

Analysis of the print media in Serbia
July - September

Quarterly MEDIAMETER

03|2015

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
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KRYVAVI BIZNIS

Newsweek

Roditelji Dade Vujašnović: Mi znamo istinu

TEOLOGIJA

Иррен Едзсер
Номачка жван мир са Русијом

NOVI MAGAZIN

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економске термине
који се срећу у медијима

Радос
Миле
ЖИ
КАО
У ЗАМ

КО НАМ НУДИ ПАТИКУ: RADOMIR LAZOVIĆ, "NE DA(VI)MO BEOGRAD"

VREME

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
EKSKLUZIV



Dvojica bivših pre

TADIN
JOSIPO

O SRBIMA I HRVATIMA, PALJEN
KOLINDI I NIKOLIĆU, TITU I M
ŠEŠELJU I VUČIĆU, ČE



Introduction

VELIMIR ČURĀUS KAZIMIR

INTRODUCTION

Acceleration

The third issue of the *Quarterly Mediameter* encompasses the period between July and September 2015. During that period, albeit it being a summer period, some important events took place, leading to a significant increase in the number of selected texts in comparison to the previous two quarters. (The first quarter saw 1,360, the second 1,673 and the third one 2,172 texts selected.) This means that the number of texts has increased by almost sixty percent in comparison with the first quarter (1,360).

This increase in the number of selected texts was not brought about only by the lack of holidays, when newspapers are not published, but also by numerous events related to domestic and international affairs. Three events significantly influenced the character and content of front pages of daily newspapers: commemorating twentieth anniversary of the crimes in Srebrenica, commemorating the military Operation Storm and the intensive “migrant crisis”, which has become the central political, social and media topic, not only in Serbia and the region, but all of Europe. For the first time after the wars in the nineties and the assassination of Zoran Đinđić, Serbia became part of a dramatic and important media story. All media in Serbia, regardless of the great differences among them, followed these three central events, i.e. topics, with the one related to migrants being an issue which will last longer. It is particularly striking how the topic of migrants increased the number of selected texts in case of the *Politika* daily.

Another noteworthy increase is pertinent to the number of texts from the fields that are basically completely apolitical, such as show business and sport, but which have all of a sudden been given a political connotation. This says a lot about how much daily politics influences our everyday lives and media are no exception.

Just like in the previous two quarters, we used the same methodological approach when analyzing empirical material. One text was used as a unit of analysis. The analysis itself is a combination of two investigative methods: (a) analysis of content, guided by “certain theoretical-hypothetical frame”... which is used to create objective and systematic experiential information related to the content of social communication, which facilitates drawing relevant conclusions about the social context in which the communication takes place”,¹ and (b) discourse analysis, which has enabled us to understand various, epistemically and methodologically incommensurable,² authorial interpretation strategies and editorial policies that reflect various, primarily ideological and political discursive realities, by analyzing their specific discursive interpretations.

1 S. Gredelj, *S onu stranu ogleđala*, Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije, Beograd, 1986, 19.

2 G. Couvalis, *The Philosophy of Science*, Sage Publications, London, 1997.

In terms of interpretation, in order to facilitate easier text organization, the analysis was, just like in the previous reports, divided into two segments, which relate to (a) an analysis of quantitative indicators collected in the process of content analysis, and (b) discursive analysis of the material from the texts selected to be the sample of this research.

Observed through the prism of genres, our media scene seems unchanged. The most prominent are *reports*, whose share is over sixty percent, followed by *articles*, with a share of around ten percent. *News* is on the third place, with almost nine percent of texts, while *commentary* is steady at eight percent. It is interesting to note that reports have pushed out the news, which speaks volumes about the focus of the newspapers on the events that have “a lot to offer” in terms of reporting. On the other hand, commentary as a genre is becoming increasingly present. Apparently, the events that marked the quarter behind us were suitable for commenting.

Reporting in Serbian newspapers is often evaluative in terms of orientation (either positive or negative), with the percentage ranging between 29 and 80 percent. A similar situation is noticed with respect to balance (texts balanced in terms of protagonists and information), which is present in only 25 percent of reports, thus clearly indicating certain orientation, even bias, in journalism in Serbia.

Political affairs in Serbia undoubtedly attract the greatest attention, since they cover almost fifteen percent of all texts. Writings about the political life in Serbia reflect a topic often discussed in a negative context.

However, even though the three abovementioned events have greatly influenced the structure of topics and genres, that does not mean that they have contributed to the tone, or had significance and influence in the newspapers in an equal measure. The most frequent topics were those related to migrants, which covered the whole quarter and continued beyond it, while the events such as the commemoration of the events in Srebrenica or the “Storm” military campaign were concentrated around the dates of these events. The events in Srebrenica were covered for a bit longer due to the attack on the Serbian Prime Minister and the subsequent meeting in Belgrade with the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Writing about Srebrenica, “the Storm”, but migrants, as well, led to a higher number of texts about the region in comparison to the previous two quarters (the texts were mostly conveying a negative tone). The texts about migrants were mainly neutral or positive, unlike those about the region and the European Union and cooperation with it. Generally speaking, a small number of texts about the EU policy were strongly critical, which is mainly a consequence of the texts about migrants and building walls and fences on their journey to Europe.

We have for the first time conducted a detailed analysis of the protagonists appearing on the cover pages of our daily newspapers. They come from all walks of life. That fact enables us to analyze the editorial policy and inclinations of certain media also from the point of view of the protagonists, who are criticized or glorified, compared, ridiculed, or who are simply there as a gateway for the chronicler. Naturally, there are also analysts who agree or argue, provide conclusions, predictions or prophesies. Thus, what is happening is being put into the framework of what it should be. And what the newspaper editorial advocate.

It seems that our journey through the newspapers is receiving new acceleration. Current crises, such as the one with migrants, seem only to contribute to the widening of the gap between the political beliefs of the protagonists. We are living in exciting times when all this excitement does not allow us to contemplate everything more. The wars between media companies are not only market-driven. However, that is a topic to consider in the next issue of *Mediameter*.



Sample

ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN


SAMPLE

As stated in previous editions, the basic idea of the *Mediameter* project is to strive to reconstruct the media reality of daily print media in Serbia, pertinent to the texts positioned (completely or partially) on the front page, which deal, in different ways, with current political events and situation in Serbia and the world. The sample from the daily newspapers was taken using two selection criteria – biggest readership and the reputation of the print media. The information regarding the circulation of the daily newspapers was taken from a survey conducted by IPSOS¹. The front page is the part of the daily newspaper that readers associate with the identity/recognisability of the media the most. It is often responsible for the first impression, our potential inclination or aversion towards a particular print edition. The front page establishes contact not only with the readers, but also with the people who may never take that particular daily newspaper in their hands. Through newspaper and TV adverts and windows at newsagent's, the front page reaches an auditorium wider than the one comprising solely the readers of any individual daily paper, thus forming, so to say, a public picture of the newspaper, symbolising its editorial policy, evaluative orientation and focus on particular target group. It is because of the abovementioned reasons that the front pages of daily newspapers from our sample are the focus of this analysis of the *Mediameter* project.

In this way, the texts from front pages best reflect the coordinates of editorial policies of printed daily newspapers. Even though we are talking about a small percentage of texts, it is through the messages placed on the front pages that we can most easily determine the editorial identity of a daily newspaper. The ratio between the total number of texts in each daily edition individually and the number of texts on the front page that make up our research sample is presented in Graphs 1-7, over the period from 1st July until 30th September 2015.


¹ Research into average readership of daily newspapers conducted over the period 01. 06. 2015 – 28. 06. 2015, population: total 12+

Graph 1 – *Večernje novosti*²



Source:
Mediameter research,
July-September 2015

Graph 2 – *Informer*³




Source:
Mediameter research,
July-September 2015


² For more information, see Table 135 in Appendix.

³ For more information, see Table 136 in Appendix.


Graph 3 – Alo!⁴




Graph 5 – Politika⁶



Graph 4 – Blic⁵



Graph 6 – Danas⁷




⁴ For more information, see Table 137 in Appendix.

⁵ For more information, see Table 138 in Appendix.

⁶ For more information, see Table 139 in Appendix.

⁷ For more information, see Table 140 in Appendix.

Graph 7 – Kurir⁸



The total number of analysed texts in all seven media that we used as the sample for our research is 2,172, with 63.78% of those texts coming from the front pages, which is an average of 63.78% of all texts on front pages, i.e. 3.31% of the total number of texts.

⁸ For more information, see Table 141 in Appendix.

Table 1. – Večernje novosti

Newspaper: <i>Večernje novosti</i>	Total number of texts on front page	Total number of selected texts from front page	Total number of not selected texts
Chronicle	86	30	56
Society	100	84	16
Politics	110	109	1
Economy	47	42	5
Current affairs	64	46	18
Reportage	21	7	14
Culture	15	4	11
Interview	12	10	2
World news	13	13	0
Lifestyle	24	0	24
Sport	20	4	16
Belgrade news	5	3	2
Supplement: doctor in the house	8	0	8
Major events	11	1	10
BGD 011	0	0	0
Belgrade stories	10	0	10
Sport plus	0	0	0
20 years since "The Storm"	9	8	1
TV Novosti	0	0	0
Destinies	6	1	5
Region	0	0	0
Feuilleton	2	0	2
Campaign	0	0	0
Testimony	0	0	0
Other side	6	2	4
Event	5	2	3
In memoriam	0	0	0
TOTAL	574	366	208

Source: Mediameter research, July-September 2015

Table 2. – Informer

Newspaper: Informer	Total number of texts on front page	Total number of selected texts from front page	Total number of not selected texts
Top news	174	173	1
News	136	108	28
Showtime	84	8	76
Entertainment	2	0	2
Sport	56	12	44
TOTAL	452	301	151

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 3. – Alo!

Newspaper: Alo!	Total number of texts on front page	Total number of selected texts from front page	Total number of not selected texts
My Serbia	30	0	30
Current affairs	99	96	3
News	169	109	62
VIP	109	5	104
Sport	69	11	58
Tips	2	0	2
TOTAL	478	221	259

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 4. – Blic

Newspaper: Blic	Total number of texts on front page	Total number of selected texts from front page	Total number of not selected texts
Current affairs	5	5	0
Archive	2	1	1
Belgrade	1	0	1
Files	8	7	1
Society	41	28	13
Economy	15	15	0
Phenomenon	6	0	6
Chronicle	62	23	39
Culture	6	1	5
Politics	39	38	1
Sport	51	4	47
Destinies	8	0	8
World news	10	7	3
Topic of the day	87	78	9
Topic of the week	5	2	3
In focus	0	0	0
Time-machine	0	0	0
Entertainment	56	5	51
TOTAL	402	214	188

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 5. – Politika

Newspaper: Politika	Total number of texts on front page	Total number of selected texts from front page	Total number of not selected texts
World news	103	92	11
Society	116	75	41
Economy	66	62	4
Politics	56	55	1
News of the day	81	75	6
Culture	33	17	16
Chronicle	50	38	12
Daily supplement	18	2	15
Belgrade	9	4	6
Serbia	22	13	9
Library	13	0	13
Sport	31	6	25
Topic of the week	13	9	4
People	10	9	1
Region	12	12	0
Front page	11	8	2
Spectrum	5	1	5
Views	9	9	0
TV supplement	6	0	6
Feuilleton	0	0	0
Consumer	4	2	2
Belgrade chronicles	1	0	1
TOTAL	669	489	180

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 6. – Danas

Newspaper: Danas	Total number of texts on front page	Total number of selected texts from front page	Total number of not selected texts
Belgrade	1	0	1
Dialogue	3	3	0
Business supplement	15	14	1
“Danas” special supplement	6	2	4
“Danas” supplement	4	0	4
“Danas” weekend edition	38	22	16
News of the Day	0	0	0
Society	66	64	2
Economy	53	52	1
Globe	56	50	6
Culture	33	13	20
Interview	0	0	0
Front page	4	4	0
Health	0	0	0
Politics	140	138	2
Periscope	0	0	0
Legal “Danas”	14	14	0
Scene	9	0	9
Sport	36	4	32
Topic	6	6	0
Scales	6	3	3
TOTAL	490	389	101

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 7. – Kurir

Newspaper: Kurir	Total number of texts on front page	Total number of selected texts from front page	Total number of not selected texts
Society	24	17	7
Economy	7	7	0
Chronicle	46	7	39
Culture	0	0	0
Planet	4	3	1
Politics	49	49	0
Sport	33	7	26
Stars	76	10	66
Topic of the day	101	92	9
TOTAL	340	192	148

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015


An insight into the results in Tables 1-7 confirms that the structure of the analysed daily newspapers follows one of two different logics. Namely, *Večernje novosti*, *Politika*, *Danas*, *Blic* and even *Kurir*, to some extent, follow the classical structure of a daily newspaper, while *Informer* and *Alo!* deviate significantly from this matrix. In those two papers, *News* are the dominant section, encompassing various fields, while special attention is paid to entertaining content, such as news about celebrities, show business and sport, which are becoming increasingly socio-political in nature. The editorial strategies described in previous two editions of *Mediameter* are completely visible in the third quarter, as well, as illustrated in Graphs 8-14. The only significant deviation can be noticed in Graph 12, which shows the structure of the sample of selected texts from *Politika*. There we can notice a huge increase in the number of selected texts from the *World news* section, from 40 and 42 in the first and second quarter, respectively (out of 95 available from the same section, announced or started on the front page) to 92 out of 103 texts selected for the sample. This is primarily due to the efforts of the *Politika* editorial in the third quarter to try to explain and reconstruct the global causes which had led to the “migrant crisis”, which came ashore to Europe and our country and which intensified in that period.

In this analysis we are “studying how the ideas and images are expressed, i.e. presented... The studying of presentation does not aim to question the “truthiness” of the remarks made... It looks beyond a comment on whether the collection of statements correctly and appropriately describes what it should. Actually, ever since researchers became focused on the process of presenting, it has become obvious that dealing with truthiness leads in a wrong direction. Studying presentation is, literally, studying how production, i.e. construction is presented... in a narrative form.”⁹

9 L. Rolend, *Masovne komunikacije*, [Mass communications]Clio, Beograd, 1998, 258-259


Comparison with previous quarter

Graph 8. – Večernje novosti




Source: *Mediameter* research January-March 2015, *Mediameter* April-June 2015 and *Mediameter* July-September 2015

Graph 9. – Informer




Source: *Mediameter* research January-March 2015, *Mediameter* April-June 2015 and *Mediameter* July-September 2015

Graph 10. – *Alo!*




Source: *Mediameter* research January-March 2015, *Mediameter* April-June 2015 and *Mediameter* July-September 2015

Graph 12. – *Politika*




Source: *Mediameter* research January-March 2015, *Mediameter* April-June 2015 and *Mediameter* July-September 2015

Graph 11. – *Blic*




Source: *Mediameter* research January-March 2015, *Mediameter* April-June 2015 and *Mediameter* July-September 2015

Graph 13. – *Danas*



Source: *Mediameter* research January-March 2015, *Mediameter* April-June 2015 and *Mediameter* July-September 2015

Graph 14. – Kurir



Source: Mediameter research January-March 2015, Mediameter April-June 2015 and Mediameter July-September 2015

If we compare all three quarters, we can notice a remarkable increase in the number of selected texts in the third quarter. The number of selected texts in the first quarter was 1,360, in the second 1,673, while the third quarter saw 2,172 texts selected. The number of selected texts from front pages in the third quarter of 2015 has increased by almost 40% in comparison to the first quarter, i.e. 23% in comparison to the second quarter. Apart from the obviously higher number of days in the third quarter (92, in comparison to 91 in the second and 90 in the first quarter), it should be noted that the newspapers were not published on four days in the first quarter (a triple-issue was published for 31st December 2014, 1st and 2nd January 2015, double-issues were published for 6th and 7th January and 15th and 16th February), on three days in the second quarter (a double-issue for 11th and 12th April and a triple-issue for 30th April, 1st and 2nd May), while the third quarter did not feature any state and religious holidays.

Another reason for the increase in the number of texts is undoubtedly the emergence of relevant events for domestic and international politics in the third quarter of 2015. Those events, such as the “migrant crisis”, were getting all the media attention, pushing out other topics. For example, Table 8 is a clear example, where the *Politika* daily boasts almost a double increase in the percentage of texts used as the sample (from 2.7% in the first to 5.2% in the third quarter).

Table 8. – Comparison of the percentage of texts selected for the sample in this research in relation to the total number of texts in all analysed media.

Newspaper	% of selected texts		
	3rd quarter	2nd quarter	1st quarter
Večernje novosti	2.8	2.7	1.7
Informer	3.9	3.4	2.5
Alo!	2.7	2.4	2.0
Blic	1.9	1.6	1.6
Politika	5.2	3.4	2.7
Danas	5.5	4.4	4.1
Kurir	2.0	1.7	1.6

Source: Mediameter research, July-September 2015

It is also worth mentioning a third trend, which relates to politicisation of traditionally “non-political” topics, such as sport and show business, which has also led to a significant increase in the percentage of selected texts from front pages in comparison to those which were not selected. More precisely, the topics that were previously “free” from any socio-political context in the third quarter received this new background, which is particularly prominent in politicisation of sport or in serving numerous affairs, where so-called “starlets” are linked to representatives of various power structures or political parties. This trend can be also be noticed in the constantly decreasing number of texts from front pages that were not selected for the sample in all media over all three quarters. Only in case of the *Kurir* daily there is a deviation from this trend, since it recorded a slight increase in the number of text not selected (see Table 9).

Table 9. – Comparison of the number of text which were not selected for the sample in all media during the first three quarters of 2015.

Newspaper	Texts not selected for the sample		
	3rd quarter	2nd quarter	1st quarter
Večernje novosti	208	267	323
Informer	151	185	179
Alo!	259	269	267
Blic	188	221	228
Politika	180	233	271
Danas	101	148	183
Kurir	148	140	157
Total	1,235	1,463	1,608

Source: Mediameter research, July-September 2015

3



Research Results

ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN

RESEARCH RESULTS

Shares of journalism genres

With 1,382 or 63.63% out of the 2,172 processed texts, the report takes up the biggest share in the genre structure of the seven dailies from the sample, as in the first two quarters of 2015. The next share is the article with 10.59%, while the news take up 8.7%, commentary 8.01% and interviews 7.78% of the texts. Other newspaper forms used by the journalists from the analyzed print media had insignificant shares (Table 10).

When we compare the stated results with the first two quarters, presence of news is considerably lower. In the previous periods, news were the second top form according to frequency (11.89% in the second, i.e. 12.72% in the first) and a high increase of the absolute number of commentaries (90 in the first, 118 in the second, and as many as 174 in the third trimester) which is primarily the result of writing in *Politika* and to a considerably lower extent in *Danas* (please Table 11).

Table 10 – Individual shares of genres in the reporting of seven media from the sample

Genre	total number	% share
report	1.382	63.63
article	230	10.59
news	189	8.70
commentary	174	8.01
interview	169	7.78
reportage	26	1.20
other forms	2	0.09
Total	2.172	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 11 – Distribution of journalism genres per media, in the seven media from the sample

Genre	<i>Blic</i>	<i>Kurir</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	<i>Alo!</i>	<i>Informer</i>	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Danas</i>	Total
report	158	140	264	160	210	216	234	1.382
article	9	36	63	3	5	87	27	230
news	30	1	0	34	79	13	32	189
commentary	2	0	0	2	1	129	40	174
interview	10	15	34	18	3	36	53	169
reportage	5	0	5	4	3	8	1	26
other forms	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Total	214	192	366	221	301	489	389	2.172

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Report

In the third quarter of 2015 a slight increase of the percentage of reports compared to other genres (61.18% in the first, 60.96% in the second, 63.63% in the third trimester). In all analyzed dailies, personal opinions of the journalists are still present in most reports, though this is not a characteristic of this newspaper form. Evaluative reporting, i.e. positive or negative value context¹ is present in as much as 80.48% of the reports in *Informer*, 61.88% in the paper *Alo!*, 55.06% in *Blic*, 45.72% in *Kurir*, 31.48% in *Politika*, 25.76% in *Večernje novosti* and 25.21% reports in *Danas*. Traditionally-structured media, such as *Danas*, *Politika* and *Večernje novosti*, still publish considerably fewer reports with clear evaluations; however the number of such texts in the last analyzed period was considerably higher, particularly in the newspapers *Danas* and *Politika*.

In *Kurir* there were a somewhat lower number of reports with evaluative connotations in comparison to the previous period; in *Blic* the percentage is identical, while the increase of texts which contain clear attitude of the journalist is noticeable in the dailies *Alo!* and *Informer*.

¹ In the analysis put forward herein, manners of presenting certain topics in individual texts from our sample were coded in three different ways, taking into consideration both the text and the accompanying textual content (headline, heading and subheading). Texts in which the authors/journalists did not take up an evaluative position towards a certain actor, but strived to present certain facts which are the subject of the text in a relatively neutral, reserved manner, respecting professional standards, were marked as *neutral*. Those interpretations in which the journalists clearly expressed sympathy and positive attitude towards the topics were marked as *positive*. We marked as *negative* those interpretations in which the journalists presented certain topics with clear antipathy and negative attitude towards certain topics.

The trend present in the first six months when it comes to balance² is still obvious, i.e. reports in all analyzed media, apart for *Danas* (where 33.76% reports is not balanced), are dominantly unilateral (for example, contain a statement by one actor, i.e. the whole text is designed around the reporting on the position of one interviewee or attitudes of several interviewees expressing the same standpoint), i.e. the balance is present in only 29,31% of all published reports in seven analyzed media.

In most dailies, the increase of the number of unbalanced reports compared to the past quarter was noticeable, particularly in the papers *Kurir* (81.58% of unbalanced reports in the second compared to 81.74% in the third), *Politika* (77.91% against 83.33%), *Alo!* (69% against 80.63%), *Blic* (60% - 68.99%), as well as *Danas* (29.53% - 33.76%). Contrary to this, in the dailies *Večernje novosti*, a fall in the share of unbalanced reports was recorded – from 80% in the second to 63.26% in the third period. The daily paper *Informer* recorded a slight decrease in the number of unbalanced reports in the third quarter, but this daily is still dominated by unilateral texts which belong to this journalism genre (92.86% in the second, against 90.95% in the third quarter).

Table 12 – Structure of the reports with reference to the value context in the seven media from the sample

Report	Value context with reference to the topic		
	positive %	neutral %	negative %
Media outlet			
Informer	10.48	19.52	70.00
Alo!	13.13	38.13	48.75
Blic	7.59	44.94	47.47
Kurir	4.29	54.29	41.43
Politika	2.78	68.52	28.70
Večernje novosti	7.20	74.24	18.56
Danas	1.71	74.79	23.50
Total %	6.51	55.57	37.92

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

² Balance represents the manner in which the journalist approaches a topic. A balanced text involves a balanced and objective approach to the topic and interviewees and comprehensiveness of information.

Table 13 – Balance of reports in the seven media from the sample

Report	Balance %	
	yes	no
Media outlet		
Informer	9.05	90.95
Kurir	12.86	87.14
Politika	16.67	83.33
Alo!	19.38	80.63
Blic	31.01	68.99
Večernje novosti	36.74	63.26
Danas	66.24	33.76
Total	29.31	70.69

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Other journalistic forms

As it has already been outlined, the second journalistic form as per its share in the previous quarter is the **article**. The most texts of this genre appeared in *Politika* 17.79%, or 87 texts, which is still about 5% less articles in this daily compared to the second quarter. The article's share in *Večernje novosti* is 17.21% of the selected texts from the front pages of this paper, i.e. 63 texts (an increase of 5% compared to the previous period). In other analyzed media, the biggest change may be seen in *Kurir*, where the article is now present with an 18.75% share, or 36 texts (compared to a total of 5.5% from the previous quarter). Smaller changes in the third trimester are visible in *Danas* and *Blic*, where this genre is now present with 6.94%, i.e. 4.2% respectively, while 1.66% (almost 4% less than in the previous period) of texts from *Informer* were articles, and only 1.35% of texts in *Alo!*

In percentage, the biggest number of articles with attached value is present in *Informer*, 80% (negative value); however, this media outlet published only 5 texts in this form. In the media where the article is more present, *Politika* published more than half (52.87%) articles with an attached positive (2.3%) or negative (50.57%) value. 63.89% of the articles in *Kurir* have negative connotation, while 44.44% of the texts in this genre in *Danas* were negative. The lowest number of texts with evaluative connotations was observed in *Večernje novosti* (4.75% positive and 28.75% negative). In *Blic*, the biggest percentage of positive texts in the form of articles was observed 11.11%; however this is merely one text, while the same paper published 66.67% of articles with negative value. Only two negative texts and one neutral have been published in *Alo!* (Please see: **Table 14**).

It is interesting to mention that in most of the analyzed media, balance is largely absent when it comes to the form of articles. This is the case in *Politika*, *Kurir* and *Informer* with more

than 80% of unilateral articles, while in the paper *Alo!* 67% of these texts are lacking balance. *Blic* and *Večernje novosti* resort to writing unilateral texts in over 50% of the articles (for more information, please see **Table 15**). The only exception is the paper *Danas*, where balance is present in 88.89% of texts.

Table 14 – Structure of articles in relation to the value context in the seven media from the sample

Media outlet	Value context against the topic						
	Genre: article	No.	positive	%	neutral	%	negative
Politika	87	2	2.30	41	47.13	44	50.57
Večernje novosti	63	3	4.76	42	66.67	18	28.57
Kurir	36	0	0	13	36.11	23	63.89
Danas	27	0	0	15	55.56	12	44.44
Blic	9	1	11.11	2	22.22	6	66.67
Informer	5	0	0	1	20.00	4	80.00
Alo	3	0	0	1	33.33	2	66.67
Total	230	6	2.61	115	50.00	109	47.39

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 15 – Balance of articles in the seven media from the sample

Article	Balance %	
	Yes	No
Media outlet		
Politika	11.49	88.51
Kurir	16.67	83.33
Informer	20.00	80.00
Alo!	33.33	66.67
Blic	44.44	55.56
Večernje novosti	47.62	52.38
Danas	88.89	11.11
Total	33.04	66.96

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

In the third quarter, **news** were the most frequent form in *Informer* (26.24%) followed by *Alo!* (15.38%), *Blic* (14.01%), *Danas* (8.22%) and *Politika* (2.65%). On the front pages of *Večernje novosti* there was no news which was included in the sample, while the paper *Kurir* published only one news text. Out of all the specified media, only *Informer* published approximately the same number of news as in the previous quarter, while all other media published considerably less texts in this genre. Though the news is a primary journalistic form, more than 49% of the news has been subjected to interpretation, i.e. they have evaluative connotations. When observing media outlets individually, the most of the “colored” news, in the media where there was more than one text in this genre, is evident in *Informer* (74.68% negative and 2.53% positive texts), followed by *Blic* with 46.66%, *Alo!* with 38.22% and *Danas* with 12.5% of evaluative texts (positive and negative). All the news published in *Politika* was neutral.

Another parameter which indicates the inclination towards news interpreting is the presence of balance in just 32.28% of analyzed news in all the media from the sample³ **Commentary (column, editorial)**, as a journalism genre, is not present in the analyzed texts from *Kurir* and *Večernje novosti*, in papers *Blic* and *Alo!*, only two comments are present, and in *Informer* only one. *Danas* published 40 commentaries (10.28% out of the total number of texts from the front pages of *Danas*, which are in the sample). Daily paper *Politika* is still in the lead with this form and to reiterate, in the third quarter, they considerably increased the number of commentaries on their front pages, therefore this is the second-ranked genre in terms of frequency in this daily paper. The unusual practice of publishing editorial comments on the front page is still present in the media which contained commentary.

Interview was most present in *Danas* and *Politika* in the period from July to September 2015. In these papers, 53, i.e. 36 interviews (13.62% and 7.36% of all published texts from the sample from these newspapers) were published. They are followed by *Večernje novosti* with 34, *Alo!* and *Kurir* with 18, i.e. 15, then *Blic* with 10 and *Informer* with 3 interviews, which is consistent to the findings from the previous editions of *Mediameter*.

Reportage make up for 26 or inconsequential 1.2% of texts. Most reportage pieces (8) were published in *Politika*, *Večernje novosti* and *Blic* with 5 each, *Alo!* – 4, *Informer* – 3, *Danas* – 1, while no reportages were published in *Kurir*.

Again, consistent to the trends from the first two numbers of *Mediameter*, report is still the most present form in all analyzed media. However, the number of news has decreased, while there was an increase in the number of commentaries and especially articles, which do not contribute particularly to investigative journalism, but are rather used for putting forward personal viewpoints and promoting certain values pursuant to the editorial policies in the media themselves. This is best seen from information that about 50% of texts written in this form have clear evaluative definition, while as many as 67% of articles contain reporting which is not balanced.

³ For more information, please see Table 142 in the Appendix.

Actors

Media in Serbia, at least according to the analysis of empirical material, collected from the front pages, largely cover political events within Serbia. As much as 49.76% out of the total number of actors featured in the selected texts from the front pages are (individual and collective) political actors who take up various positions within the political life of Serbia (please see table 16 and tables 17-21 which depict the distribution of frequency of appearance of certain individual political actors). If we add texts which talk about foreign political actors to these numbers, the percentage of frequency of political components in the total number of political actors on the front pages is on the rise, up to 75.92%. If we add to this percentage texts which refer to unnamed sources, which also cover topics from the political life, usually of Serbian society, share of these texts in the total number of texts from our sample goes up to as much as 81.58%. The second-ranked group according to frequency of appearances features various social actors who make up for 14.61% of our sample. Business and economic actors are the protagonists of texts from front pages in merely 3.80% of the cases (please see table 16).

Table 16 – Total distribution of actors which appears in texts which were included in the research sample (expressed in absolute numbers)

Actors					
Political actors	6.229	Domestic	4.083	Individual	3.403
				Collective	680
		Foreign	2.146	Individual	1.901
				Collective	245
Business/ economic actors	312	Domestic	264	Individual	177
				Collective	87
		Foreign	48	Individual	13
				Collective	35
Other social actors	1.199	Domestic	1.199	Individual	1.083
				Collective	116
		Foreign	0	Individual	0
				Collective	0
Unnamed source					464
Total					8.204

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Tables 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 show the distribution of frequency of appearance of certain individual political actors, who are active on the Serbian political scene. Individual political actors – members of the Serbian Government (51.40%) and political parties of position (14.45%) are considerably more present on the front pages (65.85% against 1.35% of representatives of the local self-government, 15.66% of opposition actors and 17.21% of those who do not belong to the current government of Serbia, neither parties of position nor opposition).

Table 17 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual political actors from the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the President of the Republic of Serbia

Government of RS and President of RS	Total	
	no.	%
Aleksandar Vučić	621	35.57
Tomislav Nikolić	246	14.09
Ivica Dačić	220	12.60
Nebojša Stefanović	148	8.48
Aleksandar Vulin	103	5.90
Zorana Mihajlović	89	5.10
Bratislav Gašić	51	2.92
Rasim Ljajić	40	2.29
Kori Udovički	28	1.60
Jadranka Joksimović	28	1.60
Nikola Selaković	27	1.55
Željko Sertić	24	1.37
Dušan Vujović	23	1.32
Aleksandar Antić	23	1.32
Srđan Verbić	19	1.09
Ivan Tasovac	18	1.03
Velimir Ilić	17	0.97
Vanja Udovičić	8	0.46
Zlatibor Lončar	7	0.40
Snežana Bogosavljević Bošković	6	0.34
Total	1.746	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 18 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual political actors from **position**

Position: individual actors	No.	%
Marko Đurić	28	5.83
Vladimir Đukanović	25	5.21
Zoran Babić	25	5.21
Siniša Mali	24	5.00
Milutin Mrkonjić	23	4.79
Branko Ružić	22	4.58
Momir Stojanović	22	4.58
Ivan Mrkić	21	4.38
Maja Gojković	17	3.54
Dušan Bajatović	17	3.54
Stanislava Pak	16	3.33
Milovan Drecun	16	3.33
Slavica Đukić Dejanović	15	3.13
Dijana Vukomanović	14	2.92
Đorđe Milićević	14	2.92
Radimir Nikolić	13	2.71
Veroljub Arsić	13	2.71
Goran Vesić	12	2.50
Dragan Marković Palma	11	2.29
Igor Mirović	11	2.29
Miodrag Linta	11	2.29
Predrag Marković	10	2.08
Vuk Drašković	10	2.08
Žarko Obradović	10	2.08
Novica Tončev	9	1.88
Meho Omerović	8	1.67
Petar Škundrić	6	1.25
Igor Bečić	5	1.04
Ištvan Pastor	5	1.04
Marijan Rističević	5	1.04
Milan Krkobabić	5	1.04
Aleksandar Jovičić	4	0.83

Position: individual actors	No.	%
Aleksandar Martinović	4	0.83
Goran Knežević	4	0.83
Momo Čolaković	4	0.83
Predrag Mikić	4	0.83
Riza Halimi	4	0.83
Đorđe Čabarkapa	3	0.63
Suzana Vasiljević	3	0.63
Vidoje Drndarević	3	0.63
Nikola Nikodijević	2	0.42
Vuk Fatić	2	0.42
Total	480	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 19 – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual political actors – **local self-government representatives**

Local self-government representative	No.	%
Milan Stamatović	9	19.57
Nagip Arifi	6	13.04
Ragmi Mustafa	6	13.04
Mihalj Bimbo	5	10.87
Tihomir Petković	5	10.87
Robert Lacko	4	8.70
Zoran Perišić	4	8.70
Bratislav Jugović	3	6.52
Čedomir Janjić	2	4.35
Jene Maglai	2	4.35
Total	46	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 20 – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual political actors from the opposition

Opposition	No.	%
Bojan Pajtić	90	17.05
Vojislav Šešelj	75	14.20
Boris Tadić	61	11.55
Borislav Stefanović	50	9.47
Čedomir Jovanović	36	6.82
Sanda Rašković Ivić	25	4.73
Dragan Šutanovac	19	3.60
Zoran Živković	18	3.41
Janko Veselinović	13	2.46
Nenad Čanak	13	2.46
Nenad Popović	12	2.27
Sulejman Ugljanin	12	2.27
Aleksandar Senić	11	2.08
Nemanja Šarović	11	2.08
Boško Obradović	10	1.89
Miroslav Vasin	8	1.52
Aleksandar Đurđev	6	1.14
Veroljub Stevanović	6	1.14
Vjeric Radeta	6	1.14
Vladimir Todorčić	6	1.14
Balša Božović	5	0.95
Konstantin Samofalov	5	0.95
Dušan Petrović	4	0.76
Marko Đurišić	4	0.76
Nataša Jovanović	4	0.76
Ninoslav Stojadinović	4	0.76
Vladan Glišić	4	0.76
Zoran Krasić	4	0.76
Goran Ješić	3	0.57
Gordana Pop Lazić	3	0.57
Total	528	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 21 – Distribution of frequency of appearance of other individual political and social actors

Other actors	No.	%
Slobodan Milošević	68	22.08
Predrag Gojković	47	15.26
parents of Predrag Gojković	47	15.26
Zoran Đinđić	25	8.12
Mlađan Dinkić	24	7.79
Dragan Đilas	10	3.25
Emir Kusturica	10	3.25
Mira Marković	10	3.25
Vojislav Koštunica	9	2.92
Kokan Mladenović	8	2.60
Bogoljub Karić	7	2.27
Dragica Nikolić	7	2.27
Nemanja Nenadić	7	2.27
Rodoljub Milović	7	2.27
Goran Miletić	6	1.95
Elizabet Farel	5	1.62
Redžep Arifi	5	1.62
Andrej Vučić	4	1.30
Ištvan Kaić	2	0.65
Total	308	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

In the analysis below, manners of presenting certain actors in individual texts from our sample were coded in three different ways; taking into consideration both the text and the accompanying textual content (headline, heading and subheading). Texts in which the authors/journalists did not take up an evaluative position towards a certain actor, but strived to present certain facts which are the subject of the text in a relatively neutral, reserved manner, respecting professional standards, were marked as *neutral*. Those interpretations in which the journalists clearly expressed sympathy and positive attitude towards the actors were marked as *positive*. We marked as *negative* those interpretations in which the journalists presented certain topics with clear antipathy and negative attitude towards certain topics. Tables 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 show the value context within which certain individual political actors from Serbia's political scene appeared in the selected texts from the front pages.

Table 22 – Value context of appearances of individual political actors from the Government of the Republic of Serbia and President of the Republic of Serbia

Government of RS and President of RS	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandar Vučić	30	4.83	580	93.40	11	1.77
Tomislav Nikolić	0	0.00	199	80.89	47	19.11
Ivica Dačić	0	0.00	209	95.00	11	5.00
Nebojša Stefanović	1	0.68	147	99.32	0	0.00
Aleksandar Vulin	2	1.94	99	96.12	2	1.94
Zorana Mihajlović	0	0.00	72	80.90	17	19.10
Bratislav Gašić	2	3.92	45	88.24	4	7.84
Rasim Ljajić	0	0.00	37	92.50	3	7.50
Kori Udovički	0	0.00	23	82.14	5	17.86
Jadranka Joksimović	0	0.00	25	89.29	3	10.71
Nikola Selaković	1	3.70	25	92.59	1	3.70
Željko Sertić	0	0.00	22	91.67	2	8.33
Dušan Vujović	0	0.00	20	86.96	3	13.04
Aleksandar Antić	0	0.00	23	100.00	0	0.00
Srdjan Verbić	0	0.00	18	94.74	1	5.26
Ivan Tasovac	0	0.00	13	72.22	5	27.78
Velimir Ilić	0	0.00	14	82.35	3	17.65
Vanja Udovičić	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Zlatibor Lončar	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Snežana Bogosavljević Bošković	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Total	36	2.06	1590	91.07	120	6.87

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 23 – Value context of appearances of individual political actors from parties of position and officials from governmental bodies and institutions

Position: individual actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Marko Đurić	1	3.57	27	96.43	0	0.00
Vladimir Đukanović	0	0.00	23	92.00	2	8.00
Zoran Babić	0	0.00	21	84.00	4	16.00
Siniša Mali	0	0.00	24	100.00	0	0.00
Milutin Mrkonjić	0	0.00	20	86.96	3	13.04
Branko Ružić	1	4.55	19	86.36	2	9.09
Momir Stojanović	0	0.00	19	86.36	3	13.64
Ivan Mrkić	0	0.00	16	76.19	5	23.81
Maja Gojković	0	0.00	15	88.24	2	11.76
Dušan Bajatović	0	0.00	15	88.24	2	11.76
Stanislava Pak	0	0.00	14	87.50	2	12.50
Milovan Drecun	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Slavica Đukić Dejanović	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Dijana Vukomanović	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Milićević	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Radomir Nikolić	0	0.00	8	61.54	5	38.46
Veroljub Arsić	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Vesić	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Dragan Marković Palma	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Mirović	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Linta	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Predrag Marković	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Vuk Drašković	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Žarko Obradović	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Novica Tončev	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Meho Omerović	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Petar Škundrić	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Bečić	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
Ištvan Pastor	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Total	2	0.42	431	89.79	47	9.79

Position: individual actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Marijan Rističević	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Krkobabić	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Aleksandar Jovičić	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Aleksandar Martinović	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Goran Knežević	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Momo Čolaković	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Predrag Mikić	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Riza Halimi	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Čabarkapa	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Suzana Vasiljević	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vidoje Drndarević	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Nikola Nikodijević	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Vuk Fatić	0	0.00	1	50.00	1	50.00
Total	2	0.42	431	89.79	47	9.79

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 24 – Value context of the appearances of individual political actors – representatives of the local self-government

Representatives of the local self-government	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milan Stamatović	3	33.33	6	66.67	0	0.00
Nagip Arifi	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Ragmi Mustafa	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Mihalj Bimbo	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
Tihomir Petković	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Robert Lacko	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Perišić	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Bratislav Jugović	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Čedomir Janjić	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Jene Maglai	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	3	6.52	38	82.61	5	10.87

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 25 – Value context of appearances of individual political actors from the opposition parties

Opposition	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Bojan Pajtić	1	1.11	71	78.89	18	20.00
Vojislav Šešelj	1	1.33	67	89.33	7	9.33
Boris Tadić	1	1.64	50	81.97	10	16.39
Borisav Stefanović	0	0.00	44	88.00	6	12.00
Čedomir Jovanović	1	2.78	23	63.89	12	33.33
Sanda Rašković Ivić	0	0.00	25	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Šutanovac	0	0.00	17	89.47	2	10.53
Zoran Živković	0	0.00	16	88.89	2	11.11
Janko Veselinović	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Čanak	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38
Nenad Popović	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Sulejman Ugljanin	1	8.33	7	58.33	4	33.33
Aleksandar Senić	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Nemanja Šarović	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Boško Obradović	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Vasin	0	0.00	5	62.50	3	37.50
Aleksandar Đurđev	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Veroljub Stevanović	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Vjerica Radeta	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Todorčić	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Balša Božović	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Konstantin Samofalov	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Petrović	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Đurišić	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Nataša Jovanović	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ninoslav Stojadinović	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vladan Glišić	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Kراسić	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Ješić	1	33.33	1	33.33	1	33.33
Gordana Pop Lazić	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	6	1.14	453	85.80	69	13.07

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 26 – Value context of appearances of **other** individual political and social actors

Other actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Slobodan Milošević	0	0.00	60	88.24	8	11.76
Predrag Gojković	0	0.00	47	100.00	0	0.00
parents of Predrag Gojković	0	0.00	47	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Đinđić	0	0.00	25	100.00	0	0.00
Mlađan Dinkić	1	4.17	15	62.50	8	33.33
Dragan Đilas	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Emir Kusturica	6	60.00	4	40.00	0	0.00
Mira Marković	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Vojislav Koštunica	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Kokan Mladenović	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Bogoljub Karić	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Dragica Nikolić	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Nemanja Nenadić	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Rodoljub Milošević	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Goran Miletić	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Elizabet Farel	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Redžep Arifi	5	100.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Andrej Vučić	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ištvan Kaić	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	12	3.90	272	88.31	24	7.79

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

As in the previous two trimesters, the actor who was most present on the front pages of dailies in Serbia is Aleksandar Vučić. The media from our sample reported on him mostly with a neutral tone (in as much as 93.4% of cases). Also, 4.83% texts about him were positive and 1.77% of texts have a negative connotation. As the protagonist of front page texts, the prime minister appeared as many as 621 times, which is considerably more than the first runner-up actor (the “unnamed source” that appears as the “protagonist” of texts from front pages as many as 464 times). The highest frequency of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić, expressed in absolute numbers, was recorded in papers *Politika* (119), *Danas* (105) and *Večernje novosti* (105) (please see Table 27). However, when expressed in relative numbers, i.e. percentage shares, in which he appears as the actor, against the total number of selected texts from the same individual newspaper, we see that he is most present in *Kurir* (as much as 42.71% of texts from our sample are about Vučić) and the daily *Alo!* (32.58% of texts) (Please see table 28). In terms

of percentage, the biggest share of positive texts about him, as in the previous trimester, is recorded in the daily *Informer* (where we find 9.72% of texts from the front pages in which he appears, and which have positive connotation) and the daily *Alo!* (11.11%). Negative texts about Vučić appear in biggest percentage, as in the previous trimester, in *Danas* (9.52%, i.e. 10 texts with negative connotations in the third trimester of 2015) (please see table 27).

Table 27 – Aleksandar Vučić: Value context per media outlet

Aleksandar Vučić	positive		neutral		negative		Total	
Medij	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Blic	1	1.52	64	96.97	1	1.52	66	100.00
Kurir	5	6.10	77	93.90	0	0.00	82	100.00
Večernje novosti	5	4.76	100	95.24	0	0.00	105	100.00
Alo!	8	11.11	64	88.89	0	0.00	72	100.00
Informer	7	9.72	65	90.28	0	0.00	72	100.00
Politika	4	3.36	115	96.64	0	0.00	119	100.00
Danas	0	0.00	95	90.48	10	9.52	105	100.00
Total	30	4.83	580	93.40	11	1.77	621	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 28 – Number of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić against the total number of texts in certain daily papers

Aleksandar Vučić as per media	number of appearances	total number of texts	% share against the total number of texts
Kurir	82	192	42.71
Alo	72	221	32.58
Blic	66	214	30.84
Večernje novosti	105	366	28.69
Danas	105	389	26.99
Politika	119	489	24.34
Informer	72	301	23.92
Total	621	2.172	28.59

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

The second individual political actor from the political scene of Serbia who appeared the most on the front pages of analyzed daily newspapers is the President of the Republic of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić. He is the protagonist in as much as 11.33% of analyzed texts (please see table 29).

Table 29 – Number of appearances of Tomislav Nikolić against the total number of texts in certain daily newspapers

Tomislav Nikolić per media outlet	number of appearances	total number of texts	% share against the total number of texts
Kurir	56	192	29.17
Alo!	34	221	15.38
Večernje novosti	38	366	10.38
Blic	22	214	10.28
Danas	38	389	9.77
Politika	42	489	8.59
Informer	16	301	5.32
Total	246	2.172	11.33

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Highest number of negative texts, as many as 47, refer to the current President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić (please see table 30). The biggest number of negative texts about Tomislav Nikolić is recorded in the daily paper *Kurir* (23 texts) and *Alo!* (16), which in both respective cases make up for 40% of the texts in which Tomislav Nikolić was featured, and which were published in these papers (please see table 30).

Table 30 - Tomislav Nikolić: Value context per media outlet

Tomislav Nikolić	positive		neutral		negative		Total	
	no	%	no	%	no	%	no	%
Blic	0	0.00	20	90.91	2	9.09	22	100.00
Kurir	0	0.00	33	58.93	23	41.07	56	100.00
Večernje novosti	0	0.00	38	100.00	0	0.00	38	100.00
Alo!	0	0.00	18	52.94	16	47.06	34	100.00
Informer	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00	16	100.00
Politika	0	0.00	42	100.00	0	0.00	42	100.00
Danas	0	0.00	32	84.21	6	15.79	38	100.00
Total	0	0.00	199	80.89	47	19.11	246	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

The highest number of negative texts among the ministers in the government of the Republic of Serbia was written about Zorana Mihajlović, a total of 17. Regarding individual political actors from the position parties and officials of governmental bodies and institutions, expressed in relative numbers, the biggest percentage score of negative texts was recorded on the Advisor to the President of Serbia, Predrag Mikić. As much as 75% of the texts from our

sample which were on the front pages and which speak about Predrag Mikić had negative evaluative connotation. Vidoje Drndarević is second-ranked. As much as 66.67 % of texts speak in negative ways about Drndarević. Third-ranked is Igor Bečić with 60% negative texts. When referring to opposition actors, the biggest number of negative texts was written about Bojan Pajtić, a total of 18 (please see tables 22, 23 and 25).

Considerably fewer texts deal with certain collective political actors relevant for the political scene of Serbia who are present in fewer than 16.65% of texts on domestic political and social actors. Tables 31-36 list all actors classified in this category from our sample together with the frequencies and value connotations of their appearances.

Table 31 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of domestic collective political actors: governmental bodies and institutions

Governmental bodies and institutions	No.	%
Government of Serbia	111	25.58
Ministry of Interior	60	13.82
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	28	6.45
National Bank of Serbia	22	5.07
Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development	20	4.61
Ministry of Defense	18	4.15
National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia	16	3.69
Serbian Armed Forces	14	3.23
Security and Intelligence Agency	13	3.00
Ministry of Finance	12	2.76
Ministry of Health	11	2.53
Presidency of Serbia	11	2.53
Privatization Agency	9	2.07
Ministry of Construction, Traffic and Infrastructure	9	2.07
Ministry of Culture and Information	9	2.07
Ministry of State Administration and Local Self-Government	8	1.84
Ministry of Justice	8	1.84
Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Policy	8	1.84
Cabinet of the President of Serbia	7	1.61
Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection	7	1.61
Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunication	6	1.38
Total	434	100.00

Governmental bodies and institutions	No.	%
Agency for Restitution	5	1.15
Ministry of Economy	5	1.15
Business Registers Agency	4	0.92
Cabinet of the Serbian Prime Minister	4	0.92
Deposit Insurance Agency	3	0.69
Ministry of Energy and Mining	2	0.46
Ministry of Youth and Sport	2	0.46
Serbian Medicines and Medical Devices Agency	1	0.23
Foreign Investments Agency	1	0.23
Total	434	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 32 – Value context of domestic collective political actors: governmental bodies and institutions

Governmental bodies and institutions	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Government of Serbia	1	0.90	108	97.30	2	1.80
Ministry of Interior	1	1.67	59	98.33	0	0.00
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	0	0.00	28	100.00	0	0.00
National Bank of Serbia	1	4.55	20	90.91	1	4.55
Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development	0	0.00	19	95.00	1	5.00
Ministry of Defense	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
National Assembly of Serbia	0	0.00	15	93.75	1	6.25
Serbian Armed Forces	1	7.14	13	92.86	0	0.00
Security and Intelligence Agency	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Finance	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Health	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Presidency of Serbia	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
Privatization Agency	0	0.00	7	77.78	2	22.22
Total	4	0.92	417	96.08	13	3.00

Governmental bodies and institutions	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Ministry of Construction, Traffic and Infrastructure	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Culture and Information	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of State Administration and Local Self-Government	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Ministry of Justice	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Policy	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Cabinet of the President of Serbia	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Agency for Restitution	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Economy	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Business Registers Agency	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Cabinet of the Prime Minister of Serbia	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Deposit Insurance Agency	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Energy and Mining	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Youth and Sport	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian Medicines and Medical Devices Agency	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Foreign Investments Agency	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	4	0.92	417	96.08	13	3.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 33 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of domestic collective political actors: position

Position: collective political actors	No.	%
Serbian Progressive Party	77	62.10
SPS	41	33.06
PUPS	4	3.23
Movement for Strong Serbia	1	0.81
Socialists' Movement	1	0.81
Total	124	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 34 – Value context for domestic collective political actors: position

Position: collective political actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Serbian Progressive Party	1	1.30	75	97.40	1	1.30
SPS	0	0.00	38	92.68	3	7.32
PUPS	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Movement for Strong Serbia	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Socialists' Movement	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	1	0.81	119	95.97	4	3.23

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 35 – Distribution of frequency of appearance of domestic collective political actors: opposition

Opposition	No.	%
Democratic Party	67	63.21
SRS	13	12.26
DSS	11	10.38
Dveri	11	10.38
LSV	4	3.77
Total	106	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 36 – Value context for domestic collective political actors: opposition

Opposition	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Democratic party	0	0.00	50	74.63	17	25.37
Serbian Radical Party	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Democratic Party of Serbia	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Dveri	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
League of Social-Democrats of Vojvodina	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Total	0	0.00	89	83.96	17	16.04

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

A considerably lower percentage of texts from the front pages speak about foreign (individual and collective) political actors and political actors from Kosovo (merely 26.69% out of the total number of texts). Protagonists of these texts are more often individual actors/individuals (in 88.58% of cases) than collective ones (11.41%) (Please see Table 16 and Tables 45 and 46). Among individual foreign political actors in a somewhat lower percentage are those who are not from the region (44.97% - please see tables 53-61), than regional ones (55.02% - please see tables 37-52).

Table 37 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual foreign political and social actors from the region: Croatia

Croatia: Individual Actors	No.	%
Zoran Milanović	91	25.07
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović	59	16.25
Ranko Ostojić	28	7.71
Franjo Tuđman	28	7.71
Milorad Pupovac	22	6.06
Tomislav Karamarko	16	4.41
Marko Perković Tompson	14	3.86
Ante Pavelić	12	3.31
Savo Štrbac	11	3.03
Vesna Pusić	10	2.75
Ivo Josipović	8	2.20
Žarko Puhovski	7	1.93
Ivan Penava	5	1.38
Total	363	100.00

Croatia: Individual Actors	No.	%
Ivo Sanader	5	1.38
Boro Grubišić	4	1.10
Dejan Drakulić	4	1.10
Jadranka Kosor	4	1.10
Mladen Markač	4	1.10
Ante Kotromanović	3	0.83
Goran Bošnjak	3	0.83
Damir Kajin	3	0.83
Igor Gavrić	3	0.83
Josipa Rimac	3	0.83
Marijan Pavliček	3	0.83
Željko Džepina	3	0.83
Orsat Miljenić	3	0.83
Branimir Glavaš	3	0.83
Josip Leko	2	0.55
Mate Granić	2	0.55
Total	363	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 38 – Value context for individual foreign political actors from the region: Croatia

Croatia: individual political actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Zoran Milanović	0	0.00	55	60.44	36	39.56
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović	0	0.00	46	77.97	13	22.03
Ranko Ostojić	0	0.00	20	71.43	8	28.57
Franjo Tuđman	0	0.00	20	71.43	8	28.57
Milorad Pupovac	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
Tomislav Karamarko	0	0.00	15	93.75	1	6.25
Marko Perković Tompson	0	0.00	4	28.57	10	71.43
Ante Pavelić	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Total	0	0.00	274	75.48	89	24.52

Croatia: individual political actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Savo Štrbac	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Vesna Pusić	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Ivo Josipović	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Žarko Puhovski	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Penava	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Ivo Sanader	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Boro Grubišić	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dejan Drakulić	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Jadranka Kosor	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Mladen Markač	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Ante Kotromanović	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Bošnjak	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Damir Kajin	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Gavrić	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Josipa Rimac	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Marijan Pavliček	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Željko Džepina	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Orsat Miljenić	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Branimir Glavaš	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Josip Leko	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Mate Granić	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	0	0.00	274	75.48	89	24.52

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 39 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual foreign political actors from the region: Montenegro

Montenegro	No.	%
Milo Đukanović	7	58.33
Filip Vujanović	3	25.00
Svetozar Marović	2	16.66
Total	12	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 40 – Value context of individual foreign political actors from the region: Montenegro

Montenegro	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milo Đukanović	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Filip Vujanović	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Svetozar Marović	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	0	0.00	11	94.12	1	5.88

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 41 – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual foreign political and social actors: Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Republic Srpska

Bosnia and Herzegovina: individual actors	No.	%
Bakir Izetbegović	69	16.71
Milorad Dodik	69	16.71
Naser Orić	52	12.59
Mladen Ivanić	31	7.51
Dragan Čović	23	5.57
Čamil Duraković	20	4.84
Alija Izetbegović	13	3.15
Dragan Mektić	13	3.15
Almir Merdić	12	2.91
Munira Subašić	10	2.42
Dragan Lukač	9	2.18
Mirsad Vilić	8	1.94
Husein Kavazović	8	1.94
Majke Srebrenice	7	1.69
Dževad Galijašević	7	1.69
Gojko Vasić	6	1.45
Denis Zvizdić	5	1.21
Valentin Incko	5	1.21
Mirsad Ćatić	5	1.21
Emir Suljagić	4	0.97
Amar Orić	4	0.97
Total	413	100.00

Bosnia and Herzegovina: individual actors	No.	%
Mujo Dizdarević	4	0.97
Elvedin Himzić	4	0.97
Morin Kormak	3	0.73
Mladen Bosić	3	0.73
Zoran Korać	3	0.73
Alen Kominlija	3	0.73
Ramiz Hodžić Siki	3	0.73
Željko Komšić	2	0.48
Fahrudin Radončić	2	0.48
Igor Crnadak	2	0.48
Hatidže Mehmedović	2	0.48
Esad Duraković	1	0.24
Momčilo Novaković	1	0.24
Total	413	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 42 – Value context for individual foreign political actors from the region: Bosnia and Herzegovina/Republic of Srpska

Bosnia and Herzegovina: individual actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Bakir Izetbegović	0	0.00	46	66.67	23	33.33
Milorad Dodik	1	1.45	65	94.20	3	4.35
Naser Orić	0	0.00	39	75.00	13	25.00
Mladen Ivanić	0	0.00	29	93.55	2	6.45
Dragan Čović	0	0.00	21	91.30	2	8.70
Čamil Duraković	0	0.00	19	95.00	1	5.00
Alija Izetbegović	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38
Dragan Mektić	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Almir Merdić	0	0.00	3	25.00	9	75.00
Munira Subašić	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Lukač	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Mirsad Vilić	0	0.00	4	50.00	4	50.00
Total	2	0.48	336	81.36	75	18.16

Bosnia and Herzegovina: individual actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Husein Kavazović	0	0.00	5	62.50	3	37.50
Mothers of Srebrenica	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0.00
Dževad Galijašević	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Gojko Vasić	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Denis Zvizdić	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Valentin Incko	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Mirsad Ćatić	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Emir Suljagić	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Amar Orić	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Mujo Dizdarević	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Elvedin Himzić	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Morin Kormak	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mladen Bosić	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Korać	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Alen Kominlija	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Ramiz Hodžić Siki	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Željko Komšić	0	0.00	1	50.00	1	50.00
Fahrudin Radončić	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Crnadak	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Hatidže Mehmedović	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Esad Duraković	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Momčilo Novaković	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	2	0.48	336	81.36	75	18.16

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 43. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual foreign political actors from the region: Macedonia

Macedonia: individual actors	No.	%
Ivo Kotevski	8	66.67
Nikola Gruevski	4	33.33
Total	12	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 44 – Value context of individual foreign political actors from the region: Macedonia

Macedonia: individual actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Ivo Kotevski	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Gruevski	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Total	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 45 – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual political actors: Kosovo

Kosovo: individual actors	No.	%
Hashim Thaci	37	24.67
Isa Mustafa	28	18.67
Oliver Ivanović	19	12.67
Petrit Selimi	10	6.67
Ramush Haradinaj	10	6.67
Ksenija Božović	6	4.00
Aleksandar Jablanović	5	3.33
Atifete Jahjaga	5	3.33
Edita Tahiri	5	3.33
Rada Trajković	5	3.33
Branimir Stojanović	3	2.00
Fatmir Limaj	3	2.00
Gabriele Meucci	3	2.00
Total	150	100.00

Kosovo: individual actors	No.	%
Roxana Komsa	3	2.00
Goran Rakić	2	1.33
Agim Ceku	2	1.33
Kadri Veseli	2	1.33
Albin Kurti	1	0.67
Illir Deda	1	0.67
Total	150	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 46 – Value context for individual political actors: Kosovo

Kosovo: individual actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Hashim Thaci	0	0.00	24	64.86	13	35.14
Isa Mustafa	0	0.00	27	96.43	1	3.57
Oliver Ivanović	1	5.26	18	94.74	0	0.00
Petrit Selimi	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Ramush Haradinaj	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Ksenija Božović	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Jablanović	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Atifete Jahjaga	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Edita Tahiri	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Rada Trajković	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Branimir Stojanović	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Fatmir Limaj	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Gabriele Meucci	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Roxana Komša	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Rakić	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Agim Ceku	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	100.00
Kadri Veseli	0	0.00	1	50.00	1	50.00
Albin Kurti	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	100.00
Total	1	0.67	127	84.67	22	14.67

Kosovo: individual actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Illir Deda	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	1	0.67	127	84.67	22	14.67

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 47 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual foreign political actors from the region: Albania

Albania	No.	%
Edi Rama	15	83.3
Shkelzen Maliqi	3	16.7
Total	18	100.0

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 48 – Value context of individual foreign political actors: Albania

Albania	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Edi Rama	0	0.00	10	66.67	5	33.33
Shkelzen Maliqi	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	0	0.00	13	72.22	5	27.78

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 49 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual foreign political actors from the region: Hungary

Hungary: individual actors	No.	%
Viktor Orban	53	53.54
Peter Szijarto	23	23.23
Zoltan Kovacs	8	8.08
Sandor Pinter	6	6.06
Janos Ader	5	5.05
Janos Lazar	4	4.04
Total	99	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 50 – Value context of individual foreign political actors from the region: Hungary

Hungary: individual actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Viktor Orban	0	0.00	33	62.26	20	37.74
Peter Szijarto	0	0.00	22	95.65	1	4.35
Zoltan Kovacs	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Sandor Pinter	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Janos Ader	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Janos Lazar	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Total	0	0.00	77	77.78	22	22.22

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 51 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual foreign political actors from the region: Greece

Greece	No.	%
Alexis Tsipras	71	55.04
Yanis Varoufakis	29	22.48
Euclid Tsakalotos	7	5.43
Panagiotis Lafazanis	7	5.43
Evangelos Meimarakis	4	3.10
Panos Kammenos	4	3.10
Nikos Kotzias	4	3.10
Yannis Dragasakis	3	2.33
Total	129	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 52 – Value context for individual foreign political actors in the region: Greece

Greece	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Alexis Tsipras	4	5.63	58	81.69	9	12.68
Yanis Varoufakis	3	10.34	26	89.66	0	0.00
Euclid Tsakalotos	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0.00
Panagiotis Lafazanis	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Total	8	6.20	112	86.82	9	6.98

Greece	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Evangelos Meimarakis	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Panos Kammenos	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Nikos Kotzias	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Yannis Dragasakis	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	8	6.20	112	86.82	9	6.98

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 53 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual political actors outside the region: foreign politicians

	No.	%
Barack Obama	38	12.06
Bill Clinton	26	8.25
Bashar al-Assad	24	7.62
Michael Kirby	23	7.30
Francois Hollande	19	6.03
Joseph Biden	19	6.03
David Cameron	19	6.03
John Kerry	12	3.81
Ahmet Davutoglu	11	3.49
Sebastian Kurtz	10	3.17
Philip Hammond	9	2.86
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	9	2.86
Petro Poroshenko	8	2.54
Jeroen Dijsselbloem	8	2.54
Victoria Nuland	7	2.22
Borut Pahor	6	1.90
Li Keqiang	6	1.90
Xi Jinping	6	1.90
Tony Blair	6	1.90
Werner Faymann	6	1.90
Bohuslav Sobotka	5	1.59
Total	315	100.00

	No.	%
Denis Keefe	5	1.59
Johanna Mikl-Leitner	5	1.59
Laurent Fabius	5	1.59
Miroslav Lajčak	5	1.59
Matteo Renzi	4	1.27
Miro Cerar	4	1.27
Peter Wilson	4	1.27
Jeremy Corbyn	3	0.95
Paolo Gentiloni	3	0.95
Total	315	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 54 – Value context of individual foreign political actors outside the region: Foreign politicians

	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Barack Obama	1	2.63	34	89.47	3	7.89
Bill Clinton	0	0.00	20	76.92	6	23.08
Bashar al-Assad	1	4.17	21	87.50	2	8.33
Michael Kirby	0	0.00	20	86.96	3	13.04
Francois Hollande	0	0.00	37	78.72	10	21.28
Joseph Biden	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
David Cameron	0	0.00	13	68.42	6	31.58
John Kerry	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Ahmet Davutoglu	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Sebastian Kurtz	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Philip Hammond	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0	0.00	6	66.67	3	33.33
Petro Poroshenko	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Jeroen Dijsselbloem	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Victoria Nuland	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Borut Pahor	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Li Keqiang	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Total	2	0.58	301	87.76	40	11.66

	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Xi Jinping	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Tony Blair	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Werner Faymann	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Bohuslav Sobotka	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Denis Keefe	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Johanna Mikl-Leitner	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Laurent Fabius	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Lajčak	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Matteo Renzi	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Miro Cerar	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Peter Wilson	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Jeremy Corbyn	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Paolo Gentiloni	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	2	0.58	301	87.76	40	11.66

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 55 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual foreign political actors outside the region: Germany

Germany: individual actors	No.	%
Angela Merkel	131	65.50
Wolfgang Schäuble	15	7.50
Frank-Walter Steinmeier	14	7.00
Sigmar Gabriel	7	3.50
Thomas de Maizière	6	3.00
Axel Dittman	5	2.50
Horst Seehofer	5	2.50
Manfred Schmidt	5	2.50
Steffen Seibert	4	2.00
Alexander Dobrindt	3	1.50
Markus Söder	3	1.50
Josip Juratović	2	1.00
Total	200	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 56 – Value context for individual foreign political actors outside the region: Germany

Germany: individual actors	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Angela Merkel	131	65.50	9	6.87	117	89.31	5	3.82
Wolfgang Schäuble	15	7.50	0	0.00	12	80.00	3	20.00
Frank-Walter Steinmeier	14	7.00	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Sigmar Gabriel	7	3.50	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Thomas de Maizière	6	3.00	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Axel Dittman	5	2.50	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Horst Seehofer	5	2.50	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Manfred Schmidt	5	2.50	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Total	200	100.00	9	4.50	183	91.50	8	4.00

Germany: individual actors	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Steffen Seibert	4	2.00	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Alexander Dobrindt	3	1.50	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Markus Söder	3	1.50	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Josip Juratović	2	1.00	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	200	100.00	9	4.50	183	91.50	8	4.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 57 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual foreign political actors: Russia

Russia: individual actors	No.	%
Vladimir Putin	71	60.68
Vitaly Churkin	12	10.26
Alexander Chepurin	8	6.84
Sergey Lavrov	8	6.84
Sergey Shoigu	8	6.84
Dmitry Medvedev	5	4.27
Dmitry Peskov	3	2.56
Genadij Gatilov	2	1.71
Total	117	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 58 – Value context of individual foreign political actors: Russia

Russia: individual actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Vladimir Putin	13	18.31	54	76.06	4	5.63
Vitaly Churkin	2	16.67	10	83.33	0	0.00
Alexander Chepurin	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Sergey Lavrov	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Sergey Shoigu	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Total	15	12.82	97	82.91	5	4.27

Russia: individual actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Dmitry Medvedev	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Peskov	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Genadij Gatilov	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	15	12.82	97	82.91	5	4.27

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 59 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual foreign political actors: Representatives of EU institutions

Representatives of EU institutions	No.	%
Johannes Hahn	39	22.67
Federica Mogherini	39	22.67
Maja Kocijančič	23	13.37
Jean-Claude Juncker	15	8.72
Michael Davenport	13	7.56
Donald Tusk	13	7.56
Natasha Berto	12	6.98
Dimitris Avramopoulos	7	4.07
Martin Schulz	7	4.07
David McAllister	4	2.33
Total	172	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 60 – Value context for individual foreign political actors: Representatives of Eu institutions

Representatives of EU institutions	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Johannes Hahn	1	2.56	38	97.44	0	0.00
Federica Mogherini	0	0.00	39	100.00	0	0.00
Maja Kocijančič	0	0.00	17	73.91	6	26.09
Jean-Claude Juncker	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Michael Davenport	0	0.00	10	76.92	3	23.08
Donald Tusk	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Natasha Berto	0	0.00	10	83.33	2	16.67
Dimitris Avramopoulos	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Martin Schulz	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
David McAllister	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Total	2	1.16	158	91.86	12	6.98

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 61 – Value context of individual foreign political actors: UN representatives

UN representatives	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Ban Ki-moon	18	36.73	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Hans Friedrich Schodder	8	16.33	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Antonio Guterres	7	14.29	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Irina Bokova	5	10.20	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Jan Eliasson	5	10.20	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Adrian Edwards	3	6.12	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Melissa Fleming	3	6.12	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	49	100.00	0	0.00	49	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 62 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors: Actors related to the Hague Tribunal

Actors related to the Hague Tribunal	No.	%
Haški tribunal	29	18.24
Ratko Mladić	22	13.84
Nikola Šainović	15	9.43
Radovan Karadžić	14	8.81
Dragan Vasiljković	10	6.29
Jovica Stanišić	7	4.40
Milan Martić	7	4.40
Mile Mrkšić	6	3.77
Vladimir Lazarević	6	3.77
Milan Babić	5	3.14
Mile Novaković	5	3.14
Miroslav Deronjić	5	3.14
Momir Talić	5	3.14
Slavko Dokmanović	5	3.14
Goran Hadžić	4	2.52
Sreten Lukić	4	2.52
Vlastimir Đorđević	3	1.89
Slobodan Praljak	3	1.89
Alphons Orié	2	1.26
Momčilo Perišić	2	1.26
Total	159	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 63 – Value context for individual foreign political actors: Actors related to the Hague Tribunal

Actors related to the Hague Tribunal	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Haški tribunal	0	0.00	22	75.86	7	24.14
Ratko Mladić	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Šainović	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Radovan Karadžić	0	0.00	12	85.71	2	14.29
Dragan Vasiljković	3	30.00	7	70.00	0	0.00
Jovica Stanišić	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Martić	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Mile Mrkšić	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Lazarević	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Babić	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Mile Novaković	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Deronjić	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Momir Talić	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Slavko Dokmanović	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Hadžić	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Sreten Lukić	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vlastimir Đorđević	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Praljak	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Alphons Orié	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Momčilo Perišić	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	3	1.89	145	91.19	11	6.92

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 64 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective foreign political actors: EU institutions

EU institutions	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
European Commission	43	67.19	0	0.00	39	90.70	4	9.30
European Parliament	12	18.75	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
"European Union"	9	14.06	0	0.00	2	22.22	7	77.78
Total	64	100.00	0	0.00	53	82.81	11	17.19

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 65 – Value context of foreign collective political actors: Croatia

Croatia: collective political actors	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Croatian police	11	15.49	0	0.00	7	63.64	4	36.36
Government of Croatia	10	14.08	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Croatian media	9	12.68	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Croatian Democratic Community	8	11.27	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Croatian Armed Forces	7	9.86	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
"Croatian authorities"	6	8.45	0	0.00	0	0.00	6	100.00
Jutarnji list	6	8.45	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
HRT	5	7.04	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
Croatian Embassy	3	4.23	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Croatian Chamber of Commerce	2	2.82	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Croatia	2	2.82	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Administrative Court of Croatia	2	2.82	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	71	100.00	0	0.00	53	74.65	18	25.35

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 66 – Value context of collective foreign political actors: Montenegro

Montenegro	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Ministry of Interior of Montenegro	4	80.00	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Government of Montenegro	1	20.00	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	5	100.00	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 67 – Value context of foreign collective political actors: Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Collective actors	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Prosecution of BiH	6	26.09	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Interior of BiH	4	17.39	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Presidency of BiH	4	17.39	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Government of Republic Srpska	3	13.04	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Black swans	3	13.04	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies in BiH	2	8.70	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Interior in BiH	1	4.35	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	23	100.00	0	0.00	21	91.30	2	8.70

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 68 – Value context of foreign collective political actors: Macedonia

Macedonia: collective political actors	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Macedonian police	7	35	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Macedonian authorities	6	30	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Macedonian media	3	15	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Macedonian railways	3	15	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Macedonian Foreign Ministry	1	5	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	20	100.00	0	0.00	18	90.00	2	10.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 69 – Value context of collective political actors: Kosovo

Kosovo: Collective actors	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Euleks	6	37.50	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Self-Determination Movement	5	31.25	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
KLA	4	25.00	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Government of Kosovo	1	6.25	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	16	100.00	0	0.00	10	62.50	6	37.50

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 70 – Value context of foreign collective political actors: Hungary

Hungary: collective political actors	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Government of Hungary	17	68.00	0	0.00	9	52.94	8	47.06
"Hungarian authorities"	4	16.00	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Total	25	100.00	0	0.00	16	64.00	9	36.00

Hungary: collective political actors	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Parliament of Hungary	2	8.00	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Hungarian Armed Forces	1	4.00	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Hungarian Foreign Ministry	1	4.00	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	25	100.00	0	0.00	16	64.00	9	36.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 71 – Value context of foreign collective political actors: Russia

Russia: Collective political actors	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Embassy of the Russian Federation	2	100.00	0	0.00	1	50.00	1	50.00
Total	2	100.00	0	0.00	1	50.00	1	50.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 72 – Value context of foreign collective political actors: Germany

Germany: collective political actors	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
German Foreign Ministry	2	33.33	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
German Ministry of Interior	2	33.33	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Government of Germany	2	33.33	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	6	100.00	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Even from skimming the overview of the frequency of appearances of individual actors on front pages of selected print media from our sample, it is clear that the media do not treat with equal interest issues from the domain of interior and foreign politics. The fact is that foreign actors on the front pages of Serbian dailies are present in a significantly lower extent (34.45% compared to 65.54% from the domain of domestic political actors). This testifies of the focus of domestic media on the field of interior affairs, which in the interpretation of

certain dailies often takes on the shape of fiction, which will be discussed in more detail in the part of the analysis focused on interpretative strategies in media's processing of certain topics. Reasons for evident lack of interest for economic actors and their understanding of social, economic and political situation in Serbia and the world remains a mystery (merely 3.80% of the total sample of actors is composed of economic actors), even more so if one takes into consideration the fact that the narratives of many politicians emphasize economic issues and economic consolidation of the country as key elements of future developmental strategies of Serbia (please see Table 16 and Tables 73-78).

Table 73 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual domestic economic actors

Economy: domestic individual actors	No.	%
Aleksandar Obradović	17	9.60
Miroslav Mišković	14	7.91
Đoko Krivokapić	13	7.34
Jelena Jovanović	10	5.65
Muhamed Alabar	10	5.65
Cvetan Vasilev	9	5.08
Lidija Udovički	9	5.08
Žarko Pavlović Vačko	7	3.95
Agroposlovi	6	3.39
Ana Brnabić	6	3.39
Continental Winds	6	3.39
Mark Crandall	6	3.39
Marko Čadež	6	3.39
Predrag Ranković Peconi	6	3.39
Martin Winterkorn	5	2.82
Tihomir Petković	5	2.82
Budimir Bulatović Lopov	5	2.82
David Petraeus	4	2.26
Dragan Đurić	4	2.26
Miodrag Kostić	3	1.69
Miroslav Bogičević	3	1.69
Nikola Nedeljković	3	1.69
Violeta Jovanović	3	1.69
Total	177	100.00

Economy: domestic individual actors	No.	%
Zoran Drobnjak	3	1.69
Marko Mišković	3	1.69
Toplica Spasojević	3	1.69
Vladan Atanasijević	3	1.69
Vojin Lazarević	3	1.69
Veselin Jevrosimović	2	1.13
Total	177	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 74 – Value context of individual domestic economic/business actors

Economy: domestic individual actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandar Obradović	0	0.00	4	23.53	13	76.47
Miroslav Mišković	0	0.00	9	64.29	5	35.71
Đoko Krivokapić	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Jelena Jovanović	0	0.00	4	40.00	6	60.00
Muhamed Alabar	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Cvetan Vasilev	0	0.00	5	55.56	4	44.44
Lidija Udovički	0	0.00	5	55.56	4	44.44
Žarko Pavlović Vačko	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Agroposlovi	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
Ana Brnabić	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Continental Winds	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Mark Crandall	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Marko Čadež	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Predrag Ranković Peconi	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Martin Winterkorn	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Tihomir Petković	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Budimir Bulatović Lopov	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Total	0	0.00	120	67.80	57	32.20

Economy: domestic individual actors	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
David Petraeus	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Dragan Đurić	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Miodrag Kostić	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Bogičević	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Nikola Nedeljković	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Violeta Jovanović	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Zoran Drobnjak	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Marko Mišković	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Toplica Spasojević	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladan Atanasijević	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Vojin Lazarević	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Veselin Jevrosimović	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	0	0.00	120	67.80	57	32.20

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 75 – Distribution of appearances of collective domestic economic/business actors

Economy	No.	%
Elektroprivreda Srbije	20	22.99
DIPOS	18	20.69
NALED	9	10.34
Srbijagas	9	10.34
Chamber of Commerce of Serbia	7	8.05
Agroposlovi	6	6.90
Continental Winds	6	6.90
Srpska fabrika stakla	5	5.75
Železara Smederevo	4	4.60
Elektromreže Srbije	3	3.45
Total	87	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 75 – Distribution of appearances of collective domestic economic/business actors

Economy	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Elektroprivreda Srbije	0	0.00	14	70.00	6	30.00
DIPOS	0	0.00	11	61.11	7	38.89
NALED	0	0.00	5	55.56	4	44.44
Srbijagas	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Chamber of Commerce of Serbia	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Agroposlovi	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
Continental Winds	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Srpska fabrika stakla	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Železara Smederevo	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Elektromreže Srbije	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	0	0.00	65	74.71	22	25.29

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 77 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual foreign economic/business actors

IMF/World Bank Representatives	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Christine Lagarde	9	69.23	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	
James Roaf	4	30.77	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	
Total	13	100.00	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 78 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective foreign economic/business actors

IMF/World Bank Representatives	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
IMF	30	85.71	0	0.00	30	100.00	0	0.00
World Bank	5	14.29	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Total	35	100.00	0	0.00	35	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Apart from the mentioned political and economic actors, protagonists of front pages are also various social actors, who in different ways affect social and political occurrences in Serbia. Based on the collected empirical content, we divided them into:

1. individual: (a) representatives of independent governmental bodies (please see table 79), (b) various analysts⁴ of political, social, economic, security and other circumstances (Tables 80, 81 and 82) (c) representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations (Tables 83, 84 and 85), (d) representatives of the judicial system (Table 86), (e) actors related to “migrant crisis” (Table 87) and (f) protagonists of various political-entertainment or criminal affairs⁵ (Tables 88-91), and those
2. collective, which include independent governmental bodies (Table 92), Serbian Orthodox Church (Table 93), judicial bodies (Table 94) and collective actors related to “migrant crisis” (Table 95)

Table 79 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: Representatives of independent governmental bodies

Representatives of independent bodies	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Saša Janković	60	66.67	0	0.00	12	20.00	48	80.00
Brankica Janković	15	16.67	0	0.00	13	86.67	2	13.33
Rodoljub Šabić	10	11.11	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Total	90	100.00	0	0.00	40	44.44	50	55.56

4 For more information on the share of individual analysts on the front pages of different media from our sample, please see Tables 143-149 in the Appendix.

5 One part of the front pages from the sample was taken up by numerous affairs which largely referred to the political life in Serbia, from the perspective of show biz/entertainment and crime, so based on the large presence of actors from these texts, separate tables illustrating these practice are given. For instance, actors grouped around the “Lottery” scandal (Draw of lottery numbers in the 59th round of the chance game “Loto” on 28th July 2015 caused a stir in the public, media, as well as state authorities and institutions. In the TV broadcast of the number draw, the fifth number appeared on the screens before the ball was actually drawn from the drum. This incident caused doubt in the manner the National Lottery of Serbia is organizing chance games, and the whole incident has been referred to by the public as the “Lottery” scandal), the “Banana” scandal (Network for investigation of crime and corruption KRIK published in early September 2015 on their site, videos from 2008 and 2009 where Rodoljub Radulović, often referred to by the media as Miša Banana, accused of smuggling cocaine as part of Darko Šarić’s group, met with the current heads of the Ministry of Interior, including the former minister at the time, Ivica Dačić. Media discussed for days about the said videos with the participation of all social and political actors. The event was referred to by the media as the “Banana” scandal) and alleged love affairs of starlets and politicians, who usually remained anonymous.

The biggest number of texts generated information about the “advisor in the Government of Serbia” (or Ministry of Foreign Affairs depending on the report) Dušica Jevđenović, who, according to the media, has “a child with a powerful politician,” whose identity was intensively speculated about. Several media outlets discussed her actions and commented her personal life, introducing her family, relatives, friends and “PR” into the narrative. Headlines like “Politician financing a long summer vacation of the reckless starlet” were an everyday occurrence in the analyzed media.

Several texts were written about the scandal of the “beauty queen killer” and “member of parliament,” as media referred to Slobodanka Tošić and Žika Gojković, so headlines read “Beauty queen killer having an affair with an MP” and similar. As part of this affair, prior to the revealing of the identity of the MP, even “lists of suspects” surfaced.

Representatives of independent bodies	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Jelisaveta Vasilčić	3	3.33	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Tatjana Babić	2	2.22	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	90	100.00	0	0.00	40	44.44	50	55.56

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Analysts have a special part in the texts on front pages of the media from the sample (please see Table 80 and 81). Media treat them in a neutral context in as much as 99.03% of the texts, while the remaining 0.78% of writings treats Danijel Cvjetičanin (in three texts) and Dušan Spasojević (in one text) in negative context.

Table 80 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual domestic social actors: Analysts

Analysts	No.	%
Dragomir Anđelković	40	7.77
Branko Radun	37	7.18
Dušan Janjić	29	5.63
Božidar Spasić	21	4.08
Zlatko Nikolić	20	3.88
Marko Nicović	18	3.50
Milan Nikolić	17	3.30
Dejan Vuk Stanković	16	3.11
Đorđe Vukadinović	15	2.91
Vladislav Jovanović	15	2.91
Mahmut Bušatlija	14	2.72
Milan Kovačević	13	2.52
Goran Nikolić	12	2.33
Miroslav Lazanski	10	1.94
Božidar Prelević	9	1.75
Mladen Kovačević	9	1.75
Aleksandra Joksimović	8	1.55
Đorđe Đukić	8	1.55
Ljubodrag Savić	8	1.55
Total	515	100.00

Analysts	No.	%
Milan Škulić	8	1.55
Vladimir Goati	8	1.55
Vladimir Vuletić	8	1.55
Zoran Dragišić	8	1.55
Aleksandar Radić	8	1.55
Dušan Spasojević	7	1.36
Milojko Arsić	7	1.36
Čedomir Antić	6	1.17
Cvijetin Milivojević	6	1.17
Miroslav Šutić	6	1.17
Ljubomir Madžar	6	1.17
Vladimir Pejić	6	1.17
Darko Trifunović	6	1.17
Miladin Ševarlić	5	0.97
Boško Jakšić	5	0.97
Dejan Jović	5	0.97
Dalibor Katančević	5	0.97
Milan Antonijević	4	0.78
Aleksandar Popov	4	0.78
Aleksandra Janković	4	0.78
Dušan T. Bataković	4	0.78
Orhan Dragaš	4	0.78
Ratko Božović	4	0.78
Vojislav Vuletić	4	0.78
Živadin Jovanović	4	0.78
Milan Mijalkovski	3	0.58
Fatmir Šeholi	3	0.58
Ljubinko Savić	3	0.58
Milan Prostran	3	0.58
Slobodan Samardžić	3	0.58
Stevica Deđanski	3	0.58
Davor Đenero	3	0.58
Vladimir Gligorov	3	0.58
Total	515	100.00

Analysts	No.	%
Danica Popović	3	0.58
Danijel Cvjetičanin	3	0.58
Miroslav Zdravković	3	0.58
Ivo Visković	2	0.39
Dragan Zečević	2	0.39
Draško Đenović	2	0.39
Dušan Simeonović	2	0.39
Aleksandar Stevanović	2	0.39
Jovo Bakić	2	0.39
Slobodan Antonić	2	0.39
Đerđ Pap	2	0.39
Danilo Šuković	2	0.39
Dobrivoje Radovanović	1	0.19
Ljubodrag Stojadinović	1	0.19
Miodrag Zec	1	0.19
Total	515	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 81 – Value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: Analysts

Analysts	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Dragomir Anđelković	0	0.00	40	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Radun	0	0.00	37	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Janjić	0	0.00	29	100.00	0	0.00
Božidar Spasić	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
Zlatko Nikolić	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Nicović	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Nikolić	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Dejan Vuk Stanković	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Vukadinović	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Vladislav Jovanović	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Mahmut Bušatlija	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Kovačević	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Nikolić	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Lazanski	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Božidar Prelević	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Mladen Kovačević	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandra Joksimović	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Đukić	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Savić	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Škulić	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Goati	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Vuletić	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Dragišić	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Radić	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Spasojević	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Milojko Arsić	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Čedomir Antić	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Cvijetin Milivojević	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Šutić	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubomir Mađžar	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Total	1	0.19	510	99.03	4	0.78

Analysts	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Vladimir Pejić	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Darko Trifunović	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Miladin Ševarlić	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Boško Jakšić	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dejan Jović	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dalibor Katančević	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Antonijević	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Popov	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandra Janković	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan T. Bataković	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Orhan Dragaš	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ratko Božović	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vojislav Vuletić	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Živadin Jovanović	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Mijalkovski	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Fatmir Šeholi	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubinko Savić	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Prostran	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Samardžić	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Stevica Deđanski	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Davor Đenero	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Gligorov	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Danica Popović	1	33.33	2	66.67	0	0.00
Danijel Cvjetičanin	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Miroslav Zdravković	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ivo Visković	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Zečević	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Draško Đenović	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Simeonović	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Stevanović	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Jovo Bakić	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Antić	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	1	0.19	510	99.03	4	0.78

Analysts	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Đerđ Pap	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Daniilo Šuković	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Dobrivoje Radovanović	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Stojadinović	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Zec	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	1	0.19	510	99.03	4	0.78

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 82 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages in different media from our research sample

Media	Number of analysts	%
Informer	165	32.03
Kurir	132	25.63
Politika	70	13.59
Alo!	39	7.57
Večernje novosti	38	7.37
Blic	37	7.18
Danas	34	6.6
Total	515	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 83 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual domestic social actors: Representatives of Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations

Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations	No.	%
Patriarch Irinej	28	24.56
Pope Francis	16	14.04
Alojzije Stepinac	15	13.16
Muamer Zukorlić	13	11.40
Metropolitan Amfilohije	9	7.89
Muhamed Jusufspahić	5	4.39
Total	114	100.00

Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations	No.	%
Bishop Irinej	4	3.51
Patriarch Pavle	4	3.51
Bishop Vasilije	3	2.63
Bishop Teodosije	3	2.63
Bishop Grigorije	2	1.75
Bishop Jovan	2	1.75
Prior Teokist	1	0.88
Bishop of Dalmatia Fotije	1	0.88
Bishop Jefrem	1	0.88
Bishop Joanikije	1	0.88
Bishop Lavrentije	1	0.88
Bishop Filaret	1	0.88
Metropolitan Porfirije	1	0.88
Mother Anastazija	1	0.88
Mother Makarija Sokolička	1	0.88
Metropolitan Stratimirović	1	0.88
Total	114	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 84 – Value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors – Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations

Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Patriarch Irinej	0	0.00	27	96.43	1	3.57
Pope Francis	2	12.50	13	81.25	1	6.25
Alojzije Stepinac	0	0.00	10	66.67	5	33.33
Muamer Zukorlić	0	0.00	10	76.92	3	23.08
Metropolitan Amfilohije	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Muhamed Jusufspahić	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Total	5	4.39	99	86.84	10	8.77

Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Bishop Irinej	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Patriarch Pavle	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Bishop Vasilije	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Teodosije	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Grigorije	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Jovan	1	50.00	1	50.00	0	0.00
Prior Teokist	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop of Dalmatia Fotije	1	100.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Bishop Jefrem	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Joanikije	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Lavrentije	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Filaret	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Metropolitan Porfirije	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Mother Anastazija	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Mother Makarija Sokolička	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Metropolitan Stratimirović	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	5	4.39	99	86.84	10	8.77

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 85 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations on the front pages in different media from our research sample

Media outlet	No.	%
Večernje novosti	45	30.82
Politika	44	30.13
Informer	18	12.32
Alo!	16	10.95
Total	146	100

Media outlet	No.	%
Kurir	10	6.84
Danas	7	4.79
Blic	6	4.1
Total	146	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 86 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearance of individual domestic social actors: Representatives of the judicial bodies

Representatives of the judicial bodies	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Miljko Radisavljević	10	33.33	1	10.00	8	80.00	1	10.00
Zagorka Dolovac	9	30.00	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Vukčević	8	26.67	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Saša Ivanić	3	10.00	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	30	100.00	1	3.33	27	90.00	2	6.67

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 87 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearance of individual domestic social actors: actors related to the “migrant crisis”

Actors related to the “migrant crisis”	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Radoš Đurović	20	34.48	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Mišković	12	20.69	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Ahmet Haljimi	11	18.97	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Cucić	5	8.62	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Ivanišević	4	6.90	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Gerginov	3	5.17	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mirjana Ivanović-Milenkovski	3	5.17	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	58	100.00	0	0.00	58	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 88 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: Protagonists of political-entertainment affairs

Protagonists of political-entertainment affairs	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Dušica Jevđenić	23	20.72	0	0.00	7	30.43	16	69.57
Radoslav Milojević Kena	9	8.11	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Ivan Jevđenić	8	7.21	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Filip Jevđenić	8	7.21	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Unnamed politician, father of Dušica Jevđenić's child	8	7.21	0	0.00	2	25.00	6	75.00
Slobodanka Tošić	8	7.21	0	0.00	0	0.00	8	100.00
Nataša Šavija	7	6.31	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Tijana Ajfon	7	6.31	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Slađana Pantić	6	5.41	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Željka Rolović	6	5.41	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
Stanija Dobrojević	6	5.41	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Žika Gojković	5	4.50	0	0.00	0	0.00	5	100.00
Anđela Veštica	3	2.70	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Dušan Jevđenić	2	1.80	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Katarina Smiljanić	2	1.80	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	100.00
Tamara Đurić	2	1.80	0	0.00	1	50.00	1	50.00
Una Grujić	1	0.90	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Total	111	100.00	0	0.00	59	53.15	52	46.85

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 89 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of protagonists of political-entertainment affairs on the front pages in different media from our research sample

Media outlet	No.	%
Kurir	76	68.46
Informer	12	10.81
Total	111	100

Media outlet	No.	%
Alo!	11	9.9
Blic	10	9
Večernje novosti	1	0.9
Politika	1	0.9
Danas	0	0
Total	111	100

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 90 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: Protagonists of the Banana scandal

"Banana" scandal	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Rodoljub Radulović-Miša Banana	40	47.06	0	0.00	31	77.50	9	22.50
Vanja Vukić	17	20.00	0	0.00	15	88.24	2	11.76
Branko Lazarević	16	18.82	0	0.00	12	75.00	4	25.00
Ivica Tončev	12	14.12	0	0.00	9	75.00	3	25.00
Total	85	100.00	0	0.00	67	78.82	18	21.18

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 91 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: Protagonists of the "Lottery" scandal

"Lottery" scandal	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandar Vulović	25	27.17	0	0.00	19	76.00	6	24.00
Serbian National Lottery	23	25.00	0	0.00	13	56.52	10	43.48
Aleksandra Gudelj	11	11.96	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
Ljubomir Škorić	10	10.87	0	0.00	7	70.00	3	30.00
Arsen Dobrota	8	8.70	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Company Nirvana	5	5.43	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Total	92	100.00	0	0.00	68	73.91	24	26.09

"Lottery" scandal	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Tijana Anđelić	5	5.43	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Nenad Lazarević	3	3.26	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Branimir Božović	2	2.17	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	92	100.00	0	0.00	68	73.91	24	26.09

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 92 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective domestic social actors: Independent governmental bodies

Independent bodies	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Anti-Corruption Agency	14	66.67	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
State Auditing Institution	5	23.81	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Commission for Equality Protection	2	9.52	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	21	100.00	0	0.00	20	95.24	1	4.76

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 93 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective domestic social actors: Serbian Orthodox Church

Serbian Orthodox Church	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Serbian Orthodox Church	28	87.50	0	0.00	26	92.86	2	7.14
Raško-prizrenska eparchy	1	3.13	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Patriarchate of Peć	3	9.38	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	32	100.00	0	0.00	30	93.75	2	6.25

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 94 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective domestic social actors: judicial bodies

Judicial bodies	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Higher Public Prosecutor in Belgrade	15	35.71	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Prosecution for Organized Crime	9	21.43	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Higher Court in Belgrade	6	14.29	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Republic Public Prosecution	5	11.90	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Prosecution for War Crimes	4	9.52	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Administrative Court	3	7.14	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	42	100.00	0	0.00	41	97.62	1	2.38

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 95 – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective domestic social actors: actors related to the "migrant crisis"

Actors related to the "migrant crisis"	No.	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Commission for Refugees and Migrations	13	61.90	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Red Cross	8	38.10	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Total	21	100.00	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Out of the total number of actors, second-ranked is the actor who appears in the narratives of journalists from daily papers under the alias “unnamed source” or alternative alias like “sources of our paper,” “sources known to the news desk” (as many as 464 texts from our sample mention unnamed sources, please see Table 16).

Frequency of appearances of this type of suspicious⁶ interviewees/sources of information is equally high in all dailies⁷ (please see Table 133), which vividly speaks of different editorial policies implementing their basic principles of professional ethics presented in the *Journalists’ Code of Serbia*⁸ in various ways. The proneness to use anonymous sources⁹, which is evident from data on the frequency of their appearances in cases of certain media, in some way follows the logic of the colloquial division between the dailies to those with a dominantly tabloid character and those which strive not to be like that. Unfortunately, according to the data from our sample, within the media space of Serbia fighting the comprehensive external and internal processes of tabloidization and turning the media into infotainment appears to be a very demanding task with an uncertain outcome.

Causes

Though the third-quarter sample was considerably increased, by 29.82% or 499 texts, this increase did not induce a change in the structure of causes. Similar type of events and actors initiated media reporting, i.e. causes for reporting were aligned with the findings from the previous two *Mediameters*.¹⁰ The media continue to come up with their own topics, so in the third trimester *causes developed by the editorial staff* were present with a share of 27.62% or 600 texts (about 3.5% less than in the previous period). This cause is again most present in

6 In the sense of their transparency, availability for checking certain information, internal motivation to take part in interpreting certain events, opening and/or clarifying certain affairs and similar.

7 For example, the biggest number of “unnamed sources” is present in the paper *Informer* (109), followed by *Kurir* (74), *Blic* (68) and daily *Alo!* (66).

8 *Journalists’ Code of Serbia* was adopted in 2006 by the Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia. Journalist associations supplemented the Code in 2013 with provisions on the preventing of corruption and conflict of interest. Within the professional community of journalists, the adopting of the Code was recognized as an important contribution to the strengthening of the media self-regulation and improvement of ethical standards of free and independent journalism.

9 For example, Chapter VI which regulates “Attitude towards sources of information”, paragraph 3, of this Code says: **“A journalist is obliged to honor a source’s request for anonymity. Making up anonymous sources is a serious violation of standard professional actions of journalists.**

Guidelines:

- Usage of anonymous (confidential) sources is generally not recommended, unless there is no other way to obtain information of extreme public importance.
- Often, use of unnamed sources of information represents merely a way for the source or the journalist himself/herself or media to put forward inaccurate, incomplete and insufficiently verified information. In case hiding sources is used for covering for their inexistence, this can cause serious detriment to the credibility of the journalist/media.
- Anonymity/confidentiality needs to be enabled to sources who can give information from “first hand”, i.e. documents which directly confirm, or in itself represent information of extreme significance for the public.
- Editor is obliged to check with the journalist the justification of using anonymous (confidential) sources of information. In that sense, it is necessary for at least one editor to know and protect the identity of an unnamed source.
- If the source of information requests from the journalist not to reveal his/her identity to the editor, this request should be denied” (*Journalists’ Code of Serbia*, 2013:20-21)

10 Tables show top five causes based on frequency.

texts about the political life in Serbia (134 texts), the ombudsman Saša Janković (47)¹¹ and the economy (37), but this time a lot of texts focusing on regional relations (37) and refugees and migrants (28), were developed by the editorial staff. Texts published based on causes developed by the editorial staff have a clear value context, so 341 texts or 56.83% is either positive or negative¹². Other more frequent causes were *event initiated by a foreign factor* (18.05%), *event initiated by the other relevant actor* (12.15%), *statement of the other relevant actor* (11.05%) and *events initiated by the Government of the Republic of Serbia* (3.73%). If we compare the findings with the previous quarter, distribution and share of causes are nearly identical, except for the increase of the share of texts where the cause is the *event initiated by a foreign factor* about 5%.

Table 96 – Distribution of causes in the seven media from the sample

Total	no. of appearances	% share
cause developed by the editorial staff	600	27.62
event initiated by a foreign factor	392	18.05
event initiated by the other relevant actor	264	12.15
statement of the other relevant actor	240	11.05
event initiated by the Government of RS	81	3.73

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 97 – Cause developed by the editorial staff – most frequent topics and value context in the seven media from the sample

Cause developed by the editorial staff/topic	no. of texts	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
political life in Serbia	134	0	0.00	74	55.22	60	44.78
Ombudsman Saša Janković	47	0	0.00	0	0	47	100
Economy	37	2	5.41	11	29.73	24	64.86
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	37	1	2.70	13	35.14	23	62.16
Migrants/refugees	28	9	32.14	17	60.71	2	7.14

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

11 Topic of *Ombudsman Saša Janković* is present only in the daily *Informer*.

12 For more information, please see Table 164 in the Appendix.

Distribution of the first four causes in the daily *Večernje novosti* is identical to the previous quarter, and texts are usually developed as a result of events initiated by a foreign factor (29.51%). Events related to other relevant actors and causes developed by the editorial staff have shares of 14.75%, i.e. 11.75% respectively, while events initiated by the Government of the Republic Serbia generated 7.38% of texts. These findings are entirely in compliance with the previous edition of the *Mediameter*, but this time there is a fifth cause with significant presence in 21 texts (5.74%) statement of the other relevant actor.

Table 98 – Distribution of causes in *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	no. of appearances	% učešća
event initiated by a foreign factor	108	29.51
event initiated by the other relevant actor	54	14.75
cause developed by the editorial staff	43	11.75
event initiated by the Government of RS	27	7.38
statement of the other relevant actor	21	5.74

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

The biggest number of texts in the daily *Blic* is based on the cause developed by the editorial staff; however, over all three quarters the share of this cause has been decreasing – from 52.57% in the first, 36.53% in the second, to 33.18% in the third quarter. Participation of other causes is very similar to the previous quarter, so events and statements related to the other relevant actor are present with 19.63% and 9.35% shares. *Event initiated by a foreign factor* is present in 13.08% texts, causes in 3.27% texts were *event initiated by the prosecution/court* and *event initiated by the Government of Serbia*.

Table 99 – Distribution of causes in *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	no. of appearances	% share
cause developed by the editorial staff	71	33.18
event initiated by the other relevant actor	42	19.63
event initiated by a foreign factor	28	13.08
statement of the other relevant actor	20	9.35
event initiated by the Government of RS	7	3.27
event initiated by the prosecution/court	7	3.27

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

The most frequent cause in the daily *Kurir* (present 27.08% or 52 texts) is *statement of the other relevant actor*. Share of this cause has doubled in comparison to the second quarter, when it was 13.48%. All other findings are similar to results from the previous period, so in the third trimester *Kurir* had a slightly lower number of texts developed by the editorial staff (16.67%), while other causes were *event initiated by a foreign factor* (14.58), *event initiated by the other relevant actor* (9.9%) and statement of the PM of Republic of Serbia (6.25%).

Table 100 – Distribution of causes in *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	no. of appearances	% share
statement of the other relevant actor	52	27.08
cause developed by the editorial staff	32	16.67
event initiated by a foreign factor	28	14.58
event initiated by the other relevant actor	19	9.90
statement of the PM of RS	12	6.25

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

In the daily *Alo!* topics developed by the editorial staff again have the biggest share with 48.42% or 107 texts (previous period – 49.7%, 83 texts). Statements of the Prime Minister of Serbia are the cause of 4.07% of texts, which is also consistent with the previous trimester, while the order and share of other causes in the paper *Alo!* have changed to a larger extent compared to the previous period. *Event initiated by a foreign factor* now has a share of 12.22% of analyzed texts in these dailies, while other causes are events and statements initiated by the other relevant actor in 10.86%, i.e. 4.52% of texts.

Table 101 – Distribution of causes in *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	no. of appearances	% share
cause developed by the editorial staff	107	48.42
event initiated by a foreign factor	27	12.22
event initiated by the other relevant actor	24	10.86
statement of the other relevant actor	10	4.52
statement of the PM of RS	9	4.07

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Informer has an increased number of texts developed by the editorial in the third quarter with a share of 58.14% or 175 texts, i.e. 53.59% or 112 writings in the second period of 2015. Distribution and share of causes differ compared to the previous edition of *Mediameter*, therefore events and statements of other relevant actors now initiated 14.95% of texts (compared to 22%), while *event initiated by a foreign factor* represents cause of 13.62% texts. Events related to the justice system initiated 2.66% of writings.

Table 102 – Distribution of causes in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	no. of appearances	% share
cause developed by the editorial staff	175	58.14
event initiated by a foreign factor	41	13.62
event initiated by the other relevant actor	26	8.64
statement of the other relevant actor	19	6.31
event initiated by prosecution/court	8	2.66

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Top five causes in terms of share in the daily *Politika* has not changed considerably compared to the second quarter, except for the cause *event initiated by a foreign factor* which initiated 7% more texts compared to the previous period, so the share of this cause is highest up to now and amounts to 20.65% (101 texts). *Statement of the other relevant actor* is the second-ranked cause with 17.18% while the share of texts cause of which was developed by the editorial staff is equal as in the previous trimester and amounts to 16.36%. *Event initiated by the other relevant actor* and reporting of the other media were causes for 6.75% and 6.34% of texts.

Table 103 – Distribution of causes in *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	no. of appearances	% share
event initiated by a foreign factor	101	20.65
statement of the other relevant actor	84	17.18
cause developed by the editorial staff	80	16.36
event initiated by the other relevant actor	33	6.75
reporting of the other media	31	6.34

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Number of texts developed by the editorial staff in the daily *Danas* has been considerably decreasing – from 42.86% (138) in the previous trimester, to 23.65% (92) in the third quarter. However, this is still the most present cause in this newspaper. Events and statements of other relevant actors are the cause in 25.71% of texts (rise of about 7% compared to the previous period), while texts initiated by a foreign factor with a share of 15.17%. Events initiated by the domestic judicial bodies, as well as the Government of the Republic of Serbia, were causes of 4.37% of texts.

Table 104 – Distribution of causes in the paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	no. of appearances	% share
cause developed by the editorial staff	92	23.65
event initiated by the other relevant actor	66	16.97
event initiated by a foreign factor	59	15.17
statement of the other relevant actor	34	8.74
events initiated by the prosecution/court	17	4.37
event initiated by the Government of RS	17	4.37

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Events and statements of the Prime Minister and representatives of the Government of the Republic of Serbia generated almost an equal number of texts as in the previous edition of *Mediameter*, so the share of these writings is now 10.27% (223 texts), while in the previous trimester they amounted to 10.46%. As it was already underlined in the first two numbers of *Mediameter*, this information certainly does not point to the context and intonation of these texts, but speaks of the manner of selecting texts which may be found on the front pages of the seven most influential daily papers.

Table 105 – Share of texts initiated by statements and activities of the President and representatives of the Government of RS in the seven media from the sample

Cause	no. of texts	% in the total number of texts
event initiated by the Government of RS	81	3.73
event initiated by the PM of RS	76	3.5
statement of the Government of RS	35	1.61
statement of the PM of RS	31	1.43
Total	223	10.27

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Topics

Each of the 2172 selected texts from the sample from the front pages of the seven analyzed dailies has been grouped under a certain topic, which represented a formidable challenge given the multitude of various pieces of information which can be read in nearly all newspaper texts. Apart from the most dominant topic, elements which are present in the text have been recorded (possibility of multiple choice), in order to formulate the topic as precisely as possible. Most of the topics with wider definitions from the first and second quarter of 2015 are still present, but three events of significance for the period July – September have been separately indexed: *marking of the twentieth anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica*, among other things, includes reporting on the proposed British resolution in UN, on the attack on the PM of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić in Potočari, and all other relevant events connected to the marking of this date, *marking of the twentieth anniversary of the military operation Storm* and *reporting about migrants/refugees*.

Share of Topics

Topic *political life in Serbia*, which includes activities of all political actors on all levels of government, except activities of the *Government of the Republic of Serbia*, *activities of the Prime Minister* and *activities of the President of Serbia*, takes up the biggest share in the third quarter – 14.27%. All four “political” topics, however, attract less attention of the media than in the previous two trimesters – this is now 18.7%, compared to 23.3% from the second and 33.68% from the first quarter. Regional relations / regional cooperation is the topic which attracted 9.39% of journalists’ attention, which is an increase of share by about 4%, however, if we look at absolute numbers, in the third quarter, this is a dominant topic in 204 texts, unlike 89 from the period April – June. This increase in the number of texts is in close connection to the complicating of regional relations due to the “migrant crisis,” marking of the anniversary of Operation Storm and crimes in Srebrenica. Out of these three topics, the biggest number of writings focused on migrants/refugees -7.46% or 162 texts, and marking of the crime in Srebrenica – 5.43% or 118 texts. Interest of the media for the areas of economy and economics is now somewhat bigger and amounts to 8.1% (in the second quarter of these topics made up for 7.21% of the front pages). Topics *Kosovo/relations of Belgrade and Priština* and *crime*¹³ were present with 86 texts or 3.96% texts, *Greek politics* is present in 78 (3.59%), while the topic of *EU/EU politics* is present in 3.41%, i.e. 74 texts.

If we look at the value context, 45.4% of all texts from the sample has evaluative connotation (for more information, please see **Table 106**). Topic which is largely presented in a negative context is *EU/EU politics* with 77.03%, i.e. 57 out of the total of 74 texts. More than 50% of texts with negative connotations were observed for the topics *marking of the anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica* (55.93%) and *economy* (54.78%). When it comes to relations in the re-

13 About 50% of texts in which the dominant topic is *crime* refer to the solving of the attempted murder of the businessman Milan Beko.

gion, this is a topic which has been traditionally, over all three quarters, presented in a negative context, however, the number of negative texts has considerably increased from 38.89% in the first, to 43.82% in the second and finally to 54.41% in the third quarter. Topic *political life in Serbia* was presented negatively in 118, i.e. 38.06% of texts, and the remaining texts were in neutral context. *Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština* and *crime* were topics which were presented negatively in 29.07%, i.e. 22.09% of the texts, respectively. The biggest number of positive texts was written on *migrants/refugees* (to be precise, about migrant policies) 23, i.e. 14.2% and *Greek politics* (negotiations with creditors, referendum and elections in that country) 14 texts or 17.95%. Writings about *migrants/refugees* were negative in only 4.94% of the texts, while Greek politics were presented in a negative light in 15.38% of texts.

Table 106 –Distribution of topics and their value context in the seven media from the sample

Topic		%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
political life in Serbia	310	14.27	0	0.00	192	61.94	118	38.06
regional cooperation/relations in the region	204	9.39	5	2.45	88	43.14	111	54.41
migrants/refugees	162	7.46	23	14.20	131	80.86	8	4.94
marking of 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	118	5.43	8	6.78	44	37.29	66	55.93
economy	115	5.29	5	4.35	47	40.87	63	54.78
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	86	3.96	4	4.65	57	66.28	25	29.07
crime	86	3.96	0	0.00	67	77.91	19	22.09
Greek politics	78	3.59	14	17.95	52	66.67	12	15.38
EU/EU politics	74	3.41	1	1.35	16	21.62	57	77.03
economics	61	2.81	2	3.28	38	62.30	21	34.43

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 107 – Share and value context for the three selected topics in the seven media from the sample

All media outlets	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
migrants/refugees	162	7.46	23	14.20	131	80.86	8	4.94
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	118	5.43	8	6.78	44	37.29	66	55.93
marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm	60	2.76	0	0.00	22	36.67	38	63.33
Total	340	15.65	31	9.11	197	57.94	112	32.94

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 108 – Value context compared to all the topics from all seven media from the sample

All media – value context	no. of texts	%
positive	129	5.94
neutral	1.186	54.6
negative	857	39.46
Total	2.172	100%

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Migrants/refugees is the topic which was sprawling with the most versatile elements – from international and regional relations to EU politics and economy. The position of most media is especially interesting when writing about relations in the region and EU politics through the prism of “migrant crisis.” Most media reported about EU politics, in this context, from a negative evaluative standpoint, in as much as 82.69% of the texts. Taking into account all the texts in all the analyzed media, out of the total of 57 of negative writings (please see **Table 106 and Table 109**) more than three quarters, i.e. 43 texts are connected to the “migrant crisis.” There are no positive attitudes, while 9 texts or 17.31% of texts were neutral. When it comes to relations in the region, negative context is also present in 61.67% of the writings (please see **Table 110**).

Table 109 – Value context of texts with primary topic of *EU/EU politics*, with the present element of *migrants/refugees*

Topic: EU/EU politics		
Element: migrants/refugees		
Value context	No.	%
positive	0	0.00
neutral	9	17.31
negative	43	82.69
Total	52	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 110 – Value context of texts in which the primary topic is *regional cooperation/regional relations*, with present element *migrants/refugees*

Topic: regional cooperation/relations in the region		
Element: migrants/refugees		
Value context	No.	%
positive	1	1.67
neutral	22	36.67
negative	37	61.67
Total	60	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Distribution of topics per media

Blic

Topic *political life in Serbia* with a share of 17.76% is the most prevalent in texts which were included in the sample from the front pages of *Blic*, and about 40% of all writings were presented in negative context. The next topic that caught this paper’s interest was *migrants/refugees*. 21 texts (9.81% share) were published on this topic. Only 14% of these writings are negative, 61.9% is neutral, while journalists of *Blic* wrote about this topic in a positive light in 5, i.e. 23.81% of the texts. In the third quarter, topics which refer to regional cooperation and EU politics received a completely different evaluative connotation compared to the previous period. When it comes to regional relations, in as much as 75% of texts of *Blic* were presented in a negative light (15 texts), and two more texts were positive and three negative (unlike the 37.5% negative texts in the second quarter). Topic of *EU/EU politics*, which was present

only in one neutral text in the previous trimester, is now present in 10 writings, out of which 9 (90%) are in negative context. Among other topics, the most prevalent in *Blic* were *crime* (15 texts, out of which 73.33% in neutral context), *the lottery scandal* (9 texts, 88.89% negative), *sport*¹⁴ (8 texts, 37.5% with negative connotation) and *social issues/social policy* (7 texts out of which 57.14% negative). Remaining two events of significance for the third quarter (with already described topic of migrants/refugees) – *marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica* and *marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm*, were present in 10, i.e. 9 texts respectively, where, in both cases, a little over half of the texts were presented in negative context (please see **Table 112**).

More than half of the texts from the sampled front pages (52.34%) were presented either in a positive or negative context (for more information, please see **Table 113**).

Table 111 – Distribution of topics and their value context in *Blic*

Blic	frequency	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
political life in Serbia	38	17.76	0	0.00	23	60.53	15	39.47
migrants/refugees	21	9.81	5	23.81	13	61.90	3	14.29
regional cooperation/relations in the region	20	9.35	2	10.00	3	15.00	15	75.00
crime	15	7.01	0	0.00	11	73.33	4	26.67
marking of the 20 th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	10	4.67	1	10.00	4	40.00	5	50.00
EU/EU politics	10	4.67	0	0.00	1	10.00	9	90.00
marking of the 20 th anniversary of Operation Storm	9	4.21	0	0.00	4	44.44	5	55.56
the "Lottery" scandal	9	4.21	0	0.00	1	11.11	8	88.89
sport	8	3.74	0	0.00	5	62.50	3	37.50
social issues/social policy	7	3.27	0	0.00	3	42.86	4	57.14

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

¹⁴ Texts on sport and entertainment were analyzed only in cases where they had political connotations. In writings from the sample, these were, for example, texts in which the so called "starlets" are tied to politicians, then writings about the "interruption of the direct broadcast of the Croatian national radio-television (HRT) during the performance of the Serbian national anthem at the medal-awarding ceremony at the world championship in water polo" and similar.

Table 112 – Share and value context for the three selected topics in the daily *Blic*

Blic	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
migrants/refugees	21	9.81	5	23.81	13	61.90	3	14.29
marking of the 20 th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	10	4.67	1	10.00	4	40.00	5	50.00
marking of the 20 th anniversary of Operation Storm	9	4.21	0	0.00	4	44.44	5	55.56
Total	40	18.69	6	15.00	21	52.50	13	32.50

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 113 – Value context compared to other topics in *Blic*

<i>Blic</i> – value context	no. of texts	%
positive	16	7.48
neutral	102	47.66
negative	96	44.86
Total	214	100%

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Kurir

Political life in Serbia was again the most prevalent topic in *Kurir* in the third quarter, present in 56 texts, or 29.1% of front-page texts, with equal shares of 50% of negative and neutral contexts, which matches the findings from the previous issue of *Mediameter*. Topics related to regional relations were presented in 9.9% of the texts, but *Kurir* wrote more neutrally about these topics (52.63%), while the remaining texts (47.37%) were in negative value context. Crime was the topic in 9 texts (77.78% neutral), while *civil society*, *entertainment/show biz* and *sport* were topics in 7 or 3.65% of the texts each (please see value contexts in **Table 114**). Information on activities of the Government of the Republic of Serbia was presented in 6 texts, 3 neutral (50%), two positive (33.33%) and one negative (16.67%). Topics related to EU were not in the focus of *Kurir* and were present in two neutral texts. Two out of three topics which we paid special attention to in this quarter – *marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica* and *migrants/refugees* – were present in 10 or 5.21% of texts, each. When referring to migrants, all writings were in neutral context, while evaluative position was clearly present in 90% of the texts (20% positive and 70% negative) when considering topics related to Srebrenica. The third topic, *marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm* had a share

of 2.6% (5 texts), out of which 20% in neutral and 80% in negative context (Table 115). 52.6% of the texts in *Kurir* do not have a value context, while 44.27% of the texts have a negative and 3.13% positive connotation (Table 116).

Table 114 – Distribution of topics and their value context in *Kurir*

Kurir	frequency	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
political life in Serbia	56	29.17	0	0.00	28	50.00	28	50.00
regional cooperation/relations in the region	19	9.90	0	0.00	10	52.63	9	47.37
activities of the President of Serbia	13	6.77	0	0.00	0	0.00	13	100.00
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	10	5.21	2	20.00	1	10.00	7	70.00
migrants/refugees	10	5.21	0	0.00	10	100.00		0.00
crime	9	4.69	0	0.00	7	77.78	2	22.22
civil society	7	3.65	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
sport	7	3.65	0	0.00	3	42.86	4	57.14
entertainment/show biz	7	3.65	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
activities of the Government of RS	6	3.13	2	33.33	3	50.00	1	16.67

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 115 – Value context in comparison with all the topics in *Kurir*

Kurir	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	10	5.21	2	20.00	1	10.00	7	70.00
migrants/refugees	10	5.21	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm	5	2.60	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
Total	25	13.02	2	8.00%	12	48.00%	11	44.00%

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 116 – Share and value context for the three selected topics in the daily paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i> – value context	no. of texts	%
positive	6	3.13
neutral	101	52.6
negative	85	44.27
Total	192	100%

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Informer

During the third quarter, *Informer* repeated a text made of short information related to the “gun scandal”¹⁵, on 47 front pages (15.61% share). The text contained “questions of the Gojković family for Saša Janković,” so *the Ombudsman Saša Janković* was the topic which was most prevalent on the front pages of this daily, as in the previous trimester. All 47 writings were negative. The next topic with the biggest share on the front pages of this paper was *political life in Serbia* - 10.31% texts, with 77.42% presented in a negative context. Topic *crime* (21 texts or 6.98%) was mostly presented in neutral context – 61.9% of the writings, while regional relations, which were not in *Informer’s* focus in the previous trimester, were now present in 20 texts (6.64%), out of which as much as 90% had negative evaluative connotation. *Informer* traditionally writes and traditionally in a negative context about the topic *media/freedom of media* (18 texts, 72.22% in negative context), and the same presence (18 texts, share 5.98%) was recorded for *EU/EU politics*, though all writings on this topic were negative. In *Informer’s* focus were also topics *the “Lottery” scandal* (3.99%), presented negatively in 66.67% of texts, as well as Greek politics (3.65%), presented positively in 36.36% and negatively in 18.18% of the texts.

Topics which were separately indexed, *marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica* and *migrants/refugees*, were present in 18 (5.98%), i.e. 15 (4.98%) of texts. Events related to Srebrenica in texts of *Informer* had mostly negative value context (72.22%), while texts about migrants and refugees recorded the biggest share of texts with evaluative judgments compared to all analyzed media, 73.33% (40% positive and 33.33% negative). *Marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm* was the topic of 8 texts, 75% of them were in negative context.

Informer takes a clear evaluative position in 79.4% texts from the front page which were included in the sample (please see Table 119.).

¹⁵ The “gun scandal” was first covered by *Informer* on 18th April 2015, when it put forward information related to the suicide of Predrag Gojković, committed from the gun which at the time belonged to the ombudsman Saša Janković.

Table 117 – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Informer*

Informer	frequency	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Ombudsman Saša Janković	47	15.61	0	0.00	0	0.00	47	100.00
political life in Serbia	31	10.30	0	0.00	7	22.58	24	77.42
crime	21	6.98	0	0.00	13	61.90	8	38.10
regional cooperation/relations in the region	20	6.64	0	0.00	2	10.00	18	90.00
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	18	5.98	3	16.67	2	11.11	13	72.22
media/freedom of media	18	5.98	1	5.56	4	22.22	13	72.22
EU/EU politics	18	5.98	0	0.00	0	0.00	18	100.00
migrants/refugees	15	4.98	6	40.00	4	26.67	5	33.33
the "Lottery" scandal	12	3.99	0	0.00	4	33.33	8	66.67
Greek politics	11	3.65	4	36.36	5	45.45	2	18.18

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 118 – Value context in comparison with the paper *Informer*

Informer	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	18	5.98	3	16.67	2	11.11	13	72.22
migrants/refugees	15	4.98	6	40.00	4	26.67	5	33.33
marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm	8	2.66	0	0.00	2	25.00	6	75.00
Total	41	13.62	9	21.95	8	19.51	24	58.54

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 119 – Share and value context of the three selected topics in the daily paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i> – value context	no. of texts	%
positive	27	8.97
neutral	62	20.6
negative	212	70.43
Total	301	100%

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Alo!

53 or 23.98% of the texts from the sampled front pages of *Alo!* focused on the *political life in Serbia*, with 39.62% presenting in a negative value context. The paper *Alo!* covered economy in 7.69% of the texts (52.94% in negative, 5.88% in positive context), while the topics related to crime were present in 5.88% of texts, mostly in neutral context 76.92%. Topics related to Kosovo were presented in 4.98% of texts – 45.45% in negative value context, while regional relations were covered in 10 texts mostly in negative context – 80%. A significant share on the front pages of *Alo!* went to topics *sport* (11 texts – 81.82% neutral), entertainment/show biz (10 texts – 70 % neutral). All three topics of interest present among the ten most prevalent topics in the newspaper *Alo!* (more information in **Table 120**). *Marking of the 20th anniversary in Srebrenica* was covered in 12 texts - three quarters were negative (9 out of 12 texts) and one positive (8.33%). Migrants and refugees were considered in 8 positive texts, while 9 texts were written about the marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm – 88.89% was written from a negative perspective (**Table 121**).

Value context is present in 53.85% of texts in *Alo!* (please see **Table 122**).

Table 120 – Distribution of topics and their value context in the daily paper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	frequency	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
political life in Serbia	53	23.98	0	0.00	32	60.38	21	39.62
economy	17	7.69	1	5.88	7	41.18	9	52.94
crime	13	5.88	0	0.00	10	76.92	3	23.08
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	12	5.43	1	8.33	2	16.67	9	75.00
sport	11	4.98	2	18.18	9	81.82	0	0.00
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	11	4.98	0	0.00	6	54.55	5	45.45

Alo!	frequency	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
regional cooperation/relations in the region	10	4.52	0	0.00	2	20.00	8	80.00
entertainment/show biz	10	4.52	1	10.00	7	70.00	2	20.00
marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm	9	4.07	0	0.00	1	11.11	8	88.89
migrants/refugees	8	3.62	8	100.00	0	0.00	0	0.00

Source: Mediameter research, July-September 2015

Table 121 – Value context in comparison to other topics in *Alo!*

Alo	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	12	5.43	1	8.33	2	16.67	9	75.00
marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm	9	4.07	0	0.00	1	11.11	8	88.89
migrants/refugees	8	3.62	8	100.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Total	29	13.12	9	31.03	3	10.34	17	58.62

Source: Mediameter research, July-September 2015

Table 122 – Share and value context of the three selected topics in the daily *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i> – value context	no. of texts	%
positive	23	10.41
neutral	102	46.15
negative	96	43.44
Total	221	100%

Source: Mediameter research, July-September 2015

Politika

The daily *Politika* allocated a lot of the attention from the front pages to regional relations, which is precisely a direct consequence of the events which attracted the attention of the media and public in the third quarter, such as effects of the “migrant crisis” on regional relations and marking of the anniversary of tragic events from the wars from the nineties in the last century. *Politika* wrote about this topic in 53 texts, but most of these texts (58.49%) had

a negative value context. *Political life in Serbia* was a third-ranked topic of interest in *Politika*, which was under the spotlight in 43 or 8.79% of all texts from the front pages and presented in 62.79% in neutral and 37.21% in negative value context. *Greek politics* is a topic with a share of 7.16% (35 texts), out of which 14.29% was written in positive and 20% in negative context. *Economics* and *economy* were topics which attracted more attention of journalists and editors of *Politika* so these topics were present in a total of 55 texts. However, the approach was different; topics related to economics were presented mostly in a neutral tone in 60.71%, while the economy was put in negative context in 77.78%. *EU/EU politics* was the topic which had different treatment in comparison with the previous trimester. In the period from April-June, *Politika* published 20 texts on this topic, with 85% in negative context, while in the third quarter, the number of texts was similar (23), but the value context was dominantly negative – 78.26% of the texts. Two more topics which were covered by *Politika* are *Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština* and *international relations*, in 21 texts (66.67% neutral) for Kosovo-related topics, i.e. 17 texts (41.18% negative) for international relations. The three specially selected topics were present in considerable extent on the front pages of *Politika*. Migrants and refugees were featured in 9% or 44 texts (second-ranked topic per share), mostly in neutral context (90.91%), with 9.09% of positive texts. Events related to Srebrenica were considered in 23 texts, out of which 47.83% were negative; while the *marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm* was covered in 8 texts, mostly negative (75%).

In the third quarter, the daily *Politika* again recorded the biggest number of analyzed texts from the front pages compared to other media from the sample (489), as well as the biggest diversification of topics. However, in the period July – September 2015, an increase of 14.29% in percentage of texts which have a value context was observed when compared to the previous quarter, so now 38.04% of writings were presented negatively and 4.91% positively (please see **Table 125**).

Table 123 – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Politika*

Politika	frequency	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
regional cooperation/relations in the region	53	10.84	1	1.89	21	39.62	31	58.49
migrants/refugees	44	9.00	4	9.09	40	90.91	0	0.00
political life in Serbia	43	8.79	0	0.00	27	62.79	16	37.21
Greek politics	35	7.16	5	14.29	23	65.71	7	20.00
economics	28	5.73	0	0.00	17	60.71	11	39.29
economy	27	5.52	0	0.00	6	22.22	21	77.78
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	23	4.70	0	0.00	12	52.17	11	47.83
EU/EU politics	23	4.70	1	4.35	4	17.39	18	78.26

Politika	frequency	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	21	4.29	0	0.00	14	66.67	7	33.33
international relations	17	3.48	2	11.76	8	47.06	7	41.18

Source: Mediameter research, July-September 2015

Table 124 – Share and value context of the three selected topics in the daily *Politika*

Politika	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
migrants/refugees	44	9.00	4	9.09	40	90.91	0	0.00
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	23	4.70	0	0.00	12	52.17	11	47.83
marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm	8	1.64	0	0.00	2	25.00	6	75.00
Total	75	15.34	4	5.33	54	72.00	17	22.67

Source: Mediameter research, July-September 2015

Table 125 – Value context in comparison with other topics in *Politika*

<i>Politika</i> – value context	no. of texts	%
positive	24	4.91
neutral	279	57.06
negative	186	38.04
Total	489	100%

Source: Mediameter research, July-September 2015

Večernje novosti

Večernje novosti presented versatile topics on its front pages, equally distributed, nevertheless, regional relations were a topic which generated the biggest number of texts - 54 (14.75%), and exactly 50% of them have a value context, positive (3.7%) and negative (46.3%). A considerably share in the total number of texts was taken up by topics *civil society* (26 texts – share 7.1%), *political life in Serbia* and *economy* with 6.83% each or 25 texts. All three specified topics were presented mostly in a neutral context (for more information, please see **Table 126**). Furthermore, *Večernje novosti* focused on the topics referring to economics and crime with 13 (3.55%) texts each, also mostly with neutral value. *EU/EU politics* was present

this time in 7 texts, out of which 42.86% were negative. The three separately analyzed topics were present in a total of 64 texts in *Večernje novosti*. 27 neutral texts (share of 7.38%) reported on migrants and refugees, while other two topics were presented with clear evaluative connotation. For instance, *marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica* was a topic covered in 25 texts (6.38%) in *Večernje novosti*. 64% of these texts were in negative context. The topic of *marking the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm* was present in 12 texts, 6 negative and 6 neutral.

Though, *Večernje novosti* presented most texts with neutral value context (71.86%), certain topics, like regional relations or EU politics still have a considerably higher share of negative connotations, which has been observed in all three trimesters of 2015.

Table 126 – Value context per topics in *Večernje novosti*

Večernje novosti	frequency	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
regional cooperation/relations in the region	54	14.75	2	3.70	27	50.00	25	46.30
migrants/refugees	27	7.38		0.00	27	100.00		0.00
civil society	26	7.10	2	7.69	23	88.46	1	3.85
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	25	6.83	1	4.00	8	32.00	16	64.00
political life in Serbia	25	6.83		0.00	23	92.00	2	8.00
economy	25	6.83	3	12.00	17	68.00	5	20.00
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	21	5.74	2	9.52	13	61.90	6	28.57
economics	13	3.55	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
crime	13	3.55	0	0.00	13	100.00		0.00
marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm	12	3.28	0	0.00	6	50.00	6	50.00

Source: Mediameter research, July-September 2015

Table 127 – Value context compared to topics in *Večernje novosti*

Večernje novosti	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
migrants/refugees	27	7.38	0	0.00	27	100.00	0	0.00
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	25	6.83	1	4.00	8	32.00	16	64.00
marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm	12	3.28	0	0.00	6	50.00	6	50.00
Total	64	17.49	1	1.56%	41	64.06%	22	34.38%

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 128 – Share and value context for the selected topics in the daily *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i> – value context	no. of texts	%
positive	24	6.56
neutral	263	71.86
negative	79	21.58
Total	366	100%

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Danas

Focus of the daily *Danas* was again on the topics pertinent to political life in Serbia, as 64 texts (16.45%) reported, 81.25% of which had neutral context. Economy and regional relations were present in 28 texts (7.20%) each, but the region was reported on in a neutral context in most texts (82.14%), while the economy was discussed in mostly negative texts in the daily *Danas*, more than 50%. Other topics of interest were *Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština* (21 texts – 5.4%), *Greek politics* (19 texts – 4.88%) as well as *culture* and *crime* (12, i.e. 11 texts), which were mostly presented in a neutral context. In *Danas*, we recorded two topics related to EU – *fulfilling the requirement/standard for EU integration* (12 texts or 3.08%) and *EU/EU politics* (11 texts or 2.83%), which were treated in different ways. Fulfilling the requirement and standard for EU was reported in neutral (91.67%) and positive (8.33%) context; EU politics themselves were seen by the journalists of *Danas* in negative light in 45.45% and neutral light in 54.55% of texts. The three separately selected topics were present in 66 texts, most of which focused on migrants/refugees – 37 texts or 9.61%, and all texts were neutral. Topics related to *Srebrenica* and *Storm* were present in 20 texts, i.e. 9 texts. Events which refer to *Srebrenica* were presented in 25% of the texts negatively, while

the topic of *marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm* was presented in a negative context in 33.33% of texts.

Danas again recorded the biggest number of texts with neutral value– 71.21%. However, the number of evaluative texts increased by 11.71% compared to the previous quarter.

Table 129 – Value context per topics in the paper *Danas*

Danas	frequency	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
political life in Serbia	64	16.45	0	0.00	52	81.25	12	18.75
migrants/refugees	37	9.51	0	0.00	37	100.00	0	0.00
economy	28	7.20	0	0.00	13	46.43	15	53.57
regional cooperation/relations in the region	28	7.20	0	0.00	23	82.14	5	17.86
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	21	5.40	0	0.00	16	76.19	5	23.81
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	20	5.14	0	0.00	15	75.00	5	25.00
Greek politics	19	4.88	1	5.26	16	84.21	2	10.53
fulfilling the requirement/standard for EU integration	12	3.08	1	8.33	11	91.67	0	0.00
culture	12	3.08	1	8.33	8	66.67	3	25.00
crime	11	2.83	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
EU/EU politics	11	2.83	0	0.00	6	54.55	5	45.45

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 130 – Share and value context of the three selected topics in the daily *Danas*

Danas	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
migrants/refugees	37	9.51	0	0.00	37	100.00	0	0.00
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	20	5.14	0	0.00	15	75.00	5	25.00
Total	66	16.97	0	0.00	58	87.88	8	12.12

Danas	total	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
marking of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm	9	2.31	0	0.00	6	66.67	3	33.33
Total	66	16.97	0	0.00	58	87.88	8	12.12

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 131 – Value context compared to topics in the paper *Danas*

<i>Danas – value context</i>	no. of texts	%
positive	9	2.31
neutral	277	71.21
negative	103	26.48
Total	389	100%

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Unnamed sources

Unnamed sources were the second-ranked actor in the third quarter of 2015 with a share of 464 appearances in texts from our sample. Though the number of texts featuring unnamed sources went up, in percents, the share of these actors is nearly equal as in the previous edition of *Mediameter* – 21.36% in the third, compared to 21.09% in the second trimester. Wide use of unnamed sources was precisely defined thanks to the method of quantifying anonymous sources, which we applied from the previous edition of *Mediameter*, by classifying as such not only the sources which the media itself defined as unnamed, but in all cases where information was provided without possibility of verifying it, regardless of the manner used to introduce the information in the text.

As Matt Carlson said in his book “On the condition of Anonymity”: “Journalism is embedded in and reliant on its surroundings, which means it can never be the independent observer it claims to be...These sort of questions are better answered through an approach that recognizes the culture of unnamed sources as a *culture*. This view steers the inquiry into unnamed sources away from the frequency and implementation towards the questions of shared meanings and patterns of collective interpretation patterns among the journalists, source and audiences. The granting of anonymity is not simply a matter of technique. Rather, it is an appeal to a particular manner of imagining the relations between these three parties.”¹⁶ Reports are a journalistic form which still contains the biggest amount of information obtained from unnamed sources, 356, which is the biggest share in percents – 25.76% (**Table 132**).

¹⁶ Carlson M. (2011), *On the condition of anonymity*, Urbana, Chicago, Springfield, University of Illinois Press, p. 7.

Table 132 – Share of “unnamed sources” in all journalistic forms, in the seven media from the sample

Genre	Total number of texts	Unnamed source	%
report	1.382	356	25.76
article	230	59	25.65
news	189	36	19.05
commentary (column, editorial)	174	9	5.17
interview	169	1	0.59
reportage	26	3	11.54
other	2	0	0
Total	2.172	464	21.36

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

The biggest percent share of texts which contain information obtained from anonymous sources compared to the total number of published texts in individual media in *Kurir* (38%), while the lowest percentage of writings which contain information obtained in this manner was recorded in *Politika* – 11.04% (please see **Table 133**).

Table 133 – Share of “unnamed sources” per analyzed media outlet

Media outlet	total number of texts/media outlet	unnamed source	%
Kurir	192	74	38.54
Informer	301	109	36.21
Blic	214	68	31.78
Alo!	221	66	29.86
Večernje novosti	366	47	12.84
Danas	389	46	11.83
Politika	489	54	11.04
Total	2.172	464	21.36

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

When talking about topics and the use of unnamed sources, this practice is again most dominant in texts talking about the political life in Serbia, i.e. the biggest number of texts published on this topic contain information which originated from unnamed sources – 310 texts, i.e. 31.29% (for more information, please see **Table 134**).

The number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” in each of the seven analyzed media may be seen in the Appendix – tables 165-170.

Table 134 – Number of texts which contain information from “unnamed sources” according to topics, in the seven media from the sample

<i>All media from the sample</i>			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	310	97	31.29
crime	86	39	45.35
migrants/refugees	162	29	17.90
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	118	29	24.58
the “Lottery” scandal	36	24	66.67
economy	115	23	20.00
regional cooperation/relations in the region	204	20	9.80
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	86	17	19.77
media/free media	45	14	31.11
EU/EU politics	74	13	17.57

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Conclusion

In the third trimester of 2015, daily papers with the biggest circulation and influence in Serbia did not change the basic way used to monitor and interpret reality. Reporting is becoming the basic genre, while the news is being forced off the front pages. Conflicts on the social and political scene are closely observed, and very often the media themselves are their initiators, therefore the overall impression of our public scene seems unsettling. Very little attention is still given to topics which exceed the frame of daily-political events, for example topics from the area of education, health, science, but also problems of modernization and reform of Serbian society. Occasional announcements of special elections are only inciting conflicts, not only between different social and political groups, but between the media themselves, shadowing all other topics.

The start of the “migrant crisis” was greeted as a media sensation, which gradually turned into routine reporting. Only a few journalists adequately followed the topic in a wider, foreign-politics context. Such events reveal the deeply-rooted problems in Serbian journalism

– lack of professional competencies and experience, as well as ability of news desks to react quickly and professionally in times of crisis. The overall attitude toward the “migrant crisis” was, however, positive. Texts of xenophobic character were rare, as well as headlines which arose animosity towards migrants. At the same time, they served as the main generator of criticism for our neighboring countries, especially Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia and Slovenia, for their relationship towards migrants. The blade of criticism was, of course, turned towards European Union, notwithstanding statements on cooperation and mutual appreciation between the prime minister and leaders of EU.

Interpretation of the role of EU in the “migrant crisis” was the gist of already negative attitudes towards the European Union. Comments became the main tool of conveying “the whole truth.” Number of analysts and commentators increased considerably. In this way, editorial staff “shifted” responsibility to external associates and showed unusual openness. These are classic strategies of presenting their won attitude in an indirect manner. Of course, this indirect manner is very often quite visible in newspapers.

Appendix

Table 135 – Sample *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	No.	%
Texts from the front pages which were selected	366	2.86
Texts from the front pages which were not selected	208	1.62
Other	12.234	95.52
Total	12.808	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 136 – Sample *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	No.	%
Texts from the front pages which were selected	301	3.94
Texts from the front pages which were not selected	151	1.98
Other	7.178	94.08
Total	7.630	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 137 – Sample *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	No.	%
Texts from the front pages which were selected	221	2.72
Texts from the front pages which were not selected	259	3.19
Other	7.640	94.09
Total	8.120	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 138 – Sample *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	No.	%
Texts from the front pages which were selected	214	1.91
Texts from the front pages which were not selected	188	1.67
Other	10.824	96.42
Total	11.226	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 139 – Sample *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	No.	%
Texts from the front pages which were selected	489	5.21
Texts from the front pages which were not selected	180	1.92
Other	8.724	92.88
Total	9.393	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 140 – Sample *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	No.	%
Texts from the front pages which were selected	389	5.55
Texts from the front pages which were not selected	101	1.44
Other	6.513	93.00
Total	7.003	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 141 – Sample *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	No.	%
Texts from the front pages which were selected	192	2.06
Texts from the front pages which were not selected	148	1.58
Other	9.003	96.36
Total	9.343	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 142 - Balance of news in the seven media from the sample

News	Balance %	
	Yes	No
Media outlet		
Blic	33.33	66.67
Kurir	0.00	100
Alo	32.35	67.65
Informer	11.39	88.61
Politika	46.15	53.85
Danas	78.13	21.88
Total	32.28	67.72

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 143 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Večernje novosti*

Večernje novosti	No.	%
Đorđe Đukić	4	10.53
Milan Kovačević	4	10.53
Čedomir Antić	3	7.89
Dušan T. Bataković	2	5.26
Dejan Vuk Stanković	2	5.26
Milan Škulić	2	5.26
Mlađen Kovačević	2	5.26
Davor Đenero	2	5.26
Vladislav Jovanović	2	5.26
Zlatko Nikolić	2	5.26
Dalibor Katančević	2	5.26
Milan Mijalkovski	1	2.63
Božidar Spasić	1	2.63
Đorđe Vukadinović	1	2.63
Miladin Ševarlić	1	2.63
Ljubinko Savić	1	2.63
Ljubomir Madžar	1	2.63
Milojko Arsić	1	2.63
Slobodan Antonić	1	2.63
Zoran Dragišić	1	2.63
Dejan Jović	1	2.63
Dušan Janjić	1	2.63
Total	38	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 144 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Informer*

Informer	No.	%
Dragomir Anđelković	13	7.88
Total	165	100.00

Informer	No.	%
Branko Radun	11	6.67
Zlatko Nikolić	10	6.06
Marko Nicović	7	4.24
Dušan Janjić	7	4.24
Miroslav Šutić	6	3.64
Cvijetin Milivojević	5	3.03
Božidar Prelević	5	3.03
Boško Jakšić	5	3.03
Dejan Vuk Stanković	5	3.03
Mahmut Bušatlija	5	3.03
Milan Nikolić	5	3.03
Miroslav Lazanski	5	3.03
Vladimir Pejić	5	3.03
Zoran Dragišić	5	3.03
Darko Trifunović	5	3.03
Đorđe Vukadinović	4	2.42
Ljubomir Madžar	4	2.42
Milan Kovačević	4	2.42
Vladimir Vuletić	4	2.42
Vladislav Jovanović	4	2.42
Aleksandar Radić	4	2.42
Aleksandra Janković	3	1.82
Božidar Spasić	3	1.82
Ljubodrag Savić	3	1.82
Mlađen Kovačević	3	1.82
Orhan Dragaš	3	1.82
Živadin Jovanović	3	1.82
Dalibor Katančević	3	1.82
Dragan Zečević	2	1.21
Dušan Spasojević	2	1.21
Ratko Božović	2	1.21
Stevica Deđanski	2	1.21
Vladimir Goati	2	1.21
Total	165	100.00

Informer	No.	%
Aleksandar Popov	1	0.61
Aleksandra Joksimović	1	0.61
Đorđe Đukić	1	0.61
Goran Nikolić	1	0.61
Danilo Šuković	1	0.61
Miroslav Zdravković	1	0.61
Total	165	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 145 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Alo!*

Alo!	No.	%
Branko Radun	6	15.38
Dragomir Anđelković	6	15.38
Dušan Janjić	5	12.82
Đorđe Vukadinović	4	10.26
Mahmut Bušatlija	3	7.69
Miroslav Lazanski	2	5.13
Ivo Visković	1	2.56
Milan Antonijević	1	2.56
Božidar Spasić	1	2.56
Dušan Spasojević	1	2.56
Ljubodrag Stojadinović	1	2.56
Milan Nikolić	1	2.56
Milojko Arsić	1	2.56
Miodrag Zec	1	2.56
Mladen Kovačević	1	2.56
Orhan Dragaš	1	2.56
Zlatko Nikolić	1	2.56
Darko Trifunović	1	2.56
Aleksandar Radić	1	2.56
Total	39	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 146 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Blic*

Blic	No.	%
Aleksandra Joksimović	4	10.81
Goran Nikolić	4	10.81
Dušan Janjić	3	8.11
Milan Antonijević	2	5.41
Božidar Prelević	2	5.41
Đorđe Vukadinović	2	5.41
Vladimir Gligorov	2	5.41
Dragomir Anđelković	2	5.41
Čedomir Antić	1	2.70
Cvijetin Milivojević	1	2.70
Ivo Visković	1	2.70
Dušan Spasojević	1	2.70
Dušan Simeonović	1	2.70
Dušan T. Bataković	1	2.70
Fatmir Šeholi	1	2.70
Dejan Vuk Stanković	1	2.70
Milan Kovačević	1	2.70
Milojko Arsić	1	2.70
Mladen Kovačević	1	2.70
Slobodan Antić	1	2.70
Vladislav Jovanović	1	2.70
Dejan Jović	1	2.70
Branko Radun	1	2.70
Aleksandar Radić	1	2.70
Total	37	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 147 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Politika*

Politika	No.	%
Milan Škulić	5	7.14
Goran Nikolić	4	5.71
Vladimir Vuletić	4	5.71
Aleksandar Popov	3	4.29
Đorđe Đukić	3	4.29
Danica Popović	3	4.29
Danijel Cvjetičanin	3	4.29
Dragomir Anđelković	3	4.29
Milan Mijalkovski	2	2.86
Miladin Ševarlić	2	2.86
Dušan Spasojević	2	2.86
Dejan Vuk Stanković	2	2.86
Ljubinko Savić	2	2.86
Ljubodrag Savić	2	2.86
Milan Kovačević	2	2.86
Milan Prostran	2	2.86
Milojko Arsić	2	2.86
Slobodan Samardžić	2	2.86
Vladislav Jovanović	2	2.86
Dejan Jović	2	2.86
Miroslav Zdravković	2	2.86
Dušan Janjić	2	2.86
Čedomir Antić	1	1.43
Aleksandra Joksimović	1	1.43
Đorđe Vukadinović	1	1.43
Dušan Simeonović	1	1.43
Fatmir Šeholi	1	1.43
Ljubomir Madžar	1	1.43
Mlađen Kovačević	1	1.43
Stevica Deđanski	1	1.43
Total	70	100.00

Politika	No.	%
Vladimir Goati	1	1.43
Vladimir Pejić	1	1.43
Vojislav Vuletić	1	1.43
Živadin Jovanović	1	1.43
Đerđ Pap	1	1.43
Branko Radun	1	1.43
Total	70	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 148 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Danas*

Danas	No.	%
Ljubodrag Savić	3	8.82
Mahmut Bušatlija	3	8.82
Vladislav Jovanović	3	8.82
Vojislav Vuletić	3	8.82
Miladin Ševarlić	2	5.88
Goran Nikolić	2	5.88
Jovo Bakić	2	5.88
Čedomir Antić	1	2.94
Milan Antonijević	1	2.94
Aleksandra Joksimović	1	2.94
Dušan T. Bataković	1	2.94
Dejan Vuk Stanković	1	2.94
Milan Kovačević	1	2.94
Milan Prostran	1	2.94
Milan Škulić	1	2.94
Milojko Arsić	1	2.94
Miroslav Lazanski	1	2.94
Slobodan Samardžić	1	2.94
Vladimir Gligorov	1	2.94
Vladimir Goati	1	2.94
Total	34	100.00

Danas	No.	%
Zlatko Nikolić	1	2.94
Dušan Janjić	1	2.94
Aleksandar Radić	1	2.94
Total	34	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 149 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Kurir*

Kurir	No.	%
Branko Radun	18	13.64
Božidar Spasić	16	12.12
Dragomir Anđelković	16	12.12
Marko Nicović	11	8.33
Milan Nikolić	11	8.33
Dušan Janjić	10	7.58
Zlatko Nikolić	6	4.55
Dejan Vuk Stanković	5	3.79
Vladimir Goati	4	3.03
Đorđe Vukadinović	3	2.27
Mahmut Bušatlija	3	2.27
Vladislav Jovanović	3	2.27
Božidar Prelević	2	1.52
Draško Đenović	2	1.52
Aleksandar Stevanović	2	1.52
Miroslav Lazanski	2	1.52
Ratko Božović	2	1.52
Zoran Dragišić	2	1.52
Aleksandra Janković	1	0.76
Aleksandra Joksimović	1	0.76
Dobrivoje Radovanović	1	0.76
Dušan Spasojević	1	0.76
Fatmir Šeholi	1	0.76
Goran Nikolić	1	0.76
Total	132	100.00

Kurir	No.	%
Milan Kovačević	1	0.76
Milojko Arsić	1	0.76
Mladen Kovačević	1	0.76
Davor Đenero	1	0.76
Đerđ Pap	1	0.76
Dejan Jović	1	0.76
Danilo Šuković	1	0.76
Aleksandar Radić	1	0.76
Total	132	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 150 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations on the front pages of the daily *Večernje novosti*

Večernje novosti	No.	%
SPC	12	26.67
Patriarch Irinej	9	20.00
Metropolitan Amfilohije	3	6.67
Bishop Teodosije	2	4.44
Patriarch Pavle	2	4.44
Patriarchate of Peć	2	4.44
Pope Francis	2	4.44
Bishop Irinej	1	2.22
Raško-prizrenska Eparchy	1	2.22
Bishop Vasilije	1	2.22
Prior Teokist	1	2.22
Bishop of Dalmatia Fotije	1	2.22
Bishop Grigorije	1	2.22
Bishop Jefrem	1	2.22
Bishop Jovan	1	2.22
Bishop Lavrentije	1	2.22
Mother Anastazija	1	2.22
Metropolitan Stratimirović	1	2.22
Muamer Zukorlić	1	2.22
Total	45	100.00

Večernje novosti	No.	%
Alojzije Stepinac	1	2.22
Total	45	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 151 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations on the front pages in the daily *Informer*

Informer	No.	%
Patriarch Irinej	4	22.22
Pope Francis	4	22.22
SPC	3	16.67
Alojzije Stepinac	3	16.67
Metropolitan Amfilohije	2	11.11
Bishop Irinej	1	5.56
Muamer Zukorlić	1	5.56
Total	18	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 152 – Distribution of frequencies of appearances of the representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations on the front pages of the daily *Alo!*

Alo!	No.	%
Muamer Zukorlić	5	31.25
Muhamed Jusufspahić	3	18.75
SPC	2	12.50
Pope Francis	2	12.50
Patriarch Irinej	1	6.25
Bishop Joanikije	1	6.25
Bishop Filaret	1	6.25
Alojzije Stepinac	1	6.25
Total	16	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 153 – Distribution of frequencies of appearances of the representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations on the front pages in the daily *Blic*

Blic	No.	%
Patriarch Irinej	2	33.33
Bishop Vasilije	1	16.67
Mother Makarija Sokolička	1	16.67
Muhamed Jusufspahić	1	16.67
Alojzije Stepinac	1	16.67
Total	6	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 154 – Distribution of frequencies of appearances of the representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations on the front pages in the daily *Politika*

Politika	No.	%
SPC	9	20.45
Patriarch Irinej	8	18.18
Pope Francis	7	15.91
Alojzije Stepinac	6	13.64
Muamer Zukorlić	4	9.09
Bishop Irinej	2	4.55
Patriarch Pavle	2	4.55
Bishop Teodosije	1	2.27
Metropolitan Amfilohije	1	2.27
Bishop Grigorije	1	2.27
Bishop Jovan	1	2.27
Metropolitan Porfirije	1	2.27
Muhamed Jusufspahić	1	2.27
Total	44	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 155 – Distribution of frequencies of appearances of the representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations on the front pages in the daily *Danas*

Danas	No.	%
Patriarch Irinej	3	42.86
Total	7	100.00

Danas	No.	%
Bishop Vasilije	1	14.29
Metropolitan Amfilohije	1	14.29
Muamer Zukorlić	1	14.29
Alojzije Stepinac	1	14.29
Total	7	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 156 – Distribution of frequencies of appearances of the representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations on the front pages in the daily *Kurir*

Kurir	No.	%
Metropolitan Amfilohije	2	20.00
SPC	2	20.00
Alojzije Stepinac	2	20.00
Patriarch Irinej	1	10.00
Patriarchate of Peć	1	10.00
Muamer Zukorlić	1	10.00
Pope Francis	1	10.00
Total	10	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 157 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of protagonists of political-entertainment affairs on the front pages in the daily *Večernje novosti*

Večernje novosti	No.	%
Slobodanka Tošić	1	100.00
Anđela Veštica	0	0.00
Ivan Jevđenić	0	0.00
Dušica Jevđenić	0	0.00
Dušan Jevđenić	0	0.00
Filip Jevđenić	0	0.00
Unnamed politician, father of the child of Dušica Jevđenić	0	0.00
Katarina Smiljanić	0	0.00
Nataša Šavija	0	0.00
Radoslav Milojević Kena	0	0.00
Total	1	100.00

Večernje novosti	No.	%
Slađana Pantić	0	0.00
Tijana Ajfon	0	0.00
Una Grujić	0	0.00
Željka Rolović	0	0.00
Žika Gojković	0	0.00
Stanija Dobrojević	0	0.00
Tamara Đurić	0	0.00
Total	1	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 158 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of protagonists of political-entertainment affairs on the front pages in the daily *Informer*

Informer	No.	%
Radoslav Milojević Kena	4	33.33
Nataša Šavija	2	16.67
Tijana Ajfon	2	16.67
Željka Rolović	2	16.67
Una Grujić	1	8.33
Stanija Dobrojević	1	8.33
Anđela Veštica	0	0.00
Ivan Jevđenić	0	0.00
Dušica Jevđenić	0	0.00
Dušan Jevđenić	0	0.00
Filip Jevđenić	0	0.00
Unnamed politician, father of the child of Dušica Jevđenić	0	0.00
Katarina Smiljanić	0	0.00
Slađana Pantić	0	0.00
Slobodanka Tošić	0	0.00
Žika Gojković	0	0.00
Tamara Đurić	0	0.00
Total	12	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 159 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of protagonists of political-entertainment affairs on the front pages in the daily *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	No.	%
Dušica Jevđenić	3	27.27
Nataša Šavija	2	18.18
Stanija Dobrojević	2	18.18
Slobodanka Tošić	1	9.09
Tijana Ajfon	1	9.09
Željka Rolović	1	9.09
Žika Gojković	1	9.09
Anđela Veštica	0	0.00
Ivan Jevđenić	0	0.00
Dušan Jevđenić	0	0.00
Filip Jevđenić	0	0.00
Unnamed politician, father of the child of Dušica Jevđenić	0	0.00
Katarina Smiljanić	0	0.00
Radoslav Milojević Kena	0	0.00
Slađana Pantić	0	0.00
Una Grujić	0	0.00
Tamara Đurić	0	0.00
Total	11	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 160 – Distribution of frequency of appearances of protagonists of political-entertainment affairs on the front pages in the daily *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	No.	%
Dušica Jevđenić	4	40.00
Katarina Smiljanić	2	20.00
Slobodanka Tošić	2	20.00
Ivan Jevđenić	1	10.00
Tamara Đurić	1	10.00
Anđela Veštica	0	0.00
Dušan Jevđenić	0	0.00
Filip Jevđenić	0	0.00
Total	10	100.00

<i>Blic</i>	No.	%
Unnamed politician, father of the child of Dušica Jevđenić	0	0.00
Nataša Šavija	0	0.00
Radoslav Milojević Kena	0	0.00
Slađana Pantić	0	0.00
Tijana Ajfon	0	0.00
Una Grujić	0	0.00
Željka Rolović	0	0.00
Žika Gojković	0	0.00
Stanija Dobrojević	0	0.00
Total	10	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 161. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of protagonists of political-entertainment affairs on the front pages in the daily *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	No.	%
Radoslav Milojević Kena	1	100.00
Anđela Veštica	0	0.00
Ivan Jevđenić	0	0.00
Dušica Jevđenić	0	0.00
Dušan Jevđenić	0	0.00
Filip Jevđenić	0	0.00
Unnamed politician, father of the child of Dušica Jevđenić	0	0.00
Katarina Smiljanić	0	0.00
Nataša Šavija	0	0.00
Slađana Pantić	0	0.00
Slobodanka Tošić	0	0.00
Tijana Ajfon	0	0.00
Una Grujić	0	0.00
Željka Rolović	0	0.00
Žika Gojković	0	0.00
Stanija Dobrojević	0	0.00
Tamara Đurić	0	0.00
Total	1	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 162. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of protagonists of political-entertainment affairs on the front pages in the daily *Danas*

Danas	No.	%
Anđela Veštica	0	0.00
Ivan Jevđenić	0	0.00
Dušica Jevđenić	0	0.00
Dušan Jevđenić	0	0.00
Filip Jevđenić	0	0.00
Unnamed politician, father of the child of Dušica Jevđenić	0	0.00
Katarina Smiljanić	0	0.00
Nataša Šavija	0	0.00
Radoslav Milojević Kena	0	0.00
Slađana Pantić	0	0.00
Slobodanka Tošić	0	0.00
Tijana Ajfon	0	0.00
Una Grujić	0	0.00
Željka Rolović	0	0.00
Žika Gojković	0	0.00
Stanija Dobrojević	0	0.00
Tamara Đurić	0	0.00
Total	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 163. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of protagonists of political-entertainment affairs on the front pages in the daily *Kurir*

Kurir	No.	%
Dušica Jevđenić	16	21.05
Filip Jevđenić	8	10.53
Unnamed politician, father of the child of Dušica Jevđenić	8	10.53
Ivan Jevđenić	7	9.21
Slađana Pantić	6	7.89
Radoslav Milojević Kena	4	5.26
Slobodanka Tošić	4	5.26
Total	76	100.00

Kurir	No.	%
Tijana Ajfon	4	5.26
Žika Gojković	4	5.26
Anđela Veštica	3	3.95
Nataša Šavija	3	3.95
Željka Rolović	3	3.95
Stanija Dobrojević	3	3.95
Dušan Jevđenić	2	2.63
Tamara Đurić	1	1.32
Katarina Smiljanić	0	0.00
Una Grujić	0	0.00
Total	76	100.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 164 – Cause developed by the editorial staff - value context of texts in all media

All media	no. of texts	positive	neutral	negative
<i>Cause developed by the editorial staff</i>				
No.	600	31	259	310
%	100	5.17	43.17	51.67

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 165 – Number of texts containing information obtained from an “unnamed source” per topic in the paper *Blic*

Blic			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	38	16	42.11
migrants/refugees	21	8	38.10
crime	15	7	46.67
the “Lottery” scandal	9	6	66.67
economy	6	4	66.67

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 166 – Number of texts containing information obtained from an “unnamed source” per topic in the paper *Kurir*

Kurir			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	56	27	48.21
activities of the President of Serbia	13	6	46.15
crime	9	6	66.67
civil society	7	4	57.14
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	10	3	30.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 167 – Number of texts containing information obtained from an “unnamed source” per topic in the paper *Večernje novosti*

Večernje novosti			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	25	7	28.00
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	25	5	20.00
regional cooperation/relations in the region	54	4	7.41
migrants/refugees	27	4	14.81
crime	13	4	30.77

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 168 – Number of texts containing information obtained from an “unnamed source” per topic in the paper *Alo!*

Alo!			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	53	20	37.74
crime	13	6	46.15
economy	17	5	29.41
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	12	5	41.67
entertainment/show biz	10	4	40.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 169 – Number of texts containing information obtained from an “unnamed source” per topic in the paper *Informer*

Informer			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
crime	21	13	61.90
media/free media	18	13	72.22
the “Lottery” scandal	12	10	83.33
political life in Serbia	31	8	25.81
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	18	8	44.44

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 170 – Number of texts containing information obtained from an “unnamed source” per topic in the paper *Politika*

Politika			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	43	8	18.60
economy	27	4	14.81
EU/EU politics	23	4	17.39
activities of the Government of RS	11	4	36.36
migrants/refugees	44	3	6.82

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

Table 171 – Number of texts containing information obtained from an “unnamed source” per topic in the paper *Danas*

Danas			
Topic	no. of texts	Unnamed source	%
political life in Serbia	64	11	17.19
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	21	7	33.33
migrants/refugees	37	4	10.81
regional cooperation/relations in the region	28	4	14.29
marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica	20	3	15.00

Source: *Mediameter* research, July-September 2015

4



Discourse
Analysis

DEJAN VUK STANKOVIĆ

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Factual existence of versatile and conflicted positions and models of interpretation of political actors, political events and processes, dominantly negative image of key political actors – authorities and the opposition, high level of content overlapping between columnists, participants in interviews and direct participants in the political fight, distinctive debate-like tension in the approach to political and social phenomenon and nearly constant absence of concord on the meaning and interpretation of a certain political event and process are the main characteristics of discourse in the print media in Serbia in the period from June to September 2015. Images of political actors and interpretations of events and socially-historical processes have been created by the public appearances (from writing to interviews) of different actors, primarily engaged intellectuals and political leaders. An inclination towards a high level of semantic and rhetorical overlapping of messages sent out by the participants in the public field is evident, regardless whether formally politically determined into political parties, or publically feigning to be politically independent, primarily committed to their profession, but basically politically sensitized. It should be pointed out that there is an undoubted prevalence of critical writing about the government as opposed to that that directly or indirectly supports it.

Images of key political actors – the government and the opposition depicted in editorial columns, interviews, texts referring to the first page of weeklies, show a tendency towards fixing, more precisely a strong tendency to keep it unchanged, unchanged regardless of the dynamics of events and intensity of social and historical process and events. Both the government and opposition are portrayed in a negative light, with few reflections on positive developments which are shown in the actions of primarily the government, especially in the area of regional policies. It is interesting to note that however static in terms of content, images of both the government and the opposition have been very specifically developed, to be precise, created in all aspects of politics, from interior affairs, to economic and social policy, closing with foreign affairs and the accompanying geo-political orientation.

The dominant negative course of presenting political actors is accompanied by the interpretation of events and social and historical process which introduces a considerable amount of evaluative relativization prescribed to internal reforms, politics of regional cooperation and finally process of European integrations.

Such spiritual-political situation almost permanently abolishes the possibility of establishing public criteria for rationally-founded and consistent evaluating of the performances of the ruling public or proposed public policies which display a tendency to replace the former.

Namely, writing of weeklies, editorial columns, interviews and essays, though offering diversity often irreconcilable standpoints, almost always and everywhere closes the option of public debate which is ruled by the normative principle “unforced authority of the better argument.”

Emphatic exclusive tone of polemics easily and quickly polarizes the public in terms of daily political issues. It is always about opting for and against some political actor, more specifically his decisions and concept, or about undermining the legitimacy of defending and advocating a certain political standpoint. And while the internal and political horizon of the debates dissolves on the plane of constant polemics of conflicting viewpoints, on the plane of regional policies, the challenge of ethnic-national homogenization is ever-effectively present. The latter is followed as a rule by revitalization of deduction matrices which dominated during the wartime nineties.

As a natural outcome of such spiritual-political climate, strong spirit of skeptical distance from the process of modernization, which is associated with the process of European integrations by an array of historically verifiable and confirmed reasons, surfaces. Construction of the image of key political actors does not exclusively rely on the text, but appears as an important element in terms of picture, especially caricatures bearing politically subversive charge. Dynamic unity of text and picture creates a clear image of political actors in the consciousness of readers. This image is not only relevant from a cognitive standpoint, but is a call for specific political action.

Critical interpretation of texts from the weeklies is divided into five parts. All parts represent key themed areas which were covered by weeklies in the period from June to September this year.

In the first part of the text, political actors, more specifically, their key characteristics from the perspective of weeklies will be described. In the second two parts, following the chronology of events, topics from regional policies will appear. Marking of the 20th anniversary of the crime in Srebrenica, as well as the marking of the 20th anniversary of the Croatian military operation Storm during which Srpska Krajina disappeared and a constitutional legal order of Croatia was established on the entire territory which used to belong to the former federal unit within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Finally, the last chapters will consider the topic of scheduling special parliamentary elections and challenges of the migrant crisis which has been affecting not only Europe, but also our region, during the last years.

Picture of the government – authoritarian, rules with fear, manipulative, disoriented in terms of foreign politics, disputable legitimacy, without a serious economic result

For objective media-political and propaganda reasons, the image of the current government is represented by the media portrait of its leader Aleksandar Vučić. First of all, it should be noted that Aleksandar Vučić is undoubtedly the most popular political person in our country and this is evidenced by all the surveys carried out by agencies for researching public opinions.

Furthermore, if speaking in terms connecting statistical and political theory, one could say about Vučić that he is the only politician who has democratic legitimacy in the country, since he is supported by between 25-28 percent of the total number of voters. Also, Vučić is an authentic representation of the current Government of Serbia based on the number of front pages in the dailies and the amount of media space taken by him in electronic media. In addition to this, the propaganda narrative opposing Vučić particularly exploits this circumstance developing the stand that he is exclusively and only a political soloist who acts authoritatively and voluntaristically, and thus needs to be politically scanned in every media appearance in order to prove this thesis.

In accordance with the already established pattern in the previous six months, the government is still viewed as authoritarian and autocratic. As such, it is deprived of democratic uses and liberal principles and is functioning per the principle of rule of the leader (in this case Aleksandar Vučić – author’s comm.). Using the mentioned political media key, the reign of Aleksandar Vučić is defined as the reign of a “charismatic autocrat”¹ and “terror-ruler”. “Rule of terror is what this is called. When ministers fear their boss, this is rule of terror. There is no good team play if you are afraid of the captain”² or as theatre director Stevan Filipović put it “Serbia under Vučić is a country which is becoming a service provider for the party followers. A country of increasing autocracy, poltroon media and practically self-cancelled political system – opposition collapsed itself with its own idiotism, and the government is not hiding its contempt for the concepts of parliamentary democracy, independent institutions and existence of critical public.”³ Žarko Jokanović, currently a writer, formerly a politician, also adopts this thinking and political-value key with elements of prophesy “A terrible fate has befallen a government which rules using fear and make-believe life.”⁴

Motive of rule of terror is transposed to the social plan by the leader of the Democrats Bojan Pajtić, who underlines, in response to the bill on fear, the following, “This law is absolutely necessary, fear is the most dominant emotion in Serbia. What’s happening today has never happened before – sellers at the market say “don’t talk about it over the phone.” People are engrossed by some sort of paranoia. And again fear from the state is present and this was last seen under Milošević”⁵

Narrative about the autocratic rule of Aleksandar Vučić is complimented by the position which is put forward about the political organization which he represents. This is the strongest party in Serbia – the Serbian Progressive Party. Foremost, according to some columnists, Aleksandar Vučić, contrary to democratic practice, thinks that all Serbs need to be members of the Serbian Progressive Party. Unity of the party, leader and people is vividly

1 Zoran Kesić, „Više nije smešno,” [It’s not funny anymore], interview with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3376, p. 21

2 Idem, p. 22

3 Stevan Filipović, „Šta posle Vučića,” [What after Vučić], interview with Sonja Čirić, *Vreme*, no. 1291

4 Žarko Jokanović, „U Srbiji nema kome više da se piše osim vođi,” [There is no one to write about in Serbia except the leader], interview with Ivana Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, no. 1282

5 Bojan Pajtić, “Vučić danas ne bi vladao Srbijom da kod Tadića nisam bio *persona non grata*,” [Vučić would not be governing Serbia today if I hadn’t been Tadić’s *persona non grata*] *Nedeljnik*, no. 191, p. 25



Politika, 27th September 2015

illustrated by the editor of *Vreme* Dragoljub Žarković. His association about the relationship between party, people and the leader is recognized in the following quotation from his original text, “Slobodan Milošević built his politics on the idea that all Serbs need to live in one country, and how is that working out these days, Aleksandar Vučić has the idea that all Serbs need to be members of the Serbian Progressive Party, “⁶ This party is depicted extremely negatively. This is a group of mediocrities and poltroons, deprived of moral, intellectual and political integrity. This characterization of SNS, among many, is most directly and most clearly given by the mentioned Žarko Jokanović, “the party with the most members in Serbia is a party of chairwarmers who worship their leader and I think that this is his biggest problem. Not so much the people against him, but those who are for him. Because “Ass-lickers feel good for a moment, but kill in the long run.”⁷

Contribution to the building of negative image of the first man of the ruling SNS is given by the media strategy of reminding. It is almost an omnipresent motive in every somewhat lengthy conversation about the prime minister of Serbia and current political moment. A case in point of this media political strategy may be seen from the following excerpts from interviews which appeared on the pages of Serbian weeklies in the period July – October 2015. The already cited Žarko Jokanović says, “people are scared, too scared. They are afraid of the reckless government which says it is European and progressive, but the citizens subconsciously cannot forget that behind the Euro-smile of current Progressives stand the bloody fangs of former Radicals. And this is what scares them because they know who the Radicals were and what they did and what kind of atrocities they inflicted upon this country. I do not believe in Progressive metamorphosis and I think that if everybody stays silent, there will be no one to stay silent tomorrow.”⁸

The journalist Slaviša Lekić addressed the readers in the same tone and with identical message, categorically claiming, “To believe in a comprehensive transformation of Aleksandar Vučić into God is essentially the same, in other words, vain activity. No matter how much he interprets his cooperation with Šešelj as an empirical necessity, though he did this on rare occasions, he never made even the slightest moral distancing from SRS. What a surprise, all that characterized and still characterizes Šešelj’s Radicals – ill-favored and dangerous rhetoric, low and torturous attacks, offensive of malice and ocean-large arrogance – today enwrathes the releases of the Serbian Progressive Party. Not only the releases, but their work in this field as well. If you scratch Vučić, no matter how much he restrained himself, open anger of the hidden Radical and quite suffering because the atmosphere projected by him in his head is not following his reformatory moves bursts out...”⁹

6 Dragoljub Žarković, „Profil i anfas – Aleksandar Vučić tvrdi da nije podložan pritiscima. Ali narod jeste. Otkud bi se inače tri hiljade ljudi kolektivno učlanilo u SNS;” [Side view and en face – Aleksandar Vučić claims he is not prone to pressures. But the people are. How else would three thousand people collectively join SNS], *Vreme*, no. 1289, p. 4

7 Žarko Jokanović, „U Srbiji nema kome više da se piše osim vođi;” [There is no one to write about in Serbia except the leader], interview with Ivana Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, no. 1282

8 Idem

9 Slaviša Lekić, „Problem sa čovekom koji nema problema sa sopstvenom prošlošću;” [Problem with the man who has no problem with his own past], *Vreme*, no. 1290, p. 37

A few sentences uttered by Žarko Jokanović may be added to this position of Lekić, from the already quoted interview in *Vreme*. “These warmongers are today’s pro-European government. Who’s the fool here? Serbia has become Alzheimer’s empire.”¹⁰

Freezing the image of the leader of SNS in the previous period, more specifically “eternal” connecting of his political and value profile to the nineties, not allowing changes distinctly resembles the rhetorical and semantic discourse which is advocated in public by the Democratic Party. Agreement of all public intellectuals and opposition parties is not democratically without legitimacy, but high level of relevant overlapping has the outcome of complete party polarization of the public space.

Though for understandable reasons, i.e. the daily political and media battle, Pajtić’s discourse is tied more to current events, but also to the spiritual point of freezing the negative image of Vučić and SNS in an extremely negative political context. Therefore, semantic overlapping of Bojan Pajtić’s message is not surprising. He says, “They (means SNS, author’s comm.) claim for themselves that they are a European-oriented party, and if only they would act accordingly, I would accept that and proclaim our victory because the idea of DS would finally become dominant in the political life of Serbia. Unfortunately, it cannot be said that SNS is carrying out pro-European politics. They are carrying out politics of indulging European politicians, and that is not formatting of the Serbian society based on European values and standards. This incapacitating of employees and pensioners as a way of consolidating would be the last thing a European politician would resort to. We cannot accept that European policies are suffocating the media and pressuring journalists or kidnapping and beating up those who disagree or arresting on political grounds without respecting the assumption of innocence...”¹¹

Challenging of politics of Aleksandar Vučić and SNS and continuous process of its “democratic delegitimizing.” This propaganda and political maneuver is taken with the aim of disputing the undoubted superiority and support which Vučić and SNS have from the voters. In the first step of creating arguments on delegitimizing the government in Serbia, social situation needs to be portrayed as dramatic with a touch of tragedy. Theatre director Kankan Mladenović identifies this mood of the public with the situation on the Titanic before the disaster, “it was merry on the Titanic, as well, the music was playing, nobody saw any problems, on the contrary – it was a journey to one new world, full of joy, and we all know what actually happened ... This government will certainly remain a part of our political reality for many years with the manipulative mechanisms it is applying and the fact that it has a corruptive incompetent and disunited opposition. What could change the ratio of political power is if someone was to inspire that huge part of discouraged citizens who lost all hope to take part in the political life. That “someone” does not exist, the one who manages to

10 Žarko Jokanović, „U Srbiji nema kome više da se piše osim vođi;” [There is no one to write about in Serbia except the leader], interview with Ivana Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, no. 1282

11 Bojan Pajtić, “Vučić danas ne bi vladao Srbijom da kod Tadića nisam bio *persona non grata*,” [Vučić would not be governing Serbia today if I hadn’t been Tadić’s *persona non grata*] *Nedeljnik*, no. 191, p. 25

solve the secret of how to bring back the abstainers into the political process, that person will change political power, now or in five years ... On an internal level, we were consciously sacrificed to one totalitarian government for sake of foreign political interests”¹²

The process of delegitimizing Vučić and SNS is clearly evident. Its goal is to undermine the principle of authentic support to the government which is ranking on lead places in all public opinion polls. First, the low level of participation in political life is reiterated, then in the second step, current “totalitarian” government is explained as a product not based on the will of the people, but on some political “pact” on the level of foreign policy. The whole political and public opinion plot follows the expectation of a new political subject who is supposed to derail the current cadre. It is precisely this expectation, along with the mentioned political mystification, as well as propaganda gesture of minimizing support in the electorate, declarations by the interviewees, that represents a direct example of propaganda and thus confirms the thesis about total domination of the “spirit of bias party propaganda” in the public sphere.

In the ideological sense, Vučić and his politics are on the “frontline” of both the left critical discourse and this conservative right discourse. It is interesting that the meeting point of these two discourses is the attitude towards EU.

Left-winged theoretical-practical disputing of Serbia’s striving towards EU and foreign orientation of Aleksandar Vučić has been expressed by the political theoretician Filip Balunović. Balunović’s criticism sums up three points – questioning the ethnic and national foundation of Serbia as a country, undermining the striving towards EU and pointing to the unfairness of social layering due to superiority of the capitalist model of economy.

In the interview for the weekly *Vreme*, Balunović says, “EU is a right conservative creation. If you look at who formed the European Economic Community, these are all Christian democratic parties which were in office at that time. Yes, the idea of EU has an embedded idea of peace, which is great. But, what is the point of all that? Progressing of only one class. The bourgeois class is the one with the biggest interest in keeping the peace...Aleksandar Vučić is a representative of the present elite which kidnapped nations in order to realize its interests on the national level. If Draža Mihailović was in office today, he would also negotiate Serbia’s accession to EU. This dichotomy between nationalism is false...”¹³

Progress in the process of solving the Kosovo issue, which is a key pre-requisite for successful European integrations of Serbia, achieved by an array of treaties was welcomed extremely negatively in the right-winged political circles. Some authors like Nikola Vrzić from the magazine *Pečat* depicted the treaty as a real achievement of Serbian diplomacy in given

12 Kokan Mladenović, „Svi znamo ko je netaleantovani reditelj,” [We all know who the talentless director is], interview with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3378

13 Filip Balunović, „Levica je slaba, ali je jača nego ikad,” [The left is weak, but stronger than ever], interview with Jovana Gligorićević, *Vreme*, no. 1278, p. 25

circumstances, with a hint of the infamous Brussels II, more precisely the new round of talks where the question of Kosovo’s membership in international institutions could resurface, “With the agreement about forming the Community of Serb Municipalities, Serbs got, in a difficult framework of what they lost in 1999 and 2013, more than they had in 1999. They almost got a state within a state (the Kosovo state). Kosovo authorities will have less influence over them compared to what was thought after the First Brussels Agreement.”¹⁴

Vrzić stated that the Community of Serb Municipalities is connected to the constitutional and legal order within the Republic of Kosovo, but it leaves room for specific jurisdictions of the Community of Serb Municipalities, especially in the domain of its representatives, on the level of president, budget which may be filled with funds collected by governmental bodies, as well as donations from Serbia.

On the other hand, a lot more open and fiercer criticism of the achievements of Vučić’s government in the negotiations on Kosovo came from Đorđe Vukadinović, editor of the site and magazine *Nova Srpska Politička Misao* and ideologist of the in many ways extreme right-winged non-parliamentary party the Democratic Party of Serbia. Vukadinović rejects any positive achievement of the Serbian delegation in the talks, “It is becoming clearer and clearer that what Priština was saying from the beginning is that this infamous Community of Serb Municipalities will not have any original or executive authorizations, that it will have to be formed and function within the law and constitutional order of the “Republic of Kosovo” and that it will essentially and by form only be a tool for realizing certain rights of the Serbian minority in the sovereign and independent Kosovo...”¹⁵

At the same time, this active right-winged intellectual projects the plot surrounding the Brussels process onto the internal political plane. The real point of Vučić’s diplomatic activity around Kosovo is not concern for national interests.

This is something else, something we could present as fortification of his political positions in the country (choking of the critical public in the country and score settling with the civil pro-European alternative to his rule) and making up a strong right wing, which could presumably jeopardize European aspirations of Serbia. The second dimension of the interior political plot around Kosovo aims to present Vučić as an authentic credible political person in the eyes of the West:

“As long as he is “fighting this battle,” no one will bother him, at least not too seriously or too much, with trivia such as eradicating the critical public, suffocating of the media and persecution of political opponents. Because, for heaven’s sake, “the resistance of the Kosovo lobby needs to be put paid to” and “restoring of conservative forces” needs to be prevented. This is the origin of the increase and revival of the radical political corpse and theatric pulling out of the scarecrow in the form of some “pledges,” “1389,” “Naši” and similar semi-existing

14 Nikola Vrzić, „5:0 za koga?” [5:0 for who?], *Pečat*, no. 384, p. 4-5

15 Đorđe Vukadinović, “Ko je prodao najskuplju srpsku reč,” [Who sold the most expensive Serbian word], *Vreme*, no. 1287, p. 7

organizations as serious threats to social stability and no less than “an avalanche about to happen.” It is really “about to happen” but only in the extent the government and some “grey” government-supported structures are helping it happen. The impression that some huge ideological and political struggle is ongoing in Serbia needs to be created at all costs. And HE is the main and only support for “pro-European,” liberal and pro-Western strengths. And in order to create such an impression, it is necessary to (number 1) as much as possible blow up the balloon of right extremism with dramatic statements and ordered polls, and at the same time (number 2) slaughter through the media and politics all real, potential, imaginary and possible competitors on the civil pole of the political specter. With more than clear and obvious aims to show how Vučić (“what can you do, like him or not, he is what he is, I don’t like him either, but ...”) simply has no alternative. And this is what is currently happening to us. From the most important, state, national and symbolic issue, Kosovo has become not even an object for political trade, but something less than that – merely a lever with which the Leader is skillfully manipulating in order to secure tactical points, extensions and buy time in the game with his western mentors. With this last treaty, “Serbian Kosovo” has played its part more or less in that project.”¹⁶

His radically critical orientation towards Vučić’s cabinet, Vukadinović will depict in one more text with an ironic title “The peace and stability factor” published in the weekly *Vreme*. The basic thesis of the text is that Vučić’s foreign policy strategy of maintaining a balance between great powers is nothing else but an inconsistent foreign policy game which is not presenting believable evidence that he is a credible partner in international relations to anyone, except Germany, more precisely to Chancellor Angela Merkel. Making big turns followed by different shapes of the media ado without real political coverage, Vučić’s foreign policy is, according to Vukadinović, a show for the domestic public and direct consequences of the authoritarian nature of his rule, “there are only current personal interests and evaluations which version lands more “freedom,” i.e. maneuvering space for his own political and economic combinations... It would be better if we also sang a bit of “Danke Deutschland.” And in the end, as icing on the cake and the peak of this (“rural”) geo-political wisdom: If we go with the Germans, the Russians will not hold it too much against us, they are also trying to maintain special and privileged relations with the Germans. And the Yankees will also let it fly as long as we don’t go with the Russians. Plus historically, the Germans are not too sensitive of those human rights, freedom of press and other democratic nitty gritty – especially while the takeover of Telekom is under way for example, and of some similar golden hens in Serbia and in the Balkans. All in all, perfect. You bet on the Germans and you cannot miss. But this is the principal problem of Vučić and the Progressives. No sooner had they realized what they are supposed to do after merely 5-10-15 years, and how things are globally, than those things drastically changed. While they developed “European” awareness, EU has not been what it was while Aleksandar Vučić was reviewing volumes of Šešelji’s collected works for a long time. But all of this is super, if it helps overcome the plight and remove the possible doubt in your own – fortunately, not particularly reflexive – electorate, which needed to be lead from Žirinovski to Tony Blair in a short period of time, from Great Serbia (“stretching to

¹⁶ Idem, p. 9

Tokyo”) to “respecting the territorial integrity of BiH.” This is why Izetbegović is “mujahedin” and “terrorist” at one point, and “dear guest” and regional partner of the new “regional leader.” And why Michael Davenport is an esteemed representative of the organization towards which we are unconditionally striving, and at other times archenemy and ring leader of the global conspiracy and assassination on our brave prime minister. And almost nobody is publicly asking who are they kidding and who is making fools of us. It is actually a structural problem of all authoritarianism, all despotism and every absolutistic power. Sooner or later, it starts believing in the image seen in its own distorted poltroon mirror, it starts misleading itself, it falls into paranoia, and it quickly loses a sense of measure and contact with reality. And then it is all surprised (and insulted) when reality at one point, like that time in Potočari, hits them on the head.”¹⁷

Construction of negative image of the first man of Serbian Government, and inherently the Government of Serbia as a whole, was continued on the plane of social-economic topics, as well. In the approach to these topics, propaganda template of minimizing success and maximizing failure was applied, through the saga of unfulfilled expectations from reform processes. Specific example of applying the mentioned propaganda strategy is the text of the Editor in Chief of the magazine *Vreme* Dragoljub Žarković “Instead of the pre-election chronicles: on the anniversary of *Vreme*, IMF bigger than Vučić and sensitivity of the government to civil initiatives.” Writing about the economic state of the country, at a time when data on fiscal consolidation and implications of modest, but still positive, economic growth in 2015, is becoming visible and verifiable, Žarković, referring to the strategic document of Cvetković’s government (which by the way did not have the political courage to implement savings measures – author’s comm.), states that the story about economic progress is becoming barren and vein, “Illusion that we are on a roll is created (the honor of our profession is being saved by the skeptics from the Fiscal Council), but these steps forward are shamelessly used to steer our attention away from the main problem. And that is the fact that this is a catastrophically low growth of the domestic product in 2015 of 0.5 percent compared to last year, which was anyway very bad due to flooding (a fall of 1.8), which means we have not even reached the product from 2013, 2012 or earlier years. Strategic objectives said that from 2010 to 2020, Serbia will record an average growth of 5.6% a year and it is already clear that the aim is unattainable which means we will still continue to be poorer compared to our surroundings. So much for the leaders in the region.”¹⁸

Criticism of the economic policy of the Government of Serbia is coming from the standpoint of consistency in the application of the IMF arrangement. This critical position has been taken by Srđoljub Antić, minister of finance from the Democratic Party’s shadow cabinet. Questioning the policy of the government, in the context of the IMF arrangement, and in response to the PM’s announcement that there will be an increase in salaries in the public sector

¹⁷ Đorđe Vukadinović, “Faktor mira i stabilnosti,” [The peace and stability factor], *Vreme*, no. 1282

¹⁸ Dragoljub Žarković, “Umesto predizborne hronike: o jubileju „Vremena“, MMF-u većem od Vučića, i osetljivosti vlasti na građanske inicijative,” [Instead of the pre-election chronicles: about the anniversary of *Vreme*, IMF bigger than Vučić, and sensitivity of the Government to civil initiatives], *Vreme*, no. 1287, p.4

and pensions, he says, "If they want to maintain the arrangement with IMF, the Government cannot increase the salaries in the public sector and pensions without the approval of IMF. Therefore, announcements about this are premature, which has been proven by the refusing of the Fund's mission to even discuss this..."¹⁹ It should be noted that the minister of DS's shadow cabinet failed to observe that the edge of the critical blade of DS towards economic policy of the Government is largely based on the criticizing of the policy of savings which involves a decision on the decrease of salaries in the public sector and pensions which is testified by the statement of Bojan Pajtić, "This incapacitating of employees and pensioners as a way of consolidating would be the last thing a European politician would resort to."²⁰ The condition of logical consistency in DS's performance against the Government's policies is here clearly unfulfilled. This prompts the conclusion that the previously cited Pajtić's statement, as well as the position of the minister of finance from DS's shadow cabinet, is solely a calculated attempt to incite disapproval among the readers. Abandoning logic in the name of political causes is not politically illegitimate, though it has consequences. Perversion of logical rules is dissolved in the propaganda speech, with quasi rational intentions based on superficially plausible stigmatizing of the political opponent.

Apart from the principal objections, negative image of the Government's economic policy has been developed through reflections on specific projects announced and started by the Government. This refers to the cooperation with the United Arab Emirates and the project "Belgrade Waterfront."

In the text "Announcements dried up," journalist of *Vreme*, Radmilo Marković, commenting on PM Vučić's last visit to the United Arab Emirates, stated that cooperation of Serbia and this Arab country is mostly an expensive announcement of large projects which remain unrealized or their realization is started to the detriment of the Serbian side which assumes the risk. Questioning the approach to cooperation with UAE in the context of comparing the announced/realized, Marković states the following, "there is not enough room to list all announced projects which the Emirates will realize in Serbia, so we will only give their summary, and supposedly they are worth over EUR 15 billion, and then "a boy erased them with a rubber," and the reality has been reduced to empty stories, sheer self-promotion and eternal campaigning."²¹ Defining the wish for self-promotion of the government as the main motive for signing the deal with UAE, Marković additionally said that it might be just as well that many of the announced deals will not be realized, "...it could be said that it is our good fortune that most of the announced projects will not be realized."²²

Another important project of the current government was scrutinized by the journalist of *Vreme*. This is the project "Belgrade Waterfront." In the text "Contracts and Comments" signed by Mirko Rudić, inadequacies of this deal between Serbia and the construction company from UAE were listed and commented point by point, with the use of opinions of members of national parliament from the ranks of the Democratic Party and the Belgrade-based

19 Srđoljub Antić, "Država ne poštuje pravila koja je sama donela," [The government does not uphold the rules it adopted itself], interview with Mijat Lakićević, *Novi Magazin*, no. 229, p. 23

20 Bojan Pajtić, "Vučić danas ne bi vladao Srbijom da kod Tadića nisam bio *persona non grata*," [Vučić would not be ruling Serbia today, if I wasn't Tadić's *persona non grata*], *Nedeljnik*, no. 191, p. 25

21 Radmilo Marković, "Presušile najave," [Announcements dried up], *Vreme*, no. 1289, p. 14

22 Idem

branch of the NGO "Transparency International." Public, constitution, profitability, risk, imprecision in the defining of the main obligation, company's expenses, choice of contractor²³ were presented very concisely and clearly, though the text neglects the presence of the other side (in this case the City of Belgrade and the Government of Serbia).

Based on and encircled around unilateralism, approach to the project "Belgrade Waterfront" represents a textbook example of the continuous negative writing of one weekly. Acknowledging arguments of only one side, more specifically failure to make arguments of both sides visible, are a clear symptom of journalistic bias aimed at producing a political effect. This kind of writing is understandable to some extent. In conditions of low party opposition to the ruling coalition, weeklies and public figures are prone to take on the role of opposition tribunes. Politically and morally, this kind of gesture is not an issue, but it would be good to clearly show this. It is not much of a surprise then that the public space in weeklies, especially in columns and interviews, is like agitprop wall newspapers of different political orientations. Weakness of the opposition in the public is attempted to be compensated for with suggestive, politically provocative rhetoric and sharp, ironing and clear style of writing which is not short of moralizing and political disqualifications. Anyway, one of the interviewed active intellectuals, theatre director Kokan Mladenović clearly says, "This moment requires a radical expression, it is not a time for sugarcoated metaphors, the way I live, work and speak indicates my attitude towards the times."²⁴

Image of opposition – disputable and low support of the voters, disunited, ideologically deeply divided mortgage of bad past at the time of rule

Similar to the government, image of the opposition in editorial columns is dominantly negative. Still, it should be noted that, unlike the government, there are two points which are somewhat neutralizing the negative image and correcting of it to a certain extent. First point of the media's retouching of the negative image of the opposition could be called searching for a justifiable reason for its currently bad, almost hopeless state. Second point, which is embedded in the texts, i.e. making statements about the opposition in the weeklies is a certain dose of nostalgia for the nineties, when there was a conceptually and organizationally strong and diversified opposition scene, which was perceived as a counterpoint to the ruling SPS, JUL and their occasional, but loyal partner, embodied in SRS.

Opposition is given considerably less spotlight in newspaper columns, interviews and texts which are present on the front pages of weeklies. Reasons are clear. Domination of ruling parties in the electorate, which is evidenced by numerous public opinion polls, fragmenting which is characteristic of both poles of the political specter (Euro-reformists and the right-wing), as potential to produce a timely result, opposition does not seem a relevant practicing

23 Mirko Rudić, "Ugovor i komentari," [Contract and comments], *Vreme*, no. 1290

24 Kokan Mladenović, "Svi znamo ko je netalentovani reditelj," [We all know who the talentless director is], interview with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3378

force in the political life of Serbia. Still, as it had already been said in the previous issues of *Mediameter*, the image of opposition in editorial columns is also negative.

Negative image, primarily, of the Euro-reformatory opposition, primarily the Democratic Party and its feeble satellites is emphasized in columns of the Editor in Chief of *Informer*, Dragan J. Vučićević. Vučićević's writing activity has specific form and content and represents a true example of sharp polemic journalism, which has a target, in both its message for the so-called capillary public, and for special layers of the population in the complex electorate of Serbia. Direct connection between the capillary public and Vučić's political-media message may be seen in the fact that this author often debates about not only politicians, their political attitudes and psychological-moral sensitivity, but also about the media which he believes to be politically and professionally unacceptable.

Vučićević's attitude towards the previous government and one part of the print and electronic media is formulated extremely negatively, using a strong and for some layers of readers very suggestive vocabulary. Vocabulary of this author is such that it demystifies shocks and causes rage of the readers. This is a writing style which is quite direct, stripped of all traces of intellectualism, sprawling with strong, provocative, insulting and rude expressions. Vučićević's criticism is always based on the principle *ad hominem*, strictly personalized, in order to make it convincing. This is why stigma is attached to a certain person, its moral and psychological profile is emphasized, making that person unworthy of any function in the public life.

A typical example of Vučićević's writing style and approach, as well as value-political message may be found in three columns "Counter-revolution of RTS" (25th July 2015), "The biggest benefit of special elections" (*Informer*, 22nd August 2015), and "Bullying minority" (*Informer*, 5th September 2015). *Ad hominem* political-evaluative critique of the opposition is directed towards the leader of the Democratic Party, Bojan Pajtić. This write-up is aimed at showing that this political champion is morally and politically problematic, making him unworthy to perform state functions, "In Serbian politics over almost three decades of modern multi-party system, numerous psychos have had a go at the most important party and state functions. When we take into consideration all the self-conscious ones in dire need of a fuck, who have been treating their problems for years over the backs of us, Serbs, it is impossible not to be pleased with Serbia as, more or less, a serious country. However, such a cretin like Bojan Pajtić has never been seen in any place. The man who became the leader of DS partially due to unfortunate and more due to queer circumstances, son of a Serbian priest who made the little political career he has off the anti-Serbian crawling maintenance of Titoistic autonomy of Vojvodina; official who has during his 16 years of reign made the Serbian north poorer than the south for the first time in history ... Political idiot who is proudly splashing around in Croatia while Ustashe celebrate the slaughter of Serbs around him; this and such Pajtić will finally do some historic good for the country and the people on the upcoming special parliamentary elections. Namely, Pajtić will slay the Democratic Party on the altar of his sick vanity."²⁵ Vučićević further develops argumentation against Bojan Pajtić as a political leader by show-

25 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Najveća korist od vanrednih izbora," [The biggest benefit of special elections], *Informer*, 22. 08. 2015, p. 5

ing that the leader of the Democrats does not respect the core principle of democracy – will of the majority. In that context, he compares Bojan Pajtić to Benito Mussolini, the leader of Italian fascists. This Italian politician believed in the elitist concept of government that correct political principle and practice need to enable superiority of the enlightened minority over the unenlightened majority.

Equalizing Pajtić and Mussolini is a consequence of Pajtić's efforts depicted in numerous interviews, in which he tried to relativize, and implicitly cast doubt over the dominance of Vučić's SNS in the public opinion polls. With this purpose, in the text "Bullying minority," Dragan J. Vučićević writes, "Mussolini attacked the form of democracy in his concept of fascism back in the twenties of the previous century, equalizing nation with majority, lowering its level to the highest prime number. The Democrat Pajtić did the same this week when he said that Vučić and SNS actually do not have the majority (!?) "because they have the votes of 40% of the 40% of electorate that votes" (however, son of a mother failed to mention that his DS gets barely six, seven percent of those "40 percent"). Mussolini further advocated superiority of "quality over quantity" claiming that his educated minority knows what's best for the country and the people. Well, aren't Pajtić's followers also thinking that they are that enlightened minority, solely worthy of deliberating and passing judgment, do they not see themselves as Mussolini-like persons of the higher caste which embodied within a state become a nation?!"²⁶ This cultural-political racism, which Vučićević attributes to Pajtić, bears elements of creating civil conflicts and introduction of the state and society into a state of social and existential uncertainty. "This and such second-Serbia racism is dominant in the convincing majority of Belgrade-based mass media, and sooner or later, they may result in civil conflicts."²⁷

The identical style of writing and nearly identical political message which denies Democratic Party and its affiliated social elite the right to participate actively in the political and media life, Vučićević sent out in response to the appointment of the new general director of RTS Dragan Bujošević and two editors of RTS, Olivera Kovačević and Nebojša Bradić. In response to their performing of functions on RTS, he writes, "...and now we have come to a situation that no one in Serbia is surprised that Blondie Bujke (referring to Dragan Bujošević – author's comm.) is dwelling on RTS nowadays, almost like we still have Kim Jong Tadić in power? Excuse me; isn't the national television supposed to reflect public interest? And hasn't the public interest been measured on the previous elections, and undoubtedly it has, well which public interest is represented by the well greased up editorial seats of Olja Kovačević and Nebojša Bradić? Well, is it possible that Serbia does not have a more competent and more "fun" editor than the cranky old maid Kovačević?!"

And doesn't the great Serbian culture have anyone other than the most dilapidated out of all the dilapidated former ministers? Is there not someone better and more worthy than Nebojša Bradić for an editor on RTS?"²⁸

26 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Nasilje manjine," [Bullying minority], *Informer*, 5. 09. 2015, p. 5

27 Idem, p. 5

28 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Kontrarevolucija: operacija RTS," [Counter-revolution: operation RTS], *Informer*, 25. 07. 2015, p. 5

For understanding the media-political scene in Serbia, writing of the Editor in Chief of *Informer* is relevant for three interconnected reasons. Firstly, the style of writing and content of the message of his texts are usually such that they reflect the interest in politics of the less educated layers who mostly buy and read tabloids and who are very loyal voters in the election process. Secondly, *Informer* is very important for the current government, because week in and week out, on daily basis, it re-examines the negative attitudes and media political images created and continuously reproduced by the critical media. And finally, *Informer* is a leader in the area of daily press and in the creating of the negative image of the current opposition as a political actor.

Certain attention of the media was again allocated to the story about the prospects of the Serbian right-wingers. Their total rating is mildly on the increase, and the political climate, as well as social and economic circumstances, is opening up the opportunity for further strengthening of trust among the citizens. European trend of increasing support to right-winged parties should be added to this, caused by the still unresolved crisis of the Euro zone, as well as the fact that the European continent is facing a large number of refugees, mostly Muslims. Serbia is not and cannot be an isolated case in Europe and pursuant to that, this topic is relevant for monitoring the complex dynamics of relations between parties, as it is important for the future political, economic, social and cultural and wider geo-strategic orientation of the country.

Factually speaking, the right-wingers of Serbia are divided into more political groups: DSS, Dveri, SRS, SNP, with an array of non-government organizations like "Obraz," "1389," "Naši" and others. They enjoy considerable support of certain intellectual circles, parts of the Serbian Orthodox Church and their own a significantly branched out and influential internet community, similar to Jobbik in Hungary. Their position is radically critical towards the current office, especially in the context of Euro-reforming political determination which is publically stated by the Serbian PM Aleksandar Vučić. In the eyes of the right-wingers, Vučić's government is perceived as an extended government of the Democratic Party and its coalition partners and political associates. Therefore, it is no wonder that one of the right-winged political champions, official of the Serbian Radical Party, Nemanja Šarović says, "They continued and then accelerated the indebteding of Serbia, betrayed Kosovo, no tycoon or serious criminal has been convicted nor has their stolen property been confiscated, salaries and pensions have been decreased, they are getting ready to fire tens of thousands of people, and the promised ten billion Euros of investments and better life are nowhere to be seen."²⁹ Promise of the right-wingers in the rhetoric-political sense is the turning away from EU and NATO and towards Russia, re-examining capitalism, return of traditionalism, sharper regional policy, bigger role of the Church in the daily life ... The economic crisis, uncertain European path, the still vivid media and political matrices from the nineties, easy and quick antagonism on the political and economic plan with Croatia, unresolved relations with Kosovo and strong potential for ethnic-national conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina makes the situation suit-

²⁹ Nemanja Šarović, stated according to the text of Zoran Preradović, "U potrazi za izgubljenim vremenom," [Searching for time lost], *NIN*, no. 3377, p. 13

able for the right-winged political parties, especially when considering the fact that they are characterized by one variety of the dissatisfaction with the political outcome of Yugoslavia's collapse, flirting with the feeling of hurt national dignity, pro-Russian geo-political orientation, original anti-capitalistic economic determination, as well as the value policy which is anti-liberal and deeply traditionally conservative. Despite these favorable circumstances, the right is burdened by a high level of political fragmenting, lack of credible leadership, as well as a deficit of new faces and patterns of media-political communication. The right is fluctuating between political opportunities, given the general political, economic and social circumstances, and real political lack of power to articulate itself organizationally and action wise. In a nearly fatal gap between what still has not happened and what should be, at their discretion is where the destiny of the Serbian right-wingers is taking place.

The array of inadequacies, as specified by the journalist of *NIN*, Zoran Preradović, should be supplemented by the fact that some right-winged parties, like DSS and SRS already had their peaks in completely different political roles and historical circumstances, "Additional problem for the "right pole" is the fact that they have already spent their "best days" (this refers to right-winged parties, author's comm.) in utterly different surroundings and completely different circumstances and in the end in an entirely different era. So, DSS has travelled the path from the icon of the velvet revolution of October 5th, over the party during the rule of which, the biggest number of Serbian officers got sent to The Hague, to a party which has been abandoned by its inviolable leader Vojislav Koštunica, with a few bad words and an array of hidden meanings which convinced even the most committed supporters that they can expect supporting roles at best. On the other hand, SRS has made the transition from Milošević's pet to a party of the parliamentary opposition. Leaving of Šešelj for The Hague and dismantling of the party from which Vučić and Nikolić took almost everything, have turned the Radicals into an ephemeral party."³⁰

Still, as Preradović says, however radical the rhetoric of the right-winged parties, SRS and DSS are above all "essentially system parties, because DSS and the Radicals were the bearers of power in various periods or they were at its side. It is not difficult to assume then that their anti-Europeanism, even if they took part in the government would result in the continuation of cooperation with Brussels. Just like in the case of Syriza."³¹

Perhaps the basic matrix for the forming of a negative image of the opposition as a political actor in Serbia lies in a more complex tension between the potential and inability of its realization, circumstances and lack of power to utilize them. This image is not primarily negative, but is founded on insight into the living and complex experience of the political life, more specifically its plots and outcomes. Precisely the specified social and political tension generates two feelings with the publically declared intellectuals. On one hand, they are pointing to the potential in the public opinion and ascertaining lack of power, leaving a somewhat utopian hope into the coming of a new opposition subject that will replace this government,

³⁰ Idem, p. 14

³¹ Idem, p. 14

“This government will certainly remain a part of our political reality for many years with the manipulative mechanisms it is applying and the fact that it has a corruptive incompetent and disunited opposition. What could change the ratio of political power is if someone was to inspire that huge part of discouraged citizens who lost all hope to take part in the political life. That “someone” does not exist, the one who manages to solve the secret of how to bring back the abstainers into the political process, that person will change political power, now or in five years. This is not my feeling; thousands of people I know feel this way.”³²

On the other hand, with some public figures, like Žarko Jokanović, nostalgia for the nineties is present, a time of oppositional enthusiasm and fight against the government, “There was huge energy and desire in the nineties, and today there is no opposition. Who is the opposition today, what is it doing, has it given any quality alternatives? Sadly, no. Are there left-wingers in Serbia? No, and that is our biggest problem. I was at the Terazijaska česma in the nineties and that was maybe the nicest thing I did in my political career.”³³

Real-political weakness is not manifested only through the nostalgia for the past or utopian expectations of some unknown historical-political subject, but there is the thesis on the reasons for the weak opposition as a consequence of the repressive nature of the government. This thesis which looks for excuses for political weakness of the opposition is put forward by the journalist Slaviša Lekić in the already cited interview for the paper *Vreme*, “Opposition is on Twitter, because it does not have where to go. This guy has taken them apart using the tabloids and national-security-orchestrated scandals. The media are closed; the remains are few and far between. There is no money for “house calls.” They do not understand each other. Old wise men say experience teaches only those who want to learn. These guys somehow do not want. And to paraphrase the Editor in Chief of *Vreme* “I don’t want to beat a donkey that’s down in the mud!” They have been sufficiently beat up.”³⁴

A discourse analysis of texts in weeklies, as well as the editorial columns in the period between July and September showed that the images of political protagonists were predominantly negative in terms of their content. Print media, with the applied writing styles and the message to their readers, are more like propaganda newsletters, which directly or indirectly make comments on daily political matters. Such comments are mostly moralistic, stigmatising and irreconcilable for the one proclaimed politically unacceptable. Instead of establishing a remotely rational framework for appraising the value of conduct, either of the government or the opposition, the media almost obscenely enjoy creating and maintaining the negative images of the actors. The matrices used to create the images of the protagonists are different, but the outcomes are the same. This period too was marked by congruence between the messages sent by certain editors, columnists and interviewees with those sent by political

32 Kokan Mladenović, “Svi znamo ko je netalentovani reditelj,” [We all know who is the talentless director], interview with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3378

33 Žarko Jokanović, “U Srbiji nema kome više da se piše osim vođi,” [There is no one to write about in Serbia except the leader], interview with Ivana Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, no. 1282

34 Slaviša Lekić, “Problem sa čovekom koji nema problema sa sopstvenom prošlošću,” [Problem with the man who has no problem with his own past], *Vreme*, no. 1290, p. 40

parties, which are directly involved in the political battle. A negative message rarely stimulates. On the contrary, it more often makes political protagonists passive or fortifies their existing beliefs. Hence, it is unrealistic to expect increased participation of citizens in the political process when it is dominantly insisted on negative messages and attaching negative labels to political actors. Similarly, any room for a rational public debate is always and everywhere closed or narrowed as much as possible, if a political and wider public debate are to be understood using the principle of “assigned roles”. The model of “assigned roles” abolishes the space for openness towards facts, their free classification and interpretation in the most convincing and rational way possible. This model jumps to conclusions, passes evaluative judgments and almost always, as if it were a rule, makes political accusations.

The outcome of such matrix of values and politics, based on the principle of assigned roles is a public space ruled by omnipresent relativization and lack of any type of agreement regarding the desired outcome, accompanied by a lack of rational parameters for evaluation and appraisal of public policies in various spheres of social life.

20 years of commemorating the crimes in Srebrenica – Spirit of media-political division and moral disorientation

The texts published in the weeklies and editorial columns on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the brutal massacre of Muslim men and exodus of women, children and the elderly organised by the Army of the Republic of Srpska is an example of a “diametrically opposed” attitudes and matrices of thoughts and values that shape our media space, in this case in print media.

In order to understand the complexity and thickness of the plot appearing in the weekly magazines, we need to look back at a series of events preceding the visit of Aleksandar Vučić to Srebrenica, i.e. the Memorial centre in Potočari. In early June, to be precise on 10th June, a former commander of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Naser Orić, was arrested in Switzerland on an Interpol warrant issued by Serbia, based on suspicion of participating in mass crimes against Serbs in 1992-1995. Orić’s arrest created great tension in the relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. The seemingly invisible rhetoric from the early nineties was quickly reactivated, i.e. intensified. Accusations and counter-accusations between the two states easily occupied the whole public space. The intensive negative rhetoric created such environment that the announced visit of the President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić was cancelled upon the request of the Bosniak member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bakir Izetbegović.

At the beginning of July, Great Britain prepared a resolution on Srebrenica suggested by the United Nations Security Council. This resolution condemned the genocide committed by the Serbian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia, i.e. the President of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić, sent a request to Russia, asking for their veto. Russia obliged. On the day when Russia used its veto, the visit of Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić to Srebrenica on 11th

July was still in doubt. Meanwhile, numerous non-governmental organisations supported an initiative of journalist Dušan Mašić to organise a performance called “7000” on 11th July. The rationale behind the organisers’ idea was to show compassion with the victims of crimes in Srebrenica by lying down on the plateau in front of the Serbian Parliament. The right-winged Serbian Radical Party had scheduled a rally for the same day, 11th July. Both events were banned by the Serbian Ministry of Interior. Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić went to Potočari, where he was attacked by a large number of visitors to the commemorative event. With strict security measures, Serbian Prime Minister left Potočari, pelted with rocks, swear-words and insults from the crowd. An unwritten rule suggests that too many related events in a short time interval thematise all questions that could be raised, for more or less valid reasons. Following the incident in Srebrenica, the media in Serbia discussed the nature of the crime in Srebrenica, with a perpetual reference to the question whether the mass crimes committed by the Serbian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be classified as a genocide or not. Has the incident in Potočari degraded the relations between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the level they are at during the wars of the nineties? Is it at all possible, and to what extent, to have neighbourly relations between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina? Has a foreign factor played any role in the ugly incidents in Potočari and if so, what was it? What is the result of Prime Minister Vučić’s visit to Srebrenica? Does Serbia have the potential to overcome the malign, criminal past in the relations with the Bosniaks? Have Serbia and the Serbian people already been punished enough for the disastrous policy from the nineties? Has Russia reaffirmed its role in leading international and European, or, in this case, the politics related to the Balkans, by vetoing the British draft resolution on Srebrenica? What are Serbia’s prospects regarding Europe in the light of its diplomatic reliance on Russia when it comes to important political-moral and historical questions, such as Srebrenica? And so on.

All the aforementioned questions have been present in various texts and interviews published in the week when the 20th anniversary of the massacre in Srebrenica was commemorated. All these questions brought to surface the endemic division in terms of political and value division, which were reflected in such texts. These divisions are visible in various approaches, i.e. focuses that the authors or interviewees set, or in various attitudes, arguments and rhetorical suggestions they offered to their readers.

Analysing the effects of Vučić’s visit to Srebrenica, a Bosniak literary critic and publicist Haris Imamović claims that despite expectations that Vučić would score negative points in the eyes of the citizens of Serbia by visiting Srebrenica, it actually had a completely opposite effect, “Thanks to the rocks, he received more apologies from the people of Srebrenica that day than he himself expressed to them, without actually recognising the genocide. Even though he had gone to Potočari, Belgrade did not welcome him as a traitor. On the contrary, he has become even more powerful. It looked as if he would be ruling for a hundred years more, without eating, sleeping or aging, but merely ruling. He became the only politician who on 11th July earned sympathy from the Bosnian, Serbian and international community... “He came to pay respect to the victims in Potočari, but was welcomed back in Belgrade as a moral winner. He left Potočari happy, but not because he had survived an “assassination

attempt”, but because he knew it was only the beginning of a magnificent PR stunt. Regardless of whether the attempt had been planned or spontaneous, he left Potočari on 11th July happy, and no one should leave Potočari happy on that day, not after what happened twenty years ago.”³⁵

Žarko Korać, psychologist and former political of left-winged, civil orientation, expressed his views on the reasons for the attack on Vučić in Srebrenica on 11th July 2015. His attitude synthesises the need for rationalisation of the anger among the Bosniak people caused by Vučić’s visit and the critical distance towards the European agenda of Vučić’s cabinet and the Serbian society in the process of adopting the democratic and liberal values of Europe.

Regarding the attack on Vučić in Potočari, Korać says: “There are several reasons, but the first and basic one is the fact that the families of victims, and I presume most Bosniaks, actually perceived all the events prior to Vučić’s arrival to Srebrenica as a negation of that crime. Serbia begged Russia to veto the British resolution. That is when the bidding process started, whether what had happened in Srebrenica was a genocide or not and we were on the verge of a consensus that there had not been a genocide, but simply criminal activities. We could hear statements that Serbian casualties were much greater and that no one even mentioned them, it was said that the resolution had been drafted to abolish the Republic of Srpska and, naturally, with all the weight of the baggage carried by that man, with his participation in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina – because according to Šešelj he had been at the Jewish cemetery, and it is a known fact that he was working at the TV station in Pale – is was quite reasonable to expect something to happen in that crowd of people. It is a major security failure and it is really bad that something like that happened, but it was by no means unexpected.”³⁶

Korać also mentions that Vučić as a pro-West, pro-German Serbian politician, but deprived of appropriate sensibility to the values that promote compassion for past sacrifices and unambiguous distancing from the morally wrong Serbian past: “Aleksandar Vučić is, both formally and by many of his actions, oriented towards the West; you have witnessed the fascination with Angela Merkel’s visit. He *does* say, “We can learn so much from the Germans”, but at the same time gives utterly confusing and disappointing, to say the least, statements about Srebrenica. Germany became a democratic state because it faced its Nazi past. No serious politician in Germany, from Adenauer to present-day, would defend the Nazi regime, or the events that occurred then. I am not making any direct analogy, but merely wish to point out that only a society critical of its past can be called democratic. So, Vučić looks up to Germany for its economic miracle, but not for its attitude towards the past... In any case, Serbia has now reached the point when it be-

35 Haris Imamović, “Križni put Aleksandra Vučića,” [The crossroad of Aleksandar Vučić], *Novi Magazin*, no. 220, p. 13-14
36 Žarko Korać, “Srbija je postala bezosečajna,” [Serbia has become heartless], Interview with Mijat Lakićević, *Novi Magazin*, no. 220, p. 20

comes clear that our society is completely disoriented, when the democratic capacities are extremely weak and when, at the same time, we are experiencing economic poverty.³⁷

The discrepancy between Vučić's visit to Srebrenica, interpreted as an act that fits the process of reconciliation and a precondition for neighbourly relations in the region and the general media-political situation in Serbia is also noticed by journalist Dušan Mašić. Condemning the attack on the Prime Minister, Mašić still does not fail to notice the latent disharmony between the Prime Minister's policy of reconciliation and the nationalistic rhetoric dominating in the Serbian media, especially those who favour him: "There is no word that could justify what we saw in Potočari. The organisers hold the complete responsibility. It was by pure chance that there were no casualties. Also, everything that the Prime Minister said both during his visit to Potočari and after it deserves praise, because we know that everything could be worse. Much worse. The problem is that if all the events are interpreted to us via TV Pink people like Vučelić, Vučićević and Cvijanović, each following day will be worse than the previous one."³⁸

In July 2015, the Serbian media fluctuated between a renewal of the nationalistic discourse from the wars in the nineties and glorification of Vučić's courage to insist on a policy of reconciliation in an extremely hostile environment. This trend in public life is noticed by journalist Dragoljub Žarković, "When you give Vučić a chance to steal the show, do not expect him to pass on it. It wasn't Clinton and Madeleine Albright, Davutoglu and other "bells and whistles" ... He was the star of the memorial service in Srebrenica, the world news of the day, which has been going on for six days in Serbia. I've been watching, since it's almost unavoidable, reactions of licensed interpreters in Serbia these days, where those interpreters are at the same time striving to ingratiate themselves to Vučić and to annihilate the message from his political phase of reconciliation. While Vučić would like to put out the fire, they have already degreased and polished their guns."³⁹

The current state of relations in the region, i.e. the fragility of the idea of reconciliation and establishing neighbourly relations, is realistically interpreted by an official from the Democratic Party and member of the Serbian Parliament, Nataša Vučković, who notices, "Everything that has happened in Srebrenica is actually raising a question about the quality of the relations in the region today. In my opinion, they have deteriorated. Despite the praise from the West for frequent mutual visits of the officials in the region, it is clear that such bilateral visits leave no deeper trace in the society and they do not contribute substantially to improving relations, let alone to reconciliation. The reason for that can

37 Idem, p. 21

38 Dušan Mašić, "Samo jedan čovek u Srbiji može da oda poštu u Srebrenici," [Only one man in Serbia can express condolences in Srebrenica], interview with Jovana Gligorićević, *Vreme*, no. 1280

39 Dragoljub Žarković, "Čekajući Oluju – Kad date Vučiću priliku da ukrade šou. Ne očekujte da ću tu priliku da propusti. Kakav Kliton ili Medlin Olbrajt... on je bio zvezda srebreničkog pomena, svetska vest toga dana koja traje već šest dana u Srbiji" [Waiting for the Storm – When you give Vučić a chance to steal the show. Don't expect that he will pass up on that chance. It wasn't Clinton and Madeleine Albright, Davutoglu and other "bells and whistles" ... He was the star of the memorial service in Srebrenica, the world news of the day, which has been going on for six days in Serbia], *Vreme*, no. 1280



Vreme, 16th July 2015

be found in the mutual distrust, which had developed, among other reasons, because of political biographies of some leading people in the region and in the fact that more rigid, harder nationalistic options have pushed out liberal and civil parties. That is also noticeable in Macedonia, which was shaken by the events in Kumanovo, and Croatia, with the attitude towards the Cyrillic alphabet. The events in Srebrenica now only come on top of all these issues.⁴⁰

In the medium term, negative implications of the Russian veto in the SC and the further course of European integrations, Nataša Vučković directly diagnoses, pointing to the very likely problem – specific relationship between Serbia and Russia “The question is how this whole thing about the Russian veto on the resolution on Srebrenica will be interpreted among our Euro-Atlantic partners. I am afraid that this, as they refer to it, “diplomatic victory” of Serbia may prove to be Pyrrhic victory in the long-term process of European integrations. The Russian veto created an image of exclusive alliance between Serbia and Russia. For instance, the French *Figaro* published a text on Srebrenica on 11th July claiming that, “Putin made Serbia its closest ally.”⁴¹

Event in Srebrenica and the entire historical-political context which it induces is interpreted by the journalist Veljko Lalić in a relatively different context than the previously specified authors and public figures. In his column in the weekly *Nedeljnik*, he asks the question of historical-political price paid by Serbia for the bad policies of the nineties, noting that present Serbia which is pro-European oriented is consequently imposed the encumbrance of absolute historical guilt, without appreciation of the suffering which the Serbian country and nation endured up to now. This tendency in western politics and media is accompanied by a high level of tolerance for the historical misconduct of the regional geo-political rivals – Serbs, Croats, Albanians, Bosnians, “What is the future of Serbs who are at the collision of three planes: east, west and orient? And what could we see in Potočari? Was the region definitely moved that day to the Middle East, where the Balkan tiffs seem like local conflicts in Canada? What did we see last week at the marking of the biggest individual killing in Europe since the Second World War, not counting Algeria which was at least formally a part of Europe in 1945 and where one of the most civilized nations in the world killed 20,000 of its citizens in a single day in peacetime? Is it normal for us Serbs to remain marked as the biggest criminals in the modern world? Is stopping the British resolution, after which we would – along with Ruanda – remain the only ones convicted of genocide, justice? Or Russia’s favor. Which word should be used then for the Germans in the Second World War, the British throughout half of history, Soviets for the exterminating of their own people, Turks for the Armenians, Croats for Jasenovac...? Have we not done our time? Who paid for the nineties more than us? Who was banished out of Croatia? Who lost their country for which they gave the most in percents in both World Wars, and joined the Second because of the English, while the Americans were remaining neutral and the Russians were mangling Europe alongside

40 Nataša Vučković, “Pirova pobjeda u Savetu Bezbednosti,” [Pyrrhic victory in the Security Council], interview with Jovana Gligorijević, *Vreme*, no. 1280

41 Idem

Hitler? Where are the Serbs in Sarajevo today? What are they doing in today’s Priština? Is there anything Serbian in Macedonia apart from the cemeteries? Do you know anyone in the world who was bombed by NATO twice? Do you know any example where such a military armada attacked a so much smaller enemy? How to define rape if not like that? How to define punishment if not like that? Which European country was so hammered by economic sanctions that it needs decades, if not centuries, to pick itself up? Is it a product of the nineties that everybody still feels that their country is up for grabs, and not for managing? In the international arena, we remain a chess board for settling scores. All that was allowed during the nineties is still ongoing today. Habits die hard...Aren’t our elites so indoctrinated that they cannot even call themselves elite? Isn’t our military in The Hague and police in mafia cartels? Weren’t the hands of our former President Stambolić cut like in medieval rituals? Didn’t an elite military unit shoot our first democratically elected prime minister at the Government’s entrance? Did this body kill the Editor in Chief of the opposition paper? Imagine if you were constantly bringing up Auschwitz to the Germans? Do you look at Croats as if they just came out of Jasenovac? Vučić, luckily, handled himself well. Anyway, he had had best three days of his life as far as his political career is concerned. The Russians saved him in the UN, Merkel anointed him in Belgrade, and Islamic fundamentalists in Potočari declared him the future leader of the region. This is Vučić’s Kosovo Polje (Field of the Blackbirds). “

Lalić’s style of writing and political-moral and wider historical message point to the versatile possibilities of interpreting Vučić’s visit in Srebrenica and its wider regional context. Still, this is a more moderate and refined version of interpretation than the ones that may be seen in the paper *Pečat*.

Approach to Srebrenica is a confirmation of the national, anti-Western and pro-Russian standpoint, which is continuously and consistently advocated by this paper. It is a model of political-historical evaluative deduction which essentially resembles the dominant discourse of the nineties, but has been “refreshed,” more specifically adjusted to contemporary circumstances. Tuning of the political-historical “spirit and letter” of the nineties to Vučić’s visit to Srebrenica involved a joint action of several momentums 1) focus on the incident, to be precise, establishing that it is an assassination or 2) pointing to the executors and principals, 3) re-examining the narrative of Srebrenica as a genocide, 4) seeing the vote on the British Resolution about genocide in Srebrenica in the context of global turmoil.

The result of answers to the four mentioned questions is the following. Incident at the commemoration in Potočari on 11th July 2015 represents a joint effort of the political security structures of the Bosniaks and the Brits. The Bosniaks were the executors and the Brits provided the inspiration. The reason for the incidence is the British frustration over the failure to adopt the Resolution on Srebrenica.

On the other hand, the Srebrenica massacre was not a crime of genocide, according to the final verdicts of The Hague Tribunal and the International Justice Court in The Hague, but a mass brutal crime. Rejecting the Resolution on Srebrenica was an act which points to a more thorough change in international relations – end of West domination and reaffirming

of Russia as one of the key actors in world politics. Success of Russia was enabled not only thanks to diplomatic activities and strength or arms, but to new value-political paradigm, which does not put freedom as key political value, but the national community.

Pečat's view of the nature of the incident and its orderers and their motives was outlined by Filip Rodić in the text "Bakir Izetbegović – stone of reconciliation." "An assassination of Vučić was carried out. The fact that it failed is perhaps just luck, correct reactions of his security or incompetence of the assassins to see their intentions through, which does not grant them amnesty," expert for fighting terrorism Dževad Galijašević said, adding that "Great Britain and its secret services are behind the attempted murder of the prime minister of Serbia, precisely as they were behind the already seen murder of one Serbian prime minister – Zoran Đinđić. Really, it is hard not to think that Great Britain, or as it likes to refer to itself, Perfidious Albion, could let go of the humiliation which it endured with its hideous resolution on Srebrenica, precisely because of its pride."⁴²

Re-examining of the Srebrenica massacre as a crime of genocide which was brought on by Russia's refusal to support the British Resolution in the UN SC, made Erafim Zurof conclude in his interview for the weekly *Pečat* that the resolution was an attempt of redefining the notion of genocide and tuning it to the daily-political interests of great western powers, "The resolution on Srebrenica is a political project of countries which are not qualified to make such evaluations. They are not competent to declare something genocide. The intention of the author of this draft is obvious and ultimately leading to the change of paradigm of viewing events, not only related to the last war in the territory of former Yugoslavia, but to the understanding of calamities in general."⁴³

Powerlessness of Britain and other Western forces to pass the resolution on the genocide in Srebrenica made some of the authors of *Pečat* see the Russian veto as a process of annulling the victory of the West in the Cold War and reaffirming of Russia's role in international relations. This process is not a product of diplomatic activities of Russia, but it has a deeper symbolic, more accurately evaluative meaning. Neoliberal model based on the supremacy of the idea of freedom is no longer the dominant ideological matrix; rather it is facing the competitive and largely efficient Putin's model of community as thorough political value. Wider, more precisely global and deeply ideologized dimension of events in Srebrenica and their international context is given by the author from the magazine *Pečat* Nikola Martić, who writes, "Russian veto in response to Srebrenica speaks of the fact that the timid processes of bringing back humanity and world society to a community of peoples, activated after Putin's taking office in Russia, have today definitely grown into a strong matrix. Of course, this is a conflict in the sphere of values, which was noted by Putin. Truth is one of such values. Truth of the neoliberal ideology, based on the principle of freedom, does not have to be the same as the truth of the conservative ideology, based on the principle of community. Anyway, for one the truth is the key principle of people's lives, and for the other the truth is a

42 Filip Rodić, "Bakir Izetbegović – kamen pomirenja," [Bakir Izetbegovic – stone of reconciliation], *Pečat*, no. 378, p. 6
43 Erafim Zurof, "Prekrajnje holokausta," [Retailoring holocaust], interview with Nataša Jovanović, *Pečat*, no. 378, p. 20

priority in the life of a community. This is at the core of today's misunderstanding between the West and Russia."⁴⁴

The story about Vučić's stay in Srebrenica can dominantly be understood from the standpoint of rivalry of two irreconcilable and radically opposed theses – civil-liberal, which is basically pro-Western, and conservative-national, which is basically pro-Russian. Depth of the discord of values and policies and suggestive conflict of the linguistic expression, which marked this discord as well, shows that with the aid of this dispute it is easy to see how easily and simply each question can be relativized and any answers which would rely on the rational alignment of society and politics are made impossible. This kind of spiritual constellation undoubtedly points to the metaphor of one Russian writer used these days, "there won't be war, but the fight for peace will be such that no stone will be left unturned." This applies to the spiritual-political climate in Serbia and it applies to the reality of regional politics. There are no indications of war, but there is imminent incapacity to make peace meaningful.

Celebration of the 20th anniversary of Operation Storm, Croatian victory day and exodus of Serbs from Krajina – endless war and challenges of regional cooperation

In the beginning of August, regional issues were again placed under the spotlight in print and electronic media. 5th August, 20th anniversary of the military-police operation Storm in which Croatia established control over the territory around the city of Knin and the surroundings, which were under the control of the Serbian people from that area since 1991 with the support of the former FR Yugoslavia. At the same time this is the date which symbolizes the exodus of more than 200,000 Serbs, men, women and children who did not see themselves as citizens of the Croatian state. Serbian weeklies and editorial columns seemed, as expected, politically determined, at times biased, and at times full of rage and anger, with a subtext of evoking revenge. There was also grief over the ill faith of the members of one's people. The motive of just wrath towards the West was also underlying. A few hours of reading comments and interviews during these weeks were sufficient to overturn any thought of good neighborly relations, rationally understood and balanced relations and common European perspective for both nations and countries.

Educational historic example of cooperation of Germans and the French, after the long history of animosity, started in 1871, which finally ended in 1945, after the Second World War, seemed like twisted fiction. All attempts of Tadić and Josipović during the second half of the last decade seemed surreal. First days and weeks of August 2015 evoked easily, quickly and intensely the matrices of deduction and evaluative judgments which were relatively similar to those that dominated the wartimes of the nineties. Truth be told, rise to this kind of style of writing, as well as numerous messages which opened room for policy of conflict between the Serbs and Croats, was given by the Croatian side. In addition to this, after the Srebrenica

44 Nikola Martić, "Njet poništava zapadnu pobjedu u hladnom ratu?" [Nyet annuls the victory of the West in the Cold War?], *Pečat*, no. 378, p. 30

incident, specifically the attack on PM Vučić at the Memorial Centre in Potočari on 11th July 2015, it was certain that the Serbian media will revive their “nationally conscious and conscientious past,” which was developed in late eighties and early nineties. “Artillery preparations around the Storm have begun, a cynic would say, at the right time, and Croatian idea to mark with a military parade, with the pompous participation of NATO forces, the days when they banished Serbs from their “centuries-old homes,” as it is usually said, is not a contribution to any kind of reconciliation, but will give rise to digging up and sharpening of old hatchets.”⁴⁵ It started with the announcement of the current Croatian government that it was organizing a pompous celebration to mark the 20th anniversary of the Storm in Knin, where they were to reveal on 5th August 2015 the monument of the first president of independent Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, while the previous day a military parade in Zagreb was to take place, in which the armies of the member countries of NATO, which are perceived as allies by Croatia, were to take part. They did not take part, despite announcements.

Serbia had its view of things. Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić, in response to the Storm, suggested to political leaders of the region to make “5th August a day of remembering the victims of all the wars of the nineties.” The initiative was rejected by officials of Croatia, Muslim leaders, Bakir Izetbegović, as well as Foreign Minister of Kosovo Hashim Thaci. Also, together with the Government of Republic Srpska, Serbia declared 5th August Memorial Day for the Victims of Operation Storm. Central celebration was held in Sremska Rača with the presence of high ranking state officials from Serbia and Republic Srpska.

Messages of politicians from the assemblies in Knin and Sremska Rača were different and antagonizing. While the Croatian President Kolinda Grabar Kitarović said that she was celebrating Croatia’s victory, “We are a nation that celebrates victories, not defeats. We are a nation that knows how to appreciate the freedom won in blood because the war was here, not somewhere far away. We want to clearly send a message from this place – this assembly is not directed against anyone, inherently it is not against Serbia. We are today celebrating our victory and togetherness,”⁴⁶ forgetting to mention the 2,000 killed citizens of Croatia who were Serbian nationals and 250,000 citizens banished from Croatia.

PM of Croatia Zoran Milanović also remained consistent with the spirit of national hermetism. Ceremonial atmosphere in Knin was acclaimed with a concert of Marko Perković Tomson, singer who openly flirts with extremist nationalism. At the pop-rock concert, paroles like “Kill Serbs,” “Ready for our homeland,” were heard. As the President of Croatia, Milanović also “omitted” to mention the Serbian suffering, even explicitly showing his “oblivion,” “Croatia is not celebrating anyone’s suffering, or persecution,” but, “we are celebrating

45 Dragoljub Žarković „Čekajući Oluju – Kad date Vučiću priliku da ukrade šou, ne očekujte da ću tu priliku da propusti. Kakav Kliton ili Medlin Olbrajt... on je bio zvezda srebreničkog pomena, svetska vest toga dana koja u Srbiji traje već šest dana,” [Waiting for the Storm – If you give Vučić a chance to steal the show, he won’t pass on that opportunity. It wasn’t Clinton and Madeleine Albright, Davutoglu and other “bells and whistles”... He was the star of the memorial service in Srebrenica, the world news of the day, which has been going on for six days in Serbia], *Vreme*, no. 1280

46 <http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/govor-predsjednice-grabar-kitarovic-u-kninu--395526.html>

freedom and peace, we are celebrating victory with an open heart.⁴⁷ And while Croatia was consumed by national euphoria, meanwhile Serbian PM in Sremska Rača first said that, “it is impossible to find a sadder day in recent Serbian history than 5th August 1995. I don’t want words of hate, conflict and revenge to mark today’s day. We have peace with Croatia; we will guard this peace and wish for best relations in the future.”⁴⁸ President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić was considerably harsher comparing modern Croatia and its statehood with the Croatian state from the Second World War, “Your suffering (referring to Serbs in Croatia in the summer of 1995 – author’s comm.) and cavalry is being celebrated as a victory and day when they renewed their country, which was left to them by Pavelić, and it was only recognized by Hitler.”⁴⁹

In its basis, a very complex political-historical and social and cultural context, which is connected to the celebration of Operation Storm or Memorial Day for the Victims, was viewed by the Serbian weeklies professionally, informatively and evaluatively. There is a subtle, but important difference among the weeklies in terms of topic processing and conclusions. Weeklies like *Pečat* bring a clear and unequivocal message of condemning Croatia, based on the facts which describe the past and the current moment, with a deficit of moral and political reflection towards the Serbian role in the war and joint state. In the writing in this ideologically very consistent weekly, strong skepticism towards the policy of good neighborly relations is evident.

On the other hand, weeklies like *NIN* and *Vreme* show openness towards interpretations which are not exclusively an expression of the “Serbian standpoint,” with readiness to review the level of political and moral responsibility for the unsuccessful project of Yugoslavia, as well as the wars of the nineties. Along with this, though aware of the limitations and uncertainties of sensible policy good neighborly relations, journalists and interviewees of these papers give indirect evaluative support to the rational framework of cooperation between Serbia and Croatia. Initiated by an array of negative political messages exchanged between Serbia’s and Croatia’s elite, it is clear that certain editorial policies, like the editorial policy of *Pečat*, are revitalizing the manner of thinking and rhetoric of the nineties’ wars. Simple and highly flammable messages, as well as an opinion framed in the already constructed ideological models make the weekly resemble a propaganda billboard from the times of armed conflicts. Production and maintenance of discourse which resembles war propaganda not only cancels the possibility of critical debate, but it establishes conflict as a permanent state between nations and countries. In this atmosphere, every reasonable attempt is ostracized as wrong and defeatist, empathy is a kind of naïve illusion, conclusion is considered logical and factually based only if it works in the narrative patriotism, care for national destiny, glorifying the exceptional nature of our victims or belittling the others. On the other hand, it

47 <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/580517/Grabar-Kitarovic-i-Milanovic-Hvala-Tudjmanu>

48 <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/580501/SECANJE-NA-ZRTVE-OLUJE-Vucic-Sest-dana-i-noci-potrebno-samo-da-se-iscitaju-sva-imena>

49 <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/580374/Nikolic-U-Hrvatskoj-slave-dan-kada-su-obnovili-drzavu-koja-im-je-ostala-od-Pavelica>

is difficult to follow the path of rational and politically balanced approach in a politically inflammable atmosphere. To cast away historical fatalism, more precisely to reduce complex dynamics of relations between peoples and countries to a permanent conflict. It is even less intellectually desirable to try another and different interpretation of history; it is difficult to resist the daily political contextualization of text, more precisely its reduction to the plane of party pamphlets. Still, regardless of the immanent difficulties, the media showed versatility of approach, starting from the celebration of Operation Storm and the commemoration for the Serbian victims, presenting them as events which can considerably cast light on an entire array of directly or indirectly connected questions, which will, as it seems, remain unanswered for a long time.

Through the writing of weeklies, different interviews and columns of editors in chief in daily papers, an abundance of topics were opened. Apart from the question of character of the armed conflicts in Croatia, historical responsibility for the national conflict was discussed; question of the victor and the defeated, victim and executioner, was raised; the question of committed and processed crimes was also considered; room was left for cultural, historical and political narrative about the memory culture. The entire discourse which was being produced and maintained during those days and weeks involved different mutually antagonizing images of Serbs and Croats. This image involved negative view of the other from the perspective of one's own nation. Images of Serbs in the eyes of Croats were and are negative. Croats are without reservations something negative and morally and politically questionable. The same scenario was applied in the other direction. At the same time, to build one's own image in opposition of another nation means to be in a position which will exclusively exist as "our" and "their" impression, attitude and interpretation. Antagonism on the principle plane of relations towards the world of others who we find and meet in that world leads to that sentence "our victory is their defeat," "our sadness is their joy," etc.

Such an approach was prevalent. Serbs and Croats, as the actress Mira Furlan would say, see each other as *camera obscura*, "Even among the most decent, "normal" people, one always finds a hysterical reaction as soon as the word crime of "our" side is mentioned. Always the same "and what did they do to us?" As if that was what this is about! Let "them" deal with "their" own, and you, my friend, deal with yourself. Croats and Serbs look at each other as if in a mirror, like in the camera obscura, you see yourself, but upside down. What is celebrated by one group is grieved over by the other. And vice versa. One does not exist without the other. Do they have any identifying traits of their own, without looking at that other face in the mirror, face which is so similar, but not identical? If it is the same, let's do all we can to make the distinction. Erase half the words from the Croatian language because they are serbisms, celebrate and organize a military parade like in the worst time of totalitarian communism, which we hate and despise so much. Our reflection in the mirror will do just the opposite, grieve while we are celebrating, and celebrate when we grieve. Preschool level. But with real weapons."⁵⁰

50 Mira Furlan, "Ljudi bez stava su ideal svakog totalitarizma," [People without attitude are ideal for any kind of totalitarianism], *NIN*, no. 3374, p. 12



Novi magazin, 30th July 2015

In the debate between Serbian and Croatian intellectuals and witnesses of Operation Storm which was facilitated by *Nedeljnik*, the issue of character of armed conflicts in Croatia was raised. Serbian intellectual and former state official in the cabinet of Vojislav Koštunica, Petar Lađević, critically examining Croatian narrative about Serbian aggression, claims that the war in Croatia from 1992 to 1995 was, “this was civil war with the victory of one side which resulted in the worst ethnic cleansing of the other side. Between 1,000 and 2,500 people were killed in Operation Storm, mostly civilians. So, this is a victory in which it was not really the soldiers who died.”⁵¹

Lađević’s remark was partially refuted, i.e. rephrased, by Dejan Jović, professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb and former advisor to the former Croatian President Ivo Josipović, by claiming that the conflict between Serbs and Croats during the nineties should be viewed through the prism of “internal civil conflict.” This type of characterization of the conflict needs to be accepted due to high level of political and historical abuse of the term “civil war.” “It seems that this is war over a word. If we are interested in peace, we will avoid some words, so it is best to say “internal civil conflict.” This is a non-contaminated word because it does not have political context. Civil war sends a political message and it irritates. The problem is that most disputes arise from defining terminology. For example, are Serbs a nation in Croatia or a minority? Introducing a politically incorrect term “minority” is degradation. The point is to reduce the rights with such defining. I am not sure that everyone wants peace and that they are happy with the results of war. If we want peace, we must move forward, we have enough good terms which will not cause a fight between us.”⁵²

Parallel to the discussion on the character of war, a discussion on the memory culture was opened. This discussion referred to the story about national identity, which is an important moment in the media-political articulation of ethnic-national conflict which took place in early nineties on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Direct link between the memory culture and national identity was explicitly stated by the Bishop of Zahumlje Grigorije in an interview for the weekly *Vreme*. “Identity of one nation is determined, among other things, by its past and present, but also what is to come – the future. A very important here, if not the most important, place in this is held by the past, since it has great influence over the present and the future of a nation. Here we come to the important notion of culture of memory, which may freely be called “culture of remembering.” If it does not exist, then a nation can find itself in serious trouble, suppressing and forgetting a part of its past.”⁵³

The past in the relations between Serbs and Croats, regardless of whether we are talking about recent or distant past, is burdened by armed conflicts, large number of dead, wound-

51 Petar Lađević in “Rat kome ne daju da se završi,” [War that’s not allowed to end], Panel of the weekly *Vreme*, reported from Sonja Šojić, “Rat kome ne daju da se završi,” [War that’s not allowed to finish], *Vreme*, no. 1283, p. 18-19

52 Dejan Jović in “Rat kome ne daju da se završi,” Panel of the weekly *Vreme*, reported from Sonja Šojić, “Rat kome ne daju da se završi,” [War that’s not allowed to finish], *Vreme*, no. 1283, p. 19

53 Vladika Grigorije, “Zlopamćenje je smrtni greh,” [Resentment is a mortal sin], interview with Jelena Jorgačević, *Vreme*, no. 1283, p. 26

ed, persecuted, atrocities of destruction, strong hatred without much chance of leaving the vicious circle of violence or spiritual-political assumptions which lead towards it. When considering the past, in peaceful times, it is important to solve the question of historical and political responsibility and moral guilt. In that extent, the already mentioned notions of memory culture appear politically, culturally and historically will appear as relevant in times of confronting interpretations of immediate and distant past, which happened at the anniversary of Operation Storm.

Serbian and Croatian public see the question of moral, political and historical blame for the war and all its direct and indirect consequences as the central one in terms of the memory culture. In the media and political and wider cultural and historical narrative which is construed around the story about the memory culture – the key role is the role of the victim. This circumstance is distinctly indicated by the Croatian historian Vjeran Pavlaković, who says, “Since the Second World War, memory of victims has been more emphasized. Serbs constantly presented themselves as such because of Jasenovac: we and the Jews are the biggest victims. My colleague Christian Axboe Nielsen called it the *Victim Olympics*. To be the biggest victim gives the biggest legitimacy. This is problematic, because if we are talking about traumas, no one wants to understand the other side. Though communities in the region underwent similar stories, some more than others, more understanding and compassion are needed. Empathy of the victim for the suffering of the other is missing. We did not even use the terms truth and reconciliation, but establishing facts of the conflict. But this is hard to do in our region, because interpretations are always much stronger than the facts.”⁵⁴ Identical position on the necessity of empathy, more precisely empathy for the victims of the other side, is advocated by the Bishop of Zahumlje Grigorije, who thinks that the narrative about the memory culture needs to be complimented with ethical attitude towards the necessity of compassion for the victims of others, because that would be one of those strong basis for peace among nations, “I have spoken about this on several occasions. I cannot look at things from the angles “we or they” or “we or you,” but from an angle of goodness, that is whether something is good and beautiful or not. To remember by bowing your head before the victims and their suffering, but not wanting revenge, definitely not revenge. Yes, two visions of this tragic event, one of the most tragic in Serbian history in the last decades, an event that is celebrated by one side as a great victory over the “oppressor” while others remember one of the biggest pogroms of the Serbian people – this can hardly be reconciled and it is unlikely to happen in the near future. As long as the politicians are dictating the pace and creating the truth, and this has been like that forever and it will stay like that, there will always be two sides of the medal and views of this event, while the truth dwells in some back room.”⁵⁵

Precisely the ethical imperative of compassion is observant in both the texts on events

54 Vjeran Pavlaković, “Pad imuniteta na fašizam,” [Fall of the immunity to fascism], interviewed by Jelena Jorgačević, *Vreme*, no. 1282

55 Vladika Grigorije, “Zlopamćenje je smrtni greh,” [Resentment is a mortal sin], interview with Jelena Jorgačević, *Vreme*, no. 1283, p. 26

of Operation Storm and in the expressing of the authors' personal political and evaluative views. In terms of the former, it should be noted that the position of political and intellectual elite is in its basis hermetic, reduced exclusively to one's own perception of the truth and justice, glorifying victory and demand to recognize only the Croatian victims of Serbian crimes as legitimate. Reason lies in, as Professor Dejan Jović already noted, the fact that Croatia at the same time sees itself as a victim and the victor, "Croatia construed itself as the victor and the victim at the same time, and this is the only case in former Yugoslavia where you are able claim this with conviction. If you look at Croatian media, talk of war is present every day; many people do not want this topic to be closed. They have a tendency to turn Croatia into a conservative country, and for that, you need to have a constant enemy. Remembering the war is maintained because it is difficult to find a new enemy, so the war is constantly alive. This is preventing Croatia and its liberal development."⁵⁶

One of the key reasons, if not the key reason, preventing the constitution of discourse which would prevail over national particularism in terms of victims and outweigh the war discourse as a dominant matrix of reasoning about the immediate and distant past is the considerable involvement of daily politics, more precisely daily political propaganda in the approach to controversial issues of the past, "Milanović wants to come off as a nationalist and that is why all of them are playing this, let's say, dirty game. A lot of us in Croatia criticized the way 5th August is celebrated. Why the militarization? Why don't we celebrate the Treaty in Erdut which peacefully integrated the rest of Croatia? Emotions and symbols are used as political capital. I was in Knin last year. Milanović was speaking and we could not hear him from the whistles. He spoke about Tuđman, the fight against foreign oppressors, but all for nothing. He could have said "Ready for the homeland" and they would still whistle that loudly. It seems to me that this celebration of the Storm is not so much directed against Serbs, but it is a matter of internal political settling of scores. The elections are coming and celebration of the Storm is used to that end, as an attack of the Government and Milanović. This is primarily a fight about who will come off looking as the bigger nationalist."⁵⁷

Contextualization of events surrounding the Storm had its daily political and media development in Serbia, as well. Journalist of *NIN* Dragana Pejović reflected on this dimension of the 20th anniversary of the Storm. She writes, "in order to stretch as far and as long as the electorate, Aleksandar Vučić came up with a matrix of speeches and an order of dosing emotions at anniversaries and commemorations over the Serbian victims, which he repeated at least two times (anniversary of NATO bombing). One layer of suffering, one layer of Europe, one layer of regional cooperation. A bit of Vulin, a bit of Nikolić, a bit of Angela Merkel. Therefore, with no sentence does the Serbian prime minister, who has already triumphed in the brawl with Bakir Izetbegović, give cause to Croatia to criticize him. Still, the messages of his cabinet were delivered to those whose lives were changed by the Storm and who have an

56 Dejan Jović in "Rat kome ne daju da se završi," Panel of the weekly *Vreme*, reported from Sonja Šojić, "Rat kome ne daju da se završi," [War that's not allowed to finish], *Vreme*, no. 1283, p. 18

57 Vjeran Pavlović, "Pad imuniteta na fašizam," [Fall of immunity to fascism], interview with Jelena Jorgačević, *Vreme*, no. 1282

abundance of reasons to despair over Croatia's official policy of nationalism."⁵⁸

Certain, not small, doze of national hermetism, strong condemning of Croatia, was shown by the weekly *Pečat*. In response to the idea of a memory culture as a political and cultural pattern which should enable bad past in the relations between Serbia and Croatia to be overcome and create conditions for policy of reconciliation and cooperation, this weekly expressed skepticism and bitterness, reviving in the current political-historical context matrices from late eighties and early nineties.

Apart from stigmatizing Croatia, the idea of membership of Serbia in the European family of nations is also significantly contended, especially when taking into account the complicated and demanding condition of good neighborly relations "Forgiveness is primarily a personal act of those who endured a crime against themselves. You cannot forgive on behalf of someone else. Victims can only be recommended to do so. This is particularly problematic when it comes to perpetrators of a prolonged crime which continues and lasts, as is the case in Croatia and among Croats. Formal and informal Croatia is not showing as a mass any relevant signs of remorse for the crime of ethnic cleansing of 250,000 Serbs twenty years ago. Even today, it still quite openly insists on its NDH continuity, taking all the "credits" for Jasenovac genocide."⁵⁹

Vučelić's writing openly and succinctly transfers the burden of responsibility onto the Croatian side. He puts Operation Storm in the context of Croatian-German-Vatican conspiracies against the Serbs, at the same time indirectly suggesting that membership of Serbia in EU in light of the condition like establishing good neighborly relations is almost impossible, "Many analysis say that Croats laid low in the phase of EU accession, but they shone with full gleam, in the Ustasha manner, stormed, flashed when Brussels became their formal capital, and Germany their direct sponsor. Vatican is understood. The crime did not happen on its own, but it was ideologically declared and legally prepared, it found strength and support in the general Croatian masses."⁶⁰

In a strange way this elaboration of the anniversary of the Storm in its conclusion found room for accepting the idea of the joint Memorial Day for the victims of wars, which was the proposal of the Serbian PM Aleksandar Vučić "Establishing of Memorial Day for the killed and persecuted Serbs in the wars of the nineties contributes not only to the memory culture and honoring of the victims, but is also part of a responsible attitude towards the past and one's own history, as well as negating of the dangerous selective remembering of facts. But it is necessary to draw serious lessons from all that has been going on and to put definite paid to the traditional gullibility and negligence – Be ready, that is all"⁶¹

With the aim of establishing an authentic national memory culture – exclusive memory of

58 Dragana Pejović, "Od Kranja do Kazanja," [From Kranj to Kazanj], *NIN*, no. 3372, p. 18

59 Milorad Vučelić, "Kultura sećanja," [Memory culture], *Pečat*, no. 381, p. 3

60 Idem, p. 3

61 Idem, p. 3

the crimes committed against the Serbian people, without the necessity of reflection on the crimes in the name and for the account of the Serbian idea, historian and political analyst Dragomir Anđelković writes and says, “this is about being negative champions in neglecting our own victims and suffering, and encouraging in this way the enemy to go to the extreme of belittling our victims. In order to prevent the erasing of Serbian remains there, i.e. to prevent this from happening to us in the future in other Serbian countries which are the subject of coveting of our enemies, we must understand that there is one more important factor of genocide with undisputed continuous intention of the villain, that is what is changeable—their strength and international circumstances. This is the attitude of the victimized people towards its own calamities. This position is self-destructive with us! Serbian children must grow up with lessons about the genocide over their people committed by NDH, as well as other mass crimes suffered in the 20th and previous centuries. This decreases the chances for them to see the same faith which the heirs to the butchers of their ancestors want for them!”⁶²

Emphasizing the spirit of wide and irremovable gap in relations between Croats and Serbs originates from completely opposite views of the Storm. The difference between Serbs and Croats is unsurpassable, since it deeply goes into their political, moral and wider cultural habitus. Words of Filip Rodić written for the paper *Pečat* testify of this, “Contrast of these two mentalities, views at the world and life, Serbian and Croatian, though visible all the time, during the events surrounding the marking of the 20th anniversary of the Storm was simply an eye sore. It was visible on all levels, from the manner the anniversary was marked, to the statements of the highest state officials and church dignitaries, to the behaviors of the people themselves”⁶³

The position of Danica Drašković, wife of the once-influential politician, is completely contrary to the previously elaborated position of the paper *Pečat*. Being a public official herself, Danica Drašković openly raised the question of responsibility for the cavalry of Serbs in Krajina. Suffering of Serbs from Krajina is a product of “joint” irresponsible actions of the elite in politics, culture and church, “Coffins in the hands of the warriors from Šabac as flying saucers across the Serbian heavenly empire are surreal, and also the real image of the nation’s suffering. The coffin was put under the arm of the volunteer from Šabac by someone else. First the Church preaching “Orthodox or death” and leading the Patriarch around Krajina, to bless defeat death and suffering. From Glina, Pakrac, Jasenovac, Knin and Trebinje, wherever he went and held the liturgy, people suffered. Then, our Sciences Academy and its paper strategists for winning battles for national interests from their “memorandum” fervors. Writers, poets, politicians – all who asked for a blood bath from TV screens front pages of newspapers and magazines in order to secure their place in history and their immortality. This spiritual masturbation of old men and cowards in slippers, in their safe houses and flats, and verbal heroism of degenerate leaders of political parties who still demand fighting for national aims over thousands of coffins above their heads, if it lasts, it will drive tractors onto the roads for all of us, the entire country, all people and it will make us think about the coffin under the arm, while we listen to their stories, read the scientific- historical research on

62 Dragomir Anđelković, “Srbi u kandžama genocida,” [Serbs in the claws of genocide], *Pečat*, no. 381, p. 10-13

63 Filip Rodić, “Oluja – dva pogleda,” [Operation Storm – two perspectives], *Pečat*, no. 381, p. 6

the former greatness and glory of the people, which according to them needs to be revived. And the only thing Serbia needs today are coffins under their arms, coffins in which they would bury their mythology, retrograde religion, false bravery and non-existent greatness and glory of the people.”⁶⁴

Independent from any political and media, emotionally charged polemics, perhaps we should set aside from the entire case and entire case and its daily political and ideological plot one human confession which sums up the suffering from what was survived and opens up possibility of finding minimal humanity in a time of great existential uncertainty and different shapes of historical flooding, starting from political, security, moral and social-economic. Endured and deeply suffered pain is converted into practical compassion for the other person who is in trouble. Example of this ethical gesture is shown in the quotation from the text dedicated to the sad faith of the refugees from Krajina, “If they are celebrating, making a parade, these other guys are calling it mourning day, what do I know, let’s pick something third. We need to light a candle for the dead, to remember them, but we should also go and take a bottle of water to those people in the park so that that guy does not have to buy it himself. Let him save up a bit. There are organizations, young people doing this. Let’s show the world that we know what suffering is. What does it mean for me to pronounce a day of mourning? What? I have mourned all I had to mourn.”⁶⁵

Refugees – endless queue of desperate people in the vortex of dangerous geo-political games

The problem of refugees was approached by the Serbian print media with adequate attention, very precisely and casting light on every even slightly important aspect of this problem. Refugee crisis has been one of the key topics, both in weeklies and dailies. It was examined through the prism of interior policies, regional relations, tensions in the EU and comprehensive geopolitical context, which caused the appearance of one of the biggest waves of refugees.

Columns and texts dedicated to this topic coincided with the general direction of policies in Serbia and treatment of refugees in society. There were no proposals of repressive measures to limit the entrance of the persecuted, just as there were no serious incidents in the social reality, protagonists of which are extreme nationalistic groups. The population was mostly sympathetic and compassionate towards the visitors from afar. Organized outpours of xenophobia and racism did not take place. Newspaper articles, columns and interviews, apart from the rare cases, offered no proposals of repressive measures. There were very few such, if any, texts which advocated direct animosity towards the refugee population. Motive of potential or real threat to Serbia’s security due to the inflow of refugees, in the sense of raising fear and panic on account of possible surfacing of terrorists who are an integral part of the refugee convoy, was not particularly used in weeklies, nor was it part of some special

64 Danica Drašković, “Uzmi malo masti,” [Take some grease], *Nedeljnik*, no. 186, p. 15

65 Mirko Rodić, “Priča moje majke,” [My mother’s story], *Vreme*, no. 1280, p. 11

elaboration in the columns, interviews or texts which are connected to the front pages. Also, in some texts in the first weeks of the refugee crisis which spread across Serbia, warning and criticizing attitudes which refer to the institutional powerlessness of the state to provide reintegration programs for refugees in Serbia.

It should be noted that the refugee crisis has become an object of daily political discords and wide media elaboration only during the short crisis in relations with Croatia in the middle of September. As it was, our media accepted the circumstance that Serbia is a transit country—stop on the way towards freedom and well-being, which all desperate people from the Middle East seek to find in West Europe. Based on the abovementioned, it seems understandable that the media interpretation of the refugees' stay in Serbia only brushed upon the question of their reintegration in the Serbian society. Still, some print media developed a particular anti-Western, anti-capitalistic narrative, which had some traits of conspiracy theories against Serbia. Namely, due to EU's inability to reach an agreement about refugee quotas, Serbia was to become permanent residence for the refugees, mostly Muslim, population. Outcome of this project from the West would be a change of the demographic, primarily ethnic and religious, composition of Serbia. The ultimate consequence would be that this demographic configuration would lead to the collapse of the state. This fabrication found its elaboration and was often supported by superficial historical analogies and supplemented with stories about secret plans, which have been developed by the informal centers of political power.

Lack of common and coordinated EU policy towards the refugee crisis, constant emphasizing of political and moral responsibility of the West for the security chaos in the Middle East and Afghanistan, mentioning of possible cancellation of the Schengen arrangement, which guarantees freedom of movement for people and goods, tensions among the member countries in terms of quotas of refugees to be accepted, growth of the right-wingers in the political field of many, if not all EU member countries, incited intensive exposure of Euro-skeptics. In the reporting about the refugee crisis, readiness of the weeklies to show individual suffering of these homeless people from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Poignant confessions of those fleeing the war destruction peaked after the photograph of a three-year-old Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi, boy who drowned during transport just off the costs of Turkey had been published. Along with Aylan's death, the tragedy of 71 refugees who were killed in the reefer truck in Austria was vivid as well as the scene of brutal beating of a refugee woman by a camerawoman of the Hungarian television.

The weekly *Nedeljnik* published a heartbreaking testimony of a refugee who is trying to find the rest of his family in order to reach with them their desired destination in Holland. Headline of the text was "We became the fear everyone is fighting against," best illustrates the hopeless position of the cast always and the basically low level of empathy shown towards them. Ill faith of the Syrian refugees is best summed up by the hero of the story who lost his own identity to such an extent that he is not allowed to or cannot say his name, "My name is Samir, if that means something to someone, it has not meant anything to me for a

long time! I am a number..."⁶⁶ The media allocated considerable attention to the causes of conflicts in Syria. This is a conflict of three well-armed and organized armies: army of the religious fanatics of the Islamic State of Syria and Levant, units of the Syrian military under command of the legal president Bashar el-Assad and the military led by the Syrian opposition. Each of the sides has powerful sponsors. ISIL is supplied with money and weapons via donations from religious and militant fanatics from all parts of the Muslim world and trade in oil, official Syrian army has the support of Russia while the opposition forces are under the influence of America and the West. Cause of thousands of people dying and mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of people is seen by the Editor in Chief of *Novosti* Ratko Dmitrović in the efforts of the West, mostly America, to dominate the Arab world via projects of imposing democracy, "Among the cries over Aylan Kurdi, this is the name of the three-year-old, cries of those who killed him are the loudest...Who caused that war? Do you remember how it started and under which circumstances? It seems that we forgot... The Iraq scenario was applied to Libya, similarly to Syria, too. Who was kept warm by the Arab Spring and whose door to hell did it open? Such a spring came on the wings of the bombing planes of the countries of the democratic and developed world. This democracy destroyed those countries and pushed little Aylan into the sea."⁶⁷

It is interesting that the thesis about the exclusive guilt of the West is additionally founded in the quotes from Western press. Developing the extreme anti-Western narrative in the centre of which is absolute responsibility of the West for the state of things in Syria "let's start from the cause of the crisis which castrated west public is not allowed to mention. Only the little known *Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten* dared to state the obvious, "Death, poverty and religion-motivated massacres which were caused by the USA and military interventions of NATO in the Middle East are spreading, they have resulted in an unprecedented inflow of refugees, which can only be stopped if the foreign "negligent" military arrangements stop" "illegal military interventions which were done by the USA or its allies," "are the key reason for these mass migrations."⁶⁸

With direct accusation of west political elites and military forces, the position about moral corruption and unprofessionalism of the media is developed. West media are nothing but servants of imperial politics. There is no room in them for freedom of opinion or striving towards objectivity. They function as the extension of the political and military plans and practices. As an instrument of imperial politics, they shift the burden of responsibility to another person, non-Western protagonist who is responsible for the state of things in Syria, "I can list off the top of my head the entire top list of responsible persons for the migrant crisis, because I listen to it every morning on BBC. The first culprit is the Islamic State, the second are the smugglers, and the third is Putin. You will almost never hear that the meddling of the West in other country's regimes had anything to do with the civil wars from which people are running away. You will seldom hear that the Islamic State

66 "Mi smo postali strah protiv koga se svi bore" [We have become the fear everyone fears], *Nedeljnik*, no. 193, p. 28

67 Ratko Dmitrović, "Slika jedne smrti," [Photo of one death], *Novosti*, 05. 09. 2015, p. 2

68 Nikola Vrzić, "Sumrak Evrope," [Dusk of Europe], *Pečat*, 18.09.2015, p. 4



Pečat, 18th September 2015

was formed out of the groups which were armed by the West for years. And Putin is to blame for the fact that Assad has not been overthrown, though all calculations are now indicating, and even Washington fears this, that Assad's quick fall could lead to the triumph of the Islamic State. Now, the poorest states are at fault for the refugee crisis.

The West blames everyone and everything; they are only not pointing the finger towards themselves. ⁶⁹ Image of Europe in the context of refugee crisis is not formed exclusively and only through the factually based analysis of the situation in European politics. In a not so small number of newspaper texts there is a strong component of devaluating the European project as a whole, portraying a situation in which everything that has been achieved by European integrations over the last few decades is falling apart, and wishing the end upon the detested EU, "Quarter of a century after the coming down of the iron curtain, euphorically celebrated as triumphant victory of freedom, humanism and democracy, all of the sudden, walls, barb wires, "sanitary cordons" and rigorous border controls are being put up in places they did not exist before. Instead of the so praised togetherness within the European Union, fierce mutual accusations and devastating duplicity have taken the stage. Everyone against everyone. And everyone is doing what they are criticizing others for... Intoxication and division is not only going down the "seams" of state borders. Dangerous sparks are seen from within national countries as well. The public is dramatically polarized. For fear of the swarming, which is reasonable but also incited by a campaign of spreading xenophobic hysteria with racist exclusivity, which is threatening to get out of hand. ⁷⁰

In the newspaper exegesis of the refugee crisis, the burden of responsibility was not solely assigned to politicians and media from the West. The refugee crisis served as cause for developing nationalistic and anti-Croatian semantics, especially in the short economic and customs dispute during the second half of September. Also, it should be noted that some weeklies, primarily *Pečat*, were inspired by the pilgrimage of the devastated people from the Middle East to make conspiracy theories and send out ant capitalistic messages.

After the closing of the Croatian border towards Serbia, by the decision of PM Milanović, the already known stereotypes about Croatia and its political-value and historical profile surfaced in Serbia. Adventitious, but important, addition consisted of clear anti-EU message. Example of such writing may be seen in the column of Dragan J. Vučićević, "If it weren't terrible, it would be funny. Tinkling humanitarian pledges of the Croatian non-Ustasha Kolinda-Milanović regime and endurance of refugees lasted, as we have seen, barely 48 hours! Croatia announced a state of emergency and blocked all crossings towards our country immediately after the border was crossed by about ten thousand emigrants ... We are expected to further masochistically indulge in our own rape and to silently watch how we are being fenced off with barb wire. We are, let's be honest, expected to be stupid and to transform our country into a concentration camp for the sake of an EU future! ⁷¹ In Vučićević's approach

69 Ljiljana Smajlović, "Istočna Evropa, zapadna hipokrizija," [East Europe, West hypocrisy], *Politika*, 10. 09. 2015, p. 5

70 Miroslav Stojanović, "Ošamućena i paralisana Evropa," [Intoxicated and paralyzed Europe], *Pečat*, 04. 09. 2015, p. 23

71 Dragan J. Vučićević "Budimo ljudi, nismo Hrvati," [Let's be human, we are not Croats], *Informer*, 19. 09. 2015, p. 5

there is not even a trace of any kind of possible cooperation between Serbia and Croatia with reference to the refugee crisis, and after the influence of the current dispute between the two countries, he categorically claims "...huge problem lies in the fact that our first neighbors are Croatians who are mostly Ustashe and who base their identity on sick hatred...Finally, the fact that the EU is actually supporting the Ustasha-like outpours of the Croatian regime behind the scenes is indicative of the fact that nobody in Brussels bothers to condemn the racist statements of Zoran Milanović, it's a fact that no EU media considers it a topic to report on the fact that the PM of Croatia refers to Serbs as barbarians – this is all case in point of another Serbian delusion! Delusion about the Union!"⁷² The factual reality refuted the allegations of the editor of *Informer*. Under the direct and more indirect pressure from Brussels, Croatia, which is an EU member, de-blocked its border crossings towards Serbia. EU sided with Serbia, and not its member Croatia, which is truly rare.

Apart from the awareness about exclusive responsibility of the West for the civil war in Syria, hypocrisy of the media from developed democratic countries, lack of common European policy pertinent to the refugee crisis, revival of anti-Croatian sentiment in response to the short crisis in relation to Croatia, anti-capitalist positions and thesis about the dismantling of Serbia via the demographic engineering manifestation of which is the refugee crisis followed. In the text "Capital is behind the immigrations" published in the paper *Pečat*, the conjunction between capitalism and the refugee crisis is clearly outlined. The author Diego Fusaro claims, "Today's animalistic kingdom of spirit has the need for a back-up "industrial army" (Marx) of emigrants with the aim of destroying the social rights, destroying the remaining organizational power of the workers and drastic lowering of cost of labor. Capital does not aim to integrate emigrants, it strives to disintegrate, through the emigrants, the non-emigrants, reducing them to the level of emigrants...Immigration appears as the image which may be entered into the register of landlord hegemonism, so, as a tool of the rules in a fight between the classes. Back-up industrial army of emigrants is a large source of labor, which at the same time does not have the tradition of fighting between classes, so this enables the realization of radical pressure on the reduction of salaries for the workers, compromising the unity – if it exists anywhere – in the workers' movement, and allowing the employers to avoid the increasing obligations arising from the right to work."⁷³

The refugee crisis has given rise to the launching of the story about the geo-strategic plans of the New World Order. Consciously incited demographic engineering should lead to the process of "nation dismantling." Quoting as the starting point in her analysis the positions of a KGB agent Yuri Bezmenov, journalist of the weekly *Pečat* Biljana Ćorović develops an idea about Serbia's dismantling by using the current refugee crisis, despite the fact that a minimal number of immigrants from the Middle East asked for residence in Serbia. Process of dismantling Serbia has its stronghold in the Zionist-American plans (Israeli Jion plan and concept of "Instability Port" developed in the Pentagon). According to the mentioned plans, dismantling of Serbia started in 1990, and gains special importance in 2006, "Dismantling of

72 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Ustaše i EU," [Ustashe and the EU], *Informer*, 26. 09. 2015.

73 Diego Fusaro, "Iza migracije stoji kapital," [Capital is behind the migration], *Pečat*, 14. 09. 2015, p. 20-21

the Serbian people has been continuously implemented since 2006. Legal and infrastructural basis for this undertaking has been established back in 1990 when the Dublin Convention adopted an amazing concept of "safe third country" – a legal model which declares the country through which asylum seekers entered in the unique space of EU responsible for providing asylum. This is the reason why all paths of emigrants on their way to EU (and authorization of their status) pass through Serbia and its territory and this is a clear indicator that this is being done demographically and systematically."⁷⁴ Parallel to the process leading to the opening of legal presumptions that the immigrants from the Middle East are to take residence in Serbia, a process of human capital flight from Serbia is ongoing, which is according to the author of the text a plan of the American corporation RAND. Process of dismantling Serbia which is currently under way is compared by the journalist of *Pečat* with the process of segregation of Kosovo from Serbia, "Process analogue to the one which enabled the stealing of Kosovo and Metohija by the global planners of Serbian demise and disappearance is now ongoing in Serbia."⁷⁵

Story about premature elections – causes, risks and outcomes

"I have a personal feeling that we should go for elections," said Prime Minister of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić in the end of August. The statement stirred up spirits and started an avalanche of contradictory information, party and expert calculations, town stories and all that makes up the public in one politically, not particularly democratically, aware country. Not long after the PM's words, two scandals broke out, creating a strong impression that the country is in a state of political crisis and confusion. The "Video" scandal, publishing of the meeting between the current foreign minister and a criminal accused of drug smuggling Rodoljub Radulović, and the scandal "Wiretap" where the main characters are the provincial PM Bojan Pajtić, Lidija Udovički, sister of the current Minister Kori Udovički and close associate of the PM Nikola Petrović, Director of the public enterprise Elektromreže Srbije.

In the first scandal the stake was compromising an important member of the ruling coalition and the foreign minister, while the other affair boiled down to (ab)use of security agencies, bribe and corruption, even mentioning the US Ambassador Michael Kirby. Affairs abated without an epilogue, with an accompanying intense exchange of accusations and counter-accusations on the relation government – opposition as well as SPS – SNS. But they became an integral part of the bad media-political atmosphere, which as a rule marks the work of every cabinet, and inherently of this one, as well. Parallel to the intense media creation of affairs and their continuous use, a discussion on the need for premature parliamentary elections was opened up. This discussion represents an important supplement to the creation of a negative image of the government, given that many journalists, columnists and

74 Biljana Ćorović, "Stvaranje novog Bliskog Istoka i demontaža Srbije," [Creating of the new Middle East and dismantling of Serbia], *Pečat*, 14. 09. 2015, p. 27

75 Idem, p. 28

interviewees used this for direct or indirect attacks of the government. On the other hand, though the prevalent tone towards the existing cabinet is negative, there were voices who called for the elections for sake of final settling of accounts with the parties who won on 5th October or who saw possibility for new geo-political, anti-European foreign policy course in the elections.

Topic of premature parliamentary elections depicted Aleksandar Vučić as a politician who is exclusively devoted to political-media campaigns, a selfish real-politician who exclusively strives to increase his own and his party's power and concentrate it, hostile towards any kind of criticism in the public, politician not prone to honoring objective reasons for the scheduling of elections, as a leader who is not ready to commit to solving of the big issues. So, a politician without responsibility and vision and someone who is exclusively prone to care about personal ratings and party gain. This negative portrayal of Vučić's political-media profile was especially contributed to by the weeklies *NIN* and *Vreme*. Vukadinović reminded us what is normally needed for a special vote, "Loss of confidence in the cabinet which leads to difficult adoption of laws, inability to adopt the budget, existence of huge social pressure (strikes, protests), disagreement in the ruling majority...All this is contrary to that. Research shows that Vučić has higher support than ever, state of the media is idyllic according to the government, serious protests are not happening," Vukadinović reminded and evaluated that the prime minister's explanation for the announcement of elections is somewhere between "comedy, farce and insult to common sense."⁷⁶ The real reason for the elections as the already cited analyst Đorđe Vukadinović states is in the PM's almost obsession to campaign. This skill, according to the opinion of this public servant, is the only thing the PM is good at, "the only thing he really likes and can do is to campaign"⁷⁷ In a word, Vučić's governing model involves constant maintaining of tension which is manifested in the permanent election campaign. On the other hand, as the analyst Cvijetin Milivojević emphasized, the only reason in the political sense is to "push the municipal and local elections." Or more specifically, as the analyst Dragomir Anđelković stated, "SNS is a political train success of which primarily depends on one big locomotive and we can expect provincial and local elections where a lot of small and middle-sized locomotives need to get stuck. By supporting their actions, Vučić is still capable of obtaining a winning score on the already certain municipal, city and Vojvodina elections. However, for SNS, result on all levels will be better if the citizens state their positions directly about the leader of that party, in parliamentary elections as well."⁷⁸ So, motivation has clearly been reduced to the individual skill of the prime minister (campaigning in the media) and party egoism (maximal political gain thanks to Vučić's popularity who is an inviolable leader on the national level). Satisfaction of the party egoism will generally open room for feeding the appetites of party officials who are currently unhappy about the division of the political and any other loot, "reason for rushing could be the hunger for power by those progressive cadre who still have not been rewarded."⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Vera Didanović, "Pretnje i upozorenja," [Threats and warnings], *NIN*, no. 3374, p. 17

⁷⁷ Idem, p. 17

⁷⁸ Dragomir Anđelković, "Zašto Vučić hoće na izbore," [Why Vučić wants the elections], *Nedeljnik*, no. 190, p. 10

⁷⁹ Vera Didanović, "Proleće u decembru," [Spring in December], *NIN*, no. 3371, p. 17



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Going for the republic elections would allow room for clear defining of the position of Tomislav Nikolić about the policies of Aleksandar Vučić. Nikolić's reserved standing towards some aspects of the cabinet's policies, "It would force Tomislav Nikolić out into the clear. Regardless whether Nikolić would start a party or not, in case of scheduling parliamentary elections, he would have to say publically whether he supports Vučić or not."⁸⁰

Apart from the solving of internal party problems, an even stronger foundation of the party in the electorate, and accumulation of even more power, premature elections would, according to some theoreticians, enable Vučić total control over public space, i.e. they would lead to an increase of control over the media. This view was presented by Vladimir Milutinović, philosopher and editor of the site *dvogled.rs*, which evaluates the prime minister's reason for (possible) scheduling of elections because the public is critical of the government as, "if elections are going to change that, then this government wants to win the mandate in order to prevent public criticizing. And this leads to a reduction of the level of democracy in the country."⁸¹ Supporting Milutinović's thesis, journalist and Editor in Chief of the weekly *Vreme* Dragoljub Žarković claims that special elections would lead to the establishing of Vučić's absolute power over all instruments of political and economic power and eventually over society as a whole, with a subtext that all that Vučić does he does with the aim of salvation of the state and the nation, "If he feels that this will fortify his position, he will schedule the elections, win convincingly and ride on the backs of the Serbian people even harder, fortifying his absolute power towards he is anyway prone, convinced, I mean honestly convinced – him, not me – that he is the God given savior of all that has, again with his honest help, been destroyed and undermined in the foundations of the Serbian state – politics, economy and culture"⁸²

One of the reasons for going for special parliamentary elections could be grouped under the thesis of rejecting western pressures, ending cooperation regarding the refugee crisis with the EU and suspension of the Brussels Treaty and in the final stage, paving the path towards dropping the European option for Serbia, "when there is a big shuffle and handout of cards, due to fear of revolting the Serbian public, post-modern oppressors reduce the pressures. And now pressures for Belgrade to accept Brussels II (factual recognition of Kosovo with its membership in the UN) and Serbia's acceptance to become a big waiting room for hundreds of refugees from the Middle East, who are trying to reach rich European countries. They (refers to West – author's comm.) find it convenient to give the Syrians and other refugees from the mentioned regions the illusion that they will get there and parallel to that to give them permanent accommodation in Serbia. For us, this is a disaster for national, religious, economic and safety reasons. Again, it is dangerous to get into an open confrontation. Special parliamentary elections would weaken their pressure

80 Vera Didanović, "Pretnje i upozorenja," [Threats and Warnings], *NIN*, no. 3374, p. 16

81 Vera Didanović, "U foajeu predizbornog ludila," [In the lobby of pre-election madness], *NIN*, no. 3377, p. 11

82 Dragoljub Žarković, "Vučić tvrdi da nije podložan pritiscima. Ali narod jeste. Otkud bi se inače 3000 ljudi učlanilo u SNS," [Vučić claims he is not prone to pressures. But the people are. How else would 3000 people join SNS], *Vreme*, no. 1289

on the Serbia's top. That's why they are useful and after their possible holding, the world would enter a phase of culmination of the US elections. US are now self-involved, without them the EU has less confidence and capacity for pressures on anyone. This is how we buy time till 2017 and then will see what to do."⁸³

83 Dragomir Anđelković, "Zašto Vučić hoće na izbore," [Why Vučić wants the elections], *Nedeljnik*, no. 190, p. 10

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About
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Public Policy Institute is a regional think-tank organization that operates in the Western Balkans region through the work of its branch offices in Belgrade, Podgorica and Ljubljana. By promoting public dialogue and constructive solutions, Public Policy Institute contributes to the efforts of the Western Balkan countries to become equal, reliable and progressive partners in the process of European integrations and mutual relationships. After the initial research and analysis of social and media context in the countries of the Western Balkans, the Institute has developed and implemented a series of media related projects, including: Role of the media in the process of securitisation in the Western Balkans, Civil Response to Clientelism in the media - MEDIA CIRCLE, NATO Reach Out - media monitoring and Role of the media in monitoring of R1325 in Montenegro.

EBART Media Archive is privately owned company established in 2000. Its main activity is archiving print media data in e-format. The print media archive consists of up-to-date material dating back to 2003, and more than 3 million print media reports from sources with national coverage. EBART is also specialized for media analysis, basic quantitative and qualitative analyses, comparing media treatment of specific keywords, as well as complex content analyses according to BBC methodology. EBART Media Archive is unmatched in the region with its unique media reports database, and 12 years of media research experience. This media database allows for the overall study of long-term media presence.

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
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