



Analysis of the print media in Serbia
October - December

Quarterly **MEDIAMETER**


04|2015

Volume I, Issue 4/2015
ISSN: 2406-274X

Analysis of the print media in Serbia
October - December

Quarterly **MEDIAMETER**

04|2015



MEDIJAMETAR

QUARTERLY MEDIAMETER
Analysis of the print media in Serbia
 Volume I, Issue 4/2015
 ISSN 2406-274X

Published by
 Public Policy Institute Belgrade
 Kneza Miloša 68
 E-mail: office.bg@publicpolicyinstitute.org
 Web: www.publicpolicyinstitute.eu

For publisher
 Vladimir Popović

Editors in Chief
 Nikola Samardžić
 Velimir Čurgus Kazimir

Editorial staff
 Milana Brisić
 Vladimir Abramović
 Aleksandra Miličević
 Marija Benke

Cover design and prepress
 Pavle Farčić

Translation
 Nataša Smirnov - Veselinović

Print
 grafoNiN d.o.o. Belgrade

CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији
 Народна библиотека Србије, Београд


659.3

QUARTERLY mediameter : analysis of the print media in Serbia / editors in chief Nikola Samardžić, Velimir Čurgus Kazimir. - Vol. 1, Issue 1 (2015)- . - Belgrade : Public Policy Institute (Belgrade : Grafonin). - 24 cm

Tromesečno. - Ima izdanje na drugom jeziku: Kvartalni medijametar = ISSN 2406-2707
 ISSN 2406-274X = Quarterly mediameter
 COBISS.SR-ID 215100940

Content

- 1** Velimir Čurgus Kazimir:
INTRODUCTION
- 2** Isidora Jarić, Danica Laban:
SAMPLE
- 3** Isidora Jarić, Danica Laban:
RESEARCH RESULTS
- 4** Dejan Vuk Stanković:
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
- 5** **ABOUT AUTHORS**



KRVAVI BIZNIS

MAČINE ČELJE
Newsweek

Roditelji Dade Vujašević: Mi znamo istinu

TEORANTIKA

Норен Едзесер
Норен Едзесер
Норен Едзесер

NOVI MAGAZIN

Н

ДАНИЦА ПОПОВИЋ МАЛИ ЕКОНОМСКИ РЕЧ НИК

Водич кроз најчешће коришћене
економске термине
који се срећу у медијима

Радос
Миле
**ЖИ
КАО
У ЗАМ**

КО НАМ НУДИ ПАТКУ: РАДОМИР ЛАЗОВИЋ, "НЕ ДА(В)МО БЕОГРАД"

VREME

broj 1266



SLUČAJ HELIKOPTER

ПО АН Т

Nedeljnik


EKSKLUZIV



Dvojica bivših pri

TADIĆ JOSIPO

O SRBIMA I HRVATIMA, PALJEN
KOLINDI I NIKOLIĆU, TITU I
ŠEŠELJU I VUČIĆU, ČE



Introduction

VELIMIR ČURĞUS KAZIMIR

INTRODUCTION

The media and social stability

One year, which is how long we have been monitoring and analyzing the print media in Serbia, especially the most influential dailies, may seem like a fleeting and illusive set of events which found their place on the front pages of newspapers by chance. When something will happen, if we speak about unplanned, spontaneous events, is not, of course, in the hands of the journalists and editors. Floods, fires, traffic accidents, deaths...all this is part of life which takes place independently of the attention allocated to it by the newspapers. There is, however, an order of things which is not only a consequence of chance and sequencing of events, but of calculated and targeted editorial policy.

As in the previous three trimesters, in the analyzing of empirical content, the same methodological approach was applied. Unit of analysis was one text. The analysis itself represents a combination of two research methods: (a) analysis of content, which was directed towards "certain theoretical-hypothetical frame... which creates objective and systemic empirical content of social communications, enabling drawing of relevant conclusions on the social context in which the communication is taking place",¹ and (b) discursive analysis, which enabled us to understand different, epistemically and methodologically immeasurable,² author's interpretative strategies and editorial policies which reflect displays of different, primarily ideological and political discursive realities, by analyzing their specific discursive meanings.

In the interpretative sense, for more convenient text organization, the analysis is, just like in the previous reports, divided into two wholes which refer to: (a) analysis of quantitative indicators collected with the help of content analysis, and (b) discursive analysis of qualitative content derived from texts which were included in the research sample.

Freedom of the media, which is not only a prerequisite for diversity and democracy, but also stability and strength of one society, represents a living and exciting challenge, both for people from the media, and for those on the public stage. Misunderstandings and lack of understanding between the media and the government are nothing new. This usually refers to different types of priorities which often cannot be aligned despite the participants' best efforts. Our analysis should help with the understanding not so much of controversial positions, but more with the nature of the media profession, as well as its social responsibility.

1 S. Gredelj, *S onu stranu ogledala [On the other side of the mirror]*, Beograd: Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije, 1986, 19

2 G. Couvalis, *The Philosophy of Science*, London, Sage Publications, 1997.

Sometimes even the journalists themselves are not aware of the things which differently placed information can cause. Namely, this is not about personal conviction or political orientation, but about the rules of trade.

Over one year and four issues of *Mediameter*, covering four quarters, from nearly seven thousand and a half newspaper texts published on the front pages of the seven dailies, one may get a strong impression of diversity in approach and shaping of media stories. Political life is a topic which is most prevalent regardless of all the differences. Regardless of events, for example, the migrant crisis, events in Srebrenica or case of the Ombudsman Saša Janković, domestic political life represents the fabric of all the front pages of dailies. Even when the newspapers engaged in mutual attacks and showdowns, which tend to "colour" certain periods, still the domestic political life is what constantly persevered as the leading topic. This type of politicization of the media certainly has its social and political reasons, but a quite strong impression that this is a way of avoiding or marginalising topics which are in a more direct connection with the needs and interests of the average citizens of Serbia remains.

This is particularly visible in this, fourth *Mediameter*, which coincides with the opening of the first negotiation chapters in the process of accession to the European Union. Number and versatility of the articles published in newspapers hardly matches the importance of this event. One may be under the impression that there are certain reservations towards this topic, because "this is not interesting to readers." Such conclusions have been long present in our media, and not only print media. "Reading" what all readers want is at the same time managed with the forming of taste and value. In this way, the social and political field of view is being narrowed. It seems that our media are more and more promoting a life outside the context of contemporary world. Self-sufficiency and self-indulgence is becoming the purpose of existence of an increasing number of media. Crisis of the media is no longer just of financial nature. It overflows to the field of trust, which is the basis of any social relationship. Trust that the rules will be preserved regardless of the circumstances represents probably the strongest pillar in a civilized and organized society. These rules are, of course, mutual – both with those involved in production and placement of information and those who use this information. The government and the opposition represent the axle of the democratic system in which the media criticize, examine and look for answers.

In Serbia, this order exists, but it is sometimes questioned. The public should not only be better informed in terms of quality, but also appreciated. This is a prerequisite for re-establishing a general trust as the warranty of social stability.

2



Sample



ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN

Sample

As stated in previous editions, the basic idea of the *Mediameter* project is to strive to reconstruct the media reality of daily print media in Serbia, pertinent to the texts positioned (completely or partially) on the front page, which deal, in different ways, with current political events and situation in Serbia and the world. The sample from the daily newspapers was taken using two selection criteria – biggest readership and the reputation of the print media. The information regarding the circulation of the daily newspapers was taken from a survey conducted by IPSOS.¹ The front page is the part of the daily newspaper that readers associate with the identity/recognisability of the media the most. It is often responsible for the first impression, our potential inclination or aversion towards a particular print edition. The front page establishes contact not only with the readers, but also with the people who may never take that particular daily newspaper in their hands. Through newspaper and TV adverts and windows at newsagent's, the front page reaches an auditorium wider than the one comprising solely the readers of any individual daily paper, thus forming, so to say, a public picture of the newspaper, symbolising its editorial policy, evaluative orientation and focus on particular target group. It is because of the abovementioned reasons that the front pages of daily newspapers from our sample are the focus of this analysis of the *Mediameter* project.

In this way, the texts from front pages best reflect the coordinates of editorial policies of printed daily newspapers. Even though we are talking about a small percentage of texts, it is through the messages placed on the front pages that we can most easily determine the editorial identity of a daily newspaper. The ratio between the total number of texts in each daily edition individually and the number of texts on the front page that make up our research sample is presented in Graphs 1-7, over the period from 1st October until 31st December 2015.


¹ Research into average readership of daily newspapers conducted over the period 01. 09. 2015 – 30. 09. 2015, population: total 12+

Graph 1 – *Večernje novosti*²Graph 2 – *Informer*³


² For more information, see **Table 149** in Appendix.

³ For more information, see **Table 150** in Appendix.

Graph 3 – *Alo!*⁴




Graph 4 – *Blic*⁵




⁴ For more information, see **Table 151** in Appendix.

⁵ For more information, see **Table 152** in Appendix.

Graph 5 – *Politika*⁶




Graph 6 – *Danas*⁷



⁶ For more information, see **Table 153** in Appendix.

⁷ For more information, see **Table 154** in Appendix.

Graph 7 – Kurir⁸

The total number of analysed texts in all seven media that we used as the sample for our research is 2177, which is an average of 64.16% of all texts on front pages, i.e. 3.57% of the total number of texts.

⁸ For more information, see Table 155 in Appendix.

Table 1. – Večernje novosti

Newspaper: <i>Večernje novosti</i> / Section	Total number of texts on front page	Total number of selected texts from front page	Total number of not selected texts
Chronicle	75	20	55
Society	118	94	24
Politics	93	93	0
Economy	51	37	14
Current affairs	37	27	10
Reportage	34	15	19
Culture	23	7	16
Interview	20	15	5
World news	15	13	2
Lifestyle	20	0	20
Sport	18	5	13
Belgrade news	14	2	12
Supplement: doctor in the house	14	1	13
Major events	7	1	6
BGD 011	1	1	0
Belgrade stories	6	0	6
Sport plus	0	0	0
Terrorism in France	13	5	8
TV Novosti	0	0	0
Destinies	3	1	2
Region	0	0	0
Feuilleton	0	0	0
Campaign	0	0	0
Testimony	0	0	0
Other side	6	2	4
Event	5	4	1
In memoriam	0	0	0
TOTAL	573	343	230

Source: Mediameter research, October-December 2015

Table 2. – Informer

Newspaper: <i>Informer</i> / Section	Total number of texts on front page	Total number of selected texts from front page	Total number of not selected texts
Top news	190	187	3
News	92	64	28
Showtime	66	9	57
Entertainment	1	0	1
Sport	33	9	24
TOTAL	382	269	113

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 3. – Alo!**

Newspaper: <i>Alo!</i> / Section	Total number of texts on front page	Total number of selected texts from front page	Total number of not selected texts
Current affairs	101	96	5
News	190	98	92
VIP	115	10	105
Sport	64	7	57
World news	2	2	0
TOTAL	472	213	259

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 4. – Blic**

Newspaper: <i>Blic</i> / Section	Total number of texts on front page	Total number of selected texts from front page	Total number of not selected texts
100 most powerfull women	4	4	0
50 most powerfull in show business	1	0	1
Current affairs	10	9	1
Archive	3	0	3
Belgrade	1	0	1
Files	2	2	0
Society	56	32	24
Economy	22	19	3
Phenomenon	1	0	1
Chronicle	53	15	38
Culture	9	4	5
Politics	46	45	1
Sport	32	0	32
Destinies	12	1	11
World news	13	13	0
Topic of the day	101	97	4
Topic of the week	8	3	5
In focus	1	1	0
Time-machine	0	0	0
Entertainment	63	4	59
TOTAL	438	249	189

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 5. – Politika

Newspaper: <i>Politika</i> / Section	Total number of texts on front page	Total number of selected texts from front page	Total number of not selected texts
World news	95	90	5
Society	92	52	40
Economy	75	73	2
Politics	57	55	2
News of the day	61	57	4
Culture	34	12	22
Chronicle	40	35	5
Daily supplement	22	4	18
Belgrade	10	3	7
Serbia	19	8	11
Library	13	0	13
Sport	22	3	19
Topic of the week	13	11	2
People	12	12	0
Region	34	34	0
Front page	13	11	2
Spectrum	7	1	6
Views	10	8	2
TV supplement	17	1	16
Feuilleton	6	1	5
Consumer	0	0	0
Belgrade chronicles	1	0	1
Files	1	0	1
TOTAL	654	471	183

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 6. – Danas**

Newspaper: <i>Danas</i> / Section	Total number of texts on front page	Total number of selected texts from front page	Total number of not selected texts
Belgrade	2	0	2
Dialogue	1	1	0
Business supplement	20	18	2
"Danas" special supplement	22	4	18
"Danas" supplement	2	2	0
"Danas" weekend edition	40	22	18
News of the Day	0	0	0
Society	71	64	7
Economy	50	50	0
Globe	66	60	6
Culture	42	7	35
Interview	0	0	0
Front page	5	3	2
Health	4	0	4
Politics	156	153	3
Periscope	0	0	0
Legal "Danas"	0	0	0
Scene	5	0	5
Sport	24	4	20
Topic	17	8	9
Scales	6	4	2
Terazije	6	4	2
TOTAL	533	400	133

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 7. – Kurir

Newspaper: <i>Kurir</i> / Section	Total number of texts on front page	Total number of selected texts from front page	Total number of not selected texts
Society	41	33	8
Economy	8	8	0
Chronicle	40	15	25
Culture	0	0	0
Planet	22	20	2
Politics	62	62	0
Sport	15	2	13
Stars	60	9	51
Topic of the day	91	83	8
TOTAL	339	232	107


Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

An insight into the results in Tables 1-7 confirms that the structure of the analysed daily newspapers follows one of two different logics. Namely, *Večernje novosti*, *Politika*, *Danas*, *Blic* and even *Kurir*, to some extent, follow the classical structure of a daily newspaper, while *Informer* and *Alo!* deviate significantly from this matrix. In those two papers, *News* are the dominant section, encompassing various fields, while special attention is paid to entertaining content, such as news about celebrities, show business and sport, which are becoming increasingly socio-political in nature. The editorial strategies described in previous three editions of *Mediameter* are completely visibly in the fourth quarter, as well, as illustrated in Graphs 8-14. The only significant deviation can be noticed in Graph 12, which shows the structure of the sample of selected texts from *Politika* in last two quarters. There we can notice a huge increase in the number of selected texts from the *World news* section, from 40 and 42 in the first and second quarter, respectively (out of 95 available from the same section, announced or started on the front page) to 92 out of 103 texts selected for the sample in third quarter. In fourth quarter 90 out of 95 texts are selected for the sample. This is primarily due to the efforts of the *Politika* editorial in the third quarter to try to explain and reconstruct the global causes which had led to the “migrant crisis”, which came ashore to Europe and our country and which intensified in that period. In fourth quarter increase in the number of selected texts from the *World news* section in *Politika* can be explained by two mayor events – terrorist attacks of Islamic State and consequences of Russian intervention in Syria.


In this analysis we are “studying how the ideas and images are expressed, i.e. presented... The studying of presentation does not aim to question the “truthiness” of the remarks made... It looks beyond a comment on whether the collection of statements correctly and appropriately describes what it should. Actually, ever since researchers became focused on the process of presenting, it has become obvious that dealing with truthiness leads in a wrong direction. Studying presentation is, literally, studying how production, i.e. construction is presented... in a narrative form.”⁹

⁹ L. Rolend, *Masovne komunikacije* [Mass communications], Clio, Beograd, 1998, 258-259


Comparison with all four quarters

Chart 8. – Večernje novosti


Source: *Mediameter* research, January-March 2015, *Mediameter* April-June 2015, *Mediameter* July-September 2015 and *Mediameter* October-December 2015

Chart 9. – Informer


Source: *Mediameter* research, January-March 2015, *Mediameter* April-June 2015, *Mediameter* July-September 2015 and *Mediameter* October-December 2015

Chart 10. – Alo!


Source: Mediameter research, January-March 2015, Mediameter April-June 2015, Mediameter July-September 2015 and Mediameter October-December 2015

Chart 11. – Blic


Source: Mediameter research, January-March 2015, Mediameter April-June 2015, Mediameter July-September 2015 and Mediameter October-December 2015

Chart 12. – Politika

Source: Mediameter research, January-March 2015, Mediameter April-June 2015, Mediameter July-September 2015 and Mediameter October-December 2015

Chart 13. – Danas

Source: Mediameter research, January-March 2015, Mediameter April-June 2015, Mediameter July-September 2015 and Mediameter October-December 2015

Chart 14. – Kurir

Source: *Mediameter* research, January-March 2015, *Mediameter* April-June 2015, *Mediameter* July-September 2015 and *Mediameter* October-December 2015

If we compare all four quarters, we can notice a remarkable increase in the number of selected texts in the third and fourth quarter. The number of selected texts in the first quarter was 1360, in the second 1673, while the third quarter saw 2172 and fourth 2177 texts selected. The number of selected texts from front pages in the fourth quarter of 2015 has increased by almost 60% in comparison to the first quarter, i.e. 30% in comparison to the second quarter. Apart from the obviously higher number of days in the third quarter (92, in comparison to 91 in the second and 90 in the first quarter), it should be noted that the newspapers were not published on four days in the first quarter (a triple-issue was published for 31st December 2014, 1st and 2nd January 2015, double-issues were published for 6th and 7th January and 15th and 16th February), on three days in the second quarter (a double-issue for 11th and 12th April and a triple-issue for 30th April, 1st and 2nd May), while the third and fourth quarters did not feature any state and religious holidays.

Another reason for the increase in the number of texts is undoubtedly the emergence of relevant events for domestic and international politics in the third and fourth quarter of 2015. Those events, such as the “migrant crisis”, were getting all the media attention, pushing out other topics. For example, **Table 8** is a clear example, where the *Politika* daily boasts almost a double increase in the percentage of texts used as the sample (from 2.7% in the first to 5.2% in the third quarter and 4.9% in the fourth quarter).

Table 8 – Comparison of the percentage of texts selected for the sample in this research in relation to the total number of texts in all analysed media in all four quarters of 2015.

Newspaper	% of selected texts			
	4th quarter	3rd quarter	2nd quarter	1st quarter
Večernje novosti	3.1	2.8	2.7	1.7
Informer	4.3	3.9	3.4	2.5
Alo!	2.9	2.7	2.4	2
Blic	2.2	1.9	1.6	1.6
Politika	4.9	5.2	3.4	2.7
Danas	6.5	5.5	4.4	4.1
Kurir	2.4	2	1.7	1.6

Source: *Mediameter* research, January-March 2015, *Mediameter* April-June 2015, *Mediameter* July-September 2015 and *Mediameter* October-December 2015


It is also worth mentioning a third trend, which relates to politicisation of traditionally “non-political” topics, such as sport and show business, which has also led to a significant increase in the percentage of selected texts from front pages in comparison to those which were not selected. More precisely, the topics that were previously “free” from any socio-political context in the third quarter received this new background, which is particularly prominent in politicisation of sport or in serving numerous affairs, where so-called “starlets” are linked to representatives of various power structures or political parties. This trend can be also be noticed in the constantly decreasing number of texts from front pages that were not selected for the sample in all media over all three quarters. Only in case of the *Kurir* daily there is a deviation from this trend, since it recorded a slight increase in the number of text not selected (see **Table 9**).

Table 9. – Comparison of the number of text which were not selected for the sample in all media during the all four quarters of 2015.

Text that were not selected				
Media outlet	4th quarter	3rd quarter	2nd quarter	1st quarter
Večernje novosti	230	208	267	323
Informer	113	151	185	179
Alo!	259	259	269	267
Blic	189	188	221	228
Politika	183	180	233	271
Danas	133	101	148	183
Kurir	107	148	140	157
Total	1.214	1.235	1.463	1.608

Source: *Mediameter* research, January-March 2015, *Mediameter* April-June 2015, *Mediameter* July-September 2015 and *Mediameter* October-December 2015

3



Research Results

ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN

RESEARCH RESULTS

Shares of journalism genres

In accordance with the trends from previous quarters, report was the most prevalent form of journalistic expression in the fourth trimester of 2015, as well. This genre noted a share of 69.36% or 1510 out of 2177 analysed texts. The biggest share of reports has been noticed in Kurir – 83.62%, while this genre has the smallest share in Politika – 51.58%. Article is second-ranked form in terms of share, with 8.82% or 192 texts (most present in Politika – 22.72%, least present in the paper Alo! – 0.94%), followed by interview with a similar share of 8.50% or 185 texts. The daily Danas has traditionally published the biggest number of interviews – 58 or 14.50%, while Informer uses this form the least – 3.35%. News is the fourth-ranked form according to its share with 136 texts or 6.25% (most present in Informer – 17.47%, least present in Kurir – 1.72%) and commentary is present in similar scope, with 6.02% share or 131 texts. Politika and Danas published 62, i.e. 52 commentaries, respectfully, while we can read only two texts in this genre in Večernje novosti and Alo! each. Reportage and other journalistic forms make up for about 1% of texts (please see **Tables 10, 11 and 12** for further information).

Table 10. – Individual shares of genres in reporting of the seven media from the sample

Genre	total number of texts	% share
report	1510	69.36
article	192	8.82
Interview	185	8.50
news	136	6.25
commentary	131	6.02
Reportage	12	0.55
other forms	11	0.51
Total	2.177	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 11. – Distribution of journalistic forms in texts from the sample, per media

Genre	<i>Blic</i>	<i>Kurir</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	<i>Alo!</i>	<i>Informer</i>	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Danas</i>	Total
report	197	194	264	175	201	242	237	1510
article	17	19	24	2	3	107	20	192
interview	13	12	35	10	9	48	58	185
news	15	4	10	24	47	10	26	136
commentary	3	3	2	2	7	62	52	131
reportage	0	0	8	0	0	2	2	12
other forms	4	0	0	0	2	0	5	11
Total	249	232	343	213	269	471	400	2177

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 12. – Share of journalistic forms in texts from the sample, per media

Genre	<i>Blic</i>	<i>Kurir</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	<i>Alo!</i>	<i>Informer</i>	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Danas</i>	Total
Report	197	194	264	175	201	242	237	1510
Article	17	19	24	2	3	107	20	192
News	13	12	35	10	9	48	58	185
Commentary	15	4	10	24	47	10	26	136
Interview	3	3	2	2	7	62	52	131
Reportage	0	0	8	0	0	2	2	12
Other forms	4	0	0	0	2	0	5	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

If we compare fourth quarter research results with the previous periods, we can firstly observe the steady increase in the number of reports by 5.73% or 128 texts compared to the third quarter, when the report recorded a share of 63.63% or 1382 texts, while compared to the first period, there was an increase of 678 texts in the form of report. Regarding this journalistic form, we recorded a constant rise in the number of texts throughout 2015 (additional information on the number and percentage share of reports in the previous quarters may be found in **Table 13**).

Table 13. – Share of reports compared to the total number of texts and total number of reports in texts from the sample, per quarters

Genre - report	4th quarter	3rd quarter	2nd quarter	1st quarter
%	69.36	63.63	60.96	61.18
number	1510	1382	1020	832

Source: Research *Mediameter*, January-March 2015; *Mediameter* April-June 2015; *Mediameter* July-September 2015 and *Mediameter*, October-December 2015

Table 14. – Share of news compared to the total number of texts and total number of news in texts from the sample, per quarters

Genre - report	4th quarter	3rd quarter	2nd quarter	1st quarter
%	6.25	8.70	11.89	12.72
number	136	189	199	173

Source: Research *Mediameter*, January-March 2015; *Mediameter* April-June 2015; *Mediameter* July-September 2015 and *Mediameter*, October-December 2015

Shares of other relevant journalistic forms during all three quarters of 2015 are presented in **Tables 15, 16 and 17**.

Table 15. – Share of articles compared to the total number of texts and total number of articles in texts from the sample, per quarters

Genre - report	4th quarter	3rd quarter	2nd quarter	1st quarter
%	8.82	10.59	9.50	7.50
number	192	230	159	102

Source: Research *Mediameter*, January-March 2015; *Mediameter* April-June 2015; *Mediameter* July-September 2015 and *Mediameter*, October-December 2015

Table 16. – Share of interviews compared to the total number of texts and total number of interviews in texts from the sample, per quarter

Genre - report	4th quarter	3rd quarter	2nd quarter	1st quarter
%	8.5	7.78	9.21	10.96
number	185	169	154	149

Source: Research *Mediameter*, January-March 2015; *Mediameter* April-June 2015; *Mediameter* July-September 2015 and *Mediameter*, October-December 2015

Table 17. – Share of commentaries compared to the total number of texts and total number of commentaries in texts from the sample, per quarter

Genre - report	4th quarter	3rd quarter	2nd quarter	1st quarter
%	6.02	8.01	7.05	6.62
number	131	174	118	90

Report

Increase in the number of reports has been recorded in nearly all dailies, but the biggest increase in the number of texts written in this form was observed in *Kurir* – 83.62% (10.71% more reports compared to the third trimester) and *Alo!* (82.16% - increase of 9.77%), while *Blic* (79.12%), *Večernje novosti* (76.97%) and *Politika* (51.38%) also published 4-7% more texts in the form of report, compared to the previous period. Only *Danas* published about 59.25%, i.e. 1% fewer reports than in the previous quarter.

In all analysed dailies, evaluative¹ reports are present, i.e. texts which clearly indicate the position of the journalist. Number of reports with value connotations, however, varies from 79.61% in *Informer*, to 16.04% in *Danas*. Position of the journalist is present in about 22% of reports in *Politika* and *Večernje novosti*, 33.5% of texts in *Blic*, while *Kurir* and *Alo!* 52.06%, i.e. 53.71% of texts have evaluative judgment – positive or negative. If we compare the results with the findings from the previous quarter, the biggest difference is visible in the reporting of *Blic*, which published texts in this form in a considerably more neutral tone.

¹ In the analysis put forward herein, manners of presenting certain topics in individual texts from our sample were coded in three different ways, taking into consideration both the text and the accompanying textual content (headline, heading and subheading). Texts in which the authors/journalists did not take up an evaluative position towards a certain actor, but strived to present certain facts which are the subject of the text in a relatively neutral, reserved manner, respecting professional standards, were marked as neutral. Those interpretations in which the journalists clearly expressed sympathy and positive attitude towards the topics were marked as positive. We marked as negative those interpretations in which the journalists presented certain topics with clear antipathy and negative attitude towards certain topics.

This media outlet published 21.56% less evaluative reports compared to the previous trimester. Newspapers of the traditional structure increased the number of neutral texts by 9.18% (*Danas*), 8.75% (*Politika*) and 3.41% (*Večernje novosti*), while *Kurir* increased the number of evaluative reports by about 6%. Daily paper *Alo!* decreased the number of texts with evaluative connotation, but still more than 50% of their writing has an evaluative context (**Table 18**).

Table 18. – Structure of the report compared to the value context in the seven media from the sample

Report	value context with regards to the topic		
media outlet	positive %	neutral %	negative %
Informer	10.95	20.40	68.66
Alo!	7.43	46.29	46.29
Kurir	2.58	47.94	49.48
Blic	2.54	66.50	30.96
Politika	3.31	77.27	19.42
Večernje novosti	4.55	77.65	17.80
Danas	1.27	83.97	14.77
Total	4.50	62.05	33.44

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Most reports, (30.46%), published in the media from the sample in the fourth quarter, except those from the daily *Danas*, are unbalanced² (e.g. reports contain a statement by only one actor, i.e. the entire text is based on the viewpoint of one interviewee or viewpoints of different interviewees who advocate the same position), and this is a trend which had been present in the previous three trimesters of 2015. The biggest number of unilateral, incomplete reports were published by the *Informer* 93.03% (an increase of about 2% compared to the previous quarter), followed by *Kurir* and *Alo!* with 89.69%, i.e. 87.43 unbalanced reports. *Politika* published about 13% more balanced reports compared to the previous quarter (19.34% in the fourth, against 16.67% in the third quarter), while *Blic* and *Večernje novosti* published 34.52%, i.e. 40.91% of complete texts in this form. The daily *Danas*, as in the previous quarter, had the biggest share of balanced reports, 66.24%.

² Balance refers to the manner in which the journalist approaches the topic. A balanced text involves a just and objective approach to the topic and interviewees and completeness of information.

Table 19. – Balance of reports in the seven media from the sample

Report	balans %	
media outlet	da	ne
Informer	6.97	93.03
Alo!	10.31	89.69
Kurir	12.57	87.43
Blic	29.34	70.66
Politika	34.52	65.48
Večernje novosti	40.91	59.09
Danas	66.24	33.76
Total	30.46	69.54

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Other journalistic forms

Out of 192 written texts, published in the form of an **article**, more than half of those – as many as 107 (55.73%) were recorded in *Politika* (**Table 11**). *Politika* published about 5% more articles compared to the previous quarter (22.72% in the fourth quarter compared to 17.79% in the third period). An increase in the number of articles is visible in *Blic* as well (by about 2.5%), while *Večernje novosti*, *Kurir* and *Danas* published fewer texts in this genre compared to the previous trimester (*Večernje novosti* and *Kurir* by about 10%, *Danas* – by about 2% fewer articles). Papers *Informer* and *Alo!* still use the article as a form of expression in an insignificant amount – in three, i.e. two texts (**Table 20**).

Table 20. – Structure and number of articles with reference to the value context in the seven media from the sample

Article	value context with regards to the topic						
media outlet	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Politika	107	2	1.87	65	60.75	40	37.38
Večernje novosti	24	2	8.33	19	79.17	3	12.50
Danas	20	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Kurir	19	1	5.26	12	63.16	6	31.58
Blic	17	0	0.00	14	82.35	3	17.65
Total	192	6	3.13	131	68.23	55	28.65

Article	value context with regards to the topic						
Informer	3	1	33.33	0	0.00	2	66.67
Alo!	2	0	0.00	1	50.00	1	50.00
Total	192	6	3.13	131	68.23	55	28.65

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Value context is present in 31.78% of published articles. All 20 texts written in this genre in the daily *Danas* were neutral, as well as in *Blic*, where most articles were neutral, i.e. 82.35% (the remaining 17.75% is negative). *Večernje novosti* and *Politika* also have neutral context in over 60% of published texts in this journalistic form (we recorded 37.78% negative and 1.87% positive texts in *Politika*, and 1.87% of positive texts, and in *Večernje novosti* 12.5% of negative and 8.33% of positive articles). The newspaper *Informer* coloured evaluatively all three published texts, while *Alo!* published one neutral and one negative article.

The biggest number of texts written in this genre in the fourth quarter are without balance (76.04%), which especially refers to *Kurir*, *Alo!* and *Informer*, where all texts are unilateral or incomplete. *Politika*, which published the biggest number of articles, also does not have a balanced approach – 85.98% or 92 texts are unbalanced. In *Blic* 70.59% texts do not have balance, while in *Večernje novosti* we recorded exactly 50% of complete and proportionately objective texts. The paper *Danas* has had different practice during the entire 2015. In the fourth quarter, this paper published 70% articles which have balance.

Table 21. – Balance of articles in the seven media from the sample

Article	balans %	
media outlet	yes	no
Kurir	0	100.00
Alo!	0	100.00
Informer	0	100.00
Politika	14.02	85.98
Blic	29.41	70.59
Večernje novosti	50.00	50.00
Danas	70.00	30.00
Total	23.96	76.04

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Interview was the third-ranked genre in the fourth quarter, primarily thanks to texts in *Danas* (58 texts – 14.5%), *Politika* (48 – 10.19%) and *Večernje novosti* (35 – 10.2%). In the three specified dailies, we recorded an increase in the number of texts in that form, which certainly speaks of the editorial concept of these media of traditional structure. About 84% of interview texts from the sample are in a neutral evaluative context, however in *Politika* and *Informer* more than a third of these texts have a negative connotation (in *Politika* there were also 4.17% positive texts). The value context was present in 16.67% of interviews in *Kurir*, 11.43% in *Večernje novosti* and 7.69% in *Blic*. *Danas* and *Alo!* did not publish interviews with evaluative connotations (**Table 22**).

Table 22. – Structure of interviews with reference to the value context in the seven media from the sample

Article	value context with regards to the topic		
media outlet	positive %	neutral %	negative %
Politika	4.17	58.33	37.50
Informer	0	66.67	33.33
Kurir	0	83.33	16.67
Večernje novosti	2.86	88.57	8.57
Blic	0	92.31	7.69
Alo!	0	100.00	0
Danas	0	100.00	0
Total	1.62	83.78	14.59

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

As it was previously stated, though it is a basic journalistic form, **news** is less and less present in the analysed front pages of dailies. News are again most present on the front pages of *Informer* (17.47% of texts on front pages of these newspapers are news), but they are by about 9% less present than in the previous quarter. In this media, only 6.38% of news is evaluatively neutral, while 93.62% is interpretative. In the daily *Alo!* 11.72% of texts were written in the news genre (about 4% less than in the third quarter), out of which 29.17% have clear evaluative context. In *Danas* 6.5% of texts are news (about 2% less than in the third period), while the evaluative connotation is present in 11.54% of these texts. *Blic* published about 8% less news than in the previous period (6.02% against 14.01% in the third trimester), with 20% of the texts being evaluative. Unlike the previous quarter (when no news were published), *Večernje novosti* published 2.92% news on its front pages (10% in negative context), while *Kurir* and *Politika* published 4, i.e. 10 neutral news, respectively.

Table 23. – Structure of news with reference to the value context in seven media from the sample

News	value context with regards to the topic		
media outlet	positive %	neutral %	negative %
Informer	0	6.38	93.62
Alo!	8.33	70.83	20.83
Blic	0	80.00	20.00
Danas	0	88.46	11.54
Večernje novosti	0	90.00	10.00
Kurir	0	100.00	0
Politika	0	100.00	0
Total	1.47	57.35	41.18

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

More than 68% news from the sample are not balanced, from 30% in *Večernje novosti*, till 97.87% in *Informer* (**Table 24**), which also shows a tendency towards interpreting content published in this form.

Table 24. – Balance of news in the seven media from the sample

News	balans %	
media outlet	da	ne
Informer	2.13	97.87
Alo!	20.83	79.17
Blic	33.33	66.67
Kurir	50.00	50.00
Politika	50.00	50.00
Danas	69.23	30.77
Večernje novosti	70.00	30.00
Total	31.62	68.38

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Commentary (column, editorial) was in the fourth quarter again most present on the front pages of *Politika*, but two times less texts were recorded (62 in the fourth quarter against 129 in the third trimester), so share of commentaries in comparison to other forms in *Politika* is

now 13.16%. More commentaries were published by the paper *Danas* (52 – 13%), while *Informer* published seven, *Blic* and *Kurir* 3, each, and *Večernje novosti* and *Alo!* 2 commentaries each.

Reportage and other forms are present in a total of 23 or 1.06% texts. Though there is a distinct difference in the number of selected texts from the front pages per quarters (from 1360 in the first to 2177 in the fourth period), when considering genres and content interpretation, the same trends have been present throughout 2015. Share and numbers of reports have been steadily increasing, while the presence of news has been decreasing. Shares of interviews, commentaries and articles have varied, so all three of these forms intertwined in accordance with editorial policies and needs of the media to show information from different angles or with the help of more or less credible interviewees. However, all forms have been prone to interpretation, which is best seen from the data for all four quarters regarding balance and value context of reports, as the most prevalent journalistic genre, and news, the basic form of journalistic expression.

In reports, the balance in the first trimester was absent from 67.67% texts, in the second trimester from 69.02%, third 73% and fourth 69.54% of texts written in this genre, while clear evaluative context was visible in 37.74% of reports in the first, 38.04% in the second, 44.43% in the third and 37.95% in the fourth quarter. Similar findings were recorded when it comes to news, which have also been inclined towards interpretations – in the first quarter 40.46%, in the second 49.25%, in the third 49.21% and in the fourth trimester 42.65% of news had clearly visible standpoint, i.e. evaluative context which the journalist/media advocates. Also, balance was absent in 63% of news in the first, 70.35% in the second, 67.72% in the third and 63.38% in the fourth quarter.

Actors

Based on the analysis of the empirical material collected from the front pages, media in Serbia mostly deal with political events in Serbia. As much as 46.86% of the total number of actors featured in the selected front-page texts are (individual and collective) political actors who take up various positions within the political life of Serbia (please see **Table 25** and **Tables 26-31**, which speak about distribution of frequency of appearance of some individual actors and **Tables 42, 44, 46 and 48** which speak about the distribution of frequency of appearance of collective domestic political actors). If we add to this number the texts which speak about foreign political actors, the percentage share of political actors in the total number of actors from the front pages increases to 73.11%. Should we add to this percentage the texts referring to unnamed sources, as they also cover topics from political life, usually that of Serbia, the share of these texts in the total number of texts from our sample increases to as much as 77.35%. The second-ranked group in terms frequency of appearance consists of different social actors who make up for 18.48% of our sample. Business and economic actors are features in only 4.15% of texts from the front pages (see **Table 25**).

Table 25. – Total distribution of actors appearing in texts included in the research sample (in absolute values)

Actors					
Political actors	7812	Domestic	5007	Individual	4101
				Collective	906
		Foreign	2805	Individual	2273
				Collective	532
Business/economic actors	444	Domestic	408	Individual	305
				Collective	103
		Foreign	36	Individual	13
				Collective	23
Other social actors	1975	Domestic	1951	Individual	1688
				Collective	263
		Foreign	24	Individual	21
				Collective	3
Unnamed source					453
Total					10684

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Tables 26-31 outline distribution of frequency of individual political actors who act within the political stage of Serbian society. Individual political actors – members of the Government of Serbia (51.67%) and political parties in government (9.90%) are considerably more present on the front pages (61.57%) compared to 5.77% for representatives of state agencies and institutions, 2.92% for representatives of the military and police, 18.58% for opposition actors and 8.80% for those who do not belong to the current government of Serbia, but also do not belong to position and/or opposition.

Table 26. – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual political actors from the Government of the Republic of Serbia and President of the Republic of Serbia

Government of RS and President of RS	number	%
Aleksandar Vučić	717	33.84
Ivica Dačić	238	11.23
Tomislav Nikolić	231	10.90
Nebojša Stefanović	163	7.69
Zorana Mihajlović	120	5.66
Aleksandar Vulin	118	5.57
Bratislav Gašić	117	5.52
Kori Udovički	65	3.07
Nikola Selaković	60	2.83
Rasim Ljajić	50	2.36
Jadranka Joksimović	38	1.79
Srđan Verbić	35	1.65
Zlatibor Lončar	35	1.65
Dušan Vujović	30	1.42
Željko Sertić	29	1.37
Ivan Tasovac	29	1.37
Aleksandar Antić	23	1.09
Velimir Ilić	8	0.38
Snežana Bogosavljević Bošković	7	0.33
Vanja Udovičić	6	0.28
Total	2119	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 27. – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual political actors in government

Government: individual actors	number	%
Branko Ružić	42	10.34
Zoran Babić	30	7.39
Vladimir Đukanović	27	6.65
Milutin Mrkonjić	21	5.17
Milovan Drecun	20	4.93
Đorđe Milićević	16	3.94
Dušan Bajatović	16	3.94
Igor Mirović	14	3.45
Dragan Marković Palma	13	3.20
Aleksandar Jovičić	12	2.96
Dijana Vukomanović	12	2.96
Vuk Drašković	12	2.96
Goran Knežević	10	2.46
Ivan Mrkić	9	2.22
Momir Stojanović	9	2.22
Veroljub Arsić	9	2.22
Milan Krkobabić	7	1.72
Oliver Antić	7	1.72
Aleksandar Martinović	6	1.48
Dragomir Karić	6	1.48
Marijan Ristićević	6	1.48
Meho Omerović	6	1.48
Aleksandra Đurović	5	1.23
Marija Obradović	5	1.23
Miodrag Linta	5	1.23
Momo Čolaković	5	1.23
Nevena Adžemović	5	1.23
Novica Tončev	5	1.23
Igor Bečić	4	0.99
Neđo Jovanović	4	0.99
Srđan Dragojević	4	0.99
Total	406	100

Government: individual actors	number	%
Žarko Obradović	4	0.99
Aleksandar Čotrić	3	0.74
Aleksandra Tomić	3	0.74
Đorđe Čabarkapa	3	0.74
Goran Vesić	3	0.74
Gorjana Marinković	3	0.74
Igor Novaković	3	0.74
Ištvan Pastor	3	0.74
Ivan Bošnjak	3	0.74
Katarina Rakić	3	0.74
Vladimir Marinković	3	0.74
Others*	20	4.93
Total	406	100

Tables show actors who were present in 3+ texts in the fourth quarter, while actors with two appearances or one were categorized under "other".

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 28. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual political actors of representatives of state agencies and institutions

State agencies and institutions: Individual actors	number	%
Marko Đurić	48	18.90
Siniša Mali	47	18.50
Maja Gojković	33	12.99
Oliver Potežica	17	6.69
Radomir Nikolić	16	6.30
Slavica Đukić Dejanović	12	4.72
Stanislava Pak	12	4.72
Veljko Odalović	11	4.33
Tanja Mišević	8	3.15
Miloš Vučević	6	2.36
Jorgovanka Tabaković	6	2.36
Saša Mirković	5	1.97
Svetomir Marjanović	5	1.97
Nenad Ivanišević	4	1.57
Zoran Stanković	4	1.57
Total	254	100

State agencies and institutions: Individual actors	number	%
Ivica Kojić	4	1.57
Dragana Kalinović	3	1.18
Goran Vesić	3	1.18
Novak Nedić	3	1.18
Zoran Đorđević	3	1.18
Others	4	1.57
Total	254	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 29. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual political actors of representatives of military and police

Military and police: Individual Actors	number	%
Ljubiša Diković	24	20.00
Milorad Veljović	15	12.50
Predrag Bandić	14	11.67
Ranko Živak	13	10.83
Aleksandar Đorđević	11	9.17
Veselin Milić	6	5.00
Biljana Popović Ivković	4	3.33
Srđan Paskvali	4	3.33
Vladimir Rebić	4	3.33
Dragan Kecman	3	2.50
Jovan Krivokapić	3	2.50
Jovica Draganić	3	2.50
Milosav Simović	3	2.50
Veljko Mijailović	3	2.50
Others	10	8.33
Total	120	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 30. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual political actors from the opposition

Opposition: individual actors	number	%
Bojan Pajtić	130	17.06
Boris Tadić	98	12.86
Vojislav Šešelj	65	8.53
Borislav Stefanović	64	8.40
Sanda Rašković Ivić	39	5.12
Dragan Šutanovac	38	4.99
Čedomir Jovanović	32	4.20
Zoran Živković	22	2.89
Vojislav Koštunica	21	2.76
Aleksandra Jerkov	18	2.36
Janko Veselinović	17	2.23
Nenad Popović	14	1.84
Saša Mirković	14	1.84
Nenad Čanak	12	1.57
Gordana Čomić	11	1.44
Saša Radulović	10	1.31
Marko Đurišić	9	1.18
Dušan Petrović	8	1.05
Miroslav Vasin	8	1.05
Nataša Vučković	7	0.92
Vjerica Radeta	7	0.92
Aleksandar Đurđev	6	0.79
Aleksandar Senić	6	0.79
Boško Obradović	6	0.79
Bojan Kostreš	5	0.66
Konstantin Samofalov	5	0.66
Radoslav Milojević Kena	5	0.66
Slobodan Homen	5	0.66
Aleksandar Lipkovski	4	0.52
Balša Božović	4	0.52
Total	762	100

Opposition: individual actors	number	%
Dejan Čokić	4	0.52
Dragoljub Mićunović	4	0.52
Jovo Ostojić	4	0.52
Petar Jojić	4	0.52
Sulejman Ugljanin	4	0.52
Dejan Nikolić	3	0.39
Dragan Maršićanin	3	0.39
Goran Bogdanović	3	0.39
Goran Ješić	3	0.39
Vladimir Todorčić	3	0.39
Others	37	4.86
Total	762	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 31. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of **other** individual political and social actors

Other individual social actors	number	%
Slobodan Milošević	55	15.99
Parents of Predrag Gojković	31	9.01
Mlađan Dinkić	23	6.69
Emir Kusturica	21	6.10
Zoran Đinđić	21	6.10
Slađana Stanković	19	5.52
Jovica Stepić	19	5.52
Dragan Đilas	15	4.36
Igor Mikić	15	4.36
Mira Marković	14	4.07
Mirko Cvetković	13	3.78
Nebojša Krstić	11	3.20
Goran Veselinović	10	2.91
Vuk Jeremić	10	2.91
Miodrag Rakić	8	2.33
Total	344	100

Other individual social actors	number	%
Nevena Veselinović	7	2.03
Branko Lazarević	6	1.74
Dragica Nikolić	6	1.74
Joška Broz	6	1.74
Stiven Sigal	6	1.74
Vesna Pešić	6	1.74
Božidar Đelić	5	1.45
Siniša Milić	5	1.45
Bogoljub Karić	4	1.16
Mihalj Kertes	4	1.16
Vladimir Beba Popović	4	1.16
Total	344	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

When we speak about the value context, the biggest number of negative texts among the representatives of the Government of Serbia was recorded with reference to Bratislav Gašić – 24, while the biggest share of texts with negative connotations featured Snežana Bogosavljević Bošković (28.57%). Regarding government parties, the biggest share of texts with negative connotations refers to Gorjana Marinković. In absolute values, the biggest number of negative texts was written about Branko Ružić – 11. Out of opposition actors, in the previous quarter, the biggest number of texts with negative connotations was published about Bojan Pajtić, a total of 28. **Tables 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37** show the value context within which individual political actors from the political scene of Serbia appear in selected texts from the front pages.

Table 32. – Value context of appearances of individual political actors from the Government of the Republic of Serbia and President of the Republic of Serbia

Government of RS and President of RS	total	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandar Vučić	717	24	3.35	670	93.44	23	3.21
Ivica Dačić	238	3	1.26	227	95.38	8	3.36
Tomislav Nikolić	231	2	0.87	208	90.04	21	9.09
Nebojša Stefanović	163	2	1.23	147	90.18	14	8.59
Zorana Mihajlović	120	0	0.00	97	80.83	23	19.17
Total	2119	37	1.75	1902	89.76	180	8.49

Government of RS and President of RS	total	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandar Vulin	118	0	0.00	110	93.22	8	6.78
Bratislav Gašić	117	3	2.56	90	76.92	24	20.51
Kori Udovički	65	0	0.00	56	86.15	9	13.85
Nikola Selaković	60	0	0.00	52	86.67	8	13.33
Rasim Ljajić	50	0	0.00	47	94.00	3	6.00
Jadranka Joksimović	38	1	2.63	33	86.84	4	10.53
Srđan Verbić	35	1	2.86	25	71.43	9	25.71
Zlatibor Lončar	35	1	2.86	25	71.43	9	25.71
Dušan Vujović	30	0	0.00	28	93.33	2	6.67
Željko Sertić	29	0	0.00	26	89.66	3	10.34
Ivan Tasovac	29	0	0.00	22	75.86	7	24.14
Aleksandar Antić	23	0	0.00	22	95.65	1	4.35
Velimir Ilić	8	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Snežana Bogosavljević Bošković	7	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Vanja Udovičić	6	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Total	2119	37	1.75	1902	89.76	180	8.49

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 33. – Value context of appearances of individual political actors from political parties in government

Government: individual actors	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Branko Ružić	42	0	0.00	31	73.81	11	26.19
Zoran Babić	30	0	0.00	24	80.00	6	20.00
Vladimir Đukanović	27	0	0.00	23	85.19	4	14.81
Milutin Mrkonjić	21	0	0.00	20	95.24	1	4.76
Milovan Drecun	20	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Milićević	16	1	6.25	15	93.75	0	0.00
Dušan Bajatović	16	0	0.00	11	68.75	5	31.25
Igor Mirović	14	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Total	406	0	0.00	356	87.68	48	11.82

Government: individual actors	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Dragan Marković Palma	13	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Aleksandar Jovičić	12	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Dijana Vukomanović	12	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Vuk Drašković	12	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Knežević	10	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Ivan Mrkić	9	0	0.00	7	77.78	2	22.22
Momir Stojanović	9	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Veroljub Arsić	9	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Milan Krkobabić	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Oliver Antić	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Martinović	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dragomir Karić	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Marijan Ristićević	6	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Meho Omerović	6	1	16.67	5	83.33	0	0.00
Aleksandra Đurović	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Marija Obradović	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Linta	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Momo Čolaković	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Nevena Adžemović	5	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
Novica Tončev	5	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Igor Bečić	4	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Nedo Jovanović	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Srđan Dragojević	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Žarko Obradović	4	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Aleksandar Čotrić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	406	0	0.00	356	87.68	48	11.82

Government: individual actors	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandra Tomić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Čabarkapa	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Vesić	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Gorjana Marinković	3	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Igor Novaković	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ištvan Pastor	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Bošnjak	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Katarina Rakić	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Vladimir Marinković	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	20	0	0.00	18	90.00	2	10.00
Total	406	0	0.00	356	87.68	48	11.82

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 34. – Value context of appearances of individual political actors of state agencies' and institutions' representatives

State agencies and institutions: individual actors	total	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Marko Đurić	48	0	0.00	48	100.00	0	0.00
Siniša Mali	47	1	2.13	34	72.34	12	25.53
Maja Gojković	33	1	3.03	28	84.85	4	12.12
Oliver Potežica	17	0	0.00	13	76.47	4	23.53
Radomir Nikolić	16	0	0.00	14	87.50	2	12.50
Slavica Đukić Dejanović	12	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Stanislava Pak	12	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Veljko Odalović	11	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
Tanja Mišević	8	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Miloš Vučević	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Jorgovanka Tabaković	6	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Total	254	2	0.79	219	86.22	33	12.99

State agencies and institutions: individual actors	total	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Saša Mirković	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Svetomir Marjanović	5	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Nenad Ivanišević	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Stanković	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ivica Kojić	4	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Dragana Kalinović	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Vesić	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Novak Nedić	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Zoran Đorđević	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	4	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Total	254	2	0.79	219	86.22	33	12.99

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 35. – Value context of appearances of individual political actors of military and police representatives

Military and police: Individual Actors	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Ljubiša Diković	24	0	0.00	20	83.33	4	16.67
Milorad Veljović	15	0	0.00	12	80.00	3	20.00
Predrag Bandić	14	3	21.43	11	78.57	0	0.00
Ranko Živak	13	2	15.38	11	84.62	0	0.00
Aleksandar Đorđević	11	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Veselin Milić	6	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
Biljana Popović Ivković	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Srđan Paskvali	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Rebić	4	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Dragan Kecman	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Jovan Krivokapić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Jovica Draganić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milosav Simović	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	120	6	5.00	103	85.83	11	9.17

Military and police: Individual Actors	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Veljko Mijailović	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	10	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Total	120	6	5.00	103	85.83	11	9.17

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 36. – Value context of appearances of individual political actors from **opposition parties**

Opposition: individual actors	total	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Bojan Pajtić	130	0	0.00	102	78.46	28	21.54
Boris Tadić	98	0	0.00	81	82.65	17	17.35
Vojislav Šešelj	65	1	1.54	58	89.23	6	9.23
Borislav Stefanović	64	0	0.00	56	87.50	8	12.50
Sanda Rašković Ivić	39	0	0.00	38	97.44	1	2.56
Dragan Šutanovac	38	0	0.00	34	89.47	4	10.53
Čedomir Jovanović	32	0	0.00	28	87.50	4	12.50
Zoran Živković	22	0	0.00	19	86.36	3	13.64
Vojislav Koštunica	21	0	0.00	19	90.48	2	9.52
Aleksandra Jerkov	18	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Janko Veselinović	17	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Popović	14	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Saša Mirković	14	0	0.00	10	71.43	4	28.57
Nenad Čanak	12	0	0.00	8	66.67	4	33.33
Gordana Čomić	11	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Saša Radulović	10	0	0.00	6	60.00	4	40.00
Marko Đurišić	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Petrović	8	0	0.00	4	50.00	4	50.00
Miroslav Vasin	8	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Nataša Vučković	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Vjerica Radeta	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Total	762	2	0.26	661	86.75	99	12.99

Opposition: individual actors	total	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandar Đurđev	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Senić	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Boško Obradović	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Bojan Kostreš	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Konstantin Samofalov	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Radoslav Milojević Kena	5	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Slobodan Homen	5	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Aleksandar Lipkovski	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Balša Božović	4	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Dejan Čokić	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dragoljub Mićunović	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Jovo Ostojić	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Petar Jojić	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Sulejman Ugljanin	4	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Dejan Nikolić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Maršićanin	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Bogdanović	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Goran Ješić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Todorčić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	37	1	2.70	34	91.89	2	5.41
Total	762	2	0.26	661	86.75	99	12.99

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 37. – Value context of appearances of **other** individual political and social actors

Other social actors	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Slobodan Milošević	55	0	0.00	53	96.36	2	3.64
Parents of Predrag Gojković	31	0	0.00	31	100.00	0	0.00
Mlađan Dinkić	23	0	0.00	13	56.52	10	43.48
Emir Kusturica	21	1	4.76	20	95.24	0	0.00
Zoran Đinđić	21	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
Sladana Stanković	19	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Jovica Stepić	19	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Đilas	15	0	0.00	11	73.33	4	26.67
Igor Mikić	15	0	0.00	12	80.00	3	20.00
Mira Marković	14	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
Mirko Cvetković	13	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Nebojša Krstić	11	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
Goran Veselinović	10	0	0.00	3	30.00	7	70.00
Vuk Jeremić	10	1	10.00	9	90.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Rakić	8	0	0.00	4	50.00	4	50.00
Nevena Veselinović	7	0	0.00	3	42.86	4	57.14
Branko Lazarević	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dragica Nikolić	6	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
Joška Broz	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Stiven Sigal	6	2	33.33	2	33.33	2	33.33
Vesna Pešić	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Božidar Đelić	5	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Siniša Milić	5	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Bogoljub Karić	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Mihalj Kertes	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Beba Popović	4	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Total	344	4	1.16	294	85.47	46	13.37

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

As in the previous three months, the most featured actor on the front pages of dailies in Serbia was Aleksandar Vučić. The media from our sample reported mostly neutrally about him (in as many as 93.44% of cases). 3.35% of positive texts were also written about him (a bit less than in the previous quarter) and 3.21%³ of texts had negative connotation. As a protagonist of texts from the front page, the PM appeared as many as 717 times, which is significantly more than the second-ranked actor (which is the “unnamed source” as it appears as the “protagonist” of front page texts 453 times). The biggest frequency of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić, expressed in absolute numbers was recorded in dailies *Politika* (146), *Danas* (126) and *Večernje novosti* (114) (please see **table 39**). However, expressed in relative values, i.e. percent shares of texts in which he appears as an actor, out of the total number of selected texts from the same individual paper, we can see that he is most present in *Kurir* (as many as 42.67% of texts from our sample discuss Vučić) and the daily *Alo!* (36.15% of texts) (please see **table 39**). In percentage, the biggest share of positive texts about Vučić is recorded in the daily *Alo!* (11.69% or 9 texts), followed by the daily *Informer* (where we can find 9.76% or 8 texts from the front pages in which he appears, and which have positive connotations). As in the previous trimester, the biggest number of negative texts was, again, recorded in the papers *Danas* (9.52%, i.e. 12 texts with negative connotations in the fourth trimester of 2015) and *Kurir* (8.08% or 8 texts) (please see **Table 38**).

Table 38. – Aleksandar Vučić: Value context with reference to media outlet

Aleksandar Vučić	positive		neutral		negative		Total	
Media outlet	no.	%	number	%	number	%	no.	%
Blic	2	2.74	71	97.26	0	0.00	73	100
Kurir	1	1.01	90	90.91	8	8.08	99	100
Večernje novosti	4	3.51	110	96.49	0	0.00	114	100
Alo!	9	11.69	67	87.01	1	1.13	77	100
Informer	8	9.76	74	90.24	0	0.00	82	100
Politika	0	0.00	144	98.63	2	1.37	146	100
Danas	0	0.00	114	90.48	12	9.52	126	100
Total	24	3.35	670	93.44	23	3.21	717	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015³ Nearly two times more compared against 1.77% of texts with negative connotations from the previous quarter.

Table 39. – Number of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić against the total number of texts in individual dailies

Aleksandar Vučić per media outlet	no. of appearances	Total number of texts	% share in relation to Total number of texts
Politika	146	471	31.00
Danas	126	400	31.50
Večernje novosti	114	343	33.24
Kurir	99	232	42.67
Informer	82	269	30.48
Alo!	77	213	36.15
Blic	73	249	29.32
Total	717	2177	32.94

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Second-ranked individual political actor from the political stage of Serbia, who appeared on the front pages of the analyzed dailies, was the President of the Republic of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić. In comparison to representatives of the Government of Serbia, he is the protagonist of 10.61% of analyzed texts (**please see table 26**). The biggest number of texts in which the actor is the President of Serbia was published by the paper *Danas* (44), but the biggest share against the total number of texts per media outlet is in *Kurir* – 15.22% (**Table 40**). The biggest number of texts with negative connotations on Tomislav Nikolić was recorded in the daily *Alo!* (7) which makes up for 23% of texts in which he is the protagonist, and which were published in this daily (**please see Table 41**).

Table 40. – Number of appearances of Tomislav Nikolić against the total number of texts in individual dailies

Tomislav Nikolić per media outlet	no. of appearances	Total number of texts	% share in relation to Total number of texts
Danas	44	400	11.00
Politika	42	471	8.92
Kurir	36	232	15.52
Večernje novosti	35	343	10.20
Alo!	30	213	14.08
Blic	26	249	10.44
Informer	18	269	6.69
Total	231	2177	10.61

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 41.** – Tomislav Nikolić: Value context with reference to the media

Tomislav Nikolić	positive		neutral		negative		Total	
Media outlet	number	%	number	%	number	%	No.	%
Blic	1	3.85	24	92.31	1	3.85	26	100
Kurir	0	0.00	35	97.22	1	2.78	36	100
Večernje novosti	0	0.00	35	100	0	0.00	35	100
Alo!	0	0.00	23	76.67	7	23.33	30	100
Informer	1	5.56	13	72.22	4	22.22	18	100
Politika	0	0.00	40	95.24	2	4.76	42	100
Danas	0	0.00	38	86.36	6	13.64	44	100
Total	2	0.87	208	90.04	21	9.09	231	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

There are considerably fewer texts dealing with certain collective political actors, important for the political stage in Serbia. These texts take up less than 18.09% among the domestic political and social actors. **Tables 42-49** detail all the actors from our sample grouped under this category together with the frequencies and value connotations of their appearances.

Table 42. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of domestic collective political actors: state bodies and institutions

State agencies and institutions: Collective actors	number	%
Government of Serbia	178	35.67
Ministry of Interior	50	10.02
National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia	25	5.01
Ministry of Finance	22	4.41
Ministry of Defense	22	4.41
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	20	4.01
Ministry of Construction, Traffic and Infrastructure	17	3.41
Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development	13	2.61
Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection	11	2.20
“Serbian authorities”	11	2.20
Total	499	100

State agencies and institutions: Collective actors	number	%
National Bank of Serbia	10	2.00
Ministry of Health	9	1.80
Privatization Agency	8	1.60
Cabinet of the President of Serbia	8	1.60
Ministry of Economy	8	1.60
Ministry of State Administration and Local Self-Government	8	1.60
Tax Administration	8	1.60
Business Registers Agency	7	1.40
Ministry of Culture and Information	7	1.40
Pension and Disability Insurance Fund	7	1.40
Presidency of Serbia	7	1.40
Ministry of Labor, Employment, Veterans' and Social Issues	6	1.20
Restitution Agency	4	0.80
Cabinet of the PM of Serbia	4	0.80
Serbian Government's Office for Kosovo and Metohija	4	0.80
Ministry of Justice	4	0.80
Ministry of Mining and Energy	4	0.80
Republic Geodetic Institute	4	0.80
Republic Statistics Institute	3	0.60
Government's Committee for New Employment Approval	3	0.60
Other	7	1.40
Total	499	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 43. – Value context with reference to political actors: **state bodies and institutions**

State agencies and institutions: Collective actors	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Government of Serbia	178	2	1.12	171	96.07	5	2.81
Ministry of Interior	50	3	6.00	46	92.00	1	2.00
National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia	25	0	0.00	25	100.00	0	0.00
Total	499	11	2.20	467	93.59	21	4.21

State agencies and institutions: Collective actors	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Ministry of Finance	22	0	0.00	20	90.91	2	9.09
Ministry of Defense	22	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	20	0	0.00	18	90.00	2	10.00
Ministry of Construction, Traffic and Infrastructure	17	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development	13	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection	11	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian authorities	11	4	36.36	6	54.55	1	9.09
National Bank of Serbia	10	1	10.00	8	80.00	1	10.00
Ministry of Health	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Privatization Agency	8	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Cabinet of the President of Serbia	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Economy	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of State Administration and Local Self-Government	8	1	12.50	6	75.00	1	12.50
Tax Administration	8	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Business Registers Agency	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Total	499	11	2.20	467	93.59	21	4.21

State agencies and institutions: Collective actors	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Ministry of Culture and Information	7	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Pension and Disability Insurance Fund	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Presidency of Serbia	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Labor, Employment, Veterans' and Social Issues	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Restitution Agency	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Cabinet of the PM of Serbia	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian Government's Office for Kosovo and Metohija	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Justice	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Mining and Energy	4	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Republic Geodetic Institute	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Republic Statistics Institute	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Government's Committee for New Employment Approval	3	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Other	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Total	499	11	2.20	467	93.59	21	4.21

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 44.** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of domestic collective political actors: **military and police**

Military and police: collective actors	number	%
Security and Intelligence Agency	18	30.51
Military of Serbia	14	23.73
Military Disciplinary Court	7	11.86
Criminal Police Head Office	5	8.47
Military Union of Serbia	4	6.78
SBPOK	3	5.08
Police Employees' Union	3	5.08
Other	5	8.47
Total	59	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 45.** – Value context against domestic collective political actors: **military and police**

Military and police: collective actors	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Security and Intelligence Agency	18	0	0.00	16	88.89	2	11.11
Military of Serbia	14	1	7.14	13	92.86	0	0.00
Military Disciplinary Court	7	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Criminal Police Head Office	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Military Union of Serbia	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
SBPOK	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Police Employees' Union	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Total	59	1	1.69	54	91.53	4	6.78

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 46. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of collective political actors: **government**

Government: collective actors	number	%
Serbian Progressive Party	116	69.46
SPS	35	20.96
Socialist Movement	4	2.40
Party of United Pensioners of Serbia	4	2.40
New Serbia	3	1.80
United Serbia	2	1.20
Serbian Renewal Movement	2	1.20
Strength of Serbia Movement	1	0.60
Total	167	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 47.** – Value context with reference to collective political actors: **government**

Government: Collective actors	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Serbian Progressive Party	116	1	0.86	104	89.66	11	9.48
SPS	35	0	0.00	32	91.43	3	8.57
Socialist Movement	4	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Party of United Pensioners of Serbia	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
New Serbia	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
United Serbia	2	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian Renewal Movement	2	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Strength of Serbia Movement	1	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	167	1	0.60	150	89.82	16	9.58

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 48.** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **opposition**

Opposition: collective actors	number	%
Democratic Party	91	50.28
Democratic Party of Serbia	22	12.15
Social Democratic Party	16	8.84
Serbian Radical Party	16	8.84
Liberal Democratic Party	10	5.52
Dveri	6	3.31
Serbian National Party	5	2.76
It's enough, Saša Radulović	4	2.21
League of Social-Democrats of Vojvodina	4	2.21
Serbian Left	3	1.66
New Party	2	1.10
Party of Democratic Action Sandžak	2	1.10
Total	181	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 49.** – Value context with reference to domestic collective political actors: **opposition**

Opposition: Collective actors	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Democratic Party	91	0	0.00	75	82.42	16	17.58
Democratic Party of Serbia	22	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
Social Democratic Party	16	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian Radical Party	16	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Liberal Democratic Party	10	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Dveri	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian National Party	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
It's enough, Saša Radulović	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
League of Social-Democrats of Vojvodina	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian Left	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
New Party	2	1	50.00	1	50.00	0	0.00
Party of Democratic Action Sandžak	2	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	181	1	0.55	164	90.61	16	8.84

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

A considerably lower percentage of texts from the front pages speak of foreign (individual and collective) political actors and political actors from Kosovo (merely 26.25% out of the total number of texts). Protagonists of these texts are more often individual actors/individuals (in 81.03% of cases) than collective ones (18.96%) (please see **Table 25** and **Table 50-81**).

Table 50. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Croatia**

Croatia	number	%
Zoran Milanović	44	19.56
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović	24	10.67
Tomislav Karamarko	21	9.33
Božo Petrov	18	8.00
“Croatian authorities”	12	5.33
Franjo Tuđman	10	4.44
Milan Bandić	10	4.44
Vesna Pusić	9	4.00
Branimir Glavaš	8	3.56
Croatian police	8	3.56
Ranko Ostojić	8	3.56
Ivo Josipović	8	3.56
Milorad Pupovac	7	3.11
Drago Prgomet	6	2.67
Most	5	2.22
HDZ	4	1.78
SDP	4	1.78
Stipe Petrina	4	1.78
Tihomir Orešković	4	1.78
Others	11	4.88
Total	255	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 51. – Value context with reference to individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Croatia**

Croatia	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Zoran Milanović	44	0	0.00	33	75.00	11	25.00
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović	24	0	0.00	19	79.17	5	20.83
Tomislav Karamarko	21	0	0.00	18	85.71	3	14.29
Božo Petrov	18	0	0.00	16	88.89	2	11.11
“Croatian authorities”	12	0	0.00	6	50.00	6	50.00
Franjo Tuđman	10	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Milan Bandić	10	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Vesna Pusić	9	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Branimir Glavaš	8	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Croatian police	8	0	0.00	3	37.50	5	62.50
Ranko Ostojić	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Ivo Josipović	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Milorad Pupovac	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Drago Prgomet	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Most	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
HDZ	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
SDP	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Stipe Petrina	4	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Tihomir Orešković	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Others	11	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Total	225	0	0.00	187	83.11	38	16.89

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 52. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Montenegro**

Montenegro	number	%
Milo Đukanović	47	17.09
Andrija Mandić	18	6.55
Democratic Front	14	5.09
Nebojša Medojević	11	4.00
Ranko Krivokapić	10	3.64
Government of Montenegro	10	3.64
Montenegrin police	9	3.27
Raško Konjević	9	3.27
Slaven Radunović	8	2.91
Svetozar Marović	8	2.91
Vijesti	8	2.91
Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro	7	2.55
Filip Vujanović	7	2.55
Milan Knežević	7	2.55
EU Delegation to Montenegro	6	2.18
Gojko Raičević	6	2.18
Milivoje Katnić	6	2.18
Srđan Milić	6	2.18
Miloš Marović	5	1.82
Montenegrin authorities	4	1.45
Igor Lukšić	4	1.45
SDP	4	1.45
Slavko Stojanović	4	1.45
Branka Bošnjak	3	1.09
Special prosecution of Montenegro	3	1.09
Higher State's Attorney of Montenegro	3	1.09
Dragan Marović	3	1.09
Mijo Martinović	3	1.09
Milena Marović	3	1.09
Total	275	100

Montenegro	number	%
Miodrag Lekić	3	1.09
Vladislav Bojović	3	1.09
Žarko Rakčević	3	1.09
Others	30	10.91
Total	275	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 53.** – Value context with reference to individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Montenegro**

Montenegro	No.	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milo Đukanović	47	0	0.00	30	63.83	17	36.17
Andrija Mandić	18	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Democratic Front	14	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Medojević	11	1	9.09	10	90.91	0	0.00
Ranko Krivokapić	10	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Government of Montenegro	10	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Montenegrin police	9	0	0.00	3	33.33	6	66.67
Raško Konjević	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Slaven Radunović	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Svetozar Marović	8	0	0.00	5	62.50	3	37.50
Vijesti	8	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro	7	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Filip Vujanović	7	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Milan Knežević	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
EU Delegation to Montenegro	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Total	275	1	0.36	238	86.55	36	13.09

Montenegro	No.	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Gojko Raičević	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Milivoje Katnić	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Srđan Milić	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Miloš Marović	5	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Montenegrin authorities	4	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Igor Lukšić	4	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
SDP	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Slavko Stojanović	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Branka Bošnjak	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Special prosecution of Montenegro	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Higher State's Attorney of Montenegro	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Marović	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mijo Martinović	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milena Marović	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Lekić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladislav Bojović	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Žarko Rakčević	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	30	0	0.00	29	96.67	1	3.33
Total	275	1	0.36	238	86.55	36	13.09

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 54. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina/Republic Srpska**

Bosnia and Herzegovina	number	%
Milorad Dodik	43	24.71
Alija Izetbegović	19	10.92
Total	174	100

Bosnia and Herzegovina	number	%
Denis Zvizdić	11	6.32
Bakir Izetbegović	10	5.75
Armin Salkić	9	5.17
Nedeljko Radić	9	5.17
Dragan Mektić	8	4.60
Mladen Ivanić	8	4.60
Mladen Bosić	7	4.02
Valentin Incko	6	3.45
State Investigation and Protection Agency SIPA	5	2.87
Dragan Lukač	4	2.30
Boris Grubešić	3	1.72
Boris Jerinić	3	1.72
Emir Suljagić	3	1.72
Naser Orić	3	1.72
Perica Stanić	3	1.72
Social Democratic Party	3	1.72
Prosecution of Bosnia and Herzegovina	3	1.72
Vahid Ćosić	3	1.72
Others	11	6.32
Total	174	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 55. – Value context with reference to individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina/Republic Srpska**

Bosnia and Herzegovina	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milorad Dodik	43	0	0.00	42	97.67	1	2.33
Alija Izetbegović	19	0	0.00	15	78.95	4	21.05
Denis Zvizdić	11	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Total	174	0	0.00	167	95.98	7	4.02

Bosnia and Herzegovina	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Bakir Izetbegović	10	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Armin Salkić	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Nedeljko Radić	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Mektić	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Mladen Ivanić	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Mladen Bosić	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Valentin Incko	6	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
State Investigation and Protection Agency SIPA	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Lukač	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Boris Grubešić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Boris Jerinić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Emir Suljagić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Naser Orić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Perica Stanić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Social Democratic Party	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Prosecution of Bosnia and Herzegovina	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vahid Ćosić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	11	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Total	174	0	0.00	167	95.98	7	4.02

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 56. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective actors:
Kosovo

Kosovo	number	%
Hashim Thaci	37	19.47
Isa Mustafa	28	14.74
Atifete Jahjaga	13	6.84
“Kosovo authorities”	10	5.26
Kosovo police	9	4.74
Ramush Haradinaj	9	4.74
Dalibor Jevtić	8	4.21
Government of Kosovo	8	4.21
Branimir Stojanović	7	3.68
Constitutional Court of Kosovo	6	3.16
Albin Kurti	5	2.63
Behgjet Pacolli	5	2.63
Petrit Selimi	5	2.63
Goran Rakić	4	2.11
Slavko Simić	4	2.11
Aleksandar Jablanović	3	1.58
Dragan Jablanović	3	1.58
Kosovo Liberation Army	3	1.58
Self-commitment	3	1.58
Others	20	10.53
Total	190	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 57. – Value context with reference to individual and collective actors: **Kosovo**

Kosovo	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Hashim Thaci	37	0	0.00	31	83.78	6	16.22
Isa Mustafa	28	0	0.00	26	92.86	2	7.14
Atifete Jahjaga	13	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
"Kosovo authorities"	10	0	0.00	5	50.00	5	50.00
Kosovo police	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Ramush Haradinaj	9	0	0.00	6	66.67	3	33.33
Dalibor Jevtić	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Government of Kosovo	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Branimir Stojanović	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Constitutional Court of Kosovo	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Albin Kurti	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Behgjet Pacolli	5	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Petrit Selimi	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Rakić	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Slavko Simić	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Jablanović	3	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Dragan Jablanović	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Kosovo Liberation Army	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Self-commitment	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	20	0	0.00	18	90.00	2	10.00
Total	190	0	0.00	166	87.37	24	12.63

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 58.** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Albania**

Albania	number	%
Ismail Morina	9	27.27
Albanian police	7	21.21
Marcel Keleshi	5	15.15
Ditmir Bushati	4	12.12
Others	8	24.24
Total	33	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 59.** – Value context with reference to individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Albania**

Albania	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Ismail Morina	9	0	0.00	1	11.11	8	88.89
Albanian police	7	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Marcel Keleshi	5	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Ditmir Bushati	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Others	8	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Total	33	0	0.00	20	60.61	13	39.39

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 60.** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual foreign political actors outside of the region: **foreign politicians**

Foreign politicians	number	%
Bashar al-Assad	70	18.18
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	44	11.43
Ahmet Davutoglu	29	7.53
Total	385	100.00

Foreign politicians	number	%
David Cameron	21	5.45
Xi Jinping	20	5.19
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	17	4.42
Alexis Tsipras	15	3.90
Viktor Orban	14	3.64
Li Keqiang	12	3.12
Sebastian Kurtz	11	2.86
Li Manchang	10	2.60
Denis Keefe	9	2.34
Miroslav Lajčák	9	2.34
Bill Clinton	8	2.08
Borut Pahor	7	1.82
Jeremy Corbyn	6	1.56
Miro Cerar	6	1.56
Viktor Ponta	6	1.56
Bernard Cazeneuve	5	1.30
Bojko Borisov	5	1.30
Philip Hammond	5	1.30
Sigmar Gabriel	5	1.30
Matteo Renzi	4	1.04
Ramzan Kadirov	4	1.04
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi	3	0.78
Aleksandar Lukashenko	3	0.78
Benjamin Netanyahu	3	0.78
Haider Al-Abadi	3	0.78
Nikola Gruevski	3	0.78
Nikos Kotzias	3	0.78
Werner Faymann	3	0.78
Others	22	5.71
Total	385	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 61. – Value context with reference to individual foreign political actors outside the region: **foreign politicians**

Foreign politicians	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Bashar al-Assad	70	0	0.00	69	98.57	1	1.43
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	44	0	0.00	34	77.27	10	22.73
Ahmet Davutoglu	29	0	0.00	27	93.10	2	6.90
David Cameron	21	0	0.00	20	95.24	1	4.76
Xi Jinping	20	1	5.00	19	95.00	0	0.00
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	17	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
Alexis Tsipras	15	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Viktor Orban	14	0	0.00	11	78.57	3	21.43
Li Keqiang	12	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Sebastian Kurtz	11	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Li Manchang	10	1	10.00	9	90.00	0	0.00
Denis Keefe	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Lajčák	9	1	11.11	8	88.89	0	0.00
Bill Clinton	8	1	12.50	6	75.00	1	12.50
Borut Pahor	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Jeremy Corbyn	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Miro Cerar	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Viktor Ponta	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Bernard Cazeneuve	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Bojko Borisov	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Philip Hammond	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Sigmar Gabriel	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Matteo Renzi	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ramzan Kadirov	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Lukashenko	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Benjamin Netanyahu	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Haider Al-Abadi	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Gruevski	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Nikos Kotzias	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	385	4	1.04	357	92.73	24	6.23

Foreign politicians	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Werner Faymann	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	22	0	0.00	20	90.91	2	9.09
Total	385	4	1.04	357	92.73	24	6.23

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 62. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective actors outside the region: **Germany**

Germany	number	%
Angela Merkel	81	62.31
Frank-Walter Steinmeier	13	10.00
Axel Dittmann	11	8.46
Doris Pack	7	5.38
Bundestag	4	3.08
Gunther Kirchbaum	4	3.08
German authorities	3	2.31
Others	7	5.58
Total	130	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 63. – Value context with reference to individual and collective political actors outside the region: **Germany**

Germany	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Angela Merkel	81	0	0.00	81	100	0	0.00
Frank-Walter Steinmeier	13	0	0.00	13	100	0	0.00
Axel Dittmann	11	0	0.00	11	100	0	0.00
Doris Pack	7	0	5.00	7	100	0	0.00
Bundestag	4	0	0.00	4	100	0	0.00
Gunther Kirchbaum	4	0	0.00	4	100	0	0.00
Total	130	0	0.00	125	100	0	0.00

Germany	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
German authorities	3	0	0.00	3	100	0	0.00
Others	7	0	0.00	2	100	0	0.00
Total	130	0	0.00	125	100	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 64. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: **France**

France	number	%
Francois Hollande	39	47.56
Marine le Pen	12	14.63
“French authorities”	8	9.76
Manuel Valls	8	9.76
French police	6	7.32
Marion Maréchal-Le Pen	3	3.66
Others	6	7.32
Total	82	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 65. – Value context with reference to individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: **France**

France	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Francois Hollande	39	0	0.00	38	97.44	1	2.56
Marine le Pen	12	0	0.00	10	83.33	2	16.67
“French authorities”	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Manuel Valls	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
French police	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Marion Maréchal-Le Pen	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Total	82	0	0.00	79	96.34	3	3.66

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 66. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors: **Russia**

Russia	number	%
Vladimir Putin	176	42.00
Sergey Lavrov	54	12.89
Dmitry Medvedev	36	8.59
“Russian authorities”	26	6.21
Alexander Chepurin	18	4.30
Sergey Shoygu	15	3.58
Dmitry Peskov	12	2.86
Igor Konashenkov	8	1.91
Russian Ministry of Defense	7	1.67
Russian Military	7	1.67
Alexey Pushkov	6	1.43
Dmitry Rogozin	6	1.43
Marija Zaharova	5	1.19
Anatolij Antonov	4	0.95
Valentina Matviyenko	4	0.95
Government of Russia	4	0.95
Sergey Ivanov	3	0.72
Sergey Gavrillov	3	0.72
Sergey Rudskoy	3	0.72
Sergey Rummyancev	3	0.72
Vladimir Markin	3	0.72
Others	16	3.82
Total	419	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 67.** – Value context with reference to individual and collective foreign actors: **Russia**

Russia	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Vladimir Putin	176	25	14.20	144	81.82	7	3.98
Sergey Lavrov	54	1	1.85	52	96.30	1	1.85
Dmitry Medvedev	36	0	0.00	35	97.22	1	2.78
“Russian authorities”	26	2	7.69	22	84.62	2	7.69
Alexander Chepurin	18	1	5.56	16	88.89	1	5.56
Sergey Shoygu	15	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Peskov	12	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Konashenkov	8	1	12.50	7	87.50	0	0.00
Russian Ministry of Defense	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Russian Military	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Alexey Pushkov	6	3	50.00	3	50.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Rogozin	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Marija Zaharova	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Anatolij Antonov	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Valentina Matviyenko	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Government of Russia	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Sergey Ivanov	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Sergey Gavrillov	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Sergey Rudskoy	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Sergey Rummyancev	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Markin	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	16	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Total	419	33	7.88	374	89.26	12	2.86

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 68. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors: **USA**

USA	number	%
Barack Obama	64	33.86
John Kerry	44	23.28
US authorities	22	11.64
Joseph Biden	13	6.88
US Embassy in Serbia	11	5.82
CIA	9	4.76
Hilary Clinton	7	3.70
George Bush	6	3.17
Donald Trump	4	2.12
State Department	3	1.59
Others	6	3.17
Total	189	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 69.** – Value context with reference to individual and collective foreign actors: **USA**

USA	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Barack Obama	64	0	0.00	60	93.75	4	6.25
John Kerry	44	0	0.00	43	97.73	1	2.27
US authorities	22	0	0.00	10	45.45	12	54.55
Joseph Biden	13	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
US Embassy in Serbia	11	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
CIA	9	0	0.00	6	66.67	3	33.33
Hilary Clinton	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
George Bush	6	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Donald Trump	4	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
State Department	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Total	189	0	0.00	165	87.30	24	12.70

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 70.** – Distribution of appearance of individual and collective foreign actors: **ISIS**

ISIS	number	%
ISIS	66	34.20
Ahmed Almuhammed	14	7.25
Enes Omeragić	11	5.70
Elma Đušinac	10	5.18
Enes Mešić	8	4.15
Salah Abdeslam	8	4.15
Abdelhamid Abaud	7	3.63
Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi	7	3.63
Nedžad Balkan	6	3.11
Omar Ismail Mostefai	6	3.11
Bilal Hadfi	4	2.07
Muhammed Meco	4	2.07
Nusret Imamović	4	2.07
Jihadi John	3	1.55
Husein Bosnić	3	1.55
Ibrahim Abdeslam	3	1.55
Mevlid Jašarević	3	1.55
Sammy Aminur	3	1.55
Others	23	11.92
Total	193	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 71.** – Value context with reference to individual and collective foreign actors: **ISIS**

ISIS	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
ISIS	66	0	0.00	42	63.64	24	36.36
Ahmed Almuhammed	14	0	0.00	5	35.71	9	64.29
Enes Omeragić	11	0	0.00	6	54.55	5	45.45
Elma Đušinac	10	0	0.00	5	50.00	5	50.00
Enes Mešić	8	0	0.00	4	50.00	4	50.00
Total	193	0	0.00	109	56.48	84	43.52

ISIS	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Salah Abdeslam	8	0	0.00	5	62.50	3	37.50
Abdelhamid Abaud	7	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi	7	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Nedžad Balkan	6	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
Omar Ismail Mostefai	6	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
Bilal Hadfi	4	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Muhammed Meco	4	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Nusret Imamović	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Jihadi John	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Husein Bosnić	3	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Ibrahim Abdeslam	3	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Mevlid Jašarević	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Sammy Aminur	3	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Others	23	0	0.00	14	60.87	9	39.13
Total	193	0	0.00	109	56.48	84	43.52

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 72. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective foreign political actors: **representatives of EU institutions and EU institutions**

Representatives of EU institutions and EU institutions	number	%
Federica Mogherini	46	19.17
European Commission	45	18.75
Johannes Hahn	33	13.75
Michael Davenport	26	10.83
Jean-Claude Juncker	18	7.50
Donald Tusk	13	5.42
Maja Kocijančič	11	4.58
European Union	9	3.75
Ulrike Lunacek	9	3.75
David McAlister	8	3.33
Jean Asselborn	8	3.33
European Parliament	4	1.67
Others	10	4.17
Total	240	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 73. – Value context with reference to individual and collective foreign political actors:
Representatives of EU institutions and EU institutions

Representatives of EU institutions and EU institutions	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Federica Mogherini	46	0	0.00	46	100.00	0	0.00
European Commission	45	0	0.00	41	91.11	4	8.89
Johannes Hahn	33	0	0.00	32	96.97	1	3.03
Michael Davenport	26	0	0.00	24	92.31	2	7.69
Jean-Claude Juncker	18	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Donald Tusk	13	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Maja Kocijančič	11	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
European Union	9	0	0.00	4	44.44	5	55.56
Ulrike Lunacek	9	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
David McAlister	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Jean Asselborn	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
European Parliament	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Others	10	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Total	240	0	0.00	226	94.17	14	5.83

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 74. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective foreign political actors: **OSCE and Council of Europe representatives**

OSCE and Council of Europe representatives	number	%
OSCE	24	47.06
Dunja Mijatović	11	21.57
Lamberto Zannier	4	7.84
Council of Europe	4	7.84
Thorbjørn Jagland	3	5.88
Others	5	9.80
Total	51	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 75. – Value context with reference to individual and collective foreign political actors:
OSCE and Council of Europe Representatives

OSCE and Council of Europe representatives	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
OSCE	24	0	0.00	24	100.00	0	0.00
Dunja Mijatović	11	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Lamberto Zannier	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Council of Europe	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Thorbjørn Jagland	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Total	51	0	0.00	50	98.04	1	1.96

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 76. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective foreign political actors: **UN representatives and UN institutions**

UN	number	%
UNESCO	49	41.88
Darko Tanasković	15	12.82
Ban Ki-Moon	8	6.84
Melita Šunjić	7	5.98
Irina Bokova	4	3.42
"Cuba representative in the Executive Council of UNESCO"	4	3.42
Antonio Guterres	3	2.56
Eleonora Mitrofanova	3	2.56
Mirjana Ivanović Milenkovski	3	2.56
"UK representative in UNESCO"	3	2.56
UN Security Council	3	2.56
Others	15	12.82
Total	117	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 77.** – Value context with reference to individual and collective foreign political actors: **UN representatives and UN institutions**

UN	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
UNESCO	49	0	0.00	47	95.92	2	4.08
Darko Tanasković	15	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Ban Ki-Moon	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Melita Šunjić	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Irina Bokova	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
"Cuba representative in the Executive Council of UNESCO"	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Antonio Guterres	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	117	0	0.00	115	98.29	2	1.71

UN	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Eleonora Mitrofanova	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mirjana Ivanović Milenkovski	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
"UK representative in UNESCO"	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
UN Security Council	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	15	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Total	117	0	0.00	115	98.29	2	1.71

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 78.** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors: **NATO**

NATO	number	%
NATO	44	61.97
Jens Stoltenberg	22	30.99
Jelko Kacin	3	4.23
Philip Breedlove	2	2.82
	71	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 79.** – Value context with reference to individual and collective foreign political actors: **NATO**

NATO	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
NATO	44	0	0.00	36	81.82	8	18.18
Jens Stoltenberg	22	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
Jelko Kacin	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Philip Breedlove	2	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	71	0	0.00	62	87.32	9	12.68

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 80. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective actors: actors related to the **Hague Tribunal**

The Hague	number	%
Hague Tribunal	20	15.75
Ratko Mladić	20	15.75
Jovica Stanišić	10	7.87
Radovan Karadžić	10	7.87
Franko Simatović	9	7.09
Vladimir Lazarević	8	6.30
Dušan Dunjić	6	4.72
Goran Hadžić	6	4.72
Florence Hartmann	4	3.15
Momčilo Perišić	4	3.15
Nenad Golčevski	4	3.15
Sefer Halilović	3	2.36
Others	23	18.11
Total	127	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 81.** – Value context with reference to individual and collective foreign political actors: actors related to the **Hague Tribunal**

The Hague	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Hague Tribunal	20	0	0.00	16	80.00	4	20.00
Ratko Mladić	20	0	0.00	19	95.00	1	5.00
Jovica Stanišić	10	1	10.00	9	90.00	0	0.00
Radovan Karadžić	10	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Franko Simatović	9	1	11.11	8	88.89	0	0.00
Vladimir Lazarević	8	1	12.50	7	87.50	0	0.00
Dušan Dunjić	6	1	16.67	5	83.33	0	0.00
Total	127	4	3.15	111	87.40	12	9.45

The Hague	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Goran Hadžić	6	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
Florence Hartmann	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Momčilo Perišić	4	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Nenad Golčevski	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Sefer Halilović	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Others	23	0	0.00	22	95.65	1	4.35
Total	127	4	3.15	111	87.40	12	9.45

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Already from a cursory glance at the frequency of appearances of certain actors on the front pages of the selected print dailies from our sample, it is clear that the media treat interior and foreign political issues with uneven interest. The fact that foreign actors appear far less on the front pages of dailies in Serbia (35.90% against 64.09% frequency of appearances of domestic political actors) speaks about the focus of domestic media on the field of domestic politics, which often takes on the contours of fiction in interpretations of certain dailies. This will be discussed in more detail in the part of the analysis dealing with interpretative strategies in the media's processing of certain topics. Reasons for noticeable lack of interest for economic actors and their understanding of the social, economic and political situation in Serbia and the world remain a mystery (merely 4.15% of the total sample of actors are economic actors). Even more mysterious when considering the fact that the narratives of many politicians emphasize economic consolidation of the country as key elements of future developmental strategies for Serbia's society (please see **Table 25** and **Tables 82-87**).

Table 82. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual domestic business/economic actor

Economic actors: individual	number	%
Lidija Udovički	47	15.41
Nikola Petrović	46	15.08
Miroslav Mišković	44	14.43
Miroslav Bogičević	42	13.77
Milan Beko	12	3.93
Stanko Subotić	8	2.62
Ana Brnabić	7	2.30
Miodrag Kostić	6	1.97
Mira Glišić Simić	6	1.97
Aleksandar Obradović	5	1.64
Bojan Gajović	5	1.64
Đoko Krivokapić	5	1.64
Marko Mišković	5	1.64
Peter Kamaraš	5	1.64
Petar Matijević	5	1.64
David Petraeus	4	1.31
Đorđe Nicović	3	0.98
Jelena Jovanović	3	0.98
Milo Đurašković	3	0.98
Mohammed bin Zayed	3	0.98
Mohammad Yusuf Dahlan	3	0.98
Predrag Ćulibrk	3	0.98
Saša Vlasisavljević	3	0.98
Velimir Jovanović	3	0.98
Veselin Marković	3	0.98
Others	26	8.52
Total	305	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 83.** – Value context of appearances of individual domestic business/economic actors

Economic actors: individual	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Lidija Udovički	47	0	0.00	37	78.72	10	21.28
Nikola Petrović	46	0	0.00	45	97.83	1	2.17
Miroslav Mišković	44	0	0.00	27	61.36	17	38.64
Miroslav Bogičević	42	0	0.00	31	73.81	11	26.19
Milan Beko	12	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Stanko Subotić	8	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Ana Brnabić	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Kostić	6	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
Mira Glišić Simić	6	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
Aleksandar Obradović	5	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Bojan Gajović	5	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Đoko Krivokapić	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Mišković	5	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Peter Kamaraš	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Petar Matijević	5	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
David Petraeus	4	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Đorđe Nicović	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Jelena Jovanović	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Milo Đurašković	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mohammed bin Zayed	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mohammad Yusuf Dahlan	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Predrag Ćulibrk	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Saša Vlasisavljević	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Velimir Jovanović	3	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Veselin Marković	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	26	0	0.00	21	80.77	5	19.23
Total	305	0	0.00	239	78.36	66	21.64

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 84. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of collective domestic business/economic actors

Economic actors: Collective	number	%
Telekom Srbija	12	11.65
Elektroprivreda Srbije	10	9.71
DIPOS	8	7.77
Petrohemija	6	5.83
Srbijagas	6	5.83
Delta holding	5	4.85
Gazprom	5	4.85
Continental Wind Partners	5	4.85
MSK Kikinda	5	4.85
VAC	5	4.85
Steel mill Smederevo	5	4.85
Chemical Industry of Pančevo, Nitrogen Plant Pančevo	4	3.88
Fiat Srbija	4	3.88
NIS	4	3.88
Airport Nikola Tesla	3	2.91
Elektromreža Srbije	3	2.91
Lukoil	3	2.91
Others	10	9.71
Total	103	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 85.** – Value context of appearances of collective domestic business/economic actors

Economic actors: Collective	no.	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Telekom Srbija	12	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Elektroprivreda Srbije	10	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
DIPOS	8	1	12.50	2	25.00	5	62.50
Petrohemija	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Srbijagas	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Delta holding	5	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Gazprom	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Continental Wind Partners	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
MSK Kikinda	5	1	20.00	4	80.00	0	0.00
VAC	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Steel mill Smederevo	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Chemical Industry of Pančevo, Nitrogen Plant Pančevo	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Fiat Srbija	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
NIS	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Airport Nikola Tesla	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Elektromreža Srbije	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Lukoil	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	10	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Total	103	2	1.94	92	89.32	9	8.74

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 86. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective foreign business/economic actors

IMF and World Bank	number	%
IMF	12	33.33
World Bank	11	30.56
James Ruf	7	19.44
Kim Daehaeng	4	11.11
Elen Goldstein	2	5.56
Total	36	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 87.** – Value context of appearances of individual and collective foreign business/economic actors

IMF and World Bank	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
IMF		0	0.00	11	91.67	1	
World Bank	12	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	8.33
James Ruf	11	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Kim Daehaeng	7	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Elen Goldstein	4	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	36	0	0.00	35	97.22	1	2.78

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Apart from the already mentioned political and economic actors, protagonists of the front pages are various social actors, who affect social and political circumstances within Serbia's society. Based on the collected empirical material, we divided them as follows:

(a) representatives of independent government bodies and institutions (please see **Tables 88-91**); (b) various analysts⁴ of political, economical, security and other circumstances (**Tables 92, 93 and 94**), (c) representative of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations⁵ (**Tables 95, 96 and 97**) (d) representatives of the judiciary bodies (**Tables 98 and 99**), (e) actors connected with the "migrant crisis" (**Tables 100 and 101**), (f) actors from the media (**Tables 102 and 103**), (g) protagonists of various judicial proceedings and criminal scandals with political connotations (**Tables 104-107**) and (h) actors from distant past who are part of collective memories and as such gain specific symbolic importance within the media discourse (please see **Tables 108 and 109**).

⁴ For more information on the share of certain analysts on the front pages of different media from our sample, please see **Tables 156-162** in the Appendix.

⁵ For more information on the share of certain representatives of Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations on front pages of different media from our sample, please see **Tables 163-169** in the Appendix.

Table 88. – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of independent bodies**

Representatives of independent bodies	number	%
Saša Janković	48	34.78
Rodoljub Šabić	20	14.49
Anti-Corruption Council	11	7.97
Anti-Corruption Agency	10	7.25
Fiscal Council	9	6.52
Goran Karadžić	8	5.80
Miroslava Milenović	8	5.80
Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media	6	4.35
Dušan Slijepčević	5	3.62
Vladimir Vučković	4	2.90
Brankica Janković	3	2.17
Others	6	4.35
Total	138	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 89.** – Value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of independent bodies**

Representatives of independent bodies	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Saša Janković	48	0	0.00	15	31.25	33	68.75
Rodoljub Šabić	20	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Anti-Corruption Council	11	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Anti-Corruption Agency	10	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Fiscal Council	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Karadžić	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslava Milenović	8	2	25.00	5	62.50	1	12.50
Total	138	2	1.45	101	73.19	35	25.36

Representatives of independent bodies	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media	6	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Dušan Slijepčević	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Vučković	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Brankica Janković	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Total	138	2	1.45	101	73.19	35	25.36

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 90.** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual and collective domestic social actors: **Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA)**

SASA	number	%
Vladimir Kostić	26	37.68
SASA	13	18.84
Matija Bečković	12	17.39
Dušan Kovačević	4	5.80
Kosta Čavoški	3	4.35
Milovan Danojlić	3	4.35
Others	8	11.59
Total	69	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 91. – Value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **SASA**

SASA	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Vladimir Kostić	26	1	3.85	21	80.77	4	15.38
SASA	13	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Matija Bečković	12	1	8.33	11	91.67	0	0.00
Dušan Kovačević	4	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Kosta Čavoški	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milovan Danojlić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Total	69	3	4.35	62	89.86	4	5.80

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Analysts (experts) have special roles in texts from the front pages of the media from our sample (please see **Tables 92, 93 and 94**). Media treat them in a neutral context in as many as 99.03% of the texts, while Živadin Jovanović, Borivoje Borović, Miloško Arsić and Milan Kovačević are treated in a negative context in one text each.

Table 92. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **analysts**

Analysts	number	%
Dragomir Anđelković	56	9.06
Branko Radun	28	4.53
Đorđe Vukadinović	23	3.72
Aleksandar Radić	19	3.07
Marko Nicović	18	2.91
Dejan Vuk Stanković	16	2.59
Dušan Janjić	16	2.59
Milan Kovačević	13	2.10
Zlatko Nikolić	13	2.10
Total	618	100.00

Analysts	number	%
Aleksandra Joksimović	12	1.94
Zoran Stojiljković	12	1.94
Ljubodrag Savić	11	1.78
Bojan Dimitrijević	11	1.78
Dževad Galijašević	9	1.46
Ivan Ninić	9	1.46
Ratko Božović	9	1.46
Vladimir Goati	9	1.46
Vladislav Jovanović	9	1.46
Božidar Spasić	8	1.29
Branko Pavlović	8	1.29
Milan Nikolić	8	1.29
Miloško Arsić	8	1.29
Miroslav Lazanski	8	1.29
Aleksandar Popov	7	1.13
Darko Trifunović	7	1.13
Dobrovoje Radovanović	7	1.13
Aleksandar Stevanović	6	0.97
Dušan Proroković	6	0.97
Ivo Visković	6	0.97
Miroslav Šutić	6	0.97
Nenad Gujaničić	6	0.97
Vladimir Vuletić	6	0.97
Zoran Dragišić	6	0.97
Bojan Klačar	5	0.81
Borivoje Borović	5	0.81
Božidar Prelević	5	0.81
Cvijetin Milivojević	5	0.81
Dragan Đukanović	5	0.81
Dušan Simeonović	5	0.81
Igor Avžner	5	0.81
Jovo Bakić	5	0.81
Total	618	100.00

Analysts	number	%
Neven Cvetičanin	5	0.81
Petar Vojinović	5	0.81
Srđan Bogosavljević	5	0.81
Sreto Malinović	5	0.81
Svetozar Vujačić	5	0.81
Vladimir Pejić	5	0.81
Boško Jakšić	4	0.65
Džejms Ker-Lindzi	4	0.65
Ivan Nikolić	4	0.65
Jelena Milić	4	0.65
Ljubodrag Stojadinović	4	0.65
Ljubomir Madžar	4	0.65
Mahmud Bušatlija	4	0.65
Miladin Ševarlić	4	0.65
Milan Mijalkovski	4	0.65
Mladen Kovačević	4	0.65
Nebojša Avlijaš	4	0.65
Slobodan Antić	4	0.65
Srđan Cvetković	4	0.65
Tomislav Kresović	4	0.65
Zoran Milivojević	4	0.65
Živadin Jovanović	4	0.65
Daniilo Šuković	3	0.49
Darko Simović	3	0.49
Goran Nikolić	3	0.49
Goran Rodić	3	0.49
Milan Škulić	3	0.49
Miodrag Živković	3	0.49
Nebojša Milosavljević	3	0.49
Ninoslav Stojadinović	3	0.49
Obrad Kesić	3	0.49
Rade Veljanovski	3	0.49
Total	618	100.00

Analysts	number	%
Slobodan Samardžić	3	0.49
Stojan Stamenković	3	0.49
Žarko Trebješanin	3	0.49
Others	49	7.93
Total	618	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 93. – Value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: analysts

Analysts	No.	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Dragomir Anđelković	56	0	0.00	56	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Radun	28	0	0.00	28	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Vukadinović	23	0	0.00	23	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Radić	19	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Nicović	18	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Dejan Vuk Stanković	16	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Janjić	16	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Kovačević	13	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Zlatko Nikolić	13	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandra Joksimović	12	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Stojiljković	12	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Bojan Dimitrijević	11	1	9.09	10	90.91	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Savić	11	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Dževad Galijašević	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Ninić	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Ratko Božović	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Goati	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Vladislav Jovanović	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Božidar Spasić	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Pavlović	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Nikolić	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Milojko Arsić	8	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Miroslav Lazanski	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Popov	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Darko Trifunović	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Dobrivoje Radovanović	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Total	619	1	0.16	612	99.03	5	0.81

Analysts	No.	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandar Stevanović	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Proroković	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Ivo Visković	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Šutić	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Gujaničić	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Vuletić	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Dragišić	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Bojan Klačar	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Borivoje Borović	5	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Božidar Prelević	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Cvijetin Milivojević	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Đukanović	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Simeonović	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Avžner	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Jovo Bakić	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Neven Cvetičanin	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Petar Vojinović	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Srđan Bogosavljević	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Sreto Malinović	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Svetozar Vujačić	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Pejić	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Boško Jakšić	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Džejms Ker-Lindzi	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Nikolić	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Jelena Milić	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Stojadinović	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubomir Madžar	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Mahmud Bušatlija	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Miladin Ševarlić	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Total	619	1	0.16	612	99.03	5	0.81

Analysts	No.	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milan Mijalkovski	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Mladen Kovačević	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Avlijaš	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Antić	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Srđan Cvetković	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Tomislav Kresović	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Milivojević	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Živadin Jovanović	4	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Danilo Šuković	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Darko Simović	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Nikolić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Rodić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Škulić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Živković	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Milosavljević	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ninoslav Stojadinović	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Obrad Kesić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Rade Veljanovski	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Samardžić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Stojan Stamenković	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Žarko Trebješanin	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	49	0	0.00	48	97.96	1	2.04
Total	619	1	0.16	612	99.03	5	0.81

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 94. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts from the front pages of various media from the research sample

Media outlet	number	%
Informer	193	31.23
Kurir	156	25.24
Politika	91	14.72
Blic	71	11.49
Alo!	44	7.12
Danas	43	6.96
Večernje novosti	20	3.24
Total	618	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 95. – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations**

Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations	number	%
SOC	47	19.34
Patriarch Irinej	39	16.05
Sava Janjić	14	5.76
Pope Francis	12	4.94
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	7	2.88
Patriarch Pavle	7	2.88
Alojzije Stepinac	6	2.47
Bishop of Raška and Prizren Teodosije	6	2.47
Bishop Vasilije Kačavenda	6	2.47
Reis-ul-ulema Mustafa Cerić	5	2.06
Bishop Jovan	4	1.65
Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral	4	1.65
Metropolitan of Zagreb and Ljubljana Porfirije	4	1.65
Muamer Zukorlić	4	1.65
Total	243	100.00

Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations	number	%
Bishop of Bačka Irinej	4	1.65
Bishop Arsenije	3	1.23
Slaviša Đurić	3	1.23
Father Serafim	3	1.23
Patriarch Kirill of Moscow	3	1.23
Archpriest Radivoje Panić	3	1.23
Russian Orthodox Church	3	1.23
Others	56	23.05
Total	243	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 96. – Value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of SOC and other religious organizations**

Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations	No.	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
SOC	47	1	2.13	44	93.62	2	4.26
Patriarch Irinej	39	1	2.56	38	97.44	0	0.00
Sava Janjić	14	2	14.29	12	85.71	0	0.00
Pope Francis	12	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Patriarch Pavle	7	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0.00
Alojzije Stepinac	6	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Bishop of Raška and Prizren Teodosije	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Vasilije Kačavenda	6	0	0.00	1	16.67	5	83.33
Reis-ul-ulema Mustafa Cerić	5	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Total	243	7	2.88	226	93.00	10	4.12

Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations	No.	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Bishop Jovan	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Metropolitan of Zagreb and Ljubljana Porfirije	4	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Muamer Zukorlić	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop of Bačka Irinej	4	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Bishop Arsenije	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Slaviša Đurić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Father Serafim	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Patriarch Kirill of Moscow	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Archpriest Radivoje Panić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Russian Orthodox Church	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	56	0	0.00	56	100.00	0	0.00
Total	243	7	2.88	226	93.00	10	4.12

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 97. - Distribution of frequency of appearances of representatives of the SOC and other religious communities on the front pages in different media from the research sample

Media outlet	number	%
Večernje novosti	89	36.63
Politika	61	25.10
Blic	23	9.47
Kurir	23	9.47
Alo!	16	6.58
Informer	16	6.58
Danas	15	6.17
Total	243	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 98.** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual domestic social actors: representatives of the judicial bodies

Justice system: individual actors	number	%
Miljko Radisavljević	18	19.78
Dragan Jovanović	16	17.58
Zagorka Dolovac	15	16.48
Dejan Terzić	5	5.49
Mladen Nenadić	5	5.49
Maja Ilić	4	4.40
Vladimir Vučinić	4	4.40
Goran Ilić	3	3.30
Snežana Stanojković	3	3.30
Tatjana Sekulić	3	3.30
Vladimir Vukčević	3	3.30
Others	12	13.19
Total	91	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 99.** – Value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: representatives of judicial bodies

Justice system: individual actors	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Miljko Radisavljević	18	0	0.00	12	66.67	6	33.33
Dragan Jovanović	16	4	25.00	12	75.00	0	0.00
Zagorka Dolovac	15	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Dejan Terzić	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Mladen Nenadić	5	1	20.00	4	80.00	0	0.00
Maja Ilić	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Vučinić	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Ilić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Snežana Stanojković	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Tatjana Sekulić	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Vukčević	3	1	33.33	1	33.33	1	33.33
Others	12	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Total	91	6	6.59	76	83.52	9	9.89

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 100.** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual and collective domestic social actors: actors related to the “migrant crisis”

Migrant crisis	number	%
Radoš Đurović	6	31.58
Vladimir Cucić	6	31.58
Ahmet Alimi	5	26.32
Commissariat for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia	2	10.53
Total	19	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 101. – Value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **actors related to “migrant crisis”**

Migrant crisis	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Radoš Đurović	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Cucić	6	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Ahmet Alimi	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Commissariat for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia	2	0		2			
Total	19	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 102.** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors from **the media**

Media	number	%
Aleksandar Rodić	82	15.05
Dragan J. Vučićević	59	10.83
Aleksandar Kornić	33	6.06
Kurir	29	5.32
Željko Mitrović	27	4.95
Politika	26	4.77
Damir Dragić	21	3.85
Dušan Bjelopetrović	18	3.30
Radisav Rodić	18	3.30
Dragan Bujošević	15	2.75
NUNS	15	2.75
TV Pink	15	2.75
Milan Lađević	13	2.39
RTS	13	2.39
Zlatija Labović	13	2.39
Ljiljana Smajlović	12	2.20
Olivera Kovačević	12	2.20
Total	545	100.00

Media	number	%
Večernje novosti	12	2.20
KRIK	11	2.02
Vukašin Obradović	11	2.02
Adrija media outleta grupa	10	1.83
Danilo Redžepović	10	1.83
Slobodan Georgijev	8	1.47
Stevan Dojčinović	7	1.28
Zoran Kesić	7	1.28
BIRN	6	1.10
Teleprompter	6	1.10
Vukadin Rodić	6	1.10
Informer	5	0.92
Milovan Brkić	5	0.92
Tanjug	5	0.92
Branko Čečen	4	0.73
CINS	4	0.73
Marija Kordić	4	0.73
Dinko Gruhonjić	3	0.55
Total	545	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 103. – Value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors from the media

Media	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandar Rodić	82	1	1.22	33	40.24	48	58.54
Dragan J. Vučićević	59	0	0.00	43	72.88	16	27.12
Aleksandar Kornic	33	0	0.00	20	60.61	13	39.39
Kurir	29	0	0.00	17	58.62	12	41.38
Željko Mitrović	27	0	0.00	16	59.26	11	40.74
Politika	26	4	15.38	19	73.08	3	11.54
Damir Dragić	21	0	0.00	19	90.48	2	9.52
Dušan Bjelopetrović	18	0	0.00	9	50.00	9	50.00
Radisav Rodić	18	1	5.56	5	27.78	12	66.67
Dragan Bujošević	15	0	0.00	7	46.67	8	53.33
NUNS	15	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
TV Pink	15	0	0.00	12	80.00	3	20.00
Milan Lađević	13	0	0.00	10	76.92	3	23.08
RTS	13	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38
Zlatija Labović	13	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38
Ljiljana Smajlović	12	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Olivera Kovačević	12	0	0.00	8	66.67	4	33.33
Večernje novosti	12	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
KRIK	11	0	0.00	7	63.64	4	36.36
Vukašin Obradović	11	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
Adrija media outleta grupa	10	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Danilo Redžepović	10	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Slobodan Georgijev	8	0	0.00	4	50.00	4	50.00
Stevan Dojčinović	7	0	0.00	3	42.86	4	57.14
Zoran Kesić	7	1	14.29	5	71.43	1	14.29
BIRN	6	0	0.00	1	16.67	5	83.33
Teleprompter	6	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Vukadin Rodić	6	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
Total	545	7	1.28	352	64.59	186	34.13

Media	number	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Informer	5	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Milovan Brkić	5	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Tanjug	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Čečen	4	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
CINS	4	0	0.00	0	0.00	4	100.00
Marija Kordić	4	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Dinko Gruhonjić	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Total	545	7	1.28	352	64.59	186	34.13

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 104.** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual domestic social actors: actors from judicial proceedings and inNewsgations

Actors from judicial proceedings and investigations	number	%
Kristijan Golubović	39	52.70
Rodoljub Radulović - Miša Banana	10	13.51
Darko Šarić	7	9.46
Luka Bojović	5	6.76
Luka Đurović	3	4.05
Ivan Adrovac	3	4.05
Dragoslav Kosmajac	3	4.05
Others	4	5.41
Total	74	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 105.** – Value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: actors from judicial proceedings and inNewsgations

Actors from judicial proceedings and investigations	no.	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Kristijan Golubović	39	0	0.00	15	38.46	24	61.54
Rodoljub Radulović Miša Banana	10	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Maja Adrovac	8	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Darko Šarić	7	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Luka Bojović	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dragoslav Kosmajac	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Adrovac	3	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Luka Đurović	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	4	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Total	82	0	0.00	54	65.85	28	34.15

Source: Mediameter research, October-December 2015

Table 106. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual domestic social actors: “Cutter” operation

“Cutter” operation	number	%
Milenka Jezdimirović	14	12.96
Slobodan Milosavljević	14	12.96
Zorana Marković	9	8.33
Željko Žunić	9	8.33
Dobrivoje Sudžum	7	6.48
Zoran Šćepanović	7	6.48
Dušan Protić	6	5.56
Zoran Radoman	6	5.56
Ferenc Irmenji	4	3.70
Ljubodrag Marković	4	3.70
Željko Ličina	4	3.70
Branka Narančić	3	2.78
Milica Dević	3	2.78
Total	108	100.00

“Cutter” operation	number	%
Nenad Komatina	3	2.78
Rade Vasin	3	2.78
Radmila Spasić	3	2.78
Rajko Tepavac	3	2.78
Stefan Miskoski	3	2.78
Others	3	2.78
Total	108	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, October-December 2015

Table 107. – Value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: “Cutter” operation

Actors from judicial proceedings and investigations	no.	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milenka Jezdimirović	14	0	0	11	78.57	3	21.43
Slobodan Milosavljević	14	0	0	7	50.00	7	50.00
Zorana Marković	9	0	0	5	55.56	4	44.44
Željko Žunić	9	0	0	6	66.67	3	33.33
Dobrivoje Sudžum	7	0	0	7	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Šćepanović	7	0	0	6	85.71	1	14.29
Dušan Protić	6	0	0	5	83.33	1	16.67
Zoran Radoman	6	0	0	3	50.00	3	50.00
Ferenc Irmenji	4	0	0	3	75.00	1	25.00
Ljubodrag Marković	4	0	0	3	75.00	1	25.00
Željko Ličina	4	0	0	3	75.00	1	25.00
Branka Narančić	3	0	0	2	66.67	1	33.33
Milica Dević	3	0	0	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Komatina	3	0	0	1	33.33	2	66.67
Rade Vasin	3	0	0	2	66.67	1	33.33
Radmila Spasić	3	0	0	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	108	0	0	78	72.22	30	27.78

Actors from judicial proceedings and investigations	no.	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Rajko Tepavac	3	0	0	3	100.00	0	0.00
Stefan Miskoski	3	0	0	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	3	0	0	2	66.67	1	33.33
Total	108	0	0	78	72.22	30	27.78

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 108. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **actors from distant past**

Actors from distant past	number	%
Josip Broz Tito	32	45.71
Dragoljub Draža Mihailović	15	21.43
Milan Nedić	14	20.00
Aleksandar Ranković	5	7.14
Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis	4	5.71
Total	70	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 109. – Value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **actors from distant past**

Actors from distant past	no.	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Josip Broz Tito	32	0	0.00	28	87.50	4	12.50
Dragoljub Draža Mihailović	15	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Milan Nedić	14	1	7.14	11	78.57	2	14.29
Aleksandar Ranković	5	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis	4	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Total	70	2	2.86	61	87.14	7	10.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Second-ranked in terms of frequency compared to the total number of actors is the actor who is in narrative reports of journalists from dailies mentioned under the pseudonym “unnamed source” or alternative pseudonyms like “source of our paper,” “source known to the news desk” (as many as 453 texts from our source mention unnamed sources, please see **Table 25**).

Frequency of appearances of this type of suspicious⁶ interviewees/sources of information is not equally high in all the dailies⁷ (please see Table 147), which vividly speak of the different editorial policies, which implement basic principles of professional ethics presented in the Journalistic Code of Serbia⁸ in various ways. To a certain extent the propensity to use anonymous sources,⁹ as testified by the data on the frequency of their appearances in the cases of certain media, follows the logic of colloquial division of dailies to those dominantly of tabloid character and those who are striving not to be. Unfortunately, judging from the data from our sample within the media space of Serbia, resistance to the comprehensive external and internal processes of tabloidization and turning of media to infotainment seems like an extremely complicated professional task with an uncertain outcome.

⁶ In the sense of their transparency, availability for checking certain information, internal motivation to take part in interpreting certain events, opening and/or clarifying certain affairs and similar.

⁷ For example, the biggest number of “unnamed sources” is present in the paper *Informer* (85), followed by *Blic* (78) and *Kurir* (73), and the smallest number in *Danas* (45).

⁸ Journalists’ Code of Serbia was adopted in 2006 by the Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia. Journalist associations supplemented the Code in 2013 with provisions on the preventing of corruption and conflict of interest. Within the professional community of journalists, the adopting of the Code was recognized as an important contribution to the strengthening of the media self-regulation and improvement of ethical standards of free and independent journalism.

⁹ For example, Chapter VI which regulates “Attitude towards sources of information”, paragraph 3, of this Code says: **“A journalist is obliged to honor a source’s request for anonymity. Making up anonymous sources is a serious violation of standard professional actions of journalists.”**

Guidelines:

- Usage of anonymous (confidential) sources is generally not recommended, unless there is no other way to obtain information of extreme public importance.
- Often, use of unnamed sources of information represents merely a way for the source or the journalist himself/herself or media to put forward inaccurate, incomplete and insufficiently verified information. In case hiding sources is used for covering for their inexistence, this can cause serious detriment to the credibility of the journalist/media.
- Anonymity/confidentiality needs to be enabled to sources who can give information from “first hand”, i.e. documents which directly confirm, or in itself represent information of extreme significance for the public.
- Editor is obliged to check with the journalist the justification of using anonymous (confidential) sources of information. In that sense, it is necessary for at least one editor to know and protect the identity of an unnamed source.
- If the source of information requests the journalist not to reveal his/her identity to the editor, this request should be denied” (Journalists’ Code of Serbia, 2013:20-21)

Causes

In the fourth quarter, no significant change in the structure of causes has been observed. In all four trimesters, causes developed by the editorial dominated the media from the sample, though from the first to the fourth quarter, this trend has been decreasing by about 9.5% (in the first period, share of causes developed by the editorial was 35.88%, in the second 31.08%, in the third 27.62 and in the fourth 26.32%). Other causes for reporting were also aligned with the findings of previous issues of Mediameter, i.e. similar type of events and actors initiated the reporting. Apart from the causes developed by the editorial staff (present in 573 texts – 1.3% less than in the previous trimester), in a somewhat changed order compared to the previous quarter, it was reported on the statement of the other relevant actor (13.73% - 299 texts), events initiated by a foreign factor (13.69% - 298), events initiated by the other relevant actor (12.26%-267), and events initiated by the Government of the Republic of Serbia (4.36% - 95) (**Table 110**).¹⁰

As in the period from July to September, cause developed by the editorial staff is again prevalent when the topic of the text is related to political life in Serbia (129 texts), economy (42), Ombudsman Saša Janković (33)¹¹ and regional relations (26). Unlike the previous trimester, when 28 texts speaking about migrants and refugees had causes developed by the editorial staff, this time, 45 texts speaking of conflicts within the media scene in Serbia were initiated by editorial staff.

Texts published with cause developed by the editorial staff have a clear value context, therefore 306 texts or 53.41% are positive or negative.¹² An especially large number of texts with negative connotations has been observed when it comes to topics related to the Ombudsman Saša Janković (32 texts or 96.97%) and conflict of the media (38 or 84.44%) (**Table 111**).

Table 110. – Distribution of causes in the seven media from the sample

Cause	no. of appearances	% share
topics developed by the editorial staff	573	26.32
statement by the other relevant actor	299	13.73
events initiated by a foreign factor	298	13.69
events initiated by another relevant actor	267	12.26
event initiated by the Government of RS	95	4.36

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

¹⁰ Tables represent five most prevalent causes.

¹¹ The topics Ombudsman Saša Janković appeared in 32 texts with negative connotations only in the daily *Informer*

¹² More information in **Table 170** in the Appendix.

Table 111. – Cause developed by the editorial staff –most frequent topics and value context in the seven media from the sample

Cause developed by the editorial staff /topic	Total no. of texts	value context with regards to the topic					
		positive		neutral		negative	
		number	%	number	%	number	%
political life in Serbia	129	0	0.00	73	56.59	56	43.41
media conflicts	45	0	0.00	7	15.56	38	84.44
economy	42	3	7.14	20	47.62	19	45.24
Ombudsman Saša Janković	33	0	0.00	1	3.03	32	96.97
regional cooperation/ regional relations	26	1	3.85	13	50.00	12	46.15

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

In the daily paper *Večernje novosti*, we can see the same causes for reporting as in the previous trimester, with a somewhat changed order. This time, most causes for writing were developed by the editorial staff (17.49% - 60 texts), followed by events related to the other relevant actor (12.83% - 44), statements of other relevant actors 8.75% - 30) and events initiated by the Government of the Republic of Serbia (7.58% -26).

Table 112. – Distribution of causes in the paper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	no. of appearances	% share
topics developed by the editorial staff	60	17.49
Events initiated by a foreign factor	49	14.29
Events initiated by another relevant actor	44	12.83
statement by the other relevant actor	30	8.75
Event initiated by the Government of RS	26	7.58

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

The paper *Blic* published the biggest number of texts with causes developed by the editorial staff during all four quarters, though share of such writing has been falling – from 52.57% in the first, 36.53% in the second, 33.18% in the third, down to 31.73% (79 texts) in the fourth

trimester. Regarding other causes, statements and events related to the other relevant actors were present in 13.25% (33) and 10.44% (26); events initiated by a foreign factor were causes in 13.25% (33), and events initiated by the Government of Serbia in 5.62% or 14 texts. Findings in *Blic* were, as with *Večernje novosti*, aligned with the previous issue of *Mediameter*.

Table 113. – Distribution of causes in the paper *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	no. of appearances	% share
topics developed by the editorial staff	79	31.73
statement by the other relevant actor	33	13.25
Events initiated by a foreign factor	33	13.25
Events initiated by another relevant actor	26	10.44
Event initiated by the Government of RS	14	5.62

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Sequence of first two causes in *Kurir* is completely the same as in the previous quarter. Statement by the other relevant actor was cause in 66 or 28.45% of texts, while 16.81% or 39 texts were developed by the editorial staff.¹³ Events initiated by the other relevant actor and foreign factor were causes in 12.5% (29), i.e. 8.62% (20) texts. Unlike the third trimester, when cause for reporting in 6.25% of texts was statement by the Prime Minister of Serbia, this time fifth-ranked cause according to share was event initiated by the prosecution/court with 5.17% or 12 texts.

Table 114. – Distribution of causes in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	no. of appearances	% share
statement by the other relevant actor	66	28.45
topics developed by the editorial staff	39	16.81
Events initiated by another relevant actor	29	12.50
Events initiated by a foreign factor	20	8.62
Event initiated by the prosecution/court	12	5.17

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

In the daily paper *Alo!*, topics developed by the editorial staff had the biggest share again

¹³ Statement by the other relevant actor was cause in 27.08% of texts, topics developed by the editorial were found in 16.67% of the texts.

with 32.39% (69) which is still about 16% less than in the previous quarter. Events and statements initiated by the other relevant actor were causes in 17.37% (37), i.e. 9.39% (20) texts, while events initiated by a foreign factor were cause in 8.45% (18) texts. Instead of the statement by the Prime Minister of Serbia, which was fifth-ranked in the third quarter according to share with 4.07% of texts, in the fourth trimester, the fifth-ranked cause was event initiated by the Government of the Republic of Serbia with a share of 5.63% or 12 texts.

Table 115. – Distribution of causes in the paper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	no. of appearances	% share
topics developed by the editorial staff	69	32.39
Events initiated by another relevant actor	37	17.37
statement by the other relevant actor	20	9.39
Events initiated by a foreign factor	18	8.45
Event initiated by the Government of RS	12	5.63

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

In the daily paper *Informer*, in the fourth quarter, more than half of the texts (53.9% - 145) were developed by the editorial staff, which is about 4% less than in the third quarter, and aligned with the findings from the second trimester of 2015 (53.39%). Distribution and share of causes are similar to the period July – September, so events initiated by a foreign factor were cause in 15.99% (43), statements by the other relevant actor 6.32% (17) and events initiated by the other relevant actor 5.95% (16) of texts. In the fourth quarter, events initiated by the prosecution/court and reporting of another media have equal shares with 4.46% or 12 texts.

Table 116. – Distribution of causes in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	no. of appearances	% share
topics developed by the editorial staff	145	53.90
Events initiated by a foreign factor	43	15.99
statement by the other relevant actor	17	6.32
Events initiated by another relevant actor	16	5.95
reporting of another media	12	4.46
Event initiated by the prosecution/court	12	4.46

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Distribution of causes in *Politika* is also similar to the previous quarter. Statement by the other relevant actor is now the most prevalent cause with a share of 21.87% (103 texts),

while events initiated by a foreign factor are ranked second with 19.11% (90). Topics were developed by the editorial staff of *Politika* in 11.68% (55) of texts, and events initiated by other relevant actors were causes in 46 or 9.77% of texts. Statement of the Prime Minister initiated 33 or 7.01% of texts.

Table 117. – Distribution of causes in the paper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	no. of appearances	% share
statement by the other relevant actor	103	21.87
Events initiated by a foreign factor	90	19.11
topics developed by the editorial staff	55	11.68
Events initiated by another relevant actor	46	9.77
statement of the PM of RS	33	7.01

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Topics developed by the editorial staff, as the most prevalent cause in the daily *Danas*, was present in the fourth quarter with 31.5% or 126 texts (about 8% more than in the period July – September). And the order of other causes is completely the same as in the third trimester, hence, according to share, the next cause is event initiated by the other relevant actor in 17.25% or 69 texts, while texts caused by events related to foreign factor have a share of 11.25% (45). Statement by the other relevant actor is present as cause in 7.50% (30), while events initiated by the Government of the Republic of Serbia in 7.25% or 29 texts.

Table 118. – Distribution of causes in the paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	no. of appearances	% share
topics developed by the editorial staff	126	31.50
Events initiated by another relevant actor	69	17.25
Events initiated by a foreign factor	45	11.25
statement by the other relevant actor	30	7.50
Event initiated by the Government of RS	29	7.25

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Statements and events related to the Prime Minister and representatives of the Government of the Republic of Serbia were causes of slightly more texts than in the previous trimesters - 13.78% or 300 texts. In the third quarter, share of these texts was 10.27% (233), in the second 10.46% (175) and in the first 13.38% (182).

Table 119. – Share of texts initiated by statements and activities of the president and representatives of the Government of RS in the seven media from the sample

Cause	no. of texts	% in total number texts
Event initiated by the Government of RS	95	4.36
statement of the PM of RS	91	4.18
statement by representatives of the Government of RS	83	3.81
event initiated by the PM of RS	31	1.42
Total	300	13.78

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Topics

In order for each text to be as clearly defined as possible, the selected texts included in the sample have been classified under only one topic, but all elements present in the text have always been recorded. This enabled us to have clearer insight into the manners of reporting and approach of the media to certain topics, which has already been shown in the third issue of *Mediameter* (increase of negative texts on topics related to EU, when the migrant crisis is a present element, for example). In the last quarter of 2015, we paid special attention to the four topics, which stirred up increasing attention of the media. These were conflicts on the domestic media scene, terroristic activities of ISIS, actions of Russia in Syria, and EU accession – opening of first negotiation chapters.

Share of topics

Throughout all four quarters, on the front pages of the media, mostly similar topics were present, out of which *political life in Serbia* takes up most space, when considering texts from the sample. This topic includes activities of all political actors on all levels of government, excluding *activities of the Government of the Republic of Serbia*, *activities of the Prime Minister* and *activities of the President of Serbia* in the period October – December, it once again has the biggest share of 17.18%, which is about 3% more than in the previous quarter. All four “political” topics – *political life in Serbia*, *activities of the Government of the Republic of Serbia*, *activities of the Prime Minister of the Government* and *activities of the President of Serbia*, take up 22.37% (increase of 4% compared to the previous quarter). If we consider all four tri-

mesters, political topics dominated the selected texts from the front pages, but their share varied from 33.68% in the first, 23.3% in the second, 18.7% in the third all up to the mentioned 22.37% in the fourth quarter. In the fourth quarter, economy is the second-ranked topic according to share (128 texts, 5.88%), while regional relations/regional cooperation are again very present on the front pages with a share of 5.33% (116) texts. Out of the specially indexed topics, the most present ones are *terrorism and ISIS* with a share of 5.28% (115 texts – for terrorist attacks in Paris and other acts of terrorism worldwide are referred to in 84 texts, while 31 texts reported on the local challenges of ISIS) and 3.9% or 85 texts refer to *media conflicts*. Topics *media conflicts* and *political life in Serbia* are connected by the element called *coup*,¹⁴ which appears in all analyzed media (share and value context of texts where the element of *coup* is present apart from these two topics may be seen in **Tables 123 and 124**). When it comes to other topics, top ten according to share are topics *Kosovo/Belgrade and Priština relations* (5.19% - 113), *activities of the Government of the Republic of Serbia* (3.81% - 83), *media/freedom of media* (3.45% - 77), *crime*¹⁵ (3.26% - 71) and *justice system, activities of the judicial bodies* (3.22% - 77). Topic *EU/EU policies* is present in merely 1.93%, i.e. 42 texts, nearly two times less than in the third quarter. Slightly more interest has been shown by the media towards the EU integrations process in Serbia itself, so the topic *meeting requirements/standard for EU integrations* was present in 2.66% or 58 texts, out of which 42 were focused on opening of negotiation chapters (**Table 121**). Also, the media did not show significant interest when it comes to economics, so only 40 (1.84%) of texts from the sample were recorded on this topic.

If we consider the value context of all the selected texts in the fourth quarter, 37.57% of texts had evaluative connotations (**Table 122**), which 8% less than in the period July-September. The biggest number of negative texts referred to the conflicts of the media which were ongoing in the final period of 2015 – as many as 74.12% (63), just as other topics related to the media have a negative tone in 41.56% of the texts. Regional relations were again present in a negative context in 46.55% (54 texts), which had been the practice of the media throughout the year (in the first quarter this topic had a negative text share of 38.89%, in the second 43.82%, in the third 54.41%). About 40% of negative texts refer to the activities of judicial bodies, while just over 30% had negative connotations while writing about the political life in Serbia, Belgrade/Priština relations and economy, which is a topic which recorded the biggest number of positive texts as well – 5.47 (7). Positive texts were written about the activities of the Government of Serbia (6.02%) and regional relations (3.45%) (**Table 120**). Out of the selected topics, we recorded the highest number of positive texts on the actions of Russia in Syria when compared to other topics – 18 (36%), while the media mostly wrote in a neutral tone about ISIS and the opening of negotiations chapters (73.91%, i.e. 88.09%) (**Table 121**).

¹⁴ Conflicts on the media scene of Serbia intensified with the change of editorial policy in the paper *Kurir*, and when visible confrontation of this daily paper with the paper *Informer* started. Later, other representatives of the media and executive government also took part in the discussions. Conflicts culminated with the announcement of the Editor-in-Chief of the paper *Informer*, Dragan J. Vučićević that Serbia was to see a coup, which only stretched the discussions of all mentioned actors.

¹⁵ 23 texts with the topic crime refer to the operation “Cutter” during which dozens of persons known to the public were arrested (**Table 171** in the Appendix)

Table 120. – Distribution of topics and their value context in the seven media from the sample¹⁶

Topic	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
political life in Serbia	374	17.18	0	0.00	242	64.71	132	35.29
economy	128	5.88	7	5.47	80	62.50	41	32.03
regional cooperation/ regional relations	116	5.33	4	3.45	58	50.00	54	46.55
terrorism and ISIS	115	5.28	0	0.00	85	73.91	30	26.09
Kosovo/ Belgrade and Priština relations	113	5.19	0	0.00	77	68.14	36	31.86
media conflicts	85	3.90	0	0.00	22	25.88	63	74.12
activities of the Government of RS	83	3.81	5	6.02	56	67.47	22	26.51
media/ freedom of media	77	3.54	0	0.00	45	58.44	32	41.56
Crime	71	3.26	0	0.00	56	78.87	15	21.13
justice system, activities of judicial bodies	70	3.22	0	0.00	41	58.57	29	41.43

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015¹⁶ Top ten topics were presented.**Table 121.** – Share and value context for four selected topics in the seven media from the sample

Topic	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
terrorism and ISIS	115	5.28	0	0.00	85	73.91	30	26.09
media conflicts	85	3.90	0	0.00	22	25.88	63	74.12
Russian action in Syria	50	2.30	18	36.00	30	60.00	2	4.00
reaching the EU standards/ opening negotiation chapters	42	1.92	3	7.14	37	88.09	2	4.76

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 122.** – Value context with reference to all the topics from all the seven media from the sample

All the media – value context	no. of texts	%
positive	98	4.50
neutral	1359	62.43
negative	720	33.07
Total	2177	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 123.** – Value context and number of texts where the primary topics are political life in Serbia or media conflicts, with the element of coup in all seven media from the sample

Media conflicts/political life in Serbia		
"Coup"		
value context	number	%
positive	0	0.00
neutral	25	56.82
negative	19	43.18
Total	44	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 124. – Value and number of texts in which primary politics political life in Serbia or media conflicts, when the element of coup is present, according to media

Media conflicts/political life in Serbia - "Coup"														
Media outlet	Blic		Kurir		Večernje novosti		Alo!		Informer		Politika		Danas	
Value context	br	%	br	%	br	%	br	%	br	%	br	%	br	%
positive	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
neutral	2	100.00	10	66.67	3	75.00	4	100.00	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	40.00
negative	0	0.00	5	33.33	1	25.00	0	0.00	8	100.00	2	33.33	3	60.00
Total	2	100.00	15	100.00	4	100.00	4	100.00	8	100.00	6	100.00	5	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Distribution of topics per media outlet

Blic

Topic political life in Serbia is present in 21.29% or 53 texts in *Blic*, out of which a bit more than one third (35.85%) were written in negative value context, while others were neutral. The next topic of interest is crime, present in 21 texts – 8.43% (operation “Cutter” initiated six texts in the last five days of December), out of which the majority, 80.95%, were neutral. Activities of the Government of Serbia were the topic of 18 texts in *Blic* (5.56% of positive and 22.22% of negative), while 15 mostly neutral texts were written about terrorism and ISIS. Exactly one half of the texts referring to economy are negative (out of 14 texts, or 5.62%), while meeting requirements/standards for EU integrations was reported on in 10 neutral and one negative text (6 neutral texts referred to opening of negotiation chapters). Other present topics were: justice system, activities of judicial bodies with 10 texts or 4.02%, then Kosovo/relations Belgrade and Priština and Russia/relations towards Russia with 8, i.e. 3.21% texts and sport,¹⁷ which is present in seven texts. Topics related to the justice system generated as much as 60% of writing, which have a negative context, while all texts discussing relations between Belgrade and Priština (more information in **Table 125**) were neutral. Topic Russian action in Syria is present in 6 neutral texts in *Blic*, while this newspaper did not deal with media conflicts on its

¹⁷ Texts related to sport and show business were analyzed only when they had a political context. In texts from the sample, this refers for example to texts connecting a so-called “starlet” to a politician, then reports on the interruption of the direct broadcast of the Croatian national radio and television during the medal awarding to Serbia at the world championship in water polo and similar.

front pages (**Table 126**). Topic EU/EU policies, which has been present in 10 texts in the previous trimester, out of which 9 (90%) were negative, now, as in the second quarter, this topic was present in only one neutral text.

This daily presented in positive or negative value context in 30.52% of all texts from the sample in the fourth quarter (more information in **Table 127**). Compared to the third trimester, number of evaluative texts was reduced by about 22%.

Table 125. – Distribution of topics and their value context in the daily *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
political life in Serbia	53	21.29	0	0.00	34	64.15	19	35.85
Crime	21	8.43	0	0.00	17	80.95	4	19.05
activities of the Government of RS	18	7.23	1	5.56	13	72.22	4	22.22
terrorism and ISIS	15	6.02	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
economy	14	5.62	0	0.00	7	50.00	7	50.00
meeting requirements/standards for EU integrations	11	4.41	0	0.00	10	90.90	1	9.10
justice system, activities of judicial bodies	10	4.02	0	0.00	4	40.00	6	60.00
Kosovo/ Belgrade and Priština relations	8	3.21	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Russia/ relations with Russia	8	3.21	1	12.50	5	62.50	2	25.00
sport	7	2.81	2	28.57	4	57.14	1	14.29

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 126. – Share and value context for four selected topics in the daily *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
terrorism and ISIS	15	6.02	0	0.00	14	93.33	93.33	6.67
Russian action in Syria	6	2.41	0	0.00	6	100.00	100.00	0.00
reaching the EU standards/ opening negotiation chapters	6	2.41	0	0.00	6	100.00	100.00	0.00
media conflicts	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0.00	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 127.** – Value context with reference to all the topics in the paper *Blic*

<i>Blic</i> - value context	no. of texts	%
positive	5	2.01
neutral	173	69.48
negative	71	28.51
Total	249	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015***Kurir***

As in the previous three quarters, in *Kurir's* texts from the sample, the topic *political life in Serbia* dominates. It is present in 60 or 25.86% of texts, out of which two thirds – 40 are neutral, one third is negative (20). Having in mind the fact that the daily *Kurir* was in the epicenter of media conflicts, this topic is second-ranked according to share in this newspaper with 23 texts (9.91%), but *Kurir* showed interest for the topics related to *media/freedom of media*, as a topic, in 13 more texts, i.e. 5.60%. When it comes to media conflicts, 43.38% texts had negative connotation, while there were 53.85% of negative wordings on *media/freedom of the media* as well. *Kurir* writes about regional relations in 12 texts (5.17%) which in 66.67% have negative context. Crime, police and justice system are present in 10 texts (4.31%) each. Police has been put in negative context in as many as 80% of the texts, justice system in 60%, and crime in 30%. Terrorism and ISIS were topics in 9 texts, while entertainment is present in 7 texts. 7 or 3.02% of the texts refer to activities of the Government of Serbia, but 71.43% of texts were written in negative value context on this topic. Out of the four topics of interest, front pages of *Kurir* offered texts on the *Russian action in Syria* (5 texts – 80% of positive and 20% neutral) and two neutral and one positive text on the opening of negotiation chapters with EU. On the front pages of *Kurir*, economy and topics related to EU policies were topics in only three texts, each, while economy was not the topic of interest at all.

48.28% of texts are evaluative in *Kurir* – 45.69% have negative, and 2.59% positive connotations (**Table 130**).

Table 128. – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
political life in Serbia	60	25.86	0	0.00	40	66.67	20	33.33
media conflicts	23	9.91	0	0.00	13	56.52	10	43.48
media/freedom of media	13	5.60	0	0.00	6	46.15	7	53.85
regional cooperation/ regional relations	12	5.17	0	0.00	4	33.33	8	66.67
police	10	4.31	0	0.00	2	20.00	8	80.00
Crime	10	4.31	0	0.00	7	70.00	3	30.00
justice system, activities of judicial bodies	10	4.31	0	0.00	4	40.00	6	60.00
terrorism and ISIS	9	3.88	0	0.00	4	44.44	5	55.56
activities of the Government of RS	7	3.02	0	0.00	2	28.57	5	71.43
Entertainment/ show biz	7	3.02	0	0.00	3	42.86	4	57.14

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 129. – Share and value context for four selected topics in the daily *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
media conflicts	23	9.91	0	0.00	13	56.52	10	43.48
terrorism and ISIS	9	3.88	0	0.00	4	44.44	5	55.56
Russian action in Syria	5	2.16	4	80.00	1	20.00	0	0.00
reaching the EU standards/ opening negotiation chapters	3	1.29	1	33.33	2	66.67	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 130.** – Value context with reference to all the topics in *Kurir*

<i>Blic</i> - value context	no. of texts	%
positive	6	2.59
neutral	120	51.72
negative	106	45.69
Total	232	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Informer**

As one of the key participants in the media conflict, *Informer* placed the biggest number of texts on this topic on the front pages – 46 texts (17.10%), and all written texts had a negative connotation. *Political life in Serbia* is the second-ranked topic according to share in this daily, with a share of 16.36% or 44 texts, and as many as 75% of these texts had a negative connotation. The next topic in *Informer* was the Ombudsman Saša Janković, who has been on the front pages of this paper since April. Texts are still mostly comprised of short information related to the “gun scandal”¹⁸ and contain “questions of the Gojković family for Saša Janković,” and out of the 33 texts published (12.27%), 32 or 96.97% have negative connotation. The media are in focus in another 15 (5.58%) exclusively negative texts. The same number of texts had the topic of *Russian action in Syria* which was presented in 66.67% texts in a positive context. Regional relations and ISIS generated 12 (4.46%) of texts, mostly extremely negative, while nine texts (3.35%) were written on the economy, relations with Russia and show

¹⁸ *Informer* first wrote about the “gun scandal” on 18th April 2015, with reference to the suicide of Predrag Gojković, which was committed with the gun which at the time belonged to the Ombudsman Saša Janković.

business, each. Russia was presented in a positive context in 56.56% of texts, while economy initiated 44.44% of negative wordings. Topics related to EU policies were presented in three negative texts, while a total of six texts were written on the topic of EU integrations, out of which three discussed opening of negotiation chapters, one positive and one neutral text.

Informer takes an evaluative position in 81.41% of the texts (8.92% positive and 72.49% negative), which makes it a newspaper with the most expressed position of journalists/editorial (please see **Table 133**).

Table 131. – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
media conflicts	46	17.10	0	0.00	0	0.00	46	100.00
political life in Serbia	44	16.36	0	0.00	11	25.00	33	75.00
Ombudsman Saša Janković	33	12.27	0	0.00	1	3.03	32	96.97
media/freedom of media	15	5.58	0	0.00	0	0.00	15	100.00
Russian action in Syria	15	5.58	10	66.67	4	26.67	1	6.67
regional cooperation/ regional relations	12	4.46	0	0.00	2	16.67	10	83.33
terrorism and ISIS	12	4.46	0	0.00	3	25.00	9	75.00
economy	9	3.35	1	11.11	4	44.44	4	44.44
Russia/ relations with Russia	9	3.35	5	55.56	4	44.44	0	0.00
Entertainment/ show biz	9	3.35	0	0.00	2	22.22	7	77.78

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 132. – Share and value context for four selected topics in the daily *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
media conflicts	46	17.10	0	0.00	0	0.00	46	100.00
Russian action in Syria	15	5.58	10	66.67	4	26.67	1	6.67
terrorism and ISIS	12	4.46		0.00	3	25.00	9	75.00
reaching the EU standards/ opening negotiation chapters	2	0.56	1	50.00	1	50.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 133.** – Value context with reference to the topics in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i> - value context	no. of texts	%
positive	24	8.92
neutral	50	18.59
negative	195	72.49
Total	269	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015***Alo!***

The daily paper *Alo!* dedicated nearly 31% of texts to the topic *political life in Serbia*, and about 41% of these texts were in a negative value context. Topics related to Kosovo were present in 16 or 7.51% of texts (68.75% negative), while also more than half of the 14 (6.75%) of texts on the terrorist activities of ISIS were negative. *Activities of the Government of Serbia* was the topic of 13 texts (two positive and three negative), while *Alo!* discussed the topics related to regional relations in the most negative tone (70% of negative texts), in 10 i.e. 4.69% texts. Nine texts from this newspaper discussed *crime*, while *economy*, *military*, *police* and *entertainment/show biz* were present in six texts each (**Table 134**). Other specially indexed topics were present in a small number of texts in the paper *Alo!* - *Russian action in Syria* and *media conflicts* were topics present in one neutral text each, while the *opening of negotiation chapters* was discussed in one positive and three neutral texts (**Table 135**). *Alo!* did not publish any texts related to EU policies in the fourth quarter.

Value context is present in 48.83% of texts from the daily *Alo!* (please see **Table 136**).**Table 134.** – Distribution of topics and their value context in the daily *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
political life in Serbia	66	30.99	0	0.00	39	59.09	27	40.91
Kosovo/ Belgrade and Priština relations	16	7.51	0	0.00	5	31.25	11	68.75
terrorism and ISIS	14	6.57	0	0.00	6	42.86	8	57.14
activities of the Government of RS	13	6.10	2	15.38	8	61.54	3	23.08
regional cooperation/ regional relations	10	4.69	0	0.00	3	30.00	7	70.00
Crime	9	4.23	0	0.00	6	66.67	3	33.33
economy	6	2.82	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
military	6	2.82	1	16.67	3	50.00	2	33.33
police	6	2.82	3	50.00	2	33.33	1	16.67
Entertainment/ show biz	6	2.82	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 135.** – Share and value context for four selected topics in the daily *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
terrorism and ISIS	14	6.57	0	0.00	6	42.86	8	57.14
reaching the EU standards/ opening negotiation chapters	4	1.88	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Russian action in Syria	1	0.47	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
media conflicts	1	0.47	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 136. - Value context with reference to all the topics in *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i> - value context	no. of texts	%
positive	16	7.51
neutral	109	51.17
negative	88	41.31
Total	213	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Politika

For the first time in 2015, in the fourth quarter, *political life in Serbia* dominated the front pages of the paper *Politika*, with a share of 9.98% or 47 texts, out of which just over one third is in negative evaluative context. *Terrorism and ISIS* and *economy* were present in 37 texts (7.86%), while regional relations were present in 27 or 5.73% of texts. This topic had very often been presented in a negative context in *Politika*, which was the case in this quarter as well, where 51.85% of texts was negative, however, this time we recorded two positive texts (7.41%). A little under one third (30.77%) out of the 26 texts dedicated to Belgrade/Priština relations were negative, and the editorial staff of *Politika* had a similar position on the matter of social policy (a total share of this topic is 4.25% or 20 texts). International relations were present in 3.83% or 18 texts (38.89% negative). Topics on the justice system were present in 17, mostly neutral texts. *Politika* reported on media liberties in 16 texts, out of which 31% were negative. Economy was present in 15, mostly neutral texts. When considering other topics who have been separately indexed, *Russian action in Syria* was present in 14 (2.97%) texts, out of which 28.57% positive, one texts was negative. 10 texts wrote about the *media conflicts* (60% negative), while opening of negotiation chapters was discussed in 8 positive and one negative text (share of this topic 1.91%). EU/EU politics was, unlike in the previous trimesters, less present (14 or 2.97% of texts), out of which about 65% have negative connotation.

Politika, compared to other media, again published the biggest number of texts included in the sample (471), and in this paper we recorded the biggest versatility of topics. *Politika* published 67.73% of texts which have clear evaluative connotation, 4.25% positive and 28.03% negative (please see **Table 139**).

Table 137. – Distribution of topics and their value context in *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
political life in Serbia	47	9.98	0	0.00	30	63.83	17	36.17
economy	37	7.86	1	2.70	24	64.86	12	32.43
terrorism and ISIS	37	7.86	0	0.00	33	89.19	4	10.81
regional cooperation/ regional relations	27	5.73	2	7.41	11	40.74	14	51.85
Kosovo/ Belgrade and Priština relations	26	5.52	0	0.00	18	69.23	8	30.77
social issues/social policies	20	4.25	0	0.00	13	65.00	7	35.00
international relations	18	3.82	1	5.56	10	55.56	7	38.89
justice system, activities of judicial bodies	17	3.61	0	0.00	13	76.47	4	23.53
media/ freedom of media	16	3.40	0	0.00	11	68.75	5	31.25
Economy	15	3.18	1	6.67	12	80.00	2	13.33

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 138. – Share and value context for four selected topics in the daily *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
terrorism and ISIS	37	7.86	0	0.00	33	89.19	4	10.81
Russian action in Syria	14	2.97	4	28.57	9	64.29	1	7.14
media conflicts	10	2.12	0	0.00	4	40.00	6	60.00
reaching the EU standards/ opening negotiation chapters	9	1.91	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 139. – Value context with reference to all topics in *Politika*

<i>Politika</i> - value context	no. of texts	%
positive	20	4.25
neutral	319	67.73
negative	132	28.03
Total	471	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Večernje novosti

The biggest number of texts of *Večernje novosti* from the sample, unlike the previous quarter, were now dedicated to the *political life in Serbia* (8.45% or 29 texts), mostly in neutral context (86.21%). Topics *regional cooperation/regional relations* and *Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština* generated 27, i.e. 26 texts (7.87% and 7.58%), out of which 37.04%, i.e. 38.46% negative ones. The next topic according to share (6.41% - 22) is economy, which apart from most neutral texts, recorded 13.64% positive texts, as well. *Activities of the Government of the Republic of Serbia* was present in 19 (5.54%) texts, out of which two positive and one negative. *Historical topics* and *issues of faith, church, and religion* take up 3.79% of mostly neutral texts, which is valid for topics like *infrastructure* and *The Hague/war crimes* (3.5% and 3.21%). However, topics related to religion have the biggest share of positive texts 15.38%. Slightly higher number of evaluative texts was recorded with reference to judicial topics (total share against the total number of texts 3.5%) – 33.33% negative. Apart from the topics related to the Hague Tribunal, total share of 3.21% was also recorded for topics related to EU policies, which are present in a negative context in 72.73% of these texts (most negatively presented topic in *Večernje novosti*). The same share was recorded by *crime*, but more than 80% of these texts were neutral. Four selected topics (*terrorism and ISIS*, *Russian action in Syria*, *media conflicts* and *reaching the standard for EU integrations/opening negotiation chapters*) are present in a total of 27 texts, out of which 24 is neutral (**Table 141**).

Most texts in *Večernje novosti* have a neutral value context (78.13%) (**Table 142**), texts are equally distributed per topics, which are versatile, but certain topics such as EU policies, recorded a considerably share of writing with negative connotations.

Table 140. – Value context per topics in the daily *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
political life in Serbia	29	8.45	0	0.00	25	86.21	4	13.79
regional cooperation/regional relations	27	7.87	1	3.70	16	59.26	10	37.04
Kosovo/Belgrade and Priština relations	26	7.58	0	0.00	16	61.54	10	38.46
economy	22	6.41	3	13.64	18	81.82	1	4.55
activities of the Government of RS	19	5.54	2	10.53	16	84.21	1	5.26
historical topics	13	3.79		0.00	13	100.00		0.00
questions of faith, church, religion	13	3.79	2	15.38	10	76.92	1	7.69
justice system, activities of judicial bodies	12	3.50	0	0.00	8	66.67	4	33.33
infrastructure	12	3.50	1	8.33	11	91.67		0.00
The Hague/war crimes	11	3.21	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
EU/EU policies	11	3.21	0	0.00	3	27.27	8	72.73
Crime	11	3.21	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 141. – Share and value context for four selected topics in the daily *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
terrorism and ISIS	10	2.92	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
reaching the EU standards/ opening negotiation chapters	9	2.62	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
media conflicts	4	1.17	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Russian action in Syria	4	1.17	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 142.** – Value context against all the topics in *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i> - value context	no. of texts	%
positive	18	5.25
neutral	268	78.13
negative	57	16.62
Total	343	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Danas**

Focus of the daily paper *Danas* was again on the topics related to the political life in Serbia in 75 or 18.75% of texts, mostly written in a neutral tone. Next topic, present in 37 (9.25%) of texts was economy, which also recorded most of the evaluative texts (negative 35.14% and positive 5.41%). *Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština* was the topic of 28 (7%), *international relations* 24 (6%), *media/freedom of media* 19 (4.75%), and *terrorism and ISIS* in 18 (4.75%) mostly neutral texts (more than 80% of these texts is in a neutral context). Government of Serbia is an actor in 17 (4.25%) texts, with a bit more defined value context – 29.41% texts was written in negative connotation. *Migrants/refuges* were the topic of 16 (4%) of mostly neutral texts, while 13 (3.25%) texts were related to the justice system, 5 or 38.46% presented negatively. *Opening of negotiation chapters* was the topic of nine, *Russian action in Syria* of five and *media conflicts* of one neutral text (**Table 144**). EU policies were present in *Danas* in 10 texts, out of which 40% were negative, which is aligned with the previous issues of Mediameter.

Throughout all quarters, *Danas* had the smallest number of texts with value connotations – in the fourth trimester exactly 80% of the texts were neutral (**Table 145**).

Table 143. – Value context per topics in the daily *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
political life in Serbia	75	18.75	0	0.00	63	84.00	12	16.00
economy	37	9.25	2	5.41	22	59.46	13	35.14
Kosovo/ Belgrade and Priština relations	28	7.00	0	0.00	26	92.86	2	7.14
international relations	24	6.00	0	0.00	21	87.50	3	12.50
regional cooperation/ regional relations	22	5.50	1	4.55	19	86.36	2	9.09
media/ freedom of media	19	4.75	0	0.00	17	89.47	2	10.53
terrorism and ISIS	18	4.50	0	0.00	16	88.89	2	11.11
activities of the Government of RS	17	4.25	0	0.00	12	70.59	5	29.41
migrants/ refugees	16	4.00	1	6.25	15	93.75	0	0.00
justice system, activities of judicial bodies	13	3.25	0	0.00	8	61.54	5	38.46

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 144. – Share and value context for four selected topics in the daily *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
terrorism and ISIS	18	4.50	0	0.00	16	88.89	2	11.11
reaching the EU standards/ opening negotiation chapters	9	2.25	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Russian action in Syria	5	1.25	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
media conflicts	1	0.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 145. - Value context against all topics in *Danas*

<i>Danas</i> - value context	no. of texts	%
positive	9	2.25
neutral	320	80.00
negative	71	17.75
Total	400	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Unnamed sources

Unnamed sources have, during all four quarters, been the second ranked actor in the selected texts from the front pages of the sampled media. This time, they are present in 453 or 20.81% of texts – nearly equally as in the third trimester (464-21.36%). The wide use of unnamed sources has been precisely established thanks to the manner of quantifying anonymous sources, which we have been applying since the second issue of *Mediameter*, because in this way, not only sources classified by the media as unnamed are included, but all those who provide information which cannot be verified, regardless of the way the paper introduced them in the text. Still, this share of information obtained from anonymous sources rather speaks of the manner of reporting of the seven media from the sample, than the need to protect the identity of the persons supplying certain information.

As Matt Carlson said, in his book *On the condition of Anonymity*, "Journalism is embedded in and reliant on its surroundings, which means it can never be the independent observer it claims to be...These sorts of questions are better answered through an approach that recognizes the culture of unnamed sources as a *culture*. This view steers the inquiry into unnamed sources away from the frequency and implementation towards the questions of shared

meanings and patterns of collective interpretation patterns among the journalists, source and audiences. The granting of anonymity is not simply a matter of technique. Rather, it is an appeal to a particular manner of imagining the relations between these three parties."¹⁹

Journalistic form that contains an increasing number of pieces of information obtained from unnamed sources is report. Out of 1510 texts written in this form, 386 or 25.25% contained anonymous sources (**Table 146**), which is completely aligned with the results for the period July – September (25.76%).

Table 146. – Share of "unnamed sources" in all journalistic forms, in the seven media from the sample

Genre	Total number of texts	Unnamed source	%
report	1510	386	25.56
article	192	44	22.92
news	136	20	14.71
reportage	12	2	16.67
commentary	131	1	0.76
interview	185	0	0.00
other	11	0	0.00
Total	2177	453	20.81

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

The biggest share of texts containing information obtained from anonymous sources against the total number of published texts in an individual media was observed in *Informer* (31.6%), but similar share of unnamed sources was present in *Kurir* (31.47%) and *Blic* (31.33%). The daily paper *Danas* obtains the least of its information in this way (11.25%) (please see **Table 147**).

¹⁹ M. Carlson, *On the condition of anonymity*, Urbana, Chicago, Springfield, University of Illinois Press, 2011, 7

Table 147. – Share of “unnamed source” in the analyzed media

Media outlet	Total number of texts	Unnamed source	%
Informer	269	85	31.60
Kurir	232	73	31.47
Blic	249	78	31.33
Alo!	213	61	28.64
Večernje novosti	343	50	14.58
Politika	471	61	12.95
Danas	400	45	11.25
Total	2177	453	20.81

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Unnamed source is most prevalent when the topic is *political life in Serbia*. Out of 374 texts in which the dominant topic was this, almost one quarter (23.26%) or 87 texts contain information from anonymous sources. However, the biggest share of unnamed sources was recorded in texts where the topics was crime - 53.52% (for more information, please see **Table 148**). Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources”, according to topics, in each of the seven analyzed media may be seen in the Appendix - **Tables 172-178**.

Table 148. – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” per topics, in the seven media from the sample

All the media iz uzorka	Total number of texts	Unnamed source	%
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	374	87	23.26
Crime	71	38	53.52
economy	128	30	23.44
terrorism and ISIS	115	29	25.22
media conflicts	85	26	30.59
activities of the Government of RS	83	22	26.51
regional cooperation/ regional relations	116	20	17.24
Kosovo/Belgrade and Pristina relations	113	17	15.04
justice system, activities of judicial bodies	70	14	20.00
police	31	13	41.94

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Conclusion

In the period from October to December 2015, several events which affected the choice of topics and number of texts in leading dailies in Serbia took place. Apart from the importance in terms of internal affairs, some of these events, such as terrorist attacks, threats of ISIS and Russian action in Syria, had a much wider, global dimension and meaning. The terrorist attack in Paris caused increased attention related to the increasing problem of the spreading of the global threat of terrorism and possible global consequences of the conflict in Syria. World events are, therefore, becoming more and more present in the Serbian press. Paradoxically, at the same time, opening of the negotiation process with the European Union and more decisive steps of Serbia in the direction of European integrations, in the last quarter of 2015 within the media discourse of the dailies in Serbia, was marginalized in the media. Most dailies were not interested in allocating significant amount of attention to this topic. On the other side, conflicts between certain media outlets, as well as the release of the news of “coup” during this last trimester won considerable media space. Mutual attacks between the media resulted in the production of stronger feelings and orientation which materialized in the significant increase in the number of texts with negative connotations (If you participate in these conflicts, you cannot be neutral!).

Announcement of early elections, though just an announcement, caused a certain stir, but still insufficient to become a topic for the media to concentrate on. In this trimester, fall in the number of texts which are without “cause” was noticeable, because real causes were, apparently, available in sufficient numbers. The number of texts dealing with the economy was on the rise. Scores are being settled. Expectations from next year are growing. But, also criticism. Newspapers which have regular economy columns were more critical than those who do not.

It seems that in this last quarter of 2015, interest of the media for what was going on around us and in the world was exclusively connected to what is dramatic and momentary, nearly forgetting that the task of the media is to report on the less dramatic events as well, allowing the readers, and indirectly, the society to be informed and not lose touch with the spirit of the times in this way. This specific editorial policy of spectacle, within which all that is not a dramatic incident of the moment can wait, omits that in that awaiting of a new spectacle worth reporting, the world around us could change, and due to unprofessional media reporting, we, as individuals and the society, could be unaware of this.

Apendiks

Table 149. – Sample *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	
Total number of selected texts from front page	343
Total number of texts from the front pages not selected	230
Other	10475
Total	11048

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 150. – Sample *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	
Total number of selected texts from front page	269
Total number of texts from the front pages not selected	113
Other	5873
Total	6255

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 151. – Sample *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	
Total number of selected texts from front page	213
Total number of texts from the front pages not selected	259
Other	6797
Total	7269

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 152. – Sample *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	
Total number of selected texts from front page	249
Total number of texts from the front pages not selected	189
Other	10730
Total	11168

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 153. – Sample *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	
Total number of selected texts from front page	471
Total number of texts from the front pages not selected	183
Other	8913
Total	9567

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 154. – Sample *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	
Total number of selected texts from front page	400
Total number of texts from the front pages not selected	133
Other	5565
Total	6098

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 155. – Sample *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	
Total number of selected texts from front page	232
Total number of texts from the front pages not selected	107
Other	9145
Total	9484

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 156.** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts in the front pages of the daily *Večernje novosti*

Analysts: <i>Večernje novosti</i>	Number	%
Bojan Dimitrijević	2	10.00
Milojko Arsić	2	10.00
Nenad Gujaničić	2	10.00
Dušan Janjić	1	5.00
Zoran Stojiljković	1	5.00
Ljubodrag Savić	1	5.00
Dževad Galijašević	1	5.00
Ivan Ninić	1	5.00
Darko Trifunović	1	5.00
Milan Mijalkovski	1	5.00
Tomislav Kresović	1	5.00
Živadin Jovanović	1	5.00
Goran Rodić	1	5.00
Blagoje Grahovac	1	5.00
Predrag Marković	1	5.00
Slaviša Orlović	1	5.00
Igor Tabak	1	5.00
Total	20	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 157.** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts in the front pages of the daily *Informer*

Analysts: <i>Informer</i>	Number	%
Dragomir Anđelković	13	6.74
Branko Radun	10	5.18
Marko Nicović	9	4.66
Dejan Vuk Stanković	7	3.63
Dušan Janjić	7	3.63
Zlatko Nikolić	7	3.63
Miroslav Šutić	6	3.11
Miroslav Lazanski	5	2.59
Igor Avžner	5	2.59
Svetozar Vujačić	5	2.59
Vladimir Pejić	5	2.59
Aleksandar Radić	4	2.07
Milan Kovačević	4	2.07
Branko Pavlović	4	2.07
Borivoje Borović	4	2.07
Cvijetin Milivojević	4	2.07
Boško Jakšić	4	2.07
Nebojša Avlijaš	4	2.07
Aleksandra Joksimović	3	1.55
Zoran Stojiljković	3	1.55
Ljubodrag Savić	3	1.55
Milan Nikolić	3	1.55
Vladimir Vuletić	3	1.55
Petar Vojinović	3	1.55
Ljubomir Madžar	3	1.55
Tomislav Kresović	3	1.55
Bojan Dimitrijević	3	1.55
Danilo Šuković	3	1.55
Miodrag Živković	3	1.55
Đorđe Vukadinović	2	1.04
Total	193	100.00

Analysts: <i>Informer</i>	Number	%
Vladimir Goati	2	1.04
Vladislav Jovanović	2	1.04
Božidar Spasić	2	1.04
Darko Trifunović	2	1.04
Aleksandar Stevanović	2	1.04
Dušan Proroković	2	1.04
Ivo Visković	2	1.04
Božidar Prelević	2	1.04
Ljubodrag Stojadinović	2	1.04
Ninoslav Stojadinović	2	1.04
Rade Veljanovski	2	1.04
Branko Dragaš	2	1.04
Danijel Cvjetičanin	2	1.04
Dževad Galijašević	1	0.52
Aleksandar Popov	1	0.52
Zoran Dragišić	1	0.52
Bojan Klačar	1	0.52
Dragan Đukanović	1	0.52
Srđan Bogosavljević	1	0.52
Sreto Malinović	1	0.52
Ivan Nikolić	1	0.52
Jelena Milić	1	0.52
Mahmud Bušatlija	1	0.52
Mladen Kovačević	1	0.52
Zoran Milivojević	1	0.52
Živadin Jovanović	1	0.52
Goran Rodić	1	0.52
Milan Škulić	1	0.52
Slobodan Samardžić	1	0.52
Dejan Jović	1	0.52
Dragovan Milićević	1	0.52
Nebojša Perović	1	0.52
Predrag Marković	1	0.52
Total	193	100.00

Analysts: <i>Informer</i>	Number	%
Slobodan Šoškić	1	0.52
Draško Đenović	1	0.52
Ljubiša Živadinović	1	0.52
Orhan Dragaš	1	0.52
Zoran Čvorović	1	0.52
Total	193	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 158. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts in the front pages of the daily *Alo!*

Analysts: <i>Alo!</i>	Number	%
Dragomir Anđelković	8	18.18
Aleksandar Radić	4	9.09
Darko Trifunović	4	9.09
Dževad Galijašević	3	6.82
Zoran Dragišić	3	6.82
Branko Radun	2	4.55
Đorđe Vukadinović	2	4.55
Dejan Vuk Stanković	2	4.55
Milan Kovačević	2	4.55
Mahmud Bušatlija	2	4.55
Marko Nicović	1	2.27
Božidar Spasić	1	2.27
Miroslav Lazanski	1	2.27
Božidar Prelević	1	2.27
Jovo Bakić	1	2.27
Neven Cvetičanin	1	2.27
Ljubodrag Stojadinović	1	2.27
Miladin Ševarlić	1	2.27
Milan Mijalkovski	1	2.27
Mladen Kovačević	1	2.27
Total	193	100.00

Analysts: <i>Alo!</i>	Number	%
Danilo Cvjetičanin	1	2.27
Milan Prostran	1	2.27
Total	193	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 159. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts in the front pages of the daily *Blic*

Analysts: <i>Blic</i>	Number	%
Branko Radun	5	7.04
Đorđe Vukadinović	5	7.04
Dragomir Anđelković	4	5.63
Srđan Cvetković	4	5.63
Aleksandar Radić	3	4.23
Dejan Vuk Stanković	3	4.23
Bojan Dimitrijević	3	4.23
Neven Cvetičanin	3	4.23
Dušan Janjić	2	2.82
Milan Kovačević	2	2.82
Dževad Galijašević	2	2.82
Bojan Klačar	2	2.82
Dušan Simeonović	2	2.82
Aleksandra Čalić Bošković	2	2.82
Kosta Nikolić	2	2.82
Slobodan Marković	2	2.82
Zlatko Nikolić	1	1.41
Aleksandra Joksimović	1	1.41
Ljubodrag Savić	1	1.41
Ratko Božović	1	1.41
Vladimir Goati	1	1.41
Milojko Arsić	1	1.41
Aleksandar Popov	1	1.41
Total	71	100.00

Analysts: <i>Blic</i>	Number	%
Vladimir Vuletić	1	1.41
Zoran Dragišić	1	1.41
Borivoje Borović	1	1.41
Dragan Đukanović	1	1.41
Srđan Bogosavljević	1	1.41
Sreto Malinović	1	1.41
Džejms Ker-Lindzi	1	1.41
Jelena Milić	1	1.41
Ljubomir Madžar	1	1.41
Mladen Kovačević	1	1.41
Živadin Jovanović	1	1.41
Goran Rodić	1	1.41
Ninoslav Stojadinović	1	1.41
Žarko Trebješanin	1	1.41
Nebojša Perović	1	1.41
Slaviša Orlović	1	1.41
Slobodan Šoškić	1	1.41
Saša Đogović	1	1.41
Total	71	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 160. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts in the front pages of the daily *Politika*

Analysts: <i>Politika</i>	Number	%
Dragomir Anđelković	7	7.69
Aleksandra Joksimović	4	4.40
Ljubodrag Savić	4	4.40
Ivo Visković	4	4.40
Nenad Gujaničić	4	4.40
Milojko Arsić	3	3.30
Aleksandar Stevanović	3	3.30
Darko Simović	3	3.30
Total	91	100.00

Analysts: <i>Politika</i>	Number	%
Goran Nikolić	3	3.30
Stojan Stamenković	3	3.30
Đorđe Vukadinović	2	2.20
Milan Kovačević	2	2.20
Ivan Ninić	2	2.20
Vladimir Goati	2	2.20
Vladislav Jovanović	2	2.20
Miroslav Lazanski	2	2.20
Aleksandar Popov	2	2.20
Bojan Klačar	2	2.20
Miladin Ševarlić	2	2.20
Milan Mijalkovski	2	2.20
Slobodan Antić	2	2.20
Milan Škulić	2	2.20
Čedomir Antić	2	2.20
Dejan Vuk Stanković	1	1.10
Dušan Janjić	1	1.10
Zoran Stojiljković	1	1.10
Dževad Galijašević	1	1.10
Bojan Dimitrijević	1	1.10
Branko Pavlović	1	1.10
Milan Nikolić	1	1.10
Dušan Proroković	1	1.10
Vladimir Vuletić	1	1.10
Božidar Prelević	1	1.10
Dragan Đukanović	1	1.10
Dušan Simeonović	1	1.10
Neven Cvetičanin	1	1.10
Srđan Bogosavljević	1	1.10
Džejms Ker-Lindzi	1	1.10
Ivan Nikolić	1	1.10
Mahmud Bušatlija	1	1.10
Živadin Jovanović	1	1.10
Total	91	100.00

Analysts: <i>Politika</i>	Number	%
Obrad Kesić	1	1.10
Slobodan Samardžić	1	1.10
Đorđe Vuković	1	1.10
Dragan Popović	1	1.10
Dragovan Milićević	1	1.10
Dubravka Stojanović	1	1.10
Mladen Lazić	1	1.10
Danica Popović	1	1.10
Miroslav Prokopijević	1	1.10
Total	91	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 161. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts in the front pages of the daily *Danas*

Analysts: <i>Danas</i>	Number	%
Ratko Božović	3	6.98
Dušan Proroković	3	6.98
Jovo Bakić	3	6.98
Ljubodrag Savić	2	4.65
Vladislav Jovanović	2	4.65
Bojan Dimitrijević	2	4.65
Milojko Arsić	2	4.65
Aleksandar Popov	2	4.65
Džejms Ker-Lindzi	2	4.65
Ivan Nikolić	2	4.65
Dragomir Anđelković	1	2.33
Đorđe Vukadinović	1	2.33
Dejan Vuk Stanković	1	2.33
Milan Kovačević	1	2.33
Aleksandra Joksimović	1	2.33
Branko Pavlović	1	2.33
Dušan Simeonović	1	2.33
Total	43	100.00

Analysts: <i>Danas</i>	Number	%
Srđan Bogosavljević	1	2.33
Miladin Ševarlić	1	2.33
Obrad Kesić	1	2.33
Slobodan Samardžić	1	2.33
Dejan Jović	1	2.33
Đorđe Vuković	1	2.33
Dragan Popović	1	2.33
Dubravka Stojanović	1	2.33
Mladen Lazić	1	2.33
Zoran Ivošević	1	2.33
Damir Novotni	1	2.33
Predrag Petrović	1	2.33
Vlada Vučković	1	2.33
Total	43	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 162. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts in the front pages of the daily *Kurir*

Analysts: <i>Kurir</i>	Number	%
Dragomir Anđelković	23	14.74
Branko Radun	11	7.05
Đorđe Vukadinović	11	7.05
Aleksandar Radić	8	5.13
Marko Nicović	8	5.13
Zoran Stojiljković	7	4.49
Dobrivoje Radovanović	7	4.49
Ivan Ninić	6	3.85
Dušan Janjić	5	3.21
Zlatko Nikolić	5	3.21
Ratko Božović	5	3.21
Božidar Spasić	5	3.21
Vladimir Goati	4	2.56
Milan Nikolić	4	2.56
Total	156	100.00

Analysts: <i>Kurir</i>	Number	%
Aleksandra Joksimović	3	1.92
Vladislav Jovanović	3	1.92
Sreto Malinović	3	1.92
Zoran Milivojević	3	1.92
Nebojša Milosavljević	3	1.92
Dejan Vuk Stanković	2	1.28
Milan Kovačević	2	1.28
Branko Pavlović	2	1.28
Dragan Đukanović	2	1.28
Petar Vojinović	2	1.28
Jelena Milić	2	1.28
Slobodan Antonić	2	1.28
Žarko Trebješanin	2	1.28
Dževad Galijašević	1	0.64
Aleksandar Popov	1	0.64
Aleksandar Stevanović	1	0.64
Vladimir Vuletić	1	0.64
Zoran Dragišić	1	0.64
Božidar Prelević	1	0.64
Cvijetin Milivojević	1	0.64
Dušan Simeonović	1	0.64
Jovo Bakić	1	0.64
Srđan Bogosavljević	1	0.64
Ljubodrag Stojadinović	1	0.64
Mladen Kovačević	1	0.64
Obrad Kesić	1	0.64
Rade Veljanovski	1	0.64
Blagoje Grahovac	1	0.64
Zoran Ivošević	1	0.64
Total	156	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 163. – Distribution of appearances of representatives of SOC and other religious communities on the front pages of the daily *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	Number	%
Patriarch Irinej	18	20.22
SOC	17	19.10
Sava Janjić	3	3.37
Bishop of Raška and Prizren Teodosije	3	3.37
Reis-ul-ulema Mustafa Cerić	3	3.37
Pope Francis	2	2.25
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	2	2.25
Patriarch Pavle	2	2.25
Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral	2	2.25
Bishop of Bačka Irinej	2	2.25
Russian Orthodox Church	2	2.25
Islamic Community	2	2.25
Alojzije Stepinac	1	1.12
Bishop Vasilije Kačavenda	1	1.12
Metropolitan of Zagreb and Ljubljana Porfirije	1	1.12
Bishop Arsenije	1	1.12
Patriarch Kirill of Moscow	1	1.12
Archpriest Radivoje Panić	1	1.12
Milić Blažanović	1	1.12
Bojan Jovanović	1	1.12
Bishop of Canada Georgije	1	1.12
Bishop of Mileševo Filaret	1	1.12
Stanislav Hočevar	1	1.12
Patriarch Vartolomej	1	1.12
Patriarchy of Alexandria	1	1.12
Archmandrite Nektarije	1	1.12
Archdiocese of Belgrade	1	1.12
Patriarchy of Belgrade	1	1.12
Eparchy of Raška and Prizren	1	1.12
Eparchy Council in Canada	1	1.12
Total	89	100.00

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	Number	%
Bishop Hrizostom	1	1.12
Darko Marinković	1	1.12
Metropolitan Atanasije Rakita	1	1.12
Metropolitan from Jašija	1	1.12
Metropolitan of Nova Gračanica Longin	1	1.12
Metropolitan of Šabac Lavrentije	1	1.12
Metropolitan of Zahumlje and Herzegovina Grigorije	1	1.12
Moscow Patriarchy	1	1.12
Father Isaija	1	1.12
Patriarchy	1	1.12
Archpriest Dragan Pavlović	1	1.12
Bishop Joanikije	1	1.12
Srem Diocese	1	1.12
Total	89	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 164.** – Distribution of frequency of representatives of SOC and other religions communities on the front pages of the daily *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	Number	%
SOC	3	19.10
Patriarch Irinej	2	3.37
Reis-ul-ulema Mustafa Cerić	2	3.37
Sava Janjić	1	3.37
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	1	2.25
Bishop of Raška and Prizren Teodosije	1	2.25
Bishop Jovan	1	2.25
Metropolitan of Zagreb and Ljubljana Porfirije	1	2.25
Bishop Arsenije	1	2.25
Patriarch Kirill of Moscow	1	2.25
Nenad Ilić	1	2.25
Vukašin Milićević	1	1.12
Total	16	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 165. – Distribution of frequency of representatives of SOC and other religions communities on the front pages of the daily *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	Number	%
Patriarch Irinej	3	18.75
Sava Janjić	2	12.50
Bishop Jovan	2	12.50
Pope Francis	1	6.25
Patriarch Pavle	1	6.25
Bishop of Raška and Prizren Teodosije	1	6.25
Bishop Vasilije Kačavenda	1	6.25
Bishop Arsenije	1	6.25
Slaviša Đurić	1	6.25
Radivoje Panić	1	6.25
Bojan Jovanović	1	6.25
Islamic Community of Serbia	1	6.25
Total	16	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 166.** – Distribution of frequency of representatives of SOC and other religions communities on the front pages of the daily *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	Number	%
SOC	4	17.39
Patriarch Irinej	2	8.70
Sava Janjić	2	8.70
Pope Francis	2	8.70
Alojzije Stepinac	2	8.70
Bishop Vasilije Kačavenda	2	8.70
Father Serafim	2	8.70
Patriarch Pavle	1	4.35
Muamer Zukorlić	1	4.35
Slaviša Đurić	1	4.35
Milić Blažanović	1	4.35
Total	23	100.00

<i>Blic</i>	Number	%
Mother Makarija	1	4.35
Vajo Bradarić	1	4.35
Father Stefan	1	4.35
Total	23	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 167.** – Distribution of frequency of representatives of SOC and other religions communities on the front pages of the daily *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	Number	%
SOC	15	24.59
Patriarch Irinej	7	11.48
Pope Francis	5	8.20
Muamer Zukorlić	3	4.92
Sava Janjić	2	3.28
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	2	3.28
Patriarch Pavle	2	3.28
Alojzije Stepinac	2	3.28
Bishop of Raška and Prizren Teodosije	1	1.64
Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral	1	1.64
Metropolitan of Zagreb and Ljubljana Porfirije	1	1.64
Bishop of Bačka Irinej	1	1.64
Slaviša Đurić	1	1.64
Radivoje Panić	1	1.64
Russian Orthodox Church	1	1.64
Bishop of Canada Georgije	1	1.64
Bishop of Mileševo Filaret	1	1.64
Islamic Community of Serbia	1	1.64
Mother Makarija	1	1.64
Muhammed Jusufspahić	1	1.64
Stanislav Hočevar, Belgrade Archbishop	1	1.64
Deacon Nenad Ilić	1	1.64
Total	61	100.00

<i>Politika</i>	Number	%
Orlando Antonini, apostolic nuncio	1	1.64
Patriarch Vartolomej	1	1.64
Reis-ul-ulema Adem Zilkić	1	1.64
Archdiocese of Belgrade and Karlovci	1	1.64
Bishop of Central Europe Constantine	1	1.64
Bishop Jure Bogdan	1	1.64
Bishop Jurij Jezernic	1	1.64
Bishop Ilarion	1	1.64
Bishop Pahomije	1	1.64
Total	61	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 168. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of representatives of SOC and other religious communities on the front pages of the daily *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	Number	%
SOC	4	26.67
Patriarch Irinej	3	20.00
Sava Janjić	1	6.67
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	1	6.67
Alojzije Stepinac	1	6.67
Bishop of Bačka Irinej	1	6.67
Patriarch Kirill of Moscow	1	6.67
Muhamed Jusufspahić	1	6.67
apostolic nuncio Orlando Antonini	1	6.67
Monsignor Laszlo Nemet	1	6.67
Total	15	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 169. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of representatives of SOC and other religious communities on the front pages of the daily *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	Number	%
SOC	4	17.39
Patriarch Irinej	4	17.39
Sava Janjić	3	13.04
Pope Francis	2	8.70
Bishop Vasilije Kačavenda	2	8.70
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	1	4.35
Patriarch Pavle	1	4.35
Bishop Jovan	1	4.35
Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral	1	4.35
Metropolitan of Zagreb and Ljubljana Porfirije	1	4.35
Father Serafim	1	4.35
Vukašin Miličević	1	4.35
Mother Anastasija	1	4.35
Total	23	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 170. – Cause developed by the editorial staff - value context of texts in all the media

All the media	no. of texts	positive	neutral	negative
Cause developed by the editorial staff				
number	573	30	267	276
%	100	5.24	46.59	48.17

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 171. – Value context and number of texts related to the “Cutter” affair in all the media

Crime		
“Cutter” affair		
Value context	number	%
positive	0	0
neutral	12	52.17
negative	11	47.83
%	100	5.24

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 172.** – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” per topics in the paper *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	53	18	33.96
Crime	21	12	57.14
activities of the Government of RS	18	9	50.00
economy	14	6	42.86
terrorism and ISIS	15	5	33.33

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 173.** – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” per topics in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	60	16	26.67
Crime	10	6	60.00
justice system, activities of judicial bodies	10	6	60.00
police	10	5	50.00
media conflicts	23	4	17.39

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 174.** – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” per topics in the paper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
Crime	11	7	63.64
questions of faith, church, religion	13	5	38.46
political life in Serbia	29	4	13.79
regional cooperation/ regional relations	27	4	14.81
terrorism and ISIS	10	4	40.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 175.** – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” per topics in the paper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	66	20	30.30
Crime	9	7	77.78
terrorism and ISIS	14	6	42.86
regional cooperation/ regional relations	10	4	40.00
activities of the Government of RS	13	3	23.08
military	6	3	50.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

Table 176. – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” per topics in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
media conflicts	46	17	36.96
political life in Serbia	44	14	31.82
economy	9	6	66.67
Russia/relations with Russia	9	6	66.67
Russian action in Syria	15	6	40.00
terrorism and ISIS	12	6	50.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 177.** – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” per topics in the paper *Politika*


<i>Politika</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
economy	37	11	29.73
political life in Serbia	47	6	12.77
regional cooperation/ regional relations	27	4	14.81
Kosovo/Belgrade and Priština relations	26	4	15.38
Terrorism and ISIS	37	4	10.81

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015**Table 178.** – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” per topics in the paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	75	9	12.00
economy	37	5	13.51
migrants/refugees	16	5	31.25
Kosovo/Belgrade and Priština relations	28	5	17.86
activities of the Government of RS	17	3	17.65
activities of the President of Serbia	4	3	75.00
terrorism and ISIS	18	3	16.67

Source: *Mediameter* research, October-December 2015

4



Discourse
Analysis

DEJAN VUK STANKOVIĆ

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Existence of numerous versatile approaches, arguments, literary devices, evaluative positions and journalistic conclusions are the key characteristics of column journalism in the daily and weekly papers. Precisely this tendency is present in numerous interviews and original texts which we can see in the period from October to December 2015. As in the previous months of 2015, a strong spirit of debate and radical government criticizing are noticeable and more often than not questioning of the moral credibility, political strength and real reaches of the opposition in the current political battle. Perception and accompanying interpretation of events and processes, whether on the internal or foreign affairs plan, bear a strong aroma of pugnaciousness and often ideological and moral exclusivity which cancels the possibility of constituting a spontaneous and rationally-based concord on the sense and meaning of any event or process in the public-political field. Subject of discourse analysis, in the period from October to December, was the portrayal of the main political actors – government and opposition, as well as interpretations of the conflict between *Kurir* and *Informer* and TV Pink. In terms of foreign affairs, we will show the journalistic and columnist approach with reference to events in Syria, especially involvement of Russia in the conflict between three sides at war, as well as the echo of the terrorist attack in Paris from November 2015.

In this period of 2015, the possibility of early parliament elections, along with the local and provincial elections, in spring of 2016 was politically completely legitimized. This circumstance caused increased political and moral tension in the writing of authors of texts and persons who address the readers via interviews. Critical writing referring to the government picked up on radicalism, but also contours of specific and detailed. Publically acclaimed achievements of the government of Serbia were disputed; it was pointed to the illogicalities in its work. Not only was the Prime Minister put under the magnifying glass, but also his closest associates and people close to him. In a nutshell, challenging the work of the Government of Serbia was radical, comprehensive, specific and often personal.

Content of the critical texts largely overlapped with the writing from the previous period in terms of sense and style. Primary goal of writing was not rationally-based criticism, more specifically exchange of arguments with the official version of events, but initiating a sense of disapproval of government's policies in the consciousness of the readers. Facts were always beyond question put into a wider context of interpretation of certain actors, events and processes. Hermeticism of political and moral standpoint relativized the possibility of creating the minimum objective approach. Negative image of the government in the media showed high level of semantic convergence with party politics, in this case, official view-

points of the opposition. At the same time, dominantly negative image of the opposition, relevantly matches the positions of ruling parties. Absence of moral credibility, deficit of competence, and therefore scarce support of the people as motifs of the anti-opposition discourse have nearly endemically grown together with the positions of majority parties and government leaders. Similar to the affiliation of critical media with the opposition, there is an undoubted closeness between the pro-Government media and the authorities.

The media have shown bias and division in evaluating actors, events and processes. Images of participants in political confrontations in Serbia, whether talking about the government or opposition, are dominantly negatively determined.

As in the previous period, writing of journalists, whether critically or affirmatively oriented towards the government or opposition, was accompanied by party propaganda. In the Serbian print media, there is almost an intertwining of party positions and journalists' writing. Journalism is extremely politicized, nearly reduced to the level of party propaganda. At the same time, parties are users, but more often than not the "victims" of media campaigns, as well. What is more, the much implicit or even explicit party orientations find their full and accurate development in column writing. On the other hand, journalists and columnists express strong daily political tension through the emphasized political and wider evaluative stand, which often surpasses the polemics of immediate participants in the daily political debates.

Pluralistic intellectual, evaluative and politically colored scene with emphasized allure of polemics as a communication genre best describes the print media through a prism of editorial, original columns and interviews. Weeklies, especially, certain regular columns may be treated as a medium for social and political criticism in an emphasized sense. Also, carefully selected guests, whose interviews are often lead texts in weeklies, are depicted as social and political avant-garde. This is a group of people from the public life with socially-recognized professions, reputations and widespread popularity. Success in their own profession makes them suitable for talking about politics. Approach, especially moral-political stands, categorical style in the presenting of standpoints and evaluative assessments make them authoritative in the media and political sense and somewhat socially relevant. Political orientation of the free thinking citizen almost as a rule ends in the strictly propaganda messages. Messages have the aim to induce resignation and rage of the wider reading population. It is assumed that indignation should incite activism.

Increased political role of the print media and free-thinking intellectuals is to a significant extent enabled by the realistically established weakness of the current opposition, as well. Ideologically confusing, party-wise fragmented, in irreconcilable political and value disputes, weak in terms of public support, current opposition is not competitive in the political market. As an expression of need to establish alternative government, a specific form of polemical, deep, politicized journalism which is not inherently illegitimate, but has a suitable role and effect, appears. The role is the change of function of print media. Content of writing, in the print media, especially in editorial columns and interviews, testifies that this form of journalism does not act from the stand of rational and moral position, but from the position of

daily-political optics. Print media is a daily political actor. Effect of the media transformation is reflected in the reducing of rational criticism, which should by initial presumption of the free public be offered by free press, to intervention of the media on the daily political plane with the aim of re-examining, and if it is possible, initiating and changing the constellation of political power in the country.

An important moment in the constructing of interpretative matrixes and direct or indirect leading of readers to conclusions, in addition to the written word in weeklies and dailies, are the images, primarily photography on the front pages and caricatures. Dynamic unity of word and image appears as a powerful communication resource which creates and maintains its own universe of meaning with the help of which and within which political and wider social reality is distinguished.

It should be emphasized that the Serbian print media are structured in such a way that they consider internal policy, economic and wider social problems in Serbia more important. Foreign policy topics, except in the weekly *Pečat*, which has a firmly established pro-Russian spiritual and political stand, are put in a direct and meaningful connection with domestic topics and dilemmas. Also, in the period from October to December 2015, the already established divisions to pro-government and anti-government media are still effective, just as effective as the division to the generally pro-European media (*Vreme*, *NIN*, *Novi Magazin* and *Nedeljnik*) and Euro-skeptic media (*Pečat*).

Image of the government – autocratic, non-democratic, repressive, incompetent, lacking serious economic results

Image of the Government of Serbia in the period from October to December 2015 was no different than the image from the previous period. Similarities may be observed in the following instances which are important for the processes of creating and maintaining the image of the Government of Serbia in columns and interviews of weeklies and dailies.

Image of the Government of Serbia is strictly personified and tied to the image of Aleksandar Vučić who having large support in the electorate is rightfully in the focus of interest of journalists, columnists and public intellectuals, who in their appearances, either rhetorically or via specific political engagement, intervene in the public and political field. Secondly, the image of Aleksandar Vučić is dominantly negative in this newspaper genre. Excluding columns in the daily *Informer*, all texts directly or indirectly have negative connotations. Thirdly, positive media and political messages, despite all that reigns over Serbia, are few and far between and they mostly come from the Ministers in the Government of Serbia or the Prime Minister himself. Fourth, in the creating of an actor's image, there is a dynamic joint effect of image and text.

One of the key questions almost obsessively discussed week in and week out by the dailies, and especially, weeklies, is the question of nature of political order, i.e. the manner of governing of PM Vučić and current Government of Serbia. Definition of Vučić's government varies. One viewpoint is that it is a dictatorship regime, i.e. that the government in Serbia is essentially in many of its forms an autocratic government. Hence, this is an emphasized political order in which Vučić as the ruler, limitlessly and arbitrarily, with the support of politically and morally indecent followers, who are deprived of any professional competence, "Serbia under Vučić is a country which is becoming a service of party disciplinants. Country of growing autocracy, poltroon media and practically self-cancelled political system – opposition has collapsed under its own idiotism, and the government is not hiding its contempt towards concepts of parliamentary democracy, independent institutions and existence of critical public. As all others failed, new generations will, unwittingly, be forced to take matters into their own hands. I hope they will succeed at being better than the roles given to them at birth or due to poor choices, through I realistically do not see much cause for such optimism."¹

In her own way, actress Bojana Maljević also presented this thesis in an interview for *NIN*, on 29th October 2015. The mentioned actress spoke about the political situation in the country, "We are living in autocracy. It is dolled up, different than what is written in textbooks under that notion, but it is that. The only thing that gives hope is the fact that Vučić is not a real leader. In order to be a leader, he has to have real followers. And followers are not the same as poltroons. In order for someone to have followers, they need to be consistent; people need to truly believe them. He is not this, nor has he distanced himself adequately from his past."²

Sharper qualification of Vučić's government than the two cited intellectuals was given by the editor of the site *NSPM (Nova Srpska Politička Misao)* Đorđe Vukadinović. Writing about the nature of Vučić's order, this columnist claims, "The name is dictatorship, fraud, lie and deception. Formerly petty and meaningless, now big and dangerous. This is the main continuity and marking of this government. In the ongoing farce around the "coup". When the newly elected Prime Minister addressed his "spontaneously gathered" supporters before the Assembly of Serbia. When there was drama about the "stolen sacks" with voters' ballots before the second round of presidential elections. When he promised "noticeable improvements" by the end of 2014 (then 2015, then 2016...). And on numerous occasions between these events. Second consequence is total destruction and degradation of all institutions. And third – enormous social and political tension pushing the country in the direction of serious conflict and some kind of civil war."³

Apart from the already known viewpoints on limitless power of one man and media manipulations for sake of maintaining this, the headline of this quote is indicative "Balance sheet

¹ Stevan Filipović, "Šta posle Vučića" [What after Vučić], *Vreme*, No. 1291, p. 35

² Bojana Maljević, "Vučić ne može da natera elitu da ga voli" [Vučić cannot force the elite to like him], *NIN*, No. 3383, p. 31-32

³ Đorđe Vukadinović, "Bilans Vučićevog termidora" [Balance sheet of Vučić's Thermidor], *Vreme*, No. 1300

of Vučić's thermidor." Special attention should be paid to the use of the word thermidor. In historical science, this word is usually associated with violent and bloody period which occurred after the two great world revolutions – the French bourgeois and the communist one. Comparison of Vučić's government with the mentioned extremely brutal periods of war history should remind the reader of the existence of excessive repression, of the violent, nearly bloodthirsty character of the current Government of Serbia.

This is an open wish of the author to evoke the feeling of existential danger and resistance using rhetorical strategies of extreme overemphasizing of the alleged danger from the morally evil and violent government. An influential member of the Democratic Party and sociologist Slobodan Gavrilović will give an almost identical political-rhetorical suggestion. He considers the rule of the Serbian Progressive Party a government to tremble before, "This is a regime, real regime, compared to this one, our government was soft. This is a regime to tremble before, and I do not want to tremble."⁴

The quoted Slobodan Gavrilović is a paradigm of cultural and political racism with reference to the Serbian Progressive Party. This matrix of deduction feeds off and reflects angry moralizing which is quite easy to do, but finally, it establishes clear democratic line between the honorable, honest and professionally competent democrats and the unenlightened, reckless and violent political elite led by the Serbian Progressive Party. Speaking about the alleged offer of the Progressives' leaders to join them, Gavrilović reminisces and shares his rejection experience with the readers. In his response to this question, the strong culturally racist message for the current government is more than visible, "And then they wanted me to be theirs. I cannot. Not for the world. With those primitive people, never; with such reckless people, ignorant, uneducated, never. With such bashibazouks, not on my life."⁵

Dragoljub Žarković joined the narration on morally and politically suspicious and violent character of Vučić's government. Similar to the stated public life participants, the Editor in Chief of *Vreme*, sees the government of Aleksandar Vučić extremely negatively, pointing out its autocratic, i.e. dictatorship dimension "Vučić is acting with his body and soul as if he has signed a secret agreement with the future itself, authorizing him to act in the name of future. He speaks pathetically, does not stay away from big words even on small matters. He irritates normal folk with his great confidence and the only faked hesitation appears when he connects Serbia's fate with his own fate."⁶

Vučić's appearance and domination on the political stage, according to the opinion of theatre director Dejan Mijač, should be considered the final challenge of history i.e. political decadence. Decadence which started with the tragic assassination of Zoran Đinđić, and which

4 Slobodan Gavrilović, "Ovo je režim pred kojim se drhti" [People tremble before this regime], *Vreme*, No. 1291, p. 24

5 Idem, p. 25

6 Dragoljub Žarković, "Minut jedan, dva, tri – počeo je rat tabloida iza koga se kriju niske strasti, krupne pare i primitivna politika" [Minute one, two, three – the great war of tabloids has begun, basic instincts, big money and primitive politics are behind it], *Vreme*, No. 1296, p. 5

reached its culmination in the embodiment of today's government, "If Đinđić had finished his first term, he would have had results which would be important for Serbia. He had, you know when a lot of do-naughts get attached to someone, he had too much of that. Remember who was in his surroundings, he saw this, he felt it, but he didn't manage to catch his breath. Treason around him was a bit collective.

Vreme: "Heirs" squandered it all...

Mijač: Not only were they not on his level, but they were not oriented towards his path, nor did they have his courage. Successors were not even politicians, or statesmen. Nobody after him was a statesman, all were politicians who were looking to surf and stay afloat.

Vreme : And so it came to this, as the people would say, god-forbid Government

Mijač : It was getting worse and worse every time, and now the worst has come. When I say worst, I fear change, because I do not know what could be worse. And worse is possible. I do not know what will be left of us. "⁷

In a condescending ironical tone with the aim of releasing an extremely negative message with reference to the current government and his first man, the mentioned well-known theatre director identifies the current Prime Minister of Serbia with King Ubu, "He (referring to the PM Aleksandar Vučić, author's comm.) said one definitive sentence, syntagma, which is short: My people! This can be read in mandatory reading assignments in Ubu the King. That's it! Ubu is the paradigm of ruling in the name of ideals, me, me and me, and once again me, and finally me. This was the demise of Ubu, but Jarry's drama is a merry one, this is a farce. "⁸

Authoritarianism, control and manipulation of the media, then the violent character of the government of Aleksandar Vučić, which have been discussed by the cited participants of the public political life, who are, formally speaking, non-party persons, also represents the set of main leitmotifs used by the heads of opposition parties in their criticizing.

Specifically, there is a significant overlapping in the rhetoric and semantics between the writing of columnists and political messages of public persons and the official opposition propaganda. In that sense, each observation about the character of Vučić's government may be perceived primarily as a rhetoric device, with the desire to overpower the political opponent and motivate one's own electorate. Several examples confirm the mentioned thesis.

Ergo, the leader of the Democratic Party and the Provincial PM Bojan Pajtić defines Vučić's government similar to Mijač, Vukadinović and Žarković, as manipulative and autocratic, "Mr. Vučić is no longer aware that the truth exists...only the people who have not lived in this country for the past four years have not had a chance to see Mr. Vučić utter some big fat

7 Dejan Mijač, "Naš kralj Ibi" [Our King Ubu], interviewed by Dragan Todorović, *Vreme*, No. 1298, p. 41

8 Idem, p. 40

fallacy, not to use the word lie. We have counted more than 100 false promises of Aleksandar Vučić. So much for being able to trust him. It is a different matter whether you can reach people with the truth in surroundings full of media blocking, especially in electronic media and in the conditions where a large number of dailies, if not all, are absolutely in the function of the regime. This could be seen in this last situation as well. If you criticize someone else from the Government, one part of the media reports it objectively and professionally; if Aleksandar Vučić is involved – fear and panic take over ... Vučić thinks that people should trust him, not their own eyes. He thinks no document, no evidence has the weight he has. This is a serious problem for all the citizens, when such a man without any work experience and with extremely authoritarian character leads the country.”⁹

Similar view of Vučić’s government is that of the former President of Serbia and the Democratic Party, Boris Tadić, who is currently leading the Social-Democratic Party. In an interview for the weekly *Novi Magazin*, Tadić insists on the inability of Vučić’s authoritarian order to initiate and maintain social progress, “the problem is in the takeover of absolute power in the country, because if there is no government control, there is no accelerated development, and then we come into a situation of general decay. Since the Government is putting extreme pressure on the media, we have no media control of the government. I have been in politics for a long time and we have never had such an absurd situation. In chess talk, we are in deadlock position, we cannot move as society and this is why it is necessary to strengthen the opposition and start a political and social dialogue”¹⁰

Relatively similar comment to the specified public servants and political leaders, on the political order, was made by the leader of the party Left Serbia and former high-ranking official of the Democratic Party, Borislav Stefanović, “He started to say two things which are by definition closest to what is referred to as dictatorship. Equalizing a country with a leader, where he says “when they undermine me, they undermine Serbia.” Another thing is that with every problem which surfaces – persecution of dissidents, cancelling shows – he speaks about this as incidents, for which he says he will do all in his power to eliminate such situations, only to have them appear in a report of the European Commission. This is also a form of dictatorship – to look at each problem as an isolated incident. We had this with Tito. Though I’m much more fond of him than Vučić.”¹¹

Dragoljub Mićunović, former leader of the Democratic Party and President of the Political Council of this party, sees Serbia similar to his former party comrades. In an interview for the weekly *Nedeljnik*, he says, “Vučić’s politics are a showdown with the opposition with all available resources. And this supports the non-democratic regime. The things the media under his control allow themselves to write about the president of the strongest opposition party

– this is without precedent. Whoever is elected for president of the Democratic Party will be under such tabloid fire in order to break the opposition. Vučić is showing on that example as well that he likes to rule alone. And this is the biggest danger for him.”¹²

Vučić is not exclusively negatively described as an unscrupulous dictator terrorizing the media and the opposition. His political profile and political practices should be observed as extremely ward-heeler-like. Vučić is, according to the opinion of *NSPM* editor, Đorđe Vukadinović, a ward-heeler, fatally obsessed with party life, obsessively interested in the media and skilled at interpreting results of public opinion polls, “People generally, and especially politicians, very often do not do what they say. But Aleksandar Vučić is, so to speak, an absolute champion at that. How many times have you heard him say how he is “not interested in popularity, ratings and public opinion polls,” as well as that he has “important things to worry about,” and thus he is not interested in “party politics”? When really, these are precisely the two things he is involved in the most, they are maybe the only things he is really interested in. He follows public opinion polls almost obsessively and – as it looks – he has quite good commands of this, and based on that he decides on and directs his statements and actions on almost daily basis. He is well aware of who his voters are and he speaks to them with almost a mathematical precision.”¹³

Therefore, the current Prime Minister of Serbia has nothing to do with statesmen, or reformists, he is just a power technician, who is at the same time a skillful communications tactician and brutal reality politician who is ready to any kind of abuse for the sake of maintaining his own rule.

It is interesting that those who belong to the critical elite see that Vučić’s autocratic manner of ruling is enabled by the deficiencies in the development of political institutions in the post-fifth-October Serbia. One of the loudest critics of Vučić’s government Vesna Pešić in an interview for *Novi Magazin* in response to the fifteenth anniversary of fifth-October changes says that the politically defective political institutions have enabled the appearance and consolidation of Vučić’s non-democratic order, “But when you do not have an established legal system, when you do not have that backbone of a liberal country, and that’s the justice system, you do not have free market either, and democracy starts to fade away, to disappear. Given that we have not established this backbone, all democratic liberties were destroyed, and I think they have been destroyed today. This is why you can say that Serbia is in the dark regarding media, some marginal paper or portal looms, but all the mainstream media are under state control.”¹⁴

9 Bojan Pajtić, “Nebeske razmere Vučićeve bahatosti” [Epic proportions of Vučić’s arrogance], *Vreme*, No. 1292, p. 11

10 Boris Tadić, “Vlada obmanjuje ljude lažima o napretku” [The government is misleading people with lies about progress], interviewed by Jelka Jovanović, *Novi magazin*, No. 241, p. 21-22

11 Borislav Stefanović, “Tito je bio diktator ali mi je draži od nego Vučić i Pajtić” [Tito was a dictator, but I was more fond of him than Vučić and Pajtić], *Nedeljnik*, No. 196, p. 15

12 Dragoljub Mićunović, “Tadić je sebe obožavao. To je uništilo njega, DS i Srbiju” [Tadić adored himself. This destroyed him, Democratic Party and Serbia], *Nedeljnik*, No. 196, p. 26

13 Đorđe Vukadinović, “Ko će glasati za njega” [Who will vote for him], *Vreme*, No. 1293, p. 16

14 Vesna Pešić, “Istrulili bismo bez petog oktobra” [We would have blown it without October 5th], interviewed by Jelka Jovanović, *Novi magazin*, No. 232, p. 19

Autocratic politician, like Vučić, is deprived of authentic support of the elite. Conflict of Vučić and the elite, as well as cadre structures of the Progressives' government is one of the favorite topics of numerous critics. Consequently, the already quoted actress Bojana Maljević emphasizes that Vučić is not a real political leader, but an autocrat who has only poltroons and mediocrities around him. As a politician of volatile political beliefs and value orientations, at the same time obsessed with power, Vučić despises strong personalities, morally credible and professionally competent;¹⁵ he is the type of leader who wants weak people around him in order to be able to control them. Good leaders gather strong people around themselves, the best and in the end they have results. Although this is risky, because the strong have bigger ambitions, but a real leader knows that it is less harmful when someone has ambition and can be his match than gathering mediocrities around himself. An autocrat likes to control the weak, because he himself is weak. It is interesting that someone allegedly inspired by Weber actually relies on abstract mathematics, but is unable to make any progress at all in state administration and institutional system.¹⁶

Vučić's majority compared to the elite is specific. Unlike his predecessors, Tadić and Koštunica, and the politically influential Čedomir Jovanović and to some extent Đinđić, Vučić has no support from the elite. Due to this lack of support, Vučić, according to the presumption of Bojana Maljević, innewss a considerable effort to silence the elite or to devastate it morally and politically via the media under his control. Bojana Maljević explains this circumstance, as you can see, by the fact that Vučić has no political and value orientation, but sees politics as a brutal game of power and targeted (ab)use of the media,¹⁷ this is silencing. About the lack of love from the so called intellectual elite, despite the confidence of over 50% of citizens, I understand how the Prime Minister feels. He is the first leader who did not get the "love" from the elite. All others had it. Milošević, Koštunica, Đinđić and that unfortunate Tadić. Just remember how much Čeda was supported by one part of the "intellectual elite." We were really rooting for changes, some result, and it did not happen, but that "love" existed, support and turning a blind eye – hoping that something we've been waiting for since 2000 will happen. And now the only one who has not got this is Vučić. I'm not taking Toma into account. I get that this is painful. But that does not mean, I guess, that the prime minister should call these people out, like he called out Kokan Mladenović, at a press conference, or me in a TV show, or tomorrow again someone else, violating rules of decorum with his statements. Vučić thinks that he will gain appreciation by disparaging?! Both associates and those who think differently. This just does not happen.¹⁸

What are the consequences of an open conflict with the elite and how long can it put away the fatal epilogue either for the ruler or for society is pointed out by the famous sculptor and university professor Mrđan Bajić, "The Prime Minister ought to bear in mind that every government that was in an open war with its own elites either quickly fell or strayed to dictatorship. If there are no results, the government heats up the electorate with enemies and in

15 Bojana Maljević, "Vučić ne može da natera elitu da ga voli" [Vučić cannot force the elite to like him], *NIN*, No. 3383, p. 32

16 Idem

that way camouflages the real problems. This government will have to show results without the pink glasses. Because from Tito, to Sloba and Koštunica to this day, unreserved love of the people lasts shorter and shorter. Regardless of how much the media iron it all out. The pace is picking up.¹⁷

Almost as if following a rule of thumb, no political constellation of power in Serbia is not without a specific very noticeable and important effect of international factors. This rule applies to the present political moment, as well. Precisely the intertwining of domestic political circumstances with foreign influences is what is leading the prime minister to find an adequate representation of his policies.

In that context, the critically oriented media launched a story about the two faces of the prime minister. Aim of this political media thesis is to show an internal inconsistency of the prime minister's policies and his moral and psychological inadequacy for this responsible function. This is about the fact that the prime minister is implementing an authoritarian practice in Serbia, while in his contact with foreigners, especially in talks with western politicians, he is rational, diplomatic and forthcoming.

Reporter of *Vreme* Dejan Anastasijević advocates this thesis and writes, "At home, he does not hesitate to yell, not only at the press, but the ministers as well, even benign criticism is seen as an attack on the state and his historic mission. However, when visiting, he is calm and cooperative, almost condescending, and this reporter has testified on several occasions, following the Brussels dialogue on the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Priština for years, that there is a discrepancy between what was agreed there and the interpretations upon the return home. It is possible that Vučić is playing this double game consciously, believing the Serbs only understand yelling, threats and an occasional kick of the door. If that is the case, then he does not have a very nice opinion about his own people."¹⁸

Similar to Anastasijević, political constellation in relations between Vučić and the world is seen by the well-known director Slobodan Šijan, who claims that Vučić's rule resembles to a certain extent the period of Josip Broz Tito, who also had two faces, one for internal and one for external use, "On the internal plan, total control of the media, persecution of certain people who think differently, and on the external plan, we are presenting ourselves as different and more progressive, that we are against repression, war, for minority rights."¹⁹

"Vučić is being taken down by his – results, cadre and media. He is incessantly apologizing

17 Mrđan Bajić, "Primitivizam specijalnog odeljenja vlasti" [Primitivism of the government's special class], interview with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, No. 3383

18 Dejan Anastasijević, "Dva lica jednog premijera" [Two faces of the prime minister], *Vreme*, No. 1302, p. 4

19 Slobodan Šijan, "Daviće nas dok Rusima ne kažemo zbogom" [They will nag us until we say goodbye to the Russians] interviewed by Olja Bečković, *NIN*, No. 3382, p. 21

17th December 2015

for the mistakes of his associates: when they call the opposition a fifth column in parliament, when ministers degrade journalists and women...Vučić is taken down by the increasing difference between the virtual reality painted by him and his colleagues and real life in Serbia.”²⁰

The quote from the interview of Nataša Vučković, the Vice-President of the Democratic Party and opposition’s MP in Serbian Parliament, implies one of the directions of criticizing Vučić’s government. It is about emphasizing the position that the government led by the President of the Serbian Progressive Party is deprived of any visible and verifiable results. This moment of critical discourse is comprehensive, more precisely it refers to all the aspects of the Government’s policies, from international policy, to regional policy, fighting for establishing a legal order, with economic policy at the end. Position that the Prime Minister of Serbia Vučić and the Government of Serbia do not have serious results in the economic-social sphere was especially developed and emphasized. This circumstance was understandable since basic expectations of the citizens from the government are related to this area of life. At the same time, a considerable part of the PM’s addressing the public refers precisely to social and economic spheres. The political-propaganda discourse of Vučić’s opponents strives to be efficiently effective, it, according to the assumption, must insist on challenging the achievements related mostly to daily life of the biggest number of citizens of Serbia.

Vera Didanovic, reporter from *NIN*, also tries to forcefully prove and show that there are no results of the work of Vučić’s cabinet. In the text “High Rating on an Empty Stomach”, she claims that the biggest success of the government is maintaining a high level of popularity of the government, which nearly has not done anything for the improvement of conditions of living of citizens of Serbia, “the biggest success of the government – maintaining high ratings, despite results which range from humble to catastrophic – was largely enabled by the catastrophic state of things in society and low level of public awareness and public debate, with lack of information and surplus of misinformation, spinning and audacious propaganda. Though, truth be told, even in these circumstances we managed to learn a lot, from the shenanigans of the PM’s brother with the personal ID card, to the strange ways of obtaining diplomas when in government, unacceptable amounts of dilettantism, if not something else as well, in the case of sending the rescue helicopter in the feat of which six adults and one baby lost their lives, new details in the Banana scandal with Ivica Dačić as the leading role ...”²¹

The Government of Serbia led by Aleksandar Vučić has clearly opted for building a market economy. Favoring the private sector (incentives for foreign and domestic investments), creating a favorable business environment, development of the legal state as basis for clearly defined and predictable relations in the economic sphere, fighting against grey economy and efficiency in collecting taxes and contributions, and finally the rationalization of the public sector and state administration (idea about a cheap state) are key economic stands of Vučić’s cabinet. Turn towards a dynamic market economy should be the key for increasing the rate of economic growth. Increasing lines of the GDP are already visible in 2015; while

20 Nataša Vučković, “Ne strahujemo od Čede i Tadića” [I do not fear Čeda or Tadić], *Nedeljnik*, No. 204, p. 18-19

21 Vera Didanović, “Visok rejting na prazan stomak” [High rating on an empty stomach], *NIN*, No. 3381, p. 24

progress of Serbia in different world lists measuring quality of the business climate in the country are the indicators of successful economic policy. These sentences describe the official version of economic policy of the Government of Serbia. Economic choices and practice of the Government of Serbia are disputed in various ways and very specifically and dynamically, on weekly basis. Methodology of these disputes involves a joint action of the two moments. Use of statistic data and author's intuitions burdened by negative prejudice about the existing government makes the flagship of the journalistic and analytical approach to this topic.

Negative image of the Government of Serbia in an economic sense is created with its antagonizing of potential innewsors from abroad. Case of wind parks is one such example of an allegedly missed opportunity for Serbia to start one of such energy industries with considerable capital from abroad. This topic was processed by a reporter of the weekly *Novi Magazin*, Miša Brkić who writes as follows on the topic of wind parks, "There is plenty of space with good conditions and favorable winds for the building of wind parks (Jahannes Sander). A billion-euro innewsment in wind parks in Serbia is waiting at the border because the innewsors think that the contract on repurchase of electricity does not give sureties (Jürgen Welschhof). I say to innewsors, companies and the industry – innews in clean energy, it is here and it is continuing to grow (Miguel Arias Canete). We want to innews a billion Euros, but we need a stable business environment and a clear legal framework (Gaetano Massara). The later they come, the better for us (Aleksandar Vučić). Strategy serves only for the preservation of one monopoly and turning its interest into a national one (Center for Ecology and Sustained Development – CEKOR)."²²

It is interesting that Brkić claims that the Government is not only unappreciative of the needs of capital that wants to enter the country, but it is also violating EU regulations from this area. It is interesting that Brkić favors interests of capital against interests of the country and the population, even if he believes EU regulations which are valid in economically more developed countries are the best possible solution for Serbia. These starting assumptions, indirectly, but irrevocably give room to political stigmatizing of the government. Government of Serbia is presented as anti-European, which is in collision with its orientation towards EU. At the same time, the government is perceived as anti-market oriented since it is insufficiently adaptable to requests of innewsors.

One manifestation of ineffectiveness in the work of state institutions in the economic sense is insufficiently efficient collection of tax. This deficiency is visible in the fact that as much as 45 billion dinars ended up in the so called "grey zone" (business zone which does not settle its debt towards the state). Failure to fully collect taxes, more specifically state's tolerance of the "grey economy" is preventing social development, more precisely making inNewsng in areas of public importance, such as education, health care or infrastructure impossible. In order to vividly explain this defect in the functioning of institutions, Brkić starts from the usual marketing trick which functions on the principle of "could have should have." This fake

common sense, but basically maliciously infantile setting, is recalculating possible social gain from really unpaid taxes. In light of this rhetoric maneuver, Brkić writes, "What could the state do, for example, with RSD 45 billion? All citizens could be exempt of income tax next year. It could cover capital expenditures planned in the budget for next year. It could cover annual costs of child protection. It could pay subsidies to agriculture and finance invalid-veteran protection. It could secure the annual budget of three ministries – construction, health and culture."²³ This text needs to be understood as a political and economic counter-thesis to the position of the Ministry of Finance which published in the end of 2015 a report on the better balances of collecting taxes compared to 2014.

Miša Brkić extended the logic of relativization of economic and social feats of the Government of Serbia with an array of texts which appeared in the end of 2015. A case in point of the use of research findings with the aim of confirming his negative stand on government's policies may be seen in the economic analysis of the ambient in 2015. The survey conducted by USAID and the Serbian Chamber of Commerce among businessmen is used by Brkić in the text "Dilapidated business" with the aim of refuting positive steps forward, registered examples on the "doing-list" of the World Bank for 2015.

Analyzing the mentioned research, Brkić claims, "Good case, bad point. With the intention of attracting more innewsors and securing more new work positions, Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić often presents Serbia as the ideal place for business and a regional leader in terms of the business ambient. Macroeconomic stability and fiscal consolidation are most often Government's "magnets" for attracting foreign companies. Under the well-packed marketing image, everything is not as ideal as it is said in the "advertisement" or as the old saying goes "it's putting lipstick on a pig." Some relevant domestic and international financial, consulting and political institutions and business associations pointed in good faith to some of the major deficiencies. The gist of these objections and suggestions is that "it does not all boil down to" inflation and reduction of deficit. It is much more to do with stable and independent institutions, protection of contracts, healthy financial institutions, independent justice system, freedom of the media...All this makes the business ambient more pleasant for business and profit. Each such suggestion, survey or analysis should be welcomed by any government, if it honestly wants and intends to turn Serbia into a good place for business and living. The gap between praise to the business environment made by the businessmen and the results achieved by their companies. Favorable "climate changes" have not helped businessmen spend less time and money on solving regulatory issues. Para-fiscal levies have the "greenhouse effect".²⁴

Use of statistic parameters present in the research of the business ambient in the country is the topic of the text by Mijat Lakićević as well, entitled "Weak D." This is an outline of the research done by the Foundation of Friedrich Naumann, under the name "Freedom barometer." The study explores issues of political and economic liberties in different countries across

22 Miša Brkić, "Spas ili propast" [Salvation or demise], *Novi magazin*, No. 234, p. 14

23 Miša Brkić, "Država još nemoćna" [State still powerless], *Novi magazin*, No. 243, p. 26

24 Miša Brkić, "Rasklimatani biznis" [Dilapidated business], *Novi magazin*, No. 241, p. 10

Europe and the world. This is a synthetic review of research of different areas of politics and economics, as well as legal systems, with the aim of valuation of the level of freedom in economics and economy. According to the results of this research, Serbia ranks pretty poorly in the domain of economic freedom, especially in the segment which refers to introduction and implementation of rule of law. This institutional deficiency is primarily the responsibility of the state, more specifically the elite in office, therefore this circumstance is emphasized in order to form a negative evaluation in the consciousness of the readers. Burdening the current nomenclature with responsibility is essentially seen in the text box, "Serbia is the worst in the region precisely in the domain where the state plays a key role – in the domain of rule of law."

At the same time, it should be noted that the text explicitly points to the fact that Serbia has an even better index of political liberties than many countries in the region. Neglecting this result is obviously intentional because indirectly, but again unequivocally, the author wants to preserve the image of the government of the Serbian Progressive Party as a government which is disputable from the viewpoint of adopting the basic principles and practices of the Western liberal democracy. Though it is not leading in any parameters, when it comes to freedom of choice, Serbia is ahead of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, while in terms of media liberties, Serbia ranks ahead of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania and Macedonia.

Contextual fragmentation as the principle of reading the report, neglecting its completeness and complete contextualization was implemented with the aim of proving a preconceived negative evaluation of Serbia as a country of low level of freedom in the political and economic sense. Very similar thinking pattern was applied in the interpretation of numbers which describe the economic growth rate in Serbia. The already mentioned Mijat Lakićević in the text "Apathy in Belgrade" manages to establish that Serbia is horridly behind the region in terms of growth thanks to the direct and extreme de-contextualized approach, "Serbia had faster economic growth than the average in CEE and higher than the average in the Balkans up to the crisis of 2008. However, it has slower growth, so it still has not reached the level of economic activity in that game-changing year. This year, countries of CEE will have an average growth of 2.7 percent, Balkans 2.4, while Serbia 0.8 percent. Projections for next year say that Central East Europe and the Balkans will reach an average growth of 2.5 percent. Prognosis for Serbia says – 1.7 percent. This means Serbia is falling behind. And that means it is in serious crisis. And what is in the biggest crisis as it seems is the understanding of the situation in which we are."²⁵

Special circumstances, with which Serbia has been faced since the floods in 2014, as well as the fact that IMF predicted lower growth rates than the realized ones, though important, were not taken into consideration for the formulating of conclusions of the text, which were based only on the direct comparison of numbers.

²⁵ Mijat Lakićević, "Apatija u Beogradu" [Apathy in Belgrade], *Novi magazin*, No. 242, p. 7

Absence of awareness about the two relevant circumstances for the assessment of economic growth suggests unilateral nature of Lakićević's text. Furthermore, unilateral nature and intentional neglecting of facts has always been one of the most suggestive signs that the writing of an author is in the service of political propaganda..

One more significant moral and economic orientation of the Government, that jobs should be given to those who deserve them for their knowledge, skill and results in the work place, has been seriously scrutinized, by reviewing a comparative study which deals with the professional preferences of the population. The aim of this research and its interpretation was not just to offer a depiction of the state of the society according to this important social and economic issue, but to show the failure of the government to promote moral suitable to market conditions of earning. Namely, as part of creating a better business climate for the development of economy, position that political or family-relation-based hiring should be avoided, i.e. those based on same-home-town favoritism. These intentions are found in collision with the current state of things. This essentially positive moral and economic tendency has been cancelled with antimeritocratic practice in awarding jobs. "Unemployed of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia prefer the state, as an attractive employer with which they can get a job through favoritism. In Serbia, only one of 10 unemployed people would like to work for a privately-owned business. Travel allowance outranks on-job training in terms of motivation."²⁶

Positive view of economic opportunities, more specifically progress in the solving of the economic crisis has been omitted by the columnists' pens, and as a result any good news of economy come exclusively and only from government ministers as domestic actors in the public life, while an occasional positive word, without reservations towards the current government, may be heard only from foreign ambassadors.

Speaking for the weekly *Novi Magazin*, Minister of Finance in the Government of Serbia Dušan Vujović pointed to positive trends in public finances, emphasizing the reduction of the deficit and the start of the fall of the public debt, "I must say that IMF is pleased because we realized plans in most fields, and largely surpassed them: in terms of the central government debt and central government debt and in the foreign exchange, i.e. current balance sheet and inflation which was merely 1.4 percent and economic growth which is projected at about 0.75% and 1.75% next year... In monetary and fiscal terms, we have results that are multiple times better than what was planned. After ten months, the central government debt amounts to 38.7 billion dinars. This is nearly five times better than planned, because, let me remind you, a deficit of 191 billion was agreed. How did this happen? We achieved all elements of revenue better than we planned; we achieved all elements of expenditures lower than we planned. There is only one segment we are not proud of, we realized smaller amount of innwsmments which are financed from the budget. Why? Because planning and finishing construction works is going slower, but also due to legal and administrative limitations.

²⁶ Miša Brkić, "Svi bi preko veze u državnu službu" [All want government jobs through favoritism], *Novi magazin*, No. 242, p. 27

Sometimes it is very hard to solve the question of land expropriation, securing all necessary permits. Second area in which we achieved very good results is monetary stability. We are in the midst of fiscal consolidation; we achieved inflation of merely 1.4 percent, which is unprecedented. We have improvements in current payments which is entirely financed by quality funds from direct investments. It means we have an increase of foreign direct investments.

Finally, we have an acceleration of economic growth. We started with projections of -1, then they were revised to -0.5, and then in the middle of consolidation, which is anyway a recession instrument, we increased the growth rate to positive 0.5, and now the Fund is already talking about 0.75, while we expect it to be 1 percent by the end of the year. Recovered growth, in a few steps, from minus one to plus one indicates the reforms are taking root and there is no slipping...²⁷

Also, Vujović said, there was a trend suggesting that borrowing of the country could soon be stopped, i.e. that Serbia was to become a solid and financially stable country, with clear indicators of that at this time, "Here, on 31st October 2015, the debt of the country was nearly 74% of the gross domestic product. Structure of our debt is EUR 9.7 bln, USD 8.8 bln and RSD 650 bln. Throughout this year, our debt in dollars increased by 200 million, and in Euros by 100 million. The debt increased in Euros by one billion and a half. Why? Due to foreign exchange rates. This is best seen when we look at the debt in dollars, which fell from 27.7 to 26.7 billion. So when people talk about debt, they should pick a more reliable measure. A more reliable measure is looking at what is essentially happening with the change of debt. In the past 10 months, we reduced the expected deficit by EUR 600 million, and inherently the need for external financing. For me that is a much better indicator. Secondly, the interest rates under which Serbia is borrowing are decreasing in the last few months because of the better rating of the country. These are the positive effect of fiscal consolidation."²⁸

Norwegian Ambassador Arne Sannes Bjørnstad spoke positively on the work of the Government of Serbia. In the text entitled "It easier to do business in Serbia than before," this diplomat ascertained there is progress in terms of business practice. Speaking about the business operations of the companies from his country, the Norwegian Ambassador said the following, "They are mostly happy and they say they are happy about the progress which eased up their work. Telenor, for example, has some problems in other countries, but here, everything is running smoothly. Anyway, permits are obtained more easily, legal framework for doing business is a lot more predictable, so the whole situation is such that business is more easily conducted than before. I want to emphasize that Norwegian companies believe Serbia is a country where it is easier to do business than in other regions."²⁹

27 Dušan Vujović, "Važno je da ljudi poveruju u uspeh" [It is important for people to believe the success], interviewed by Mijat Lakićević, *Novi magazin*, No. 237, p. 8

28 Idem, p. 21-22

29 Arne Sannes Bjørnstad, "U Srbiji se lakše radi nego ranije" [It's easier to do business in Serbia than before], interviewed by Julijana Mojsilović, *Novi magazin*, No. 238

In the period from October to December 2015, constructing of negative image of Aleksandar Vučić and the Government of Serbia was realized through media attacks on his closest associates, who are in close amicable relations with him.

In the centre of media attention, Nikola Petrović, Director of PE Elektromreže Srbije, and Mayor of Belgrade Siniša Mali were "targeted" by journalistic criticism. Campaigns against them were strictly personified and calculated in order to cause extremely negative effect with the readers.

Two of PM Vučić's closest associates were under special magnifying glass of the opposition weekly *Vreme*. Both were awarded front pages with allusive caption under the photographs. *Vreme* published on 15th October 2015 a photo of Nikola Petrović with the caption "The man talked about: From the best man – polygraph (reference to a popular beer commercial's slogan, translator's comm.)." Text gives a detailed account of Petrović's biography, business career, friendly, i.e. best-man relations with Prime Minister Vučić, with reflection on his current status among top ranking officials in the government. Mayor of Belgrade Siniša Mali attracted admirable attention of this Belgrade weekly, too. Of course, not for what he has done or intends to do on his high-ranking government position, but for alleged ownership of his off-shore company over a complex of 24 apartments on the Bulgarian Riviera. Front page with the photo of Siniša Mali bears the title "Deals of the Belgrade Mayor. This city is too small for me (mayor's surname means small in Serbian, translator's comm.). The allusion is clear. Alleged greed of the mayor which follows his managerial career clearly indicates that he is in politics for purely material interests. At the same time, allusion indirectly overlaps with the details of the biography of the first man of the capital, a man who spent one part of his life studying and working abroad. After a detailed summary of Siniša Mali's personal and professional biography, the author of the text poses a suggestive question on the material value of the mayor's property and his official income. So, *Vreme* writes, "The scandal with 24 apartments of Siniša Mali is another one in an array of those which surfaced during the mandate of Vučić's government and indicates that people from his near surroundings are potentially involved in high-end corruption deals...."³⁰

The relationship of politics and business is the main topic of campaigns against these two important people in the government. It is understood that the aim of the campaign is to point out that the privileged position of two present potentates exclusively depends on the close relations with the first man of Serbian politics. Politically provoking, and atrocious allusion in the media sense, involves and at times strives to directly show that everything is allowed for the close friends of Aleksandar Vučić in the system of his personal rule. The saying of the Spanish dictator Franco, "My friends get everything, others get the law," figures as a silent assumption of this journalistic, but also political venture.

Numerous known and unknown writers from dailies and weeklies strived to directly or indirectly show and prove the alleged shady deals of these two prominent persons in present political set.

30 Slobodan Georgiev, "Mali mi je ovaj grad" [This city is too small for me], *Vreme*, No. 1294, p. 6

Nikola Petrović got under the spotlight via the “Phone-tapping” scandal. He was accused as the Director of PE Elektromreža by the leader of the Democratic Party Bojan Pajtić of stopping the issuing of a permit and directly asking for money from an American innwsor for the construction of wind parks in Vojvodina. Pajtić’s allegations were harshly refuted by Petrović, negating any connection with the case of the alleged corruption. The current government suggested that Petrović and Pajtić take the polygraph in order to ascertain whether the accusations of the leader of the biggest opposition party were true. Petrović showed up for the questioning, but Pajtić did not. Leader of the Democrats did not miss the chance to make an entire political-media performance. Paradoxically, the most significant part of Pajtić’s interview is the part where he negates that he has material evidence that the Director of PE Elektromreže asked for money from a future innwsor, “I don’t have any material evidence that he was given any money and for this reason initiatives to take the polygraph are ridiculous.”³¹ Interesting, and at the same time absurd, the attitude is that the lack of evidence for corruption of the head of PE Elektromreže prompts the conclusion that polygraph questioning is ridiculous. It is more likely that the leader of the Democrats and current PM of AP Vojvodina would not find the polygraph results to his liking, hence deciding to declare it an irrelevant instrument for ascertaining the truthfulness of one’s positions in the proceedings.

Series on the PM’s associates in the in executive government ended with the text of Slobodan Georgijev “All the PM’s men” in the weekly *Vreme* dated 10th December 2015. Apart from the alluding to the film by Alen Pakula “All the President’s Men,” showing the Watergate scandal, the text does not bring any new information neither on the close associates of Aleksandar Vučić, apart from the fact that the reference to Watergate eloquently infers that Vučić should resign due to unacceptable morals of his associates, similar to Nixon, who did that after the Supreme Court of USA confirmed journalistic findings that the secret police wiretapped the head quarters of the, at the time, opposing Democratic Party.

Though *Vreme* dedicated a significant amount of attention to analyzing the biography of Siniša Mali and Nikola Petrović, there was no possibility for them to respond to the allusive-provocative texts which are being published in this Belgrade-based weekly week in and week out.

Voice of Mali and Petrović was only heard in the weekly *Nedeljnik*. In an interview “I don’t like politics, I’m not in politics,” Petrović admitted closeness, i.e. friendship with the Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić, successful career as a businessman, membership in the Serbian Progressive Party, but at the same time, he decisively refuted the accusations of corruption. He generally confirmed that he is more directed towards politics, than business. At the same time, Mayor Siniša Mali replied to the critics from the ranks of the opposition and media in an interview for the weekly *Nedeljnik* entitled “All of Serbia would benefit if Pajtić had built “Novi Sad Waterfront, and Živković Niš Waterfront.” Mali firmly pointed out the non-party character of the project “Belgrade Waterfront” at the same time addressing the critics that it would be good for Serbia if there was a Novi Sad Waterfront and Niš Waterfront.

31 Bojan Pajtić, “Nebeske razmere Vučićeve bahatosti” [Epic proportions of Vučić’s arrogance], *Vreme*, No. 1292

This message is clear. Siniša Mali is defending the concept of the Belgrade Waterfront, alluding to the places of residence of the two opposition politicians (Pajtić and Živković) who are known as his biggest critics. Accusations against Petrović and Mali were not proven, scandals were created without an epilogue, and the public scene was additionally poisoned with negative tension full of accusations and counter accusations.

Political and media strike on the Government and the Prime Minister via stories about “shady” deals conducted by his people is devised with the aim of tearing down Vučić’s image of a fighter against corruption without compromise, as well as to bring the ordinary citizen worn out by the hard life into conflict with the alienated political class bathing in privileges. Constructing a negative image of the government involved reflections on to the scandals: the infamous case of “coup” which involved conflicts of the media and conflict of certain media with the government, like the incident with the Minister of Defense Bratislav Gašić, the political and media dispute surrounding the statement made by the SASA President Vladimir Kostić about Kosovo, debate of the government with the Ombudsman Saša Janković, but also an array of other reflections on economic policies, like the adoption of the budget, but also problems with companies in restructuring.

Unlike the previous periods when the criticism was more of overall nature and bearing often practical tension, more specifically inciting involvement in the political and public field, in the period from October to December 2015, criticism got specifically developed meaning, it picked up in politics and moralizing; and it is starting to include almost all from the political, media and economic life.

Image of the opposition – no moral credibility, politically disputable democratic legitimacy, divided from within, burdened by failures from recent past.

Unlike the current government which is present in journalistic columns in dailies and weeklies in considerable amounts, the opposition is a lot less the subject of journalistic circles, especially those who are professionally engaged in weekly papers. There are numerous reasons for such a status of the opposition. Two of them seem to be the most important. Firstly, the influence of the opposition on the pace of outcomes of political processes in the country is little. The government has convincing majority both in Parliament and public opinion. Secondly, most, nearly all, weeklies are, to a certain extent, critically oriented towards the government. Their topic orientation is such that the opposition in commentaries and editorial columns is more or less reduced to a few descriptive, mostly critical remarks.

At the same time, orientation towards criticism of the government, in itself, involves dedicating little space to critical analysis of the period when the opposition was in majority positions. Construction of the negative image of the opposition represents a combination

of evaluations of their activities and analysis of circumstances which would open a timely prospect that the opposition could establish itself as a political actor which could at least in some ways be an equal partner to the extremely dominant ruling coalition at this time.

Similar to the general portrayal or image of the government, the image of the opposition is also dominantly negative. Special role in the attributing of negative evaluative component to opposition parties is played by the paper *Informer* both with reference to texts which appear in the daily edition, and in the editorial columns of Dragan J. Vučićević. Vučićević's columns in the moral and political sense problematize actors on the opposition stage. They also treat critically opposition media and non-government organizations, with nearly unavoidable reflection on the period of October-fifth winners. The basic thesis of these claims could be summed up in the following three interconnected moments which make up the approach of the author: 1) current opposition has no moral credibility (due to highly corrupted political class it comprises) and political capacity to lead the state due to failed transition in Serbia, 2) in opposition-oriented media, and among the print media, this is most media, the current Government is being attacked without a rational explanation and with one single purpose to bring it down as soon as possible 3) in the media which support the current opposition, there is undoubted discrimination of all those who are not opposed to Vučić's government.

Vučićević's criticism of the Serbian opposition scene is equally directed towards the opposition as a component in the political life, but also to the media which are extremely critical towards the government. His criticism always follows the principle *ad hominem*, strictly personalized, in order to be convincing. This is why a concrete person is stigmatized; his/her moral and psychological profile is portrayed in order to make the person unworthy of any function in the public life.

In order to understand the media and political scene in Serbia, writing of the Editor in Chief of *Informer* is relevant for three interconnected reasons. Primarily, the style of writing and content of messages of his texts are such that they reflect the interest in politics of the less educated classes who mostly buy and read the tabloids and are very devoted voters in the election process. Secondly, *Informer* is important for the present government because on daily and weekly basis it challenges negative positions and media-political images of the government created by and continuously reproduced by the critical media. And finally, *Informer* is a leader among dailies in the forming of the evaluatively negative image of the current opposition as a political actor.

In the period from October to December, apart from actors in the political life, Vučićević also analyzed the media scene with negative evaluative stands towards the editorial policies of RTS and the tabloid *Kurir*. Also, the anti-European sentiment in the public life was very actively being disseminated, undermining the already fragile foundations of regional relations, and especially promoting support of Russia and its political leader Vladimir Putin.

Precisely this kind of political-evaluative position of Dragan J. Vučićević prevents him from completely identifying with the policies of the current Government of Serbia, since it sees

itself as an active component of the process of European integrations and advocate of regional peace and political stability.

Still, the position towards political opponents of the government is openly critical in the already known language which strives to morally stigmatize the opponent, already through his/her description, while the conclusion, i.e. evaluative position is logically derived from the extensive description often spiced with a few cursed words.

Classic examples of anti-opposition political message in Vučićević's optics are the texts "Vučić, arrogant of you" and "Gašić – best proof of racism." These texts best confirm the lack of political and moral credibility of the opposition and the biasness of one part of the media towards political actors, especially the government. With his sharp style of writing, Vučićević incites indignation and rage with the readers, creating a continuously negative tension with its readers, whose social and demographic and value profile largely corresponds to the government's voters, mostly the Progressives'.

In the text "Vučić, arrogant of you," Vučićević analyzes the interview of the President of the Democratic Party given for the weekly *Vreme* where suspicions at the expense of corrupting dealings of the Director of EMS, Nikola Petrović, close friend of PM Vučić, are put forward; as well as the political situation in the country, "Doctor Bojan Brioni Pajtić from the heights of the supreme, undisputed moral and political authority proves the thesis according to which Serbia does not have, nor has it ever had, a worse and more arrogant government than this Vučić's. Pajtić, undisturbed by the yellow Kalember-Švarm, proves Vučić's "arrogance of epic proportions" even with the fact that this horrid arrogant tyrant will soon probably schedule early parliamentary elections! "Vučić is resorting to elections because he can count on a considerable portion of the electorate," said shamelessly Naked Bojan, who has been clutching at his own chair of the provincial prime minister for years, though he has six or seven percent of voters behind him."³²

It is clear from the said quotation which motives are sent out by the editor of *Informer* in the concept of his political message – Naked Bojan is reference to the photograph from a summer holiday on Brioni, where Bojan Pajtić and his family went in the summer of 2015 (he reminds the reader that the leader of the Democrats went to Croatian Riviera at the time of the celebration of the Storm and Statehood Day of Croatia, initiated odium of the reader with reference to the actor being discussed), "clutching to his chair of the provincial prime minister (open political allusion to Pajtić's status as parliamentary PM; striving to show that government is the top political aim and value for Pajtić) and "though he has barely six or seven percent of voters behind him" (proof of the thesis on the power-thirsty character of Pajtić's rule and deficit of democratic legitimacy for performing a public function).

After the moral and political stigmatization of the leader of the Democratic Party, Vučićević invites the PM of Serbia to schedule elections in order for the citizens to express their opin-

32 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Vučiću, bahato" [Vučić, be arrogant], *Informer*, 10.10.2015, p. 5

ions once again on the matter of who has their confidence and who has the right to make decisions and implement them.

At the same time, the democratic legitimacy of the new (old) government would enable it to raise the question of corruptive actions of the provincial government. Parallel to examining trespasses, the process of dismantling the state apparatus formed around the government of the Democratic Party and its coalition partners:

“I want to call Prime Minister Vučić here and now to make the wish of Pajtić and politicoids similar to him and to arrogantly schedule elections on all levels. To as soon as possible, arrogantly stop this agony of dealing with imposed orchestrated scandals every single day. To once again, arrogantly, count ourselves and then, if he wins the majority, to finally and quite arrogantly say that there will be no elections in the next four years, all up to 2020! What I want to say is that it is time for this country to arrogantly pull it together and absolutely arrogantly refuse to deal with fabricated scandals. But, precisely because of that, the state must, also arrogantly, insist on the debunking of those real scandals and establish final truths on the decade-long robbing of this people. And to, once and for all, arrogantly relinquish yellow cops, tax men, prosecutors and judges, who have been successfully covering up inNewsgations of billions-worth pilferage for almost four years now. Because it's hardly possible that Serbia robbed itself.”³³

In early December, more specifically in the second week of the last month of the year, Defense Minister Bratislav Gašić made a verbal gaffe when addressing the reporter of B92 Zlatija Labović, during his statement after the visit to the arms factory in Trstenik. Harsh criticism of the public, first of all journalists' associations and opposition parties, followed. Faced with his own comprehension of the newly-arisen situation and the reaction of the public, PM Vučić ordered a dismissal of the Defense Minister and high-ranking official of the Progressives. In his text “Gašić – best proof of racism,” Dragan Vučićević opens up the question of the media treatment of the Gašić incident, proving the thesis that certain kind of political and moral racism is ongoing in the Serbian public.

As all racism, media racism also rests on strict demarking line between those worthy, unworthy and less worthy, between the specially chosen ones and those who are always and everywhere irrelevant, and inherently marginal. The strict division generates the different term for the basically same political and social actors. Therefore, what is allowed to the Democrats and parties of similar orientation, is not allowed nor is equally applied to the Serbian Progressive Party and their political allies.

This circumstance generates strong moral condemnation, intensive dramatization of which is observed in Vučićević's writing and the manner of reasoning, creating high political and media tension and establishing continuous substance of the state of moral panic, “Second-Serbian racism is generally accepted and completely legitimate concept for the public

³³ Idem, p. 5

of Serbia! ...when Minister Gašić makes a mistake, making an inappropriate remark towards a reporter, a sexist comment and apologizes for that immediately and publically, when the PM dismisses him within 12 hours this is not enough for the yellow lords of the media. They, of course, cannot even think of praising or even acknowledging this never before seen level of principle and responsibility in high politics. No, none of that. To them, “DOSistic Goebbelses” and yellow haters, Gašić's mistake and Vučić's later decision on the replacement are only cause for the most fierce campaign with which they have been proving for a week now that the Progressives are some lower race unworthy of government. The basic message is: they are the majority, but they are pigs! Just watch the news on the CIA TV N1 or B92, skim through the patriotische zeitung *Blic* or that Rodić's sewage trash of *Kurir* and all will be clear to you. This blood-thirsty journalistic formation whose main editors sit in Western embassies would not be satisfied even if Bata Gašić was to ritually hang himself on Terazije! At the same time, these numerous critics and fake fighters for women's rights did not lift a finger when Dragan Šutanovac liked a comment on Twitter, asking a member of the Progressives Party whether she was on her knees at meetings (!?!); they did not mention that the reporter insulted by Gašić celebrated his dismissal on Facebook by posting a photo from the graveyard and quite an inadequate comment.”³⁴

As it can be deduced, there is a joint effort between those opposing the current government and the media. They are observed as group of conspirators which uses every opportunity to stigmatize the government, to dispute it in the media, politically weaken and incite as massive as possible social mobilization to support the opposition's political activity.

In this portrayal of the opposition, there are several mutually connected moments which create an extremely negative image: the opposition is morally ill-equipped to face the challenge of being government, opposition stops at nothing to obtain power, the opposition has no support of the people. This is an alienated group of people who want to obtain their privilege, position and social power again.

Writing of the print media in the period October – December showed a certain level of auto-reflection of opposition leaders. Opposition's auto-contemplation was not a central topic in their performance or in the writing about the opposition, but it received its media and political legitimacy. Despite the legitimacy of opposition's auto-contemplation, there was no significant practical effect, i.e. new nucleus of opposition action has not been formed. Despite self-knowledge, any thorough, or even cosmetic change, failed to happen. Old cadre, identical pattern of political communication, deficit of innovativeness and surplus of political ambition are the basis of opposition activity. Set of political and evaluative and organizational troubles is bordered with frustration due to practical powerlessness to change things on the political stage. In such circumstances, the need for auto-reflection of opposition parties is more than necessary.

³⁴ Dragan J. Vučićević, “Gašić-najbolji dokaz rasizma” [Gašić – best proof of racism], *Informer*, 12. 12. 2015, p. 5

In the print media, the clearest form of opposition auto-reflection was given in the form of an interview. Three interviews which we will present here express the essence of opposition auto-consideration and may be considered politically and media-wise relevant for the analysis of the state of opposition.

Analyzing the situation in the Democratic Party, its influential member and high-ranking official, Slobodan Gavrilović, says that the collapse of the Democratic Party is a result of corruptive activities of some of its influential members and lack of democracy within the party. Also, the Democratic Party is unjustifiably followed by a stigma of an “absolutely corrupt party” since, as Gavrilović states, the party itself has a lot of honorable and professionally competent people. At the same time, there is a surplus of authentic political, primarily, value-related ideological effort for a party cause, “In this country of ours, this is one of the most honorable parties, which had crooks, to be clear. I will never deny that. I know many who joined the party without even a pair of underwear, pardon my French, and today they have castles. This cannot be achieved on a salary. But, the most honorable men that I met were in the Democratic Party. We are all in a way embarrassed... We wish we formed fractions about which I spoke about. Two things destroyed our party: first, insufficient tolerance towards those who were left in minority and secondly, strong rivalry between individuals and large appetites of individuals. Fractions within a party which fight and respect each other are one thing; individuals who took from the party to satisfy their personal appetites and obtain personal gain are another. Ideological fractions are one thing, while interest-fractions are quite another. In our party, in the background of each conflict is some sort of money. I will not take part in that. I want to participate in a value, ideological conflict, not in material plundering. There is no one to fight for the Democratic Party, while one part is afraid for their own persons; others are afraid for their assets, and third for their positions.”³⁵

Former high-ranking official, Borislav Stefanović, states, similarly to Gavrilović, that lack of ideological and value foundation, reducing politics to daily political pragmatics, and finally very low level of tolerance within the party are main weaknesses of the Democratic Party, “You cannot be a good leader if you are running a party which is structurally connected by common material interests, making deals who will get which position, just to make the census, just to be MPs again and to be able to travel across Europe. This is at the heart of politics of the top of the Democratic Party. There is no idea. When I put forward an idea, I’m being ridiculed. They say that is populism; that is demagoguery. They send me a picture of Đinđić with the five-pointed star taken off the Assembly of Belgrade. What does that mean? That I am unorthodox? Then you are not a democrat.”³⁶

His own view of political troubles which befell the Democratic Party was given by its first president since the renewal of the multi-party life and political pluralism, Professor Dragoljub Mićunović, PhD. In a very direct address to the readers of the weekly *Nedeljnik*, veteran of the political stage pointed to two main reasons for the demise of the Democratic Party.

35 Slobodan Gavrilović, “Ovo je režim pred kojim se drhti” [People tremble before this regime], *Vreme*, No. 1291, p. 25-26
36 Borislav Stefanović, “Tito je bio diktator ali mi je draži od nego Vučić i Pajtić” [Tito was a dictator, but I was more fond of him than Vučić and Pajtić], *Nedeljnik*, No. 196, p. 23-24

“Tadić’s arbitrariness in leading the party and the country, generated by a narcissist character is an important reason behind the loss of political positions of the party... He created a cabinet which, de facto, led the party and the country. He had a few of his “favorites” who later turned their back on him more or less ... Boris should have stayed away of easy fixes, large publicity and taking responsibility under the principle of – me, myself and I.”³⁷

“Also, an important role was played by political combinatorics of former coalition partners after the outcome of presidential elections in the spring of 2012, “These elections are interesting. The problem is that this ruling coalition which included Dinkić and Dačić and Ljajić and Vuk Drašković got more than on the previous elections. When you add their result to that of the Democrats, this was one serious win. But Dinkić and Dačić and Ljajić and Drašković betrayed us. And when they switched sides, the Democratic Party was left alone.

It was wrong of Tadić to insist on shortening his mandate and making those presidential elections at the same time. He calculated that more parties will be engaged in that way and that we will win more easily. And he did win in the first round. In the second round, however, all were certain of the win, and then many did not vote. But if he had not scheduled those elections, Dinkić and Dačić and Ljajić and Vuk would have been running to his arms.”

Images of political actors in the print media are extremely negative, dynamically and intensively formed. They involve joint action of different media content from written word, to photography and caricature. Their effect can hardly be an incentive to the general population to get involved in politics. And not only because of the proverbial problems of weeklies and the print media with sales under conditions of continuous economic crisis, but due to the sense and meaning of the messages about the participants in political life being sent out to the public. A negative message is rarely stimulating, it makes you either politically passive or convinces you of something you already know. In as much, increase of participation of the citizens in the political process can hardly be realized by constant reproduction of negative messages and fixating negative images of political actors. Also every window for a rational public debate is always and everywhere closed, if political and wider social debate is following the principle of precast roles. Pursuant to this basic orientation, pro-Government and anti-Government media never miss a chance to mark an actor extremely negatively or extremely positively. Model of precast roles nullifies the space for openness towards the facts, their free classifying and a convincing and rational interpretation as much as possible. The model of media and politically cast roles makes conclusions in advance, evaluative judgments and always politically condemns.

The result of this model is that the public space is spiced with relativism, lack of any consent about the aim, rational parameters for the assessment and evaluation of public policies in different spheres of society.

37 Dragoljub Mićunović, “Tadić je sebe obožavao. To je uništilo njega, DS i Srbiju” [Tadić adored himself. This destroyed him, Democratic Party and Serbia], *Nedeljnik*, No. 196

15th October 2015

Russia's military intervention in Syria – pro-Russian propaganda in the vortex of Syrian hopelessness and new global turmoil

Air forces of the Russian Federation started a military intervention in Syria on 1st September 2015. Aim of the Russian air campaign was support to the official Syrian army and stabilizing the government of the current Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Opponent of Assad military is the Islamic State of Syria and Levant and opposing armed formation al-Nusra Front. Armed conflict in Syria has been ongoing for the past four years. USA, Turkey and France and the Arab allies, primarily Saudi Arabia and Jordan, have an active role in the conflict. At the start of the conflict which in all respects seemed like the continuation of Arab Spring, started in 2011, USA and Saudi Arabia and Jordan supported both anti-Assad military formations. Led by fundamentalist religious ideology and desire for independent take-over of the territory and natural resources, primarily, oil, the Islamic State cut itself loose from the alliance with USA and other Arab countries.

In the significant part of the territory of Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State formed a separate political entity under the name Islamic State of Syria and Levant. On the territory of this country, the most rigorous version of Sharia laws is being implemented, at the same time physically destroying all Islamic apostates and infidels. Thanks to mass murders and terror over Yazidis and other Arab Shiites, as well as Western citizens, ISIL very quickly became synonymous with the biggest evil in history. Western allies led by the USA started a massive air strike. At the same time, anti-Assad-oriented al-Nusra continued to attack Assad regime in Damask. Just before the Russian intervention, ISIL forces came close to the capital of Syria, Damask. Apart from Russia, allies of the Syrian military under the command of Bashar al-Assad are Iraq and Iran.

Serbian public has been following this armed conflict both from the prism of the course of events in the field, as well as their direct consequence, the refugee crisis. Russia's involvement additionally incited interest for covering events in Syria, especially in the pro-Russian oriented press. Furthermore, it may be freely and convincingly said that the topic of the conflict in Syria got real media publicity in the print media thanks to the involvement of the Russian army in these operations. Still, it should be emphasized that apart from the pro-Russian propaganda and reporting information on the course of the conflict, topic of conflicts in Syria is not particularly discussed. Texts implying possible outcomes and crisis exit scenarios are far and few between, i.e. only a few reminiscences of the causes which led to the conflict. Comprehensive expert coverage of the problem is missing, or to be specific, it is rare, and certainly not a rule. Also, evaluative estimate and assessment of the situation on the field is merely in passing and often taken from the writing of correspondents from Syria, primarily from Western media. Serbian press is distinctly more covering domestic topics and

dilemmas from the area of politics, economy, social politics, culture, education and sport. Reflecting on global topics is very rare and often reduced to reproduction of the chronology of events or statements of the participants who are directly or indirectly involved in the conflict.

Two approaches to the Russian action in Syria appeared in Serbian weeklies and editorial columns. The first approach could be referred to as ideologically neutral, and the second pro-Russian. The main characteristic of the first approach is that it is based clearly and unequivocally on the stating of facts which describe the chronology of events, with the making of clear distinctions surrounding the motives and aims of the Russian engagements without emphasized justification context related to the Russian military involvement with the absence of anti-Western rhetoric. On the other hand, the pro-Russian position directly and indisputably reproduces the propaganda matrix of Russian politics. It involves, apart for an array of reasons for the action, specifying of its goals, emphasized glorification of the Russian military power, awareness of the end of domination of the West in international relations, questioning of responsibility of the West, especially of America, for the course of events in Syria. Of course, there is a positive attitude towards Russian military involvement, political motives for the action and role of Russia in the future order of the Middle East, and the world in general.

It can be applied to both positions on the Russian military action in Syria that the conflict on the territory of Syria and Iraq is some kind of miniature version of a global war. The reflection on the number of participants itself, i.e. the different open and covert alliances, length and intensity of the conflict, as well as possible outcomes supports this assertion. Hence, the weekly *Vreme* ascertains the complexity of the conflict, depicts various motives and interests of participants in the conflict, and indirectly sends a message on possible positive or negative scenarios, "On the territory of Syria, devastated by the civil war, members of NATO, USA, Turkey and France are active, with Great Britain and Federal Republic of Germany about to join in. The Western alliance is supported by the Saudi Arabia, Jordan, but also the Kurds. On the other hand, the Russian Federation closely works with Iran and Iraq. Officially, they are all united in the war against the Islamic State (IS), while unofficially each side is minding at its own interests and more bombing their opponents and opponents of their supporters, than the IS itself: Western alliance is bombing the army of Bashar al-Assad, Russian alliance are bombing rebels against Assad, and Turks are bombing Kurds wherever they can."³⁸

Geopolitics of the conflict in Syria obviously involves a common goal: destruction of ISIS, but opposed viewpoints in terms of Syria's future. And while USA, Turkey and European countries insist on the necessary change of Bashar al-Assad regime, Russia and its Arab allies, like Iraq and Iran, strive to keep him in power.

What is more, primary aim of USA and its allies was Assad overthrowing. Russia's view of things is considerably different and it is summed up in Vladimir Putin's addressing of the na-

tion related to the air strike against ISIL, "If someone is still wondering what Russia is doing in Syria – as if that is not obvious – they got their explanation these days (truth be told, not a complete one) from the most competent place. In an interview for state TV, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the aim of the action is strengthening of the position of Bashar al-Assad, in order to restrain the terrorist threat in that country and increase the chances for mutual end of the general war in that country. In a situation, when extremist forces are outside of Damask and there is risk of their takeover of full control over Syria, Putin explained, Assad regime would certainly not even be ready to consider the possibility of political compromise with its opponents; in this way, with the Russian involvement on Assad side and establishing a relative balance of power in the field, such possibility will once again open... if we look at the political map of the world, it is not difficult to see what Russia represents: it will be clear that we do not need foreign territories nor foreign natural resources. We are self-sufficient and we do not need to go to war and be in conflict with anyone." Russia has no intention of making an empire or renewing the Soviet Union, Putin concluded."³⁹

Reporter of *NIN* Vladan Marjanović clearly indicated that the officially released Russian reasons for the action in Syria are not all the reasons which led Russia to actively take part in the conflict. Namely, apart from the mentioned, the main reason for the air strike by the Russians is reflected in the intention to preserve the military base in Tartus, in the Latakia province, the last geo-strategic point of Russia's influence in the Mediterranean, "action in Syria is to enable Moscow to preserve its only client in the Middle East and in this way preserve some sort of influence in the region, as well as ensure the survival of the only Russian military base outside the country's borders, the one in Tartus, outside Latakia – without which, Russia would be forced out of the Mediterranean and I guess, it is clear to everyone, it is ready to defend this base with all available resources."⁴⁰

Also, the commentator of *NIN* will note that Russian action is possible because Russia is powerful enough at this moment in history to protect and promote its geopolitical priorities with military devices, "To be honest, Russia started the bombing campaign in Syria for one additional reason: because it can at this moment. Just like it could annex Crimea a year and a half ago."⁴¹

As part of the ideologically neutral approach to the question of Russia's military intervention in Syria and the matter of conflict in Syria in general, a very important question of the reach of military in the process of fighting terrorism is prompted. In that context, position that it is not possible solve terrorism in conflicts such as the one in Syria by exclusive use of powerful military force is promoted. The reason lies in the high number of civilian casualties, who are the initial trigger for recruiting new generations of terrorists. This thesis is presented by the German reporter Jurgen Todenhofer, who says, "Bombing civilians will only recruit new terrorists. Again and again." Todenhofer writes that pictures of dead kids from the Syrian city

38 Milan Milošević, Momir Turudić and Andrej Ivanji, "Mala proba svetskog rata" [Small test-run of the world war], *Vreme*, No. 1300, p. 43

39 Vladan Marjanović, "Nova svetska pometnja" [New global turmoil], *NIN*, No. 3381, p. 43

40 Idem, p. 43

41 Idem, p. 43

Raka, unofficial capital of IS, where there are not more than a couple of thousand Jihadists and several dozens of thousands of distraught residents who have not managed to escape, are circulating around the Arab world. These images are sent out mostly by IS, while Raka is being bombed by America's, Jordan's, Russia's, and Syria's military planes. After the terrorist attacks in Paris, France joined in the ruthless bombing of Raka. If we were to judge based on the reports of all participants in the bombing, dozens of command centres of Islamic State are destroyed on daily basis, while someone else is always responsible for civilian casualties.⁴²

Apart from this, in the basis of these realistic considerations of the Russian action in Syria, there is the dimension of contemplating their far-reaching outcome with reference to international relations. In that context, hypothesis is made that the world will be bipolar (domination of USA and China) or multi-polar, i.e. the world where numerous key actors will be defined by different levels of co-dependency. Journalist of *NIN*, Vladan Marjanović, ended his text on the mentioned topic by paraphrasing one of the theories on the future organization of the multi-polar world. This world looks like Cineplex cinemas, "in the predictions of Amitav Acharya, Professor of International Relations at the US University in Washington. In his original vision, the uni-polar world will not be replaced by a bipolar one, nor a multi-polar one, but by a multiplex order. Multiplex world is like a multiplex cinema. (...) Compared to that world, the American liberal hegemony is like an old cinema in the neighbourhood where you can see only one film at a time," he believes.

Pro-Russian approach to the air strike of Russia in Syria shows a high level of ability of dailies, and especially certain weeklies, to literally follow propaganda matrixes of the Russian media and state. In the centre of this type of writing are several mutually connected motifs: glorification of the Russian military force, historical-political necessity of action by the Russian military in a crisis area, need for redefining relations on the world geopolitical stage and relevance of events on the world stage for our local, i.e. national perspective.

In the most direct shape, propensity for glorification of Russian weapons is reflected in obsessive listing of the characteristics of Russian aircrafts and accompanying military equipment. In terms of promotion of Russian power, precision and deadlines is especially underlined. Case in point of the marvelling at Russian air force is given in the text by Filip Rodić "What have you been doing for the past year?" Rodić writes, "First week of Russian operations in Syria is behind us, and the drastic difference between the efficiency of Russian air strike and the pale results of nearly one-year bombing led by the US and their coalition partners is distinct."⁴³

42 Milan Milošević, Momir Turudić and Andrej Ivanji, "Mala proba svetstskog rata" [Small test-run of the world war], *Vreme*, No. 1300, p. 46

43 Filip Rodić, "A šta ste vi radili godinu dana?" [What have you been doing this past year?], *Pečat*, No. 390, p. 3



2nd October 2015

Apart for the celebration of the deadliness of Russian missiles and bombs, *Pečat* shows high level of understanding, more specifically literally shows and presents in the form of some kind of recommendation of Russia's standpoint in terms of Syrian crisis and participation of Russia in it, "Leaders of Russia clearly set targets for the undertaken measures. The targets are, primarily, supporting the legitimate government of Syria, and then establishing political balance in that part of the world. The West has compromised that balance here by destroying the states which supported it. This is Iraq, Libya, Egypt and now – Syria. The solution offered by Russia, which is so unexpected from the West's viewpoint, has colossal importance in my opinion. The West is silent; its diplomats are avoiding interviews. Obama has no idea how to react now. Unlike them, Russia has a clearly defined concept, and it is implementing it."⁴⁴

Russian concept rests on the idea of making the UN the central body of international relations, especially in cases when authorization for military strikes on extremists should be given throughout the world. In this specific case, as Vladimir Putin says in his address to the General Assembly of UN, "it should be recognized that only the Syrian state and military and Kurd volunteers are legal in the fight against terrorists." Also, reporting Putin's words from this important diplomatic convention, *Pečat* underlines that on the global plan, activities of the international coalition forces against terrorism should be based on observing the UN Charter, "We suggest reviewing the possibility of synchronizing the resolution on the coordination of actions of all parties fighting against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups. Such coordination should be based on the principles of the UN Charter."⁴⁵

After the glorification of Russian weapons, explication of politically justified reasons for military action, it is important to strongly underline that Russia is for international law, unlike the bullying and militant West. At the same time, the final era of American domination is upon us. This foreign policy circumstance must be clearly announced and pointed out; it is shaped in the blend of historical actuality, political expectation and pseudo valuable gesture.

Russian militarism "lined" by international law appears as a hint of freedom on the horizon of history. In the current historical moment, this freedom will be brought to the world by Putin's Russia and communist China. USA was given a chance to join the free world which is surfacing from the combination of decisive military action of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and the Chinese economic expansion, which is gradually followed by an increasing effect on global circumstances, "Americans can now choose – either they will join Russia and China in the building of a new world, but as an equal partner, or the new world will be built without them. And it is largely possible against them. Bearing in mind the numerous good things America gave the world throughout its history and all the bad

44 Natalija Naročnickaja, "Često razmišljam o sličnosti naših sudbina" [I often think about the similarities of our destinies], interviewed by Stefan Karganović, *Pečat*, No. 393, p. 10

45 Bogdan Đurović, "Putin objavio kraj američkog liderstva" [Putin announced the end of American leadership], *Pečat*, No. 389, p. 14

it can undoubtedly inflict in the future – it would be best for Washington to give up on "excellence" and accept the hand still extended by Moscow and Beijing. Before it is too late for everything."⁴⁶

Propaganda lines of *Pečat*'s pro-Russian discourse are expressed in the interpretation of incidents on the Turkish-Syrian border, when Russian Suhoj-24 was shot down. Official Ankara interpreted this act as an act of self-defence, in the sense of protecting Turkey's air space. On the other hand, Moscow evaluated Turkey's act as a brutal provocation, behind which is the desire to humiliate Russia and to draw it into a wider conflict with NATO. After the armed incident, strong rhetoric on both sides followed, with threats of military action and unavoidable passing of high level of mutual economic sanctions. In the spirit of pro-Russian propaganda matrix, *Pečat* explained the Turkish operation as an example of pro-NATO belligerence, more specifically, dangerous violence which provokes the Russian side, whose planes and other aircrafts are taking part in a campaign of fighting terrorism. At the same time, it was underlined that the Turkish President Erdogan is more protecting ISIS terrorists than fighting against them. "Authorities in Ankara and circles close to the Turkish government are working closely with the Islamic State and they have similar interests."⁴⁷ This is oil trade which is on behalf of and for the account of the Turkish President being conducted by his son Bilal personally, as well as the fact that the "Erdogan family is involved in humanitarian aid for the terrorists of the Islamic State."⁴⁸

At the same time, as Filip Rodić concluded, the Turkish attack on a Russian plane affected the decrease of possibility for forming a joint coalition of NATO and Russia with the aim of breaking ISIL, "All in all, Turkey made the NATO alliance even closer to open conflict with Russia, in the very least it compromised any chance of making a NATO-Russia alliance in the fight against Islamic State in Syria, which was maybe Erdogan's plan from the start, bearing in mind that just a few days prior to the attack, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on joint fight against terrorism, naming Islamic State, Al-Qaeda and their affiliated terrorist organization."⁴⁹

Russian successes in Syria are interpreted as an invitation for and political, i.e. geopolitical, expectation of the current government to give up on Euro-integrations and start developing closer partnership relations with Russia. Case "Syria" shows that Russia is not only a military-political partner. But also that it can, as it is the case with Bashar al-Assad, come to the rescue, "Manoeuvring space for an easy turn (referring to the turn from EU towards Russia, author's comm.) – there is no need for hastiness - is more available today than ever before. And that space is so much bigger because the Russians in Syria can and will come to the rescue of their ally."⁵⁰

46 Idem, p. 16

47 Filip Rodić, "Očajnički tražeći rat" [Desperately asking for war], *Pečat*, No. 397, p. 4

48 Idem, p. 4

49 Idem, p. 6

50 Nikola Vrzić, "Zašto je Vučić progovorio ruski?" [Why Vučić started speaking Russian?], *Pečat*, No. 393, p. 6

On the path of transformation from Euro-integrations towards the union with Russia, a question should be raised whether Vučić is capable of making such a turn at all. Vrzić suggests that there are certain, in his opinion, positive signs on that transformation path, “In terms of the matter of (not) introducing sanctions for Russia, resistance to the British Resolution on Srebrenica, even the customs war with Croatia, he (this refers to Aleksandar Vučić – author’s comm.) has that stamina.”⁵¹

Terrorist attacks in Paris – between European and Russian discourse on the gruesome massacre

In the murdering streak of the three groups of fanatic terrorists of the Islamic State in the night between 13th and 14th November 2015, 139 Parisians lost their lives, several hundreds were hurt, and 99 of them were in critical condition after the attack. The terrorists’ bloodbath shocked the world and Serbia. News from the capital of France spread instantly across the world. The event was quickly named Europe’s 9/11. In Serbia, the media acted in line with the world trend. Paris massacre became the main topic of daily and weekly papers, radio and TV shows. Serbia as a political community condemned the senseless act of terrorism and showed compassion for the victims of the terrorist attack. Some of the injured were Serbian citizens.

In the week of the attack, Serbian weeklies made the hideous crime in Paris their lead topic, for numerous valid reasons. In terms of approach, more specifically manner of processing and media and political messages, two types of interpreting events of 13th November 2015 in Paris could be distinguished.

One type of approach can be considered the European reading of the horrid tragedy. European discourse on the event involved a photograph and setting the event in a wider value context of dominant European values. Contextualization of the event is dual. On one hand, the attack is interpreted as the attack on core European values and aimed at disseminating fear in the everyday life of the Europeans. Second context, refers to mid-term and long-term sustainability of core political and moral values of Europe, such as human rights, ideals of tolerance, rule of law, multiculturalism in light of uncertainty offered by terrorism as a dangerous challenge for modernism and future. In the methodological sense, this approach is based on strict factography which refers to events and processes which led to this and evaluative assessment of the sense and meaning which the event has at the time of its occurrence.

Second approach could, conditionally, be called the pro-Russian reading of the sense and meaning of the event. This is a discourse basically established on the takeover of the Russian view of the tragedy. Methodology in this approach follows the logic of facts and outlines the evaluative assessments and evaluations. Conclusions and messages of this population are

51 Nikola Vrzić, “Srbija pred izborom” [Serbia facing elections], *Pečat*, No. 391, p. 11

largely critical towards the Western, especially American, politics, both in terms of cause of the attack in Paris, and in terms of the role of USA in international relations, including relations in Europe and the position towards the Syrian crisis.

European reading of the Parisian massacre follows the chronology of events and often taken statements of eye witnesses or writing from foreign press, reporting on the horrors from the streets of Paris during and after the terrorist attack. The brutal terrorist act itself is treated as an event which represents literally the “end of civilization.”

The weekly *Nedeljnik* draws attention to this kind of characterization. Terrorists had the entire civilization at gunpoint this time. They spread chaos and killed across a city famous for its culture, for its overlapping of influences, for freedom of thought and expression. The attack on the probably biggest city in Europe – in the sense that it is the most European one – is an attack on European values, on the lives of us and our children, on the way of life of our citizens. On prosperity, rule of law, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom to go to a sports match, to have drink after work or to go to a restaurant with your wife and child and plan how you will spend your weekend. Civilization, this means living together, using the same space, being able to walk wherever you want, work and play, build your life without disrupting someone else’s.”⁵²

Understandably the horrible terrorist act imposed an awkward atmosphere in the capital of France. This is an atmosphere which is a combination of “fear, panic, anger, despair and spite”. Great loss of human life and significantly increased state of fear from core existential uncertainties open an array of questions dealing with circumstances which resulted in the tragic act.

Intensifying allies’ bombing of ISIS, strong desire for revenge and despise of radical Islamists towards Western culture and civilization, incomplete and often insufficient integration of European Muslims in the Western, in this case French, society, mistakes of intelligence agencies in monitoring dangerous persons, are mentioned as main reasons for the brutal massacre of 13th November in Paris. Complexity of reasons shows that political and military issues are not the only ones important for the understanding and solving of the problem of terrorism. An important aspect is integration, i.e. socialization of Muslims, most often socially, economically and culturally marginalized part of Western societies, “Jihad has proven to be seductive for some alienated young Muslims in areas of high unemployment and urban neglecting. For many years, some of the impoverished residential areas in the suburbs of Paris, very different than the 10th and 11th arrondissements, and similar areas of other cities, have been fertile soil for recruiting Islamic extremists in France.”⁵³

52 Marko Prelević, “Kraj civilizacije” [The end of civilization], *Nedeljnik*, No. 201, p. 12

53 Milan Milošević, Uroš Mitrović, Prvoslav Karanović, “Bes, strah i odmazda” [Rage, fear and retribution], *Vreme*, No. 1298

Similarly, the question of mid-term and long-term effects of the terrorist act on West-European societies and the idea of free movement of people, capital and goods within the common European area has been raised. Terrorism raises the level of distance between the European and Muslim stand, incites strengthening of right-winged, principally Islam-phobic parties, and challenges freedom of movement, more specifically the Schengen agreement, "Another question is prompted as unavoidable – is Europe paying the price of democracy and freedom of movement and protection of human rights? Answer offered by experts and some politicians is that it is paying"⁵⁴

It is said that suspending freedom of movement, more specifically limiting it by suspending the Schengen agreement or by developing and encouraging the spirit of ethnic and religious distances among the citizens, evanescence of the spirit of pluralism of life styles and social practices would be a triumph of the Jihadists "giving up on the Western way of life would mean the victory of Jihadists and it would mean the defeat of democracy."⁵⁵

Unlike the European reading of the terrorist act in Paris, in the focus of the pro-Russian discourse are also other important aspects of the entire case. In the Russian interpretation the culprit is clearly marked, it is pointed to current, maybe even structural, problems with European security; hidden agenda of certain political-security decisions is discussed. Local supplement to the substantially Russian viewpoint of the Paris attacks involves an attempt to establish symmetry between the taking away of Kosovo by the Albanians and their American protectors and the massacre which ISIS committed in Paris in 2015. Additionally, as an unavoidable supplement, some kind of conclusion/recommendation of the shift away from Euro-Atlantic integrations and approaching Russia appears.

Principal viewpoint of the Russian media and the expert public is that the USA is *primae facie* responsible for the events in Paris, "Russian media are categorical: behind the terrorist attack in Paris, the European 9/11, are American secret services which are instructing Islamic terrorists."⁵⁶ France paid a bloody price of American adventurism in the Middle East and North Africa. With this, the traditional geopolitical motif in interpreting terrorist acts in Western metropolises, another factor pointing to the involvement of America in the tragic events in Paris appears.

Namely, protecting its national and economic interests, France represents a damn to the signing of two agreements important for US domination – Trans-Atlantic and Trans-Pacific. In addition to that, the French and German governments refused to cover the cost of hiring American army, whose stay on European soil was to guarantee safety of the former continent. "For a better understanding, one needs to remember the recent statement of the French Minister Matthias Fekl, "France will give up the talks on the Trans-Atlantic partnership if its demands are not taken into account." This is a statement against one of the two

54 Julijana Mojsilović, "Izazov celom svetu [Challenge for the entire world], *Novi magazine*, No. 238, p. 14

55 Idem, p. 14

56 Zoran Milošević, "Pariz – pogled iz Rusije" [Paris – view from Russia], *Pečat*, No. 396, p. 14



19th November 2015

main projects of economic and global domination of USA – the Trans-Atlantic and Trans-Pacific, which were a taboo topic in the West until the Russian President Vladimir Putin raised this as a question at the UN Assembly. Demand of Washington for EU to pay America for its own safety also adds to this, because up to now this was reimbursed by the American budget. In other words, Washington is trying to racketeer the European Union in the economic and geopolitical sense. France and Germany let Washington know they are not interested in paying the racket, so a terrorist attack in France was predictable, just as it is predictable that the next terrorist attack will be carried out in Germany (which is also against the Trans-Atlantic partnership and racket for geopolitical safety). In other words, using terrorist attacks, USA is explaining to the Europeans that safety is only possible if they pay for the services of their Government, NATO, Pentagon, NSA and CIA by opening their markets for American corporations.”⁵⁷

The Russian media, as *Pečat* conveyed to the Serbian reader, notice that there are oversights in the security agencies in France and the West in general, which opened up the possibility for organizing and implementing a terrorist attack. Three oversights are considered crucial. Weekly *Pečat* listed them, quoting the Russian portal *vz.ru*, “Anton Krilov for portal *vz.ru* says the tragedy in Paris was enabled by three things: weak security system, which in addition to everything became corrupt. Secondly, a “terrorist internationale” has been formed, while (third) there is no anti-terrorist internationale. The worst is that the European Union placed its safety in the hands of NATO with the assumption that Russia will attack it. However, Russia, as you can see, did not attack anyone, but terrorists did. In these circumstances, NATO is powerless and cannot protect any member state, not even France. Since the European Union turned its safety to the hands of Americans, as well as independent foreign policy, the responsibility for the terrorist attack is on America.”⁵⁸

The narrative about American responsibility for the terrorist attack in Paris for the weekly *Pečat* was intensified with the interview with Professor Emeritus from the University of Ottawa, Michel Chossudovsky, who is at the same time the founder of the Centre for Globalization Studies.

Speaking of the situation in Syria and the role of USA and its allies, Chossudovsky emphasized that the Islamic State is a creation of the American intelligence services and that its purpose is to take down the Syrian government with Bashar al-Assad at its steering wheel. At the same time, connecting the Islamic State with the Western intelligence and security circles sets before them the burden of responsibility for the Paris events, “architects of the Islamic State are western intelligence services. As it is well known and documented, Al Qaeda and its affiliated entities, including the Islamic State, are secretly supported by CIA, MI6 and various associated intelligence agencies. And when the French President said that the attacks were done by members of the IS, he admitted that Western intelligence agencies are behind the attack, because they secretly support IS. There is a contradiction in that narrative,

57 Idem, p. 14

58 Idem, p. 16

in the discourse of President Hollande. France is at war – he said, alluding to the war which the Western allies are leading against IS, led by the air strikes initiated by Obama in August/September last year. War of USA against the Islamic State is a complete lie used to destroy Syria: its infrastructure, cities and institutions. There are numerous pieces of evidence which show that the Islamic State is under the protection of Western allies, and if you look at who these allies are, we come to Saudi Arabia and Qatar, responsible for recruiting, financing and training, and Turkey, responsible for enabling IS's terrorists and mercenaries into Syria from its west border. We have very concrete information that NATO and the Turkish high command arranged in early 2011 to initiate a program of recruiting and training terrorists. Many put forward evidence that Saudi Arabia and Qatar are recruiting and financing terrorists of the IS, but they somehow always “forget” to mention that Saudi Arabia and Qatar are France's allies.”⁵⁹

The already quoted Michel Chossudovsky emphasized that events in Syria are closely connected to everything that has happened on the territory of former Yugoslavia. The architect is the same, USA, and the pattern of action is relevantly similar, “I want to say to the readers in Serbia that wars in the Middle East are a continuation of wars in Yugoslavia. Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, bombing and mutilation of Serbia are part of the military and economic agenda which was implemented by USA and their West-European partners. The same agenda has been extended to the Middle East. Serbia can work with the EU? Is it in its interest to join EU? No. In the interest of Serbia is to restore its sovereignty and its borders.”⁶⁰

Establishing a mutual connection between American actions related to Kosovo and American responsibility for the massacre in Paris is made prominent in the text of the Editor in Chief of *Pečat* Milorad Vučelić “If you play with fire, you're bound to get burnt.” Put bluntly, the West got hurt for political and security trading with the Islamic State, which in time became an autonomous actor following a bloody fundamentalist logic of terror and rooting out Western civilization.

The mentioned similarity between Kosovo and ISIS does not only reflect in the common founder, but in their fluid and basically legally and politically unsound, i.e. disturbing nature, “This type of territorially undefined and fluid creations, which are enlarging by sheer force at the expense of the already existing states, typical of ISIL, had and are having their final rehearsal precisely in Kosovo. Today, Islamic State, tomorrow Great Albania. Who does not see that today, I am afraid he will not see a lot of things. And who really sees it must show that by not choosing the wrong side again.”⁶¹

Writing in weeklies with reference to the massacre in Paris showed that there are directly and diametrically opposed interpretations of events and processes in the public and that it

59 Michel Chossudovsky, “Sintetički teror i rat migracijama” [Synthetic terror and war with migrations], interviewed by Biljana Čorović, *Pečat*, No. 396, p. 8

60 Idem, p. 10

61 Milorad Vučelić, “Ko sa đavolom tikve USAi...” [If you play with fire...], *Pečat*, No. 396, p. 5

is impossible to establish a rationally based consensus on the sense and meaning of these. Harsh debate and rhetorical suggestion, together with seemingly rational constructions, with a pre-defined model of classifying, and then connecting facts, cancels openness for understanding reality on rational grounds. Where interest to legitimize a certain version of interpreting events dominates over their sense which may be revealed by appreciating the logic of facts and logic rules and deductions, political debate directly or indirectly is exhausted in propaganda, in convincing techniques which promote pre-assumed and pre-legitimized aims and values.

“Coup d’état” – an exhausting war among media in the pits of raw real politics

The “coup d’état” scandal showed a strong and deep contraposition between media in Serbia. The scandal is a synonym not for a factual coup d’état, which fortunately did not happen, but for the conflict of media companies and the accompanying conflict of political actors.

Harsh exchange of accusations and counter-accusations on the relation *Pink* and *Informer* against *Kurir* showed all the bias and professional and political conflict and dividedness not only of editors and owners of these media, but wider political and so called capillary public. It is interesting to notice that in this social conflict, main actors were the media, and the politicians were, in the end, on the backburner. The gloves were off in this media war, high doses of pugnaciousness were expressed.

It all started with the intention of the owner of Adria Media Group, member of which is *Kurir*, to acquire *Politika* and *Večernje novosti*, two of the most influential media outlets among print media. Acquisition of these two papers would enable monopoly of Adria Media Group in the area of daily print journalism. Establishing a monopoly in this sphere of journalism would clear the way for the prohibited political influence and the creating of channels of “informal power” which would autonomously affect the political and party life.

In the case of Adria Media Group, things would be even more far-reaching because apart from the highly read *Kurir*, this media corporation would get a share in the media, and inherently in political power. Demonstration of the media power of *Kurir* started with the publishing of an array of controversial material on associates of the PM of Serbia, especially Mayor Siniša Mali and Director of EMS Nikola Petrović. Culmination of “blows below the belt” was the front page of *Kurir* on 29th November 2015. The front page featured the Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić and his brother Andrej, heads of the tabloid *Informer*, of course Editor in Chief Dragan J. Vučićević and the Director of the paper Damir Dragić. The reason for the front page was the accusation of Aleksandar Kornic, former director of *Kurir*, that he was encouraged and forced by the above mentioned to give a false statement about the al-

leged underhand dealings related to the business operations of the first man of Adria Media Group, Aleksandar Rodić. A response of the accused followed. Prime Minister Vučić gave a statement to the police regarding the charges and underwent a polygraph, and in the name of *Informer*, Dragan J. Vučićević addressed the public via television *Pink*, accusing *Kurir* of being part of a broader conspiracy being prepared against the legally elected government, proving that the former director of *Kurir* is not a credible interviewee, targeting with harsh accusations the PM of Serbia, his brother and lead people in a competitive newspaper. Prime Minister’s polygraph questioning refuted the accusations of Aleksandar Kornic, and the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office became interested in the case of the former director of *Kurir*.

The whole saga about the coup was announced ten days before Vučić’s visit to China. The main actor was Dragan J. Vučićević. In addition to that, in a few TV shows on TV *Pink*, the tendency towards monopolization of the daily press by the Adria Media Group was discussed, and a narrative on the joint action of parts of political government, police, underground and West embassies, especially American and British, with the aim of ruining the Serbian PM’s reputation, was developed.

Print media, especially editor of *Informer*, and columnists in weeklies elaborated on the case in detail. As a participant in the “coup” scandal, Dragan J. Vučićević harshly responded to the writing of the daily *Kurir*. His style of writing was sprawling with heavy words and curses, portraying the rage of the righteous who demand justice before the state bodies. Central motifs of his writing can be summed up in a few moments: demand for establishing the truth in the case of the allegations of Aleksandar Kornic, undermining of the moral and professional credibility of Aleksandar Rodić and his paper, determining the truth in terms of influences of foreign intelligence structures on the writing of *Kurir*, demand for starting a procedure against abuses committed by the owner of *Kurir*, Aleksandar Rodić.

Vučićević’s discourse was again here, as in the previous cases, personified, directed at the personality of Aleksandar Rodić. Arguments were *ad hominem*, starting from discrediting his personality, his moral and psychological sensibility with the aim of proving his inadequacy for the social role and influence. Specified messages from Vučićević’s discourse could be confirmed by the quotes from his texts. Demand for determining the truth in the case of criminal charges of Aleksandar Kornic is presented by the editor of *Informer* Dragan Vučićević as an act of fighting the media terrorism of the boss of *Kurir*, “Kurir’s boss, Aleksandar Rodić, abundantly supported by the yellow-scum political and media elites, is feverishly trying to present himself as the victim of the regime. In a desperate attempt to save his empire built on thefts, frauds and tax evasions, Aca Sewage started doing media terrorism! Because what else is media terrorism if it is not when Shortened Rajica prints criminal charges of a mental patient A. Kornic accusing the PM Aleksandar Vucic, his brother, director of *Informer* Damir Dragić and me, of organized crime last week?! See, the man in question, A. Kornic claims that we kidnapped him, took him to some basement, where he met no other than Vučić himself and arranged to falsely accuse the flawless

Rodić for EUR 120 and Nike tracksuit?! Rodić's media terrorism proves, of course, that he is very afraid of the truth and that he is trying to escape it in every way."⁶²

Vučičević presents the readers with concrete findings about the influence of foreign services over *Kurir's* writing, "You, dear readers, probably think that Rodić came up with the idea to attack Milo Đukanović in Montenegro, on his own?! That would be nice, but he didn't. This is the idea of certain Connor from the US Embassy who regularly gives orders to Aca Rodić in one Belgrade sushi bar. Miserable and pitiful man, no moral at all. Screw journalism directed by Davenport, Kirby, Connor, Chepurin or anyone else."⁶³

Portraying Rodić as an exponent of foreign intelligence services, Vučićević underlines the circumstance that the owner of *Kurir* is ready to blackmail rich people and political actors with media scandals, "Maybe, Raja's kid should have known that it is possible to cheat some people for a while, but it is impossible to cheat all people all the time. Or, to translate to the language of Ripanj for you: You messed up big time if you thought that you will be able to blackmail and racketeer across Serbia forever! A time has come to settle the score. A time has come for the law to apply to everyone. For us and for you. For me and for you. I look forward to it. You? ...At one point, Aleksandar, you believed that you were really the Great. You convinced yourself, you scoundrel from Ripanj, that there can be no smarter, more literate and worthy Serb than you to be the owner of *Politika* and *Novosti*, and as such you are entitled to take hundreds of Euros in cash. You remember when you went with Dule Bjelopetrović and an empty bag to Šabac to rob EUR 700,000 (I hear, you have been in panic asking around whether Bogićević recorded the handover?!) this was for you, little Raja, something quite ordinary and everyday for you. For you racketeering is, actually, the basic, most important and most profitable activity. You remember, little Raja the short, how you sold the trademarks of your failed, long shut down newspapers to blackmailed businessmen and politicians?! You managed to knock off one for more than EUR 500,000?! You did not forget already how you once asked a high-positioned official for 50,000 EUR a month in order to write nice things about him."⁶⁴

In his politically provocative manner, Dragan J. Vučićević invites and calls out the state to take matters into its own hands in response to the Rodić case. The main subject of interest of state bodies should be the financial underhand dealings of the owner of the daily paper *Kurir*, more specifically tax evasion, "Definitive proof that Serbia is not a state goes by the last name Rodić, first name Aleksandar...if there was a state here, it would have to urgently apply the law in this matter. In the case of Rodić, we are not talking about petty financial or tax violations, but about crime in which the state of Serbia was at a loss for hundreds of millions of dinars in taxes! In the request for extension of investigation which

62 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Evo zašto je Rodić media outletski terorista" [Here's why Rodić is a media terrorist], *Informer*, 5. 12. 2015, p. 5

63 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Nisi ti, Rodiću, kreten! Kreteni su oni koji te plaše!" [You're not the idiot, Rodić! Idiots are the people who fear you!], *Informer*, 2. 11. 2015, p. 5

64 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Nije ovo država!" [This is not a state], *Informer*, 7. 11. 2015, p. 5

the Higher Prosecutor's Office sent to the Higher Court in Belgrade, on 22nd January 2009, Deputy Public Prosecutor Mirjana Jakovljević described in detail on 18 single-space pages Rodić's system of economic robbery which damaged the budget of the Republic of Serbia from 2000 to 2008 by RSD 201,710,754.00, while state and private companies and banks were robbed for additional RSD 314,991,256.77! In total, it says in this document, Raja and Aleksandar Rodić avoided paying liabilities towards the state, banks and creditors in the amount of RSD 1,101,510,640.98. Yes, you read it correctly! RSD 1.1 billion!!! And then after that, another big nothing happened officially! InNewsgative judge ordered after a year to join the procedures. Alekdandar Rodic was interrogated on 19th February 2010, and then it all ended up in a drawer!"⁶⁵

Similar to *Informer*, weekly *Pečat* placed actions of Aleksandar Rodić in a wider geopolitical context, i.e. connected the content of the texts over the last months in 2015 with political needs and demands of the US Embassy. According to *Pečat's* working hypothesis and the understanding devised from it, behind the writing of *Kurir*, including the mentioned extremely compromising front page for the Prime Minister Vučić, accusing him of extortion, lies the intent of USA was to damage the reputation, and inherently weaken the political power, of the Prime Minister of Serbia, which stands for an untouchable political authority in the country, in order to cancel any chance of autonomous leading of foreign affairs of Serbia. Precisely, the autonomous position of Serbia in international relations enabled several unacceptable moves according to USA and their allies. Absence of sanctions for Russia, rejection of the British Resolution on the Genocide in Srebrenica, as well as challenging Kosovo's membership in UNESCO are the most obvious examples of rejecting the dictation from the West. If the ability of Serbia, i.e. the Government of Serbia, is to be annulled, it is necessary to find a sufficiently attractive newspaper in terms of readers for such a feat. *Kurir* as a newspaper with good daily circulation and visited web page is necessary for such a feat. Precisely because of that, *Kurir* is a suitable tool for the destabilization of the existing government.

Nikola Vrzić wrote about all the mentioned aspects of the case "coup d'état" in the text "Who is destabilizing Serbia", *Pečat*, 4th December 2015. Firstly about the connection between the American administration and the paper *Kurir*, "Whose support could that be? The answer to this USA tale with a tiresome plot is of key importance, and actually unexpectedly simple. *Kurir*, on 12th November, four days after Aleksandar Rodić attacked Aleksandar Vučić with his apology to Serbia for the lack of freedom of the media, writes "Asked to comment on the unprecedented pressure which *Kurir* and Adria Media Group have been enduring, and then the call to lynch the President of the Company, Aleksandar Rodić and his family after publishing the scandals in which people from the government took part (Ambassador of USA, Michael) Kirby emphasized that freedom of the media must exist, "I have been an advocate of freedom of media ever since I was a child...I think freedom of the media is important in any society in order for representatives of the government, such as myself, to remain honest, and if we are not honest, to report about that... USA is advocating for fair reporting and for investigative reporting, though this is

65 Idem, p. 5

not pleasant for all..." At the same time principal support to the freedom of *Kurir's* thoughts came directly from Washington, from Daniel Server, former official of the State Department, who is still studying our hilly region from the University of John Hopkins, the hothouse of all Washington cadres. ⁶⁶

The explanation why *Kurir* was selected is more than clear and it is self-imposed once you take into consideration the decent effect *Kurir* has on the public in Serbia, "For the simple reason that there is not much choice in Serbia today. That Serbian opposition which has been traditionally leaning towards them, i.e. the obedient one, is in a state of chronic chaos, with ample prospects to stay like that for a long time. Various inNewsgative internet portals which have been researching the real and alleged corruption in Vučić's government, anyway financed by a list from the European Union and United States, have a very limited effect and evidently insufficient to cause any serious attention of the public. Therefore, including *Kurir* in this feat is actually a big step forward." ⁶⁷

Use of *Kurir*, as it was already stated, was necessary due to Vučić's undoubted propensity to confront the West, on various issues which affect regional and international politics, like rejecting the British Resolution on Srebrenica, denial of the Assembly of Serbia to accept membership of Kosovo in UNESCO or even unwillingness of the Serbian government to join the EU in sanctions towards Russia which are in effect against Russian involvement in Ukraine, relying on Russia in terms of arms supply or announcements of business deals with China regarding the building of infrastructure in Serbia, "America certainly has reasons to be unhappy with Vučić. It did not have such reasons when the First Brussels Agreement was signed with Vučić's blessing – Vučić, interestingly, was not attacked by the media close to the West then – but, since then, he has not fulfilled their demand to introduce sanctions for Russia, with the help of Russia, he rejected the British Resolution on Srebrenica in the Security Council with the help of Russia, China and other friends of ours from the free world, he prevented Kosovo's entering Unesco, with which he not only defeated the Americans and their servants, but he at the same time compromised their intention to have Serbia agree to Kosovo's joining the UN and other international organizations in the next Brussels agreement, and then after all that, in Russia, he agreed on the arming of the Serbian military with Russian weapons, and it is well known how much effort the Americans made to reform our military in accordance with their interest (Wiki leaks, memo of US diplomacy 06BELGRADE842), and now he was in China, agreeing on major infrastructural projects, though Americans want all the infrastructure projects to be under their control, as Willy Wimmer said." ⁶⁸

Using *Kurir* and the internet portal, this Serbian version of the American *Newsweek*, had the aim of bringing down Vučić's rating, politically destabilizing him and driving him to cohabitation with other political factors which would entirely align Serbian politics with the demands of official Washington and Brussels. First step to that end is Vučić's destabilization via daily

66 Nikola Vrzić, "Ko destabilizuje Srbiju?" [Who is destabilizing Serbia], *Pečat*, No. 398, p. 9

67 Idem, p. 9

68 Idem, p. 9-10

press with an admirable circulation, "What are all these attempts of destabilizing Aleksandar Vučić for? Simple: as such, destabilized and weaker than today, he will be much more open to Western pressures...this is pure geopolitical interest of the US. According to Willy Wimmer, "The whole situation in Yugoslavia happened because the Americans wanted to push the Russians out of the Balkans." ⁶⁹

Unlike the moralist-geopolitical reading of the "Coups" case, there is another, radical, critical understanding of this media and political episode on the very dynamic and tense political TV scene of Serbia. This type of interpretation of the mentioned event can be found on the pages of all critically oriented weeklies like *Vreme*, *NIN*, *Novi Magazin* and *Nedeljnik* which dealt with this topic a lot less critically bias compared to the previously specified weeklies.

In the critical showdown with the Government of the Prime Minister Vučić, the Prime Minister himself, *Pink* and *Informer*, weekly *Vreme* went the furthest. Interpretative and rhetoric horizon of the debate between TV *Pink* and the daily *Informer* and the daily *Kurir* is defined in the text written nearly one month before the mentioned media and political war got its culmination. Text "Minute, two, three – the tabloids started an open war, behind which are basic instincts, big money and primitive politics," of Dragoljub Žarković, Editor in Chief of *Vreme* testifies of the manner of understanding the mentioned media dispute. It is an explosion of moral and psychologically uncontrolled and unacceptable positions, fight for financial and other effect, and in the end, ambition to directly participate in politics, and it involves the lack of moral scruples.

Combination of raw politics, vocabulary with high tension, which is often below the culturally suitable for decent society and the fight for the preservation and enlargement of one's wealth, should be depicted entirely. In journalistic terms, which connect bitterness, political anathema and moral stigmatization, the following needs to be proven: journalism in the mentioned media is at the lowest level, professional and general moral for these media outlets do not exist; they are the dirtiest instrument of politics, which is unacceptable in everything. Blend of politics and media, which breaks through such media, has destructive effects on state institutions, norms of common decency, and in the end, inaugurating as ruling politics that of a violent and primitive autocrat.

Joint actions between media and politics promoted by these media should be rooted out in all ways. The best example of such "critical gesture" are the texts of Jovana Gligorijević "Stroke – Anatomy of destabilization of common sense" and Đorđe Vukadinović "Balance sheet of Vučić's thermidor." Both published in the paper *Vreme*, in the issue of 4th December 2015. Observing the media and political plot in the "Coups" scandal, using a language and manner of thinking appropriate for a propaganda moralist, Jovana Gligorijević puts the whole plot surrounding the tabloid war and television *Pink* and their real and contingent consequences in the context of negating elementary rationality. The whole issue is something from beyond common sense, writer of the anti-government weekly *Vreme* noticed. The

69 Idem, p. 10

mentioned writer writes, in response to the interview of the Prime Minister given on RTS on 1st December 2015, where he negated any allegations about the existence of a coup, pointing to the destabilization of Serbia based on various writing of the daily *Kurir*, that the whole case is from the other side of rationality, "The most important man in Serbia, as he described himself, cooled the situation which reached its boiling point the previous day and breached the border of every rationality."⁷⁰ The set up of the media and political dispute between two newspapers shows that *Vreme* interprets the entire dispute not in the coordinates of the media and politics, but in the coordinates of psychiatry. If the whole "Coup" scandal is, as reporter Jovana Gligorijević wrote, opposite of common sense or even elementary common sense, it means that this scandal can be identified with what is opposite of common sense, i.e. insanity. From this and such inNewsgative motivation, one can easily explain the ironic and spiteful headline "Stroke."

Specifically, Jovana Gligorijević and the editorial of *Vreme* sent to the readers a message that the entire debate among the media, its plot, and then the TV show dedicated to this event is a case in point of genuine insanity. This insanity is grotesque and funny, but should, in any case, be intensely underlined and politically and moralistically defamed. The "lunatics" should therefore be called out and put to the public pillory and this is what the Deputy Editor in Chief of *Vreme* really did, by spreading animosity towards supporters of different political options, showing that politics run by a pen turn disagreements with political opponents into hatred.

Special example of daily politics run by the pen can be read in the statements of the ministers who in their participation in the program on TV *Pink* practically destroyed all state institutions. Though reporters are often justifiably obsessed with their profession, statements and comments in response to one political and media skulduggery such as the criminalization of the state top on the pages of tabloids neither literally, nor metaphorically can be interpreted as evidence of destroying institutions. Labelling of the "destroyers of institutions" starts by the statement made at the press conference of the Minister of Interior Nebojša Stefanović, "Press conference of the police minister – What did the government say to the citizens when it lined up fully armed police officers before cameras? To those who support it: don't worry, we are armed to our teeth. To those criticizing it: expect open fire from all available resources. Police institution – destroyed."⁷¹

After Nebojša Stefanović, it was Minister Zlatibor Lončar's turn; he destroyed the health care in record time, "In just three minutes of his guest appearance on *Pink* Lončar managed to break doctors' oath, Law on Health Protection, Law on Protection of Patient's Rights and Law on Protection of Personal Information. Institution of confidentiality of personal information on the doctor-patient relation – destroyed. "Still, the matter did not end with the ministers of police and health care, the justice system stepped on the court, too. It was "destroyed" by the fact that there is no accord between the notion of destabilization of a country and ap-

⁷⁰ Jovana Gligorijević, "Moždani udar" [Stroke], *Vreme*, No. 1300, p. 6

⁷¹ Idem, p. 8



3rd December 2015

appropriate legal regulations which regulate the issues of threatening the constitutional order of the country, “all of them very precisely describe what they are referring to and at no time can one even infer that is what *Kurir* published on the front page, or the criminal charge filed by Kornic. However, Higher Prosecutor’s Office and Prosecutor Zagorka Dolovac is not bothered by this when they need to make an announcement and talk gibberish about initiating criminal proceedings for the destabilization of the country. Institution of the justice system – destroyed.”⁷²

Minister of Defence Bratislav Gašić also had a chance to join the group of destroyers of institutions since he organized special head quarters for protection of the prime minister. Of course, it is understood that the “coup” scandal was not left without conclusions and commentaries at the expense of the status of the critics in the political and media field, “Mother of all issues of course is why, why and of what use is for the ruling structures the presenting of Serbia as a country which is under constant threat of political assassinations, plots, sabotages and coups d-etat. There are two possible answers. One is that this government just does not know how to its job. The second is that the government is keeping the citizens in a perpetual state of tension and fear. These two answers are not mutually exclusive, and both lead to the permanent collapse of democracy, legal state, rule of law and entire system which is keeping a country and society away from the precipice. We are witnesses and actors of a perpetual hostage crisis, where the hostages are citizens of Serbia, and kidnappers –their legitimately elected representatives.”⁷³

Also, the critical intelligence is marked as martyrish in a regime which rules via manipulation, fear and violence. The whole saga about the state coup shows that the forever well-meaning critics of the government are not given sufficient recognition, and that the government viewed the critics as a constitutional part of the public as a form of destabilization of the country, “ permanent intention to destroy the Government of Serbia is no secret operation, nor plot, and of course there is no coup. This is one pretty benign, and for each government welcome occurrence, called – criticism.”⁷⁴

Understanding of criticism is to say the least strange. It includes two moments in instances of concrete texts. In the first step, the government and its supporters are viewed as someone functioning on the other side of common sense. In the other analytical step, it moves onto the conclusion which directly suggests the relationship of the current government towards the citizens, similar that of kidnappers towards the hostages. The message of the author is clear, “Lunatics from the government and pro-government media are keeping us all hostage!” Government’s “criticism” which sounds supremely “well-meaning.” Well-meaning comprehension of the political and wider social critique was developed in the “Balance of Vučić’s thermidor” by Đorđe Vukadinović. Vukadinović analysed in his text the dispute between *Kurir* and *Informer* and TV *Pink*,

72 Idem, p. 9

73 Idem, p. 11

74 Idem, p. 11

Describing an array of events which refer to the tabloids war and finally to the “coup” scandal, Editor of *NSPM*, Đorđe Vukadinović says, “A year and a half of the Government in office, as appropriate, was marked ceremonially and operatively. By a parade and a rally entitled “bringing down Vučić,” in which quintessence of the Progressives’ government was demonstrated – absolute instrumentalization of the media and state institutions, abuse of our profession and authorities, waving with papers and diagnoses, mockery of the state, serious services and people. It was all sprawling with events for ten days during the hysterical campaign of disclosing the “campaign for taking down Vučić,” “breaking news,” tickers, “special shows” and even more special experts were lining up with the aim of debunking the conspiracy against the Prime Minister himself. Even the Duke Vojislav Šešelj was called to help (after all, he has known best around these “behind the scenes” things since the nineties, when no one could play the part of the “constructive opposition” better than him), who in a seasoned and confident manner explained that the strings of the plot are in the triangle America – Zorana Mihajlović – Tomislav Nikolić. Wow. OK, Zorana. This is common knowledge already. OK, America (and England), that was also kind of understood. (Though it is not completely clear how it is relative with all the successful visits to the US and emphasizing of the friendship with Michael Kirby). But Toma ... We were naive in thinking that Toma was a Putino-ophile and true Rusophile?! And in that name torn, fired upon by the media and ridiculed with or without cause. However, just the opposite.”⁷⁵

After only at first glance suggestive irony via which the author wanted to convey the paradox and political and media confusion in light of events of November 2015, Vukadinović turned to undermining the precision and legality of the use of the polygraph, “I already spoke about this, the person who came up with the Progressives (there is reasonable doubt that it was a virus which escaped from the laboratory of the late Miki Rakić) deserves the Nobel Prize for political spinning, cynicism and burlesque. But the person who came up with this progressive shenanigan with the polygraph deserves very high recognition in the same genre. Just imagine. They hook you up to some electricity and immediately see what a lie is, what the truth is and who is to blame, and who is right and proper. So to say, wood knowing right from wrong, god’s finger who separates the just from the sinners in the Progressive brave new world.”⁷⁶

Of course, Vukadinović went on. His analytical discussion of the topic included three more moments:

- 1) pointing to the “reason” behind the TV show “Coups”,
- 2) showing the essence of Vučić’s government which stands behind the entire media and political project and
- 3) “well-meaning” inviting, analytically “unbiased” inviting to civil disobedience via one type of spiritual and political uprising against Aleksandar Vučić.

75 Đorđe Vukadinović, “Bilans Vučićevog termidora” [Balance sheet of Vučić’s thermidor], *Vreme*, No. 1300, p. 15

76 Idem, p. 15

Precise as a detective and skilful as a writer, Vukadinović tells the readers the real reason for broadcasting the show “Coup d’état.” “Anyway, who will now, in light of so much fuss and general conspiracy be bothered by the banal questions? Were there meetings in that cafe in Zemun? (We do not know. But it is almost certain that there were). Was Prime Minister Vučić present? It is hard to say, but it is possible that he was not. (Vrca (Kornic) did not seem completely convincing and credible). Was the PM’s brother present? Probably. Was Kornic (Vrca) offered and promised many things if he pointed the finger to Aleksandar Rodić? Taking all into account, yes, he was. Is that scandalous and illegal? Absolutely. Are the persons involved from the proximity and surroundings of the Prime Minister? Yes. And that is the gist of the story, which is being flung under the carpet with intimidation or talking gibberish about a state coup. To be honest, if there was a coup, then it happened three years ago, when Aleksandar Vučić unconstitutionally, with the help of a few dossiers and a few tabloids, took absolute power in the state. What we are watching now is just the final phase of that process, i.e. the moment of crisis when it is being decided, whether some resistance will be articulated or we are going in the direction of total “kimilsungiazation.” This is, in my opinion, the real background of this story on the state coup. Namely, one ought to cover up the immediate mess made by the overzealous seekers of witnesses against Aleksandar Rodić and preventively, all media and political points of potential resistance should be cut off. Because, imagine the horror. OK, Facebook, *Vreme*, *NSPM*, and other small-time players. It’s not pleasant, but it does not cause too much harm. But one high-circulation daily paper, at one time, for some reason, decides to stretch its leash and start critically writing about the PM. Not entirely, and not all the way and nowhere near as much as it crucified and smeared the PM’s opponents from the government and opposition. Well, this is quite unacceptable.”⁷⁷

After revealing the point of broadcasting *TV Pink*’s program, Vukadinović took us to the heart of the problem – the nature of the rule of Aleksandar Vučić. This is rule without clear orientations in the political and value sense, rule supported by manipulation, lies and violence. “If we wanted to rant on, it could be said that Serbia elected Vučić precisely because it did not have the strength to pick anything. Neither Europe, nor Russia, neither liberalism, nor socialism, neither clear resistance nor real capitulation. Vučić perfectly personifies and symbolizes this great, gaping nothing. In other words, political and mental sclerosis which, despite constant simulation of decisiveness and activism, actually cannot pick or decide on anything (essentially). “

The government described by Vukadinović needs to be erased from the “face of the Earth” as an act of resistance to injustice and ignorance, “This thing did not come into office on the elections – but on the so called elections of last March, it was only legalized and legitimized. “Ha, there goes another one! Another one. So, you are calling for an uprising, bro.” Of course, I am calling. But an uprising of competence against stupidity, uprising of hope against hopelessness, uprising of civil courage against cowardliness. Rebellion of the normality we got against insanity. Fairly and analytically speaking, chances for success of that “uprising” and that rebellion are not all that high – but, at the same time, it’s not like they don’t exist. In any

⁷⁷ Idem, p. 16

case, the mentioned aims belong to things which are worth fighting for, even worth a few sacrifices. Or it seems so to me. You?”⁷⁸

In the same “well-meaning” and “enlightened” manner of criticism, reporters of the weekly *NIN*, Vesna Mališić and Vera Didanović depicted the entire matter. Vesna Mališić thinks, “Society in which a tabloid with a pedigree of scandal-maker becomes the main threat for the stability of the state, and the other tabloid is more informed than the state and it dictates the list of politicians who are in cahoots with foreign embassies implementing a coup d’état.”⁷⁹

Giving her contribution to the moral and political devastation of the Prime Minister and *TV Pink*, Vera Didanović claims, “The coup announced for days therefore did not happen, but all this destruction of institutions, senseless lying, spreading fear and panic and repeated calling on a lynch is a serious blow for the state. And if there are no sanctions for all that, and it seems that there won’t be, this means this behaviour is allowed. And it’s only a matter of time when it will be repeated, and with what intensity it will slap us, as numb as we are, across our common sense and remaining dignity. And maybe even our lives, why not – if we are found on the list against those who are calling on a lynch from the program of a television with national frequency.”⁸⁰

Short reflection on the interpretation of the “coup” scandal showed that the weeklies set each event in the already prepared interpretative coordinates. Hence, the verbal showdown of *Kurir*, (which is under America’s influence both due to the ownership structure of Adria Media Group, and alleged contact with American embassy) with *Informer* and *Pečat*, becomes something logical. At the same time, the pro-Russian orientation of *Pečat* and *Informer* was made prominent around this media and political controversy of the state coup, as well. Radically critical positions and anti-Government position is shown by *Vreme*, and to some extent by other weeklies of similar political orientation. Through each internal affair’s theme or foreign-policy challenge whether on regional or global plan, editorial policy is reflected, their value context, but also their position towards specific political actors. Serbia is a country of political pluralism in the media. At the same time, Serbia is a country of mutually opposing interpretative matrixes in reading the decisions and actions of actors, sense and meaning of specific events and processes in the complex whirl of political and historical and wider social and economic circumstances. Genre defined by the public is controversy. Controversy is prominently intense. There is no dominance of authority of arguments, but rhetoric and political suggestion is repeatedly sustained, aiming to get the reader as a political supporter, or at least voter. Political press is largely one with party life.

⁷⁸ Idem, p. 7

⁷⁹ Vesna Mališić, “Plinsko svetlo” [Gas light], *NIN*, No. 3388, p. 3

⁸⁰ Vera Didanović, “Udarena država – Ko stvara haos u Srbiji – specijalni rat protiv zdrave pameti” [State hit on the head – Who is creating chaos in Serbia – special wars against common sense], *NIN*, No. 3388, p. 12

5



About
Authors

ABOUT AUTHORS

Public Policy Institute is a regional think-tank organization that operates in the Western Balkans region through the work of its branch offices in Belgrade, Podgorica and Ljubljana. By promoting public dialogue and constructive solutions, Public Policy Institute contributes to the efforts of the Western Balkan countries to become equal, reliable and progressive partners in the process of European integrations and mutual relationships. After the initial research and analysis of social and media context in the countries of the Western Balkans, the Institute has developed and implemented a series of media related projects, including: Role of the media in the process of securitisation in the Western Balkans, Civil Response to Clientelism in the media - MEDIA CIRCLE, NATO Reach Out - media monitoring and Role of the media in monitoring of R1325 in Montenegro.

EBART Media Archive is privately owned company established in 2000. Its main activity is archiving print media data in e-format. The print media archive consists of up-to-date material dating back to 2003, and more than 3 million print media reports from sources with national coverage. EBART is also specialized for media analysis, basic quantitative and qualitative analyses, comparing media treatment of specific keywords, as well as complex content analyses according to BBC methodology. EBART Media Archive is unmatched in the region with its unique media reports database, and 12 years of media research experience. This media database allows for the overall study of long-term media presence.

Velimir Ćurgus Kazimir was born in Novi USA in 1948. Since 2002, he is the director of the Ebart Media Archive, the unique media documentation center in Serbia. He was a journalist and editor of the cultural section of *Politika* newspapers from 1988 to 1996. He is one of the founders of the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia. He authored several books of prose and essays on culture and cultural policy. His works have been translated into English, French, German, Spanish, Polish and Japanese. He has won the International Prize for essay of the journal *Lettre Internationale* in Weimar in 2000. He's member of the Serbian PEN Center since 1987. He has edited several books on the relationship between politics and the media. He is author of several projects in the field of research, media and culture. He conducted studies of the media scene in Serbia and the influence of media on the political and social reality in particular.

Isidora Jarić, PhD. Born in Belgrade, Serbia in 1970. Graduated and earned PhD at The Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Sociology, University of Belgrade. Assistant Professor at Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Sociology, University of Belgrade. Associate of The Institute of Sociology and Social Research, engaged in researching and examining global characteristics and transformations within Serbian society. Editor of two proceedings: *Bologna reform of higher education in Serbia: Problems, doubts, fears and expectations of the teaching staff at the University of Belgrade* (Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory Filip Višnjić and IP, Belgrade, 2010) and *Politics of Parenthood* (Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade, 2015).

Danica Laban. Born in Belgrade, Serbia in 1976. She is media analyst, journalist and communicationist. Worked on numerous projects, which had represented visibility, training and research as its media components. She was collaborated with national and international organizations and institutions such as the Council of Europe (CAR project 2011 - 2012), UN Women (projects in the field of social – economic empowerment of women, 2012), the Office for Human and Minority Rights, NGO Praxis/ERT, HINT, NELI. She also worked on the evaluation of media for Strategic Marketing/IPSOS, for the purpose of the BBC Trust. In 2006 she founded Jigsaw Communication Agency, under which she operates today. During her career she was also a journalist and editor in RTS, BK TV and TV Politika.

Dejan Vuk Stanković, PhD. Born in Belgrade, Serbia in 1973. Graduated and earned PhD at The Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Belgrade. Currently, he teaches philosophy, ethics and philosophy of education at The Teachers Training Faculty, University of Belgrade. From 2000 to 2003 he was scholar at the The Institute for Philosophy and Social studies. From 2004 to 2006, he worked for Marten Board International, a Serbian private company specialized for the market research and public polls. He was agency main pollster and political analyst. From 2006 until today, Dejan Vuk Stanković is an independent political analyst, comments political and social life in Serbia and region of Western Balkans for various TV and radio stations, as well as for print media.

Data entry and processing

Snežana Bajčeta, PhD candidate, Faculty of Political Science

Predrag Bajić, PhD candidate, Faculty of Political Science


Milica Oros, fourth year of undergraduate studies, Faculty of Political Science

Katarina Vukajlović, fourth year of undergraduate studies, Faculty of Political Science

Borjana Aćimovac, third year of undergraduate studies, Faculty of Political Science

Rada Bjelić, third year of undergraduate studies, Faculty of Political Science





MEDIJAMETAR