



Analysis of the print media in Serbia  
April - June

# Quarterly **MEDIAMETER**


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MEDIAMETER

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
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ДАНИЦА ПОПОВИЋ  
**МАЛИ  
ЕКОНОМСКИ  
РЕЧНИК**

Водич кроз најчешће коришћене  
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КО НАМ НУДИ ПАТКУ: РАДОМИР ЛАЗОВИЋ, "НЕ ДА(В)МО БЕОГРАД"

**VREME**



SLUČAJ HELIKOPTER

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ЕКСКЛУЗИВ



Dvojica bivših pri

**TADI  
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О СРБИМА И ХРВАТИМА, ПАЈЕН  
КОЛИЋИ НИКОЛИЋУ, ТИТУ И  
ШЕШЕЉУ И ВУЧИЋУ, ЧЕ

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# 1

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Introduction

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VELIMIR ČURGUŠ KAZIMIR

# Introduction

## Circular history at a standstill

The second issue of the *Mediameter* is the right time to check whether the model and methodology which we applied in our efforts to obtain as precise and as objective image of the national print media in Serbia as possible are correct. Did we manage to capture the image or has it perhaps “escaped” from its frame? Has anything happened to drastically change the media scene of Serbia? We are very proud to ascertain that the questions asked and their answers are entirely in accordance with the results of the analysis from the first and second issue. This is a six-month period, split into two quarters: January – March: 1,360 analysed texts, and April – June: 1,673 texts, in total: 3,033 texts. Increased number of analysed texts from the front pages of seven dailies is not only a consequence of the dynamics of our media scene and multiplying of the number of major events, but also the lower number of holidays which significantly affected the number of selected texts in the first trimester.

What was happening during this seemingly short time period? Which events attracted attention, gave rise to social tensions, stirred and/or eased the public's mind? Was there more criticism at the current government's expense from within Serbia or from “foreign factors?” Did we look more towards the future or the past? Answers to these questions are found in direct or indirect form on the pages of newspapers from our sample. Of course, we can never ascertain with certainty whether some texts are a result of conscious editorial decision or a spontaneous reaction of the journalist. However, what may be deduced from this analysis is that there are significant differences in interpretations and approaches to topics by different editorial staff. It is not difficult to notice that the critical approach to some topics, i.e. actors, is unequivocally negative in some papers, while positive in others. Causes of choice per affiliation are clear and consistent, although sometimes paradoxical. One thing is clear: we have at the same time diversity, but also consistency of different editorial policies, which remain true to their positions regardless of the events around them.

As in the previous trimester, the same methodological approach was applied to analysis of empirical content. Unit of measurement in the analysis was one text. The analysis itself offered to our readers represents a combination of two research methods: (a) analysis of content, understood as a research process directed by “certain theoretical-hypothetical framework ... creating objective and systematic empirical structure on the content of social communicating, which enables drawing relevant conclusions on the social context in which this is taking place,”<sup>1</sup> and (b) discourse analysis, which enabled us to map and understand

different, epistemic and methodologically immeasurable<sup>2</sup>, author's interpretative strategies and editorial policies which reflect in the presentation of different, rather ideological, discourse realities, where each has its own internal criteria of assessing values of certain events, knowledge and interpretation, by analysing their specific discursive meanings. In that sense, the discourse is also defined as a specific interpretation system, “a continuous process of creating meanings and their public circulating” and “collection of meanings, metaphors, presentations, images, stories, statements which together create a specific version of events.”<sup>3</sup>

In the interpretive sense, for convenience, the analysis is, just as the previous report, divided into two wholes which refer to: (a) analysing quantitative indicators collected through analysis of content, and (b) discursive analysis of qualitative content taken from texts which were included in the research sample.

In order to obtain a more complete image of what goes on in the dailies, we limited the discursive analysis to three events which have been present in the media. Two foreign affairs: (a) participation of Serbia in the military parade in Moscow and (b) visit of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić to Tirana, as well as one domestic affair, which refers to (c) different media treatment of the Ombudsman Saša Janković.

In the meantime, so many things happened that we lose the right dimension of what we went through in the course of intermitting sensations and “revelations.” If we look at the chronology of events which dominated the front pages of dailies from April 1<sup>st</sup> to June 30<sup>th</sup> we will easily notice that the most frequent and present were: the request of the Tribunal to return Vojislav Šešelj to custody, Šešelj's actions and illness, crash of the helicopter and reactions, as well as the Ombudsman Saša Janković.

Perhaps it will be clearer what was really going on, if we compare some events from four, five months ago to the current ones, it may seem to us that this is somewhat of a circular history (as described by Borges). As if history is repeating itself, at shorter and shorter intervals and with increasingly trivial announcements.

1 S. Gređelj, *S onu stranu ogledala [On the other side of the mirror]*, Istraživačko- izdavački centar SSO Srbije, Beograd, 1986, 19

2 G. Couvalis, *The Philosophy of Science*, Sage Publications, London, 1997.

3 V. Ber, *Uvod u socijalni konstrukcionizam [Introduction to social constructionism]*, Zepter Book World, Beograd, 2001, 83

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# 2

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Summarized  
chronology  
of the most  
important  
events

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## Summarized chronology of the most important events on the front pages of dailies from April 1<sup>st</sup> to June 30<sup>th</sup> 2015

### April

- 01.04. Request of the Tribunal to return Vojislav Šešelj to custody, reactions
- 02.04. Croatian Ambassador travels to Zagreb for consultations  
Reaction to Šešelj's burning of the Croatian flag
- 03.04. Vojislav Šešelj still a news topic
- 04-09.04. Crash of the helicopter, investigation, reactions
- 08.04. Parade in Moscow
- 10.04. Helicopter, relations within the military
- 14.04. Vojislav Šešelj
- 15.04. Vojislav Šešelj
- 16.04. Thaci not coming to Belgrade
- 17.04. Children to be vaccinated without the consent of the parents
- 18.04. Forced landing of the Government's air plane with President Tomislav Nikolić on board
- 19.04. Air plane, forced landing
- 20.04. Ombudsman Saša Janković – the "gun" scandal
- 21.04. Air plane, forced landing  
Saša Janković
- 22.04. Air plane, forced landing  
Saša Janković
- 23.04. Saša Janković  
Air plane, forced landing  
Privatization of the Avala film
- 24.04. Saša Janković
- 25.04. Saša Janković
- 26.04. Derby, supporters' clash
- 27.04. Derby, supporters' clash  
Saša Janković
- 28.04. Saša Janković
- 29.04. Jihadists attacking Belgrade (the case of Zvornik)

### May

- 03.05. Tomislav Nikolić criticising Gašić for Putin (Parade in Moscow)  
Helicopter, reactions
- 07-08.05. Parade in Moscow
- 09.05. Parade in Moscow  
Saša Janković
- 10-14.05. Kumanovo, mayhem in Macedonia
- 13.05. Aleksandar Vučić to visit Tirana
- 15-16.05. Draža Mihailović rehabilitated
- 21.05. Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox Church
- 26-29.05. Aleksandar Vučić in Tirana

### June

- 01-04.06. Aleksandar Vučić visited Washington
- 02.06. Trial for the murder of S. Čuruvija started
- 04.06. Vojislav Šešelj's illness
- 06.06. Saša Janković
- 10.06. Vojislav Šešelj
- 12.06. Naser Orić arrested  
Vojislav Šešelj
- 13.06. Naser Orić, Resolution on Srebrenica
- 15-17.06. Alleged kidnapping and death of a boy in Banatska Subotica
- 18.06. Hungary erecting a wall on the border
- 20.06. Naser Orić, Resolution on Srebrenica
- 21-23.06. Welcoming of the junior football players
- 25.06. Hungarian wall  
Naser Orić
- 26.06. Release of Naser Orić from custody
- 27.06. Tourist massacre in Tunisia



3



Sample

ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN

## SAMPLE

The basic idea behind the project *Mediameter* is to try to reconstruct the coordinates of the media reality of the daily print media in Serbia as read from the texts which have been positioned (entirely, or partially) on the front pages, and which in different ways write about current political events and circumstances in Serbia and the world. Sample of the dailies has been composed based on two selection criteria – the biggest scope and reputation of the print media. Data on scope of the dailies has been taken from IPSOS research.<sup>1</sup> The front page is part of the daily paper which the readers connect the most with the identity/recognizability of a media. It is often responsible for the first impression, our feelings of potential affection or repulsion, formed towards some print edition. The front page is viewed not only by the readers of a certain paper, but also by the people who may never actually pick up those papers. Through newspaper and TV ads and news stand windows, the front page is exposed to an auditorium wider than the one comprising the readers of any individual daily, forming to an extent a public image of the newspaper which symbolizes its editorial policy, value orientation and direction towards a certain reading audience. Due to all of the above mentioned reasons, front pages of dailies from our sample have been in the focus of the analysis of the project *Mediameter*.

Though texts from front pages represent a small percentage of the total number of texts contained in certain dailies, in this analysis they were treated as a kind of litmus paper for understanding certain editorial policies in the dailies from our sample. The charts 1-7 depict the percentage share of the total number of texts found on front pages and texts which were included in the sample of our research, in comparison to the total number of texts in analysed issues of special dailies in the period from April 1<sup>st</sup> to June 30<sup>th</sup> 2015.

<sup>1</sup> Research of average scope of the daily print media was done for the period from June 1<sup>st</sup> 2015 to June 28<sup>th</sup> 2015 population: total 12+

Chart 1 – *Večernje novosti*<sup>2</sup>





Chart 2 – *Informer*<sup>3</sup>



<sup>2</sup> For more information, please refer to the Table 100 in the Appendix

<sup>3</sup> For more information, please refer to the Table 101 in the Appendix

Chart 3 – *Alo!*<sup>4</sup>






Chart 4 – *Blic*<sup>5</sup>




4 For more information, please see Table 102 in the Appendix.

5 For more information, please see Table 103 in the Appendix.


Chart 5 – *Politika*<sup>6</sup>



6 For more information, please see Table 104 in the Appendix.

**Chart 6 – Danas<sup>7</sup>**

Source:  
Research *Mediameter*  
April - June 2015

**Chart 7 – Kurir<sup>8</sup>**

Source:  
Research *Mediameter*  
April - June 2015

Total number of analysed texts in all seven media which have been included in the sample of our research is 1673, and that number accounts for 53.34% of the texts from the front pages and 2.70% of the total number of texts.

Analysis of the distribution of sections within which the texts from our sample were published is particularly interesting as it reveals the editorial strategies used to introduce certain content, consider and interpret them within media representations.

<sup>7</sup> For more information, please see Table 105 in the Appendix.

<sup>8</sup> For more information, please see Table 106 in the Appendix.

**Tabela 1. – Večernje novosti**

Newspaper: Večernje novosti / section	Total number of texts on the front page	Total number of selected texts on the front page	Total number of texts which have not been selected
Chronicles	85	12	73
Society	93	76	17
Politics	87	86	1
Economics	43	40	3
Current Affairs	70	39	31
Reportages	32	12	20
Culture	11	2	9
Interview	22	15	7
World	9	5	4
Life plus	15	0	15
Sport	29	0	29
News Belgrade	16	0	16
Supplement Doctor in the House	9	0	9
Spectacle	7	0	7
BGD 011	5	0	5
Belgrade stories	6	0	6
Sport plus	0	0	0
TV news	3	0	3
Human stories	6	0	6
Region	4	1	3
Feuilleton	1	0	1
Action	0	0	0
Confession	0	0	0
Second page	2	1	1
Events	1	1	0
In memoriam	1	0	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>557</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>267</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 2 – Informer**

Newspaper: Informer / section	Total number of texts on the front page	Total number of selected texts on the front page	Total number of texts which have not been selected
Breaking news	183	172	11
News	97	36	61
Showtime	61	0	61
Entertainment	1	0	1
Sport	53	2	51
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>395</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>185</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 3 – Alo!**

Newspaper: Alo! / section	Total number of texts on the front page	Total number of selected texts on the front page	Total number of texts which have not been selected
Current Affairs	99	88	11
News	157	76	81
V.I.P.	111	3	108
Sport	69	0	69
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>436</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>269</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015



**Table 4 – Blic**

Newspaper: Blic / section	Total number of texts on the front page	Total number of selected texts on the front page	Total number of texts which have not been selected
Series	4	1	3
Current Affairs	3	3	0
Archives	0	0	0
Belgrade	2	0	2
Dossier	5	1	4
Society	47	24	23
Economics	17	16	1
Feuilleton	2	0	2
Chronicles	50	7	43
Culture	4	2	2
Politics	45	41	4
Sport	46	0	46
Human stories	6	0	6
World	3	2	1
Topic of the Day	79	59	20
Topic of the Week	9	4	5
Spotlight	0	0	0
Time machine	0	0	0
Entertainment	66	7	59
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>388</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>221</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 5 – Politika**

Newspaper: Politika / section	Total number of texts on the front page	Total number of selected texts on the front page	Total number of texts which have not been selected
World	80	42	38
Society	86	55	31
Economics	63	58	5
Politics	56	52	4
Daily events	66	61	5
Culture	29	5	24
Chronicles	33	25	8
Daily supplement	23	2	21
Belgrade	15	6	9
Serbia	21	13	8
Library	10	0	10
Sport	40	3	37
Topic of the Week	11	9	2
Characters	11	9	2
Region	17	17	0
Front page	18	10	8
Spectre	10	1	9
Views	6	6	0
TV insert	7	0	7
Feuilleton	1	0	1
Consumer	3	3	0
Belgrade Chronicles	4	0	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>610</b>	<b>377</b>	<b>233</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April-June 2015

**Table 6 – Danas**

Newspaper: Danas / section	Total number of texts on the front page	Total number of selected texts on the front page	Total number of texts which have not been selected
Belgrade	2	1	1
Christmas	0	0	0
Dialogue	2	1	1
Business Insert	13	9	4
Danas special insert	1	0	1
Danas supplement	0	0	0
Weekend today	36	9	27
Event of the day	0	0	0
Society	68	60	8
Economics	36	34	2
Globe	54	27	27
Culture	31	2	29
Interview	0	0	0
Front page	3	2	1
Health	2	0	2
Politics	148	144	4
Periscope	1	1	0
Law Today	28	26	2
Stage	4	0	4
Sport	30	1	29
Topic	1	1	0
Scales	9	3	6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>469</b>	<b>321</b>	<b>148</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 7 – Kurir**

Newspaper: Kurir / section	Total number of texts on the front page	Total number of selected texts on the front page	Total number of texts which have not been selected
Society	25	19	6
Economics	2	1	1
Chronicles	32	3	29
Culture	1	0	1
Planet	2	2	0
Politics	39	38	1
Sport	26	0	26
Stars	56	1	55
Topic of the Day	281	141	140
<b>Total</b>			

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015


Suffice to take a mere glance at the shown tables 1-7 to notice that the structure of the analysed dailies follows two different logics. Most of the analysed papers follow the traditional structure of the sections, typical for the daily print media. *Večernje novosti*, *Politika*, *Danas*, *Blic*, even *Kurir* to an extent, follow this traditional matrix of structuring the daily. However, the dailies *Informer* and *Alo* significantly differ from this matrix, making a step towards the new hybrid genre of tabloids which are, in various ways and to a different extent, gradually conquering parts of the media space in Serbia. This new structure loses the traditional division of news to that concerning politics, society, economics, culture etc. and they are all combined into a provisional section of news, with an emphasis placed on entertainment contents such as information on celebrities, entertainment and sports. Thusly shaped structure of a paper sends a clear message on the required professional qualifications of journalists, within which the strictly specialized knowledge such as expertise in the interpretation of economic issues, foreign policy or any other, is no longer required, and probably not even welcome. Of course, even in such media, the largest number of selected articles contained in the sample of our research was published just within the sections of news and current events/topic of the day. In all other newspapers, the largest number of articles included in the sample of our study was published in the section of politics, with an exception of the daily newspaper *Politika* where slightly more articles were published under the Economics section.

In the following analysis, we will try to reconstruct the policies of media reporting on current events by analysing the share of certain newspaper genres, structure and frequency of appearance of certain (individual and collective) social actors, structure of the topics of texts from the front page and analysis of the direct causes for introducing certain topics in the media discourse, in the manner these causes were interpreted within individual newspaper narratives without considering their possible (in)accuracy.

## Comparison with the previous trimester


Charts 8-14 depict a comparative distribution of selected texts from the sample of the research implemented in the first (January – March) and second (April – June) quarter of 2015. Charts show that the structure of both samples is similar, almost identical, in all researched dailies (please see charts 8-14).

Chart 8 – *Večernje novosti*




Source: Research Mediameter January-March 2015 and Mediameter April-June 2015


Chart 9 – *Informer*




Source: Research Mediameter January-March 2015 and Mediameter April-June 2015

Chart 10 – *Alo!*


Source: Research Mediameter January-March 2015 and Mediameter April-June 2015

Chart 11 – *Blic*

Source: Research Mediameter January-March 2015 and Mediameter April-June 2015


Chart 12 – *Politika*

Source: Research Mediameter January-March 2015 and Mediameter April-June 2015

Chart 13 – *Danas*

Source: Research Mediameter January-March 2015 and Mediameter April-June 2015

Chart 14 – Kurir



Source: Research Mediameter January-March 2015 and Mediameter April-June 2015



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# 4

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Results of  
research

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ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN

## RESULTS OF RESEARCH

### Share of journalism genres

The genre structure of the seven dailies is dominated by reports, as in the period from January 1<sup>st</sup> to March 31<sup>st</sup> 2015, presented in the first issue of *Mediameter*. Out of the 1673 processed texts, 1020 or 60.96% were written in this genre form, which is prevalent in all media. News account for 11.89% of texts from the front page from the sample, articles and interviews for 9.50%, i.e. 9.21% comments for 7.05% while other newspaper forms, like reports, photo news, or undefined genres which consist of lists and listings have an insignificant share (1.38% in total).

**Table 8** – Share of individual genres in the reporting of the seven media from the sample

Genre	Total	% share
Report	1.020	60,96
News	199	11,89
Article	159	9,50
Interview	154	9,21
Commentary	118	7,05
Reportage	17	1,02
Other forms	6	0,36
Total	1.673	100

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 9** – Distribution of the journalist forms per media outlet, in the seven media from the sample

Genre	Blic	Kurir	Večernje novosti	Alo!	Informer	Politika	Danas	total
Report	100	114	210	100	140	163	193	1020
News	41	9	1	47	53	8	40	199
Article	9	8	35	1	8	86	12	159
Interview	7	10	33	11	4	46	43	154
Commentary	6	0	2	7	2	70	31	118
Reportage	1	0	8	1	0	4	3	17
Other	3	0	1	0	2	0	0	6
Total	167	141	290	167	209	377	322	1673

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

### Report

In the second quarter of 2015, reports had a completely equal share as in the first quarter of this year, though the number of analysed texts was lower by as much as 313. There are still noticeable differences in the concept and realization of this newspaper form. Some media treat this genre as space where personal positions of the journalist can be expressed, while others perceive the report as space where to publish information of assumed interest to the readers. Traditional structure media, like *Danas*, *Politika* and *Večernje novosti*, publish considerably less reports which have positive or negative value context<sup>1</sup> (*Danas* 12.95%, *Politika* 20.86% and *Večernje novosti* 27.62%), while in *Kurir*, *Blic* and the paper *Alo!* just over 50% of the reports have an attached value. The biggest percentages of the reports which have a positive or negative connotation were recorded in *Informer* (76.43%). It is interesting to note that reports in all media, except for *Danas* where only 29.53% of the reports are not balanced<sup>2</sup>, are largely unilateral (for example, they contain the statement of one actor, i.e. the whole text is based on the reporting of the position of one interviewee or positions of various interviewees who share a standpoint), therefore *Informer* does not provide complete information in that sense in 92.86% of the reports, *Kurir* in 81.58%, *Večernje novosti* in 80%, *Politika* 77.91%, *Alo!* 69% and *Blic* in 60% of the texts which belong to this journalism genre. More specifically, there is balance in only 30.98% of all the published reports in the seven analysed media.

<sup>1</sup> In the presented analysis, we have coded the manner of presenting certain topics in individual texts from our sample in three ways, taking into consideration both the text, and the accompanying content (headline, heading and subheading). Texts where the authors/journalists have not made an evaluation towards a certain actor, but have presented the facts relevant for the text in a relatively neutral, balanced manner, observing professional standards were marked as *neutral* presenting. Marked as *positive* are the interpretations expressing clear sympathy and positive attitude of the journalists through the presenting of certain topics. Interpretations in which the journalists expressed clear antipathy and negative attitude towards certain topics through their manner of presenting them have been marked as *negative*.

<sup>2</sup> Balance presents a manner in which the journalist approaches the topic. Balanced text involves a balanced and objective approach to the topic and interviewees and completeness of information.

**Table 10** – Structure of the reports with reference to the value context in the seven media from the sample

Report Media	Value context	
	positive and negative %	neutral %
Informer	76.43	23.57
Blic	55	45
Kurir	53.51	46.69
Alo!	52	48
Večernje novosti	27.62	72.38
Politika	20.86	79.14
Danas	12.95	87.05
Total	38.04	61.69

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 11** – Balance of reports in the 7 media from the sample

Report Media	Balance %	
	Yes	No
Informer	7.14	92.86
Kurir	18.42	81.58
Večernje novosti	20.00	80.00
Politika	22.09	77.91
Alo!	31.00	69.00
Blic	40.00	60.00
Danas	70.47	29.53
Total	30.98	69.02

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

## Other journalism forms

News are present the most in the daily paper *Alo!*, which is consistent with its format (28.14%), followed by *Informer* (25.36%), *Blic* (24.55%), *Danas* (12.42%), and *Kurir* with 6.38% of texts in this journalism form. News account for only 2.12% of the texts from the front page

of *Politika*, while in *Večernje novosti* this percentage is nearly irrelevant – 0.34% or just one piece of news. News are significantly more neutral (50.75%), but there is a huge difference in the approach among the seven analysed dailies – from 90% of neutral news in *Danas* and 87.50% in *Politika*, via 59.57% in *Alo!*, 51.52% in *Blic* and 14.44% in *Kurir*, to merely 9.43% of neutral news in *Informer*<sup>3</sup>. It may be concluded that even this basic journalism form is certainly susceptible to interpretations.

The daily *Politika* traditionally continues the practice of publishing the largest number of articles, which is this time increased in comparison to the previous period and amounts to 22.81%, i.e. 86 texts. *Večernje novosti* also nurture this journalism form (12.07%). In other analysed media, the share of articles varies from about 4% in *Danas* and *Informer* to about 5.5% in *Blic* and *Kurir*. Media outlet which almost does not use the expression in the form of an article pursuant to the editorial policy is the daily *Alo!* (0.60% - one negative text). *Informer* and *Kurir* most often publish texts of this genre in the negative context – 87.50%, i.e. 62.5%, *Večernje novosti* published 37.14%, *Blic* 33.33%, *Politika* 29.07% of articles in the negative context, while this percentage in *Danas* is 8.33%.

When talking about commentary as a journalism genre, the trend according to which *Politika* also nurtures this significant form continues. This is a form where authors clearly express their positions (18.57% of texts) and this remains the third-ranked genre according to frequency in the dailies. The daily *Danas* (9.63%) also pays more attention to commentary on the front pages, where positions expressed in texts by authors of wider social influence, such as the former Greek Minister of Finance Yanis Varoufakis or the Swedish politician and diplomat Carl Bildt are evident. Other media place commentary on the front page less – from 4.19% in *Alo!* to 0.67% in *Večernje novosti*. Unusual practice, according to which editorial commentary is published on the front page is still present, but in a lesser extent. Four editorial commentaries have been published in total – two from the Editor and Chief of *Politika* Ljiljana Smajlović and Deputy Editor and Chief of the paper *Blic* Svetomir Marjanović. It should be mentioned that the column of Ljiljana Smajlović, *Gojković family without protection*, published on May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2015 in *Politika* on page A6, was reported in its entirety on the next day in *Informer*, in a front page text.

In the period from April to May 2015, the interview was most present in *Politika* and *Danas*, where 46, i.e. 43 interviews were published (12.20% and 13.35% of all published texts in these daily papers). They are followed by *Večernje novosti* with 33, *Alo!* and *Kurir* with 11, i.e. 10, then *Blic* with 7 and *Informer* with 4 interviews, which is in line with the findings from the previous edition of *Mediameter*.

There were 17 reportages or an irrelevant percentage of 1.02% of texts. The largest number of reportages – 8, was published in *Večernje novosti*, *Politika* -4, *Danas* – 3, while *Blic* and *Alo!* published one reportage each.

Izveštaj je, kako je već primećeno, dominantna forma u svim medijima, posebno u *Kuriru*. *Blic*, *Alo!* i *Informer* uglavnom se dodatno oslanjaju i na vesti, dok je upotreba novinskih žanrova u

<sup>3</sup> The one piece of news published in *Večernje novosti* is neutral-value.

*Danas*, Report, as it has already been noted, is the dominant form in all media, especially in *Kurir*, *Blic*, *Alo!* and *Informer*, which additionally rely on the news, while the use of journalism genres in *Danas*, *Večernje novosti* and especially in *Politika* is considerably more versatile. All mentioned up to now, completely depicts the directions in reporting for which the specified newspapers have opted, as a matrix of structuring these publications, according to which classic structure newspapers use more versatile genres, while print media, which opted for the structure which involves a reduced number of sections, mostly chose shorter forms, such as the report and news.

## Actors

The media in Serbia, at least according to the analysis of the empirical material collected from the front pages, mostly feature political events within Serbia. As much as 39.90% of the total number of actors, featured in the selected texts from the front pages, are (individual and collective) political actors which hold different positions within the political life of Serbia (see Table 12 and Tables 13, 14, 15 and 16 which talk about the distribution of the frequency of appearance of some individual political actors). If we add to these texts those which write about foreign political actors, the percentage of political components in the total number of actors on the front pages increases up to 66.78%. However, if we add to these the texts which refer to unnamed sources, which also cover topics from the political life, most often from the Serbian society, share of these texts in the total number of texts from our sample goes up to as much as 74.82%. Second group per frequency of appearance are different social life actors which account for 22.76% of our sample. Economic actors are featured in texts from front pages only in 2.41% of cases (see Table 12).

**Table 12** – Total distribution of actors who appear in texts which have been included in the research sample (expressed in absolute numbers)

Actors					
Political actors	2934	Internal	1753	Individual	1.184
				Collective	569
		Foreign	1181	Individual	1.051
				Collective	130
Economic actors	106	Internal	83	Individual	65
				Collective	18
		Foreign	23	Individual	4
				Collective	19
Other social actors	1000	Internal	1000	Individual	929
				Collective	71
		Foreign	0	Individual	0
				Collective	0
Unnamed sources					353
Total					4.393

Source: Research Mediameter, April-June 2015.

In Tables 13, 14, 15 and 16, distribution of frequency of appearance of some individual political actors which are active on the political scene of the Serbian society is given. Individual political actors, members of the Government of Serbia and ruling political parties are considerably more present on the front pages (51% compared to the 38.31% of the opposing actors and 10.37% of those who do not belong to the current government of Serbia, neither to position nor opposition parties).

**Table 13** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual political actors from the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the President of the Republic of Serbia.

Government of RS and President of RS	total	%
Aleksandar Vučić	522	33.61
Tomislav Nikolić	239	15.39
Ivica Dačić	179	11.53
Nebojša Stefanović	99	6.37
Bratislav Gašić	98	6.31
Zorana Mihajlović	80	5.15
Aleksandar Vulin	60	3.86
Rasim Ljajić	40	2.58
Nikola Selaković	31	2.00
Zlatibor Lončar	31	2.00
Kori Udovički	24	1.55
Ivan Tasovac	23	1.48
Dušan Vujović	21	1.35
Jadranka Joksimović	21	1.35
Aleksandar Antić	18	1.16
Željko Sertić	18	1.16
Srdjan Verbić	16	1.03
Vanja Udovičić	12	0.77
Velimir Ilić	11	0.71
Snežena Bogosavljević Bošković	10	0.64
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.553</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015.

**Table 14** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual political actors ruling parties

Ruling	Total	%
Stanislava Pak	33	8.94
Zoran Babić	30	8.13
Oliver Antić	27	7.32
Ivan Mrkić	20	5.42
Siniša Mali	20	5.42
Marko Đurić	20	5.42
Maja Gojković	18	4.88
Igor Mirović	16	4.34
Vladimir Đukanović	15	4.07
Radomir Nikolić	15	4.07
Vuk Drašković	14	3.79
Branko Ružić	14	3.79
Dragica Nikolić	13	3.52
Dušan Bajatović	11	2.98
Momir Stojanović	10	2.71
Milutin Mrkonjić	10	2.71
Dragan Marković Palma	9	2.44
Tanja Mišćević	8	2.17
Nikola Nikodijević	8	2.17
Jasmina Mitrović Marić	8	2.17
Dijana Vukomanović	8	2.17
Milovan Drecun	7	1.90
Milan Krkobabić	7	1.90
Aleksandar Martinović	7	1.90
Igor Bečić	6	1.63
Miloš Vučević	5	1.36
Goran Vesić	5	1.36
Jorgovanka Tabaković	4	1.08
Dubravka Filipovski	1	0.27
<b>Total</b>	<b>369</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Research Mediameter, April-June 2015.



**Table 15** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual political actors from the **opposition**

Opposition	Total	%
Vojislav Šešelj	100	22.03
Bojan Pajtić	75	16.52
Boris Tadić	64	14.10
Borislav Stefanović	53	11.67
Dragan Šutanovac	29	6.39
Zoran Živković	13	2.86
Sanda Rašković Ivić	12	2.64
Nenad Čanak	11	2.42
Janko Veselinović	11	2.42
Čedomir Jovanović	11	2.42
Goran Ješić	8	1.76
Balša Božović	7	1.54
Nemanja Šarović	6	1.32
Marko Đurišić	6	1.32
Aleksandra Jerkov	6	1.32
Zoran Krasić	5	1.10
Vladimir Pavićević	5	1.10
Saša Radulović	5	1.10
Miroslav Vasin	5	1.10
Gordana Čomić	5	1.10
Branimir Kuzmanović	5	1.10
Andreja Mladenović	5	1.10
Dragoljub Mićunović	4	0.88
Vjerica Radeta	3	0.66
<b>Total</b>	<b>454</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 16** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of **other** individual political actors

Other political actors	Total	%
Slobodan Milošević	57	46.34
Zoran Đinđić	18	14.63
Vojislav Koštunica	15	12.2
Mlađan Dinkić	13	10.57
Mirko Cvetković	9	7.32
Dragan Đilas	7	5.69
Vesna Pešić	4	3.25
<b>Total</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

In the following analysis, the manner of presenting certain actors in individual texts from our sample have been coded in three ways, considering both the text and the accompanying textual content (headline, heading and subheading). We marked the texts which present certain actors in which the author does not evaluate the actor but tries to present facts relevant to the text in a relatively neutral and balanced manner as *neutral*. Interpretations in which journalists indicate clear sympathy and positive attitude towards certain actors through their manner of presenting have been marked as *positive*. We marked as *negative* those interpretations in which the journalists indicate clear antipathy and negative attitude towards the actors through their manner of presenting. Tables 17,18, 19 and 20 show the value context within which certain individual political actors from the political scene of Serbia appear in selected texts from the front pages.

**Table 17 – Value context of the appearance of individual political actors from the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the President of the Republic of Serbia**

Government of RS and President of RS	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Aleksandar Vučić	19	3.64	491	93.87	12	2.49
Tomislav Nikolić	4	1.67	199	83.26	36	15.06
Ivica Dačić	3	1.68	161	89.94	15	8.38
Nebojša Stefanović	1	1.01	93	93.94	5	5.05
Bratislav Gašić	2	2.04	73	74.49	23	23.47
Zorana Mihajlović	0	0.00	68	85.00	12	15.00
Aleksandar Vulin	0	0.00	56	93.33	4	6.67
Rasim Ljajić	0	0.00	40	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Selaković	0	0.00	29	93.55	2	6.45
Zlatibor Lončar	2	6.45	28	90.32	1	3.23
Kori Udovički	0	0.00	23	95.83	1	4.17
Ivan Tasovac	0	0.00	19	82.61	4	17.39
Dušan Vujović	0	0.00	20	95.24	1	4.76
Jadranka Joksimović	0	0.00	18	85.71	3	14.29
Aleksandar Antić	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Željko Sertić	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
Srdjan Verbić	0	0.00	13	81.25	3	18.75
Vanja Udovičić	1	8.33	8	66.67	3	25.00
Velimir Ilić	0	0.00	8	72.73	3	27.27
Snežena Bogosavljević Bošković	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>		<b>1391</b>		<b>130</b>	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 18 – Value context of the appearance of individual political actors from ruling parties and officials from government bodies and institutions**

Position	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Stanislava Pak	0	0	25	75.76	8	24.24
Zoran Babić	0	0	23	76.67	7	23.33
Oliver Antić	0	0	20	74.07	7	25.93
Marko Đurić	0	0	20	100	0	0
Siniša Mali	0	0	19	95	1	5
Igor Mirović	0	0	16	100	0	0
Maja Gojković	0	0	16	88.89	2	11.11
Vladimir Đukanović	0	0	14	93.33	1	6.67
Vuk Drašković	0	0	13	92.86	1	7.14
Branko Ružić	0	0	11	78.57	3	21.43
Radomir Nikolić	0	0	10	66.67	5	33.33
Momir Stojanović	0	0	10	100	0	0
Ivan Mrkić	0	0	10	50	10	50
Milutin Mrkonjić	0	0	9	90	1	10
Tanja Mišević	0	0	8	100	0	0
Dušan Bajatović	0	0	8	72.73	3	27.27
Dragan Marković Palma	0	0	8	88.89	1	11.11
Nikola Nikodijević	0	0	7	87.5	1	12.5
Milovan Drecun	0	0	7	100	0	0
Jasmina Mitrović Marić	0	0	7	87.5	1	12.5
Dijana Vukomanović	0	0	7	87.5	1	12.5
Aleksandar Martinović	0	0	6	85.71	1	14.29
Milan Krkobabić	0	0	5	71.43	2	28.57
Miloš Vučević	0	0	4	80	1	20
Dragica Nikolić	0	0	4	30.77	9	69.23
Igor Bečić	0	0	3	50	3	50
Goran Vesić	0	0	3	60	2	40
Jorgovanka Tabaković	0	0	2	50	2	50
Dubravka Filipovski	0	0	1	100	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>296</b>		<b>73</b>	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 19** – Value context of appearance of individual political actors from opposition parties

Opposition	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Vojislav Šešelj	0	0.00	90	90.00	10	10.00
Bojan Pajtić	1	1.33	54	72.00	20	26.67
Boris Tadić	1	1.56	58	90.63	5	7.81
Borislav Stefanović	1	1.89	37	69.81	15	28.30
Dragan Šutanovac	0	0.00	24	82.76	5	17.24
Zoran Živković	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Sanda Rašković Ivić	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Čanak	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Janko Veselinović	1	9.09	8	72.73	2	18.18
Čedomir Jovanović	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Goran Ješić	0	0.00	5	62.50	3	37.50
Balša Božović	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Nemanja Šarović	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Đurišić	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Aleksandra Jerkov	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Krasić	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Pavičević	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Saša Radulović	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Vasin	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Gordana Čomić	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Branimir Kuzmanović	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Andreja Mladenović	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dragoljub Mićunović	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vjerica Radeta	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4</b>		<b>382</b>		<b>68</b>	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 20** – Value context of appearance of **other** individual political actors

Other political actors	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Slobodan Milošević	0	0	53	92.98	4	7.02
Zoran Đinđić	0	0	18	100	0	0
Vojislav Koštunica	0	0	13	86.67	2	13.33
Mirko Cvetković	0	0	8	88.89	1	11.11
Mladen Dinkić	0	0	7	53.85	6	46.15
Dragan Đilas	0	0	6	85.71	1	14.29
Vesna Pešić	0	0	3	75	1	25
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>108</b>		<b>15</b>	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

As in the previous quarter, the most present actor on the front pages of dailies in Serbia is Aleksandar Vučić. The media from our sample mostly reported neutrally about him (as much as 94.06%). 3.64% positive and 2.49% negative texts were written about him. As an actor of texts from the front pages, the Prime Minister appeared as many as 522 times, which is considerably more than the first runner-up (which is “unnamed source” which appears as the “protagonist” of front-page texts over 353 times). The highest frequency of appearance of Aleksandar Vučić, expressed in absolute numbers, was recorded in the daily *Danas* (121) and *Politika* (112) (see Tables 21 and 22). However, when expressed in relative numbers of percentage shares of texts in which he appears as the actor in relation to the total number of selected texts from the same individual newspaper, we see that he appears the most in *Kurir* (as much as 42.55% of the texts from our sample write about Vučić) and *Danas* (37.58% of the texts) (see Table 22). In percentage, the biggest share of positive texts on Vučić, as in the previous quarter, is recorded in the daily *Informer* (where there is as much as 18.18% of the front page texts in which he appears, and which have positive connotation) and the daily *Alo!* (11.32%). When it comes to texts with negative connotation, again as in the previous quarter, the paper *Danas* leads (6.61%, i.e. 8 negative-value texts in the second quarter of 2015) (see Table 21).

**Table 21** – Aleksandar Vučić: Value context per media outlet

Media	Positive		Neutral		Negative		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Danas	1	0.83	112	92.56	8	6.61	121	100
Politika	1	0.89	110	98.21	1	0.89	112	100
Večernje novosti	1	1.3	76	98.7	0	0	77	100
Kurir	2	3.33	57	95	1	1.67	60	100
Blic	0	0	54	98.18	1	1.82	55	100
Alo	6	11.32	46	86.79	1	1.89	53	100
Informer	8	18.18	36	81.82	0	0	44	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>3.64</b>	<b>491</b>	<b>94.06</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>522</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 22** – Number of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić compared to the total number of texts in certain dailies

Aleksandar Vučić per media	Number of appearances	Total number of texts	% share in the total number of texts
Kurir	60	141	42.55
Danas	121	322	37.58
Blic	55	167	32.93
Alo	53	167	31.74
Politika	112	377	29.71
Večernje novosti	77	290	26.55
Informer	44	209	21.05
<b>Total</b>	<b>522</b>	<b>1673</b>	<b>31.2</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

Second individual actor from the political stage which appeared the most on the front pages of the analysed dailies is the President of the Republic of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić. He is the protagonist of as much as 14.28% of analysed texts (see Table 23).

**Table 23** – Number of appearances of Tomislav Nikolić compared to the total number of texts in individual dailies

Tomislav Nikolić per media	Number of appearances	Total number of texts	% Share in the total number of texts
Kurir	28	141	19.85
Alo	30	167	17.96
Danas	53	322	16.45
Politika	57	377	15.11
Blic	24	167	14.37
Večernje novosti	39	290	13.44
Informer	8	209	3.82
<b>Total</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>1673</b>	<b>14.28</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

The most negative-value texts, as many as 36, refer to the current President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić (please see Table 17). The highest number of negative-value texts on Tomislav Nikolić was recorded in the daily *Alo!*, as many as 16, which accounts for 53.33% of the texts in which Tomislav Nikolić is the protagonist, and which were published in this paper (see Table 24). Negative connotation texts on the members of the President's immediate family may be added to this number – on his son Radomir Nikolić (5 texts) and his wife Dragica Nikolić (9 texts), which write about the currently relatively poor image of the current President of Serbia within the media reality of dailies in Serbia during the second trimester of 2015 as well.

**Table 24** - Tomislav Nikolić: Value context per media outlet

Media	Positive		Neutral		Negative		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Politika	4	7.02	53	92.98	0	0	57	100
Danas	0	0	47	88.68	6	11.32	53	100
Večernje novosti	0	0	39	100	0	0	39	100
Alo	0	0	14	46.67	16	53.33	30	100
Kurir	0	0	22	78.57	6	21.43	28	100
Blic	0	0	16	66.67	8	33.33	24	100
Informer	0	0	8	100	0	0	8	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1.67</b>	<b>199</b>	<b>83.26</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>15.06</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

Still, expressed in relative numbers, the biggest percentage of negative texts about Dragica Nikolić was recorded. As much as 69.23% of the texts from our sample which were found on the front pages and which feature Dragica Nikolić have a negative connotation. Second-ranked is Ivan Mrkić, on whom 50% of the texts reported negatively. The most negative-value texts among the Ministers of the Government of the Republic of Serbia were written about Bratislav Gašić, Minister of Defence, total 23. Referring to opposition actors, the biggest number of negative-value texts was written about Bojan Pajtić, total of 20 (see Tables 17, 18 and 19).

There are significantly less texts which feature certain collective political actors of importance for the political stage of Serbia who are present in less than 32.44% among domestic political social actors. In tables 25-30, we listed all actors classified in this category from our sample together with the frequency and values of connotations of their appearances.

**Table 25 – Distribution of frequency of appearance of domestic collective political actors: state institutions**

State institutions	total	%
Government of Serbia	167	42.39
Ministry of Interior	38	9.64
Ministry of Defence	37	9.39
National Assembly	25	6.35
Ministry of Health	15	3.81
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	14	3.55
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology	12	3.05
Ministry of Economy	11	2.79
Ministry of Construction, Traffic and Infrastructure	11	2.79
Ministry of Finance	11	2.79
Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veterans' and Social Issues	10	2.54
Ministry of Agriculture	10	2.54
Ministry of Culture and Information	8	2.03
Ministry of State and Local Administration	7	1.78
Office for Kosovo and Metohija	6	1.52
Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunication	5	1.27
Ministry of Youth and Sport	5	1.27
Office for European Integrations	2	0.51
<b>Total</b>	<b>394</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 26 – Value context with reference to collective domestic political actors: state institutions**

State institution	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Government of Serbia	2	100	160	42.22	5	38.46
Ministry of Defence	0	0	36	9.5	1	7.69
Ministry of Interior	0	0	35	9.23	3	23.08
National Assembly	0	0	24	6.33	1	7.69
Ministry of Health	0	0	15	3.96	0	0
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	0	0	14	3.69	0	0
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology	0	0	12	3.17	0	0
Ministry of Economy	0	0	11	2.9	0	0
Ministry of Finance	0	0	11	2.9	0	0
Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran's and Social Issues	0	0	10	2.64	0	0
Ministry of Agriculture	0	0	10	2.64	0	0
Ministry of Construction, Traffic and Infrastructure	0	0	9	2.37	2	15.38
Ministry of Culture and Information	0	0	8	2.11	0	0
Ministry of State and Local Administration	0	0	7	1.85	0	0
Office for Kosovo and Metohija	0	0	6	1.58	0	0
Ministry of Youth and Sport	0	0	5	1.32	0	0
Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications	0	0	4	1.06	1	7.69
Office for European Integrations	0	0	2	0.53	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>379</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015



**Table 27** – Distribution of the frequency of appearance of domestic collective political actors: **ruling parties**

Ruling	total	%
Serbian Progressive Party	68	85.00
Socialist Party of Serbia	12	15.00
Total	80	100

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 28** – Value context with reference to domestic collective political actors: **ruling**

Ruling political parties	total	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Serbian Progressive Party	68	85.00	1	100.00	65	95.59	2	2.94
Socialist Party of Serbia	12	15.00	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Total	80	100.00	1		76		3	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 29** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of domestic collective political actors: **opposition**

Opposition	total	%
Democratic Party	63	66.32
Serbian Radical Party	12	12.63
Social-Democratic Party	11	11.58
Democratic Party of Serbia	9	9.47
Total	95	100.00

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 30** – Value context referring to domestic collective political actors: **opposition**

Opposition	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Democratic Party	1	1.59	49	77.78	13	20.63
Serbian Radical Party	1	8.33	11	91.67	0	0
Social-Democratic Party	0	0	10	90.91	1	9.09
Democratic Party of Serbia	0	0	8	88.89	1	11.11
Total	2		78		15	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

Significantly lower percentage of texts from the front page writes about foreign (individual and collective) political actors and political actors from Kosovo (merely 26.68% out of the total number of texts). Protagonists of these texts are more often individual actors/ individuals (in 88.99% cases) compared to collective ones (11.00%) (see Table 12 and Tables 39 and 40). Individual foreign political actors, from outside the region, appear slightly more often (55.28% - see Tables 43-52) than regional ones (44.71% - see Tables 31-42).

**Table 31** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual foreign political actors from the region: Croatia

Croatia	total	%
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović	26	41.27
Zoran Milanović	12	19.05
Vesna Pusić	11	17.46
Predrag Matić	6	9.52
Gordan Markotić	5	7.94
Ivo Josipović	3	4.76
Total	63	100.00

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 32** – Value context referring to individual foreign political actors from the region: Croatia

Croatia	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović	1	3.84	23	88.46	2	7.70
Zoran Milanović	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Vesna Pusić	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Predrag Matić	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Gordan Markotić	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ivo Josipović	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Total	1		59		3	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 33** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual foreign political actors from the region: Montenegro

Montenegro	total	%
Milo Đukanović	6	50.00
Filip Vujanović	6	50.00
Total	12	100

**Table 34** – Value context referring to individual foreign political actors from the region: Montenegro

Montenegro	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Milo Đukanović	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Filip Vujanović	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Total	0		11		1	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 35** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual foreign political actors from the region: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina/Republic of Srpska

Federation B and H/ Republic Srpska	total	%
Milorad Dodik	68	38.64
Naser Orić	49	27.84
Mladen Ivanić	19	10.80
Bakir Izetbegović	17	9.66
Čamil Duraković	13	7.39
Željka Cvijanović	5	2.84
Dragan Čović	5	2.84
Total	176	100.00

**Table 36** – Value context referring to individual foreign policy actors from the region: Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina/Republic of Srpska

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Republic of Serbia	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Milorad Dodik	0	0.00	68	100.00	0	0.00
Naser Orić	0	0.00	38	77.55	11	22.45
Mladen Ivanić	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Bakir Izetbegović	0	0.00	15	88.24	2	11.76
Čamil Duraković	0	0.00	10	76.92	3	23.08
Željka Cvijanović	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Čović	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Total	0		159		17	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 37** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual foreign political actors from the region: Macedonia

Macedonia	total	%
Nikola Gruevski	20	33.90
Ivo Kotevski	12	20.34
Ali Ahmeti	9	15.25
Đorđe Ivanov	8	13.56
Zoran Zaev	7	11.86
Gordana Jankulovska	3	5.08
Total	59	100.00

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 38** – Value context referring to individual foreign political actors from the region: Macedonia

Macedonia	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Nikola Gruevski	0	0	18	90	2	10
Ivo Kotevski	0	0	12	100	0	0
Đorđe Ivanov	0	0	8	100	0	0
Zoran Zaev	0	0	7	100	0	0
Gordana Jankulovska	0	0	3	100	0	0
Ali Ahmeti	0	0	7	77.78	2	22.22
Total	0		55		4	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 39** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual political actors: Kosovo

Kosovo	total	%
Hashim Thaci	42	43.30
Isa Mustafa	25	25.77
Ramus Haradinai	20	20.62
Edita Tahiri	5	5.15
Atifete Jahjaga	5	5.15
Total	97	100.00

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 40** – Value context referring to individual political actors: Kosovo

Kosovo	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Hashim Thaci	0	0	33	78.57	9	21.43
Isa Mustafa	0	0	24	96	1	4
Ramus Haradinai	0	0	12	60	8	40
Edita Tahiri	0	0	5	100	0	0
Atifete Jahjaga	0	0	5	100	0	0
Total	0		79		18	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 41** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual foreign political actors from the region: Albania

Albania	total	%
Edi Rama	49	81.67
Shkelzen Maliqi	7	11.67
Buyar Nisani	4	6.67
Total	60	100.00

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 42** – Value context referring to individual foreign political actors from the region: Albania

Albania	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Edi Rama	0	0	34	69.39	15	30.61
Shkelzen Maliqi	0	0	7	100	0	0
Buyar Nisani	0	0	4	100	0	0
Total	0		45		15	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 43** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual foreign political actors outside the region: Foreign politicians

Foreign politicians	Total	%
Angela Merkel	59	19.34
Michael Kirby	24	7.87
Barack Obama	22	7.21
Alexis Tsipras	21	6.89
Joseph Biden	17	5.57
Francois Hollande	15	4.92
Frank-Walter Steinmeier	13	4.26
Dennis Keefe	11	3.61
David Cameron	11	3.61
Tony Blair	10	3.28
Victoria Nuland	9	2.95
Bill Clinton	8	2.62
Michael Davenport	8	2.62
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	7	2.30
Peter Siatro	7	2.30
John McCain	7	2.30
Borut Pahor	7	2.30
Petro Poroshenko	7	2.30
Viktor Orban	6	1.97
Raul Castro	6	1.97
Matteo Renzi	6	1.97
Yanis Varoufakis	6	1.97
Viktor Janukovič	5	1.64
Miloš Zeman	5	1.64
Sebastian Kurz	4	1.31
John Kerry	4	1.31
Total	305	100.00

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 44** – Value context referring to individual foreign political actors outside the region: Foreign politicians

Foreign Politicians	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Angela Merkel	2	3.39	57	96.61	0	0
Michael Kirby	0	0	24	100	0	0
Barack Obama	0	0	22	100	0	0
Alexis Tsipras	1	4.76	20	95.24	0	0
Joseph Biden	0	0	16	94.12	1	5.88
Francois Hollande	0	0	15	100	0	0
Frank-Walter Steinmeier	0	0	13	100	0	0
Dennis Keefe	0	0	11	100	0	0
David Cameron	0	0	10	90.91	1	9.09
Tony Blair	0	0	9	90	1	10
Victoria Nuland	0	0	8	88.89	1	11.11
Bill Clinton	0	0	8	100	0	0
Michael Davenport	0	0	7	100	0	0
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	0	0	7	100	0	0
Peter Siatro	0	0	7	87.5	1	12.5
John McCain	0	0	7	100	0	0
Borut Pahor	0	0	6	100	0	0
Petro Poroshenko	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0
Viktor Orban	0	0	6	85.71	1	14.29
Raul Castro	0	0	6	100	0	0
Matteo Renzi	0	0	6	100	0	0
Yanis Varoufakis	0	0	5	83.33	1	16.67
Viktor Janukovič	0	0	5	100	0	0
Miloš Zeman	0	0	5	100	0	0
Sebastian Kurz	0	0	4	100	0	0
John Kerry	0	0	2	50	2	50
Total	4		292		9	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 45** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual foreign political actors: Russia

Russia	total	%
Vladimir Putin	66	60.55
Sergey Lavrov	20	18.35
Sergei Shoigu	9	8.26
Alexander Chepurin	9	8.26
Dmitry Medvedev	5	4.59
<b>Total</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 46** – Value context referring to individual foreign political actors: Russia

Russia	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Vladimir Putin	4	6.06	57	86.36	5	7.58
Sergey Lavrov	0	0	20	100	0	0
Sergei Shoigu	0	0	9	100	0	0
Alexander Chepurin	0	0	9	100	0	0
Dmitry Medvedev	0	0	5	100	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>		<b>100</b>		<b>5</b>	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 47** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual foreign political actors: representatives of EU institutions

Representatives of EU institutions	total	%
Johannes Hahn	28	28.57
Federica Mogherini	24	24.49
Jean-Claude Juncker	16	16.33
Maja Kocijančič	15	15.31
Martin Schulz	6	6.12
Ivo Vajgl	5	5.10
Tanja Fajon	4	4.08
<b>Total</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 48** – Value context referring to individual foreign political actors: Representatives of EU institutions

Representatives of EU institutions	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Johannes Hahn	0	0	27	96.43	1	3.57
Federica Mogherini	0	0	23	95.83	1	4.17
Jean-Claude Juncker	0	0	15	93.75	1	6.25
Maja Kocijančič	0	0	13	86.67	2	13.33
Martin Schulz	0	0	6	100	0	0
Ivo Vajgl	0	0	5	100	0	0
Tanja Fajon	0	0	4	100	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>93</b>		<b>5</b>	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 49** – Distribution of frequency of appearance of individual foreign political actors: Actors related to the Hague Tribunal

Actors related to the Hague Tribunal	total	%
Serge Brammertz	20	35.09
Jean-Claude Antonetti	10	17.54
Goran Hadžić	10	17.54
Ratko Mladić	8	14.04
Radovan Karadžić	6	10.53
Nenad Golčevski	3	5.26
<b>Total</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 50** – Value context referring to individual foreign political actors: Actors related to the Hague Tribunal

Actors related to The Hague Tribunal	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Serge Brammertz	0	0	20	100	0	0
Jean-Claude Antonetti	0	0	10	100	0	0
Goran Hadžić	0	0	10	100	0	0
Ratko Mladić	0	0	8	100	0	0
Radovan Karadžić	0	0	6	100	0	0
Nenad Golčevski	0	0	3	100	0	0
Total	0		57		0	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 51** – Distribution of appearance of collective foreign political actors

Foreign collective political actors	total	%
The Hague Tribunal	45	34.62
NATO	26	20.00
KLA/NLA	19	14.62
OSCE	14	10.77
US Embassy	11	8.46
European Parliament	6	4.62
UK Embassy	5	3.85
Syriza	4	3.08
Total	130	100.00

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 52** – Value context referring to foreign collective political actors:

Foreign collective political actors	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
The Hague Tribunal	0	0	40	88.89	5	11.11
NATO	0	0	21	80.77	5	19.23
OSCE	0	0	13	92.86	1	7.14
US Embassy	0	0	11	100	0	0
European Parliament	0	0	6	100	0	0
UK Embassy	0	0	5	100	0	0
KLA/NLA	0	0	5	26.32	14	73.68
Syriza	0	0	2	50	2	50
Total	0		103		27	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

Even a brief inspection of the frequency of appearance of certain actors on the front pages of selected print dailies from our sample clearly shows that the media treat the domain of domestic and foreign policy with uneven interest. The fact that foreign actors are considerably less present on the front pages of dailies in Serbia (40.23% compared to 59.76% of frequency of appearance of domestic political actors) indicates that domestic media focus on the field of domestic policy, which in interpretation of certain dailies often resembles fiction. This will be discussed in more detail in the part of the analysis dealing with interpretive strategies in the media coverage of certain topics. The reasons for noticeable lack of interest for economic actors and their understanding of the social, economic and political situation in Serbia and the world remains a mystery (merely 2.41% of the total sample of actors account for economic actors), even more so having in mind the fact that economic issues and economic consolidation of the country are reiterated in the narratives of politicians as key elements of the future developmental strategies of Serbia (see Table 12 and Tables 53, 54 and 55).

**Table 53** – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual domestic economic actors

Businessmen	Total	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Miroslav Mišković	37	56.92	0	0	28	75.68	9	24.32
Miodrag Kostić	10	15.38	0	0	8	80	2	20
Miroslav Bogičević	7	10.77	0	0	2	28.57	5	71.43
Mića Jovanović	6	9.23	0	0	2	33.33	4	66.67
Milan Beko	5	7.69	0	0	4	80	1	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>44</b>		<b>21</b>	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 54** – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective domestic economic actors

Collective domestic economic actors	Total	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
National Bank of Serbia	18	100	0	0	17	94.44	1	5.56
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>17</b>		<b>1</b>	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 55** – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances (individual and collective) foreign economic actors

Foreign economic actors	Total	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
IMF	19	82.61	0	0.00	18	94.74	1	5.26
Zuzana Murgasova	4	17.39	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>22</b>		<b>1</b>	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

Apart from the already mentioned political and economic actors, various other social actors that influence social and political circumstances within Serbia are featured on the front pages. Based on the collected empirical content, we divided them into:

1. individual: (a) representatives of independent state bodies (see Table 56), (b) various analysts<sup>1</sup> of political, social, economic and security circumstances (Table 57 and 58), (c) representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations (Table 59), (d) representatives of the Serbian Army (Table 60) and (e) other (Table 61), and
2. collective ones, which include independent state bodies (Table 62), Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian Army (Table 63).

Special “role” in texts on front pages of the media from the sample is held by analysts (see Table 57). Media treat them with a neutral tone in as much as 98.16% of texts, while the remaining 1.84% writings treat with a negative tone analysts Jovo Bakić (in three texts), Vladislav Jovanović, Slobodan Samardžić and Dragomir Anđelković (one text each).

**Table 56** – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: representatives of independent state bodies

Representatives of independent state bodies	Total	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Saša Janković	110	75.86	14	12.73	32	29.09	64	58.18
Rodoljub Šabić	23	15.86	0	0	22	95.65	1	4.35
Zoran Stojiljković	6	4.14	0	0	6	100	0	0
Tatjana Babić	6	4.14	0	0	6	100	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>14</b>		<b>66</b>		<b>65</b>	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

<sup>1</sup> For more information on the share of certain analysts on front pages of different media from our sample, please see Tables 107-113 in the Appendix.

**Table 57** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual domestic social actors: analysts

Analysts	total	%
Dragomir Anđelković	34	10.40
Dušan Janjić	30	9.17
Branko Radun	22	6.73
Aleksandar Radić	21	6.42
Zoran Dragišić	19	5.81
Jovo Bakić	16	4.89
Marko Nicović	12	3.67
Đorđe Vukadinović	12	3.67
Miroslav Lazanski	10	3.06
Vladimir Pejić	9	2.75
Dejan Vuk Stanković	9	2.75
Vladislav Jovanović	8	2.45
Ljubodrag Savić	8	2.45
Dušan Spasojević	8	2.45
Zlatko Nikolić	6	1.83
Petar Vojinović	6	1.83
Milan Nikolić	6	1.83
Ljubomir Madžar	6	1.83
Darko Trifunović	6	1.83
Božidar Spasić	6	1.83
Vladimir Goati	5	1.53
Mladen Kovačević	5	1.53
Milan Škulić	5	1.53
Milan Prostran	5	1.53
Milak Kovačević	5	1.53
Dušan Proroković	5	1.53
Cvjetin Milivojević	5	1.53
Aleksandar Popov	5	1.53
Vladimir Gligorov	4	1.22
Ratko Božović	4	1.22
Boško Jakšić	4	1.22
Milojko Arsić	4	1.22
Orhan Dragaš	3	0.92

Božo Prelević	3	0.92
Vladimir Vuletić	2	0.61
Draško Đenović	2	0.61
Slobodan Samardžić	2	0.61
Jurij Bajec	2	0.61
Slobodan Antonić	1	0.31
Ljubodrag Stojadinović	1	0.31
Tomislav Kresović	1	0.31
Total	327	100.00

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 58** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages in different media from the research sample

Media outlet	Number of analysts	%
Informer	116	35.47
Kurir	79	24.16
Politika	42	12.84
Blic	28	8.56
Danas	25	7.65
Alo	23	7.03
Večernje novosti	14	4.28
Total	327	100

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015



**Table 59** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual domestic social actors: Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations

Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations	Total	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Patriarch Irinej	44	19.47	0	0	42	95.45	2	4.55
Bishop Georgije	28	12.39	0	0	24	85.71	4	14.29
Bishop Filaret	28	12.39	0	0	23	82.14	5	17.86
Pope Francis	23	10.18	0	0	22	95.65	1	4.35
Metropolitan Amfilohije	22	9.73	0	0	20	90.91	2	9.09
Bishop Irinej	10	4.42	0	0	7	70	3	30
Bishop of Raška-Prizren Teodosije	9	3.98	0	0	9	100	0	0
Bishop Grigorije	7	3.1	0	0	7	100	0	0
Muamer Zukorlić	6	2.65	0	0	6	100	0	0
Metropolitan Porfirije	5	2.21	0	0	5	100	0	0
Bishop of Slavonia Jovan	4	1.77	0	0	4	100	0	0
Bishop of Kruševac David	4	1.77	0	0	1	25	3	75
Bishop Joanikije	4	1.77	0	0	4	100	0	0
Bishop Artemije	4	1.77	0	0	4	100	0	0
Bishop of Žiča Justin	3	1.33	0	0	1	33.33	2	66.67
Archbishop Jovan	3	1.33	0	0	3	100	0	0
Bishop of Niš Jovan	2	0.88	0	0	1	50	1	50
Bishop Hrizostom	2	0.88	0	0	2	100	0	0
Bishop of Šabac Lavrentije	2	0.88	0	0	2	100	0	0
former superior of the monastery Crna Reka Nikolaj	2	0.88	0	0	2	100	0	0
West-European Bishop Luka	1	0.44	0	0	0	0	1	100
West-American Bishop Maksim	1	0.44	0	0	1	100	0	0
Bishop of Vranje Pahomije	1	0.44	0	0	0	0	1	100

Bishop Vasilije Kačavenda	1	0.44	0	0	0	0	1	100
Bishop of Šumadija Jovan	1	0.44	0	0	0	0	1	100
Middle-European Bishop Sergej	1	0.44	0	0	0	0	1	100
Bishop of Banat Nikanor	1	0.44	0	0	0	0	1	100
Bishop Atanasije Rakita	1	0.44	0	0	1	100	0	0
Bishop of Britain and Scandinavia Dositej	1	0.44	0	0	0	0	1	100
Bishop of Toplica Arsenije	1	0.44	0	0	1	100	0	0
Bishop Konstantin	1	0.44	0	0	1	100	0	0
Bishop Dionisije	1	0.44	0	0	1	100	0	0
Archimandrite Ilarion	1	0.44	0	0	1	100	0	0
Archimandrite Danilo Ljubotin	1	0.44	0	0	1	100	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>30</b>		

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 60** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual domestic social actors: Serbian Army

Individual social actor: Serbian Army	Total	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Ljubiša Diković	36	36	0	0	28	77.78	8	22.22
Predrag Bandić	29	29	1	3.45	26	89.66	2	6.9
Ranko Živak	16	16	0	0	15	93.75	1	6.25
Petar Cvetković	11	11	0	0	11	100	0	0
Nebojša Draić	8	8	4	50	4	50	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>5</b>		<b>84</b>		<b>11</b>	

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 61** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of individual domestic social actors: Others

Others	Total	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Family of Predrag Gojković	56	43.08	2	3.57	54	96.43	0	0
Predrag Gojković	54	41.54	0	0	54	100	0	0
Đorđe Grubačić	11	8.46	0	0	7	63.64	4	36.36
Saša Mišić	9	6.92	0	0	4	44.44	5	55.56
<b>Total</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>119</b>		<b>9</b>	

Source: Research of Mediameter April-June 2015

**Table 62** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of collective domestic social actors: independent state bodies

Independent state bodies	Total	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Anti-Corruption Agency	14	100.00	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>14</b>		<b>0</b>	

Source: Research Mediameter April-June 2015

**Table 63** – Distribution of frequency of appearances of collective domestic social actors: Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian Army

Collective domestic social actors	Total	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Serbian Orthodox Church	30	52.63	0	0.00	29	96.67	1	3.33
Serbian Army	27	47.37	2	7.41	24	88.89	1	3.70
<b>Total</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>53</b>		<b>2</b>	

Source: Research Mediameter April-June 2015

Second-ranked according to frequency of appearances, compared to the total number of actors, is the actor which is referred to in narrative pieces of journalists from dailies under the pseudonym “unnamed source” or alternative pseudonym like “our paper’s source,” “source known to the editorial staff” (as many as 353 texts from our sample mention unnamed sources, see Table 12).

Frequency of appearances of this type of suspicious<sup>2</sup> interviewees/sources is not equally present in all dailies<sup>3</sup> (see Table 98 on page 78), which clearly depicts editorial policies which implement professional ethics presented in the *Journalist Code of Serbia*<sup>4</sup> in different ways. To a certain extent, tendency to use anonymous sources<sup>5</sup>, supported by data on the frequency of their appearance in case of certain media, follows the logic of colloquial division of dailies onto the ones with a dominant tabloid nature and those which strive not to be that. Unfortunately, judging by the data from our sample within the media space of Serbia, fighting the comprehensive external and internal processes of tabloidization of media with entertainment as the main objective turns out to be an extremely complicated professional task with an uncertain outcome.

## Causes

Though the sample in the second quarter of 2015 was increased by 18.71%, texts were initiated by similar causes as in the previous period, i.e. similar type of events and actors generated newspaper writings. *Cause developed by the editorial staff* still dominates in this area, in a slightly lower percentage – 31.08% or 520 texts, in comparison to 35.88% or 488 from the first quarter. The specified cause is present the most when texts discuss the political life in Serbia (129), Ombudsman Saša Janković (51), economy (31), activities of the Government of the Republic

<sup>2</sup> In the sense of their transparency, availability for checking certain information, internal motivation to take part in the interpretation of certain events, opening and/or clarifying certain scandals and similar.

<sup>3</sup> For example, most of the “unnamed sources” are present in the daily *Informer* (91), then in *Danas* (74), daily *Alo!* (47) and *Kurir* (46).

<sup>4</sup> *Journalists’ Code of Serbia* was adopted in 2006 by the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia and Association of Journalists of Serbia. Associations of Journalists supplemented the Code in 2013 with provisions on the prevention of corruption and conflict of interest. Within the professional community of journalists, the adoption of this Code was recognized as a significant contribution to the strengthening of self-regulation and advancement of ethical standards of free and independent journalism.

<sup>5</sup> For example, in Chapter VI which regulates “Attitude towards sources of information”, paragraph 3 of this Code reads: “A journalist is responsible for honoring the request of the source to remain anonymous. Fabricating anonymous statements is a gross violation of the standard professional conduct of journalists.”

Guidelines:

- Using anonymous (confidential) sources of information is generally not recommended, unless there is no other way to obtain information of exceptional public importance.
- Often, use of unnamed sources of information merely represents a way for the source or the journalist/media to put forward inaccurate and insufficiently-checked information. In case hiding of sources is used as a cover-up of its non-existence, credibility of the journalist/media will be severely compromised.
- Anonymity/confidentiality should be enabled to sources which may provide “first-hand” information, i.e. for documents which directly confirm, or inherently represent, information of exceptional public importance.
- An editor is obliged to check with the journalist the justification of the use of an anonymous (confidential) source. In that sense, it is necessary for at least one editor to know and protect the identity of an anonymous source.
- If the source of information asks the journalist not to reveal his/her identity to the editor, such a request should be denied.” (*Journalists’ Code of Serbia*, 2013:20-21)

of Serbia (27) and media/freedom of media (22)<sup>6</sup>. Texts published based on cause developed by the editorial staff have clear value context (49.23% of texts is positive or negative), and it is interesting to mention that when referring to the ombudsman, all the texts arisen from the media themselves have a clearly defined value (see Table 53).

The first next cause, *event initiated by a foreign factor* is present with 13.33%, while *statement of the other relevant actor* is ranked third with 10.7%. Both causes were recorded in nearly equal percentage as in the previous quarter (13.24%, i.e. 10.00%). *Events initiated by the other relevant actor* is this time present in 10.7% texts, in comparison to merely 2.72% in the previous period, while *events initiated by the Government of the Republic of Serbia* are ranked fifth with 71 texts, i.e. 4.24%.

**Table 64** – Distribution of causes in the seven media from the sample

Total	Number of appearance	% Share
Cause designed by editorial staff	520	31.08
Event initiated by a foreign factor	223	13.33
Statement of the other relevant actor	179	10.7
Events initiated by the other relevant actor	179	10.7
Event initiated by the Government of RS	71	4.24

Source: Research Mediameter, April – June 2015

**Table 65** – Cause developed by the editorial staff – most frequent topics and value context in the seven media from the sample

Cause developed by the editorial staff	No. of texts	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Political life in Serbia	129	1	74	54
Ombudsman Saša Janković	51	5	0	46
Economy	31	2	15	14
Activities of the Government of RS	27	2	17	8
Media/Freedom of media	22	0	5	17
TOTAL	520	26	264	230

Source: Research Mediameter, April-June 2015

<sup>6</sup> Five causes with biggest shares are presented in the table.

When we consider newspapers individually, causes developed by the editorial staff are not dominant only in *Večernje novosti*, where they are ranked third, with a share of 12.76% which is consistent with the findings from the first quarter (12.21%). Writings of this daily is still mostly caused by events initiated by foreign factors – 30.69%, which is a considerable increase compared to the previous period when 19.25% writings were caused by this. Events related to the other relevant actors and the Government of the Republic of Serbia initiated writing of 13.1%, i.e. 9.66% of texts and 6.55% of the texts from the front pages of *Večernje novosti* from the sample were prompted by events related to the Serbian Orthodox Church.

**Table 66** – Distribution of causes in *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	No. of appearances	%Share
Events initiated by a foreign factor	89	30.69
Event initiated by the other relevant factor	38	13.1
Topic developed by the editorial staff	37	12.76
Event initiated by the Government of RS	28	9.66
Event initiated by the Serbian Orthodox Church	19	6.55

Source: Research Mediameter, April-June 2015

The daily *Blic* reduced the percentage of causes developed by the editorial staff from 52.57% to 36.53%, though this practice is still considerable. Statements and events related to other relevant actors were causes in 12.57% of the texts, which represents a significant difference compared to the first three months of 2015, where only one of these causes initiated 6.86% of the texts. *Events initiated by the prosecution/court* caused 5.39% of the texts; foreign factor initiated 8.38% of the writing, which is also in accordance with the results of the first quarter (8%).

**Table 67** – Distribution of causes in *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	No. of appearances	% Share
Topic developed by the editorial staff	61	36.53
Event initiated by another relevant actor	21	12.57
Statement of the other relevant actor	21	12.57
Event initiated by a foreign factor	14	8.38
Event initiated by the prosecution/court	9	5.39

Source: Research Mediameter, April – June 2015

In the second quarter of 2015, the daily *Kurir* also published a lot less texts with cause developed by the editorial staff (17.73% compared to 44.03% in the first trimester of 2015). Events and statements related to other relevant actors account for causes in 14.18% and 13.48% of the texts. Foreign factor initiated 12.77% of the texts. Unlike the previous period in which 17.16% of the texts were related to the Government of Serbia and ruling parties, statements of the PM of Serbia was cause in merely 7.8% of the texts.

**Table 68** – Distribution of causes in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	No. of appearances	% Share
Topic developed by the editorial staff	25	17.73
Events initiated by the other relevant actor	20	14.18
Statement of the other relevant actor	19	13.48
Event initiated by the foreign factor	18	12.77
Statement of the PM of RS	11	7.8

Source: Research Mediameter, April-June 2015.

The daily paper *Alo!* reduced the number of texts with causes developed by the editorial staff from 75.41% to 49.7% in the second quarter. Statements and events initiated by the other relevant actor take up 19.76% of texts, considerably more than in the previous period (4.92%). Statements of the PM were cause in 8 or 4.79% of the texts, while 10 writings (5.99%) were initiated by the court or prosecution.

**Table 69** – Distribution of causes in the paper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	No. of appearances	% Share
Topic developed by the editorial staff	83	49.7
Statement of the other relevant actor	18	10.78
Event initiated by the other relevant actor	15	8.98
Event initiated by prosecution/court	10	5.99
Statement of the Prime Minister of RS	8	4.79

Source: Research Mediameter, April-June 2015

*Informer* increased the number of texts designed by the editorial staff from 40% in the first quarter to 53.59% in the second quarter of 2015, i.e. from 58 to 112 texts. In accordance with the trend present in the media presented up to now, causes in terms of events of other relevant actors initiated a total of 22% of texts. Events initiated by a foreign factor and reporting of another media were causes in 5.25% writings each and together they note a decrease in comparison to the first trimester by 6.03 %.

**Table 70** – Distribution of causes in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	No. of appearances	% Share
Topic developed by the editorial staff	112	53.59
Event initiated by the other relevant actor	23	11
Statement of the other relevant actor	23	11
Reporting of another media	11	5.26
Event initiated by a foreign factor	11	5.26

Source: Research Mediameter, April – June 2015

In the daily *Politika*, though the number of writings initiated by the editorial staff was reduced in percentage in the period from April to June from 18.18% to 16.98%, this cause still initiates the largest number of texts together with statements of other relevant actors – 64, i.e. 61. Events initiated by a foreign factor, which were dominant in the first three months of 2015, are now ranked third with 13.53% and they recorded a fall of 7.68%. Statements of the Prime Minister, representatives of the Government of the Republic of Serbia and reporting of other media were cause for 5.04% of texts.

**Table 71** – Distribution of causes in the paper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	No. of appearances	% Share
Cause developed by the editorial staff	64	16.98
Statement by the other relevant actor	61	16.18
Event initiated by a foreign factor	51	13.53
Event initiated by another relevant actor	25	6.63
Statement by the PM of RS	19	5.04
Statement by representatives of the Government of RS	19	5.04
Reporting of another media	19	5.04

Source: Research Mediameter, April – June 2015

*Danas* increased the number of texts developed by the editorial staff from 39.05% to 42.86%, during the other three months of 2015. Events and statements of other relevant actors were cause in 18.94% of the texts, while events initiated by a foreign factor incited the writing of 10.56% of the texts. Event initiated by the Government of the Republic of Serbia were equally present in both quarters, 6.93% in the first, i.e. 6.52% in the second.

**Table 72** – Distribution of causes in the paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	No. of appearances	%Share
Topic developed by the editorial staff	138	42.86
Event initiated by the other relevant actor	37	11.49
Event initiated by a foreign factor	34	10.56
Statement by the other relevant actor	24	7.45
Event initiated by the Government of RS	21	6.52

Source: Research Mediameter, April – June 2015

Cause for opening certain topics is certainly related to the events which attracted our attention in the second trimester of 2015. Therefore, events and statements of other relevant actors (example: reactions of public life figures to the decision on rehabilitation of Dragoljub Mihajlović) and events initiated by a foreign factor (military parade in Moscow, reactions to the conflict in Kumanovo, visit of Aleksandar Vučić to Albania and similar), and these events imposed certain topics and were present to a significant extent in the dailies, except for the paper *Alo!*.

It is interesting to mention that events and statements of the Prime Minister and Representatives of the Government of the Republic of Serbia generated only 10.46% of the texts. As it had already been emphasized in the first issue of *Mediameter*, this information certainly indicates context and tone of these texts, but also speaks about the manner of selecting texts which may be found on the front pages of the seven most influential daily newspapers.

**Table 73** – Share of texts initiated by statements and activities of the PM and representatives of the Government of Serbia from the seven media included in the sample

Cause	No. of texts	Share (%) in the total number of texts
Event initiated by the Government of RS	71	4.24
Event initiated by the PM of RS	20	1.2
Statement by the representatives of the Government of RS	34	2.03
Statement of the PM of RS	50	2.99
TOTAL	175	10.46

Source: Research Mediameter, April – June 2015

## Topics

Each text processed as part of this research has been classified under only one topic, which often represents a great challenge given the diversity of information, which is evident in all newspaper writing. Apart from the prevailing topic, elements which appear in the text (possibility of multiple choice) are evident, in order to formulate the topic more precisely. All topics with a wider formulation from the first quarter of 2015 are still present, though four events of significance for the period April – June are separately indexed: the military parade in Moscow, visit of the Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić to Tirana, topics related to the Ombudsman Saša Janković and conflict in Kumanovo.

## Share of topics

The topic *political life in Serbia*, which includes activities of all political participants in all levels of government, excluding *activities of the Government of the Republic of Serbia*, *activities of the PM* and *activities of the President of Serbia*, again account for the most space – 14.7%. All four “political” topics, nevertheless, jointly attract considerably less attention from the media, so this percentage now amounts to 23.3% compared to 33.68% from the first quarter. Interest of the media for economy and economics is also decreasing and now these two areas occupy 7.21% of the front pages together, two times less than during the first three months of 2015. This time, regional cooperation was in the focus of the media, with 5.32% of published texts on the front pages, as well as the Ombudsman Saša Janković, who was the subject of a lot of debating by the public (4.96% of the texts were dealing with this topic), which is at the same time the third-ranked topic of interest. Question of the Hague and war crimes, as well as relations of Belgrade and Priština, were monitored with the same level of intensity (4.72%, i.e. 4.24%). Topic related to events in the Serbian Orthodox Church was covered in 65 texts (3.89%), and the media showed greater interest in questions related to *EU policies* (3.17%).<sup>7</sup> Ombudsman and the other three topics which are separately indexed, took up a total of 8.65% of the texts from the front pages from the sample<sup>8</sup>. Media reported on the conflict in Kumanovo in 25 texts, the military parade in Moscow in 22 and the visit of the PM Aleksandar Vučić to Albania in 15 texts. With reference to the value context, the topic *political life in Serbia* was presented negatively in 100, i.e. 40.65% of texts, and a similar percentage of negative texts. *Economy*, *questions related to faith, church, religion* and topics which refer to The Hague Tribunal and war crimes were presented in about 30% of negative texts. The largest number of negative texts refers to debates related to the Ombudsman Saša Janković, so as much as 74% of texts on this topic had negative value, and most of these come from the daily *Informer*. Also, the ombudsman was, at the same time, presented in the largest number of positive texts – 13, i.e. 15.66% published in *Blic* and *Danas*. *Activities of the Government of the Republic of Serbia* also recorded 9 positive texts or 12.68% of texts on this published topic.

<sup>7</sup> Ten most frequent topics are presented in tables that follow the topic's segment

<sup>8</sup> Value context of the specified topics may be seen in Table 75

**Table 74 – Distribution of topics and their value context in the seven media from the sample**

Topic	Frequency	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Political life in Serbia	246	14.7	2	0.81	144	58.54	100	40.65
Regional cooperation / relations in the region	89	5.32	1	1.12	49	55.06	39	43.82
Ombudsman Saša Janković	83	4.96	13	15.66	8	9.64	62	74.7
The Hague/war crimes	79	4.72	0	0	55	69.62	24	30.38
Economy	75	4.48	4	5.33	48	64	23	30.67
Activities of the Government of RS	71	4.24	9	12.68	45	63.38	17	23.94
Kosovo/Relations between Belgrade and Priština	71	4.24	0	0	47	66.2	24	33.8
Faith, Church and Religion	65	3.89	3	4.61	42	64.62	20	30.77
Justice system, activities of the justice system	58	3.47	4	6.9	40	68.97	14	
EU/EU policies	53	3.17	1	1.89	37	69.81	15	28.3

Source: Research Mediameter, April – June 2015

**Table 75 - Distribution of topics and their value context in the seven media from the sample**

All the media from the sample	Total	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Ombudsman Saša Janković	83	4.96	13	15.66	8	9.64	62	74.70
Conflict in Kumanovo	25	1.49	0	0.00	8	32.00	17	68.00
Military parade in Moscow	22	1.31	9	40.90	10	45.46	3	13.64
Visit of Serbian PM to Tirana	15	0.89	0	0.00	13	86.70	2	13.30
Total	145	8.65	22	15.17	39	26.90	84	57.93

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

## Distribution of topics per media outlet

### *Blic*

Political life in Serbia occupies 23.35% of the front pages in *Blic*, and just under half of those texts were presented in a negative context (46.15%). This daily still allocated attention to the helicopter accident<sup>9</sup> and reported on this in 12 texts (66.67% negative connotation). The Serbian Orthodox Church is the third-ranked topic of interest in *Blic*, presented negatively in 72.73% of writings. Events in the economy were presented negatively in a similar percentage 71.43%, while about one third of texts related to the regional and international relations, as well as the economy were also presented negatively. It is interesting to note that all 6 texts which refer to the ombudsman were written in a positive context. Other topics of interest were presented in one neutral text (visit of the PM to Tirana and military parade in Moscow) each, i.e. in four (two neutral and two negative) about the conflict in Kumanovo. Topics related to the EU were present in one neutral text.

Clear value context may be attributed to 51.5% of texts in *Blic* (see Table 77).

**Table 76 – Distribution of topics and their value context in *Blic***

<i>Blic</i>		%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Political life in Serbia	39	23.35	0	0.00	21	53.85	18	46.15
Helicopter accident	12	7.19	0	0.00	4	33.33	8	66.67
Faith, church, religion	11	6.59	0	0.00	3	27.27	8	72.73
Activities of the Government of RS	8	4.79	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
Regional cooperation/ regional relations	8	4.79	0	0.00	5	62.50	3	37.50
Justice system/activities of the justice system	8	4.79	0	0.00	3	37.50	5	62.50
Commerce	7	4.19	0	0.00	2	28.57	5	71.43
International relations	7	4.19	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Economy	6	3.59		0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Ombudsman Saša Janković	6	3.59	6	100.00	0	0.00	0	0.00

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

<sup>9</sup> On March 15th, 2015, a helicopter of the Serbian Army fell during a rescue mission of transporting a five-days old baby, which was seriously ill. Army members were hired to transport the baby to a hospital in Belgrade because this could not have been done by land due to an avalanche. During the mission, there were complications due to weather which led to the fall of the helicopter.



**Table 77** – Value context with reference to all the topics in *Blic*

<i>Blic</i> – value context	No. of texts	%
Positive	7	4,19
Neutral	81	48,50
Negative	79	47,31
Total	167	100

Source: Research *Mediameter*, April - June 2015**Table 78** – Share and value context of the four selected topics in the daily *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>		%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Ombudsman Saša Janković	6	3.59	6	100.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Conflict in Kumanovo	4	2.4	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Military parade in Moscow	1	0.6	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian PM's visit to Tirana	1	0.6	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Research *Mediameter*, April – June 2015***Kurir***

*Political life in Serbia* accounts for 25.53% of the texts from our sample from the cover page of *Kurir*, and exactly one half of the writing is presented in a negative context, which is consistent to *Kurir's* approach, which presents 50.36% of its texts in that way. Topics related to regional relations were presented in a negative context in *Kurir* from April to June (69.23%), as well as activities of the President of Serbia (80%). Information on activities of the Government of the Republic of Serbia were presented mostly in a negative context (55.56%), with 11.11% of texts in a positive tone, while the texts related to Serbian Army were also mostly presented negatively. When it comes to four topics which are separated as part of this issue of *Mediameter*, *Kurir* published four texts on the conflict in Kumanovo (100% negative), three texts in the primary focus on the visit of the PM of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić to Tirana (two texts in neutral and one in negative context) and one on the ombudsman (neutral) and the military parade in Moscow (positive). Unlike the previous period, when topics related to the European Union were completely out of focus, *Kurir* published three neutral texts which refer to this topic in the second trimester. This daily presented more than half of the texts from the front pages from the sample (53.2%) in a positive or negative context (see Table 80).

**Table 79** – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	Frequency	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Political life in Serbia	36	25.53	1	2.78	17	47.22	18	50.00
Regional cooperation/ relations in the region	13	9.22	1	7.69	3	23.08	9	69.23
Activities of the Government of RS	9	6.38	1	11.11	3	33.33	5	55.56
Terrorism	9	6.38	0	0.00	2	22.22	7	77.78
Helicopter accident	8	5.67	0	0.00	5	62.50	3	37.50
Entertainment/ Celebrities	7	4.96	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Activities of the Prime Minister	6	4.26	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Activities of the President of Serbia	5	3.55	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
Army	4	2.84	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Conflict in Kumanovo	4	2.84	0	0.00	0	0.00	4	100.00

Source: Research *Mediameter*, April - June 2015**Table 80** - Value context in relation with reference to all topics in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i> – value context	No. of texts	%
Positive	4	2,84
Neutral	66	46,8
Negative	71	50,36
Total	141	100

Source: Research *Mediameter*, April - June 2015

**Table 81** – Share and value context of the four selected topics in the daily *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	Frequency	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Conflict in Kumanovo	4	2.84	0	0.00	0	0.00	4	100.00
Serbian PM's visit to Tirana	3	2.13	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Ombudsman Saša Janković	1	0.71	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Military parade in Moscow	1	0.71	1	100.00	0	0.00	0	0.00

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

### *Informer*

The Ombudsman Saša Janković was in the focus of the daily paper *Informer* in the second quarter and he was presented negatively in all 59 texts. During June, this daily repeated the text composed of short information related to the “gun scandal” every day<sup>10</sup>, which contained “questions of the family Gojković for Saša Janković”. Nearly the same content, announced on the front page, was thus repeated 22 times<sup>11</sup>, different texts on this topic were published on two days, while the ombudsman was not on the front page of *Informer* only on June 20<sup>th</sup>, 2015. This paper dealt with the political life in Serbia in 33 texts, which were in 81.82% of the cases negative. All writings related to the media also have completely negative context. Topics related to war crimes and The Hague Tribunal (72.73% negative) were treated in similar manner, while the military parade in Moscow was covered in a positive context entirely by *Informer*. When referring to the last two topics of importance for this analysis, the daily *Informer* published one neutral text focusing on the PM's visit to Tirana and three negative texts about the conflict in Kumanovo. Topics related to the EU (4 texts) were also reported about in a negative connotation.

Journalists and editors of *Informer* clearly express their position in 80.38% of the texts (see Table 83).

<sup>10</sup> *Informer* first published a text on the “gun scandal” on April 18<sup>th</sup>, 2015 when it first put forward information related to the suicide of Predrag Gojković, which was committed from the gun which at the time belonged to the Ombudsman Saša Janković.

<sup>11</sup> On the 23<sup>rd</sup> front page, only an announcement asking the ombudsman “to answer”

**Table 82** – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	Frequency	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Ombudsman Saša Janković	59	28.23	0	0.00	0	0.00	59	100.00
Political life in Serbia	33	15.79	0	0.00	6	18.18	27	81.82
Media/ freedom of media	19	9.09	0	0.00	0	0.00	19	100.00
Crime	14	6.7	0	0.00	8	57.14	6	42.86
The Hague/ war crimes	11	5.26	0	0.00	3	27.27	8	72.73
Justice system/ activities of the justice system	8	3.83	2	25.00	2	25.00	4	50.00
Economy	7	3.35	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Activities of the Government of RS	4	1.91	2	50.00	1	25.00	1	25.00
Military parade in Moscow	4	1.91	4	100.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Terrorism	4	1.91	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 83** - Value context with reference to topics in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer – value context</i>	No. of texts	%
Positive	13	6,22
Neutral	41	19,62
Negative	155	74,16
Total	209	100

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015



**Table 84** – Share and value context of the four selected topics in the daily *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	Frequency	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Ombudsman Saša Janković	59	28.23	0	0.00	0	0.00	59	100.00
Military parade in Moscow	4	1.91	4	100.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Conflict in Kumanovo	3	1.44	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Serbian PM's visit to Tirana	1	0.48	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

### *Alo!*

The newspaper *Alo!* dedicated 40.12% of the texts from the front pages from our sample to the *political life in Serbia*, and 41.79% of these texts were presented in a negative context. *Justice system/activities of the justice system* account for 5.99% of the texts from the sample for the paper *Alo!* (90% in neutral context), while *activities of the Government of Serbia* and *Economy* were presented in 9 texts each and 44.44% presented negatively. *Activities of the President of Serbia* and topics related to events in the Serbian Orthodox Church were presented with negative connotation in 83.33% of the texts, while relations of Belgrade and Priština and Conflict in Kumanovo also had a negative connotation in 75% of the writings of *Alo!* and the remaining three topics of interest for this research were written about in two texts each for the visit to Tirana and ombudsman (one negative texts on Saša Janković, and the remaining neutral) and one neutral text on the military parade in Moscow. The daily *Alo!* dealt with the topics of EU in two neutral texts.

The value context is present in 44.91% of the texts in *Alo!* (see Table 86).

**Table 85** – Distribution of topics and their value context in the daily *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	Frequency	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Political life in Serbia	67	40.12	1	1.49	38	56.72	28	41.79
Justice system/activities of the justice system	10	5.99	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Activities of the Government of RS	9	5.39	1	11.12	4	44.44	4	44.44
Economy	9	5.39	0	0.00	5	55.56	4	44.44
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	8	4.79	0	0.00	2	25.00	6	75.00
Activities of the President of Serbia	6	3.59	0	0.00	1	16.67	5	83.33
Faith, church, religion	6	3.59	0	0.00	1	16.67	5	83.33
Helicopter accident	6	3.59	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Activities of the Prime Minister	5	2.99	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Conflict in Kumanovo	4	2.4	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00

Source: Research Mediameter – January – March 2015

**Table 86** - Value context with reference to topics in the paper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i> – value context	No. of texts	%
Positive	3	1,8
Neutral	92	55,09
Negative	72	43,11
Total	167	100

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 87** – Share and value context of the four selected topics in the daily *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	Frequency	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Conflict in Kumanovo	4	2.4	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Ombudsman Saša Janković	2	1.2	0	0.00	1	50.00	1	50.00
Serbian PM's visit to Tirana	2	1.2	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Military parade in Moscow	1	0.6	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Politika**

In the daily *Politika*, except for recording the largest number of texts (377), we may see the biggest diversity of topics as well, which are equally distributed. This time, there was talk of The Hague Tribunal and war crimes (7.43% - 17.86% negative), political life in Serbia (6.63%), economy and economics (together 12.73% out of which 36%, i.e. 47.83% negative texts). Social issues generated 5.84% (36.36% negative). *Politika* allocated some attention to the topics related to EU (20 texts – 15% negative), regional relations (5.04% - 42.11% negative), and events in the Serbian Orthodox Church (without negative texts, 88.89% neutral, 11.11% positive). Relations between Belgrade and Priština were depicted in 4.51% of the texts (41.18% negative), while the Russian Federation was in the focus of 3.98% of writings, with 26.67% positive and 73.33% texts neutral, while negative writings were not recorded. When considering the four topics of interest, the largest number of texts were written about the parade in Moscow (5), 40% positive, 60% neutral, conflict in Kumanovo was in the primary focus of three texts (two neutral, one negative), ombudsman with one negative and one neutral text, while *Politika* dealt with the visit of the Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić to Tirana in two neutral texts.

In the daily *Politika* 28.65% of the topics had a value context (see Table 89).

**Table 88** – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	Frequency	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
The Hague/war crimes	28	7.43	0	0.00	23	82.14	5	17.86
Political life in Serbia	25	6.63	0	0.00	24	96.00	1	4.00
Commerce	25	6.63	3	12.00	13	52.00	9	36.00
Economy	23	6.1	0	0.00	12	52.17	11	47.83
Social issues/social policies	22	5.84	0	0.00	14	63.64	8	36.36
EU/EU policies	20	5.31	0	0.00	17	85.00	3	15.00
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	19	5.04	0	0.00	11	57.89	8	42.11
Faith, church, religion	18	4.77	2	11.11	16	88.89	0	0.00
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	17	4.51	0	0.00	10	58.82	7	41.18
Russia/attitude towards Russia	15	3.98	4	26.67	11	73.33	0	0.00

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 89** - Value context with reference to topics in the paper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i> – value context	No. of texts	%
Positive	22	5.83
Neutral	269	71.35
Negative	86	22.82
Total	377	100

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 90** – Share and value context of the four selected topics in the daily *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	Frequency	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Military parade in Moscow	5	1.33	2	40.00	3	60.00	0	0.00
Conflict in Kumanovo	3	0.8	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Ombudsman Saša Janković	2	0.53	0	0.00	1	50.00	1	50.00
Serbian PM's visit to Tirana	2	0.53	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

***Večernje novosti***

*Večernje novosti*, like *Politika*, presents a large number of topics, which are equally distributed on its front pages. Regional relations are a topic which generated most texts in this paper (8.97%), but 57.69% of these writings were in negative context. The Hague and the war crimes were presented in neutral tone, while Belgrade and Priština relations were negative in 47.06% of the texts. Events related to the Serbian Orthodox Church were the fourth ranked topic of interest in *Večernje novosti*, presented largely in a neutral context (82.35%), as well as the topics related to the economy and social policies (93.33%, i.e. 80% neutral texts). *Political life in Serbia* and *Activities of the Prime Minister* account for 4.48% of the writings from our sample, though the first topic is presented in 23.08% of the texts in negative, while the second one has the same percentage of positive texts. *Activities of the Government of the Republic of Serbia* were presented in positive (20%) and neutral (80%) context, while *EU/EU policies* were presented in negative and neutral context (50% each). The four topics of interest were not relevant to the editor and journalists of *Večernje novosti* – *Conflict in Kumanovo* was covered in five texts (one neutral, four negative), *Military parade in Moscow* in four (one positive, three neutral), while events related to the ombudsman were reported on in one neutral and one negative text of *Večernje novosti*. Visit of the PM to Tirana generated one negative text.

Most texts in *Večernje novosti* had a neutral context (70.34%), while 29.66% has a clear value connotation. Similar as in *Politika*, *Večernje novosti*, generally, take a value tone when it comes to certain topics of interest to the editorial staff (see Table 92).

**Table 91** – Value context according to topics in the paper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	Frequency	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	26	8.97	0	0.00	11	42.31	15	57.69
The Hague/war crimes	21	7.24	0	0.00	17	80.95	4	19.05
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	17	5.86	0	0.00	9	52.94	8	47.06
Faith, church, religion	17	5.86	1	5.88	14	82.35	2	11.76
Economy	15	5.17	1	6.67	14	93.33	0	0.00
Social issues/social policies	15	5.17	0	0.00	12	80.00	3	20.00
Political life in Serbia	13	4.48	0	0.00	10	76.92	3	23.08
Activities of the Prime Minister	13	4.48	3	23.08	10	76.92	0	0.00
Activities of the Government of RS	10	3.45	2	20.00	8	80.00	0	0.00
EU/EU policies	10	3.45	0	0.00	5	50.00	5	50.00

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 92** - Value context with reference to topics in the paper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i> – value context	No. of texts	%
Positive	21	7.24
Neutral	204	70.34
Negative	65	22.42
Total	290	100

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 93** – Share and value context of the four selected topics in the daily *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	Frequency	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Conflict in Kumanovo	5	1.72	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
Military parade in Moscow	4	1.38	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Ombudsman Saša Janković	2	0.69	0	0.00	1	50.00	1	50.00
Serbian PM's visit to Tirana	1	0.34	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	100.00

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

***Danas***

The daily *Danas* publishes most of its texts in a neutral context, regarding almost all topics. The biggest number of writings was dedicated to the political life in Serbia, followed by Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština (100% neutral context), activities of the Government of Serbia (84.21% neutral) and EU/EU policies, topic which records a somewhat higher percentage of negative texts – 22.22%. *Danas* on the front pages deals with regional and international relations, as well as topics related to the justice system. Economy and economics were presented in slightly more texts with negative connotation (18.18% and 27.27%). When it comes to the Ombudsman Saša Janković, we recorded the biggest number of positive texts on the front pages of *Danas*, 63.64%. Out of the remaining three topics of interest, the visit of the PM to Tirana and Conflict in Kumanovo were presented in 5, i.e. 2 neutral texts, while the military parade in Moscow was presented in 50% of the texts in negative tone, and in 16.67% in positive.

*Danas* records the largest number of texts in the neutral value context – 82.92% (see Table 95).

**Table 94** – Value context per topics in the daily *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	Frequency	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Political life in Serbia	33	10.25	0	0.00	28	84.85	5	15.15
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	20	6.21	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Activities of the Government of RS	19	5.9	1	5.26	16	84.21	2	10.53
EU/EU policies	18	5.59	1	5.56	13	72.22	4	22.22
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	17	5.28	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
Justice system/activities of the justice system	16	4.97	0	0.00	14	87.50	2	12.50
International relations	15	4.66	1	6.67	13	86.67	1	6.67
Media/freedom of media	13	4.04	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38
Commerce	11	3.42	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
Ombudsman Saša Janković	11	3.42	7	63.64	4	36.36		0.00
Economy	11	3.42	0	0.00	8	72.73	3	27.27

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 95** - Value context with reference to topics in the paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i> – value context	No. of texts	%
Positive	15	4.66
Neutral	267	82.92
Negative	40	12.42
Total	322	100

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 96** – Share and value context of the four selected topics in the daily *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	Frequency	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Ombudsman Saša Janković	11	3.42	7	63.64	4	36.36	0	0.00
Military parade in Moscow	6	1.86	1	16.67	2	33.33	3	50.00
Serbian PM's visit to Tirana	5	1.55	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Conflict in Kumanovo	2	0.62	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

### Unnamed sources

In all researched media and genre forms in the second quarter of 2015, an increase in the number of information coming from unnamed sources was observed. This is again the second-ranked actor in terms of participation in journalism forms, with a total of 353 appearances. There are two specific reasons for the increase in the number of unnamed sources on the front pages from the sample compared to the first quarter. First of all, the sample itself was increased by 313 texts or 18.71%. On the other hand, the research team of *Mediameter*, having observed the share of unnamed sources in the first project cycle, approached the quantification of unnamed sources differently, by qualifying not only the sources which the media identified as unnamed, but also all those which provided information which cannot be checked, regardless of the manner the information was introduced in the text. For instance, one media outlet put forward as evidence of their hypothesis the position of “an expert familiar with the work of the real-estate cadastre,” without specifying the name and last name of the mentioned expert. The position presented in this manner confirms the hypothesis published in the text, but the readers and the broader public are not able to check the truthfulness of the claim, or the competence of the unnamed expert which makes him just one of the array of unnamed sources which are used by media representatives.

Anonymity of the source is extremely important if it is necessary to learn information which people, wheeling the power, are not willing to share with the public. On the other hand, this practice still opens unforeseeable possibilities of manipulation of information of public significance. Such a manner of obtaining important information may shake the trust of the public in the media and their sources if the data turn out to be false later. However, in some situations, it may be very important to shed light on unacceptable behaviour and actions of a person with power.

As Matt Carlson said in his book “On the condition of Anonymity”: “Journalism is embedded in and reliant on its surroundings, which means it can never be the independent observer it claims to be...These sort of questions are better answered through an approach that recognizes the culture of unnamed sources as a *culture*. This view steers the inquiry into unnamed sources away from the frequency and implementation towards the questions of shared meanings and patterns of collective interpretation patterns among the journalists, source and audiences. The granting of anonymity is not simply a matter of technique. Rather, it is an appeal to a particular manner of imagining the relations between these three parties.”<sup>12</sup>

When considering journalism forms, the biggest number of information obtained from unnamed sources was recorded in reports – 253, while in percentage, the biggest share of anonymous sources is in the news 28.64%.

**Table 97** – Share of “unnamed sources” in all journalism forms, in all seven media from the sample

Genre	Total number of texts	Unnamed source	%
Report	1020	253	24,8
News	199	57	28,64
Article	159	30	18,86
Commentary	118	12	10.17
Interview	154	1	0.65
Reportage	17	0	0
Other	6	0	0
Total	1673	353	21.09

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

Causes developed by the editorial staff remain in an inextricable from the use of unnamed sources, i.e. out of 367 of relevant texts<sup>13</sup>, an unnamed source is an active participant in 136, 37.05% of these texts originate from information which is hard to check.

Presence of unnamed sources in texts from the front pages is generally most evident in *Informer* (91 texts of 43.54%), while the least (expressed in number and percentage) referrals to information obtained from anonymous sources are made in *Politika* 28 or 7.42% (information for all media may be seen in Table 98). za sve medije videti u tabeli 98.).

<sup>12</sup> M. Carlson, *On the condition of anonymity*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, Springfield, 2011, 7

<sup>13</sup> Out of the total number of texts caused by a *topic developed by the editorial staff* – 520, interviews account for 154 texts, their cause is inherently developed by the editorial staff, and the interviewee is always named. Interviews were not taken into consideration when analyzing the most present cause, except for one texts in the form of the interview, where the journalist referred to an unnamed source.

**Table 98** – Share of “unnamed sources” per media outlet

Media	Total number of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Informer	209	91	43.54
Danas	322	74	22.98
Alo!	167	47	28.14
Kurir	141	46	32.62
Blic	167	37	22.15
Večernje novosti	290	30	10.34
Politika	377	28	7.42
<b>Total</b>	<b>1673</b>	<b>353</b>	<b>21.09</b>

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

When talking about topics and the use of unnamed sources, this practice was noticeable in the largest number of texts talking about the political life in Serbia, which is consistent with the total number of texts published on this topic. Topics which incite the media to use anonymous sources are events related to the Serbian Orthodox Church, Ombudsman Saša Janković, activities of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, questions related to Kosovo and others (see Table 99).

Number of texts containing information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in each of the analysed media may be seen in the Appendix – Tables 114 – 120.

**Table 99** – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics, in the seven media from the sample

<i>All media from the sample</i>			
Topic	No. of texts	Unnamed source	%
Political life in Serbia	246	57	23.17
Faith, church, religion	65	27	41.54
Ombudsman Saša Janković	83	20	24.10
Activities of the Government of RS	71	20	28.17
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	71	15	21.13
Media/freedom of media	52	15	28.85
Justice system/activities of the justice system	58	14	24.14
Crime	34	14	41.18
The Hague/war crimes	79	13	16.46
Economy	75	12	16.00

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

## Conclusion

As indicated in the presented analysis, the differences between different print media (dailies) in Serbia exist and they are not irrelevant. They are primarily a consequence of: (a) different professional equipment of some media, (b) the ability of the media themselves to place objective, timely and relevant information, (c) economic limitations faced by the media, (d) different editorial policies, (e) professional competencies of the journalists and editors themselves, and (f) overall social-political atmosphere within which the media operate. It seems that the editorial policies of most media in Serbia are the result of these adverse circumstances rather than a thought-out strategy of strengthening certain media within the media, but also market, space of the Serbian society. An example of such a result, we recorded that within the analysed dailies there are topics which cannot seem to find their right place. For example: economy and economics, problems of modernization and reforms, significance and meaning of the European integrations, education and science status in Serbia... Whole areas are not only neglected, but it seems that fewer and fewer journalists are willing to speak and write about these topics in a professional manner. Loss of specialized focus, particularly evident in sections dealing with society, economics, foreign policy and culture, leads to the creation of a kind of hybrid *mishmash* on the level of the journalistic text, comprised of fragments of different topics without a clear topic and content focus. The only sections which are thriving are crime and celebrities, and this trend is increasingly followed by journalists with a years-long professional tradition.

It is especially interesting to note that even the papers in which value-neutral texts dominate, report on certain topics with a clear value-tone (mostly negative) and this mostly refers to delicate areas such as regional relations and European integrations. Sources known “only to the editorial staff” are constantly expanding. On the other hand, back checking has become a forgotten discipline, an almost faded memory within the media space of Serbia. The safest conveyors of messages and attitudes, nowadays, are certainly various experts and analysts, who become the stars of numerous front pages, because they can express opinions and evaluations with zero liability of the media. On the other hand, most of the journalists have their favourite analysts, and already the choice of a favourite analyst vividly speaks of certain ideological and value positions of certain media.

## Appendix

**Table 100** – Sample *Večernje novosti*

Sample <i>Večernje novosti</i>	
Texts from the front pages included in the sample	290
Texts from front pages not included in the sample	267
Other	10379
<b>Total texts</b>	<b>10936</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 101** – Sample *Informer*

Sample <i>Informer</i>	
Texts from the front pages included in the sample	210
Texts from front pages not included in the sample	185
Other	5793
<b>Total texts</b>	<b>6188</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Tabela 102.** – Sample *Alo!*

Sample <i>Alo!</i>	
Texts from the front pages included in the sample	167
Texts from front pages not included in the sample	269
Other	6643
<b>Total texts</b>	<b>7079</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 103** – Sample *Blic*

Sample <i>Blic</i>	
Texts from the front pages included in the sample	167
Texts from front pages not included in the sample	221
Other	10365
<b>Total texts</b>	<b>10753</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 104** – Sample *Politika*

Sample Politika	
Texts from the front pages included in the sample	377
Texts from front pages not included in the sample	233
Other	10529
Total texts	11139

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 105** – Sample *Danas*

Sample Danas	
Texts from the front pages included in the sample	321
Texts from front pages not included in the sample	148
Other	6837
Total texts	7306

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 106** – Sample *Kurir*

Sample Kurir	
Texts from the front pages included in the sample	141
Texts from front pages not included in the sample	140
Other	8.084
Total texts	8.365

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 107** – Distribution of frequency of the appearance of analysts on the front pages of *Večernje novosti*

Analysts	Večernje novosti	%
Zoran Dragišić	1	0.07
Zlatko Nikolić	0	0.00
Vladislav Jovanović	3	0.21
Vladimir Vuletić	0	0.00
Vladimir Pejić	0	0.00
Vladimir Goati	0	0.00
Vladimir Gligorov	0	0.00



Draško Đenović	0	0.00
Slobodan Samardžić	0	0.00
Slobodan Antonić	0	0.00
Ratko Božović	0	0.00
Petar Vojinović	0	0.00
Orhan Dragaš	0	0.00
Mladen Kovačević	0	0.00
Miroslav Lazanski	0	0.00
Boško Jakšić	0	0.00
Milojko Arsić	0	0.00
Milan Škulić	1	0.07
Milan Prostran	1	0.07
Milan Nikolić	0	0.00
Milan Kovačević	0	0.00
Marko Nicović	0	0.00
Ljubomir Madžar	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Stojadinović	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Savić	0	0.00
Jurij Bajec	0	0.00
Jovo Bakić	2	0.14
Dušan Spasojević	2	0.14
Dušan Proroković	0	0.00
Dušan Janjić	2	0.14
Dragomir Anđelković	1	0.07
Đorđe Vukadinović	0	0.00
Dejan Vuk Stanković	0	0.00
Darko Trifunović	1	0.07
Cvjetin Milivojević	0	0.00
Branko Radun	0	0.00
Božo Prelević	0	0.00
Božidar Spasić	0	0.00
Tomislav Kresović	0	0.00
Aleksandar Radić	0	0.00
Aleksandar Popov	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 108** – Distribution of frequency of the appearance of analysts on the front pages of*Informer*

Analysts	Informer	%
Zoran Dragišić	6	0.05
Zlatko Nikolić	5	0.04
Vladislav Jovanović	2	0.02
Vladimir Vuletić	1	0.01
Vladimir Pejić	6	0.05
Vladimir Goati	2	0.02
Vladimir Gligorov	1	0.01
Draško Đenović	0	0.00
Slobodan Samardžić	0	0.00
Slobodan Antonić	0	0.00
Ratko Božović	0	0.00
Petar Vojinović	1	0.01
Orhan Dragaš	3	0.03
Mladen Kovačević	1	0.01
Miroslav Lazanski	6	0.05
Boško Jakšić	4	0.03
Milojko Arsić	0	0.00
Milan Škulić	1	0.01
Milan Prostran	0	0.00
Milan Nikolić	2	0.02
Milan Kovačević	4	0.03
Marko Nicović	9	0.08
Ljubomir Madžar	2	0.02
Ljubodrag Stojadinović	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Savić	5	0.04
Jurij Bajec	0	0.00
Jovo Bakić	4	0.03
Dušan Spasojević	2	0.02
Dušan Proroković	4	0.03
Dušan Janjić	5	0.04
Dragomir Anđelković	8	0.07
Đorđe Vukadinović	5	0.04
Dejan Vuk Stanković	3	0.03
Darko Trifunović	3	0.03

Cvjetin Milivojević	1	0.01
Branko Radun	7	0.06
Božo Prelević	1	0.01
Božidar Spasić	4	0.03
Tomislav Kresović	1	0.01
Aleksandar Radić	6	0.05
Aleksandar Popov	1	0.01
<b>Total</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 109** – Distribution of frequency of the appearance of analysts on the front pages of *Alo!*

Analysts	Alo!	%
Zoran Dragišić	2	0.09
Zlatko Nikolić	0	0.00
Vladislav Jovanović	1	0.04
Vladimir Vuletić	0	0.00
Vladimir Pejić	0	0.00
Vladimir Goati	1	0.04
Vladimir Gligorov	0	0.00
Draško Đenović	0	0.00
Slobodan Samardžić	1	0.04
Slobodan Antonić	1	0.04
Ratko Božović	0	0.00
Petar Vojinović	1	0.04
Orhan Dragaš	0	0.00
Mladen Kovačević	1	0.04
Miroslav Lazanski	1	0.04
Boško Jakšić	0	0.00
Milojko Arsić	0	0.00
Milan Škulić	0	0.00
Milan Prostran	0	0.00
Milan Nikolić	0	0.00
Milan Kovačević	1	0.04
Marko Nicović	0	0.00
Ljubomir Madžar	1	0.04

Ljubodrag Stojadinović	1	0.04
Ljubodrag Savić	0	0.00
Jurij Bajec	0	0.00
Jovo Bakić	1	0.04
Dušan Spasojević	0	0.00
Dušan Proroković	0	0.00
Dušan Janjić	1	0.04
Dragomir Anđelković	2	0.09
Đorđe Vukadinović	1	0.04
Dejan Vuk Stanković	2	0.09
Darko Trifunović	0	0.00
Cvjetin Milivojević	1	0.04
Branko Radun	0	0.00
Božo Prelević	0	0.00
Božidar Spasić	0	0.00
Tomislav Kresović	0	0.00
Aleksandar Radić	3	0.13
Aleksandar Popov	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 110** – Distribution of frequency of the appearance of analysts on the front pages of *Blic*

Analysts	Blic	%
Zoran Dragišić	0	0.00
Zlatko Nikolić	0	0.00
Vladislav Jovanović	0	0.00
Vladimir Vuletić	0	0.00
Vladimir Pejić	1	0.04
Vladimir Goati	0	0.00
Vladimir Gligorov	1	0.04
Draško Đenović	0	0.00
Slobodan Samardžić	0	0.00
Slobodan Antonić	0	0.00
Ratko Božović	3	0.11
Petar Vojinović	3	0.11
Orhan Dragaš	0	0.00

Mladen Kovačević	0	0.00
Miroslav Lazanski	0	0.00
Boško Jakšić	0	0.00
Milojko Arsić	1	0.04
Milan Škulić	0	0.00
Milan Prostran	2	0.07
Milan Nikolić	0	0.00
Milan Kovačević	0	0.00
Marko Nicović	0	0.00
Ljubomir Madžar	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Stojadinović	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Savić	0	0.00
Jurij Bajec	1	0.04
Jovo Bakić	1	0.04
Dušan Spasojević	0	0.00
Dušan Proroković	0	0.00
Dušan Janjić	5	0.18
Dragomir Anđelković	1	0.04
Đorđe Vukadinović	3	0.11
Dejan Vuk Stanković	0	0.00
Darko Trifunović	0	0.00
Cvjetin Milivojević	2	0.07
Branko Radun	0	0.00
Božo Prelević	1	0.04
Božidar Spasić	0	0.00
Tomislav Kresović	0	0.00
Aleksandar Radić	2	0.07
Aleksandar Popov	1	0.04
<b>Total</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 111** – Distribution of frequency of the appearance of analysts on the front pages of *Politika*

Analysts	Politika	%
Zoran Dragišić	2	0.05
Zlatko Nikolić	1	0.02
Vladislav Jovanović	0	0.00
Vladimir Vuletić	1	0.02
Vladimir Pejić	2	0.05
Vladimir Goati	2	0.05
Vladimir Gligorov	1	0.02
Draško Đenović	0	0.00
Slobodan Samardžić	0	0.00
Slobodan Antonić	0	0.00
Ratko Božović	0	0.00
Petar Vojinović	0	0.00
Orhan Dragaš	0	0.00
Mladen Kovačević	1	0.02
Miroslav Lazanski	2	0.05
Boško Jakšić	0	0.00
Milojko Arsić	3	0.07
Milan Škulić	2	0.05
Milan Prostran	0	0.00
Milan Nikolić	0	0.00
Milak Kovačević	0	0.00
Marko Nicović	0	0.00
Ljubomir Madžar	2	0.05
Ljubodrag Stojadinović	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Savić	0	0.00
Jurij Bajec	1	0.02
Jovo Bakić	2	0.05
Dušan Spasojević	3	0.07
Dušan Proroković	1	0.02
Dušan Janjić	3	0.07
Dragomir Anđelković	6	0.14
Đorđe Vukadinović	1	0.02
Dejan Vuk Stanković	0	0.00
Darko Trifunović	0	0.00

Cvjetin Milivojević	1	0.02
Branko Radun	2	0.05
Božo Prelević	1	0.02
Božidar Spasić	0	0.00
Tomislav Kresović	0	0.00
Aleksandar Radić	0	0.00
Aleksandar Popov	2	0.05
<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 112** – Distribution of frequency of the appearance of analysts on the front pages of the paper *Danas*

Analysts	Danas	%
Zoran Dragišić	0	0.00
Zlatko Nikolić	0	0.00
Vladislav Jovanović	1	0.04
Vladimir Vuletić	0	0.00
Vladimir Pejić	0	0.00
Vladimir Goati	0	0.00
Vladimir Gligorov	1	0.04
Draško Đenović	0	0.00
Slobodan Samardžić	1	0.04
Slobodan Antonić	0	0.00
Ratko Božović	0	0.00
Petar Vojinović	0	0.00
Orhan Dragaš	0	0.00
Mladen Kovačević	0	0.00
Miroslav Lazanski	0	0.00
Boško Jakšić	0	0.00
Milojko Arsić	0	0.00
Milan Škulić	1	0.04
Milan Prostran	2	0.08
Milan Nikolić	0	0.00
Milan Kovačević	0	0.00
Marko Nicović	0	0.00
Ljubomir Madžar	1	0.04

Ljubodrag Stojadinović	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Savić	3	0.12
Jurij Bajec	0	0.00
Jovo Bakić	6	0.24
Dušan Spasojević	0	0.00
Dušan Proroković	0	0.00
Dušan Janjić	3	0.12
Dragomir Anđelković	1	0.04
Đorđe Vukadinović	0	0.00
Dejan Vuk Stanković	0	0.00
Darko Trifunović	2	0.08
Cvjetin Milivojević	0	0.00
Branko Radun	0	0.00
Božo Prelević	0	0.00
Božidar Spasić	0	0.00
Tomislav Kresović	0	0.00
Aleksandar Radić	2	0.08
Aleksandar Popov	1	0.04
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 113** – Distribution of frequency of the appearance of analysts on the front pages of the daily *Kurir*

Analysts	Kurir	%
Zoran Dragišić	8	0.10
Zlatko Nikolić	0	0.00
Vladislav Jovanović	1	0.01
Vladimir Vuletić	0	0.00
Vladimir Pejić	0	0.00
Vladimir Goati	0	0.00
Vladimir Gligorov	0	0.00
Draško Đenović	2	0.03
Slobodan Samardžić	0	0.00
Slobodan Antonić	0	0.00
Ratko Božović	1	0.01
Petar Vojinović	1	0.01

Orhan Dragaš	0	0.00
Mladen Kovačević	2	0.03
Miroslav Lazanski	1	0.01
Boško Jakšić	0	0.00
Milojko Arsić	0	0.00
Milan Škulić	0	0.00
Milan Prostran	0	0.00
Milan Nikolić	4	0.05
Milan Kovačević	0	0.00
Marko Nicović	3	0.04
Ljubomir Madžar	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Stojadinović	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Savić	0	0.00
Jurij Bajec	0	0.00
Jovo Bakić	0	0.00
Dušan Spasojević	1	0.01
Dušan Proroković	0	0.00
Dušan Janjić	11	0.14
Dragomir Anđelković	15	0.19
Đorđe Vukadinović	2	0.03
Dejan Vuk Stanković	4	0.05
Darko Trifunović	0	0.00
Cvjetin Milivojević	0	0.00
Branko Radun	13	0.16
Božo Prelević	0	0.00
Božidar Spasić	2	0.03
Tomislav Kresović	0	0.00
Aleksandar Radić	8	0.10
Aleksandar Popov	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Research Mediameter April - June 2015

**Table 114** – Texts which contain unnamed sources, according to topics in the paper *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>			
Topic	No. of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Political life in Serbia	39	7	17.95
Faith, church, religion	11	5	45.45
Activities of the Government of RS	8	3	37.50
International relations	7	3	42.86
Economy	7	3	42.86

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 115** – Texts which contain unnamed sources, per topic in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>			
Topic	No. of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Political life in Serbia	36	11	30.56
Activities of the Government of RS	9	5	13.89
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	13	4	11.11
Activities of the Prime Minister	6	4	11.11
Terrorism	9	3	8.33

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 116** – Texts which contain unnamed sources, per topic in the paper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>			
Topic	No. of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Faith, church, religion	17	8	47.06
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	26	2	7.69
The Hague/war crimes	21	2	9.52
EU/EU policies	10	2	20.00
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	17	1	5.88

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 117** – Texts which contain unnamed sources, per topic in the paper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>			
Topic	No. of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Political life in Serbia	67	14	20.90
Justice system/activities of the justice system	10	5	50.00
Economy	9	3	33.33
Helicopter accident	6	3	50.00
Conflict in Kumanovo	4	3	75.00

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 118** – Texts which contain unnamed sources, per topic in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>			
Topic	No. of texts	Unnamed source	%
Political life in Serbia	33	17	51.52
Ombudsman Saša Janković	59	13	22.03
Media / Freedom of Media	19	12	63.16
Crime	14	8	57.14
The Hague/war crimes	11	4	36.36

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 119** – Texts which contain unnamed sources, per topic in the paper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>			
Topic	No. of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Faith, church, religion	18	4	22.22
Political life in Serbia	25	3	12.00
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	17	3	17.65
The Hague/war crimes	28	1	3.57
Economy	25	1	4.00

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

**Table 120** – Texts which contain unnamed sources, per topic in the paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>			
Topic	No. of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	20	8	40.00
Activities of the Government of RS	19	7	36.84
EU/EU policies	18	6	33.33
International relations	15	5	33.33
Political life in Serbia	33	4	12.12

Source: Research Mediameter, April - June 2015

5



Discursive  
analysis

DEJAN VUK STANKOVIĆ

## DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS

The primary research aim of the discursive analysis is to present the images of the political actors, processes and events in the print media, especially in the weeklies. Role of these images is to present political persons, collective actor, process and events. As it was underlined in the previous study, **Mediameter I**, images generally do not strive to be rationally believable, more precisely to be founded on facts and to be logically consistent; their aim is rather to be rhetorically suggestive. They do not prove, but convince and often call for political action. Also, images of actors, events and political processes are founded on a specific model of interpretation of actors and events. Model of interpretation which creates images is a model of cast roles (political actors) and model of ideologically desirable and pre-defined goals and outcomes of political-historic processes.

In line with the set methodology, the subjects of the discursive analysis are editorials, newspaper columns, interviews, as well as reportages, which correlate with the front pages.

Factual existence of diverse and conflicting attitudes and models of interpretation of political actors, political events and processes, dominantly negative image of key political actors – government and opposition, high level of content overlapping between the authors of columns, participants in interviews and immediate actors from the political battle, strongly emphasized debate tension in the presence of political and social phenomena and nearly constant absence of accord on the sense and meaning of a certain political event and process were the main features of discourse in the print media in Serbia in the period from April to June 2015.

Effect of the specified media-political optics is strong relativization and reduction of the public space in the media to the level of daily political disputes with no original, more precisely objectively engaged rational content. Often, the content of the texts and the interviews has an intensely controversial character. It is manifested in the spirit of accusations, which, nearly every time, have the character of personal stigma attachment, most often to the Prime Minister and some of the more important Ministers. A similar matrix of stigmatization is used in the affirmation of the pro-government standpoints, though the number of texts and interviews, which have been published with the aim of affirmation or defence of the government's positions, is quantitatively lower beyond comparison. Additionally, critical-opposing discourse is far more developed in terms of attempts of a rational development of argued standpoints, but also persuasive strategies which should have an effect on the disappointed voters of the opposition parties.

The mentioned conclusions are derived from a discursive analysis of editorial commentaries and columns, texts which are introduced on the front pages of weeklies, as well as the large number of interviews which were in the mentioned period present on the pages of the weeklies.

Plurality of value and political positions and viewpoints is accompanied by a division into pro-government and anti-government comments and commentators. Despite the domination of the ruling parties in the public opinion, there is an undoubted accent on the opposing and critical discourse in the print media, especially in the area of columnist journalism, which establishes interpretive matrixes for understanding politics, society and history. In the period from April – June 2015, there is a noticeable expansion of interviews as a journalism genre/form in the weeklies, especially in the weeklies *Vreme* and *NIN*. Often, the interviewee, a figure from the public and political life, gets the front page of the paper, which additionally underlines its significance and emphasizes the message sent out by this person to the public.

Almost as if following a rule of thumb, as we will see from the following study, this is a message of political propaganda, calculated to create a negative attitude towards the government. An interesting media gesture is the criteria of selecting the interviewed persons. They are becoming the conveyors not only of a certain political-moral message, but a measurement for establishing what is morally desirable and politically prudent, and inherently somehow socially and historically necessary.

Emphasized paying of attention to certain public figures shows that the process of creating new (old) enlightened elite is under way. This is a proto-educational idea which blends different forms of knowledge about politics and society, with a call for concrete action in the social and political arena. Specifically, the positions put forward are pleas for political action, which we will later prove. At the same time, it should be noted that significance is attributed to the appearance of the front page, which contain a strong political message, similar to election campaign posters, suggesting that these are the people of "certain upbringing." Specifically, individually or together, members of the elite from the front pages are measurement of the rationality in interpreting political, social and economic events, examples of moral excellence and finally, the political alternative to the current government.

Awarding of statuses of local educators to certain members of the elite is happening at a time when it is becoming clear that a crisis of trust for and program identity of the opposition is present in Serbia, according to public opinion polls and given the myriad of less important election statements. This prompts the conclusion that the editorial staff of certain media think that some intellectual circles account for a certain kind of a social-historic avant-garde. They should, according to a silent, but effective assumption, lead Serbia from the historic dead-end in which it fell by choice of the current government. In this first step, the historic-political task of these elite is to construct a negative image of the current government in the fullest extent. Process of construction of the negative image is implemented in multi layers,



dynamically and thoroughly. The government is challenged in all segments, from internal and foreign policy, to economy, media and finally cultural policy. In the second step, the result of such an interpretation should be wide grouping and motivation of the passive voters, who largely supported the winners of the October-5<sup>th</sup> revolution.

The image of the other actor of the political life, the opposition, is not significantly different. Opposition is most often depicted negatively in the commentaries in the print media in the specified period. Also, it is given much less space in the print media so thorough analysis of its activities is not available. In that sense, it is mostly challenging of the opposition's moral and political credibility in criticizing the current government, and reminding of the mistakes from the time when it was in office, deriving that it is unworthy of the people's trust and even allegedly politically irrelevant.

In the analyzed weeklies, issued in the period from April to June 2015, there is no published text in which any choice of the government is directly or indirectly supported, regardless of whether it is a concept choice or a specific decision. Exceptions are cases in which such affirmative messages are coming from the actors themselves, politicians directly involved in the government. Sometimes, it is possible, like e.g. in the "Janković" case (which will be discussed later), to find the conditional, i.e. indirect affirmation of these standpoints which could possibly be considered close to the government's. Outside of the indirect defence or direct addresses of the government's representatives, there are no texts or interviews which are connected to the front pages of weeklies, for which it could be said that they are promoting or strengthening the position of the government. In a nutshell, column journalism is a medium of social and political critics. At the same time, it testifies of the existence of plurality of different viewpoints in the Serbian public.

Apart from monitoring the complex dynamics in the construction and explication of the image of key political actors, the subject discursive analysis treats a series of events which are relevantly present in the print media.

Visit of the Prime Minister of Aleksandar Vučić to Tirana, crisis in Macedonia, Victory Day Parade in Moscow, media-political and wider foreign policy plots surrounding the Resolution on Srebrenica in the UN Security Council, the Ombudsman Saša Janković's case and the rehabilitation of General Dragoljub Draža Mihajlović belong to the category of events which stirred up considerable attention of the media. Treatment of these events in the media represents a sort of test of the way in which the Serbian media scene approaches events, which, each in their own way, figurate as relevant from the standpoint of the European path of Serbia.

Visit of the PM Vučić to Albania, Macedonian crisis, and controversy surrounding the Declaration on Srebrenica are the events which reflect the complex and in many ways controversial issues of relations in the region. Starting from the position that policy of good neighbourly relations is one of the key political requirements for Serbia's accession

in the European family of nations, it is important to investigate whether and to what extent the media interpreted the mentioned events in the context of one of the key European requirements for establishing good neighbourly events, or a matrix which fortifies the ethnic and political distance and closes the possibility of cooperation among the nations from the region is still effective in the public political sphere.

The second topic, the Victory Day Parade in Moscow, was a media-political challenge under the circumstances of tense relations between the West and Russia, particularly in light of deeply-rooted disputes surrounding Ukraine. In the context of this topic, the issue is whether, and if yes, in what extent, the parade in Moscow was perceived in a wider sense of aligning Serbia's foreign policy with that of the EU.

Though at first glance the rehabilitation of General Dragoljub Mihailović strictly speaking belongs to questions of Serbian history, experience of the post-communism societies, which have been integrated in the European family of nations, shows that by righting the wrongs of the communist regime, gradually and irrevocably, moral, political and historic basis for building a legal system are created. In the context of this circumstance, the case of rehabilitation of General Mihailović becomes relevant for the research of the relation between the media and politics as part of the European path of Serbia.

Finally, the case of Saša Janković, Ombudsman, was viewed as part of the very important aspect of European integrations – relation between the government and independent institutions which protect the rights and interests of citizens.

Interpretations of the mentioned persons, events and processes were performed under a strong influence of daily-political relativization, additionally undermining the already fragile support for the European process in Serbia.

Many different completely opposite interpretations, both explicitly and implicitly, questioned the commitment to good neighbourly relations. Reactivating and reviving one of the geopolitical matrixes from the time of Milošević's anti-European regime is one of the indicators and symptoms of the bad past which has not been overcome.

Parallel to it, excess of declarative Russophillia expressed in response to the parade on May 9<sup>th</sup> in Moscow, together with the often banal politicization of the case of the Ombudsman Saša Janković, and the deeply rooted ideological and political disputes regarding the rehabilitation of General Mihailović indicated the lack of agreement on European values. Proverbially, manifestation is the absence of a rational matrix for the assessment of actors, events and processes which are in the centre of the media attention. Writings in the print media have shown that the spirit of radical controversy remains a dominant characteristic of our public-political space.

## Image of the government (most frequent messages): authoritative, unlimited, extremely manipulative, violent, low cultural level, questionable legitimacy, lack of expertise and morals

Image of the government in the print media, especially in interviews and columns is personified. Image of the government is the image of Aleksandar Vučić, man who is the supreme political authority in two senses: given the wide scope of authorizations which has been awarded to the Government in the Constitution and given the trust which he currently enjoys from the electorate.

Construction of Vučić's image in the analysed print media is comprehensive and detailed. In terms of content, his image is generally extremely negatively defined. Challenging of Vučić's political actions takes place in two ways and it refers to his personal traits, manner of performing and organizing the government, political concept, more precisely his proclaimed goals, but also specific results in the work of the Government he leads.

Psychological and moral traits of Vučić's personality, such as decisiveness, energy and entrepreneurship are perceived as prominent authoritativeness, exclusivity and intolerance. Realistic and pragmatic approach to solving political and economic problems is easily questioned by constructing unattainable political and economic goals and projects of the Government. And finally, authentic commitment to performing the duties of the Prime Minister is travestied and depicted as open fanatic behaviour and impatient desire to succeed.

Media's confrontation with Vučić's psychological and moral characteristics is transferred onto the daily political and often pseudo scientific plane. Propaganda which combines (abuses) scientific elements, daily political commentary and personal passions picked up intensity in the interviews and editorial comments in the period which was the subject of this analysis. Synergy effect of these three basically irrational moments in the approach to political and social phenomena is evident in the vocabulary, terminological schemes, premises and conclusions about the activities of the Government of Serbia offered by the expert public which is extremely interested in the daily politics.<sup>1</sup>

Though elected in democratic elections, results of which were accepted and verified by all the relevant actors from the election process, from the immediate participants to certain international institutions, though the government has not suspended/derogated any articles of the Constitution and law which promote basic liberal democratic principles up to now,

<sup>1</sup> Expert public extremely interested in daily politics refers to a group of social scientists, publicists and journalists, who do not strive towards more complete and accurate description and explanation of political actors, events and processes, but strive to directly and unequivocally take sides in the daily political controversy, by accusing and defending in the name and for the account of some entity or government candidate. Specifically, the expert public extremely interested in daily politics deals with daily politics, and uses its scientific titles and knowledge in the daily political battle, either as part of a pseudo-educational image (scientific title), or as a trump card in the political controversy (scientific knowledge).

the Government of PM Vučić has been labelled as autocratic, "It would be most accurate to say that Serbia is close to the notion of real autocracy."<sup>2</sup> "Now, power is literally personal, that is to say personal and paranoid, vengeful, argumentative, even violent. When you have such a government, made entirely out of one person and its character, and when that person develops into a bully, victims will inevitably fight back<sup>3</sup>." The already quoted Slobodan Antonić defines the Government of Aleksandar Vučić as "authoritative populism of the Baron Muncchausen type."<sup>4</sup> Antonić continues his narration about the first man of the Serbian government with a position from which can be derived that Vučić is a political hybrid which connects the strong leadership similar to Slobodan Milošević and the ability to skilfully use political marketing, which is the defining trait of the former President Boris Tadić, "Vučić is synthesis of Milošević's urge to demonstrate power and Tadić's understanding of the importance of marketing. In short – a hybrid of Milošević and Tadić."<sup>5</sup>

With the aim of achieving rhetorical suggestion, i.e. aspiring to challenge the approval of their readers, critics of Vučić's leadership style inconspicuously switch from a "scientific plane" to colloquial speech.

This kind of discourse is undoubtedly more acceptable than the dull sociological and pseudo-political language and this is reflected in one remark of the actress Bojana Maljević "Vučić is no longer referred to as Aca or Alek, or Prime Minister, but the State. We will see what the State thinks, says, and believes."<sup>6</sup>

Current Prime Minister of the Government of Serbia is being stigmatized on several levels. Not only is he characterized by politically wrong ideas and decisions, but his personal qualities are also problematic.

Reducing the political discourse to incidental psychological intuitions represents the "meeting place" of two, in their core ideological and value-wise antipodes – the conservative Slobodan Antonić and liberally oriented Vesna Pešić, reputable and politically active sociologists. Continuing from the already mentioned Antonić's psychological-political portrayal of Aleksandar Vučić, Vesna Pešić decisively claims, "He (refers to Aleksandar Vučić – *author's comment*) is aware that he does not have the knowledge or talent – except the talent for lying and manipulation."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Vesna Pešić, "Oda radu jednog lezilebovića" [*Ode to the work of one dossier*], *Vreme*, no. 1266

<sup>3</sup> Slobodan Antonić, "Posle Vučića Srbija će biti olupina" [*After Vučić, Serbia will be wreck*], interview with Filip Švarm, *Vreme*, no. 1271, p.15

<sup>4</sup> Idem, p. 15

<sup>5</sup> Idem, p. 16

<sup>6</sup> Bojana Maljević, "Ovde više nije ništa smešno" [*Nothing is funny here anymore*], interview with Aleksandar Đuričić, *Newsweek*, no. 14, p. 34

<sup>7</sup> Vesna Pešić "Oda radu jednog lezilebovića" [*Ode to the work of one dossier*], *Vreme*, no. 1266



Vreme, 14. May 2015.

In order to subject Vučić as a political person to even more ridicule, his political work should be presented as an undoubted ambition to “rule forever.” This motive in the portrayal of Vučić’s personality is the journalistic discovery of the editor of the weekly *Vreme*, Dragoljub Žarković, “Vučić has discovered within himself a talent “a man of all times,” and high popularity and need of the international community to have on the other side of the table someone who is “holding all the reins” are adding wind to his sails. So why shouldn’t he be the Serbian Putin?”<sup>8</sup>

Editor of the daily *Danas* says that Vučić’s government is affiliated with Russian climate, defining in his column Vučić’s rule as “Euro-Stalinism” or “rural Stalinism.” These quantifiers are used by Panović in response to the case of the show *Utišak nedelje* and in response to the debate between the representatives of the government and the Ombudsman Saša Janković, “...entropy in the interior policy section has threatened to compromise the passionate liking of international readers ... the Serbian Prime Minister is on the offensive, flirting with the civil pro-West sector which is convinced that the Prime Minister is behind the two scandals *Utišak nedelje* case and the “Janković” case. After a bit sensationalistic meeting with Janković himself, and NGO representatives, there could be word of a detente ... It would be too much to expect Vučić to abruptly cut off his connections with the tabloids and the right-wingers, but to abandon this phase of “rural Stalinism” (fabricating a domestic enemy in cooperation with the foreign factor) would be good for him and his company.”<sup>9</sup>

The so-called “rural Stalinism,” which rests on the fabrication of the “domestic enemy” which has the flavour of a foreign mercenary, transforms into “Euro-Stalinism” which could, according to Panović’s assumptions, be seen in the debate between the government officials and the Ombudsman Saša Janković, “The regime uses soft Stalinism in doses. We have a strange Euro-Stalinism in which the campaign against Janković does not mean the abatement of the intensity of Brussels amok.”<sup>10</sup>

Each autocratic or arbitrary government is in no way concerned with respect for institutions of the legal and political order. This motive in the criticism of Vučić furthers the previous position on autocratic rule. The position on the process of destroying institutions “which is currently under way” may be seen from the attitude of the sociologist Jovo Bakić, “Underestimating institutions, their destruction, as well as policy based on blackmail are the rule mechanisms of this government and the problems faced by the citizens. One man came into power and is being more and more lost in it.”<sup>11</sup>

8 Dragoljub Žarković, “Godišnjica formalne vladavine Aleksandra Vučića - Najava reza u političko tkivo i želja za dugovečnošću” [Anniversary of the formal rule of Aleksandar Vucic – Announcement of the incision in the political tissue and desire for longevity], *Vreme*, no. 1269, p. 4

9 Zoran Panović, “Šarmiranje građanske Srbije” [Charming the civil Serbia], *Danas, Weekend*, 23.05.2015, p. 3

10 Zoran Panović, “Dozirani staljinizam” [Dozed Stalinism], *Danas, Weekend*, 25.04.2015, p. 3

11 Jovo Bakić, “Vladavina ucenjivačke politike” [Rule of the blackmailing politics] – Zoom in, interview of Filip Švarn with Đorđe Vukadinović, Jovo Bakić and Branislav Bugarski, *Vreme*, no.1272, p. 30

Destruction of institutions is the violation of principles of a division of power which is one of the core principles of liberal-democratic order. This alleged anomaly of functioning of the political-legal order was ascertained by Professor Vukašin Pavlović, “The Parliament has only formal power, and the real power is in the hands of the Government, or more precisely in the hands of the Prime Minister. Pragmatic politics of the populist kind is being implemented, the kind of politics run by Orbán and Erdoğan in Hungary and Turkey.”<sup>12</sup>

Like Bakić, Pavlović also did not give any plausible arguments to support the thesis on the violation of the principles of the division of power. Individual example, i.e. examples, are non-existent in his address, except for the scientifically questionable method of deduction as per analogy, in this case, as suggested by Professor Vukašin Pavlović, by referring to the experience of Turkey and Hungary.

While reflecting on the work of the Government, an attempt to precisely classify its ideology has been made. Ideological characterization of the current Government of Serbia has been put forward by Professor Vladimir Vuletić, PhD, from the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade. Economic savings policy and encouraging the development of the private sector, institutional reforms which are to create the framework for a market economy are not perceived by Vuletić as ideologically innovative in any way. On the contrary, the reform efforts of the Government of Serbia are marked as ideological continuity with a neoliberal ideological paradigm, “... It was clear to me that this Government will go in the direction of what is called a reforming course. However, it must be admitted that this course is actually not reformatory at all, but a continuation of the process which has been ongoing worldwide for a quarter of a century.”<sup>13</sup>

Though it is clear that the economic policies of the Government of Serbia largely rely on the liberal political-economic matrix, Vuletić denies it the substantial liberal character. Accepting the liberal economic paradigm is the product of political pragmatism, and not commitment to the principles of this political and economic ideology, “I do not think that he (refers to PM Vučić – author’s comment) is a liberal or anything else in the strict ideological sense. He recognized which are the key international institutions; he recognized that he will get their support if he behaves this way. In that sense, he is pragmatic rather than an ideological advocate of this or that. He is not a slave to ideology; he is a slave to pragmatism.”<sup>14</sup>

12 Vukašin Pavlović, in the text by Vera Didanović “Ahilova peta demokratije” [*Achilles’ heel of democracy*], *NIN*, no. 3360, p. 18

13 Vladimir Vuletić, “Rob pragmatizma vlada Srbijom” [*Slave to pragmatism*], interview with Jovan Gligorijević, *Vreme*, no. 1268

14 Idem

Still, for Vuletić, the biggest secret of Vučić’s politics is not in the ability to recognize circumstances which rule on an international level and to accept politically and economically desirable paradigms in accordance with them. The secret is somewhere else: on the internal – political plan and it mostly reflects in Vučić’s ability to persuade “the citizens to vote against their own interests.”

Pragmatic, liberal Prime Minister Vučić has his own technology of power, as well as a political organization which enables him to rule effectively.

Technology of power and political organization, more precisely the party led by Aleksandar Vučić, were on the line of fire of the political-intellectual elite. In the spirit of the already quoted statement on the “withering democracy” of the sociologist Vesna Pešić, political analyst and editor of the right-winged site *Nova Srpska Politička Misao* Đorđe Vukadinović identifies Vučić’s technology of power with the Orwellian concept of politics and society. Asked by the journalists, “Upon what does Vučić’s power rest?” he directly and suggestively answers, “On deception, lies and manipulation. Times three. Plus irresponsibility, illusionism, crudeness and lack of scruples. But, it is equally important to emphasize – on the huge disappointment of the ordinary people in what happened after October 5th”<sup>15</sup>

In addition to this, the technology of power rests on the constant production of enemies, “On the permanent production of enemies. Permanent production of enemies, production of crisis, as well as various curtains and models are the key elements of the government which survives. (This is mostly the only production which thrives under this government). There is obviously a certain continuation of the nineties’ politics, only then we had one type of enemies, now we have some other. Today, the enemies are the so called “yellow” and “tycoons,” then there were “foreign mercenaries and domestic traitors,” “*balije*” and “*ustaše*”, as well as the Americans. Americans are now the good guys, and “*ustaše*” and “*balije*” are our partners on the European path. But this need for production of enemies, for painting a scarlet letter on people, for homogenization of the electorate by exposing someone to a public lynch is now satisfied through demonizing and stigmatization of the anyway weak political opposition, unfit tycoons and rare media critics... Essentially, it does not really matter to Vučić to destroy this enemy that is anyway not too big of a threat to him, it is important to crucify him virtually, through the media, he does not need to arrest him, kill him or something similar. The important thing is for the enemy to exist, to be demonized and dehumanized, to be subjected to slander and compromised, and there, in the media, if such outlets can be referred to as media, there the enemy plays its crucial part.”<sup>16</sup>

Implementing of the mentioned technology of power is possible exclusively if the media are under undoubted and complete control of the first man of the Serbian politics. In that respect,

15 Đorđe Vukadinović, “Vladavina laži, obmane i manipulacije” [*Rule by lies, deception and manipulation*], *Vreme*, no. 1265

16 Idem



the editor of *NSPM* puts forward his opinion typical of a large number of public and political figures from the opposing provenance, which is summed up in a colloquial and politically provocative clause “the media are the hammer of the regime.” They implement a kind of “media torture” of their political opponents as per the principle of “virtual elimination.”<sup>17</sup>

When considering Vučić’s profile, critics of his politics have touched upon his political organization and Vučić’s associates in the Government of Serbia. Like the image of the leader, image of the associates is also extremely negative. Therefore, Slobodan Antonić states, “SNS (Serbian Progressive Party) is not just a leading party ... this kind of a party is the result of an entire negative evolution in all leading parties: it picked up the worst from the Serbian Radical Party, Democratic Party and others”<sup>18</sup> Similar negative characterization of Vučić’s associates in the Government, primarily the ministers, is delivered by Professor Danica Popović, PhD, from the Faculty of Economics in Belgrade, “I did not expect a thing from anyone who joined Vučić’s government. All, who joined someone who appointed Aleksandar Vulin as minister, a ceramist for a minister of defence, who gathered around himself a team of plagiarisers and who takes them under his wing when theft of intellectual property is proven, are the same.”<sup>19</sup>

Regardless of the numerous listed characteristics of Vučić’s government by one part of the public, in all public opinion polls, this government stands for a several times more popular government than its competition, and at the same time, in the political sense, for a democratically legitimate.

Legitimization as a reflection of confidence in this government is a bit paradoxical, since the current Serbian government is implementing savings measures, encouraging private initiative, performing efficient collection of the government’s income from companies and citizens, while at the same time, it is implementing European policies on the external plan, accepting the Brussels agreement and actively advocating the overcoming of the negative past with the neighbouring peoples and countries, conducting a policy of reconciliation. Though support to Vučić, SNS and the ruling coalition is undisputable as a whole, there is unequivocal need to minimize and ridicule the support. Challenging of the democratic legitimacy of the government, given the position of the public opinion is the task (self)entrusted to *NSPM* and its editor, Đorđe Vukadinović.

17 Support to the development of the thesis on dictatorship and censorship, as key “evidence” of media censorship, Vukadinović mentions the case of *Utišak nedelje* (Impression of the Week), with the epilogue of an out-of-court settlement between the author of the show and B92, and the continuation of her journalism career in the reputable weekly NIN; insufficient media coverage of the research of *NSPM*. This is a web site and magazine, not a licensed research agency for surveying public opinion. Anyway, *NSPM* is a site and magazine, editor of which is Vukadinović (psychological indicative is speech about oneself in third person – author’s comment); and lack of media coverage of the anecdote on the private meeting of Vučić and sociologist Jovo Bakić, retold by Bakić to one Belgrade-based daily. More details in the text by Đorđe Vukadinović, “Ko je sakrio pištolj koji se puši” [Who hid a smoking barrel], *Vreme*, no. 1275

18 Slobodan Antonić, “Posle Vučića Srbija će biti olupina” [After Vučić, Serbia will be wreck], interview with Filip Švarm, *Vreme*, no. 1271, p. 14

19 Danica Popović, “Vučić nije iskoristio svoju šansu” [Vučić has not used his chance], interview with Milan Đulibrk, *NIN*, no. 3356

Support to the Prime Minister and his Serbian Progressive Party in public opinion polls is constantly high and stable. Among the political figures, Aleksandar Vučić, and among the parties, SNS are confirming their dominance convincingly. The prestigious position on the political scene of Serbia will be confirmed for the leader and this party by Professor Srđan Bogosavljević, PhD, Director of the IPSOS Strategic Marketing IPSOS, “All surveys, not only ours, show superiority of Aleksandar Vučić and SNS. The party has permanently over fifty percent of supporting voters.”<sup>20</sup>

Contrary to research findings and evaluation of Professor Srđan Bogosavljević, PhD, site *NSPM* in its May research published findings according to which support for SNS fell to 42.2%. Findings of *NSPM* are not questionable in themselves. Public opinion polls are “still photography” and it is possible to determine certain deviations, more specifically fluctuations in the level of support. However, if one takes into account the explanation of Đorđe Vukadinović contained in the text published in the weekly *Vreme*, “The wagon is going sideways,” initial bias of the researcher is evident entitling us to doubt that the research of *NSPM* is just one of the “media-political” trump cards in the war with the “dictator” Vučić.

At the start of the text, Vukadinović says, “Yes, rating of SNS has finally started to fall. But don’t rejoice too soon,”<sup>21</sup> casting a shadow on the work of the researcher which should have been to as precisely and objectively as possible and based on statistic indicators explain the current status of politicians and parties as viewed by the public. Instead of this, Vukadinović is, in his statement, implicitly “invoking joy” of the readers, which suggests Vukadinović’s assumption that the readers are expecting a fall of ratings of which he is informing them as the bearer of good news. The conclusion being imposed with reference to the specified text is actually the existence of an unbiased “research” intention of *NSPM* – demise of SNS’s rating. Vukadinović does not stop at his own analysis, but with the aim of promoting the results of the research by *NSPM*, at the same time approximately slurs the work of other researchers. He further says, “Without drastic increase of repression and outside some individual local elections, there is no chance of SNS being able to reach those fifty plus results, to which it is being treated by the ingratiating politically-affiliated researchers.”<sup>22</sup>

The ascertained fall of support for SNS, according to the mentioned researcher, is definite, “Taking all into account, maybe it is important to note that those who are gone are gone for good. In other words, it is hard to imagine the media hocus-pocus which could bring back the disappointed voters to the progressive party.”<sup>23</sup> Voters of SNS, who have irrevocably gone into abstinence or towards different political options, returned already in the June research of *NSPM* and in a not so small percent of 2.8. Unlike the 42.6% of the voters who would have voted for SNS in May, 45 percent of the politically affiliated voters would have voted for SNS in June, as reported by *NSPM*.<sup>24</sup>

20 Srđan Bogosavljević, “Opozicija treba da se menja” [Opposition needs to change], *Novi Magazin*, no. 197

21 Đorđe Vukadinović, “Obrnula kola niza stranu” [Wagon going sideways], *Vreme*, no. 1270, p. 22

22 Idem, p. 22

23 Idem, p. 22

24 <http://rs.n1info.com/a74190/Vesti/Istrazivanje-NSPM-o-standardu-gradjana.html>

In this case, the problem is not that the results of SNS were different according to *NSPM*'s research in May and June; the disputable nature of the findings is contained in the cancellation of the previously stated remark as part of the explanation of the fall of SNS' rating in May, which read "voters are gone for good." The question remains, "How did a group of people who was gone for good, return to the same side of the political spectre within one month?" The answer to this question, which is inherently prompted, keeping in mind the previously made claims, has not been provided by the political analyst Đorđe Vukadinović. The very phrase "fatal" drop of rating of SNS reveals the hidden agenda of the researcher: questioning of the status of the strongest party in government and its first man, challenging the legitimacy, showing the fall of the support, simply "treating" the despised Vučić's regime to yet another bad piece of news, contributing to the construction of the negative image of the government by pointing to the loss of confidence among the voters.

Finally, it should be noted that the construction of the negative image of the government is not something related to different scientific or intuitive insights of individuals. It aims to incite the specific form, in this case, joint opposing political action. Moreover, in the largest number of cases, each position or collection of positions does not have an informative dimension, but is a call for political action and this goes hand in hand with clear and unambiguous preference. Unity of insights and political action is summed up by several advocates of the so called critical discourse. Caricaturist Dušan Petričić, who regularly publishes his caricatures in *Politika*, the daily paper owned by the state, says, "it seems that one shouldn't draw quite reduced messages like "This government is destroying you," or "Free yourselves of stupidity and ignorance as soon as possible" for this crippled people. Those two sentences should be written clearly, with artistic prominence, broadcasted daily so that the people remember and realize that not believing your own eyes, but his words, leads nowhere."<sup>25</sup> Bojana Maljević, the actress, loudly says, "We must react to this autocracy that has befallen us. It is important to move beyond the social media, to go out, that is why I attended the rally of DS (Democratic Party). Just to support gathering in the streets."<sup>26</sup> Finally, Slobodan Antonić shapes the call for unity in action with the aim of taking down the "despised regime," "In order to form an efficient opposition, it is extremely important to achieve some sort of consensus or agreement about the basic values opposite of Vučić. First among such values are democracy and democratic institutions: we can disagree about foreign policy or democratic integrations, but our most important interest is to have discussion in democratic institutions. Second value is our state and national interest – if this exists, then cooperation can be established around other things in order to form an alternative to the regime."<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Dušan Petričić, "Vlast nam je pojela čitav vek" [*The government has eaten a whole century of ours*], interview with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3360, p. 14

<sup>26</sup> Bojana Maljević, "Ovde više nije ništa smešno" [*Nothing is funny here anymore*], interview with Aleksandar Đuričić, *Newsweek*, no. 14, p. 30, 32

<sup>27</sup> Slobodan Antonić, "Posle Vučića Srbija će biti olupina" [*After Vučić, Serbia will be wreck*], interview with Filip Švarm, *Vreme*, no. 1271, p.17.



Politika, 31. May 2015.

An epilogue of the alleged enlightened discourse criticizing the government culminated in the call for engagement, specifically in daily politics. Critical public becomes an active component of the daily politics, and not a participant who challenges and opens political and wider topics and dilemmas with its authority of knowledge in the public sphere. Social, political and other problems in the spirit and letter of the democratic Constitution are to be resolved by the competent institutions of the system and the democratically elected representatives, while public figures are free, equal and rational participants in the public debate, and certainly not the moral and political judges fascinated with their own historic-political and cultural mission.

As in the previous issue of the Mediameter, an undoubted and relevant overlapping of the positions of the advocates of the critical discourse and representatives of the official opposition is evident.

During his visit to Sofia and participation at the Conference on West Balkans organized by the Association of European Socialists, leader of the Democratic Party Bojan Pajtić said, "Serbia is ruled by fear, because the government absolutely does not tolerate any kind of criticism, regardless whether it is coming from the press, opposition or independent institutions."<sup>28</sup>

Similarly, Pajtić states, "because during the three-year of his (referring to Aleksandar Vučić, Prime Minister of Serbia, author's comment) reign Serbia has been economically impoverished, all people live worse today than they did three years ago. The government is irresponsible, arrogant; freedom of the media has been shut down."<sup>29</sup>

The Democratic Party, more specifically its heads, is making all efforts to dispute the democratic legitimacy of the current government. So, the President of DS, probably inspired by the research of NSPM in May, stated, "Research speaks of a serious fall of confidence for the regime which keeps releasing untruth after untruth." In order to strengthen the power of his claim, Pajtić again emphasizes research, "Research shows the fall of the ruling party, and therefore the accelerated restoration of confidence in DS, which is anyway the only political organization which can beat SNS."<sup>30</sup> Still, DS is not bothered by the majority which SNS has in public opinion polls, but the presence of SNS in system institutions is problematic for them, despite the fact that DS recognized the results of the elections in 2014. In that context, Dragoljub Mićunović, President of the Political Council of DS, claims, "we are dealing with highhandedness, recklessness and belief in the dialectic principle that all quantity must turn into quality and that a mass of 150 MPs is quality in itself. Unfortunately, quantity itself does not do anything; it only increases arrogance and aggressiveness. That guy in North Korea also has 99.9 percent of support, is that a reputable country?"<sup>31</sup>

28 Bojan Pajtić, "Srbijom vlada strah" [Serbia is ruled by fear], *Danas*, 12.05.2015, p. 4

29 Bojan Pajtić, "Koalicija sa Vučićem ne dolazi u obzir" [Coalition with Vučić is out of the question], *Danas*, 14. 04. 2016, p. 2

30 Bojan Pajtić, "Rado bih video Sašu Jankovića u DS" [I'd like to see Sasa Jankovic in DS], *Danas*, 23. 05. 2015, p. 3

31 Dragoljub Mićunović, "Ova vlast privatizuje državu" [This government is privatizing the state], interview with Ranko Pivljanin, *Blic*, 03. 05. 2015, p. 2

The forever rhetorical plot which rests on the equalization of Serbia and North Korea seems to point to one specific characteristic of Mićunović's media-political performance. It is the ease of turning general positions from political theory into catchy propaganda messages. Demonstration of this pseudo-enlightening gesture may be observed in the evaluation of the structure and manner of functioning of the government, "The aim is to privatize the country and to subject all institutions to your own will. Montesquieu noticed a long time ago that government always strives to narrow down, this is hunger for power. But there is a dangerous boundary, when the ruler starts to think he is the state. No one is the state, the people are the state. Solon's laws, 2600 years ago, read that anyone, who tries to implement autocracy and is trying to cancel equality of the citizens and claims that he is the state, must be banished from the state... In the political vocabulary of our leaders the pronoun "I" is used the most, seldom "we," this discloses autocratic ambitions "I am not giving them money, I take responsibility, I said..." Who needs a state in which all the decisions are made by one head?"<sup>32</sup>

Head of the MP Club of DS in the Parliament of Serbia and the announced and ill-fated leader of the Serbian Syriza, Borislav Stefanović, gave his impression of the current government in the weekly *Vreme*. His message is semantically and rhetorically symmetric with both the positions of his party colleagues, and numerous standpoints of the members of the politically active intelligence. In the evaluation of the current government, Stefanović reiterated the already well-known standpoints, "what this government definitely destroyed are economic and social prospects, economic substance of this country is finished off, the government is autocratic, controls most of the media, calls the people who do not share their views horrible names, slurs them through the tabloids, persecutes and arrests, and now it even has bullies. This government is extinguishing the independence of institutions and the judicial system, it dared to trample over the institution of the ombudsman, and therefore this government and Aleksandar Vučić are the creators of one sophisticated autocratic model based on making empty promises and the rule of one man who is in charge of absolutely everything. He implements personal and state government."<sup>33</sup>

Finally, in order to fully understand the plot surrounding the critical and propaganda-like discourse outlined here, one should observe that it is extremely goal-oriented. It might be said that among other things its role is to "awaken" interest in politics in the layer of the electorate which punished the Democratic Party and other winners of October 5<sup>th</sup>. This is the middle class, economically richer, i.e. better educated and more IT literate part of the population. As research of NSPM published in March stated, this population is passive and uninterested to take part in the political process.<sup>34</sup> Precisely because of the demographic,

32 Idem, p. 3

33 Borislav Stefanović, "Beda i siromaštvo su okovali Srbiju" [Serbia in the chains of destitution and poverty], interview with Ivan Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, no. 1273

34 See text "Obrnula kola niza stranu" [The wagon going sideways], *Vreme*, no. 1270, p. 24-25.

social and value preferences of this segment of the voters, the critical discourse is full of elements of political-educational rhetoric shaped in narratives on censorship, dictatorship, autocracy, and demise of institutions and similar.

## Image of the opposition in the media – deficit of confidence from the public, mortgage of failure, scarce level of political-value innovation, fragmented and without new leaders

Unlike the current government which is very present in newspaper columns in the daily and weekly papers, the media write about the opposition occasionally and sporadically, excluding the daily *Informer*. There are many reasons for such a status of the opposition. Among them, two seem to be the most important. Firstly, real influence of the opposition on the dynamics and outcomes of the political processes in the country is very limited. The government has a convincing majority both in Parliament and in public opinion. Then, the biggest number, i.e. nearly all weeklies, are to a certain extent critical of the government. Their topic orientation is such that analysis of the opposition in the commentaries and editorials is more or less reduced to some general, mostly critical remarks. At the same time, their orientation towards the criticism of the government in itself leaves little space for the critical analysis of the period in which the opposition ruled. Construction of the negative image of the opposition is reflected through the blend of evaluation of its activities and analysis of the presumed circumstances which would open some timely prospect in which it would be established as a political actor which may be an equal contender with the current ruling coalition.

Strong critical charge towards the current opposition is present in a large number of editorials published in *Informer* in the period April – June 2015. These are primarily columns of the Editor and Chief Dragan J. Vučićević who disputes in a moral and political sense the actors on the opposition stage, at the same time criticising the opposition media and non-government organizations, with a nearly unavoidable reflection on the period of rule of the winners of October 5<sup>th</sup>. Basic thesis could be summed in the following three interconnected moments which define the approach of this author: 1) current opposition has no moral credibility (due to highly corrupt political class which it is made of) nor political capacity to lead a country due to the failure of transition in Serbia 2) in opposition-affiliated media, and among the print media this means most of them, the current Government is being attacked without a serious rational explanation and with the exclusive aim of overturning them as soon as possible 3) the media which support the current opposition undoubtedly discriminate all those who are not direct opponents of Vučić's government.

Vučićević's criticism of the Serbian opposition scene is equally directed towards opposition as a component of the political life, but also the media that are extremely critical towards the government. A typical text which describes the approach of this author is "Goebbels and little goebbels cry about censorship in order to hide the thieves," *Informer*, April 4<sup>th</sup>, 2015.

Attitude towards the previous government and one print and one electronic media is formulated by Vučićević in an extremely negative way, using strong and for some groups of readers extremely suggestive vocabulary. Vocabulary of this author is such that it demystifies, shocks, and causes outrage in readers. It is a style of writing which is quite direct, stripped of any hint of intellectualism, often intertwined with provocative, insulting and inappropriate expressions.

His criticism is always based on the *ad hominem* principle, strictly personalized, in order to be more convincing. This is why a person is stigmatized and its moral and psychological profile is outlined, making that person in the eyes of the readers unworthy of any function in the public life. An example of such an approach of this columnist is visible in the writing about one high-ranking official of the opposing Democratic Party, Dragan Šutanovac. Vučićević writes "How did Šule (refers to Dragan Šutanovac, high-ranking official of DS – author's comment), who started his career as a bouncer at a discotheque paid 20 Deutsch marks a night, get a hold of the pasture on Vračar (refers to the spacious flat of this official in the elite part of Belgrade – author's comment), Louis Vuitton shoes and the biggest collection of luxurious watches in the region? Does this wealth worthy of a prince have anything to do with the robbed Serbia and the completely humiliated military?"<sup>35</sup>

An entire outpour of epithets and moralistic viewpoints has not been written by chance. This is propaganda aimed primarily at inciting the indignation or initiating active opposing to a certain political group (the winners of October 5<sup>th</sup>, primarily DS, the once influential URS, LDP), as well as certain media actors, who have been presenting themselves as Euro-reformatory for a decade, "While the different-Serbia troopers, having been heavily greased by the tycoons and dirty cash from Brussels, cry out about censorship and point their finger at Aleksandar the Terrible, the Belgrade-based media organize nearly daily fascistic-like witch-hunts of the people from the top of the government. They have only one goal: to convince the Serbs that there are no bigger thieves than the ones running our country."<sup>36</sup> "The aim of the campaign is to protect the riches of some heads of DS acquired during transition, by applying a series of accusations against the government. In the focus of the anti-government papers is not the question of moral credibility of the previous political set, nor the research whether and how much it got rich, nor why and how the project of transition from 2000 to 2012 failed, but there is only the desire to attack the current government."<sup>37</sup> This is why Vučićević insists on the absence of moral credibility of today's opposition by articulating the anger of one certain layer of the population. "Yellow thieves, corrupt bastards, who, to quote Tadić, got indecently rich while we were being systematically robbed, are not a topic for them. They are a protected species."<sup>38</sup>

35 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Gebelsi i gebelsičići dreče o cenzuri da bi sakrili lopove" [*Goebbels and little goebbels crying out censorship in order to hide the thieves*], *Informer*, 4. 04. 2015, p. 5

36 Idem, p. 5

37 Idem, p. 5

38 Idem, p. 5



In such writing of the certain number of media, as the author dramatically suggests, is a “desperate fight for survival” of the opposing political circles. Such a strong distance from a certain part of the political scene, specifically the opposing and the Euro-reforming one, is based on the pessimistic perception of the performance of the winners of October 5<sup>th</sup> in the implementing of transition. Starting pessimistic assumption of Vučićević’s critical reception of the current opposition may be read from the following lines in which he speaks about the present opposition, i.e. previous government, and the media affiliated with them, “Accomplices in the DOS-like crime, people who tailored our country to the likings of the mafia, hypocrites hidden behind the EU mantra that Serbia can be successfully transformed in the Columbia of the Balkans, thieves who got rich on the most brutal robbery of the people.”<sup>39</sup>

Vučićević does not accuse just the teaming up of the former government and the media, but separately confronts the media that are critical of the government. His goal is to prove bias in the reporting on each activity of the Prime Minister and the Government of Serbia.

So, in one of the numerous columns, the subject of Vučićević’s criticism was the reporting on the visit of the Prime Minister Vučić to America, during which the announced meeting with the Vice-President of the United States Joseph Biden did not take place, but an array of important contacts with influential persons from the political life was established, “We are world champions at spitting up, we are unbeatable at finding flaws and humiliating ourselves. All can happen, but never and by no means must Serbia succeed at something or can the Serbian government do something good. On duty Serbian media and political big dogs found a thousand faults with Vučić in America. They say he did not meet Biden. And the man literally lost his son a day after the visit. They are whining; he met John McCain who is an “Albanian lobbyist.” And what was, I beg your pardon, Vučić supposed to do? To spit on McCain and place one across his cheek?”<sup>40</sup>

Scepticism in the Euro-Reforming media towards Vučić’s visit to Ameirca is shared by the Pro-Russian oriented newspapers as well as one part of the critical public. Vučićević also categorizes them in the group of those who only and exclusively want to develop the negative image of the current government and its first man, “In order to make it a complete event, *DOS-like* haters, growing more and more passionate troopers of the yellow sector, are being amply helped sideways by the so called Russian Serbs. They, of course, claim that First Deputy Prime Minister Vučić betrayed “mummy Russia” because he dared to even talk with the Americans about alternative routes for the gas line.”<sup>41</sup> Journalism designed like this is reduced to, this columnist would say, “clean and naked” hatred.

39 Dragan J. Vučićević, “Žuta pobeda” [*Yellow victory*], *Informer*, 16. 05. 2015, p. 5

40 Dragan J. Vučićević, “Mržnja radi mržnje” [*Hatred for hatred's sake*], *Informer*, 6. 06. 2015, p. 5

41 Idem, p. 5

In order to understand the media political scene in Serbia, writing of the Editor and Chief of *Informer* is relevant for several interconnected reasons. Firstly, the style of writing and content of the message derived from his texts are such that they keep the interest in politics among the less educated class, which at the same time buys and reads tabloids in large numbers and are on top of that the loyal voters in the election process. Secondly, *Informer* is very important for the current government because on weekly basis, day in and day out, it deals with the questioning of negative positions and media-political images which are being created about the government and continuously reproduced by the critical media. Finally, *Informer* is the leader in the area of daily press in creating a negative-tone image of the current opposition as a political actor.

Apart from the negative tone of the image of the opposition, and which is continuously most devotedly articulated by the daily *Informer*, the negative image of the opposition is formed by the writing in the dailies and weeklies which deal with the possibility of its strengthening. These are texts in which the value component and ideology is on the backburner, while the focus is on the analysis of the facts and consideration of different options how and in what way the opposition may be a credible contender in the fight with the according to public dominant SNS and Aleksandar Vučić. In this type of analysis, shortage of credibility is practically ascertained, along with wrong daily political orientation, inability to articulate and purposefully use its own potential, as well as lack of program innovations in the sense of new personnel who would motivate the voters.

Texts dedicated to this topic usually start with statements related to the present state of the opposition. Typical evaluation of the state of opposition is summed up in the assessment of the sociologist Slobodan Antonić, “We have a wasteland of political parties. If one big party like the Democratic Party went through degradation, then it is clear what the situation of others is. When it comes to forming an opposition to Vučić’s regime, they should, in my opinion, start at the beginning. Unfortunately, the majority of the existing party structures can be included in this only partially, not as a whole.”<sup>42</sup> Direct explanation why one part of the existing party structures in opposition is unusable was offered by the opposition-affiliated sociologist Jovo Bakić, “We have big patrons who are building their client networks within their parties. Dragan Šutanovac and Balša Božović are classic examples of the people who have a negative reputation in the public, whenever they appear, the party is at a loss, but they have very strong positions within the party. Based on this, no one can move them from their party functions and this is the problem of DS, and it’s not the only one.”<sup>43</sup>

The problem of personnel in the opposition parties is not irrelevant at all, especially if one takes into account the famous remark by Stalin on the political life, which states that “people are everything in politics.” Personnel, especially the managerial ones, make decisions; set the course of action, but also influence different social groups, whose support is necessary for the success of the political actions of one party. Wrong daily political orientation of

42 Slobodan Antonić, “Posle Vučića Srbija će biti olupina” [*After Vučić Serbia will be a wreck*] *Vreme*, no. 1271, p. 17

43 Jovo Bakić, “Vladavina ucenjivačke politike” [*Rule of blackmailing politics*], *Vreme*, no. 1272, p. 35

opposition parties reflects in the insisting on premature elections. This tactical mistake is noted by Dragoljub Žarković, “Opposition embodied in the parties is wandering around and finding it hard to manage in space and time. Part of it is still wooing Vučić, hoping to gain something in the next reconstruction of the Government, and others “like the braver ones,” mention some elections though they themselves realise that they are prepping the ball for Vučić’s volley. They do this ritually because someone told them that opposition must ask for elections, but they failed to mention that this leads directly to defeat.”<sup>44</sup>

Wandering, as Žarković states, is manifested in the making wrong demands from the government. Also, daily political lack of orientation is accompanied by the inability of the current leaders to produce wider mobilization of the electorate, more specifically to popularize the opposing political standpoint.

This weak opposition was visible during the organization of the rally in Belgrade, on April 25<sup>th</sup>, 2015. Commentary of the daily *Danas*, under the title “Light up the opposition” speaks about the weakness of the opposition. Perhaps the message of the rally, that the government should go, would have been stronger if there were more participants in the rally, if the gathering was addressed by people with a more famous name and last name, actors, journalists, TV hosts, intellectuals, who also oppose the government, but are not party affiliated. Petrović, Živković, Pajić cannot warm up the crowd on their own, they cannot send a message that the government must leave because they themselves were or are the government, and most citizens do not want to identify with them and share their views. Their time has passed, and few people believe in their honesty.”<sup>45</sup>

During April and May 2015, one of the most often mentioned and discussed topics was the possibility of forming a left-winged movement similar to the Greek Syriza. Head of the DS MP club in Parliament of Serbia, Borislav Stefanović, was supposed to lead this movement. Stefanović explained his need to form a party by the need for ideological innovation on the political scene and opening up space for new people who will stand up to the current government, “There is a strong illusion that by making some new DOS, results will be achieved. They won’t. No one wants to watch recycled personnel or even worse recycled politics...The second problem is that today’s opposing parties have largely become the guardians of their own past. And as such they have not been able to make a wider step forward. New party is, for example, the guardian of the heritage of Zoran Živković and operation Saber, DS is the keeper of the heritage of the previous government and Zoran Đinđić; SDS of Boris Tadić is an absolute example of the keeper of the heritage of Boris Tadić. Such policies are justification of what we were doing confronted with the accusations of SNS.”<sup>46</sup>

44 Dragoljub Žarković “Srbija kao veliko Pasjane-Broj obmana raste sa Vučićevom potrebom da očuva rejting i kako nisam otišao u *Tešku reč*” [Serbia as big Pasjane – Number of deceits rising with Vučić’s need to preserve ratings and how I did not go to the TV show *Teška reč*], *Vreme*, no. 1273, p. 5

45 “Osvetli opoziciju” [Light up the opposition], *Danas*, 28. 04. 2015, p. 11

46 Borislav Stefanović “Beda i siromaštvo su okovali Srbiju” [Serbia in the chains of destitution and poverty], interview with Ivan Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, no. 1273

Information on the new Serbian left-wing headed by a DS official incited stories about a new tear within the Democratic Party, but at the same time it also started the story about the possibility of making a left-oriented alternative to Vučić’s government which would at the same time be modern, European, critical towards the savings policy and open for membership of Serbia in the EU. Apart from the criticism of liberal capitalism, recognizable left-winged discourse about a bright future, idea of progressive taxation, increased role of the state in the economy and expectations for the state to secure a large number of benefits for the citizens and in that way correct radical social inequality generated by the failed transition, program of the new left-winged party would include an anti-NATO position. Anti-NATO position of Stefanović’s political option was harshly criticized by the columnist of *Vreme* Teofil Pančić, claiming that it is preventing Serbia from joining the civilized West, at the same time depicting it as politically detrimental Serbian context. This is, according to Pančić, a trendy hipster-like left-winged boasting which has no particular political innovativeness because like capitalism it does not carry the halo of the rebellion political idea and it is not popular in the intellectual and political circles, “NATO, (surprise, surprise) is the same as capitalism: it is just not charming, popular, sexy, most accurately it is not cool. In democratic countries, “all that care about themselves” (so, hipster-idle casts of all types) are against NATO, and more or less against capitalism as well.”<sup>47</sup>

Without new leaders and ideas, with a noticeable deficit of capacity for mobilization of the unhappy voters, fatally fragmented, always afraid of internal discord, possessed by leaders who distance themselves from one another, but are all individually encumbered by their political responsibility for the failed transition from 2000-2015, opposition Euro-reforming block is depicted negatively in the print media. The “right-wing” opposition does not have a better reputation in the media either. It is made of numerous small and not particularly influential parties in the eyes of the public; it is short of a leader with a media and real influence.

Realistic view of the right political stage, based on current facts, is evident in the text “To the right, square out” of the reporter Jelka Jovanović from *Novi Magazin*, 4.06.2015, “If we stick to those who are visible in the public opinion polls, most often qualified as extreme, one may speak of the potential of the right, as defined by Srđan Bogosavljević from Strategic Marketing. Translation: about a million voters could be gathered by one strong right party if such was to exist and it would be a major factor. In order to be successful, the right option is lacking consolidation, or a leader which can round them up, and he is obviously not available today.”<sup>48</sup>

47 Teofil Pančić, “Borko, Jovo i zamlaćivanje pod kišobranom” [Borko, Jovo and idling away under the umbrella], *Vreme*, no. 1273

48 Jelka Jovanović, “Udesno razbrojs” [To the right, square out], *Novi Magazin*, no. 214, p. 20

Perhaps in a complex tension between potential and inability of its realization, opportunity and powerlessness to use it is the basic matrix for forming a negative image of the opposition as the political actor. This image is primarily negative in value, but founded on insight into a live and complex experience of the political life, i.e. its relevant plots and potential outcomes.

Images of political actors in the print media are prominently negative, dynamically and intensely formed. They involve co-effect of different media contents: from written word, to photography and caricature. It may be said that there is justified scepticism that the effects of such formed images may encourage the wider classes of citizens to engage in politics, precisely bearing in mind the meaning and sense of the message sent out about the actors of the political life. Negative message is seldom stimulating, it, on the contrary, usually makes political entities passive or fortifies their already existing beliefs. Furthermore, participation of citizens in the political process cannot be expected to go up if it is constantly insisted on negative messages and fortification of negative images of political actors. Also, the space for rational public debate is always and everywhere closed and maximally narrowed since the political and wider social debate is understood according to the principle of "precast roles." In line with the principle of "cast roles" pro-Government or anti-Government media never miss out on the opportunity to mark a certain actor extremely negatively or extremely positively. Model of cast roles cancels the space for openness towards facts, their free classification and a plausible and rational interpretation as much as possible. This model concludes in advance, makes value judgements and almost always, as if by rule of thumb, politically condemns.

The outcome of the value-political matrix based on the principle of cast roles is public space governed by overall relativization and absence of any accord on the aim, with the absence of rational parameters for evaluation and assessment of public policies in different social spheres.

## Case of Saša Janković – relationship between the state and independent institutions in editorial columns and weeklies

The dispute between the Ombudsman Saša Janković and certain state officials was during April 2015 among the top political-media topics. As one of the central topics, it included an entire myriad of political actors (the government, opposition, non-government sector, international institutions, OSCE and EU), significantly polarizing the public, at the same time confirming that Serbia, in the media-political sense, is constantly in the state of political campaigning, which is sprawling with accusations and counter-accusations. Apart from the political debate, the "Janković" case incited debate among some media as well. Some of them have openly taken a stand "for" and "against" Janković, i.e. "for" and "against" the government.

Like numerous intensely and comprehensively covered topics, the Janković case remained without a clear political-legal epilogue. Janković engaged in an open conflict with the top of the government, but he also continued to perform the function of ombudsman, while allegations about the violation of procedures of the Ministry of Interior and the Military Security Agency and the Ministers of Defence and Interior remained in the domain of decision-making by the competent authorities. Saša Janković himself remained outside the daily politics, and his debate with the top of the government was used as one of the central places for developing political propaganda narratives on "autocracy and collapsed institutions" orchestrated by Aleksandar Vučić. On the other hand, one Belgrade-based daily (*Informer*) continued to insist on the "Gun" scandal, deeming it unfinished.

The "Janković" case was found in the epicentre of the media-political attention after the report which the Ombudsman filed after the unpleasant events at last-year's Pride Parade on September 28<sup>th</sup>, 2014. After members of the Gendarmerie of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia used excessive force and inflicted serious physical injuries on Andrej Vučić, brother of the PM of the Government of Serbia, and Predrag Mali, brother of the Mayor of Belgrade Siniša Mali, the Ombudsman Saša Janković composed a report specifying the irregularities in the operating of the government bodies with detailed description of the incident.

Apart from the listing of numerous legal irregularities in the conduct of government bodies, Janković also insists in the report on responsibility for omissions, i.e. not upholding the procedures of the Ministry of Interior and Military Security Agency, with responsibility of the responsible ministers: Minister of Interior, Nebojša Stefanović, and Minister of Defence, Bratislav Gašić. Additionally, the Ombudsman Saša Janković publically stated in one media release that the Minister of Defence Bratislav Gašić prevented him from obtaining documents relevant for the case of investigating the regularities of the Military Security Agency, by not allowing him to be in the building of this security agency.<sup>49</sup>

The debate between Janković and military and the police heads has become one of the everyday newspaper stories, which gets its detailed development in the texts and interviews in the Belgrade-based weeklies.

The media aspect of the "Janković" case picks up on intensity and gets daily political contextualization on April 19<sup>th</sup>, 2015, when the daily *Informer* initiated the "Gun" scandal as the basis for re-examining the credibility of Saša Janković for performing the prominent legal function in the state. This was the death (death of Predrag Gojković, roommate and friend of Saša Janković), which occurred in the Ombudsman's flat in 1993. According to *Informer's* writing, this was a death which occurred as a result of use of a fire weapon (a

49 Set of objections at the expense of the competent state bodies which were listed in the report of Saša Janković based on this case is summed up in the text of Nebojša Pešić, "Zakon kršili žadarmi, VBA i Gašić" [Law was broken by the Gendarmerie, Military Security Agency and Gašić], *Novi Magazine*, no. 216, p. 10-16





NIN, 14. May 2015.

gun) for which it is claimed that Saša Janković did not have a license. Also, as this daily writes, traces of chemical substances found in gun powder were discovered on the hands of Saša Janković. Officially, the death of Predrag Gojković was qualified by the authorities (the police and the justice system) as a suicide, but the Gojković family continued to doubt the official version. Doubt of the family became the topic not only of a certain type of media, but also caused additional statements by the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia, which was unable to reopen the investigation due to statute of limitations. Still, the doubt of the Gojković family was presented as an extremely strong political-media trump card in disputing the credibility of Saša Janković as well as the dispute of the professionalism of the media which unconditionally sided with Janković in the dispute with the state.

Unconditional defence of Janković as a media-political concept of one, majority part of the print media, and undermining of Saša Janković's credibility were the two media-political strategies which dominated this case. Both functioned under the principle of cast roles. Pursuant to immanent propaganda matrix of their functioning, both matrixes assigned excessive daily political meaning. Circumstances which "sparked up" during the case "Janković" support the specified assessment. Namely, by monitoring print and other media, one may observe at least three circumstances which undoubtedly have political meaning and are related to the "Janković" case: 1) the Ombudsman, though strictly legally and factually speaking a non-partisan person, became the topic of public opinion polls<sup>50</sup>, though prior to spring 2015, his individual rating was never a topic for public opinion researchers; 2) the Ombudsman, as *in strict sensu*, non-partisan person, was invited by the leader of the Democratic Party to join it<sup>51</sup> (there were speculations about his presidential campaign in 2017) 3) on account of the "Gun" scandal, Janković was invited by certain media to hand in his resignation, though strictly speaking, the ruling majority never initiated this debate and the procedure for dismissal neither in the public nor in Parliament. To sum up, the presence of many elements of daily politics may be ascertained - research of ratings, possible candidacy, invitation to join one of the most influential opposition parties up to the invitation to resign due to (an alleged) problematic biography which disqualifies Janković as an Ombudsman.

In the complete daily political chaos which was created and maintained by certain media, the topic of control of the legality of the work of institutions, the debate on the presence or lack of relevant evidence, as well as whether abuse in the work of institutions occurred and in what extent were left completely out of focus. Expanding the horizons of the debate referring to the "Janković" case was a deliberate act of political actors and one more case in point that the current media-political and broader spiritual climate produces an excessive doze of intellectual, moral and political relativism in the public-political domain.

50 <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/553454/OTKRIVAMO-Sta-stoji-iza-kampanje-protiv-ombudsmena-Vlast-se-plasi-rejtinga-Sase-Jankovica>

51 More on [www.danas.rs/danasrs/Politika/bojan\\_pajtic\\_rado\\_bih\\_video\\_sasa\\_jankovica\\_u\\_ds\\_56.html?news\\_id=3021](http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/Politika/bojan_pajtic_rado_bih_video_sasa_jankovica_u_ds_56.html?news_id=3021)

Several quotes support the fact that the media coverage of the Janković topic moved within the coordinates of critical discourse aimed primarily at constructing a negative image of the government.

Registry of terms and vocabulary in the assessment of the status of the Ombudsman Janković does not deviate from the usual discursive-rhetorical concept used when criticising the government. At the same time, strategy of moral and political destruction of credibility is activated, serving as useful means in the media-political debate.

Both media matrixes construct negative images of its opponents in the dispute and both award them extremely negative roles in the development and the epilogue of the story (in this case the dispute between the state and the Ombudsman – *author's comment*) which gets detailed development in the media political field. The effect of applying the mentioned media matrixes are scandals without a clear epilogue and confused and in many aspects baffled public, which remains denied a sensible answer to an important and controversial question through the numerous facts, constructions, misused metaphors, superficial analogies and propaganda tricks. The spirit of daily politicization induces a chaotic perception of the case, which most often as if following a rule of thumb, ends up in an ample of contradictory interpretations which are mutually exclusive.

In the “Janković” case, political propaganda was again used, terms like “dictatorship”, “collapse of institutions”, which were combined with a series of political-moral attributes which encourage the impression of dramatics of the situation. The “Janković” case quickly and easily slipped from the strictly institutional and legal onto the plane of a media “war” and daily politics. Use of harsh words with strong, primarily in the political sense, negative-value terms, is one of the main, if not the main, characteristic of the dynamic political-media debate which has been and still is ongoing, when it comes to issues between the state and the Ombudsman. Terms like “dozed Stalinism,” “Euro-Stalinism,” phrases such as “collapse of the entire system of security” and similar ones were to make the whole thing more dramatic, and to attach a stigma to one of the disputing parties causing a feeling of indignation with certain, at this time, politically passive part of the public.

The signature of the confusing daily political contextualization of the “Janković” case may be seen in the following column of the editor of the paper *Danas*, Zoran Panović, “If the Ombudsman Saša Janković was guilty, how could he pass the security checks of the regime? If he did pass, how can he be guilty? ... I spoke to one member of the Gojković family yesterday and he told me that the family was only asking for one thing – **the truth!** This is why, he adds, Serbia must not put paid to this case. Maybe this is, politically speaking, a demonstration of the short sightedness of the regime of Aleksandar Vučić, shorter than the episode with the TV show *Utišak nedelje*. The synchronized political-security-media campaign (chase) against the ombudsman is not the only contact of our reality with Stalinism in European robes. In technique and ideology. The regime uses soft Stalinism in dozes... We have here a strange Euro-Stalinism in which the campaign against Janković

does not mean the abatement of the intensity of the Brussels amok.”<sup>52</sup>

In a largely activist-like spirit, the quoted columnist continues, “Stalinist nuances of our European path indicate the “rococo” dimension. This is a style of tamed baroque (tamed by radicalism) with gentler lines, lighter colours and less offensive decorations (rusty spoons). Ornament becomes organic, light and airy, the pastel technique is used often, and child-like spirit of fun is prevalent. This is said by those smarter than us. Ours is only to recognize ourselves. And to recognize them.”<sup>53</sup>

After the blend of political-propaganda aesthetics, which puts forward certain reference to art in the conclusion and a call to opposition social gathering, which is, according to the testimony of our historic experience, “usual practice in an era of Stalinism” (comment DVS), criticizing of the government gets “apocalyptic” tones. Namely, raising of questions of credibility of Saša Janković prompted the journalist of the paper *NIN*, Sandra Petrušić, to ascertain that this is a collapse of all security services in the country, “In just a few days, all institutions in the country have collapsed in a chain crash and not only the ones which were marched on (primarily the institution of ombudsman, and then other independent control bodies) but also the police, prosecution, justice, in order to finally cast doubt on the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) and Military Security Agency (VBA). The Government simply assessed that none of them was doing their job appropriately because all of them missed out on the chance to prove that Saša Janković was practically a murderer and member of Arkan’s clan”<sup>54</sup>

On the other pole of the political-media scene, negative image of Saša Janković, as the holder of an important state function, was constructed. Cause for this venture was the alleged “Gun” scandal initiated by the daily *Informer*. The construction of the negative image cannot be attributed exclusively to the figment of journalistic imagination and ideological blindness, since this had been preceded by a letter of the family of Predrag Gojković who tragically died in the flat of Saša Janković in 1993. In their public address, the Gojković family demands the truth on the death of their son, at the same time, asking an array of questions, which directly or indirectly, might be relevant for the investigation. Since Saša Janković was marked by a large number of print media as a true fighter for democracy, freedom and justice at the time of publishing this letter, the letter of the Gojković family had a more than limited echo and it was reduced to a publication in merely a few daily papers.

In his efforts to essentially portray as problematic the privileged position of Saša Janković for a majority of the public, the Editor and Chief of the paper *Informer*, Dragan J. Vučićević, asks a suggestive question, “Please, close your eyes. And imagine this: last Monday patriotische zeitung *Blic* exclusively reveals that in 1993, in the flat of Aleksandar Vučić,

52 Zoran Panović, “Dozirani staljinizam” [*Dozed Stalinism*], *Danas, Weekend*, 25. 04. 2015, p. 3

53 Idem, p. 4

54 Sandra Petrušić, “Država ne veruje službama bezbednosti” [*The state does not trust its security agencies*], *NIN*, no. 3357, p. 22

Vučić's friend was killed from Vučić's gun for which Vučić did not have a license. And then after a day or two, it was discovered that Vučić had traces of gun powder on his hands immediately after the "suicide," and that the friend "shot" himself from a distance of more than half a meter from above, from left to right, with his right hand, which was found in the jeans' pocket of the man who committed suicide...And then it turns out that Vučić's dad brought to his son on the day of the tragedy a license for the gun which was issued 24 hours prior to the "suicide." I ask you, wouldn't the media, from the Public Service to the last "evil" tabloid," be covering this topic? All the media would be writing and talking about this. Vučić would, without a doubt be forced to resign, and he would probably be brought in for questioning with police escort. I agree. That's exactly what would happen...How is it possible that nearly all media in Belgrade are ignoring the letter of the parents of the late Predrag Gojković, in which they directly accuse the "ombudsman" Janković of covering up a murder? Are they saying that the grieving father and mother are accomplices in some sort of campaign against Saša the Piece (this refers to Saša Janković – author's comment) which is visible only to cretins from *Blic*?<sup>55</sup>

Apart from *Informer*, Ljiljana Smajlović, editor of *Politika*, was also sympathetic to the tragic fate of Predrag Gojković in the text "The Gojković family without protection," *Politika*, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2015, in which she pointed to the fact that civil Serbia is critical towards Vučić, but supports Janković regardless of the "obviously sloppy police investigation from 1993." On this occasion, Ljiljana Smajlović writes, "I understand that for Saša Janković the most important aspect of the Gojković case is the defence of Saša Janković, but shouldn't the ombudsman put the family Gojković first? A family searching for answers about their son's death for 22 years, without access to the media, should not be second to the reputation and career of Saša Janković. Is the Gojković family and their life story not more important than "the information leak" and "collapse" of institutions of the police? I know that thousands of citizens, all well-known names of the "civil Serbia," are signing the petition to defend Saša Janković, but I do not understand how could they omit to mention, at least in a footnote, that the circumstances under which a twenty-year-old grad student, full of plans for the future, who was going home to Loznica, but ended up with a shot to the head on the floor of Saša Janković's flat should be fully investigated. Does no one think that the investigation is one working hypothesis short of a motive for suicide, if they are not bothered by the lack of an investigative judge and the prosecutor's say? ... How is it possible that so many of the "well-meaning" members of the Serbian elite...are still protesting about the fact that the media even learned of this sloppiness? ...**this is politics. Civil Serbia is defending Janković because he engaged in direct conflict with Vučić. This is a political defence of a man who is among other games playing a political part, as well.** (Bolded by DVS)"<sup>56</sup>

55 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Afera pištolj" [Pistol affair], *Informer*, 25. 04. 2015, p. 5

56 Ljiljana Smajlović, "Gojkovići bez zaštite" [*The Gojkovic Family without protection*], *Politika*, 03. 05. 2015, p. 6

The response of the other side in the political-media clash was fierce and unequivocal. So, the already quoted journalist of *NIN*, Sandra Petrušić wrote in the text "The chase: new attacks on the ombudsman – Shot in the dark", "The pseudo scandal on the darkest affair from the life of Saša Janković, who may or may not have had an unregistered gun 23 years ago, on account of which the former government has him "in their pocket", was launched exactly where it should, in a tabloid, so that the current government's bots, among which some have a national frequency, might be given material for slandering the ombudsman. Tasteless, primitive, unintelligent, but desperately needed by the regime which monitors on daily basis the distancing from it."<sup>57</sup>

In an atmosphere of mutual exchange of animosities, different political media constructions, based on different forms of (ab) use of the facts related to the case, with too much tension in institutions and outside them, we are left with an impression that both political actors and the media did not conduct themselves formidably in the complex topic of relations between independent and controlled institutions and the state. Negative media tension, as well as the general political tension, was pacified by the meeting of the Serbian PM Aleksandar Vučić and the Ombudsman Saša Janković on May 15<sup>th</sup>, 2015.

Regardless of the reduced intensity of media debates, the "Janković" case continues to be viewed by one part of the public as one more piece in the sea of "evidence" of the authoritative and repressive nature of the regime. The role of Saša Janković in the "Gojković" case is still a topic in the daily *Informer*, though not a central one. Though some media announced it, there was no political retribution in terms of replacement of the ombudsman, and calls for engagement in the work of opposition parties remained, as well. Saša Janković is no longer a topic of public opinion polls. His suggestions for stricter defining of the security agencies which would make them more efficient and more responsible still represent possible solutions for the improvement of the system of security agencies. Ministers Stefanović and Gašić still remain in their government functions. Media writings about the "Janković" case confirmed that the political battle in the media space boils down to a clash of negative images of political actors and the inability to try to establish a unique and rationally-founded interpretation of some event.

57 Sandra Petrušić, "Hajka: novi napadi na zaštitnika građana – Pucanj u prazno" [*Witch-hunt: new attacks on the ombudsman – A shot in the dark*], *NIN*, no. 3356, p. 9



## Vučić in Tirana – regional cooperation in editorial columns and weeklies

Visit of the PM Aleksandar Vučić in Tirana on May 27<sup>th</sup>, 2015, was one of the most interesting foreign policy, particularly regional events, in 2015. Despite the undoubted significance of the event, Vučić's visit to the Albanian capital did not incite interest for column writing or interviews with experts on international and regional relations. Writings of the print media were reduced almost entirely to the plane of daily press which meticulously reported on all the details of the visit. Absence of a detailed and scrupulous dealing with this topic in the weeklies may be explained with a double key: complexity of the topic objectively narrowed down the number of experts who have the expertise necessary for a systematic and rational approach to the topic, on the other hand, this is a topic which is easily susceptible to the daily political contextualization, resting on ideological and moral labelling. Specifically, the visit of the PM of Serbia is not a topic which can be used to openly object to the actions of the first man of the Serbian Government, especially when, declaratively speaking, the position of weeklies and their editors, in a wider political and geopolitical sense, is pan-European. This circumstance is typical for a majority of weeklies. Consequently, correct relations between Belgrade and Tirana, which are at the same time a mandatory condition for developing a policy of good neighbourly relations and establishing of peace and stability in the region, are almost unusable in a wider context of developing a story on the authoritative ruler (which is, almost obsessively, the occupation of the most influential weeklies from Belgrade).

The visit itself is important for numerous interconnected reasons. Among them, the historic and daily political one stands out. From the historic standpoint, the arrival of Vučić in Tirana is the first visit of a Serbian (Yugoslav) politician to Albania since June 7<sup>th</sup>, 1947, when Marshal Josip Broz Tito visited Tirana. Sixty eight years later, in a completely different geopolitical, regional and economic context, the Prime Minister of Serbia and the Prime Minister of Albania, Edi Rama, met.

The immediate context of Vučić's stay in Tirana is not only defined by the extremely deep historic political distance between the countries and the nations, but also with ample political discord and awkward incidents from the recent past. The primary gap in the relations between Belgrade and Tirana undoubtedly forms the approach in the solving of the issue of the status of Kosovo, but the context is additionally burdened by the incidents on the football match Serbia-Albania from November 2014, as well as the protocol-media misunderstandings between Vučić and Rama at the press conference during the last visit of the Albanian PM to Belgrade on November 10<sup>th</sup>, 2014. The tension in relations between the two PMS, two countries and nations, was increased by the statement of Edi Rama, who during the meeting with the Foreign Minister of Kosovo Hashim Thaci, openly spoke about the possibility of "national unity of Albania and Kosovo" (April 8<sup>th</sup>, 2015). In addition to the above mentioned, visit of the Serbian Prime Minister was shadowed by the armed conflict in Macedonia, where Macedonian security forces and groups of Albanian mercenaries

clashed, the latter attacking first the border crossings between Kosovo and Macedonia and thus provoking armed action in Kumanovo.

Situated among the collection of specified circumstances, the visit of Vučić to Tirana was a visit of high security risk and increased political tension, so security measures of the Serbian PM were raised to the level of security during the visit of the Roman Pope.

Emphasizing security measures, and protocol activities, such as the honorary guards and playing of the national anthem, additionally dramatized the situation, making the gesture of treading on Albanian soil, an act of political courage and role model of statesmanship. When it comes to the statesmanlike message, the standpoint of the official Serbian policy towards Kosovo "as an integral part of Serbia" was outlined, open disagreement of Aleksandar Vučić with the idea of "Great Albania" was indicated, as well as Vučić's very direct comment that "the appearance of the "drone" with the flag of Great Albania at a football match in November last year was an act of "political provocation." Still, apart from the issues on which the interlocutors did not agree (Kosovo), accent was put on the possibility of regional cooperation, with special emphasis on: construction of road infrastructure, energy, trade exchange and inciting of tourism. Emphasizing of this topic in an international dialogue between Vučić and Rama indicates that the subject meeting was put into a wider context of European integrations.

This is especially important if one takes into account the fact that the EU is interested in financially supporting projects of constructing infrastructure between Serbia and Albania, which was one of the conclusions of the meeting between the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and political leaders of the West Balkans, in August 2014.

Contextualization of relations between Belgrade and Tirana was viewed on the plane of the European future of the region, which is eloquently supported by the metaphor used by the Albanian PM who said "Serbia and Albania should develop relations like France and Germany, after the Second World War." This metaphor of Rama was interpreted in different ways in the Serbian media. It could be noted that in response to this statement by Rama there were two patterns using which this metaphor was interpreted: the Euro-sceptical and the moderate pro-European one. The Euro-sceptical attitude is founded on the recognition of a direct analogy of relations between Albania and Serbia and Germany and France, after the Second World War.

This standpoint may be recognized in the opinion of the political analyst Dragomir Anđelković, who claims "They want to say that we are the Germans, and they are the French, so we could build the future together if we accept that Kosovo is now Alsace and Lorraine, which now belongs to them. This combination is wrong. If he thinks that Serbs and Albanians could do something for the future of Europe and the region, then we would have to start from a realistic approach, solving the Serbian issue along with the Albanian

one. Because we were not the defeated side, in this last war, we have not been defeated by the Albanians, we engaged in conflict with their mentors. <sup>58</sup> Rejecting the analogy with Germany and France, this analyst thinks that thought should be given to a new model of solving the conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians, a model which would force both sides to give up their maximalist ambitions in the national and territorial sense.

On the side of the geopolitical optics, the metaphor of Serbia and Albania being like Germany and France is put in the context of the development of the two counties through infrastructural, energy, economic and cultural projects which should open the prospect of good neighbourly relations in the spirit of European political tradition from the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Still, given the recent past of the conflict, current disputes about the status of Kosovo, and the undeniable spirit of ethnic distance, possibility of cooperation between Belgrade and Tirana, i.e. Serbs and Albanians, is possible with the assistance of western powers, especially in light of the regional security risks, which are not only associated with Kosovo, but also for Macedonia, as the armed conflict in Kumanovo in spring this year testifies. Considering the imperative of cooperation and high level of security risk, support from the west for the development of good neighbourly relations between the Serbs and Albanians is necessary, as Jelka Jovanović, reporter of *Novi Magazin*, observed, "It would be more precise to say that this part of the Balkans has actually an array of frozen conflicts, and the Kumanovo one is merely a last-minute warning and threat to the fragile stability. And, of course, this bomb, with an already removed fuse, is a threat to the entire region. This is why it is essential to have Berlin and Paris, and Washington as active participants in the vision of Albania and Serbia as France and Germany. Flags and anthems will remain only symbols and decor if many questions from the present and recent past are not answered after the visit." <sup>59</sup>

A cross section of the state of Serbian print media in terms of promoting the policy of neighbourly relations can be made on the example of a metaphor about the relations between Belgrade and Tirana as the relations between Berlin and Paris. To be concrete, this policy is the main political requirement for EU membership. In the media atmosphere marked by a high level of scepticism and lack of faith in neighbourly relations, it is almost impossible to politically pacify the tensions arisen from the nineties' wars.

Lack of political pacification of the nineties' heritage inherently increases the level of the security risk embedded in the region of West Balkans. This political-security constellation makes integration of the entire region in EU an uncertain and hard-to-attain goal. Fluctuating between emphasized Euro-scepticism and reduced Euro-enthusiasm, the Serbian media elite was, partially understandably, unable to offer a wider rational articulation and value

58 Dragomir Anđelković in the text "Srbija i Albanija - nova stranica ili stari sukobi" [*Serbia and Albania – a new page or old conflicts*], author Jelena Cerovina, *Politika*, 26. 05. 2015, available at : <http://www.Politika.rs/rubrike/dogadjaji-dana/Taci-najavio-tuzbu-protiv-Srbije-za-genocid.It.html>

59 Jelka Jovanović "Beograd i Tirana kao Berlin i Pariz?" [*Belgrade and Tirana as Berlin and Paris*], *Novi Magazin*, no. 213, p. 7

affirmation of the historic Vučić-Rama meeting in Tirana. Therefore, it is noticeable that the pan-European policy of the Government was stripped of a deeper media support in the print media, as it was stripped of a socially-value context, being left for analysis by the expansive propaganda and its own real political skill of negotiations and agreements with the EU.

## The Parade on May 9th in Moscow – historic and foreign-policy challenges of Serbia in editorial columns and weeklies

Marking of the seventieth anniversary of the victory over fascism, on May 9<sup>th</sup>, 2015 in Moscow, represented a high-level foreign policy event of complexity and controversy. The crisis in the relations between Russia and the West, caused by opposing viewpoints concerning the security-political crisis in Ukraine, contributed in a decisive extent to the complexity and controversy of this event. Western countries, led by the USA and leaders of EU, boycotted the Victory Parade in Moscow on May 9<sup>th</sup>, 2015 due to the involvement of Russia in the conflict in Ukraine and annexation of the Crimea.

Since Serbia is strategically committed to membership in the EU, whilst maintaining close historic, political, economic and cultural relations with Russia, it found itself in a delicate position in this situation: choice between completely real and symbolic alignment of foreign policy with the EU, which would be followed by a boycott of the parade, and continuation of close relations with Russia, and therefore participation in the ceremony, was to be made. Faced with a foreign-policy dilemma, official Serbia played the "Russian card," with reasons for such a decision being of a historic and political nature. Decision for the country to take part at the highest level of the President of the Republic and active participation of the Serbian Army in the Red Square parade was made by the President and Supreme Commander of the Serbian Army, Tomislav Nikolić. He explained his reasons in favour of this decision in the interview for the weekly *Vreme* and they can generally be marked as historic-political, "The decision to go to Moscow was easy to make...I believe we have what to be proud of...We had two anti-fascistic movements, one of which was more effective in the field, and the other was less...Our participation in the war cannot be neglected, just as the participation of the Red Army... Liberation of major cities was also helped by the artillery, which accompanied the Red Army." <sup>60</sup> Joint fighting in the Second World War is the main reason for participating in the parade on May 9<sup>th</sup>, though this reason is connected to the general perception of Russia as a political ally, since the conception of the modern Serbian state until today's diplomatic "battles" in which Russia stands for an ally. Whenever I prepare for a speech on such events (means events marking historic dates – author's comment) I cannot omit to mention the role of Russia, even in the Second Serbian Uprising. "Then and now, when Moscow represents the only protector of our fight for the sovereignty of Serbia on Kosovo and Metohija." <sup>61</sup>

60 Tomislav Nikolić, "Kada sam video koje u Vladi, znao sam da će Vučić morati mnogo da radi" [*When I saw who is in the Government, I knew Vučić will have to work hard*], interview with Filip Švarn and Jovan Gligorijević, *Vreme*, no. 1270, p. 6-7

61 Idem, p. 6





Pečat, 10. April 2015.

Similar historic argumentation, though with a focus on events in the Second World War, with the dismissal of the idea on the existence of two anti-fascistic movements,<sup>62</sup> was put forward by the writer Ivan Ivanji, "President of Serbia will be on the ceremonial stands at Lenin's mausoleum on May 9<sup>th</sup>. He should be there. His name is not important, it is important that the citizens of Serbia elected him for that function, which is why he will be representing, on that spot and in that context, the fighters of the only military and political power which represented a force outside the fronts from 1941 to the victory, and certainly not the ones who collaborated with the Nazis regardless of the excuse."<sup>63</sup>

Emphasizing the historic reasons for Serbia's presence at the parade in honour of the Day of Victory over Fascism is supported by the columnist of the weekly *Pečat*, Nikola Vrzić, "Victory of the Soviet people was a victory of the Serbian people, not only because the Soviets, mostly Russians, helped us liberate ourselves, but because the ones who gave their lives for our freedom, who were killed during the seize, were mostly Serbs. Only in Serbia, 100 Serbs were killed for one German attacker. The big fatherland war was our war for life and freedom, which we paid at a high cost and in blood."<sup>64</sup>

Absence of western political leaders was interpreted by the Serbian weeklies with a negative connotation. Two typical critical evaluations were noted: 1) founded on the unity of the facts and the value position; and 2) evaluations in the spirit of the propaganda matrix, which interpreted the absence of western leaders from the Victory Parade in a wider context of pro-Putin and anti-Western attitude. The first example of a critical stand was demonstrated by the already quoted author and publicist Ivan Ivanji, "The Parade, which will be held in honour of Victory Day in Moscow this year, will also mark the defeat of the winners seventy years ago. They inflict the defeat upon themselves. Also, I think the disruption of a joint celebration over fascism represents a betrayal of those 1,500,000 soldiers of Western allies who charged on German bunkers during the operation "Overlord" on June 6<sup>th</sup>, 1944 via La Manche. 65,700 soldiers were killed. The unknown American hero from this operation known to us from many films does not deserve less admiration than his Russian ally on the other end of Europe. Opposite the ones killed on the coast of France are the 27,000,000 citizens, USSR soldiers who lost their lives...The Russians were defending and defended their land, and the Americans came to Europe to help its liberation. This is why they both deserved to be represented in the Red Square."<sup>65</sup>

62 Ivanji decisively disputes the credibility of the Chetnik movement as an antifascist movement in the following paragraph "It is quite clear that Draža Mihailović collaborated with the German oppressors and Nedić's government. Captain of the German counter intelligence Joseph Mati wrote about this. He described that representatives of Draža Mihailović established contact with him back on October 29<sup>th</sup>, 1941, that Draža met with the representatives of the German military command on November 11<sup>th</sup> and that the cooperation of Ravna gora with Germany started already then..." Ivan Ivanji, "Tribina 70 godina od kraja Drugog svetskog rata" [Panel 70 years from the end of the Second World War], *Vreme*, no. 1271, p. 29

63 Ivan Ivanji, "Dan pobede ili poraz pobednika" [Victory day or a defeat of the victorious], *Vreme*, no. 1270, p. 15

64 Nikola Vrzić, "Vaskrs na Crvenom Trgu: Srbija među pobednicima 9. maja u Moskvi" [Resurrection on the Red Square: Serbia among the victorious], *Pečat*, no. 364, p. 7

65 Ivan Ivanji, "Dan pobede ili poraz pobednika" [Victory day or a defeat of the victorious], *Vreme*, no. 1270, p. 14

Contrary to Ivanji's attempt to see the Victory Parade in Moscow as a memory of a joint past in the basis of which is the fight against the greatest evil of humanity fascism and Nazism, other commentators put the Moscow Parade in the context of world events (the Ukraine crisis), as well as our domestic and foreign policy topics and dilemmas.

So, the already quoted Nikola Vrzić says, "Will our accession to NATO end on the Victory Day Parade in Moscow? ... In analysis and considerations, we must, both because of the Ukraine crisis and our EU integrations, which are in this situation proving to be something unnatural and contradictory to the entire history of our struggle, be ourselves. Whoever we are, but we are ourselves."<sup>66</sup> In line with the specified opinion, shared past of Russians and Serbs in the fight against fascism has far-reaching consequences on the current moment in which Serbia finds itself. Shared past should represent the basis for the foundation of the anti-European attitude, and the attitude towards Russia should be the first and the most important point of resistance towards EU integrations.

In that sense, Vrzić claims, "What is unpredictable is the position of the Serbian state leadership. They were cooperative until sanctions for Russia came up; and continued to be cooperative about everything – from Kosovo over the IMF's economy to NATO – except for our attitude towards Russia, lastly with our upcoming Victory Day Parade on the Red Square. Does this mean that the only sample of our lack of cooperativeness is the fear of our ample/forced cooperativeness? Or is the basis of this insufficient cooperativeness, awareness of our state and national interests after all?"<sup>67</sup>

The position towards the Victory Day Parade prompts the attitude towards the anti-European politics, geostrategic turn, hope and expectation that it will happen. This turn, according to this position, should happen precisely because today's European political elite is morally and politically unworthy of its historic role, and entirely under the influence of America, stripped of its own moral, historic and geostrategic signposts, as the editor and chief of *Pečat* Milorad Vučelić observed. In open political propaganda and a provocative manner, Vučelić writes, "Today's leaders of the western world have proven unworthy and ungrateful lot completely blinded by all the things which led the world into the Second World War. With their actions, they have become the followers of the defeated in the Second World War...This kind of position and characteristics of the western leaders are not surprising, because when we look at who got up to rule in the world, and Europe especially, a lot of bad and wrong things may be expected. None of these current western personalities, not even one, has reached the level of a statesman. The same personas are humiliating Europe and its long tradition. European countries have been turned into real carriers of US army planes, bases for accommodating NATO troops and polygons for positioning US missiles. And this is not enough for the EU but it wants to turn each spot on its continent – and thus Serbia as well – into a target for the Russian defence weapons." <sup>68</sup>

66 Nikola Vrzić, "Vaskrs na Crvenom Trgu: Srbija među pobednicima 9. maja u Moskvi" [*Resurrection on the Red Square: Serbia among the victorious*], *Pečat*, no. 364, p. 6

67 Ibid, p. 8

68 Milorad Vučelić, "Srozavanje Evrope" [*Downfall of Europe*], *Pečat*, no. 365, p. 3

Building of a negative image of NATO and the EU has been implemented by using a historic theme, Victory Day, victory over fascism. Symbolically and realistically, this event served to raise the intensity of the negative charge towards western countries, encouraging the already wide spread Euro-scepticism and showing that affection for Russia supported by the Serbian nationalism, may be the fuel for a powerful anti-European campaign.

The trouble with this and similar standpoints is that they show inconsideration in terms of the environment which defines the foreign policy position of Serbia and based on them they are articulating a choice of the state top, especially PM Vučić and the Government of Serbia for Euro-integrations, at the same time neglecting the presidency in OSCE which includes balancing between the harshly opposing positions of Russia and the West surrounding the Ukraine crisis and finally neglecting the circumstance that Serbia is present at a high level of the Foreign Minister on the parade in honour of the Victory Day in Kiev.

Print media in Serbia failed, except in the very rare cases, to show a different view of the current Russian foreign policy and the Victory Day Parade. Apart from the reported text of Nina Hrushchov, the granddaughter of the President of USSR Nikita Hrushchov and the Dean of the New School for Social Research, from New York, entitled "Putin's parade," *Danas*, May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2015. In the text "Putin's parade", Hrushchova points to the autocratic and conservative-military dimension of the gathering with which Putin celebrates autocracy." The unreal nature of this gathering reflects the increasingly bizarre nature of Putin's regime. Really watching Russia today is like watching the last sequel of the X-men series "Days of future past." Just like X-men in that film join forces with themselves from the past in order to save humanity, today's Kremlin is returning to the Russian Soviet past which is seen as today's fight for the survival of the country..." Putin sees himself as the new tsar. His KGB past dictates his leadership style, which includes cancellation of free and honest choices, persecution of opponents and promotion of conservative values which, just like Petain before him, lead him in opposition of the corruptive influence of immoral and decadent West. Relying on this approach, Putin has built an alliance, for example, with the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and the Egyptian war lord Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. China, the second economy in the world, is a useful addition to this collection of friendly anti-democratic countries since it has its own strategic complaints at the West's expense. Unlike China, however, Russia is not a super power on the rise. Putin tried to portray his actions in Ukraine as fighting fascism. But this is really a fight for relevance – fight which he will never win. Regardless of how grandiose the parade was, he cannot hide the truth: Russian days as a super power are a thing of the past. Putin's patriotism, as Petain's, is destroyed...

In the same way, the print media denied reflexion about the consequences of participation on the parade in Moscow in terms of the European path of Serbia. Especially, in light of the circumstances, where the necessary part of the process is joining the EU, alignment of the foreign and safety policy of Serbia and EU. This tendency of deviation from the shared policy of EU is not rare, but it is not getting a rational development in the public in Serbia, despite the strategic commitment to EU membership.

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About  
Authors

## ABOUT AUTHORS

**Public Policy Institute** is a regional think-tank organization that operates in the Western Balkans region through the work of its branch offices in Belgrade, Podgorica and Ljubljana. By promoting public dialogue and constructive solutions, Public Policy Institute contributes to the efforts of the Western Balkan countries to become equal, reliable and progressive partners in the process of European integrations and mutual relationships. After the initial research and analysis of social and media context in the countries of the Western Balkans, the Institute has developed and implemented a series of media related projects, including: Role of the media in the process of securitisation in the Western Balkans, Civil Response to Clientelism in the media - MEDIA CIRCLE, NATO Reach Out - media monitoring and Role of the media in monitoring of R1325 in Montenegro.

**EBART Media Archive** is privately owned company established in 2000. Its main activity is archiving print media data in e-format. The print media archive consists of up-to-date material dating back to 2003, and more than 3 million print media reports from sources with national coverage. EBART is also specialized for media analysis, basic quantitative and qualitative analyses, comparing media treatment of specific keywords, as well as complex content analyses according to BBC methodology. EBART Media Archive is unmatched in the region with its unique media reports database, and 12 years of media research experience. This media database allows for the overall study of long-term media presence.

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