and Nikolić are each also presented in a positive context in 3 articles. Out of five of the most prominent actors, the greatest share of negative articles concerns Zorana Mihajlović – 12.97%.

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of the five most prominent individual political actors from **the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the President of the Republic of Serbia** in all of the four calendar quarters of 2016

The Government of Serbia and the President of Serbia – all media, I-IV quarter	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandar Vučić	2747	33.12	79	2.88	2554	92.97	114	4.15
Ivica Dačić	958	11.55	3	0.31	856	89.35	99	10.33
Tomislav Nikolić	940	11.33	3	0.32	855	90.96	82	8.72
Nebojša Stefanović	476	5.74	1	0.21	453	95.17	22	4.62
Zorana Mihajlović	370	4.46	0	0.00	322	87.03	48	12.97

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

After the calm period following the turbulent electoral campaign and elections which marked the first half of 2016, in the third quarter of that year we saw the return of the number of appearances of actors from the opposition to the frequencies that were found during 2015. However, in the fourth quarter of 2016 again we see the rise in the number of actors belonging to the opposition, caused by the upcoming presidential elections. Compared to the last quarter of the previous year, the number of appearances of actors belonging to the opposition in the first and second quarter of 2016 was two times higher (1428 in the first and 1552 in the second quarter of 2016, compared to 762 in the last quarter of 2015). In the third quarter of 2016, we marked 792 appearances, which is the baseline presence of this kind of actors on the front pages. In the fourth quarter, there are 1225 appearances of opposition actors. In this quarter the most prominent leaders are Vojislav Šešelj and Boris Tadić, with a presence of 12.73% and 8.41% respectively, while Vuk Jeremić⁶ was present in 12.16% of articles. The highest number of negative articles was written on Vuk Jeremić (36 – 24.16%), Vojislav Šešelj (9 – 5.77%) and Dragan Šutanovac (8 – 9.41%). Not a single positive text was written about the opposition representatives during the fourth quarter of 2016.

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual political actors from **the opposition**

Opposition – individually	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Vojislav Šešelj	156	12.73	0	0.00	147	94.23	9	5.77
Vuk Jeremić	149	12.16	0	0.00	113	75.84	36	24.16
Boris Tadić	103	8.41	0	0.00	99	96.12	4	3.88
Dragan Šutanovac	85	6.94	0	0.00	77	90.59	8	9.41
Čedomir Jovanović	80	6.53	0	0.00	78	97.50	2	2.50
Boško Obradović	75	6.12	0	0.00	71	94.67	4	5.33
Saša Radulović	66	5.39	0	0.00	61	92.42	5	7.58

⁶ Even though Vuk Jeremić is not a member of any political party, he has been included in this group of actors as then (in the fourth quarter) potential, and as of January 15th 2017 officially confirmed presidential candidate, representing a different political platform compared to the ruling coalition.

Zoran Živković	54	4.41	0	0.00	53	98.15	1	1.85
Sanda Rašković Ivić	35	2.86	0	0.00	31	88.57	4	11.43
Dijana Vukomanović ¹	26	2.12	0	0.00	25	96.15	1	3.85
Đorđe Vukadinović	19	1.55	0	0.00	18	94.74	1	5.26
Nenad Čanak	18	1.47	0	0.00	15	83.33	3	16.67
Balša Božović	17	1.39	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Vjerica Radeta	17	1.39	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Nemanja Šarović	16	1.31	0	0.00	15	93.75	1	6.25
Bojan Pajtić	16	1.31	0	0.00	12	75.00	4	25.00
Borko Stefanović	13	1.06	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Đurišić	12	0.98	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Sulejman Ugljanin	12	0.98	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Miroslava Milenović	11	0.90	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Goran Ješić	10	0.82	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Marinika Tepić	10	0.82	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Radoslav Milojević Kena	10	0.82	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Aleksandra Jerkov	9	0.73	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Gordana Čomić	9	0.73	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Miloš Jovanović	9	0.73	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Dejan Nikolić	8	0.65	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Dragoljub Mićunović	7	0.57	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Jovo Ostojić	7	0.57	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Tatjana Macura	7	0.57	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Žarko Korać	7	0.57	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Božić	6	0.49	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
Vesna Rakić Vodinelić	6	0.49	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Petrović	5	0.41	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Goran Ćirić	5	0.41	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Lapčević	5	0.41	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Milorad Mirčić	5	0.41	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Petar Jojić	5	0.41	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Uroš Janković	5	0.41	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00

Zoran Lutovac	5	0.41	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Amir Bislimi	4	0.33	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Branka Stamenković	4	0.33	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Janko Veselinović	4	0.33	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Miroslav Parović	4	0.33	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Nataša Mičić	4	0.33	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Konstantinović	4	0.33	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Aida Ćorović	3	0.24	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Branimir Kuzmanović	3	0.24	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Branislav Mihajlović	3	0.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Danilo Šuković	3	0.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Pavlović	3	0.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Konstantin Samofalov	3	0.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Bastać	3	0.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladan Glišić	3	0.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Krasić	3	0.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	54	4.41	0	0.00	51	94.44	3	5.56
Total	1225	100.00	0	0.00	1117	91.18	108	8.82

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Throughout the whole of 2016 (I-IV quarter), the media gave the most attention to the leader of SRS Vojislav Šešelj on their front pages, who was an actor in 567 or 6.84% of all of the sampled articles (8293). Most of the negative articles concerned themselves with the former president of Demokratska stranka (The Democratic Party, the DS), Bojan Pajtić (128 or 26.18%), while, out of the most prominent representatives of the opposition, there were 2 articles with positive connotations written about the current president of the DS, Dragan Šutanovac.

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of the five most prominent individual political actors from the **opposition**

Opposition – all media/ I-IV quarter	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Vojislav Šešelj	567	6.84	1	0.18	508	89.59	58	10.23
Boris Tadić	492	5.93	0	0.00	449	91.26	43	8.74
Bojan Pajtić	489	5.90	1	0.20	360	73.62	128	26.18
Čedomir Jovanović	367	4.43	0	0.00	320	87.19	47	12.81
Saša Radulović	263	3.17	0	0.00	224	85.17	39	14.83
Sanda Rašković Ivić	238	2.87	0	0.00	211	88.66	27	11.34
Dragan Šutanovac	216	2.60	2	0.93	174	80.56	40	18.52

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual political actors from the **ruling coalition**

The ruling coalition - individually	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Muamer Zukorlić	49	8.18	0	0.00	34	69.39	15	30.61
Branko Ružić	42	7.01	0	0.00	31	73.81	11	26.19
Velimir Ilić ²	31	5.18	0	0.00	29	93.55	2	6.45
Vladimir Đukanović	30	5.01	0	0.00	30	100.00	0	0.00
Marijan Rističević	28	4.67	0	0.00	15	53.57	13	46.43
Milutin Mrkonjić	27	4.51	0	0.00	24	88.89	3	11.11
Novica Tončev	26	4.34	0	0.00	25	96.15	1	3.85
Dragan Marković Palma	24	4.01	0	0.00	23	95.83	1	4.17
Aleksandar Martinović	23	3.84	0	0.00	20	86.96	3	13.04
Miroslav Lazanski	23	3.84	0	0.00	23	100.00	0	0.00
Bratislav Gašić	18	3.01	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
Đorđe Miličević	17	2.84	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Ivana Petrović	15	2.50	0	0.00	11	73.33	4	26.67
Milovan Drecun	15	2.50	0	0.00	12	80.00	3	20.00
Miodrag Linta	15	2.50	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Marija Obradović	14	2.34	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Milenko Jovanov	13	2.17	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Vuk Drašković	12	2.00	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00

Nenad Popović	11	1.84	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Selaković	11	1.84	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Bečić	10	1.67	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Predrag Marković	8	1.34	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Miljkan Karličić	7	1.17	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Dragomir Karić	6	1.00	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Darko Glišić	5	0.83	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Mrkić	5	0.83	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Ivica Tončev	5	0.83	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Meho Omerović	5	0.83	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Vladanka Malović	5	0.83	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Žarko Obradović	5	0.83	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Popović	4	0.67	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Šormaz	4	0.67	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Igor Novaković	4	0.67	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Atlagić	4	0.67	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Zoran Babić	4	0.67	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Bratislav Jugović	3	0.50	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Čabarkapa	3	0.50	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dubravka Filipovski	3	0.50	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Ištvan Partor	3	0.50	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Jahjaga Ferhatović	3	0.50	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Momo Čolaković	3	0.50	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Orlić	3	0.50	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Žika Gojković	3	0.50	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	50	8.35	0	0.00	47	94.00	3	6.00
Total	599	100.00	0	0.00	529	88.31	70	11.69

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual political actors representing **state authorities, institutions and agencies**

State authorities, institutions and agencies - individually	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Marko Đurić	57	18.27	0	0.00	54	94.74	3	5.26
Maja Gojković	55	17.63	0	0.00	51	92.73	4	7.27
Siniša Mali	23	7.37	0	0.00	22	95.65	1	4.35
Goran Vesić	14	4.49	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Miloš Vučević	14	4.49	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
Jorgovanka Tabaković	9	2.88	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Mirović	9	2.88	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Stanislava Pak	8	2.56	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Nikodijević	7	2.24	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Darko Bulatović	6	1.92	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Miša Vacić	6	1.92	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
Tanja Mišćević	6	1.92	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Jana Ljubičić	5	1.60	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Svetislava Bulajić	5	1.60	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Zoran Stanković	5	1.60	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Željko Sertić	5	1.60	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Radomir Nikolić	4	1.28	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Jovan Vorkapić	4	1.28	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Darko Tanasković	3	0.96	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milun Todorović	3	0.96	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Ivanišević	3	0.96	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Oliver Antić	3	0.96	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Predrag Mikić	3	0.96	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Radojica Rovčanin	3	0.96	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
others	52	16.67	0	0.00	50	96.15	2	3.85
Total	312	100.00	0	0.00	291	93.27	21	6.73

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of **other** individual and collective political and social actors

Other actors	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Zoran Đinđić	68	10.38	0	0.00	67	98.53	1	1.47
Slobodan Milošević	65	9.92	0	0.00	62	95.38	3	4.62
Andrej Vučić	47	7.18	0	0.00	44	93.62	3	6.38
Bogoljub Karić	42	6.41	3	7.14	34	80.95	5	11.90
Josip Broz Tito	39	5.95	0	0.00	39	100.00	0	0.00
Vojislav Koštunica	38	5.80	0	0.00	36	94.74	2	5.26
Nebojša Čović	27	4.12	0	0.00	10	37.04	17	62.96
Mlađan Dinkić	23	3.51	0	0.00	20	86.96	3	13.04
Emir Kusturica	17	2.60	4	23.53	13	76.47	0	0.00
Nenad Borovčanin	17	2.60	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
CIRSD	15	2.29	0	0.00	12	80.00	3	20.00
Gordana Filipović Đinđić	14	2.14	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Mila Đinđić	14	2.14	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Slavko Ćuruvija	13	1.98	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Krga	12	1.83	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Beba Popović	12	1.83	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Dragan Jakovljević	11	1.68	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Mirjana Marković	11	1.68	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
Sonja Biserko	11	1.68	0	0.00	3	27.27	8	72.73
Dražen Milovanović	10	1.53	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Jelena Milić	10	1.53	0	0.00	3	30.00	7	70.00
Srđa Popović	10	1.53	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Dragica Nikolić	9	1.37	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Rodoljub Milović	9	1.37	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Vesna Pešić	9	1.37	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Jelena Karleuša	8	1.22	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Nataša Kandić	7	1.07	0	0.00	3	42.86	4	57.14
Srđan Verbić	7	1.07	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Rakić	6	0.92	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Vukčević	6	0.92	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00

Božidar Đelić	5	0.76	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Mihajlović	5	0.76	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Stambolić	5	0.76	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Jovica Stanišić	5	0.76	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Snežana Malović	5	0.76	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Staša Zajović	5	0.76	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
Tomislav Žigmanov	5	0.76	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Mikić	4	0.61	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Milošević	4	0.61	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Veran Matić	4	0.61	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Dragan Đilas	3	0.46	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubomir Simović	3	0.46	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mirko Cvetković	3	0.46	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Svetko Kovač	3	0.46	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Čičak	3	0.46	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Kori Udovički	3	0.46	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Tasovac	3	0.46	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	655	100.00	7	1.07	576	87.93	72	11.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of domestic collective political actors: **state authorities and institutions**

State authorities, institutions and agencies - collectively	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
The Government of Serbia	234	30.55	1	0.43	224	95.73	9	3.85
The Ministry of Internal Affairs	100	13.05	0	0.00	94	94.00	6	6.00
The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia	68	8.88	1	1.47	56	82.35	11	16.18
The Ministry of Defense	33	4.31	0	0.00	33	100.00	0	0.00
The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure	29	3.79	0	0.00	28	96.55	1	3.45
The Ministry of Health	25	3.26	0	0.00	24	96.00	1	4.00
The National Bank of Serbia	23	3.00	0	0.00	23	100.00	0	0.00

The Ministry of Justice	20	2.61	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs	20	2.61	0	0.00	17	85.00	3	15.00
The Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development	19	2.48	0	0.00	18	94.74	1	5.26
The Ministry of Finance	18	2.35	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
The National Health Insurance Fund	18	2.35	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
"Serbian authorities"	18	2.35	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
The Ministry of Industry	12	1.57	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
The Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection	10	1.31	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
The Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Policy	10	1.31	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
The Ministry of Public Administration and Local Self-Government	9	1.17	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Tax Administration of Serbia	8	1.04	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Office for Kosovo and Metohija, the Government of the Republic of Serbia	7	0.91	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
The Ministry of Culture and the Media	7	0.91	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
The Cabinet of the Prime Minister of Serbia	6	0.78	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
The Serbian Business Registers Agency	5	0.65	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Republic Agency for Property	5	0.65	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
The city of Belgrade	5	0.65	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
The Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Serbia	5	0.65	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
The Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications	5	0.65	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Commissariat for Refugees and Migration of the Republic of Serbia	4	0.52	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

The Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia	4	0.52	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Traffic Safety Agency	3	0.39	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
The National Employment Agency	3	0.39	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
The Presidency of the Republic of Serbia	3	0.39	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
other	30	3.92	0	0.00	28	93.33	2	6.67
Total	766	100.00	2	0.26	726	94.78	38	4.96

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of domestic collective political actors: **the ruling coalition**

The ruling coalition - collectively	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
SNS	225	64.10	1	0.44	213	94.67	11	4.89
SPS	88	25.07	0	0.00	79	89.77	9	10.23
SPO	6	1.71	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Jedinstvena Srbija	6	1.71	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Pokret socijalista	5	1.42	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
PUPS	4	1.14	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
SDPS	4	1.14	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
SNP	4	1.14	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Pokret snaga Srbije	4	1.14	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Nova Srbija	3	0.85	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
SVM	2	0.57	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	351	100.00	0	0.00	330	94.02	20	5.70

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of domestic collective political actors: **opposition**

Opposition - collectively	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
DS	115	25.78	0	0.00	105	91.30	10	8.70
Dosta je bilo	64	14.35	0	0.00	60	93.75	4	6.25
SRS	53	11.88	0	0.00	52	98.11	1	1.89

DSS	47	10.54	0	0.00	44	93.62	3	6.38
Dveri	47	10.54	0	0.00	44	93.62	3	6.38
LDP	41	9.19	0	0.00	40	97.56	1	2.44
SDP	30	6.73	0	0.00	30	100.00	0	0.00
LSV	21	4.71	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
Nova stranka	14	3.14	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
SDA Sandžaka	4	0.90	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
others	10	2.24	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Total	446	100.00	0	0.00	424	95.07	22	4.93

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective actors: **Kosovo**

Kosovo	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Hashim Thaçi	19	8.60	0	0.00	12	63.16	7	36.84
Edita Tahiri	18	8.14	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
Trepča	15	6.79	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
"Kosovo authorities"	13	5.88	0	0.00	5	38.46	8	61.54
Isa Mustafa	12	5.43	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubomir Marić	11	4.98	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Kosovo Assembly	11	4.98	0	0.00	5	45.45	6	54.55
Branimir Stojanović	9	4.07	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
KLA	8	3.62	0	0.00	4	50.00	4	50.00
Nihat Thaçi	7	3.17	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Slavko Simić	7	3.17	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Oliver Ivanović	6	2.71	1	16.67	5	83.33	0	0.00
The Government of Kosovo	6	2.71	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
Dalibor Jeftić	5	2.26	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ramush Haradinaj	5	2.26	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
Daut Haradinaj	4	1.81	0	0.00	0	0.00	4	100.00
Jovan Dimkić	4	1.81	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Srpska lista	4	1.81	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

Bajram Gecaj	3	1.36	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Enver Hoxhaj	3	1.36	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Rakić	3	1.36	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ilir Deda	3	1.36	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
KFOR	3	1.36	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mirjana Jeftić	3	1.36	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
others	39	17.65	0	0.00	37	94.87	2	5.13
Total	221	100.00	1	0.45	179	81.00	41	18.55

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Croatia**

Croatia	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Andrej Plenković	34	16.50	0	0.00	28	82.35	6	17.65
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović	27	13.11	0	0.00	15	55.56	12	44.44
"Croatian authorities"	20	9.71	0	0.00	8	40.00	12	60.00
Franjo Tuđman	10	4.85	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Davor Ivo Štir	8	3.88	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Milorad Pupovac	7	3.40	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Milanović	7	3.40	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Ante Gotovina	5	2.43	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Ante Pavelić	5	2.43	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ante Tomić	5	2.43	1	20.00	4	80.00	0	0.00
Savo Štrbac	5	2.43	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Stjepan Mesić	5	2.43	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
The Government of the Republic of Croatia	5	2.43	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
HDZ	4	1.94	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Croatian Intelligence Agency(SOA)	4	1.94	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Rajko Grlić	4	1.94	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Božo Petrov	3	1.46	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Pernar	3	1.46	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Miro Kovač	3	1.46	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Tihomir Orešković	3	1.46	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

others	39	18.93	0	0.00	34	87.18	5	12.82
Total	206	100.00	1	0.49	160	77.67	45	21.84

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Montenegro**

Montenegro	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milo Đukanović	72	32.14	0	0.00	61	84.72	11	15.28
DPS	18	8.04	0	0.00	15	83.33	3	16.67
Demokratski front	17	7.59	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Andrija Mandić	11	4.91	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Duško Marković	7	3.13	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Filip Vujanović	6	2.68	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Medojević	6	2.68	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Special State Judicial Department of Montenegro	6	2.68	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Goran Danilović	5	2.23	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
The Supreme State Court of Montenegro	5	2.23	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
"Montenegro authorities"	4	1.79	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Milivoje Katnić	4	1.79	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Slavko Stojanović	4	1.79	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Veselin Veljović	4	1.79	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
CeMI	3	1.34	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Montenegro police	3	1.34	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Miodrag Lekić	3	1.34	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ranko Krivokapić	3	1.34	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
SDP	3	1.34	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	40	17.86	0	0.00	40	100.00	0	0.00
Total	224	100.00	0	0.00	207	92.41	17	7.59

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Attempt of Coup in Montenegro**⁷

Attempt of Coup in Montenegro	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Bratislav Dikić	38	49.35	2	5.26	34	89.47	2	5.26
Aleksandar Sinđelić	9	11.69	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Nemanja Ristić	4	5.19	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Branka Milić	3	3.90	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	23	29.87	0	0.00	23	100.00	0	0.00
Total	77	100.00	2	2.60	73	94.81	2	2.60

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Bosnia and Herzegovina	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milorad Dodik	43	30.07	0	0.00	40	93.02	3	6.98
Čamil Duraković	10	6.99	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Mladen Grujić	10	6.99	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
The Justice Department of Bosnia and Herzegovina	9	6.29	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Bakir Izetbegović	7	4.90	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Dragan Mektić	6	4.20	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina	5	3.50	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Alija Izetbegović	4	2.80	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Naser Orić	4	2.80	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina	3	2.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
SDA	3	2.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
SNSD	3	2.10	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Valentin Incko	3	2.10	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
others	33	23.08	0	0.00	32	96.97	1	3.03
Total	143	100.00	0	0.00	133	93.01	10	6.99

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

⁷ On the warrant of the Special State Judicial Department of Montenegro, on the day of the parliamentary elections in that country 20 individuals were arrested, predominantly Serbian citizens. The Supreme Court of Montenegro issued a statement that there was a suspicion that the mentioned group had intentions of seizing the Assembly of Montenegro during the announcement of the results of the elections and declare the victory of certain political parties, as well as arrest the Prime Minister Milo Đukanović. The table shows the actors of this event who were represented on the front pages of the seven media making up the sample.

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors outside of the region: **foreign politicians**

Foreign political actors	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Bashar al-Assad	33	7.97	0	0.00	33	100.00	0	0.00
Edi Rama	23	5.56	0	0.00	18	78.26	5	21.74
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	20	4.83	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Fidel Castro	16	3.86	4	25.00	12	75.00	0	0.00
Xi Jinping	16	3.86	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Viktor Orban	16	3.86	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Theresa May	14	3.38	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Francois Hollande	13	3.14	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Boris Johnson	12	2.90	1	8.33	10	83.33	1	8.33
Marine Le Pen	9	2.17	0	0.00	7	77.78	2	22.22
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	9	2.17	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Matteo Renzi	8	1.93	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Fethullah Gülen	7	1.69	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Li Keqiang	7	1.69	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Lajčák	7	1.69	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Norbert Hofer	6	1.45	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Petro Poroshenko	6	1.45	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Raul Castro	6	1.45	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Bojko Borisov	5	1.21	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Li Mačang	5	1.21	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Sebastijan Kurz	5	1.21	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Charles Crawford	4	0.97	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Heinz-Christian Strache	4	0.97	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Nigel Farage	4	0.97	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Péter Szijjártó	4	0.97	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Rumen Radev	4	0.97	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Shinzō Abe	4	0.97	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Tony Blair	4	0.97	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Binali Yıldırım	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
David Cameron	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Đorđe Ivanov	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Jeremy Corbyn	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Irina Bokova	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Kim Jong-un	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Kristalina Georgieva	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Manuel Valls	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Žan Mark Ero	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Miro Cerar	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nicolas Sarkozy	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nursultan Nazarbayev	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Viktor Yanukovych	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Witold Waszczykowski	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	101	24.40	0	0.00	101	100.00	0	0.00
Total	414	100.00	5	1.21	398	96.14	11	2.66

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors outside of the region: **Germany**

Germany	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Angela Merkel	57	45.24	3	5.26	53	92.98	1	1.75
Frank-Walter Steinmeier	10	7.94	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Axel Dittmann	7	5.56	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
The Alternative for Germany	4	3.17	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
The Christian Democratic Union of Germany	4	3.17	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Thomas de Maizière	3	2.38	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Sigmar Gabriel	3	2.38	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	38	30.16	0	0.00	36	94.74	2	5.26
Total	126	100.00	3	2.38	119	94.44	4	3.17

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors outside of the region: **Russia**

Russia	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Vladimir Putin*	232	37.97	16	6.90	206	88.79	10	4.31
Sergey Lavrov	51	8.35	3	5.88	48	94.12	0	0.00
Dmitry Medvedev	37	6.06	0	0.00	36	97.30	1	2.70
Sergey Shoygu	33	5.40	1	3.03	32	96.97	0	0.00
Alexander Chepurin	30	4.91	0	0.00	30	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Peskov	24	3.93	0	0.00	24	100.00	0	0.00
Nikolai Patrushev	22	3.60	3	13.64	16	72.73	3	13.64
"Russian authorities"	16	2.62	2	12.50	14	87.50	0	0.00
Andrei Karlov	15	2.45	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Maria Zakharova	13	2.13	1	7.69	11	84.62	1	7.69
Sputnik	13	2.13	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Konashenkov	8	1.31	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Russian Ministry of Defence	7	1.15	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	7	1.15	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Vitaly Churkin	7	1.15	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Niš	6	0.98	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Russian Army	6	0.98	2	33.33	4	66.67	0	0.00
Viktor Ozerov	5	0.82	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Russian Federal Security Service	4	0.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Gennady Timchenko	4	0.65	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Maksim Sokolov	4	0.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Sergei Zheleznyak	4	0.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Svetlana Petrenko	4	0.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Russian Embassy	3	0.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Yevgeny Primakov	3	0.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Konstantin Kosačev	3	0.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	50	8.18	1	2.00	49	98.00	0	0.00
Total	611	100.00	30	4.91	566	92.64	15	2.45

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

The attention of the majority of the domestic media in the fourth quarter, including the seven daily newspapers making up the sample, was drawn to the presidential elections in the United States of America. Extremely high number of articles (231) were published on the ,then Republican candidate, and currently, the elected President of the USA – Donald Trump. His possible actions, especially concerning Serbia, were the subject of many speculations, details were analyzed that had no connection with his political activities, and some of the media even showed the tendency of idolizing the newly chosen president of the USA.⁸ The highest number of articles concerning him were published in the newspaper *Politika* – 67. Most of these articles were neutral in context, but also the highest number of negative articles were found as well (10 – 14.93%). On the other hand, a similar share of articles with Donald Trump as an actor - 13.11%, was also found in *Informer*, but in this media 7 or 21.88% of the articles had a positive connotation. Positive articles were also noticed on the front pages of *Kurir* (3 or 13.04%).

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors outside of the region: **The USA**⁹

The USA	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Donald Trump	231	26.52	11	4.76	199	86.15	21	9.09
Hillary Clinton	120	13.78	0	0.00	107	89.17	13	10.83
Barack Obama	86	9.87	0	0.00	85	98.84	1	1.16
Kyle Scott	29	3.33	0	0.00	21	72.41	8	27.59
"American authorities"	24	2.76	0	0.00	9	37.50	15	62.50
Bill Clinton	24	2.76	0	0.00	21	87.50	3	12.50
CIA	23	2.64	0	0.00	19	82.61	4	17.39
George Soros	19	2.18	0	0.00	6	31.58	13	68.42
Rudolph Giuliani	17	1.95	1	5.88	16	94.12	0	0.00
The New York Times	16	1.84	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
John Kerry	16	1.84	0	0.00	15	93.75	1	6.25
The USA Embassy	14	1.61	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
Melania Trump	13	1.49	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Joseph Biden	11	1.26	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Michael Flinn	10	1.15	1	10.00	9	90.00	0	0.00
State Department	10	1.15	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00

8 For example: *Kurir*, 10.11.2016: *Trump, Serbi; Informer*, 10.11.2016: *Trump and Putin are changing the world*, 14.11.2016: *The division of Kosovo just became possible*.

9 Number of actors from the USA is several times higher (871) compared to the third (396) and second (222) quarter of 2016.

Rex Tillerson	9	1.03	1	11.11	8	88.89	0	0.00
The Washington Post	9	1.03	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
FBI	8	0.92	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Mike Pence	8	0.92	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
The Republican Party	8	0.92	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Reince Priebus	7	0.80	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0.00
Bernie Sanders	5	0.57	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
James Comey	5	0.57	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
John Kirby	5	0.57	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Henry Kissinger	5	0.57	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
William Montgomery	5	0.57	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
David Petraeus	4	0.46	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
The Democratic Party of the United States of America	4	0.46	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Janet Yellen	4	0.46	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ivanka Trump	4	0.46	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Newt Gingrich	4	0.46	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Walid Phares	4	0.46	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Bob Dole	3	0.34	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Donald Trump Junior	3	0.34	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
John Bolton	3	0.34	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
John Podesta	3	0.34	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
George Bush	3	0.34	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Eric Trump	3	0.34	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ivana Trump	3	0.34	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Chris Christie	3	0.34	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Paul Ryan	3	0.34	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	83	9.53	0	0.00	77	92.77	6	7.23
Total	871	100.00	15	1.72	762	87.49	94	10.79

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016

The number of Donald Trump's appearances compared to the total number of articles in certain daily newspapers.

Donald Trump in the media	number of appearances	total number of articles	% of participation compared to the total number of articles
<i>Politika</i>	67	504	13.29
<i>Informer</i>	32	244	13.11
<i>Kurir</i>	23	215	10.70
<i>Blic</i>	33	312	10.58
<i>Danas</i>	37	406	9.11
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	24	344	6.98
<i>Alo!</i>	15	226	6.64
Total	231	2251	10.26

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Donald Trump: Context value in relation to media

Donald Trump	positive		neutral		negative		total	
media	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
<i>Blic</i>	0	0.00	28	84.85	5	15.15	33	14.29
<i>Kurir</i>	3	13.04	20	86.96	0	0.00	23	9.96
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0	0.00	24	100.00	0	0.00	24	10.39
<i>Alo!</i>	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00	15	6.49
<i>Informer</i>	7	21.88	25	78.13	0	0.00	32	13.85
<i>Politika</i>	1	1.49	56	83.58	10	14.93	67	29.00
<i>Danas</i>	0	0.00	31	83.78	6	16.22	37	16.02
Total	11	4.76	199	86.15	21	9.09	231	100.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective foreign political actors: **EU institutions and representatives of EU institutions**

EU	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
EU	52	19.33	0	0.00	37	71.15	15	28.85
European Commission	49	18.22	0	0.00	44	89.80	5	10.20
Michael Davenport	30	11.15	0	0.00	30	100.00	0	0.00
Federica Mogherini	27	10.04	0	0.00	27	100.00	0	0.00

Johannes Hahn	19	7.06	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
"European governments"	16	5.95	0	0.00	10	62.50	6	37.50
Maja Kocijančič	13	4.83	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
David McAllister	7	2.60	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Donald Tusk	7	2.60	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
European Parliament	7	2.60	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Jean-Claude Juncker	6	2.23	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
EU Delegation in Serbia	5	1.86	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
EBRD	5	1.86	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
The European Council	5	1.86	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Martin Schulz	5	1.86	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Franc Bogović	3	1.12	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
other	13	4.83	0	0.00	12	92.30	1	7.70
Total	269	100.00	0	0.00	241	89.59	28	10.41

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective foreign political actors: **representatives of the OSCE and The Council of Europe**

OSCE - The European Council	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
OSCE	9	52.94	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
European Court of Human Rights	3	17.65	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dunja Mijatović	5	29.41	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Total	17	100.00	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective foreign political actors: **UN institutions and representatives of UN institutions**

UN	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
UNSC	17	38.64	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
United nations	9	20.45	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
António Guterres	6	13.64	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
UNESCO	6	13.64	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Ban Ki-moon	3	6.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Simona-Mirela Miculescu	3	6.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	44	100.00	0	0.00	44	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors: **NATO**

NATO	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
NATO	86	78.18	0	0.00	71	82.56	15	17.44
Jens Stoltenberg	17	15.45	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Anders Fogh Rasmussen	3	2.73	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
other	4	3.64	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Total	110	100.00	0	0.00	92	83.64	18	16.36

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective actors: **actors connected to the Hague Tribunal**

Hague Tribunal	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Hague Tribunal	28	38.36	0	0.00	24	85.71	4	14.29
Ratko Mladić	16	21.92	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Radovan Karadžić	9	12.33	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
other	20	27.40	0	0.00	16	80.00	4	20
Total	73	100.00	0	0.00	65	89.04	8	10.96

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Even from a cursory overview of the frequency of appearances of certain actors on the front pages of our sampled daily newspapers, it is clear that the media unequally shows interest towards issues relating to domestic and foreign politics. The fact that foreign actors on the front pages of the daily newspapers in Serbia are present in a much smaller percentage (33.80 %, compared to 66.21% of the frequency of appearances of domestic political actors), showcases the interest of domestic media towards domestic politics, which in the interpretation of certain daily newspapers often takes on the shape of fiction - about which more was said in the analysis dealing with interpretative strategies in the medias' treatment of certain topics. The reasons for the noticeable absence of interest for economic actors and their understanding of the social, economic and political situation in both Serbia and the world is perplexing (in total 3.58% of the total actor sample is made out of economic actors), all exacerbated by the fact that in the narratives of many politicians, issues of economy and economic consolidation are emphasized as key elements of the future development strategies of Serbian society.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of **individual business/economic actors**

Economic actors - individual	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Miroslav Mišković	17	10.69	0	0.00	14	82.35	3	17.65
Dmitar Đurović	9	5.66	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Bajatović	8	5.03	0	0.00	4	50.00	4	50.00
Rodoljub Drašković	8	5.03	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Aleksandar Obradović	6	3.77	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Blagoje Spaskovski	6	3.77	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
Milan Beko	6	3.77	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Milorad Grčić	6	3.77	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Marko Čadež	5	3.14	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Bogičević	4	2.52	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Miroslav Jovičić	4	2.52	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Đurić	4	2.52	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

Nikola Petrović	4	2.52	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Petar Jovanović	4	2.52	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Radojica Milosavljević	4	2.52	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Miodrag Kostić	3	1.89	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Đoko Krivokapić	3	1.89	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ratomir Todorović	3	1.89	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Drobnjak	3	1.89	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
other	52	32.70	1	1.92	46	88.47	5	9.61
Total	159	100.00	1	0.63	135	84.91	23	14.47

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of **collective business/economic actors**

Economic actors - collective	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Elektroprivreda Srbije	22	7.69	0	0.00	19	86.36	3	13.64
Telekom Srbija	22	7.69	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
RTV Bor	13	4.55	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Srbijagas	13	4.55	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Swisslion Takovo	10	3.50	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Azotara Pančevo	9	3.15	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Petrohemija	8	2.80	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Jura	7	2.45	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Serbian Railways	7	2.45	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Azvirit	6	2.10	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia	6	2.10	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dipos	5	1.75	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Air Serbia	5	1.75	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Corridors of Serbia	5	1.75	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
MSK Kikinda	5	1.75	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
NIS	5	1.75	1	20.00	4	80.00	0	0.00

Proenergy BGD	5	1.75	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Roads of Serbia	5	1.75	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Resavica	5	1.75	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Železara Smederevo	5	1.75	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Fiat	4	1.40	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Hesteel	4	1.40	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Mobtel	4	1.40	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Zastava	4	1.40	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Kredit Agrikol bank	3	1.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Belgrade Waterfront	3	1.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
State Lottery of Serbia	3	1.05	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Exim bank	3	1.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Elektromreže Srbije	3	1.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Eagle Hills	3	1.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
JKP Javno osvetljenje Beograd	3	1.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Keep Light	3	1.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
MK group	3	1.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Societe Generale bank	3	1.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
other	72	25.17	1	1.39	67	93.05	4	5.56
Total	286	100.00	2	0.70	268	93.71	16	5.59

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective foreign business/economic actors:

IMF - World Bank	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
IMF	15	48.39	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Wold Bank	6	19.35	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
James Roaf	5	16.13	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ellen Goodstein	3	9.68	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Tony Verheijen	2	6.45	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	31	100.00	0	0.00	31	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Besides the political and business actors that have already been mentioned, the protagonists found on the front pages are various other social actors, who have in a number of different ways influenced the social and political circumstances in Serbian society. Based on the gathered empirical framework, we have categorized them into:

(a) representatives of independent and autonomous government bodies and institutions, (b) analysts of political, social, economic, security and other circumstances, (c) representatives of the Serbian orthodox church and other religious organizations (d) media actors, (e) representatives of judicial authorities , (f) attorneys and protagonists of various judicial proceedings and (h) protagonists of media and other affairs.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective domestic actors: **representatives of independent bodies**

Independent bodies	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Saša Janković	135	69.59	1	0.74	117	86.67	17	12.59
Rodoljub Šabić	21	10.82	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
Agency for Combating Corruption	8	4.12	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Fiscal council	7	3.61	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Council for Combating Corruption	6	3.09	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Vučković	3	1.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Lipkovski	3	1.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
other	11	5.67	0	0.00	10	90.90	1	9.10
Total	194	100.00	1	0.52	175	90.21	18	9.28

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and other religious organizations**

Religion	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
SOC	25	13.59	0	0.00	25	100.00	0	0.00
Pope Francis	18	9.78	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
Irinej, Serbian Patriarch	18	9.78	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
Aloysius Stepinac	13	7.07	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38
Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus'	8	4.35	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Patriarch Pavle	7	3.80	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0.00
Amfilohije, Metropolitan bishop of Montenegro and the Littoral	6	3.26	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Islamic Community of Serbia	6	3.26	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Irinej, Bishop of Bačka	5	2.72	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Roman Catholic Church	4	2.17	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Stanislav Hočaver, Archbishop of Belgrade	4	2.17	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Grizostom, head of the eparchy of Zvornik-Tuzla	3	1.63	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Josip Bozanić, cardinal	3	1.63	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Jovan, Bishop of Šumadija	3	1.63	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Kacavenda, dismissed bishop	3	1.63	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Porfirije, Metropolitan of Zagreb and Ljubljana	3	1.63	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
other	55	29.89	1	1.82	52	94.54	2	3.64
Total	184	100.00	2	1.09	171	92.93	11	5.98

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of the representatives the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations on the front pages of the various media from the research sample

Media	Number	%
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	88	47.83
<i>Politika</i>	30	16.30
<i>Informer</i>	21	11.41
<i>Kurir</i>	13	7.07

<i>Danas</i>	12	6.52
<i>Alo!</i>	11	5.98
<i>Blic</i>	9	4.89
Total	184	100.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors from the **media**¹⁰

Media	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Kurir	25	11.57	0	0.00	19	76.00	6	24.00
<i>Informer</i>	13	6.02	0	0.00	8	61.54	5	38.46
Dragan J. Vučićević	13	6.02	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38
KRIK	13	6.02	0	0.00	8	61.54	5	38.46
RTS	13	6.02	0	0.00	10	76.92	3	23.08
Dragoljub Draža Petrović	11	5.09	0	0.00	8	72.73	3	27.27
Nedeljnik	11	5.09	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
TV Pink	11	5.09	0	0.00	7	63.64	4	36.36
Željko Cvijanović	11	5.09	1	9.09	10	90.91	0	0.00
Slobodan Geor-giev	9	4.17	0	0.00	3	33.33	6	66.67
Danas	7	3.24	0	0.00	2	28.57	5	71.43
Milomir Marić	7	3.24	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Stevan Dojčinović	7	3.24	0	0.00	2	28.57	5	71.43
Aleksandar Rodić	6	2.78	0	0.00	0	0.00	6	100.00
Branko Čečen	6	2.78	0	0.00	1	16.67	5	83.33
CINS (Serbian center for investigative journalism)	6	2.78	0	0.00	1	16.67	5	83.33
Dragoljub Žarković	6	2.78	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
BIRN	5	2.31	0	0.00	0	0.00	5	100.00
Dušan Petričić	5	2.31	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
NUNS (Independent Association of Journalists)	5	2.31	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Insajder	4	1.85	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

10 The actors who were the subjects of the reportage of other media, and media houses on whose work other media reported on, have been presented.

Ljiljana Smajlović	4	1.85	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Olja Bečković	4	1.85	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Vukašin Obradović	4	1.85	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Dinko Gruhonjić	3	1.39	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Dragan Bujošević	3	1.39	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Adria Media Group	2	0.93	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Brankica Stan-ković	2	0.93	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	216	100.00	1	0.46	138	63.89	77	35.65

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

In the following table, the actors whom the sampled media connected to the murder of the singer Jelena Marjanovic, and her family members, associates and friends have been presented. These actors have been present in 968 front pages in the second quarter, almost two times more than, for example, foreign politicians or government bodies and institutions. Even though this media-constructed affair is still present on the front pages of the analyzed daily newspaper in the third quarter, interest began to significantly wane, and so later only 166 appearances have been recorded. In the fourth trimester, that number began to rise yet again, regardless of how much time has passed since the murder, and so on the front pages there were 193 appearances of the actors connected to Jelena Marjanovic.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **“The Murder of Jelena Marjanovic”**

The Murder of Jelena Marjanovic	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Jelena Marjanović	52	26.94	0	0.00	52	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Marjanović	39	20.21	0	0.00	32	82.05	7	17.95
Zorica Krstanović	19	9.84	1	5.26	17	89.47	1	5.26
Vladimir Marjanović	17	8.81	0	0.00	14	82.35	3	17.65
Jana Marjanović	15	7.77	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Miloš Marjanović	10	5.18	0	0.00	6	60.00	4	40.00
Zorica Marjanović	10	5.18	0	0.00	7	70.00	3	30.00
Rada Matić	8	4.15	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
The Marjanovic family	7	3.63	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Ljubica, sister of Zorica Krstanovic	5	2.59	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Pelagija Manojlović	4	2.07	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

other	7	3.63	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Total	193	100.00	1	0.52	171	88.60	21	10.88

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual domestic social actors: "Savamala"

Savamala	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
The <i>Ne Davimo Beograd</i> initiative	22	40.74	0	0.00	18	81.82	4	18.18
Dobrica Veselinović	9	16.67	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Ksenija Radovanović	9	16.67	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Radomir Lazović	6	11.11	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
other	8	14.81	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Total	54	100.00	0	0.00	48	88.89	6	11.11

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

UNNAMED SOURCES

In the selected front page articles from the sampled media, unnamed sources have also been, in the fourth trimester, the second most prominent actor. This time there were 546 instances of quoting anonymous sources, or rather 24,26% captions, which was almost identical to the results from the previous quarter (24,3%). If we look at the total number of unnamed sources who were the actors of the front page articles during 2016, we come upon the information that the editorial staff of the seven media present in the sample have used unverifiable information in a total of 1988, or 24,13%, of articles.

The widespread usage of unnamed sources has been precisely determined thanks to the manner of qualifying anonymous sources, which we have been applying since the second *Mediameter* issue, so as to not only classify those sources which the very media has defined as anonymous, but also those who provide information that cannot be verified, no matter the manner in which they have been incorporated into an article. Of course, the presence of information gained from anonymous sources speaks more about the manner of the reporting done by the seven media found in our sample, than about the actual need of protecting the identities of the individual who provide certain information.

As Matt Carlson, in his book "On the Condition of Anonymity" has said: "Journalism is woven into the fabric of our environment, and in turn is based on it, meaning that it can never be an objective observer, as it is claimed...These sorts of questions are better answered through an approach that recognizes the culture of unnamed sources as a *culture*. This view steers an inquiry into unnamed sources away from frequency and implementation, toward issues of meanings that we share and patterns of collective interpretation between journalists, sources and the public. The securing of anonymity is not just a question of technique. It is, actually, a request for a certain type of imagining of relations between these three sides."¹¹

¹¹ M. Carlson, *On the condition of anonymity*, Urbana, Chicago, Springfield, University of Illinois Press, 2011, 7

The journalistic form that contains the greatest number of information received from unnamed sources is the report. Of the 1616 articles written in this form, 439, or 27.17% contain anonymous sources. However, the greatest participation of unnamed sources is noted once more when talking about news articles, 34.77%.

Participation of "unnamed sources" in all journalistic forms, in the seven sampled media

Genre	total number of articles	unnamed sources	%
report	1616	439	27.17
news article	256	89	34.77
news	54	12	22.22
commentary	114	3	2.63
journalistic coverage	20	2	10.00
interview	188	1	0.53
other	3	0	0.00
Total	2251	546	24.26

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

The greatest number of articles whose information originates from anonymous sources compared to the total number of published articles in a certain media was found in the *Informer* (41.39%), which also has the largest number of information coming from unnamed interviewees (101). Next is *Kurir*, having more than a third of their articles coming from anonymous sources (37.67% - 81), and after that, *Alo!* (33.63%), *Večernje novosti* (28.78%) and *Blic* (24.04%). A significantly lower number of articles based on this type of information gathering was noted for *Danas* (13.79% - 56) and *Politika* (11.15% - 58).

Number of "unnamed sources" based on the analyzed media

Media	total number of articles	unnamed sources	%
<i>Informer</i>	244	101	41.39
<i>Kurir</i>	215	81	37.67
<i>Alo!</i>	226	76	33.63
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	344	99	28.78
<i>Blic</i>	312	75	24.04
<i>Danas</i>	406	56	13.79
<i>Politika</i>	504	58	11.51
Total	2251	546	24.26

Source: *Mediameter research*, October - December 2016.

Conclusion

The most common topic, which clearly dominated the last quarter of 2016, and the whole year, was Serbian politics and the parliamentary elections of 2016, and the announcement relating to the presidential elections of 2017. Essentially more than a quarter of the chosen front page articles of the seven daily newspapers. Topics relating to the surrounding region was also present, mostly as part of conflicts or excesses. The media generates significant negative energy in this area. In third place is the economy which is mostly written in an illustrative manner, subjectively, and with little analysis.

The attitude towards the European Union and Russia is perhaps the clearest indicator of the different approaches of different media. The analysis shows that in the world of media in Serbia there are journalists who directly support or criticize either Russia or the EU. The circulation of various daily newspaper attests to, among other things, how different the values and political orientations of the citizens of Serbia are, faithful readers of certain daily newsletter, newsletter which in their articles follow the principles of set editorial policies and politics to the letter. By reading these newspaper, the readers also support these policies and value orientations.

(Footnotes)

1 Dijana Vukomanović has left SPS at the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2016 and modified her political approach.

2 During the fourth quarter, Velimir Ilić, as well as the party he leads (Nova Srbija), formed the part of the ruling coalition and that is the reason why Ilić is the part of this group. His support to the ruling coalition ended in the January of 2017, at the end of the period during which the research was being conducted.

3 Same as in the previous quarters, Vladimir Putin is the most prominent foreign actor on the front pages of the daily newspapers making up the sample.

4 Saša Janković has resigned from his position as public advocate in February, 2017, when he announced his candidacy for president of Serbia. In the time period covered by this analysis (October - December 2016), Janković has been active as public advocate.

4



Discourse
analysis

DEJAN VUK STANKOVIĆ

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

In the field of weekly journalism, in the period from October to December of 2016, there were no new tendencies in neither the approach nor content of media-political messages. The absence of any limiting factors, that is, freedom of thought and expression are widely present in weekly journalism, as well as the value-political pluralism, resembling previous periods. Specifically, there are no grounds for the claim that there are political and media activities that are prohibited, or more accurately, removed from the public eye, as there is no evident tendency to deliberately exclude or prevent certain topics from reaching the public. Editorial policies are unconstrained in their selection of topics, the analysis and processing of said topics, as well as representing certain political viewpoints, that are in the domain of journalism in weekly newspapers predominantly opposed, or at least critical, to the current government of Aleksandar Vučić, his political party and their coalition partners as well.

The media scene, as viewed from the perspective of the front pages of weekly newspapers, related articles, then interviews, commentaries, and editorial columns, testifies about the high level of intellectual dynamism, the intense politicality of the engaged intellectuals, but also the propaganda-like manner of journalism which basically aims much more to persuade politically on a daily basis, rather than to examine issues or investigate argumentative intrigues in the public-political life.

In brief, weekly journalism carries a significant level of everyday politics, but not the kind of politics that is a legitimate topic of media analysis, but one that is more activist-oriented, the kind of politics that engages, or rather, initiates action. Keeping all that in mind, the spirit and the writings of the front pages are understandable, as well as the acuity of the political message, the suggestiveness of images and even political propaganda dimension of caricatures. In addition, there is a strong tendency of overlapping values and political attitudes of journalists and their interviewees that do not come directly from the realm of party politics, as well as the attitudes that politicians explicitly advocate. The model of critical reporting often adopts the form of a negative, persona-oriented campaign, more precisely, the form of media which is currently focusing on the current Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, who is regarded as the main protagonist of politics in Serbia. This negative obsession with Vučić's personality and political attitudes links different genres in journalism, different journalists, interviewees, caricaturists and politicians that achieve relevant presence in print media. In this quarter of 2016 too, the role of an interview as a journalistic genre has been prominent. Specifically, a continuous process of conversations with predominantly critically minded intellectuals, activists from the NGO sector, as well as representatives of independent legal institutions, such as the commissioner for information of public importance and personal data protection. The advocating of interviews goes hand in hand with the conception of front pages, on which the focus is often on the person being interviewed. That way, a certain political message is potentiated, and the public is suggestively lead into accepting the interviewee's way

of thinking. Visually, the front pages of weekly newspapers resemble posters of political parties when they are trying to emphasize the importance of certain individuals.

This is further supported by the existence of the short messages that are always part of the announcement title of certain interviews. The insistence on only certain interviewees and their viewpoints is a direct move to turn them into some kind of a political brand, a trademark of a political group. Similarly, the continued tendency to set a certain part of the capillary public as the top authority in the field of analysis of the socio-historical processes, events, decisions and government actions is evident.

The opposition, in particular, those Euro-reformers, is unambiguously supported by most weekly newspapers, more accurately, all except Pečat. Their views are either rationalized, or more precisely, directly or indirectly defended, while the government is excluded as an actor during conversations (like in Vreme or NIN) or given the position to talk in favor of themselves. In contrast with the government's soliloquies, the critical, or rather, oppositional discourse is developed thoroughly and to the point. Beginning with general and persistent political issues concerning the main principles, structure, and functioning of the government, ensuring specific and constantly recurring themes, such as the "Savamala" affair and ending with issues triggered by immediate and current events and some political and broader social processes.

An important feature of opposition discourse is the presence of the image of a certain political actor being the subject of critical analysis. The fixation on the image of a character or an event is one of the most commonly used "weapons" in the political propaganda war. Fixation of the image (brand) is the process in which, and thanks to whom, an actor always remains the same as he always was, regardless of his potential or actual transformation, and the significantly changed political, economic and broader social-historical circumstances. This pseudo-intellectual matrix operates on a principle of assigned roles. The actors were placed in the eye of the public based on the model of "good" versus "bad" guys.

On the other hand, morally and politically positive attributes are ascribed to a particular group of political figures and organizations, while the negative ones are irrevocably and unquestionably assigned to the opposite side. A Manichean division of the political-media elite is in the center of the conflict in the public-political domain. Consequently, the weekly newspapers are biased and in their bias are clear and cutting. Disagreement in the interpretation of events, processes, and actors is such that the original nationality in the public sphere, suitable for the democratically constituted public, can function neither as a useful illusion, nor any regulatory principle in the classification of textual-visual content.

Anyone can be against anyone else and they all do it for their own shamelessly personal reasons that are incommensurable in comparison to the attitudes and arguments of the other side. The spirit of polemics in the Serbian weekly newspapers, especially in columns and interviews is truly radical, full of political defamation of opponents and the first-order moral exclusivity.

Unlike the developed discourse of the opposition, namely criticism of the government, the attitude of the parties and leaders of the opposition is much more differentiated. Even though there is some fierce criticism, which collectively and individually may be treated as a moral and political denial in the articles of the weekly newspaper Pečat and the daily Informer, the attitude that prevails in other weekly newspa-

pers and columns of editors and journalists carries a certain amount of evaluative and political reserve, even understanding, with the addition of fierce criticism of the government for its undemocratic and anti-liberal spirit in all of its actions and dealing, especially in the domain of the media.

The formation of the image of political actors implies an affective and evocative effect of both text and image, namely the front page and the accompanying articles that directly or indirectly refer to it. The complexity of the image formation based on the connection between words and suggestive pictures often does not correspond to the negative content of the image of certain actors or figureheads in the media. The content of political messages that are a product of journalistic writing or actualization of interviews is negative. Therefore, if political differences between the government and the opposition were transposed into the domain of weekly journalism, then the political life could be portrayed as a struggle between negative media images which is gradually and continuously reproduced in print media.

The focus of the analysis in this issue of Mediameter is a standard analysis of political actors' images, but also on two events that have a much broader character. Two topics, one regional, the other global, are in question. An interesting regional topic in the period from October to December 2016 were the elections in Montenegro and, without a doubt the most important global event, elections in the USA and the victory of a Republican candidate, the controversial businessman Donald Trump.

Weekly newspapers can be categorized in two ways. By the criterion of division, which is common in a democratic society, they should be divided into weekly newspapers whose views are close to those of the government, and those which are moderately or radically critical towards the same. In Serbia, said criterion cannot consistently develop, for the simple reason that all weekly newspapers in Serbia are either partially or completely critical of the government. Weekly newspapers, such as Pečat, are amongst the partially critical ones and quite openly criticize the Vučić's government's orientation towards European foreign policy. However, Pečat also shows strong critical instance towards the moral credibility, axiological orientation and political views of the victors of the "October 5th revolution" that occurred in the year 2000.

On the other hand, weekly newspapers such as NIN, Vreme, Novi Magazin and Nedeljnik are totally critical of the government. The difference exists only in the tone and insinuations of criticism. And while in Vreme and to some extent NIN (especially in the domains of national politics and economy) there is an absolute, actualized and fierce criticism of the government, while in others, such as Novi Magazin and Nedeljnik, a more moderate tone is emphasized in expressing critical views. They use significantly fewer accusations and less labeling than is the case with the most influential Serbian weekly newspapers Vreme and NIN.

In the same vein, we can classify weekly newspapers according to their attitudes towards foreign policy. Vreme, NIN, Novi magazin and Nedeljnik are more or less pro-European. On the other hand, Pečat clearly emphasizes the anti-Western and consequently pro-Russian stance, which should sustain nationalist discourse, that is relevantly similar to the dominant discourse during the Yugoslav wars in the '90s.

Image of the government – autocratic, separate from the people, does not respect the rule of law, not competent to run the country, shameless, arrogant, aggressively narcissistic, deeply criminalized, associated with football hooligans

The period between October and December of 2016 offers almost an identical image of the government, or rather, identical image of Aleksandar Vučić, which we were able to encounter in the majority of weekly newspapers during the last few months. Criticism of the government is predominantly personified and conveyed in categorical negative judgments that are often hardly within the limits of decency, despite the tendency in weekly journalism to maintain a decent level of intellectualism and conventional decency in the attitudes and expressions of both writers and interviewees.

It should be noted that the analysis of the media-political profile of Aleksandar Vučić is being put into the context of a, in essence, decadent image of Serbian society and the Serbian state. The issue here is the society in a country that is realistically, symbolically and politically dying out.

Society is subordinated to the laws of negative evolution. In fact, instead of progress that needs to happen, or rather generate over time, Serbia is characterized by a continuous regression. So instead of the atmosphere of optimism, historical enthusiasm and real hope for future prosperity, we are faced with a politically and morally questionable concept of politics that is futile and fatally historically dangerous. This thesis is presented by politically engaged singer Đorđe Balašević, close to the former government under the Democratic party: "I know only that on its way back, the wheel of history ran over a huge opportunity, optimism, irretrievable positive energy. And took us back to the time of demagoguery, cheap populism and rhetoric filled with aggressive slogans, uravnilovka and Prva Petoletka".¹

The film director Goran Marković states that in a decadent moment of history, loss of the system of moral values is both necessary and dangerous. The danger is hidden behind justification of any form of oppressive behaviour by the government, and in general, any kind of open use of violence in society: "What is dangerous is that every system of values in society has been utterly destroyed, you cannot rely on anything, it is dangerous that anyone can come up with a context in which he can accuse you, perhaps even kill you. That is a situation that suggests that we are utterly destroyed as a society and that apart from a few signs that there is still such a thing called public opinion, for example those people affected by the Savamala affair, which has become a symbol of some civil courage, that there is nothing else besides that."²

The already mentioned decadent context describing contemporary Serbia receives specific development. It is the city of Niš, as well as proverbial, but now significantly more visible tension towards the

1 Đorđe Balašević, "Ovi su tu da nas dotuku [They are here to finish us off]," an interview with Olja Bečković, NIN, no. 3436, page 20

2 Goran Marković, "Od ljudi prave moralne nakaze [They are making immoral monsters from people]," an interview with Olja Bečković, NIN, no. 3437, page 20

city of Belgrade. Niš is an example of a political and a broader historical nihilism, which Zoran Ćirić, writer and winner of the NIN award, recognizes and is talking about. "In my mother's hometown there is nothing, misery and despair have taken on metaphysical proportions. Niš is just an acronym for ništavilo (nothingness). And the Serbian madness is not an issue here, which has become an alibi for every disaster that befalls us. This is quite a logical consequence of the close-minded, ignorant and extremely anti-national politics of the local state leadership. Whose main projects are the "Belgrade waterfront" and "Niš in catacombs". I am afraid that this upstart nihilism has gone too far and all this "intercity clowning" will end up in mad chants of political slogans in the streets."³

On the image of historical decadence which it's numerous nihilistic attributes, quite fittingly are added the interpretations of principles, of the structure and the ways how the political order functions. Essentially, the characterization of the current government and their first man does not deviate from the norm and from what it was in the previous period. The government of Prime Minister Vučić is marked as autocratic and undemocratic, prone to media control and the abuse and abolishment of institutions, directed towards controlling the media and with no capability to manage the important aspect of a functioning country – control of security. On the stated legal and political qualifications, pseudo-psychological analyses of Aleksandar Vučić are added, as well as the harsh moralistic rhetoric that aims to create feelings of turmoil and anger, or rather, extreme disapproval of the government's actions among readers.

A sort of "renaissance" of liberal-democratic suggestive and moralistic discourse aims to recreate the Manichaean division into "good" and "bad" in politics, and thus displays Serbia in 2017 the same as it was during the nineties. This political-media motivation is evident in particularly emphasized and latently prevalent campaign focused on not forgetting the nineties, as well as the tendency to permanently sustain the image of Vučić and to ridicule his entire work on changing political behavior. Even a casual glance at the list of interviewees outside the sphere of politics, as well as authors of articles, will show that the creation of opposition discourse is entrusted with more or less the same group of people who consciously and conscientiously perform their job of keeping a negative campaign against the government and promoting the points of view of the opposition. Similarly, we should point to the often mentioned phenomenon of semantic and rhetorical overlap of attitudes between journalists and the representatives of the opposition. This symmetry will show that the aim of weekly newspapers is much less recognizable in the level of understanding or discussion of politics, of a moment of history, society or other phenomena, but that they are more identified with the need for engaged writing, writing that is a call to political action, actions right here and right now. Such approach to criticism carries a significant dimension of hermeticity and political exclusion. Next, it generates an identical or relevantly similar response. The encounter of mutually irreconcilable viewpoints always abolishes the possibility of spontaneously conceptualized public dialogue in which there may not always be an agreement, but where there is inviolable supremacy of rationality over irrationality.

The non-democratic nature of Aleksandar Vučić's government is widely and openly spoken about. One of the more distinctive examples of this way of thinking is the political scientist Filip Ejduš, who in an interview for the weekly newspapers Vreme claims: "The problem is that those who have already taken

3 Zoran Ćirić, "Nema države, postoje samo mržnja i prezir [There is no state, only hatred and disdain exist]," an interview with Olja Bečković, NIN, no. 3434, page 22

Serbia to the abyss during the '90s are governing it today, as well as their closest political heirs. Even though they have ordinarily adopted a pro-European rhetoric, their political method has remained very much alike. They still believe in a charismatic savior and rely on the heavy party control over the state and media. They are feuding with our neighbors, the opposition is treated as a public enemy and NGOs are accused of being foreign mercenaries. With such a type of political mentality, Serbia is more likely to become a model of an unsuccessful rather than a successful transition... It is true that in Serbia, over the past few years there has been a degradation of political freedoms, a division of power and the rule of the law. This does not mean that it is a 'blunt autocracy' but we are probably going in that direction, assuming the erosion of democratic institutions continues... If by European values you have in mind democracy and rule of the law, with this government we are more likely going in the opposite direction. However, since the authoritarian and xenophobic tendencies are increasing in Europe, a cynic might see these processes in Serbia as the latest wave of Europeanization."⁴

Zoran Živković, an MP and the leader of the Nova Stranka (New Party) has stated his stance on the government of Aleksandar Vučić, in a more harsh way than Ejduš has. He described it as an autocratic power with the addition that, in Vučić's opinion, citizens should actually love and support that authority because is exactly like it was previously described: "Vučić's problem is not only that the nature of his government is autocratic, but also that he expects that we should love that it is so, be thrilled with the fact that he abolishes institutions and does not respect the law."⁵

An openly radical oppositional and affirmatively confronting judgement of the nature of the current government was presented by the sociologist Vesna Pešić, in an interview with the weekly newspapers NIN in which she clearly highlights Vučić's right-wing character with an array of ethically judgmental reviews: "We live in an extremely right-wing, authoritarian ('potentate') regime in which the exploitation of all the working classes of a society is transferred into financial benefits of a hidden group, whose main players hold the most important state functions. Their army comprises of 'their people' who are positioned everywhere, in every layer of society, from public enterprises, municipalities up to the state authorities. New professions are created just for them, in order to reinforce the repression and the control over the citizens. Citizens bad-mouthing him is an ordinary thing at PM press conferences, he is constantly arguing and suppressing hard-working workers. Now, when everyone is talking about the presidential elections, we can see that the most important thing for Vučić is that power remains with one person, him, and in no way is depleted or shared with anyone else. The opposition needs to conceal their candidates, as not to be torn apart by Informer, Pink and other state media... He is characterized by lying, propaganda and the obedience of the passive and puppet cabinet standing behind him. He also uses the old mechanisms, without which this manner of government would not be possible. Authoritarian government ensures control of the so-called 'deep state', namely the Security Services, which were placed under his control, as well as the police and the judicial prosecution. How far will he go depends on us too, on the society. We just got away from our rough past and long-term exclusion due to the wars in the 90's. Our society is falling behind with its weak economy being uneducated, unemployed, poorly paid people subjective to propaganda and authoritarianism. Since the economy is bad, our only hope is to get

4 Filip Ejduš, "It is high time someone opened our eyes," "Vreme", no. 1347, pages 14-15

5 Zoran Živković, "Uvredljivo je Đinđića da ga porede sa Vučićem [Comparing Vučić with Đinđić is offensive]," Vreme, no. 1349, pages 13-14



NIN, 8th December 2016

some results from the government, where all the power is located, including economic power. Hence the notorious partisanship. And their leaders have turned the public sector into their personal property...”⁶

In the same vein, the former president of Serbia, Boris Tadić, gave a review of the current political climate and explicitly states: “It is clear that this is a political circus... Now I will explain the functioning mechanism of Vučić’s cabinet, which is his media-circus, or in the language of the media – his spinning tactic. There, in addition to a number of international and national spin doctors, work a few tabloid editors – it is known exactly who they are, and some have even themselves admitted that their media houses had functioned as a part of the Election Headquarters of SNS (Srpska Napredna Stranka – Serbian Progressive Party, that Vučić is leader of). They all have signature styles. He rests on the famous state coups that are occurring in the region at an unprecedented frequency, while no one can find neither the culprits nor the weapons, as well as various state affairs that cover up one another... Take Vučić’s cynical talk about his political opponents for example, where he describes them as ‘people who have already won the elections’ and how he, once again cynically says he will try to ‘find a candidate who might be able to confront them’. That is completely superfluous political style, dangerous for democracy; slandering presidential candidates evocative of Goebbels’ time. The elections would have to be carried without placing curses and attacks on the personal integrity of the candidates. All this suggests that these presidential elections must be truly important for Vučić.”⁷

An addition to this undermining of the democratic legitimacy of Vučić’s government is the detailed, erratic and significantly daily-political biased analyses of the work of judiciary bodies and the legislative authorities. In regard to the work of legislative authorities, in particular of the Parliament, a journalist of Vreme Radmilo Marković has described the atmosphere and the state of affairs among the highest national representatives as such that the government led by SNS is making every effort to strip the meaning from all parliamentary debates broadcasted via public service in order for the citizens to lose every desire for monitoring MPs via television broadcasts.

This would achieve the effect that inevitably follows every authoritarian government fearful of democratic values – an almost total lack of transparency in the work of state institutions: “The Parliament in Serbia is among the last places where you can actually hear a debate between the government and the opposition – in fact, where you can even hear the voice of the opposition. What was happening for the last ten days in the Parliament is an attempt to completely discredit the opposition and to evoke the feeling of revulsion among the citizens watching it broadcasted... This is understandable if one looks at the results of the SNS’s office politics: the Parliament has remained virtually the only place where you can hear any kind of a debate between the government and the opposition that is discernible to the citizens of Serbia, in other words, the only place that has remained on TV stations on a national frequency. All other shows and programs where the voice of the opposition would be heard – including debates during the election campaigns – were abolished and ceased to exist: under various pretences but sharing one thing – they are all gone. Therefore, following this logic of suffocating the media, yet still being reluctant

6 Vesna Pešić, “Vučić je zaveo teror nad institucijama [Vučić has established a terror reign over institutions],” an interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, NIN, no. 3441, pages 10-11

7 Boris Tadić, “Zašto je Jeremić obavestio generala Krgu [Why did Jeremić inform general Krga],” Vreme, no. 1355, pages 8-9

to simply cancel broadcasting of the Parliament, it seems that the government MPs have decided that the Parliament shall turn into the absurd, a spectacle and a program not worth watching.”⁸

Aside from the alleged destruction of the representative body (the Parliament), what is also controversial is our judiciary system. Vida Pertovic Skero, former President of the Supreme Court in Serbia was called to the aid of formulating this, though not so explicitly and so evidently propagandistic. Her critical review should demonstrate the contrast between our current situation and a judicial system fit for a democratic society: “Throughout our judicial system – and the prosecution is the part of it – there is something strange going on. In certain situations, we allow various participants in the procedure to lead certain proceedings, rather than the state authority which is legally and constitutionally empowered to do so. Often we can hear a judge stating that he is unable to resolve some dispute on, let’s say, property rights, because the first time a lawyer had sent a notice he was sick, the second time had just not appeared and only later justified his absence, after that he filed some motion and so the court sessions are scheduled every six months. To the question of who is to blame, everyone will answer the court and not the parties who abuse the authorities. The thing is, the court cannot allow for that to happen. The court is closer to me because I was a judge, but it is the same with the prosecution: the prosecutor cannot justify himself claiming that the answers he had demanded did not arrive for months and, at some point, he must take certain actions that are prescribed by the law. We need to return to the basic settings of the rule of law: democracy, protection of human rights and of the public that ensures democracy. In a democratic society, it cannot happen that someone destroys someone else’s property, even if it was built illegally, without a verdict of the relevant authority. Someone’s rights were disregarded, and we had no publicity even when it was being torn down, not even in the months afterward. No one there has a right to accuse the media of pressing the authorities to do their job. The job of the media is to provide transparency, regardless of the fact that in our country, almost everything can be classified as ‘the yellow press’.”⁹ Similar accusations against the legal system in Serbia were made by Vladimir Vukčević, until recently a prosecutor for the war crimes on the territories of former Yugoslavia, who raises a suggestive question in an interview with the weekly newspapers NIN, which clearly indicates that the legal system and the country as a whole are in a stage of a severe decline, since the line between a crime and the protectors of the state and the legal system no longer exists: “What kind of a country this is if I as a prosecutor can become a public enemy? I who was an enemy of the worst criminals and felons. Is it something wrong with me or with the state?”¹⁰

The system of governing in which legislative and judicial power are virtually suspended, or reduced to a manner of functioning that is quite contrary to all democratic ideals and practices is surely a sign that Serbia functions as an autocratic or dictatorial country. Both cases deal with the system of the individual power of Aleksandar Vučić, a man whose ruling skills stem from his deep-set narcissistic psychological makeup. The political and psychological thesis presented by the members of the opposition of the media is that the government in Serbia is just a magnified “I” of Aleksandar Vučić. This moral-

8 Radmilo Marković, “Gospodari parlamentarnog terora [The masters of parliamentary terror],” *Vreme*, no. 1351, page 6

9 Vida Petrović Škero, “Niko nema poverenja u pravosuđe [No one has faith in the judicial system],” an interview with Tatjana Tagirov, *Vreme*, no. 1346, page 9

10 Vladimir Vukčević, “Pretio mi je Tomislav Nikolić [Tomislav Nikolic has threatened me],” an interview with Anja Nikolić Đaković, NIN, no. 3438, page 21

istically political and superficially psychological outcry can be seen in the following attitude of Dušan Teodorović, an academic who identifies Vučić’s government as absolutist and, despite the proclaimed constitutional and legal constraints, political practice and common sense: “...The Prime Minister, who at this point has absolute power.”¹¹

A government that is not managed and supervised is at the same time, as stated by the caricaturist of NIN Dušan Petričić: “Blatant, arrogant, autistic government intoxicated by their own lies.”¹² The director Goran Marković comes to a similar conclusion, with a certain moralistic connotation and a touch of armchair psychology, and claims: “I do not know how other people think, but I can no longer mentally stand the sight of that narcissistic disorder in all the daily news, I immediately mute it... It has passed the limit of good taste and ascended into the domain of a social pathology and, moreover, an individual pathology. It is, therefore, necessary for someone to oppose it and some kind, any kind, of balance needs to be created. Some strong authoritative person needs to stand up to him, until then, he can regulate the media ad nauseam and bombard the audience with his performances in which the only topic is ‘I’ – see how wonderful and fantastic I am, look what I am doing, look how I see your life... It has really passed all bearable limits, for me at least, I do not know what other people think about it.”¹³

An addition to the words of Marković, Teodorović and Petricevic was given by the sociologist Jovo Bakić in an interview with weekly print *Vreme* in November of 2016. Bakić there explicitly states that in Serbia an authoritarian oligarchy is in power, best reflected in an absolute dominance of the influence of coercion, the media and a conscious creation of an ideological jumble, of which the principal feature is contradiction. “The contradiction is the hallmark of our government system. Even among its MPs, the government is comprised of both those who fully support the USA and NATO policies and those whose biggest dream is probably being Vladimir Putin’s lapdogs. This is an intentional contradiction in politics because that way, the government can cover a more diverse electorate. It can rightfully address the pro-Westerners and ‘Russophiles’. Furthermore, they can all express their opinions, which is interesting, the only thing connecting them being greed for power. A political circus is in question. Tomislav Nikolić, the President of Serbia is a great Russophile, the Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić a pro-Westerner, as well as Zorana Mihajlović, while Vulin is infatuated with Russia. The same goes for political analysts, Dragoslav Anđelković is a great Russophile, Branko Radun as well, while Dejan Vuk Stanković is Western-oriented, and like that, they all say what they think and it is all in favour of the government of Aleksandar Vučić because they all benefit from it. That way, an ideological cacophony that cements an authoritarian government is created.”¹⁴

Vučić’s authoritarian government is based on his magnified “I”, the psychological inclinations of this political leader to fully and unconditionally occupy the entire political, and even public, space. This tendency, woven into Vučić’s model of government, was noted many times. Interestingly enough, the forms

11 Dušan Teodorović, “Premijer ruši pravni poredak [The Prime Minister undermines the legal system],” an interview with Jelka Jovanovic, *Novi Magazin* no. 293, page 18

12 Dušan Petričić, “Vučić me otpustio [Vučić has fired me],” an interview with Olja Bečković, NIN, no. 3432

13 Goran Marković, “Od ljudi prave moralne nakaze [They are making immoral monsters from people],” an interview with Olja Bečković, NIN, no. 3437, page 24

14 Jovo Bakić, “Šta spaja Trampa, Vučića i Šešelja [What is the connection between Trump, Vučić and Šešelja],” an interview with Ivana Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, no. 1350, page 19

of communication range from pseudoscientific analysis to everyday observations that even aspire to a halo of humorous local context. An example of these observations is an interview with the screenwriter Siniša Kovačević, given in the last days of 2016: “There is an expression in Srem, rarely used and only known by the aged – ‘japaja’ (I-than-I-than-I). You know who is Pera Japaja? It is that Pera who at all times speaks to himself ‘ja, pa ja, pa ja’ (I, then I, then I). There is something that Ostrovski best defined as a talent – a sense of moderation. One should not apply it only when it comes to love, gastronomy, and art, but to politics as well – so where does he apply this sound advice?”¹⁵

At the same time, Kovačević accuses Vučić of an abrupt ideological conversion and latent inauthenticity of his political views. One can sense the presence of the campaign of bringing Vučić’s early political steps to mind in that moralistic objection, in order to portray him as a negative political figure to a certain section of the public: “...had utterly changed his political views overnight when he was 40-something! That was not a gradual maturation through which every man passes, but rather an epiphany – this way I will never reach power and the other way I will, end of story. This kind of swindle can be expected from him as early as tomorrow.”¹⁶

The direct association on this campaign of “reminding”, namely the conscious tendency of collocutors of certain weekly newspapers to bring back the question of the political past of Prime Minister Vučić is apparent in a multitude of articles and interviews. Two of the most representative ones are certainly contained in the following places of the corresponding media content. An already mentioned academic Dušan Teodorović, supporter of the ultra-opposition movement “Dosta je bilo” (Enough is enough!) states: “We must not forget that people who are currently running this country – Aleksandar Vučić, Tomislav Nikolić and Maja Gojković – had largely contributed to the collapse of Serbia. It is my honest belief that those people should have been filtered out in the year 2000, for they have greatly contributed to deaths of young people, as warmongers, as well as responsible for the economic recession of the country, emigration of young people, the injured and the refugees. This should always be taken into account and it is never late for lustration.”¹⁷

An even more explicit and more obscene presentation of a political opponent can be found in the appearances of Dušan Petričić and Vesna Pešić. Their political contemplation of the situation in our society is presented in a series of literal profanities that have a derogatory meaning in everyday life, not to mention in public speech. Mannerly and civil Serbia has always had its political spokesperson and moral authority in Vesna Pešić. The said sociologist has put the following conventionally indecent diagnosis, speaking of the relationship between President Nikolić (whom she once supported in the elections of 2012), Aleksandar Vučić (who she compared to Churchill and Se Gaulle, along with the leader of SPS), Vojislav Šešelj, the leader of the opposition party Srpska Radikalna Stranka and the perspectives of Serbia: “Even though they are of the same origin and have similar views, they have failed to form an alliance. Vučić does not tolerate competition and must be an absolute potentate. He needs to humiliate

everyone, in order to accept them. Nikolić has tried not to be bothered by that, but that was not enough. Vučić has, ‘just to be sure’ put him through his tabloid puddle of mud, and took over his duties, while Nikolić allowed that, and erroneously responded with Rusophillia and obsession with Kosovo. And now they both have a problem. Nikolić wants another mandate, but Vučić will not support him since he is not sure he could win the elections. That is where Šešelj became involved, which was not supposed to happen, but Vučić relied on him too, when needed. This radical mob needs to disappear from our political scene if Serbia wants to become a civilized country.”¹⁸

In a similar spirit of his political opponents speaks the already cited Dušan Petričić, who instead of the mentioned word “mob” uses words “scum” and “dregs”. Speaking of the disappointment in the previous, Euro-reformist, government, Petričić suggests a strong moral appeal for the necessity of struggle and the expression of civil disobedience, virtually at all costs. He believes that is the only way for the by him despised government, which he labels with derogatory names, to disappear: “OK, you are disappointed, and what are we to do now? To retreat and vanish, while scum and dregs do whatever they like to us? That is our problem – we were not raised to give up. Serious, proper and correct people do not give up.”¹⁹ At the same time this bitter caricaturist categorically claims, based on his own political orientation, and seemingly appropriate psychological state that connects angst, resentment, frustration and lack of any kind of self-control in public speech that: “Vučić behaves that way to prove to Serbs that they are imbeciles”²⁰ and comes to a conclusion that: “He is just a football fan and nothing more.”²¹ The rhetoric of degradation of the PM which is basically a political de-subjectification and personal anathematization culminates in the stance of a dissidently-minded intellectual who in a “society of un-freedom” peacefully draws, says and writes what he wants achieving some income in the country and abroad. This is about a media-political “democratically-enlightened” manuscript, which clearly distinguishes and differently evaluates political actors by introducing culturally political racism, the insurmountable morally political distance that encourages and reproduces irreconcilable conflicts in the public, with the intent to transfer it to the whole of society. Of course, all under the image of democracy, justice, and fairness. Naturally, the whole process of a harsh dispute with the government cannot go by without victimization of the opposition. As an actor of political activities in a democratic system, the opposition is not truly recognized and respected. It is the subject of continuous media repression, symbolical and political violence both in the institutions of the system and to the general public. Placing the opposition in the “martyr” context is strongly suggested by Zora Drčelić, a journalist of Vreme and states: “There is not a shred of a doubt that the PM’s party-media machinery has enabled a completely grotesque atmosphere in which every potential candidate for the President of Serbia who is not Vučić or someone behind him needs to seriously consider whether it is worth being tied to the horses’ tails and drawn and quartered through the tabloids for only two or the whole three months. Or maybe they should not even try since it is known in advance that the winner of any elections in Serbia can be the one and only – Aleksandar Vučić, because the ratings say so.”²²

15 Siniša Kovačević, “Šta će crkve umirućem narodu? [Why does the doomed nation need churches?]” an interview with Olja Bečković, NIN, no. 3444, page 10

16 Ibid, page 10

17 Dušan Teodorović, “Premijer ruši pravni poredak [The Prime Minister undermines the legal system],” an interview with Jelka Jovanović, Novi Magazin, no. 293, page 17

18 Vesna Pešić, “Vučić je zaveo teror nad institucijama [Vučić has established a reign of terror upon institutions],” an interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, “NIN”, no. 3441, page 13

19 Dušan Petričić, “Vučić me otpustio [Vučić fired me],” an interview with Olja Bečković, NIN, no. 3432, page 11

20 Ibid, page 12

21 Ibid, page 12

22 Zora Drčelić, “Kuća velikog premijera [The house of the great Prime Minister],” Vreme, no. 1354

Besides the authoritarianism, the demolition of the democratic-liberal order, repressive practices against the media and his political opponents, aggressively narcissistic personality type which aspires to emphasize the self and to literally control all the resources and the people, he is also a political figure who inauthentically represents European values and receives the support of European officials conditionally. Positive relations between the EU and Vučić are the result of the EU's desire to support a democratically-based person who implements the policies of regional cooperation and political stability in this region.

An agreement between the EU and Vučić is partial, and the constructiveness of the PM of Serbia on the issues of Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as other regional challenges, has been awarded with the tolerance of his autocratic tendencies in the conduct of internal politics. In support of this thesis a British historian and writer Misha Glenny, who was the moderator of the dialogue between Serbian PM Aleksandar Vučić and Albanian PM Edi Rama, was brought, as a man who needs to prove Vučić's inauthenticity in the acceptance and implementation of the European agenda in Serbia: "It is interesting that Vučić and Rama have a coordinated approach to the EU, which has not remained unnoticed. For the European leaders, it is important that Vučić remains on the path of European integration and maintains the dialogues with Pristina, with a serious role also being the refugee crisis, due to the geographical position of Serbia. They need his cooperation. With Brexit happening, a very difficult situation in Italy, a disaster in Greece and security threats... For Vučić all this provides fairly enough room to maneuver, because regardless of his autocratic tendencies, at this point the West does not need any instability and chaos in the Balkans."²³

From the internal and foreign policy level, we proceed to the individual level, which has already been suggested earlier by Pešić's or Petričić's receptions of the political behavior of the government. A ruthless critique should be continued on a psychological and moral level, to which every man is sensitive, including the PM of Serbia - Aleksandar Vučić. The focus of the writings in October was on, according to all relevant and publicly available information in the investigation, an attempt to threaten the safety of the PM Vučić and his family members. Even though the police has found weapons and other clues that suggest a rational conclusion that something serious is in store, the critically oriented part of the public started mocking the potential threats with great enthusiasm, making openly malicious jokes at the expense of important issues such as the safety of the holders of the highest positions in the country. First to undermine the whole story of the weapons found in the Jajinac woods near Vučić's family home, in the manner of an amateur police investigator, who combines street humor, so-called logical witticism, and a partial common sense was the press bard Milos Vasić.

The mentioned journalist has interpreted the whole event in his article "Tales from the Jajinac woods" as an expression of political propaganda and the police amateurism, with all the accompanying media plots which to him seemed panicky, nervous and funny: "Instead of the regular, everyday procedure, a mass-panic with a circus in tow has been immediately created, because for this government propaganda has always been more important than criminology. We have received yet another weekend of nervousness and panicking, only to finally hear from the PM and the Minister of Internal Affairs that

23 Miša Gleni, "Zašto je Vučić miljenik Zapada? [Why is Vučić the golden boy of the West?]" an interview with Dejan Atanasijević, *Vreme*, no. 1345, page 6

chances are weak that the issue of that weapon will ever be resolved, which the PM has found funny, but Dr. Stefanović has not, and should not. Then the story of how the PM will step down from the position of the Coordinator of the Safety Services appeared because supposedly, he was not satisfied with their work. So he was their boss the whole time, and now is leaving because they are not doing so well? Various political analysts have after that engaged in the debates of who should secure the PM up-close and who from a distance, and who with counter-intelligence, as if those people from three different departments (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Information Agency and Military Security Agency) had to constantly patrol through the Jajinac woods in hope they will, and not some neighbours, find a suspicious trunk."²⁴

With the same message and in a similar tone, the case of the weapons found in Jajinci was analyzed by Dragan Šutanovac, the former Minister of Defence and current president of the opposition Demokratska Stranka (The Democratic Party): "I have seriously analyzed with my team not only the case in Jajinci, but all the cases in the last four years and we have noted dozens of front pages on which the assassination attempt was 'just about to' or 'just had' happened on the PM and the state leadership. I do not want to get into whether that was really true or not, but in no serious state is that a way to present information. If such thing were happening and if we have people within the Ministry of Internal Affairs who are revealing confidential information, then the questions of who performed a security check on them, how did they get into those positions and how is it possible that they have not been prosecuted by now should be answered. A massive problem here is that everything is done theatrically, as in a drama, or some kind of a thriller, and at the same time our country is in the phase of regression, with the highest level of poverty, the lowest living standard, reduced salaries and pensions and increased taxes, and it all becomes irrelevant when articles regarding 'coups' appear."²⁵

In the same spirit of political disqualification, that connects pseudo-psychological analysis and moralistic understandings of politics, "the fierce" Vesna Pešić expresses similar claims as Šutanovac and Milos Vasić. Her statement can be summarized in the following thesis - all the security threats to the PM Vučić and his family members are part of a media-political charade: "All these coups, conspiracies of foreign embassies, spies and threats to Vučić are just a plain fiction. We have never heard a single coherent explanation of who is, and why is he, threatening Vučić. Nor have the police discovered who was responsible for the alleged assassination attempt. That is why the story of the assaults on the government is just another distraction for the citizens. It is not them who are in the difficult position, but those in power. Poor government is struggling, while we are enjoying and lounging! The government can, in reality, be compromised if it is associated with crime and parallel and armed structures. If it were so, but we do not know anything about it then it really is unstable in its foundation. Vučić talks about his endangerment because he is a coward. He gets petrified at the very thought he could lose power at the elections. As soon as he hears something, and that something is criticism, he claims someone wants to bring him down. Hence he is terribly annoyed by the opposition and its existence. He is intimidated and so would preferably abolish any opposition. But he cannot go all the way in this since the story of joining the EU runs in parallel. So

24 Milos Vasić, "Priče iz šume jajinačke [Tales from the Jajinac woods]," *Vreme*, no. 1348, pages 5-6

25 Dragan Šutanovac, "Rijaliti šou scenarista iz Vlade [The reality show of the government screenwriters]," an interview with Ivana Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, no. 1348, page 15

he has to preserve that path, being important for the continuance in power, even though he does not enjoy it.”²⁶

It goes without saying that the “fictitious” public coups have their realistic media-political influence. This is why a journalist for the weekly newspaper *Vreme*, Dejan Anastasijević, clearly alluding to the close connection between the Prime Minister Vučić and his brother Andrej, minimized the whole problem by reducing it to a mere family “melodrama” that is taking part in front of the television and newspaper audiences, with a goal of facilitating two things: 1) stigmatization of political opponents and 2) setting the stage for the reorganization in the sectors of state and military security. “No matter the results of the formal investigation, the critics of the current ruling coalition, either domestic or foreign, from now on will have to count on being marked as, if not direct, then at least moral accomplices of the assassins. Also, figuratively speaking, many heads will soon roll in the sector of security, and the only one that is sure to remain on its shoulders is the head of the Minister of Police.”²⁷

Next to making light of security threats, and obsessive analysis of their media and political effects, critically oriented journalists have tried to prove and present the connection between Vučić and football fan groups that deal in suspicious and illegal businesses. What this is really about is a system of indirect criminalization that, through insinuations, unproven hypotheses, stretched arguments, partial findings and the help of abuse of common sense, promotes the agenda that directly criminalizes the Prime Minister and his associates. A convincing example of the construction of the negative image of the authorities by means of misuse of football fan groups issue appeared after the murder of the FK Partizan football fan group leader Aleksandar Stanković. The author of the text „Mutava država” [Dumb state], Slobodan Georgijev, tries to uncover if there are dealings, and how are they performed, between the government, led by Aleksandar Vučić, and the football fan group, which was lead by the murdered Aleksandar Stanković.

Slobodan Georgijev’s thesis is that the passivation of the football fans’ rebellion against the government is “rewarded” with tolerance towards criminal acts and non-existent prison sentences for the fans that show loyalty to the political elite: “That is why Stanković is important: with his ‘activities’ on and off the stands, he made sure that the ‘right people’ in management receive the necessary support, so that the stands and the streets do not make too many waves against the authorities. For all of that hard work, for wearing his heels down on the streets and at the stand, Stanković managed to avoid serving his prison sentence, and it seems that, by choosing to accept that deal and trade for freedom, he made problems for himself which lead him to such a grizzly end.”²⁸

Next to the attempts to connect the government with suspicious characters, like the late football fan group leader of FK Partizan, almost a ritual repetition of the „Savamala” case is also present. Insistently illegal demolition of the objects in that part of Belgrade, in the night between the 23rd and 24th of April 2016, is the crown piece of evidence of the love for power, suspicious business dealings and social at-

26 Vesna Pešić, “Vučić je zaveo teror nad institucijama [Vučić has established a reign of terror upon institutions],” an interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, “NIN”, no. 3441, page 12

27 Dejan Atanasijević, „Čuvar brata svojega [His own brother’s keeper],” *Vreme*, no. 1349, page 7

28 Slobodan Georgijev, „Mutava država [Dumb state],” *Vreme*, no. 1346, page 6

mosphere ruled by a high level of insecurity and fear. The „Savamala” case presents, for the opposition leaders, ombudsman, NGOs, part of the media and a small part of the citizens of Belgrade, the crowning piece of evidence against the SNS government and Aleksandar Vučić. The evidence that shows its violent and non-transparent dimension, a confirmation that the power-holding elite has morally questionable intentions. The importance of the said event for the discourse of the opposition is enormous. That is why there is such an investment of huge and intense energy to keep this topic public. In the writings of weekly newspapers, interviews, columns, texts and caricatures, there is not a single political activist belonging to the opposition who does not mention this case.

For example, the already quoted academic Dušan Teodorović, supporter of the ĐB (Enough is enough) movement, claims: “The state was murdered with the Savamala case. The Prime Minister does not seem to understand that this is not about the demolition of three barracks, as he constantly repeats, but about the demolition of the state, and the rule of law”. The same spirit and context is present in the editorial office of the editor in chief of the newspaper *Vreme*, Dragoljub Žarković: “If Vučić and his associates think to sweep Savamala under the rug by publicizing the murder of a singer, which he mentions often, they are badly mistaken. Every day some illegal ‘hundred-year-old’ structures are torn down in Belgrade, but that is not the point and such things will never be a government issue. Savamala became a government issue, and is the subject of communiqués between intelligence agencies, as well as of the upcoming reports on the state in Serbia – from the EU to the American administration. Here are just several reasons: First, and universal: It was a form of suspension of the state law, a coup on a limited territory and in limited time. Second, and less universal: somebody issued the order to cut the electricity and water supply while the masked men were tearing down the structures. Third, and more specific: Somebody issued the order to the police not to take any calls while the deed was being done. Fourth, and supplemental: Everyone, including the Prime Minister, and especially the state prosecutor’s office, are turning a blind eye to this violence directed towards the legal system. Fifth, and even more grotesque: The protests against the state violence in Savamala are presented as being financed and all of us that condemn such behavior are marked as foreign mercenaries and domestic traitors.”²⁹

Not far behind the two quoted public figures, we can also find the journalist of NIN Sandra Petrušić, who makes a statement that the „Savamala” case shows that to the Prime Minister Vučić, in spite of his declaratively pro-European attitude, the idea of the rule of law is not a priority: “As far as the rule of law and legal state go, the Prime Minister has proven and demonstrated beyond any doubt that these ideas do not concern him at all. And not just by giving his blessing to the continuing damage that his pet project, Belgrade Waterfront, is incurring with the recent approval of the donation of a cultural monument of great significance to Serbia – the building of Geozavod for foreign investors.”³⁰

Autocracy, abolishment of institutions, media control and, now, routine procedure of symbolical and verbal elimination of opposition in the public and political arenas, latent simulations of a state coups, as well as the connection between the state and criminal underworld – being the main claims of oppositional parties and the critical intelligentsia – all have their culmination in two claims made by two po-

29 Dragoljub Žarković, „Kako najbolji student Vučić pada na ispitu-pitajte me nešto o pevačici [How the best student Vučić fails an exam – ask me something about the singer],” *Vreme*, no. 1349, page 4

30 Sandra Petrušić, “Beograd na vodi, istina na ledu [Belgrade waterfront, frozen truth],” NIN, no. 3443, page 5

litically engaged artists, supporters of the former DS government and its political partners. One of them is the already quoted Goran Marković who literally claims, in an interview with Olja Bečković, a journalist for NIN, that freedom in Serbia exists only in a mental institution:

“Marković: Guberevac is the first psychiatric clinic on the Balkans, built by the Prince Mihailo. Those few doctors, the first psychiatrists in Serbia, actually controlled the last piece of free territory in Serbia. There was no Serbia, the government and the army were on Corfu, the country was occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but those few hundred hospital square meters were free.

NIN: So the only freedom to be found was in a mental institution?

Marković: That's right. And that is the connection with the present.”³¹

A similarly harsh message was also sent by the actor Zoran Cvijanović, at one time the Advisor for Ecology of the then European Integrations Minister Božidar Đelić, who also explicitly claims that politics in Serbia can only be swallowed with a fistful of tranquilizers, like diazepam: “It's the only solution offered, three bottles of diazepam are spent per capita in Serbia every month. In old days people used to only drink, so when you saw someone drunk, you didn't bring up any serious subjects this person, you waited for him to sober up, and solve any possible problems tomorrow. Today you can't tell what your colleague at a business meeting is on and why can't he put two and two together. You come up on a man in traffic who is incredibly 'cool', he starts to break and won't go through the green light! Only in the evening, when you remember the incident, you think: Well, O.K., he probably took a quarter of diazepam and felt great, green light, reminded him of his hometown, of nature I guess...But the real answer to surviving insecurity without medication is creativity, this doesn't apply to artists only, but to every human being walking this earth. Imagination is crucial to defending yourself, some idea of self, of your life, of everything.”³²

Marković and Cvijanović represent metaphors of seeing politics as originally irrational, seriously dangerous and chaotic activity. The politics of today is beyond reason, alienated from any reasonable or moral considerations, reduced to various manifestations of violence and infinitely unsuccessful different political and economic projects.

The state of the Opposition – between the lack of political and moral legitimacy and constant striving for the return to the zone of political relevancy

The image of the opposition in weekly newspapers and editorial columns of daily newspapers is far more complex and is represented in a greater variety of dimensions. In the daily and weekly newspapers critical of the victors of the Fifth October, Informer and Pečat, the image of the opposition is extremely negative. In the mentioned printed media there are no interviews with the members of the EU supporting the opposition, and very little, almost no space is given to the anti-European opposition to Vučić, represented by DSS and Dveri. Šešelj and SRS are not treated the same, but they are not in any way, nor

31 Goran Marković, „Od ljudi prave moralne nakaze [They are making immoral monsters from people],” razgovor sa Oljom Bečković, NIN, no. 3437, page 24-25

32 Zoran Cvijanović, „Politiku ne možeš da pratiš bez bensedina [One can't keep track of politics without bensedin],” razgovor sa Oljom Bečković, NIN, no. 3442, page 19

can they be, the darlings of these media. However, unlike the winners of the Fifth October, the Radicals are not politically stigmatized. In the same way, the image of the opposition is extremely negative on almost every political issue, including the issue of political or any other kind of credibility of opposition leaders through reminders of their governing period, or polemics with their attitudes, open or hidden intentions. On the other hand, weekly newspapers like Vreme, NIN, Novi Magazin and Nedeljnik give their open support which does not vary according to the content, but according to the intensity. In radically critical weekly newspapers, the intensity of support for the opposition is greater, and measured not only by space provided for the oppositional leaders to express their positions and interpretations, but also by the strength and radicalism of the negative campaign lead against Aleksandar Vučić and Srpska Napredna Stranka. Unlike Informer and Pečat, opposition leaders are provided with a huge space for expression and elaboration of their positions, leading to the political and media blockage of the possible influence of the argumentation and rhetoric of the government, not only with the relatively small readership of weekly newspapers, but, above all, they narrow the influence of the government on the heartbeat of the public. This kind of media and political situation is partially the source of the confrontation between Vučić and the “elite”.

The complexity of the opposition's image is viewed through the different approach to the issues of its activity and potential. Pro-government print media, Informer above all, and Pečat up to a point, see its activity and potential as dubious. At the same time, oppositional weekly newspapers, especially those radically critical of the government like Vreme and NIN, most often ascertain its public, or political impotence, but also develop the discourse that shows the democratic deficiencies of the political situation, at times idealizing the activity of the opposition. What is typical is that in these detail oriented weekly newspapers there is almost no critical review on the activities of the pro-European opposition from the fairly recent time when it formed the government. This type of “omission” is not accidental but consciously chosen, considering the fact that the weekly newspapers are an active factor in party polemics, a kind of an intellectual supplement in the difficult and exhausting struggle of political actors in Serbia.

A special role in applying a negative value component to the opposition parties is reserved for the newspaper Informer, both in relation to the articles appearing in the daily editions, and the editorial columns of Dragan J. Vučićević. Vučićević's columns problematize actors on the oppositional scene in a moral and political sense, as well as treating oppositional media and NGOs critically, with almost constant reflection to the period of the government of the victors of the Fifth October. Basic thesis of these theses could be condensed into the following three mutually connected moments that make up this author's approach: 1) present opposition has no moral credibility (due to the highly corrupt political class that it consists of) and the political capacity to lead the state due to the failure of the transition in Serbia; 2) in the printed media inclined to the opposition, which is most of them, the present government is attacked without a serious rational explanation and with one goal only – to be brought down as quickly as possible; 3) in the media that support the current opposition there is a clear discrimination of all of those who do not oppose the government lead by Vučić.

Vučićević's critique of the Serbian opposition scene is inasmuch directed towards the opposition as a factor of political life and the media which are extremely critical of the government. His critique is always based on ad hominem attacks, strictly personalized, in order to be more convincing. That is why he stigmatizes a specific person, and the person's moral and psychological profile is emphasized in a way that makes that person unworthy of any function in public life.

The writings of the editor in chief of *Informer* is relevant to the understanding of the media and political scene in Serbia for three mutually connected reasons. Firstly, the style and content of his writing are such as to sustain the political interest of classes with lower education, who represent the majority of tabloid readership and a very loyal electoral body. Secondly, *Informer* is important for the current government because from week to week, from day to day, it deals in a reevaluation of the negative attitudes and media and political images attached to it, images being consistently reproduced, by the critically oriented media. And, finally, *Informer* holds the leading place in the daily media in creating the negative image of the current opposition as a political actor.

One of the basic assumptions of Vučićević's writing is that the concept of the political opposition is not strictly tied to the parties that vote against the government's political decisions, laws and other initiatives and drafts in the Parliament, but that the opposition is made up of a network of various connected organizations and public figures. The opposition is seen as a coalition of parties, NGOs, media and public intellectuals. The second basic assumption is the specific understanding of politics that Vučićević ascribes to the oppositional leaders and their political and media allies. Politics is for the oppositional leaders, in Vučićević's vision, an instrument for the previous political elite to get even richer. In the conditions of high poverty and objectively low standard of living, this kind of image of the opposition is used for fuel of the current government's campaign and its loyalist media. It is exactly these campaigns that bring up the rage, disappointment or indifference with opposition supporters, and can motivate the government supporters to stop the restoration of the corrupt political elite made up of the winners of the Fifth October.

The third assumption of Vučićević's interpretation of the opposition as a political actor is its deficit of patriotism, anti-Russian politic and unconditional loyalty to Western powers. For the purpose of obtaining power and demonstrating their loyalty to the Western states, according to the opinion of the editor in chief of *Informer*, the oppositional parties are prepared to do anything necessary at the given political moment, from starting various media campaigns, to acts that serve the purpose of destabilizing Serbia as a state.

In the context of the saga of loyalty to the West, two mutually connected moments vary: absence of any coherent nationally responsible politics and coldness towards Russia, which appears as an ally of Serbia in every sense. Several examples from the texts published in *Informer* can show all of the mentioned characteristics of the anti-opposition discourse. Extensive interpretation of the concept of opposition, contextualization of intraparty struggle, without consideration if the focus is on the parties or other real or potential rivals of the government, viewing politics as an instrument for personal gain, harsh charges that go beyond what is considered civil, one-sided moral judgments, personal moral questioning of every oppositional actor, all of these discourse elements are combined into a powerful whole, with the goal of making a deep impression in the mind of the reader who needs to be clearly and continuously directed towards one type of political orientation, or another.

In relation to the content, Vučićević's discourse is composed of mutually connected elements that mark, in specific contexts, political actors, events, and processes. The opposition has been given an extremely negative role. Firstly, it is not democratic since it requests "rule without elections", furthermore, it is a "factor of political instability", potential generator of "violence on the streets, similar to Macedonia, Ukraine and so on", its "patriotic allegiance" is suspect, and the moral imperfection of oppositional

leaders is unquestionable and radical. It treats Serbia like a "Western colony or a vassal", it is financially supported by the money of the Rockefeller foundation and the money of the American billionaire of Hungarian origin George Soros...At the same time, columns of the editor in chief of the newspaper *Informer* unconditionally support certain aspects of the political program and activity of the government lead by Aleksandar Vučić, whether it is its foreign affairs politics of balance between the East and the West, or its political support to the fight against crime and corruption. Of course, the integral part of Vučićević's writing is a harsh polemic with oppositional media, or more precisely, the media that are critically oriented towards the government or towards Russia. The whole issue, approach, rhetorical and argumentative twists, and conclusions, are encircled by an atmosphere of moral panic and high tensions on a micro, macro, and even global level. Political differences between actual personalities, positions or rivalries of foreign powers on a local or global level are shown with fatalistic tension, and a specific, not so small, dose of passion and one-sided conclusions.

Due to soon coming presidential elections, writing about potential opposition candidates, especially about Sasa Jankovic and Vuk Jeremic, is very striking. General motive in opposition actors unmasking has been reduced to variation of 2 moments – deficiency of political and moral credibility.

Opposition moral credibility deficiency can be noticed in several different aspects. First, everything what opposition does or has an intention to do, it does due to its narrowly understood interest of its leaders, domestic tycoons or a part of non-governmental sector or due to west powers interest, especially of the USA interest. In Vucicevic's vistas, politics is seen by the opposition as a mean for acquiring some privileges of enormous proportions or for foreign mentors interest defraying. Equally, opposition, especially euro-reform one, has been deprived of the foundation so accordingly it doesn't accept democratic elections as a heritage and tries to gain the power via street protests. The whole anti-democratic plot is happening in the shadow of global leavening between the USA and Russia, making the event very important and encouraging the state of moral panic and political confusion. One characteristic spot in Vučićević's text shows crossing of recently stated motives: "No salvation for us, we won't go bust". This one, due to many repetitions a bit worn statement of Nikola Pašić he said in the middle of the 1st WW in Niš, where the Serbian capital was temporary relocated, even today – after 100 years, gives the best course of describing a horrible historical fate of our nation and our state. Squeezed between 2 worlds, 2 irreconcilable civilizations and 3 warring religions, always under attack of worldly empires, we Serbs never in history have managed to avoid a big war. It seems it will be the same this time too. Ultimatum given by the USA and EU that expires on Sunday 9th October at midnight, imposing the idea to Belgrade to obediently give up from 'Telekom' property on Kosovo and Metohija in exchange for empty promises given by EU, which would in general be, of course, just an introduction into the robbery of a complete state property in our southern district, property valuable almost EUR 200 billion (!?!), essentially is the same like Austro-Hungarian ultimatum from 1914. Ok, this time war is not directly something we can expect in relation to this ultimatum – at least still nobody brandishes us with an occupation, but the goal is the same: to destroy Serbia as an independent and sovereign state! Please, just don't keep yourself in any illusion. Agreements and alliance with the West are not possible anymore. West powers don't need our country as a state that rules itself, but only as a puppet- servant territory where octroyed ruling elite, for a slavish portion of fasting beans, amenably serves and listens to. They won't stop until Serbia gives up of itself, until we recognize Kosovo, until we agree with a suppression of the

Republic of Srpska and until we 'make a war' with Russia. What do you have to say? It is not possible, that will never happen? I agree. That's the reason why the chaos in Serbia can't be avoided."³³

Vucicevic's tone of moral and political condemnation appears also in relations with other media, in the concrete case – daily newspapers Blic. In his writing about Russian arms delivered to Serbia, one of the columnists of Blic Veselin Golubovic, critically looked back on offered Russian arsenal of air and ground arms, declaring it "being outdated and needless". Vucicevic's Counter-response has arrived according to almost perfect measurement of propaganda journalism engaging and opts the reader: "Of course, one should really be an idiot to believe that obersturmbanführer Veselin Pigmej Simonovic is just an ordinary idiot. No, he is paid very well from tycoon and NATO funds to make a fool of himself and to try to make Serbs being the bunch of idiots. At least only complete idiots today can't see what Russia has done, what is doing and what will do for Serbia. Only one idiot and imbecile can believe that our honest friend and strategic ally may be someone who bombed us, who stole Kosovo from us, who was robbing our country from 2000-2012 in collaboration with DOS criminals (DOS – Democratic Opposition of Serbia). At the end, only the idiot can believe in stupid NATO propaganda which overloads us every day by pro-German Zeitung Blic and its stinking under-newspapers Alo, as well as that evil racketeers of Kurir! Let make it clear at the end, the truth is that Vladimir Vladimirovič Putin, with his delivery of "MIGs", military tanks and announced delivery of the missile systems "BUK M2", sent a clear message to all evildoers in the West: 'Back off from Serbia, it will never again be an easy target!'"³⁴

Before these presidential elections, as a shape of preventive "special press war", the editor of Informer paid his attention to biographies of Vuk Jeremić and Saša Janković. Both of them, except of the fact they both are shown as "storm troopers on behalf and for an account of Western interests", are shown as immoral persons. Saša Janković – as an ombudsman who hasn't protected any citizen and, simultaneously, there is a controversial story about suicide (murder) of his friend from youth, with which Jankovic has been connected directly. "That Saša Janković is a clear phenomenon, popularly known as Sale Prangija (Sale the Gun), that one working for more than 8 years as an ombudsman even there is no evidence he has helped even to one citizen in the sense of protecting his/her rights, that one who would like to be a politician but in the same time, to have a huge state salary, on the working position prohibiting being involved in politics... So, hmm, it could be very easy that Sale Prangija Janković was recruited, even on that 01st April 1993, immediately after the murder of Predrag Gojković. For example, by those ones who would like now, via him, to tailor our collective destiny. And please, let the sturmbannführer Veselin Simonović, director of pro-German Zeitung Blic, know that this is not chasing nor satanization. This is only insisting on the truth. Satanization and chase are done only by those who are afraid of the truth. False ombudsman Saša Janković, for example".

The story on inconsequence of Vuk Jeremić is even more illustrative. It reminds on some kind of the Informer editor personal memory on the meeting held few years ago. Kosovo was the topic of the meeting. According to Vucicevic's testimony he shared with the readers in the form of text, Vuk Jeremic was ready in 2008 to support the politics of giving up from Kosovo and to dedicate himself to including Serbia into

33 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Kontrarevolucija [Counterrevolution],“ Informer, 01. 10. 2016, page 4

34 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Poljski kaluđer, Veselin pigmej i ruski 'migovi' [Polish monk, Veselin the Pigmy and Russian 'MIGs'],“ Informer, 24. 12. 2016, page 4

Euro-Atlantic structures. However, the whole thing was changed in 2010 when, faced with the possibility of failure in DS (Democratic Party), Jeremic decided to think about foundation of own national-democratic party. The point of whole story is very simple: For Jeremic, Kosovo is not of crucial importance, its importance is relative and is connected to the scope of his action. According to this, the reader is suggested that Jeremic is a man prone to different political transformations and very bad and unreliable candidate for the president. This meeting description is visible in the next quote: "Twelve years ago, Vuk Jeremić, the then advisor of the president Boris Tadic, tried to convince me that it is very important for Serbia to get rid of Kosovo as soon as possible because, let me paraphrase – our state can have the future only with clearly defined borders. When I told him that Serbs will never forgo of Kosovo because, no Kosovo – no Serbia, Vuk jumped from his leather sofa and told me I am behind and I am a bigot and that I must understand that to average Serbian Kosovo is far as Albania is?!

It must be that you, 'Little Wolf', are from Kosovo?! – Jeremić pulled his 'crucial argument' in proving my narrow-mindedness No Vuk, my origin is not from Kosovo. But, I am as the huge majority of Serbs are, from Kosovo with my soul... - I responded and Jeremic reacted on that only with his contemptuous smile and waved... Except of official reception, we never met again, until the end of 2010. And then, suddenly in December of the same year, maybe 5-6 days after his failure on elections for the vice president of DS (Democratic Party) he invited me to have lunch with him, in the 'Mitologija' restaurant. That Saturday, in the early afternoon, Vuk Jeremić, sitting opposite to me, was completely different man. Enjoying in smoking the thick Cuban cigarette, he told me how Boris 'screwed him over totally' and that he will quote – 'fuck his mother, soon or the later' (Serbian curse meaning taking revenge against him). Later, he was interested in knowing how would Serbs reacted if he founds a new democratic and national party and then, he started to have speech on 'holy Serbian land' we mustn't give up from. Ok, you can guess – he spoke about Kosovo??? – Wait a minute Vuk, didn't you try to convince me 6 years ago that we must give up of Kosovo?! When have you become so backward and a bigot?!? – I couldn't have resisted. – Baaah, leave that, that was a different time... - he snorted, signed the bill for our lunch, of course on the account of MFA and ran out. Never again I have heard from him."³⁵

Generally, in creation of the opposition negative image, different motives were used; especially, one can separate – unscrupulousness in political fight; modest, almost non-existent moral credibility; political incompetency; lack of patriotism; extreme loyalty to the West, especially to the USA and EU.

Impressionable contours of the uniformed way of thinking, more precisely – press access and conclusion on presidential candidates of opposition, it is possible to discover in the Pecat weekly magazine. In this context, very indicative is the attitude of the Editor in Chief Milorad Vucelic. He considers that Jeremic and Jankovic would cancel patriotic and pro-Russian card of Vucic's politics and would make Serbia closer to its historical enemies on the West: "According to the politics of almost all parties, and especially those of democratic preference, it is possible to conclude that, immediately after presidential elections, the Constitution of Serbia must be changed; especially its preamble on Kosovo and Metohija. There must be underlined in the new Constitution, a provision on the Vojvodina statehood. As for Presevo, they will have autonomy at least and there are no obstacles for the path to the 'natural Albania', being only a free translation for a Big Albania. Simultaneously, no obstacles would be created in the function-

35 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Vuk u dve slike [Vuk in two pictures],“ Informer, 29. 10. 2016, page 4

ing of Albanian municipalities, from Ulcinj to Presevo, leading towards to the same goal. In parallel with that process, the Brussels Agreement would be left and independency of the fake Kosovo state would be urgently recognized. That would be the way of, as they say 'unloading' of Serbia on its way on EU path. For that purpose, the UN Security Council would be required officially to annul 1244 Resolution and to accept Kosovo in the UN. Russia would be ultimately required to give up the right of veto in the Security Council, in the same way it was required by the yellow regime to accept EULEX instead of UNMIK. Russia would be, in polite or impolite way, asked by our future president, not to be against Kosovo acceptance in UNESCO. A new democratic president will submit (to the Serbian Assembly) a Resolution ordering to Russia to bring back Crimea to the Ukraine and that, with all means, stops the resistance in Donbass."³⁶

Put into the frame of mentioned (geo)political i.e. political dilemmas, the opposition candidate program, according to the editor of Pečat, is the program of giving up from the state and national interests and, being such, it is not acceptable for most of Serbs.

The Nedeljnik columnist Ljiljana Smajlović gives a special kind of reflection to oppositional and wider critical discourse. She confronted to 2 tendencies in the oppositional discourse- separation to "clever" and "not clever", "cultural" and "not cultural" and the trend of psychologisation in the critical interpretation of Vučić's politics. Clearly she writes in the text "Myth on weak leader" the following: "I tremendously am annoyed with 2 things. The first one is snobbery of 'anti-Vučičevićs' who divide the citizens of Serbia on the elite and peasants, where we from 'the circle of tram No. 2' (Belgrade slang, meaning a small number of people) are from the first group and those who vote for Vučić are from the second one. Much more they go on my nerves with their never-ending psycho-analysis of the prime minister, giving him psychiatric diagnosis instead of telling what would they do so different if they were him. Would they for example buy Russian 'MIGs' or involve sanctions to Russia? Would they vote for the Ukraine Resolution in UN? Would they protect the workers in the way of kicking the ass of that strict and unjust South Korean company investing in Vranje? The reader has for sure notice the Freud's jargon flooded the political speech? Vučić is egocentric, infantile, 'juvenile a bit', schizophrenic, aggressive, authoritative and pathological liar."³⁷

Of course, the picture of the opposition is not exclusively negative. Most weekly newspapers are open for promotion the opposition leaders' point of views and who almost on regular basis have interviews on more sides. Also, detailed analysis of actual political moment are in favor of opposition, both in written or interview form, by different social actors (actors, film directors, cartoonists, politicologists...) being directly or indirectly "in favor of oppositional thing". Also, many front pages and caricatures review make problematic every movement of the Government, making its main protagonist Aleksandar Vucic politically unacceptable and morally disputable.

However, there are 3 moments that should be separated in favor of positive identification with opposition, in moral – political sense. Opposition is a victim of media torture of the Government, opposition has a chance to come back to the social scene through non-conventional shapes of protests and opposition is, unlike present Government, ready to accept the change of Government as a natural part of political process in democracy.

36 Milorad Vučelić, "Predsednik [President]", Pečat, 16. 12. 2016, page 2

37 Ljiljana Smajlović, "Mit o slabom lideru [Myth of the weak leader]", Nedeljnik, no. 259-260

Constantly potentiated narrative on institutional violence over opposition in Serbian Parliament should be added to this, which completes the discourse of the opposition (auto)victimization, as a political actor. Apart of manipulation with moral-preferential status of "victim", oppositional way of observation of the world gets the shape of affirmation of non-conventional citizen movement and initiatives. The reason for this kind of media-political operation is in bitter fact that present oppositional parties are not attractive enough for the electorate, so accordingly, they must be media encouraged by other actors. One of the promoters of this political idea is a politicologist Filip Ejduš who says: "I think that currently the biggest potential have new oppositional movements, being clearly confronted ideologically with current SNS regime and who have new and vigorous people as their leaders, with an untainted reputation. These new powers are mostly much more capable than established political parties in social media and alternative shapes of mobilization, being capable in that way easier to neutralize more and more stronger media control and censorship. Among these new movements, I count recently found Gradjanski front on the left, Dveri on the right and Dosta je bilo in the middle of political spectrum. I thought that it is very important that the movement 'Ne da(vi)mo Beograd' offers an alternative on city elections. Crucial for that movement is to offer a strong ideological, esthetic, economic and political alternative to the 'Belgrade Waterfront' project and it would be enough."³⁸

In showing the picture about opposition, it is very important to take a look on one more, very important detail which should, allegedly, show the essential difference between SNS and the 5th October parties. Relations towards the issue on the Government change. While DS made many mistakes, one thing was very obvious – it was ready for peaceful leaving the government. From acting the current, SNS led government, something like that may be concluded due to brutalization both public and political sector. This bitter moral-political condemnation in public area was legitimated by Dušan Petričić, the cartoonist: "I belong to those who believe Tadić is the main culprit for Vučić's coming to the power, I have no dilemma about that; however, people horribly forget there are several 'trifles' showing the crucial difference between DS and this party having power now. DS had a power, lost elections and peacefully left the government, clearly respecting its democratic character – while these will never leave in peaceful and democratic way, that must have been clear to everybody who has at least 3 gr of brain. The second, in the time of Milošević and these sharing the power with him, the state was loaded with criminal, murders in the streets, shooting, bombs, horrible. During the time of democrats, that was stopped: now we have again shooting, violence, murders in Novi Sad, Belgrade, jeeps in Bela Palanka... For me, those are very big differences. Critical ones."³⁹

Unlike the picture of the government, being mostly shown in almost completely negative colors, the picture of opposition is differentiated and stratified. Of course, the opposition image is negative in magazines and daily newspapers, completely or partly supporting Vucic's visions and movements. On another side, there is a serial of affirmative and indirectly affirmative attitudes trying to make opposition, in media and political way, redesigned and to make it, as soon as possible in some extent competitive to present government.

38 Filip Ejduš, "Vreme je da neko upali svetlo [It's time that somebody turns on the light]", Vreme, no. 1347, page 16

39 Dušan Petričić, "Vučić me otpustio [Vučić has fired me]", conversation with Olja Bečković, NIN, no. 3432, page 10

Montenegro at pre-electoral crossroads – destabilization of security or “pre-electoral games” and political points?

Elections in Montenegro resounded in political and wider public in Serbia. There are many reasons, but two are the crucial. First, it was expected from the electoral competition that it would determine (geo) political future of our neighbor, more precisely to provide the final political answer to the issue if Montenegro will continue its orientation towards NATO or if there will be any geopolitical reversal and refusal of NATO integration. Except of the NATO question, as “an eternal” topic, the story about historical and political demise of the most powerful modern Montenegrin politician, Milo Đukanović.

To drama and importance of these elections, in a special way also contributed an action of arresting armed and organized group of conspirators, led by a former commander of Serbian gendarmerie Bratislav Dikić. According to statements of official Montenegrin Government, the stated retired police officer was a part of wider endeavor to provoke armed incidents, more precisely, using demonstrations – in the streets to take over control in Montenegrin Government.

Electoral result after that, was very complicated, but in favor of ruling DPS. The strongest Montenegrin party, in that way and helped by minority parties and social-democrat Ivan Brajović, formed a new Montenegrin Government, led by Duško Marković. Regardless to the victory of DPS and Milo Đukanović, there is a bitter taste of discomfort in reception and interpretation of the electoral result, due to a new victory of the first and the most powerful man in Montenegrin politics for the last 25 years.

Political facticity ascertainment, followed by constant reproduction of journalist moral peevishness, can be read in the text of the journalist of Vreme from Montenegro, Dušica Tomović who writes: “Milo Đukanović, political chameleon who has a power for almost 30 years, who meanwhile was a Serbian nationalists, Yugoslav and fighter for independent Montenegro, and Russian partner, played on the card of NATO and won the game. He showed and proved the West that only with him as a leader, Montenegro enters NATO and makes a retreat from several centuries of friendship with Russia, sending the message that it is very important for the region too due to ‘increasing influence of Moscow’. Although on the day of elections he survived ‘attempt of a coup d’etat’ as pro-government media call a weird arresting of ex commander of Serbian gendarmerie Bratislav Dikić and 19 Serbian citizens suspected for terrorism, this time Đukanović will need more effort (alchemy) to provide and to form a stable majority with which he could rule up to the next elections, regularly planned for 2020. With a powerful pre-electoral machinery and followed with huge support of the state organs and the budget assets, he managed to win with more than 40% of votes.”

Interpretations of events in Montenegro were not out of the limits we expected. They were in already defined national and daily political stereotypes consistently reproduces by the domestic weekly newspapers. Due to Serbian security services included and in relation to the incident with Dikić group, interpretation of electoral process in Montenegro had characteristic of daily political reception of actions of local authorities; to whole electoral process in Montenegro it gives a local, specific Serbian media-political sub-context. Actually, it happened media relativization of the sense and importance of all individual events, whether we speak about the electoral result interpretation or interpretation of Dikić’s group and its planned (not realized) undertaking.

Electoral result in Montenegro in October 2016, was observed in two mutually connected and crucially dependent political and geopolitical areas – through the relationship between the government and opposition and between pro-NATO and anti-NATO political powers. When we speak about the first aspect of Montenegro elections, ruling DPS won approximately 10.000 votes less than on previous elections, bearing in mind it appeared without its partner – the party of Ranko Krivokapić that has been divided into two camps – Krivokapić’s wing and the wing led by Ivan Brajović. Both camps of unique SDP kept its parliamentary status.

Opposition had more weaker results then it had expected; due to almost endemic ideological heterogeneity and necessity of having a pact with national minorities in order to achieve the goal, was left without maneuver space to bring down Milo Đukanović. More interesting is the data showing that, despite a sharp division into the power and opposition in Montenegro, a number of those who voted for pro-NATO option in Montenegro significantly increases in relation to previous elections, and over 20.000 voters more supported that option. The journalist of pro-Russian Pečat, Nikola Vrzić, factually notes this circumstance: “Look at the Sunday results on this way too. Four years ago, on previous parliamentary elections, DSP list won 168.290 votes on its platform of NATO integrations, and now 158.301 Montenegrin voters voted for DPS. But, NATO parties actually benefit now in relation to the last elections because 2012 on the mutual list with DPS were today’s SDP and social-democrats that didn’t exist in that period of time in this current shape; it means that a real mood of this year elections will be shown if we add to DPS votes (158.301) the votes of SDP (19.997) and votes of social-democrats (12.447). The result is 190.745 i.e. 22.455 votes against pro-NATO forces more than 4 years ago. Regardless to bigger or smaller electoral irregularities and buying of the votes, this actually is a real mood in Montenegro; we all must reconcile with it in the same amount how much we don’t like that Montenegrin state and national identity are being built on denial of Serbian ones. But, this is not weird: If they tried to build they special national identity without confrontation to Serbian one, they would come to the fact that they are Serbs, but that is the topic for some other occasion.”⁴⁰

Despite the stated fact – the most important thing oriented towards NATO in Montenegrin Parliament – Vrzić comes to, to put it mildly, contra-intuitive and logically problematic conclusion. Namely, he claims that, despite very significant political and financial investments of Russia in Montenegrin opposition and media supporting it, Russian politics in Montenegro wasn’t defeated; it also didn’t get any stimulus because the state remained the same as before elections: “Russians didn’t lose because now they didn’t have anything to lose: after these elections, Montenegro didn’t find itself on the road towards Euro-Atlantic integration but it continues to go on it. And there is also the fact that Russians didn’t get anything too. The order remains in existing order which means that only new moment - new in relation to 25 years old trend of putting all Balkan under American control, sometimes ‘dressed in European dress’ – remains a Serbian victory in Bosnia done via referendum in the Republic of Srpska. The Americans got in Montenegro a consolation prize because they managed to keep something being theirs for long time ago, but it only means that the main battle remaining is the battle for Serbia.”⁴¹

Apart of stated analysis of the electoral result, one topic more was in the Serbian media central interest. That is a famous intrusion of organized and armed group led by Bratislav Dikić. Instead of analysis of the

40 Nikola Vrzić, “Milov gambit [Gambit of Milo],” Pečat no. 442, page 7

41 Ibid, page 8

facts connected to organization and actions of this group, Belgrade printed media considered all event in electoral context. The reporter of Pečat, Slobodan Ilić, upon listing the facts and different interpretations connected to Dikić's group actions, claims that even existence of that group and publishing the video of arresting its members, was a strong electoral trump of Đukanović's DPS: "Arresting of alleged terroristic group from Serbia, as well as publicity of this action on the day of elections in Montenegro, ought to have been very important electoral trump, sort of doping for 'overheated' Montenegrin voters".⁴²

So, that arrest of potentially dangerous armed group of people, of morally suspicious and politically dangerous intentions, wasn't understood as a shape of necessary state prevention of potential armed conflict and possible undermining of the state; it was represented in the context of political-nationalist plot which, directly or indirectly, accuses present Montenegrin government. In that context Nikola Vrzic writes: "How much influence did this episode with ex commander of Serbian gendarmerie Bratislav Dikić and his arrest influenced Đukanović's victory, even a relative one? Of course it can't be precisely calculated. The same as, at least for now, won't be totally clear – even there is a huge ground for those suspicions – what exactly Dikić tried or didn't try to do on that electoral day in Montenegro. But, from the very start it was totally clear that arresting of retired general of Serbian police and his (alleged) collaborators during that electoral day, with its media usage, had the goal in additional mobilization of Đukanović's electorate and improving his party's results. And that can be maybe the saddest impression on the state of mind in today's Montenegro: Montenegrin voters are mobilized on anti-Serbian and anti-Russian bases, instead of being contrary. What would Njegoš, St. Vasilije Ostroški and heroes of Mojkovac battle say?"⁴³

It is interesting that similar interpretative model in interpretation of events related to Montenegro elections, more precisely the role of Dikić's group, has also a magazine Vreme. Even this magazine, since being established – in its value-political orientation pro-European and reform magazine, the view point of the events in Montenegro is not different from that one in nationalistic, euro-skeptical and pro-Russian Pečat. Anti-Đukanović's discourse of the magazine Vreme goes together with radically critical discourse towards present Government in Serbia led by Aleksandar Vučić, and relates to complex and controversial issues of Montenegro elections, counting previous events and those after.

Essentially to continue the line of concluding led by the journalist of Pečat magazine Slobodan Ikončić, already cited journalist of magazine Vreme from Podgorica Ružica Tomović, except of arrested retired general Dikić, as a political trump of Milo Đukanović introduces also Serbian prime minister Aleksandar Vučić: "While new Government in Podgorica still doesn't appear at least in traces, a part of opposition refuses to admit the electoral results; to make the time shorter to the people eager of new episodes in the serial 'A coup d'état', first, the main special Prosecutor for Organized Criminal and Corruption, Milivoje Katnić and then Serbian Prime minister Aleksandar Vucic did their best. Both of them really did the best to save Montenegro from terrorism and to keep safe Prime minister Milo Đukanović, until the end of elections. According to Katnić, dismissed commander of Serbian gendarmerie Dikić, supported by ninjas from Ravna Gora, trained fisherman, tailors and ceramists almost destroyed Montenegro. After that in Montenegro it was possible to see uncertainty and anxiety (so strong that almost could have been cut

42 Slobodan Ikončić, "Kec iz rukava [Ace from the sleeve]," Pečat, no. 442

43 Nikola Vrzic, "Milov gambit [Gambit of Milo]," Pečat no. 442, pages 7-8

Милов гамбит

Никола Врзић 21/10/2016 Друштво, БРОЈ 442 1. коментар



Пише Никола Врзић

На недељним изборима у Црној Гори уздрмана је власт Мила Ђукановића, али је учвршћена подршка уласку Црне Горе у НАТО

Недељни избори у Црној Гори нису се завршили онако како смо се надали и завршили су се онако како смо желели, без крви и без сукоба дакле, што значи да нисмо изгубили оно што нисмо ни имали и да нисмо изгубили оно што смо још имали да изгубимо, а то су мир и какав-такав привид стабилности у региону који је кудикамо бољи од стварних сукоба у региону. Другим речима, како ствари сада стоје, Мило Ђукановић, после 27 година проведених на власти, и даље остаје чињеница у Црној Гори, нашем некадашњем другом оку у глави...

Pečat, 21st October 2016

by knife), until, 8 days after alleged coup d'etat and 5 days after Katnić eased his soul, Vučić announced that actually it was only him and nobody else who personally saved Đukanović's head. Vučić claims that Đukanović was in danger much bigger than Dikić and the rest of brotherhood, i.e. those who were counted on the help from 'foreign element'. Montenegrin citizens were, almost 100% of them, in front of their TV devices, watching Vučić's live speech to the nation on Monday 24th October. At the end, all were happy: opposition with Vucic's claiming that no single politician had been involved in that alleged coup d'etat, that Dikić at the end isn't so dangerous, actually the coup d'etat didn't exist at all; pro-government media celebrated one confirmation more that Đukanović's head was in so big danger before elections, until Serbia prevented the big disaster. But their celebration was almost destroyed by Vučić's statements that 'no politicians from Montenegro and Serbia are included in this case'; media in Montenegro, under direct control of Đukanović, published this one or two days after the elections. Who, when, what for... it is not so important."⁴⁴

Tomović insists on the thesis that provoking, i.e. simulations of coup d'etat represent an important segment of Đukanović's ruling. That method has been used by the most powerful Montenegrin politician many times during his 25 years long ruling and every time epilogues of security and political destabilization were absent or were problematic, even (mis)use of coup d'etat always, by default, brought a benefit to Đukanović. In the context of proving her thesis, Dušica Tomović is referring to the "cases" from 1994, 1997, 2006 and 2008.

Appearance of Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić on press conference related to discovery of Serbian security services that action against Montenegrin state leadership led by Milo Đukanović had been planned, represents an addition of the story about elections in Montenegro. Prime minister of Serbia stated that except from Dikić's group, there was a more dangerous group of conspirators which, followed by suitable logistic, was ready to call in question political and security order in Montenegro. Vučić's press conference caused a negative reaction in radically-critical circles. These press circles observed this whole "case about destabilization of Montenegro" with a noticeable dosage of ironizing skepticism, trying to put in the background all analysis of the facts connected to possible undermining of constitutional order, and primarily to underline their overemphasized (negative) obsession with Vučić's media appearance.

The right example of such approach is the journalist of magazine Vreme, Miloš Vasić: "We didn't even know who are those people caught here based on 'foreign elements' (whatever it means): were they kept for 48 hours, were they given to the Prosecution and in general, what is their criminal and legal status; we didn't know about 'American spy'. In total, it seems that we live in the time of complete lawlessness and revolutionary justice – some kind of it. Does it have any connections with Montenegrin elections and panic made in purpose from this or that side – also we don't know, although many 'analysts' have many theories, as usual. Whole this story from Monday evening, however, looks so confusing and contradictory. Now it is not these, but those; no more 'Ravna Gora guys' from Zubin Potok, although there is some 'scum' for who we have no idea who they are and where they are coming from; what 'uniforms' and means of communication? Who are those people, who they had connection with, what did they want? No answers, but loud press conference was created. In normal world with normal governments, first such jobs have to be done and after them a press conference comes. Why does Vučić, who knows what time again, goes before it is time, so recklessly and flippantly – we don't know. There are some theories of his awareness that his time slowly runs out,

44 Ružica Tomović, "Crna Gora – Državni udari Mila Đukanovića – Dva oka u glavi [Montenegro – Milo Đukanović's coup d'etats – Two eyes in the head]," Vreme, no. 1347

but even if it is true – in what we don't believe – it is not the best way."⁴⁵ At the end, instead of analysis of the Montenegrin destabilization case in their electoral day, Vasić draws the reader's attention with his analysis of the Vučić's press conference: "He didn't have to do that, all together; it would have been better if he hadn't made that conference when he has nothing to say anyway."⁴⁶

A little more respectable relationship towards press conference of the Serbian Prime minister, related to security questions connected to Serbia and Montenegro, showed Nikola Vrzić, although a hypothetical conclusion in terms of inspirator i.e. organizer of that armed group threatened to Montenegro Prime minister from Serbia is, to put it mildly, weird. Though, in his analyses he includes a visit of a top Russian intelligence officer Nikolay Patrushev.

According to Vrzić, in this spy-security game that could have finished tragically for Montenegrin state leadership, West is guilty, not Russia, regardless that Montenegrin politics has anti-Russian character and resistance of that country to membership in NATO: "If Serbia caught all secret agents who were prepared to cause some kind of chaos in Montenegro and gave them to the boss of all Russian intelligence services, would he, just few days later, have suggested to Serbia to sign a memorandum of understanding from his area of interest that Russia has – there we go to the crucial words – 'with the most reliable partners'? This question is rhetoric ones, an answer obvious. There is here also something that doesn't seem so logic. Namely, if in Montenegro really was planned a coup d'etat, who would take over the government? Just to remind you, Vučić said that there were no Serbian / Montenegrin politicians and Montenegrin investigation still hasn't denied this statement of Vučić. So, who would then take over the government? If the coup d'etat really had been planned. Due to this confusion but also because (due to the reason we already stated) the Russian factor caught in Serbia seems to be less possible variety, we should take a look at another side, Western one. The third one doesn't exist. So, that foreign element – was it maybe Western element? For the beginning, it would explain why there is nobody who would take over the government in some coup d'etat; coup d'etat actually hadn't been planned but just some kind of incident, serious or less serious one, bloody or less bloody one. What would have been the goal of such operation, launched from Serbia and which was successfully stopped by Serbia because operation hadn't been launched? To accuse Serbia for making chaos in Montenegro, to get involved into the conflict with immense consequences and which we really don't need at all. Relating to this, we would desperately like to know whose (police or military) signs were on those sequestered uniforms mentioned by Vucic. Such attempt to destabilize Serbia (by the attack on Montenegro) is possible to be real also because it would represent a logical continuation of strengthening the Western political and para-political pressure on Serbia, being mirrored especially in sudden sharpening conditions related to Kosovo (ultimatum related to the Agreement on telecommunications, Trepča, entering new and unfavorable conditions within negotiated framework for Kosovo, Chapter 35, threats with making Kosovo army...) all together having one goal: final breaking down of Serbian resistance to Euro-Atlantic purposes in Balkan."⁴⁷

45 Miloš Vasić, "Crna Gora, CIA i spijuni u rukama [Montenegro, CIA and spies in the hands]," Vreme, no. 1347, page 6

46 Ibid, page 7

47 Nikola Vrzić, "Špijunski rat na Balkanu [Spy war in the Balkans]," Pečat, no. 443

In an analysis of electoral process in MNE, especially dramatic events in the day of elections, there was a tendency of the change of focus, neglecting the facts and wider daily – political i.e. ideological contextualization. In its motivation, the way of processing and outcomes, media analysis of MNE elections significantly relies on negative moral and political connotation added to Milo Djukanovic and DPS, pro-Atlantic determination of MNE and, at the end, political partnership between Djukanovic and Vucic. Correct relationships between Serbian and MNE leaders are placed “between 2 fires” in both pro-European and nationalist weekly newspapers. Also, there is a tendency of relativisation of the sense and meaning of security threats and their political motives and outcomes.

Trumpomania - two Americas and two Serbias

An appearance and a victory of Donald J. Trump caused a big attention, especially because an unexpected level of uncertainty was brought into the world politics, taking into consideration all challenges in the presence and always-open horizon of the future. From the beginning up to his sudden victory over democratic candidate Hilary Clinton, Donald Trump has been a synonym for controversial. Political and media controversial billionaire from New York has separated American society but also the world. The separation is deep and sharp and influenced almost all. Opposites between Trump’s critics and supporters are not self-understandable, but sure they are completely irreconcilable. The spirit of deep separation on pro-Trump and anti-Trump side influenced our political and media scene. While, in one significant part of daily newspapers, tabloids at the first places, the thesis on Trump as a politician who will generate geopolitical changes and strengthen the position of Serbia and Serbian people in general was developed, weekly newspapers almost in detail transferred American and general world atmosphere. In one word, through the writing of domestic weekly magazines and newspapers, it is easy to make the reconstruction of the whole diapason of questions and uncertainties Trump caused, as well as it is possible quite authentically to make a reproduction of the spirit and the letter of different approaches and determinations Trump’s victory initiated and encourages in the world, especially in the USA.

If we separately take a look on approaches and value determination of weekly newspapers in analysis and interpretation of Trump’s appearance and triumph on November elections, the we can separate 3 different approaches: 1) liberal – value negative, 2) objectivist – value neutral and 3) traditional – conservative affirmative one.

Under liberal-negative we consider the approach and value determination towards Donald Trump, observing him as a politician who substantially brings into the question a commitment to democratic-liberal political culture and practice, simultaneously declaring him as an enemy of free market on the global level, of powerful financial sector, of valuable pluralism and American leadership in promotion of democracy in the world. Under objectivist – neutral approach, there is a value-neutral analysis of Trump’s electoral success. value-neutral analysis of the actors and circumstances is here in charge, without any deeper political – value context. Traditional – conservative affirmative approach is based on the idea that the Trump’s appearance means the demise of liberal democracy, its valuable substrate, as well as justified suspension in the base of globalist, neoliberal economic politics.

Radical-negative liberal attitude towards Trump has been shown, almost crystal clearly in the words of sociologist Jovo Bakić who, relating to the victory of the Republicans candidate on presidential elections 2016, exposed the factors of his political rise and characteristics of his leadership: “This is the first time that the critics comes from the right side and that radical-right wing ideological moment has its clear pendant in Europe. The existing problem, in my opinion, is a weakness of liberal-democratic system from one side and deep crisis of capitalist social-economic system, on another side. Not only the citizens of Serbia but the whole Europa and the USA, are faced with a huge increase of social inequality, where one narrow oligarchy determined conditions of life in the biggest part of the society; due to this people are not satisfied. That dissatisfaction gets its political expression in different demagogues, telling the people those things people want to hear. Simple and easy solutions, within radical –right wing ideology are offered and in that sense we should speak about shifting to the right in the whole world, especially in Europe and the USA. Basically, the Americans voted in favor of one of the richest citizens because they accepted his social demagoguery, especially his xenophobic one. But, the interesting thing is that such man wins elections. That tells us a lot about bad state of one society, and that state is, unfortunately, spread in Europe too.”⁴⁸

In the same time, Trump identifies himself with the leader who resembles on authoritative right-wing leaders from 1930s: “Trump has very recognizable basic ideological lines of the radical right wing: exclusive nationalism, xenophobia and authoritativeness. In that sense, he attracts all in Europe and the USA who are ideologically oriented in that way.”⁴⁹

Far politically sharper, more precise and concrete, taking into consideration the reasons on Trump’s victory and in the sense of his imperfection, was Željko Pantelić from the magazine Nedeljnik. He sees the Trump’s victory as a negative evolution of American politics, suggesting a possible objection to his ruling: As it happens in so called banana states – an expression often used by the Americans in pejorative sense (a writer O. Henry established this definition), the president’s children will decide these days who will get the job in White House and administration, and then they will start to manage the family business. A screaming conflict of interests almost wasn’t mentioned in electoral campaign but it will be, no doubt, Trump’s Achilles heel during the presidential mandate. He won elections due to slogans, no program, no vision, except to win the power, spreading fear, waking up the lowest instincts in the people, xenophobia, racism, fear and paranoia.”⁵⁰

Even more stronger language of opposing to the new USA president, completely in the spirit of liberal – left political agent provocateurs and media “assassins”, can be recognizable in the critical interpretation of Trump’s political rise, offered by the magazine Nedeljnik journalist Srđan Jovanović Maldoran: “If Hilary is an evil, her opponent must be good – simple, clear black-white world, supported and developed by the politicians of the right wing. And they managed to do that. On Tuesday 8th November 2016, the Earth put the crown on its stupidities since one xenophobic, sexist, racist, orange buffoon managed to continue the line Lincoln – Roosevelt – Kennedy...Trump. One clown becomes a president of one of

48 Jovo Bakić, “Šta spaja Trampa, Vučića i Šešelja [What is the connection between Trump, Vučić and Šešelja],” an interview with Ivana Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, no. 1350, page 12

49 Ibid, page 12

50 Željko Pantelić, “Trampova banana republika [Trump’s banana republic],” *Nedeljnik*, no. 253, page 20



Nedeljnik, 10th November 2016

the most powerful countries in the world, the state with a huge amount of nuclear weapon. It sounds not realistic at all, it sounds horrifying, and it sounds as impossible. It looks as the movie 'Idiocracy' of Michael Judge, 2006, over the night became – a documentary... Trump was one of the leaders of so called 'birther' movement – a bunch of half-educated racists convincing themselves that Barack Obama is not born American (sometimes that he is a Muslim) – there is a question to remain: what is 'worse' from that for 'birthers'.⁵¹ Except of racism, sexism and homophobia, liberal-oriented journalists take issue with Trump's social-economic demagoguery, i.e. fake promises on the support for the workers, deindustrialization of the country, being very obvious in the following: "Populism is also a promise that a big public works will be open and that, in the same time, tax will be decreased. Trump's idea is that private companies and individuals finance all works and for that, to provide them big tax exemptions. You don't have to be so clever to understand who will pay the price at the end in that story. In order to satisfy the Republicans, being allergic on financing from the budget of public works, Trump believes in private sources of financing; but, in order to attract them, he promises tax exemptions (it means, smaller filling the budget), which in total sum brings to, more or less, to the same result but sounds great: taxes are going down and public works are going up. Even if it were feasible."⁵²

Almost mutual denominator in the analysis of Trump's victory was connecting the same with a serial of right – wing movements and parties that get stronger in Europe in the recent years; "There is one more unavoidable and negative consequence of Trump's victory for Europe: it has already encouraged demagogues and supporters of 'strong hand' throughout the continent. Several days after American elections, Bulgaria got a pro-Russian candidate Rumen Radev for the president: Austria is waiting for repeated presidential elections, and next year will be electoral in the Netherlands, France and Germany. In all those countries, except of Germany, extremely right candidates are (if not sure winners) real favorites."⁵³ More radical in his marking the implication of Trump's victory on world's happenings was already mentioned Srđan Jovanović who considers that it is scandal to send even diplomatic congratulation to the new president of the USA: "Our experience for Serbia tells us that when the right-wing person comes to the power, even when he/she relents, the state is destroyed. Well, what to do now? Only what is needed is not to keep your mouth closed. Politicians from the whole world started to congratulate Trump, some of them even to suck up instead to loudly condemn the madness in the USA. All the time we speak about the dialogue with the right wing, as the same is able to make a dialogue. Was it probably necessary for Jews to 'get into dialogue' with Hitler? No, dialog is not needed; we need to fight against atavism and backwardness."⁵⁴

Objectivist – neutral approach to the Trump's victory was not dominating one, but wasn't absent in the Trump's sudden victory analysis. Of course, texts being written with a significant dosage of impartiality, in rational way and with reference to the facts in present media but also in wider constellation of the time in which we live in, are not attractive nor so often. But, related to Trump we had them, and – what is the most interesting and almost paradoxically, they related to the influence of Trump's victory on relationships between Serbia and the USA, as well as to the influence of the same to the wider events in

51 Srđan Jovanović Maldoran, "(Ne)svesno udesno [Non-consciously to the right wing]," Novi Magazin, no. 290, page 18

52 Željko Pantelić, "Trampova banana republika [Trump's banana republic]," Nedeljnik, no. 253, page 22

53 Dejan Anastasijević, "Narandzasta senka nad Evropom [Orange shadow over Europe]," Vreme, no. 1350

54 Srđan Jovanović Maldoran, "(Ne)svesno udesno [Non-consciously to the right wing]," Novi Magazin, no. 290, page 20

Balkan. A realistic estimation of the sociologist Jovo Bakić is very indicative in this context: "In general, nothing special will change as for Serbia. An individual never creates the politics by himself, it is a job of teams. Those foreign-politics teams are mutually connected in the way that we can see the relationships between democrats and republicans; those are actually their foreign-politics schools that do not change from day to day. Serious countries, big powers especially, formulate their foreign-politics strategies for decades in advance. Politics towards ex Yugoslavia was formulated 1991-1992, when it was decided that Yugoslavia must fall apart and that it must fall apart according to republican borders. In that period of time, it had an importance of so called demonstration effect, as a demonstration exercise how USSR should fall apart i.e. that Russia must not change the borders of ex USSR states. Mostly due to it the decision was brought that, when finally decided that Yugoslavia must fall apart, it must be done very deeply and thoroughly."⁵⁵

An example of such reading of Trump's victory we can find in the text of Ivan Vejvoda "Amerika suo-cena sa sobom" (America faces itself). He clearly detects political and social-economic factors which prepared the path for controversial billionaire to take over the power. Politically, Trump is reaction on moral-political debacle of political elite in Washington and lack of faith, more precisely potential scorn towards financial brokers and bankers in Wall Street. In the same time, Trump's victory has characteristics of a social bunt of disempowered workers and lower middle class, left without social security and decent level of life's well being. In relation to political and social-economic factors, Vejvoda is maybe the most precise in the following part of the text: "In addition to unknown that is Donald Trump in any way, we believe that slogans 'I want to dry up the swamp of politica in Washington' and to announce bringing back the function of the factories in the USA, as well as 'dignity' of working class, these who are losers of globalization. These who vote, where mostly people from rural and suburb area, that are included in de-industrialization process last years."⁵⁶

The same sort of American approach is presented in the text of Momčilo Pantelić, where is noted that the elected American President got less votes than his rival Hilary Clinton, but electoral system helped Trump to become a President. This circumstance Pantelić is not using to undermine of democratic legitimacy of Trump, but considers it as a product of compelling and useful rules of game; they will, having in the mind the current relationships in politic life, not be changed, although even some reasons of so exists in the history of presidential race in US. "The fact that electoral discord is obvious, last five election races for White House, will for sure, make stronger argument and actions for democratic rule 'one man, one vote'. In order to modernize the 'old system' is needed, they say, constitutional amendment, which was not supported till now. The change of political will can be expected among republicans, who will be following the present system and presidential victory scored, keeping the domination in both of houses of Congress, still having 'ideological predominance' in Supreme Court. And have no reason to change the system in which in both last cases, now as well as in 2000, won their Republicans with less number of votes and more electors."⁵⁷

55 Jovo Bakić, "Šta spaja Trampa, Vučića i Šešelja [What is the connection between Trump, Vučić and Šešelja]," an interview with Ivana Milanović Hrašovec, Vreme, no. 1350

56 Ivan Vejvoda, "Amerika suo-cena sa samom sobom [America faces itself]," Novi Magazin, no. 290, page 10

57 Momčilo Pantelić, "Sada kao i 2000 [Now also like in 2000]," Novi Magazin, no. 290, page 18

The conservative – traditional access to Trump's victory is present in anti-western press, especially in pro-Russian and anti-global weekly newspaper Nedeljnik, and daily newspaper Informer. Trump is identified as a potential new leader, able to release the world of two clamps - domination of liberal overview to the world, and of American interventionism. Trump's election is a choice of making an alliance with Russia, the community of sovereign national states, new economic model and liberation of 'clamps' of ideology of political correctness. With it, in eyes of Serbian nationalists and Russia lovers, Trump is "the one who defeated disliked Clintons". That is, according to their opinion, the value by itself.

About historical-political mission of Donald Trump, eloquently writes Filip Rodić, the journalist of Pečat. He clearly indicates that the new American President is a chance for emancipation of western world, a kind of political innovator and a man whose visions is proving undeniable historical truth about the collapse of liberalism. The Ideological narrative of post-liberal and possible Trump's world is noticed in following paragraph "US is rightly or wrongly, called 'leader of free world'. Now, with Trumps victory in election race, US got a chance to, even, became 'a leader of the liberation of Western world'. Will he fulfill his promises, we can't know for now, but it's obvious that Trump's success it the victory of freedom under political correctness, the victory of isolationism over interventionism, the victory of the 'normal' people, over the powerful people from the shadow."⁵⁸

Together with explication of Trumps historical-political vision, there is a myth created about Trump's heroism in daily political battle for first position in internal US politic. "Trump has shown that in despite of extremely unequal starting points, the system can be defeated. He had the media, opinion pools, Hillary Clinton and her party, his own party, former presidents and entire elite against him. On his way to victory, first he beat 16 of his rivals to get Republicans nomination, and then not only Hillary Clinton and her family dynasty, but the Bush dynasty as well. For these reasons, it's less important the mentioned part, of what Trump's victory brings, or whether, will he fulfill his promises or not. The most important is that in his political campaign, the myth about bipolarity of American political life is broken, and what was really called unipolar system is finally ended. Demolition of unipolarity in the world most powered country gives the hope that uni-polarity will be broken also in other countries in the world too".⁵⁹

Triumph of Trump has been enabled by a kind of intellectual inertia and barrenness of media, academic and political circles in facing reality that inevitably and irrevocably imposed new and harder challenges: "Forces of the west order all together with the whole army of theorists and analysts show that they have no terms and capabilities to have an insight into reality of their societies or the world. They are all the time disappointed, stunned and caught... by return of Russia as a power to the world's stage, by Brexit, by China's changed role and now by Trumps victory. They are not capable to notice the evil and injustice they made the system of and that the people are deeply disappointed not with this or that but exactly with this ruling capitalism. This army is in blind service to the status quo. They haven't noticed anything on time, have no political and intellectual invention and capabilities to recognize social problems, they just go through the life on the roads of the pure inertia. And when the result of some process in not in accordance with their prejudices, they plunge with all their forces on those who bother them in confirming their own convictions. Researching of public opinion is done every day, as well as surveys, without any

58 Filip Rodić, "Novi šerif u gradu [A new sheriff in the town]," Pečat, no. 445, page 7

59 Ibid, page 9

reality – so the results are fake forecasts. Social reality and basic and fundamental dissatisfaction of people are completely under the mask of epiphenomenon and buried with fake alternatives and political correctness which Donald Trump, in his defiance, largely transgressed.”⁶⁰

Nikola Vrzić, one of the most notorious journalists in the weekly magazine *Pečat*, will show that Trump is somebody who is expected the most, in political sense but also in the sense of concrete political action both in America and at the global level. Vrzić considers that Trump's victory is very important especially because of his, more than polite, communication with Vladimir Putin, but also because spiritually “similarity” to political and historical views of two ideologists of conservative America and conservative Russia, Steven Bannon and Aleksandar Dugin.

For possibility of Russian-American political and historical collaboration, Vrzić believes that for Russia is desirable that, in Trump's victory, America rejected neoliberal political and economic paradigm: “But, Trump is also conservative. His voters vote for conservatism and tradition... For Russia is very important that liberalism was defeated in its own center. Because, if the Americans said NO to liberal globalization – Russia really has no reason not to do the same. If Trump's Washington has no radical – Atlantic ‘agenda’, why wouldn't it collaborate in the fight against Islamic state or in confrontation to other forms of terrorism? At the end, if Trump – in accordance with his pre-electoral promises – centers himself to the USA, he can become American Euro-Asiatic, i.e. continentalist.”⁶¹

In the same time, Trump's victory means the projection of expectations that, modeled as communist Internationale, a movement of conservative and sovereign parties will appear; with their leadership in their countries, they will additionally influence and speed up building some new relations between states in the world: “Ok, one could say there must be here some secret (or not too secret) relationship between Donald Trump and Steven Bannon, Vladimir Putin and Aleksandar Dugin, Nigel Farage, Marine le Pen, Geert Wilders, Victor Orban (who deeply welcomed Trump's victory)... A global movement Tea Party or non-official traditionalist and sovereign Internationale, confronting more and more to Soros's (neo)liberal global order, coming to the power after fall of the Berlin wall and wants to abolish our national identities and sovereignties. The globalists against independents, liberalists against traditionalists, robbers against robbed... After Brexit and Trump's triumph – together with, from the global point of view small but not so unimportant, victories of pro-Russian candidates in Bulgaria and Moldavia, Rumen Radev and Igor Dodon – it is obvious that this fight goes to direction which wasn't desirable by the owners of our destinies and the global order. And let hope that Nigel Farage – who described Trump's victory as ‘the first real kick to the liberal establishment which, together with its friends in the big business and in big banks, dominates in the world for the last few decades’ – that Farage doesn't make mistake when warns that ‘democratic revolution is not finished’. There are many shocks to be expected. 2017 may surprise us as 2016 did and maybe the forecast of Marine le Pen will come true: ‘Europe of free nations will be born’. And then, we in Serbia will also feel much better...”⁶² So, as the last sentence suggests, Trump's victory was taken as a desirable outcome to possible consequences for “our Serbian thing”.

60 Milorad Vučelić, “Tramp [Trump],” *Pečat*, no. 445, page 4


61 Nikola Vrzić, “Globalna revolucija protiv globalizacije [Global revolution against globalization],” *Pečat*, no. 446

62 Ibid, page 12

Interpretation of Trump's victory are an echo of the wider global context where irreconcilable opposition between right wing and left wing / liberals and conservatives dominates. After ideological vacuum happened upon economic crisis 2008 and historical demising of liberalism, Trump's victory appeared as a space of possibilities for reinvention of ideological disputes in public-political area.

After Trump and opposite to Trump, it is obvious that not small intellectual effort is needed to cover, as clearly and fully as it possible, this reality being more and more dynamic and complex. Old paradigms obviously don't work anymore and short and active renaissance of conservatism for sure is not a solution in globalized world.

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About
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Public Policy Institute is a regional think-tank organization that operates in the Western Balkans region through the work of its branch offices in Belgrade, Podgorica and Ljubljana. By promoting public dialogue and constructive solutions, Public Policy Institute contributes to the efforts of the Western Balkan countries to become equal, reliable and progressive partners in the process of European integrations and mutual relationships. After the initial research and analysis of social and media context in the countries of the Western Balkans, the Institute has developed and implemented a series of media related projects, including: Role of the media in the process of securitisation in the Western Balkans, Civil Response to Clientelism in the media - MEDIA CIRCLE, NATO Reach Out - media monitoring and Role of the media in monitoring of R1325 in Montenegro.

EBART Media Archive is privately owned company established in 2000. Its main activity is archiving print media data in e-format. The print media archive consists of up-to-date material dating back to 2003, and more than 3 million print media reports from sources with national coverage. EBART is also specialized for media analysis, basic quantitative and qualitative analyses, comparing media treatment of specific keywords, as well as complex content analyses according to BBC methodology. EBART Media Archive is unmatched in the region with its unique media reports database, and 12 years of media research experience. This media database allows for the overall study of long-term media presence.

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Danica Laban. Born in Belgrade, Serbia in 1976. She is media analyst, journalist and communicologist. Worked on numerous projects, which had represented visibility, training and research as its media components. She has collaborated with national and international organizations and institutions such as the Council of Europe (CAR project 2011 - 2012), UN Women (projects in the field of social – economic empowerment of women, 2012), the Office for Human and Minority Rights, NGO Praxis/ERT, HINT, NELI. She also worked on the evaluation of media for Strategic Marketing/IPSOS, for the purpose of the BBC Trust. In 2006 she founded Jigsaw Communication Agency, under which she operates today. During her career she was also a journalist and editor in RTS, BK TV and TV Politika.

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
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