



Analysis of the print media in Serbia
April - June

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Introduction

VELIMIR ČURĞUS KAZIMIR

INTRODUCTION

Expecting the new Government

In the spring after the elections, main topics in Serbia were the floods and the selection of the future Prime Minister. Media are naturally interested in whether the floods will be disastrous, but even more who will the new Prime Minister be. In June, Ana Brnabić was appointed as the new PM. In the period of three months analyzed by Quarterly Mediameter, from April to June 2017, Ana Brnabić climbed on the third place of the most popular public figures on the front pages of daily newspapers in Serbia. She pushed Tomislav Nikolić to the fourth place.

In this issue of Mediameter, a total of 2091 texts published on the front pages of seven daily newspapers were analyzed. As in the previous nine calendar quarters, the same methodological apparatus was applied in the analysis of the empirical data. A single text was chosen for the subject of analysis. Analysis itself represents the combination of two research methods: (a) content analysis, which was guided by a „specific theoretical and hypothetical frame... creating an objective and systematic empirical collection of the social communication content, which enables the formation of relevant conclusions about the social context in which the communication takes part,”¹ and (b) a discourse analysis which enabled us to understand various, epistemologically and methodologically immeasurable, ² authors’ interpretative strategies and editorial policies which reflect perceptions of different, primarily ideological and political, discourse realities, by analyzing their specific discourse meanings.

In the interpretative sense, in order to offer better coherence of the text, the analysis is, as in the previous reports, divided into two wholes which refer to: (a) analysis of quantitative indicators collected using content analysis, and (b) discourse analysis of the qualitative content excerpted from texts which were included in the research sample.

The tendencies observed in the previous quarters, in terms of representation of different

news genres, are present in this quarter as well. In this sense, it seems that we can talk about the most characteristic genre of today’s press. Daily newspapers are sovereignly dominated by reports (about 75%), while the news almost completely disappeared (with only 1.05%). This order of things has a very simple explanation - the press cannot compete with the Internet and electronic media when it comes to the news content. This is why the media portals of the newspapers we analyzed are much richer in content than their front pages.

The largest number of reports was made by *Informer* (95.1%), and the smallest by *Politika* (56.13%). *Politika* had the highest number of articles (22.88%), while *Alo!* had no published articles on the front page whatsoever. Interviews are most popular in *Danas* (11.84%), and the least in *Informer* (1.47%). The presence, or lack thereof, of certain genres, confirms the nature and type of newspapers that have been analyzed.

Politics and political life always remain on the front pages in Serbia. Politics sets the pace and the meaning of life in which the print media are shaped. In this period, there was less economy and crime. Kosovo, the region and economy continue to be present, as subjects of about 7% articles. The media, however, were the topics themselves. This is related to a conflict between *TV Pink*, *Kurir* and *Informer*. There is a war fought with headlines and mutual threats. Media of balance in these two newspapers doesn’t exist - in *Informer* 98.04%, and in *Kurir* 91.88% of published articles are unbalanced.

The triggers are still largely induced by the editorial staff (26.26%). The Government of Serbia and the ruling party are the trigger in about a quarter of the texts, while the opposition initiated 3.78% of the articles. Almost 81% of the articles are not balanced. At the same time, there is an increasing percentage of published articles from unnamed sources.


There were fewer texts on the European Union and Russia, although the press is still more critical of the EU than of Russia. 36.25% of the articles are value-oriented, which is a sign of a strong newsroom affiliation. Rhetoric, of course, is very different. And that too is a part of editorial policy and media strategy.

No matter how short the time since she became the Prime Minister (on June 15th she received the mandate to form the Government, on 29th June the Government was made) still in that period there were no negative articles about her. This was quite surprising having in mind the media atmosphere in Serbia. At least for a while. It seems that in relation to the media not much has changed.

¹ S. Gredelj, *S onu stranu ogledala* [On the other side of the mirror], Beograd: Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije, 1986, 19

² G. Couvalis, *The Philosophy of Science*, London, Sage Publications, 1997.

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Sample

ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN

Sample

As stated in earlier publications, the basic idea of the project *Mediameter* is to try to reconstruct media reality of the dailies in Serbia, the way it can be defined considering the texts that are positioned (wholly or partially) on front pages, as various reflections of current political events and circumstances in both Serbia and the world. A sample of the dailies was composed considering two selection criteria – the largest circulation and reputation of the print media. Daily newspaper circulation data were taken from a research done by IPSOS.¹ The front page is the part of the dailies that the readers connect the most with the identity/recognition of a media outlet. It is often responsible for the first impression, our potential affection or repulsion formed about some printed media. The front page comes into contact not only with the readers of that particular paper, but also the people who will perhaps never touch that paper. Through newspaper and TV advertising and shop windows, the front page reaches a wider auditorium than that forming the readers of individual dailies. The front pages, hence form, in a certain way, the public image of the newspaper which symbolizes its editorial policy, evaluative orientation and targeting of certain audiences. On account of the above-mentioned reasons, the front pages of dailies from our sample were in the focus of analysis of the project *Mediameter*.

Texts from front pages reflect best the coordinates of editorial policies of daily print editions. Though this involves a small percentage of texts, editorial identity of a daily can be most easily identified through messages conveyed through front pages. The ratio of the total number of texts in each daily individually and the number of texts from the front pages that were included in the sample of our research are shown in the charts 1-7, for the period from 1st April to 30th June 2017.

¹ Research of the average scope of the daily print media was done for the period from January 8th to February 15th 2017, population: total individuals

Chart 1 – *Večernje novosti*²







Chart 2 – *Informer*³





² For more information see **Table 96** in the Appendix

³ For more information see **Table 97** in the Appendix

Chart 3 – Alo!⁴**Chart 4 – Blic**⁵


⁴ For more information see **Table 98** in the Appendix

⁵ For more information see **Table 99** in the Appendix

Chart 5 – Politika⁶**Chart 6 – Danas**⁷

⁶ For more information see **Table 100** in the Appendix

⁷ For more information see **Table 101** in the Appendix

Chart 7 – Kurir⁸

The total number of analysed texts considering all seven media that are included in our research sample is 2091 and that number accounts for averagely 62.49% texts from front pages and for 3.79% of the total number of texts. The number of all published text on front pages in each media from the sample, along with the number of selected ones, could be seen in the following tables.

Table 1. – Večernje novosti

Media outlet Večernje novosti / section	Total number of front- page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front- page texts that were not selected
chronicle	69	7	62
society	93	69	24
politics	121	121	0
economics	37	29	8
current affairs	38	16	22
reportage	26	8	18
culture	15	2	13
interview	26	18	8
world	26	16	10
sport	17	2	15
Belgrade news	12	7	5
supplement	5	3	2
reflector	8	1	7
neighbours	1	1	0
foto-trace	2	0	2
real-life stories	3	0	3
region	1	1	0
feuilleton	1	1	0
events	12	10	2
TOTAL	513	312	201

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

⁸ For more information see **Table 102** in the Appendix

Table 2. – Informer

Media outlet: In-former / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
breaking news	153	151	2
news	115	51	64
showtime	70	1	69
sport	43	1	42
TOTAL	381	204	177

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 3. – Alo!

Media outlet: Alo! / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
current affairs	83	82	1
news	226	118	108
v.i.p.	103	7	96
sport	54	7	47
world	5	3	2
interview of the week	4	3	1
feuilleton	1	1	0
reportage	5	0	5
TOTAL	481	221	260

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 4. – Blic

Blic/rubrika	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
series	1	1	0
current affairs/ interview	8	7	1
reportage	2	0	2
feuilleton	1	1	0
society	49	13	36
chronicle	50	8	42
culture	9	1	8
politics	96	96	0
sport	23	1	22
destinies	3	0	3
world	14	10	4
topic of the day	78	69	9
Blic guest	3	3	0
in focus	3	2	1
dossier	2	1	1
entertainment	9	2	7
remembrance	1	0	1
Blic foundation	4	0	4
economy	29	25	4
TOTAL	385	240	145

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 5. – Politika

Media outlet: Politika / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
world	29	19	10
society	84	22	62
economics	39	28	11
politics	14	14	0
event of the day	18	13	5
culture	49	13	36
chronicle	33	10	23
daily supplement	10	2	8
Serbia	28	7	21
sport	30	1	29
topic of the week	45	32	13
personalities	2	1	1
region	7	7	0
front page	245	245	0
spectre	6	0	6
views	3	3	0
consumer	9	1	8
Belgrade events	12	6	6
colorful page	1	0	1
culture supplement	5	0	5
TOTAL	669	424	245

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 6. – Danas

Danas/rubrika	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
business supplement	11	8	3
special supplement	5	1	4
Danas weekend	37	20	17
Event of the day	27	27	0
society	87	82	5
economy	51	50	1
globe	30	18	12
culture	33	14	19
interview	4	1	3
front page	59	59	0
politics	134	134	0
Novi Sad	1	1	0
Belgrade	5	4	1
sport	15	1	14
topic	9	9	0
last page	11	10	1
dialogue	7	6	1
small screen	1	0	1
20 years	3	3	0
suočavanje	5	5	0
pomodoro	2	2	0
scales	1	1	0
TOTAL	538	456	82

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017


Table 7. – Kurir

<i>Kurir</i> /rubrika	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
news	92	89	3
politics	118	102	16
planet	18	14	4
chronicle	44	14	30
busines	1	1	0
society	17	9	8
stars	73	3	70
culture	7	0	7
belgrade	0	0	0
sport	8	1	7
topic of the day	1	1	0
TOTAL	379	234	145


Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

By reviewing the presented tables 1-7, it is still noticeable that the structures of dailies follow two different patterns. In other words, *Večernje novosti*, *Politika*, *Danas* and *Blic* follow the traditional structure of daily newspapers, while *Informer* and *Alo!* deviate from this matrix to a considerable extent, as in previous trimesters. In these two publications, *news* are the dominant section, uniting different areas, while special attention is paid to entertaining content, like information about celebrities, then show business and sport, which increasingly gain social and political character. In newspaper *Kurir*, once again the drastic changes in structure are visible – during April and May 2017 the columns representing classic form could be noticed, while in June this newspaper approaches to the concept of *Alo!* and *Informer*, since most sections (such as *politics*, *society*, and *economics*) are merged in the *news* column (Chart 14).


Editorial strategies that were established in the previous nine editions of Mediameter are entirely visible in the second quarter of 2017, as it may be clearly seen in Charts 8-14.

Chart 8. – Večernje novosti


Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Chart 9. – Informer


Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Chart 10. – *Alo!*


Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Chart 12. – *Politika*


Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Chart 11. – *Blic*

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Chart 13. – *Danas*

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Chart 14. – Kurir

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

If we compare the number of selected texts in the period April – June of 2017, 2016 and 2015, it can be noticed that approximately the same number of articles were published in 2017 and 2016 (2091, or 2106) in the same period, while the number of selected articles in 2015 significantly smaller (1673). Compared to the previous quarter (January - March 2017), 312 texts less were selected for the period April - June 2017 (2403 vs. 2091). Apart from the focus on political developments after the end of the presidential election, the selected texts related to the situation in the region, while the number of articles on foreign policy was lower than in the previous period.

Table 8 - Number of selected texts by quarter

Time period	2015. godina	2016. godina	2017. godina
First quarter	1360	1924	2403
Second quarter	1673	2106	2091
Third quarter	2172	2012	
Fourth quarter	2177	2251	
TOTAL	7382	8293	

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

3



Research
results

ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN

RESEARCH RESULTS

Share of journalistic genres

In the second quarter of 2017, the share of Reports in the total number of analyzed texts further increased for about 4%, and amounted to 75.13% or 1571 texts. The largest share of the reports was again observed in *Informer* - 95.1%, while this time the lowest number was noted in *Politika* - 56.13%. The Interview and the Article, observed in 186, or 8.9% of articles, follow them. The largest number Interviews is recorded in *Danas* (54 or 11.84%), and the lowest in *Informer* - 1.47% (3). Articles are most present in *Politika* - 22.88% or 97, and paper that did not have any articles this quarter is *Alo!*. The genres that follow, according to share, are Commentaries and other forms (like Features) - 3.97% (83 characters) that is, 29.1% (27), while this quarter recorded the smallest number of News stories - 1.05% or 22 news. Reportages are present in only 0.77%, or 16 of the texts (see more in Tables 9, 10 and 11). In the second quarter of 2017, the order of the share of genres has changed compared to the previous quarter, which is especially embodied in the low number of news stories and increased presence of other forms, such as Features or series of articles.

Table 9. – Individual share of genres in reporting of seven media from the sample

Genre	ukupanNo	%
Report	1571	75,13
Interview	186	8,90
Article	186	8,90
Commentary	83	3,97
Other (hybrid forms, features)	27	1,29
News story	22	1,05
Reportage	16	0,77
total	2091	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 10. – Distribution of journalistic genres in texts from the sample, per media

Genre	Alo!	Blic	Danas	Informer	Kurir	Politika	Večernje novosti	total
Report	190	202	317	194	181	238	249	1571
Interview	21	23	54	3	16	45	24	186
Article	0	3	29	3	26	97	28	186
Commentary	0	5	37	0	0	38	3	83
Other (hybrid forms, features)	1	4	11	0	10	0	1	27
News story	9	3	4	4	1	0	1	22
Reportage	0	0	4	0	0	6	6	16
total	221	240	456	204	234	424	312	2091

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 11. – Share of journalistic forms in texts from the sample, per media outlet

Genre	Alo!	Blic	Danas	Informer	Kurir	Politika	Večernje novosti	total
Report	85.97	84.17	69.52	95.10	77.35	56.13	79.81	75.13
Interview	9.50	9.58	11.84	1.47	6.84	10.61	7.69	8.90
Article	0.00	1.25	6.36	1.47	11.11	22.88	8.97	8.90
Commentary	0.00	2.08	8.11	0.00	0.00	8.96	0.96	3.97
Other (hybrid forms, features)	0.45	1.67	2.41	0.00	4.27	0.00	0.32	1.29
News story	4.07	1.25	0.88	1.96	0.43	0.00	0.32	1.05
Reportage	0.00	0.00	0.88	0.00	0.00	1.42	1.92	0.77
total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

The Report

In the sampled newspapers, the report is represented in the following way: in *Informer* 95.1% or 194, in the daily newspaper *Alo!* - 85.97% or 190 texts, *Blic* - 84.17% (202), *Večernje novosti* - 79.81% (249), *Kurir* 77.35% (181), *Danas* - 69.52% (317) and *Politika* with 56.13% (238). In comparison with the previous quarter, the representation of the Report has increased in *Danas* (about 8%), *Blic* (about 5%), *Informer* and *Kurir* (an increase of about 2% in both). A significantly higher number of reports were noted in *Večernje Novosti* (14.38%), while it was lower in *Politika* (4.7%) and *Alo!* (About 1.5%).

In all seven newspapers, the reports are evaluative¹, that is, the article shows a clear position the journalist, and the number value-oriented texts is higher than in the previous quarter for about 1%. The share of opinionated texts in this genre varies from 68.04% in *Informer* to 11.04 % in *Danas* (in both media, the result is almost the same as in the second quarter). A positive or negative position of the journalist can be seen in 62.98% of the texts in *Kurir* (increase in the share of texts containing a clear position rose for 21% in comparison to the previous quarter), 37.35% in *Večernje novosti* (about 1% higher), 34.03 % in *Politika* (around 7%), 26.32% in the daily *Alo!* (About 10%), 21.78% in *Blic* (about 8% less) (for more information see table 12).

Table 12. – Report structure with regards to evaluative context in the seven media from the sample

Report	Value context with reference to the topic					
Media	Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%
<i>Informer</i>	22	11.34	62	31.96	110	56.70
<i>Kurir</i>	5	2.76	67	37.02	109	60.22
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	42	16.87	156	62.65	51	20.48
<i>Politika</i>	31	13.03	157	65.97	50	21.01
<i>Alo!</i>	6	3.16	140	73.68	44	23.16
<i>Blic</i>	1	0.50	158	78.22	43	21.29
<i>Danas</i>	4	1.26	282	88.96	31	9.78
total	111	7.07	1022	65.05	438	27.88

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

¹ In the analysis put forward herein, manners of presenting certain topics in individual texts from our sample were coded in three different ways, taking into consideration both the text and the accompanying textual content (headline, heading and subheading). Texts in which the authors/journalists did not take up an evaluative position towards a certain actor, but strived to present certain facts which are the subject of the text in a relatively neutral, reserved manner, respecting professional standards, were marked as neutral. Those interpretations in which the journalists clearly expressed sympathy and positive attitude towards the topics were marked as positive. We marked as negative those interpretations in which the journalists presented certain topics with clear antipathy and negative attitude towards certain topics.

In the second quarter almost 78% of reports were unbalanced² (e.g. reports contain the statement of only one actor, i.e. the entire text is based on the standpoint of one interviewee or different interviewees advocating the same position), and the result is different in 2.18% compared to the previous quarter. The largest number of unbalanced texts in this genre was recorded in *Informer* 97.94%, followed by *Kurir* - (91.16%), *Politika* (78.57%), *Alo!* (73.68%), *Blic* (72.77%), *Večernje Novosti* (69.88%) and *Danas* (69.72%) (Table 13).

When perceived individually, there have been some changes in relation to the previous quarter, especially in *Politika*, where the number of unbalanced reports increased by more than 9%. Participation unbalanced reports in *Informer* and *Danas* remained at the level of the previous quarter, the in dailies *Blic* and *Kurir* it was reduced by about 6% that is, 7%, while in *Večernje Novosti* and *Alo!* it increased by 5% (Table 13).

Table 13. – Balance of reports in the seven media from the sample

Report	Balance %	
Media	Yes	No
<i>Informer</i>	2.06	97.94
<i>Kurir</i>	8.84	91.16
<i>Politika</i>	21.43	78.57
<i>Alo!</i>	26.32	73.68
<i>Blic</i>	27.23	72.77
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	30.12	69.88
<i>Danas</i>	30.28	69.72
total	22.09	77.91

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

² Balance represents the manner in which the journalist approaches the topic. Balanced text involves a balanced and objective approach to the topic and interviewees and the comprehensiveness of information.

Other journalistic forms

The daily paper *Politika* published on its front pages the largest number of articles, 22.88%, which is also the highest number of articles in total (97). This is followed by *Kurir* with 11.11% (26), *Večernje novosti* with 8.97% (28) and *Danas* with 6.36% (29). *Blic* and *Informer* published three articles each, while *Alo!* had no articles whatsoever (tables 10 i 11). The presence of this form in *Politika* is similar to the previous quarter. Daily *Večernje novosti*, in comparison to the second quarter, published 12% less articles, while *Kurir* and *Danas* published 5%, that is 2% less.

The evaluative context, in comparison with the previous quarter, increased by 10% - 54.84% in second, in contrast with the 44.16% in the first quarter of 2017. When analyzed separately, least number of neutral texts were noted in *Kurir*, where only 2 out of 24 or 7.69% of articles were neutral, followed *Politika* with 43.3%, *Večernje novosti* - 53.57% and *Danas* with 75.86% neutral articles. (table 14).

Table 14. – Structure of articles with reference to value context in the seven media from the sample

Article	Value context with reference to the topic					
Media	Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0.00	2	7.69	24	92.31
<i>Informer</i>	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
<i>Politika</i>	7	7.22	42	43.30	48	49.48
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0	0.00	15	53.57	13	46.43
<i>Blic</i>	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
<i>Danas</i>	0	0.00	22	75.86	7	24.14
total	7	3.76	84	45.16	95	51.08

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

The highest number of texts written in this genre in this quarter had no balance – 76.34%. There is no balance in one single article written in *Informer*, in *Kurir* 92.31% of articles are imbalanced, in *Politika* - 86.6%, *Večernje novosti* 60.71%, while the large proportion of articles in *Danas* (55.17%) and *Blic* (66.67%) are proportioned (see more info in table 15).

Table 15. – Balance of articles from the seven media from the sample

Article	Balance	
Media	Yes	No
<i>Informer</i>	0.00	100.00
<i>Kurir</i>	7.69	92.31
<i>Politika</i>	13.40	86.60
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	39.29	60.71
<i>Danas</i>	55.17	44.83
<i>Blic</i>	66.67	33.33
total	23.66	76.34

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

As noted, the Interview was equally represented as the Article in the seven sampled newspapers in the second quarter of 2017. According to the presence, *Danas* is on the top of the list with 54 or 11.84%, followed by *Politika* with 10.61% (45 interviews), *Blic* (9.58% - 23), *Alo!* (9.5% - 21), *Večernje novosti* (7.69% or 24), *Kurir* with 6.84% (16) and *Informer* with 3 interviews.

The largest number of interviews - 154, or 82.8% were written in a neutral context, and this particularly relates to the media where all interviews were neutral in context - *Blic* and *Alo!*. Increased presence of neutral interviews is recorded in *Danas* (about 98%), while in *Kurir* 81.25% of the interviews are neutral. A larger share of value-oriented interviews was recorded in *Politika* (40%), *Večernje* (37.5%) and *Informer* (33.33%) (Table 16).

Table 16. – Structure of interviews in relation to the value context in the seven media outlets

Interview	Value context with reference to the topic					
Media	Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%
<i>Politika</i>	3	6.67	27	60.00	15	33.33
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	2	8.33	15	62.50	7	29.17
<i>Informer</i>	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0.00	13	81.25	3	18.75
<i>Danas</i>	0	0.00	53	98.15	1	1.85
<i>Alo!</i>	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
<i>Blic</i>	0	0.00	23	100.00	0	0.00
total	5	2.69	154	82.80	27	14.52

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

The next form, according to the activity, is the Commentary (column, editorial), present in 3.97% of the texts. In some significant extent, this genre is present only in *Politika* - 8.96% and 38 texts in *Danas* (37 or 11.8%). *Blic* had another 5, *Večernje novosti* 3 columns, while other media have not published works written in this genre on their front pages.

Most of the commentaries published *Blic* (80%), *Danas* (72.97%) and *Politika* (50%) were evaluative, while 2 out of 3 commentaries in *Večernje novosti* were neutral (Table 17).

Table 17 – Structure of commentaries with reference to the evaluative context in the seven media outlets from the sample

Commentary	Value context with reference to the topic					
Media	Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%
<i>Blic</i>	1	20,00	1	20,00	3	60,00
<i>Danas</i>	4	10,81	10	27,03	23	62,16
<i>Politika</i>	2	5,26	17	44,74	19	50,00
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0	0,00	2	66,67	1	33,33
total	7	8,43	30	36,14	46	55,42

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

The second quarter of 2017, recorded the lowest number of news stories compared to the results from all the previous nine numbers of Mediameter. This time, the front pages contained only 1.05 % of news, mostly in *Alo!* - 9 or 4.07%, *Informer* 1.96% (4), *Blic* 1.25% (3), *Danas* 0.88% (4), *Kurir* 12.43% and *Večernje novosti* with 12.32% (one text each), while *Politika* had none (table 11).

Most news were of neutral context, 86.36%, and if analyzed individually, the highest number of evaluative news were recorded in *Informer* (25%), followed by *Alo!* with 11.11%, while the news in *Blic*, *Večernje Novosti* and *Kurir* remained neutral (Table 18).

Table 18 – Structure of news with reference to the value context in the seven media from the sample

News	Value context with reference to the topic					
Media	Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%
<i>Danas</i>	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
<i>Informer</i>	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
<i>Alo!</i>	1	11,11	8	88,89	0	0,00
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0	0,00	1	100,00	0	0,00
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0,00	1	100,00	0	0,00
<i>Blic</i>	0	0,00	3	100,00	0	0,00
total	1	4,55	19	86,36	2	9,09

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

First quarter of 2017 recorded 63.64% of imbalanced news. *Informer* and *Kurir* had no balanced news, *Danas* only 25%, *Alo!* 33%, while *Večernje novosti* and *Blic* maintained their news balanced (Table 19).

Table 19. – Balance of news in the seven media from the sample

News	Balance %	
Media	Yes	No
<i>Kurir</i>	0,00	100,00
<i>Informer</i>	0,00	100,00
<i>Danas</i>	25,00	75,00
<i>Alo!</i>	33,33	66,67
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	100,00	0,00
<i>Blic</i>	100,00	0,00
total	36,36	63,64

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Other forms (such as a features, and different hybrid forms), which, because of the heterogeneity of the research will not be further analyzed, are represented in 27 texts, or 5 texts more than the news, while in the second quarter reportages make up for 0.77% of all sampled texts. The genre is mostly present in the paper of conventional structure - *Politika* (6 texts), *Večernje* (6) and *Danas* (4) (Tables 10 and 11).

Causes

In the second quarter of 2017, the Topics developed by the editorial staff were present with 26.26% or 549 texts, regarding the *functioning of the Government of the Republic of Serbia / ruling party* 495 texts or 23.67% were created, while the *opposition* gave a cause to the media in 3.78% or 79 articles. It can be concluded that in this quarter too, almost an equal number of articles published on the opposition's or the government's activities (27.45%) were made, and without a clear reason (26.26%).

Table 20 – Distribution of causes in the seven media from the sample

Cause/All media	No. of appearances	% share
other	968	46,29
topic developed by the editorial staff	549	26,26
event initiated by the government of RS/ ruling party	495	23,67
event initiated by the opposition	79	3,78
total	2091	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

From 549 of texts developed by the editorial staff, 209 or 38.07% are of neutral/negative context (**table 22**). Cause developed by the editorial staff is more present when the topic is related to *the political life in Serbia* (183 or 33.33% of texts developed by the editorial staff), followed by the topic of Kosovo – 48 or 8.74% headlines, economy (44 or 8.01%), regional relations (33 or 6.01%) and culture (27 or 4.92% developed by the editorial staff) (**table 21**).

Table 21 – Cause developed by the editorial staff – most frequent topics and the value context in the seven media from the sample

Cause developed by the editorial staff/topic	total		Value context with reference to the topic					
			Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
political life in Serbia	183	33,33	3	1,64	138	75,41	42	22,95
Kosovo/ relations of Belgrade and Pristina	48	8,74	0	0,00	19	39,58	29	60,42
Economy	44	8,01	6	13,64	19	43,18	19	43,18
Regional cooperation/ relations in the region	33	6,01	1	3,03	13	39,39	19	57,58
Culture	27	4,92	2	7,41	20	74,07	5	18,52

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 22 – Cause developed by the editorial staff – value context of texts from all media

Povod topic developed by the editorial staff	No of texts	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Number	549	22	340	187
%	100	4,01	61,93	34,06

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

In tables 23 – 29 the order of the causes listed is presented:

Table 23. – Distribution of causes in Večernje novosti

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	No. of appearances	% share
other	135	43,27
event initiated by the government of RS/ ruling party	128	41,03
topic developed by the editorial staff	42	13,46
event initiated by the opposition	7	2,24
total	312	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 24. – Distribution of causes in Blic

<i>Blic</i>	No. of appearances	% share
other	106	44,17
topic developed by the editorial staff	64	26,67
event initiated by the government of RS/ ruling party	53	22,08
event initiated by the opposition	17	7,08
total	240	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 25. – Distribution of causes in *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	No. of appearances	% share
other	113	48,29
topic developed by the editorial staff	53	22,65
event initiated by the government of RS/ ruling party	51	21,79
event initiated by the opposition	17	7,26
total	234	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 26. – Distribution of causes in *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	No. of appearances	% share
other	86	38,91
topic developed by the editorial staff	83	37,56
event initiated by the government of RS/ ruling party	46	20,81
event initiated by the opposition	6	2,71
total	221	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 27. – Distribution of causes in *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	No. of appearances	% share
other	140	68,63
topic developed by the editorial staff	35	17,16
event initiated by the government of RS/ ruling party	24	11,76
event initiated by the opposition	5	2,45
total	204	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 28. – Distribution of causes in *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	No. of appearances	% share
other	194	45,75
event initiated by the government of RS/ ruling party	125	29,48
topic developed by the editorial staff	103	24,29
event initiated by the opposition	2	0,47
total	424	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 29. – Distribution of causes in *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	No. of appearances	% share
other	194	42,54
topic developed by the editorial staff	169	37,06
event initiated by the government of RS/ ruling party	68	14,91
event initiated by the opposition	25	5,48
total	456	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Topics

In order for each article to be defined as clearly as possible, the selected writings that make up the sample are classified under a single topic, but nevertheless, all relevant elements present in these articles have been accounted for. This gave us a clearer insight into the manner of how the news is provided and into the approach of the media to certain topics in the previous issues of the *Mediameter* too. Articles covering local crime news, as well as the writings relating to the murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović,³ were again included into the sample, as an example of the paradigm of the state of Serbian journalism, which is marked by various kinds of disrespect for the ethical principles of reporting.

³ Although singer Jelena Marjanovic was killed on April 2nd 2016, speculations about this crime still occupy space on the front pages of the newspaper from the sample. This topic is represented 15 cover pages.

Topic prominence

In the period of April – June 2017, political topics once again took up the larger part of front page space of the daily newspapers in the sample. Topic *political life in Serbia* is present in as much as 635 or 30.37%. Remaining political topics *activities of the Government of Serbia*, *activities of the Prime Minister* and *activities of the President of Serbia* are present in 97 texts (4.64%), so in total politics encompass 35.01% of the sample in the second quarter. Second topic is the economy, about which the media wrote in 158 (7.56%) texts. Kosovo-related developments and relations between Belgrade and Priština are the third topic in terms of participation, which is somewhat less than the previous quarter (6.55% of texts in the second, compared to 7.28% in the first period). Regional topics are almost identically represented as in the previous quarter - 6.31% or 132 published texts. The character of the texts that refer to Kosovo and the region, as well as in all the previous nine quarters, remains the same - dominantly negative (more than 60% of the texts on both topics have a negative connotation). Regarding foreign policy issues, this time the interest of the media is directed towards international relations (77 texts - 3.68%). The top ten topics are rounded up by topics related to the media (73 - 3.49%), the judiciary and the military (56 texts - 2.68%), the EU / politics - the EU is mentioned at 55 or 2.63%, and the tenth topic in the presence is social issues / social policy - 46 or 2.2% of the texts. The texts that talk about Russia (33 - 1.58%) are slightly less represented than in the last quarter, and a large decline in text coverage on the front pages is recorded about the topics economy and crime. In the first quarter, 62 or 2.58% of the texts were dedicated to economy, while in the second quarter this topic was present in 33 or 1.58% of the article. The difference is even more drastic when it comes to texts about crime, which this time only make 0.86% of the sample (18 entries), as opposed to 95 or 3.95% of texts in the previous quarter.

If the value context of 2091 of the selected text is observed in the second quarter of 2017, 36.25% of the caption is connotated - 29.75% negative and 6.5% positive (**Table 31**). Of all the above topics, the most negative connotations refer to the media - 67.12% (49). A very similar share of negative texts was written about regional relations and relations between Belgrade and Priština, 61.36% and 63.5% respectively. More than one third of the negative connotations were recorded on international relations (36.36%) and the activities of judicial authorities (33.93%), while the economy in this context is represented in 30.38% of the texts. Negative texts were recorded, among other things, on social issues (28.26%) and political life in Serbia (18.11%). Among the ten most frequently discussed topics, a significant number of positively connotated texts were written on the cover pages, only when it comes to economy and the army - 16 (10.13%) and 12 (21.43%) (**Table 30**). The largest number of positively connotated texts in relation to all topics relates to Russia - 17 or 45.95% (**Chart 15**).

Table 30. – Distribution of topics and their value-orientation in seven sampled newspapers⁴

All media	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Political life in Serbia	635	30,37	9	1,42	511	80,47	115	18,11
Economy	158	7,56	16	10,13	94	59,49	48	30,38
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Pristina	137	6,55	0	0,00	50	36,50	87	63,50
Regional cooperation	132	6,31	3	2,27	48	36,36	81	61,36
International relations	77	3,68	0	0,00	49	63,64	28	36,36
Media/ Media freedoms	73	3,49	1	1,37	23	31,51	49	67,12
Rule of Law/ Activities of institutions	56	2,68	1	1,79	36	64,29	19	33,93
Army	56	2,68	12	21,43	36	64,29	8	14,29
EU/ Politics of EU	55	2,63	3	5,45	46	83,64	6	10,91
Social issues	46	2,20	0	0,00	33	71,74	13	28,26

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 31. – Value context in relation to all the topics in all seven media


Total	No	%
Positive	136	6,50
Neutral	1333	63,75
Negative	622	29,75
total	2091	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

If we look at the attitude of the media towards Russia and the European Union, we can see a slightly higher representation of the texts on the EU - 55 versus 37. However, media attitude towards countries continues to differ. When it comes to Russia, 45.95% of all texts from the sample are positive (**Graph 15**), which is, first of all, the result of writing of daily newspapers *Informer*, where 8 out of 13 published articles were positive (61.54%), and *Politika* (6 or 42.86% positive texts). Texts in a positive context were also recorded in *Večernje novosti* (2) and *Kurir* (1), while only one negative was found in the newspaper *Alo!*. On the other hand, the EU has a positive tone in just one text in *Politika*, *Danas* and *Informer*. Negative texts about the EU are recorded in *Politika* (4), *Kurir* and *Večernje novosti* (one each).

⁴ In all tables, 10 most representative topic are listed.

Graph 15. – Value context in all media in relation to the topic *Russia/ Attitude towards Russia* and *EU / EU policy*



Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Distribution of topics according to media

Blic

The most frequent topic in the daily *Blic* is the political in Serbia, with the high 41.25% (99 articles), which is approximately equivalent to the last quarter. Most articles on this topic are neutral (90.91%), while the remaining 8.08% are negative, with one positive text. From the list of most frequent topics in *Blic*, the largest share of negative reporting falls within Economy - 60.53%. This topic is the second on the list of frequency with 38 or 15.83% texts. Kosovo threads are present with same amount as in the previous quarter; a context value of these texts is negative in 36.36% cases. A similar representation and negatively intoned texts are present when it comes to the topic of the Region - 33.33%. From this list, daily *Blic* published one text with positive connotation about the army (order and evaluative structure of other most frequent topics can be seen in the Table 32).

In the second quarter of 2017, daily *Blic* had 20.83% of its texts placed in the positive or negative context (Table 33), which is approximately 6% less than in the beginning of 2017 period between 2017. *Blic* publishes an extremely small number of positively valued texts - only 2 or 0.83%, while the remaining 20% were negative.

Table 32. – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Political life in Serbia	99	41,25	1	1,01	90	90,91	8	8,08
Economy	38	15,83	0	0,00	15	39,47	23	60,53
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Pristina	22	9,17	0	0,00	14	63,64	8	36,36
Regional cooperation	12	5,00	0	0,00	8	66,67	4	33,33
Government of RS	9	3,75	0	0,00	8	88,89	1	11,11
Rule of Law/ Activities of institutions	8	3,33	0	0,00	6	75,00	2	25,00
Army	7	2,92	1	14,29	6	85,71	0	0,00
International Relations	5	2,08	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00
Religion/Church issues	4	1,67	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00
Terrorism and ISIL	4	1,67	0	0,00	3	75,00	1	25,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 33. – Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	No	%
Positive	2	0,83
Neutral	190	79,17
Negative	48	20,00
total	240	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Kurir

Political life in Serbia is again a topic that dominates the front pages of *Kurir*, this time in 43.59% or 102 texts, of which 43.14% were of negative connotation, with one positively intoned text. Kosovo topics were present in 16 or 6.84% of the texts, out of which 87.5% were negative. A significant share of negatively intoned titles was related to the Region (85.71%), with a total of 14 written texts. This media is still very active in the monitoring of developments in relation to crime, represented in 9 or 3.85% of texts (88.89% negative), followed by 8 pieces devoted to international relations (62.5% negatively connotted) and the activities of the President of Serbia (75 % negatively connotted texts). Murder of Jelena Marjanovic is a topic still present on 6 front pages of *Kurir*, despite the fact that significant progress in the

investigation of this murder was not made.⁵

In *Kurir*, evaluative texts are present with 61.97%, which is about 20% higher than in the previous quarter. 59.83% of those are negative (the largest proportion of negatively intoned texts of all sampled newspapers) and 14.2% positive (**Table 35**).

Table 34. – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Political life in Serbia	102	43,59	1	0,98	57	55,88	44	43,14
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Pristina	16	6,84	0	0,00	2	12,50	14	87,50
Regional cooperation	14	5,98	0	0,00	2	14,29	12	85,71
Crime	9	3,85	0	0,00	1	11,11	8	88,89
International relations	8	3,42	0	0,00	3	37,50	5	62,50
Activity of the President of Serbia	8	3,42	0	0,00	2	25,00	6	75,00
Media/Media freedoms	7	2,99	0	0,00	3	42,86	4	57,14
Murder of the singer Jelena Marjanovic	6	2,56	0	0,00	1	16,67	5	83,33
Activity of the Government of RS	6	2,56	0	0,00	0	0,00	6	100,00
Local government	5	2,14	0	0,00	1	20,00	4	80,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 35. – Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	No	%
Positive	5	2,14
Neutral	89	38,03
Negative	140	59,83
total	234	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

⁵ The murder of Jelena Marjanović is represented in as many as 319 or 3.85% of the entire media sample for 2016 (8293 texts), and this is the sixth topic by representation throughout the past year. *Informer*, *Kurir* and *Alo!* wrote the most on this topic.

Informer

Daily newspaper *Informer*, compared to the previous quarter, has half less articles dedicated to the topic of political life in Serbia (36 or 17.65% in the second, opposed to 82 or 36.28% in the first quarter), and about 58% of these texts are negatively intoned. This newspaper records the highest share of value-oriented and a large share of negatively intoned texts in relation to all topics. Thus, texts related to regional relations are negatively intoned in 77.42% or 24 out of 31 cases, the media (27 exclusively negatively intoned), Kosovo (94.44% - 17/18) and the US (62.5% - 5/8). On the other hand, a clear position, yet a positive one, is demonstrated towards Russia, so in 8 out of 13 or 61.54% about it have a positive tone. Also, *Informer* favors military issues (3). The only topic that was represented in a relatively neutral context is the economy (87.5% neutral) (**Table 36**).

Journalists of *Informer* don't take a clear stand in only 33.33% of cases; the positive tone is expressed in 10.78% and a negative one in 55.88% of texts (see Table 37).

Table 36. – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Political life in Serbia	36	17,65	0	0,00	15	41,67	21	58,33
Regional cooperation	31	15,20	0	0,00	7	22,58	24	77,42
Media/Media freedoms	27	13,24	0	0,00	0	0,00	27	100,00
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Pristina	18	8,82	0	0,00	1	5,56	17	94,44
Russia/ Attitude towards Russia	13	6,37	8	61,54	5	38,46	0	0,00
International relations	10	4,90	0	0,00	6	60,00	4	40,00
USA/ Attitude towards USA	8	3,92	0	0,00	3	37,50	5	62,50
Economy	8	3,92	1	12,50	7	87,50	0	0,00
Terrorism and ISIS	6	2,94	0	0,00	3	50,00	3	50,00
Army	6	2,94	3	50,00	2	33,33	1	16,67

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 37. – Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	No	%
Positive	22	10,78
Neutral	68	33,33
Negative	114	55,88
total	204	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Alo!

Daily *Alo!*, as well as the other sampled newspapers (except *Politika*), are mostly writing about political life in Serbia (93 or 42.08% texts), with an overwhelmingly neutral content (89.25%). On the front pages of *Alo!*, a lot of attention is paid to the topic of Kosovo / Relations between Belgrade and Pristina (24 or 10.86%), largely presented in a negative tone - 58.33%. In a similar manner, but slightly less negative, *Alo!* writes about regional relations (9 texts, 44.44% negative). The most neutral manner *Alo!* has in the area of sports (3.17% - 7 texts, 85.71% neutral), the economy, local government and international relations (6 or 2.71%), while the issue of religion, in 6 published stories, mostly negative context is present – with 66.67%. The daily newspaper *Alo!*, the same as *Kurir*, continues to pay attention to information in connection with the murder of Jelena Marjanovic, featured on the cover in 5 neutral titles. The only issue among the more frequent, which had two positive texts, was the army (the third topic on the list with 11 or 4.98% titles) (Table 38).

The evaluation is present in the texts in *Alo!* with 23.08% (Table 39), i.e. value-oriented texts are about 3% less present than in the first quarter. In these papers, 7 texts have a positive tone on the subject, while the remaining stories (19.91%) had a negative tone.

Table 38. – Distribution of topics and their value context in the daily *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Political life in Serbia	93	42,08	1	1,08	83	89,25	9	9,68
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Pristina	24	10,86	0	0,00	10	41,67	14	58,33
Army	11	4,98	2	18,18	9	81,82	0	0,00
Regional cooperation	9	4,07	0	0,00	5	55,56	4	44,44
Sports	7	3,17	0	0,00	6	85,71	1	14,29
Economy	6	2,71	0	0,00	6	100,00	0	0,00
Local government	6	2,71	1	16,67	4	66,67	1	16,67
International Relations	6	2,71	0	0,00	5	83,33	1	16,67
Religion/Church issues	6	2,71	0	0,00	2	33,33	4	66,67
The murder of singer Jelena Marjanovic	5	2,26	0	0,00	5	100,00	0	0,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 39. – Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	No	%
Positive	7	3,17
Neutral	170	76,92
Negative	44	19,91
total	221	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Politika

Daily *Politika* se mostly dealt with the Economy in the second quarter of 2017. – 51 or 12.03% texts – 35.29% (18) negative, and 17.65% (9) positive. As already mentioned, political life in Serbia is the second most frequent topic in this paper, with 39 (9.2%) published texts (out of which 10.26% negative). The topics that are presented in mostly negative way in *Politika* are mainly related to the issues in the region (30 texts, 56.67% negative) and Kosovo (25 texts, 72% negative), which has been a trend in these papers in almost all analyzed quarters. More negatively intoned stories are devoted to the social issues (69.23% of 13 published), while 38.71% negative texts are about the International Relations. *Politika* takes neutral stand in the context of EU (81.48%) and education (91.67%). Majority of positively intoned stories were about Russia, where 42.86% or 6 out of 14 were of positive context. There were positive texts within the topic of culture – 21.05% (more info in **table 40**).

For the first time since Mediameter analysis have started, the daily *Politika*, has not published the largest number of sampled texts, but it still holds the first place when it comes to the pluralism of topics. It published 6.56% more value-oriented texts than in the last quarter, 41.98%, or 178 out of 424, out of which 10.38% positive and 31.6% negative (see **Table 41**).

Table 40. – Distribution of topics and their value context in the paper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Economy	51	12,03	9	17,65	24	47,06	18	35,29
Political life in Serbia	39	9,20	0	0,00	35	89,74	4	10,26
International relations	31	7,31	0	0,00	19	61,29	12	38,71
Regional cooperation	30	7,08	1	3,33	12	40,00	17	56,67
EU/ EU policy	27	6,37	1	3,70	22	81,48	4	14,81
Kosovo/Relations of Belgrade and Pristina	25	5,90	0	0,00	7	28,00	18	72,00
Culture	19	4,48	4	21,05	10	52,63	5	26,32
Russia/ Attitude towards Russia	14	3,30	6	42,86	8	57,14	0	0,00
Social issues	13	3,07	0	0,00	4	30,77	9	69,23
Education	12	2,83	0	0,00	11	91,67	1	8,33

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 41. – Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	No	%
Positive	44	10,38
Neutral	246	58,02
Negative	134	31,60
total	424	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Večernje novosti

The attention of *Večernje novosti* was pointed at political events which amounts to 61 published texts or 19,55 % in the first quarter, of which four was in negative and one in a positive tone. The following two topics were again pointed at Kosovo/ regional relationship between Belgrade and Priština (24 texts per issue-7,69%). Those are the topics mentioned in a negative tone in almost all previous quarters. This media keeps pursuing the mentioned practice in this quarter as well. Therefore, 75% of regional topics in the issued texts are written in a negative tone and 66,67% is directed towards Kosovo. Social issues were covered in a neutral tone exclusively (13 articles per issue/4,14%). Media and topics on system of justice were covered in 9 texts per issue (66,67% was in a neutral tone in both cases). On the other hand, the topics that were covered in a positive tone (also represented in 9 articles), were on protocol events (88,89% texts in a positive tone) and the military (33,33%), and the recorded inscriptions written in a positive tone covered infrastructure (50% out of 12 published inscriptions) and economy (31,58% out of 19 published inscriptions) (please see **table 42**).

60,58% of sampled texts published on the covers of *Večernje novosti* were in a neutral context. 15,06%⁶ were in a positive tone while 24,36% were in a negative value context. This makes a total of 4% increase in the value context inscriptions in comparison to the previous quarters (**table 43**).

⁶ The largest share and the number of positively connoted texts - 15.05% or 47, was published in *Večernje novosti*.

Table 42. – Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Political life in Serbia	61	19,55	1	1,64	56	91,80	4	6,56
Kosovo/ Belgrade relations with Priština	24	7,69	0	0,00	8	33,33	16	66,67
Regional cooperation/relation in the region	24	7,69	1	4,17	5	20,83	18	75,00
Economy	19	6,09	6	31,58	13	68,42	0	0,00
Social issues/ social politics	13	4,17	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Infrastructure	12	3,85	6	50,00	6	50,00	0	0,00
Media/freedom of media	9	2,88	0	0,00	6	66,67	3	33,33
Protocol events	9	2,88	8	88,89	1	11,11	0	0,00
System of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	9	2,88	1	11,11	6	66,67	2	22,22
Military	9	2,88	3	33,33	4	44,44	2	22,22

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 43. – Value context in relation to all topics in the paper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	No. of texts	%
Positive	47	15,06
Neutral	189	60,58
Negative	76	24,36
total	312	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Danas

In the daily paper *Danas* political topics dominate with 2% of increase in comparison to the previous quarter. Therefore, 205 texts or 44,96% covered political life in Serbia out of which 12.2% in a negative tone and 2,44 in a positive tone. The next ranked topic was the *economy* (31-6,8% texts- 9,68% in a negative tone), while the following topic according to the participation was *media/freedom of media* in 48% of texts presented in a negative tone (there were 25 issued texts on media- 5,48%). The following topics are the *system of justice, activities of judiciary bodies* (16-3,51%) and *EU/ European Union politics* (14-3,07%) mostly presented in a neutral manner. Unlike majority of other sampled media, daily paper *Danas* presents regional relations in a neutral tone (12-2,63%) in 75% of inscriptions and more than 80% of neutral texts were on social topics and economy. The most inscriptions in a negative tone were recorded on the topic of Local Government activities - 60%, which is also 10th ranked topic according to the representation (please see **table 44**).

This is the first time we recorded the largest number of sampled texts in daily paper *Danas* – 456 and the largest participation of neutral texts - 83,55%. 1.97% in a positive tone and 14,47% in a negative tone which is a similar outcome to the one in the previous quarter (**table 45**).

Table 44. – Value context in relation to the topic in daily paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	Value context with reference to the topic							
	total		Positive		Neutral		Negative	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Political life in Serbia	205	44,96	5	2,44	175	85,37	25	12,20
Economy	31	6,80	0	0,00	28	90,32	3	9,68
Media/freedom of media	25	5,48	1	4,00	12	48,00	12	48,00
Culture	17	3,73	0	0,00	16	94,12	1	5,88
System of justice, activities of judiciary bodies	16	3,51	0	0,00	11	68,75	5	31,25
EU/European Union politics	14	3,07	1	7,14	13	92,86	0	0,00
Regional cooperation/relation in the region	12	2,63	1	8,33	9	75,00	2	16,67
Social issues/social politics	12	2,63	0	0,00	11	91,67	1	8,33
Economy	11	2,41	0	0,00	9	81,82	2	18,18
Local Government	10	2,19	0	0,00	4	40,00	6	60,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 45. – Value context in relation to all the topics in the daily paper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	No	%
Positive	9	1,97
Neutral	381	83,55
Negative	66	14,47
total	456	100,00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Balance

When we take into account all the texts from the sample for the period April-June 2017, it can be noticed that most of the topics presented were not treated in a comprehensive manner, as evidenced by the fact that the balance is present in only 19.37% of all texts, 2% less than in the previous quarter. The least balanced texts were recorded in newspaper *Informer* - 1.96% or 4 out of 204 entries, while in *Kurir* 8.12% or 19 out of 234 texts were balanced. In the fourth quarter, *Politika* daily additionally reduced the number of balanced texts by about 2%, so in these newspapers only 15.09% or 64 out of 424 entries are comprehensive. *Alo!* follows with 75.57% of the unbalanced texts, *Blic* (75%) and *Danas* (74.56%), while the highest number comprehensive texts were recorded in *Večernje novosti* (71.79%), which is also very small in the total number of entries (**Table 46**).

Although the value context is not expressed in 63.75% of all texts, consideration must be given to the fact that the vast majority of texts from the cover pages we have analyzed are not comprehensive, and that one-sided approach reflects the general situation in the Serbian media.

Balanced texts, of course, necessarily show some degree of restraint, which, obviously, does not represent a particularly widespread phenomenon in Serbian journalism. Taking sides, which is sometimes very stressful, attracts the audience but reduces seriousness. This is about the speed of the reaction, not the detailed and rational information required by the research, a larger number of interlocutors and reliable and verifiable data, along with available information sources. In this way, circulation and popularity are gained in a short time, but not a reputation.

Table 46. – The balance in relation to all the topics and all seven media from the sample

All media	Yes		No	
Media	%	No.	%	No.
<i>Informer</i>	1,96	4	98,04	200
<i>Kurir</i>	8,12	19	91,88	215
<i>Politika</i>	15,09	64	84,91	360
<i>Alo!</i>	24,43	54	75,57	167
<i>Blic</i>	25,00	60	75,00	180
<i>Danas</i>	25,44	116	74,56	340
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	28,21	88	71,79	224
total	19,37	405	80,63	1686

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Actors

Media in Serbia, at least according to the analysis of the empirical material collected from the front pages, mainly deal with political events within Serbia. Even 49.09% of the total number of actors covered by selected texts from the front pages are (individual and collective) political actors who occupy different positions within the political life of Serbia (see **Table 47** and **Tables 48, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57** and **58**, which present the distribution of the frequency, the occurrence of individual individual appearances, and **Tables 59, 60, 61** and **62**, which speak of the distribution of the frequency of the appearance of collective domestic political actors). If we add this number to the texts that speak of foreign political actors, the percentage of the participation of political actors in the total number of actors on the headlines rises to 74.45%. The second group by frequency of occurrence is different social actors, which make up 15.06% of our sample. Economic actors are the protagonists of the texts on the covers in only 6.79% of cases (see **Table 47**).

Table 47. – Total distribution of actors appearing in the texts which are a part of sampled research (expressed in absolute numbers)

Actors					
Political causes	10404	Domestic	6860	Individual	5070
				Collective	1790
		Foreign	3544	Individual	2869
				Collective	675
Economic actors	950	Domestic	915	Individual	324
				Collective	591
		Foreign	35	Individual	0
				Collective	35
Other social actors	2105	Domestic	2077	Individual	1472
				Collective	605
		Foreign	28	Individual	28
				Collective	0
Unnamed source					514
Total					13973

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

In tables 48,53-58 distribution of frequency of appearance of certain political actors that are active within the political scene of Serbia. Individual political actors- members of the Serbian government (43.19%), actors of political parties in office (10.05%) and actors from opposition parties (30.17) are increasingly present on the front pages (77.75%) in comparison to 8.77% representatives of state agencies and institutions, 2.30% representatives of local government, 3.90% representatives of armed and police forces and 7.25% of those who do not belong to the present government of Serbia nor opposition parties.

Table 48. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearance of individual political actors from the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the President of the Republic of Serbia

The Government and the President of the Republic of Serbia	No	%	Positive	%	Neu-tral	%	Nega-tive	%
Aleksandar Vučić	843	38,49	28	3,32	774	91,81	41	4,86
Ivica Dačić	258	11,78	0	0,00	244	94,57	14	5,43
Ana Brnabić	189	8,63	8	4,23	181	95,77	0	0,00
Tomislav Nikolić	171	7,81	2	1,17	147	85,96	22	12,87
Nebojša Stefanović	123	5,62	0	0,00	119	96,75	4	3,25
Aleksandar Vulin	106	4,84	0	0,00	102	96,23	4	3,77
Zorana Mihajlović	83	3,79	0	0,00	81	97,59	2	2,41
Rasim Ljajić	50	2,28	0	0,00	50	100,00	0	0,00
Zoran Đorđević	47	2,15	0	0,00	45	95,74	2	4,26
Dušan Vujović	37	1,69	0	0,00	37	100,00	0	0,00
Aleksandar Antić	36	1,64	0	0,00	36	100,00	0	0,00
Mladen Šarčević	36	1,64	0	0,00	35	97,22	1	2,78
Slavica Đukić Dejanović	33	1,51	0	0,00	33	100,00	0	0,00
Jadranka Joksimović	30	1,37	0	0,00	30	100,00	0	0,00
Branislav Nedimović	30	1,37	1	3,33	29	96,67	0	0,00
Vladan Vukosavljević	29	1,32	0	0,00	28	96,55	1	3,45
Goran Knežević	23	1,05	0	0,00	23	100,00	0	0,00
Zlatibor Lončar	22	1,00	0	0,00	21	95,45	1	4,55
Nela Kuburović	21	0,96	0	0,00	21	100,00	0	0,00
Vanja Udovičić	13	0,59	0	0,00	13	100,00	0	0,00
Milan Krkobabić	10	0,46	0	0,00	10	100,00	0	0,00
total	2190	100,00	39	1,78	2059	94,02	92	4,20

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

As in the previous quarter, the most frequent actor on the front pages of daily newspapers in Serbia was Prime Minister and current President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić,⁷ about whom media from our sample report predominantly neutral (in 91.81% of cases). About 3.32% (28)⁸ positive and 4.86% (41) texts with negative connotation were written about him. The Serbian Prime Minister / President, as the protagonist of the texts on the cover, appears 843 times, which is significantly higher than the next ranked actor, Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić, who is present in 258 texts, the ministers for local self-government and then candidates for Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabić⁹ (189 articles) and Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić,¹⁰ who appeared in total 171 times. The highest frequency of the appearance of Aleksandar Vučić, expressed in absolute numbers, is recorded in the daily newspapers *Danas* (229), *Večernje novosti* (118) i *Kurir* (116). Expressed in the relative numbers of the percentage participation of the texts in which he appears as an actor, and in relation to the total number of selected texts from the same newspapers, we can see that he is the most frequent in *Danas* (50.22%), and then in the daily newspapers *Kurir* (49.57%) and *Alo!* (43.89%). The smallest share of the texts in which the Serbian Prime Minister / President of Serbia is the actor, is recorded in *Politika* (23.82%) (see **Table 50**).

When it comes to the value context, the largest share, as well as the number of negative texts, are again present in *Danas* (9.61% or 22 entries) and *Kurir* (16.38% or 19 entries). Except in these daily newspapers, negative connotations are not recorded in any other media. The most positive texts were published in *Informer* - 12.20% or 10, followed by *Večernje novosti* (8), *Politika* (5) and *Alo!* (5) (more information in **Table 49**).

Table 49. – Aleksandar Vučić: Context value with reference to the media

Aleksandar Vučić	Positive		Neutral		Negative		total	
Media	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<i>Alo!</i>	5	5.15	92	94.85	0	0.00	97	100.00
<i>Blic</i>	0	0.00	100	100.00	0	0.00	100	100.00
<i>Danas</i>	0	0.00	207	90.39	22	9.61	229	100.00
<i>Informer</i>	10	12.20	72	87.80	0	0.00	82	100.00
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0.00	97	83.62	19	16.38	116	100.00
<i>Politika</i>	5	4.95	96	95.05	0	0.00	101	100.00
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	8	6.78	110	93.22	0	0.00	118	100.00
total	28	3.32	774	91.81	41	4.86	843	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

7 During the second quarter of 2017, on April 2nd 2017, presidential elections were held where the then Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, won. He took over the position of the President of Serbia on May 31st 2017.

8 About 25% less than in the previous quarter, when a total of 40 positive texts were recorded, but more than in the last quarter of 2016, when only 16 positive connotations were recorded.

9 Ana Brnabić was appointed prime minister at the end of the second quarter of 2017 - on June 29th 2017, when the new Government of the Republic of Serbia was also constituted. For this reason, the previous convocation of the Government was presented in the table.

10 See footnote 7.

Table 50. – Number of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić in respect of total numbers of texts in particular dailies

Aleksandar Vučić per media	No. of appearances	Total no. of texts	% share against total no. of texts
<i>Danas</i>	229	456	50.22
<i>Kurir</i>	116	234	49.57
<i>Alo!</i>	97	221	43.89
<i>Blic</i>	100	240	41.67
<i>Informer</i>	82	204	40.20
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	118	312	37.82
<i>Politika</i>	101	424	23.82
total	843	2091	40.32

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

The former President of the Republic of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić, who is the protagonist in 171 (7.81%) of analyzed texts, is the fourth according to the frequency of appearances among individual political actors from the Serbian political scene (see **Table 48**).

The highest number of articles in which the Serbian president was published in newspapers *Blic* (31) and *Politika* (31), but *Blic* (12.92%) and *Kurir* (12.39%) have the largest share in the total number of articles in the media (**Table 51**). The most negative connotations about Tomislav Nikolić are recorded in *Blic* (13), where the largest percentage of negative connotations (41.94%) is recorded. In this quarter, unlike the previous two, in which no positive text on the current president of Serbia was written, we note two such texts published in *Politika* (see **Table 52**).

Other actors from this group are almost in 95% of texts presented in a neutral value context. In addition to the president and prime minister, a slightly larger number of negative connotations were recorded with Ivica Dačić - 14¹¹ and Aleksandar Vulin and Nebojša Stefanović (4 negative connotations) (**Table 48**).

11 Somewhat higher than in the previous quarter when there were 10, and less than 15 negative connotations in the fourth quarter of 2016, 21 in the third quarter of 2016, and 35 negative connotations in the second quarter of 2016.

Table 51. – Number of appearances of Tomislav Nikolić in respect of total numbers of texts in particular dailies

Tomislav Nikolić per media	No. of appearances	Total no. of texts	% share against total no. of texts
<i>Blic</i>	31	240	12.92
<i>Kurir</i>	29	234	12.39
<i>Alo!</i>	20	221	9.05
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	26	312	8.33
<i>Politika</i>	31	424	7.31
<i>Danas</i>	26	456	5.70
<i>Informer</i>	8	204	3.92
total	171	2091	8.18

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 52. – Tomislav Nikolić: Context value with reference to the media

Tomislav Nikolić	Positive		Neutral		Negative		total	
Media	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
<i>Alo!</i>	0	0.00	17	85.00	3	15.00	20	100.00
<i>Blic</i>	0	0.00	18	58.06	13	41.94	31	100.00
<i>Danas</i>	0	0.00	26	100.00	0	0.00	26	100.00
<i>Informer</i>	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00	8	100.00
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0.00	23	79.31	6	20.69	29	100.00
<i>Politika</i>	2	6.45	29	93.55	0	0.00	31	100.00
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0	0.00	26	100.00	0	0.00	26	100.00
total	2	1.17%	147	85.96%	22	12.87%	171	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

In the fourth quarter of 2016, there were 1225 appearances of opposition actors. This number was significantly increased in the first quarter of 2017, when 1981 appearance of opposition figures was recorded. In the second quarter of 2017, this number is back to values from the end of the previous year (1243). The most represented opposition leaders¹² are Saša Janković (183 texts), Vuk Jeremić (101), and Vojislav Šešelj (94). The highest number of negative texts was written about Saša Janković (27 - 14.75%) and Vuk Jeremić (19 - 18.81%). About the representatives of the opposition in the second quarter of 2017, only one positive text was written (0.08%) (see Table 53).

Table 53. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearance of individual political actors from the opposition

Opposition- individual	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Saša Janković	183	14.72	1	0.55	155	84.70	27	14.75
Vuk Jeremić	101	8.13	0	0.00	82	81.19	19	18.81
Vojislav Šešelj	94	7.56	0	0.00	91	96.81	3	3.19
Boris Tadić	73	5.87	0	0.00	71	97.26	2	2.74
Boško Obradović	72	5.79	0	0.00	68	94.44	4	5.56
Ljubiša Preletačević Beli	65	5.23	0	0.00	64	98.46	1	1.54
Zoran Živković	53	4.26	0	0.00	51	96.23	2	3.77
Čedomir Jovanović	50	4.02	0	0.00	47	94.00	3	6.00
Saša Radulović	47	3.78	0	0.00	43	91.49	4	8.51
Dragan Šutanovac	42	3.38	0	0.00	42	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Stamatović	34	2.74	0	0.00	34	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Čanak	32	2.57	0	0.00	32	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Parović	29	2.33	0	0.00	29	100.00	0	0.00
Sanda Rašković Ivić	28	2.25	0	0.00	27	96.43	1	3.57
Bojan Pajtić	20	1.61	0	0.00	17	85.00	3	15.00
Aleksandar Popović	18	1.45	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Borko Stefanović	15	1.21	0	0.00	13	86.67	2	13.33
Dušan Teodorović	14	1.13	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
Đorđe Vukadinović	14	1.13	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
Marinika Tepić	13	1.05	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Janko Veselinović	12	0.97	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Radoslav Milojević Kena	11	0.88	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00

¹² Who were also presidential candidates.

Velimir Ilić	10	0.80	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Vjerica Radeta	10	0.80	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Đurišić	10	0.80	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Dijana Vukomanović	9	0.72	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Vesna Rakić Vodinelić	9	0.72	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Balša Božović	8	0.64	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Sreto Malinović	8	0.64	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Ćirić	7	0.56	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Aida Ćorović	6	0.48	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Konstantin Samofalov	6	0.48	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Nemanja Šarović	5	0.40	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Duda Ivković	4	0.32	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Tatjana Macura	4	0.32	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Miloš Jovanović	4	0.32	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Pavlović	3	0.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milorad Mirčić	3	0.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Bojan Kostreš	3	0.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Sulejman Ugljanin	3	0.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Krasić	3	0.24	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Željka Radeta	3	0.24	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Saša Mirković	2	0.16	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Bastać	1	0.08	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Petrović	1	0.08	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Others	101	8.13	0	0.00	96	95.05	5	4.95
total	1243	100.00	1	0.08	1158	93.16	84	6.76

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

In **tables 54, 55 i 56** show the value context within which some individual political actors – representatives of political parties in the opposition, state bodies, agencies, institutions and local self-government – appeared in selected front-page texts, while Tables 63 and 64 show the frequency and value context of appearances of representatives of military and police forces and other social and political actors.

Table 54. – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual political actors representing the position.

Position- individual	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Dragan Marković Palma	61	11.98	0	0.00	57	93.44	4	6.56
Branko Ružić	59	11.59	0	0.00	57	96.61	2	3.39
Nikola Selaković	37	7.27	0	0.00	37	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Đukanović	37	7.27	0	0.00	36	97.30	1	2.70
Muamer Zukorlić	28	5.50	0	0.00	26	92.86	2	7.14
Vuk Drašković	26	5.11	0	0.00	25	96.15	1	3.85
Nenad Popović	20	3.93	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Trivan	18	3.54	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
Aleksandar Martinović	18	3.54	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
Bogoljub Karić	17	3.34	0	0.00	15	88.24	2	11.76
Marijan Rističević	12	2.36	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Novica Tončev	12	2.36	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Milovan Drecun	11	2.16	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Darko Glišić	11	2.16	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Lazanski	10	1.96	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Orlić	9	1.77	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Milenko Jovanov	9	1.77	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Marija Obradović	8	1.57	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Predrag Marković	8	1.57	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Milićević	7	1.38	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Ištvan Pastor	6	1.18	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Radimir Nikolić	6	1.18	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Igor Bečić	6	1.18	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Žarko Obradović	5	0.98	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Miodrag Linta	5	0.98	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Milutin Mrkonjić	4	0.79	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Ivana Petrović	3	0.59	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Zagrađanin	3	0.59	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Zoran Anđelković	3	0.59	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Dubravka Filipovski	3	0.59	0	0.00	3	100.00		0.00
Others	47	9.23	0	0.00	44	93.62	3	6.38
total	509	100.00	0	0.00	484	95.09	25	4.91

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 55. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual political actors: representatives of State bodies, agencies and institutions

State bodies, agencies and institutions	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Maja Gojković	82	18.43	0	0.00	80	97.56	2	2.44
Siniša Mali	56	12.58	0	0.00	54	96.43	2	3.57
Miloš Vučević	46	10.34	0	0.00	46	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Đurić	27	6.07	0	0.00	27	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Vesić	19	4.27	0	0.00	18	94.74	1	5.26
Veljko Odalović	12	2.70	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Jorgovanka Tabaković	9	2.02	1	11.11	6	66.67	2	22.22
Vladimir Dimitrijević	9	2.02	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Mrkić	7	1.57	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Zoran Stanković	6	1.35	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Nino Brajović	6	1.35	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Stanislava Pak	4	0.90	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Igor Mirović	4	0.90	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Blagojević	4	0.90	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Milovan Drecun	4	0.90	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Strahinja Sekulić	3	0.67	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	147	33.03	0	0.00	117	79.59	30	20.41
total	445	100.00	1	0.22	403	90.56	41	9.21

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 56. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual political actors: representatives of local governments

Representatives of local governments	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Jonuz Musliju	33	28.21	0	0.00	16	48.48	17	51.52
Aleksandar Šapić	13	11.11	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Boško Ničić	9	7.69	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Veroljub Stevanović	5	4.27	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Others	57	48.72	0	0.00	53	92.98	4	7.02
total	117	100.00	0	0.00	96	82.05	21	17.95

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 57. – Distribution and frequency and value context of appearances of individual political actors: representatives of military and police

Military and police	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Ljubiša Diković	35	17.68	0	0.00	35	100.00	0	0.00
Bratislav Gašić	34	17.17	2	5.88	31	91.18	1	2.94
Aleksandar Đorđević	10	5.05	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Ranko Živak	8	4.04	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Novica Antić	7	3.54	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Momir Stojanović	5	2.53	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Veljko Mijailović	4	2.02	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Milorad Veljović	3	1.52	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	92	46.46	6	6.52	74	80.43	12	13.04
total	198	100.00	8	4.04	177	89.39	13	6.57

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 58. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of **other** individual political and social actors

Others društveno - Political causes	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Slobodan Milošević	100	25.45	1	1.00	97	97.00	2	2.00
Zoran Đinđić	41	10.43	0	0.00	41	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Đilas	29	7.38	0	0.00	26	89.66	3	10.34
Vojislav Koštunica	24	6.11	0	0.00	24	100.00	0	0.00
Dragica Nikolić	22	5.60	1	4.55	12	54.55	9	40.91

Mlađan Dinkić	17	4.33	0	0.00	12	70.59	5	29.41
Mirjana Marković	15	3.82	0	0.00	13	86.67	2	13.33
Slavko Ćuruvija	14	3.56	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
SANU	13	3.31	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Mirko Cvetković	11	2.80	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Srbijanka Turajlić	9	2.29	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Nataša Kandić	8	2.04	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Andrej Vučić	8	2.04	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Veran Matić	7	1.78	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Drugi krug	6	1.53	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Bumbaširević	5	1.27	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Fond za humanitarno pravo	5	1.27	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Kovačević	5	1.27	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Vesna Pešić	4	1.02	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Marko Vidojković	4	1.02	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku	4	1.02	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Marija Mali	4	1.02	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Worldlana Ceca Ražnatović	4	1.02	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Jurić	4	1.02	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Karađorđević	4	1.02	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Emir Kusturica	4	1.02	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Sonja Biserko	4	1.02	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Jelena Mačić	3	0.76	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Filip David	3	0.76	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava	3	0.76	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nataša Jeremić	3	0.76	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Milošević	3	0.76	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Mihajlović	3	0.76	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
total	393	100.00	2	0.51	367	93.38	24	6.11

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Within the category *others*, are actors with a certain social impact or who are represented for other

reasons in the public space, but their social role is not institutionalized. Also in this category are persons who had great influence or significant political roles during their lifetime, such as Zoran Đinđić or Slobodan Milošević.

There are noticeably few texts that deal with significant collective political actors, which are among the domestic political actors with 26.09%. In **Tables 59-62** are listed all the actors from our sample classified in this category, together with the frequencies and value connotations of their occurrence.

Table 59. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **state bodies and institutions**

State bodies, agencies and institutions	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Government of Serbia	162	23.11	3	1.85	154	95.06	5	3.09
Ministry of Interior	64	9.13	1	1.56	61	95.31	2	3.13
RIK	58	8.27	0	0.00	58	100.00	0	0.00
National Assembly of Serbia	44	6.28	0	0.00	44	100.00	0	0.00
National Bank of Serbia	34	4.85	0	0.00	33	97.06	1	2.94
Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development	31	4.42	0	0.00	30	96.77	1	3.23
Ministry of Culture and Information	30	4.28	0	0.00	29	96.67	1	3.33
Ministry of Defence	29	4.14	0	0.00	29	100.00	0	0.00
Foreign Ministry	27	3.85	0	0.00	24	88.89	3	11.11
Ministry of Justice	21	3.00	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Health	20	2.85	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Business Registers Agency	16	2.28	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Finance	16	2.28	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
"Serbian authorities"	15	2.14	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Ministry of State Administration and Local Government	13	1.85	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Policy	12	1.71	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Construction, Traffic and Infrastructure	10	1.43	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection	8	1.14	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Economy	8	1.14	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Tax Administration	8	1.14	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00

Restitution Agency	6	0.86	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunication	5	0.71	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian Presidency	5	0.71	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ministry of Energy and Mining	5	0.71	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
The Government of Autonomous Province of Vojvodina	3	0.43	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Republic Geodetic Authority	3	0.43	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
City of Belgrade	3	0.43	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	45	6.42	0	0.00	44	97.78	1	2.22
total	701	100.00	4	0.57	681	97.15	16	2.28

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 60. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **military and police**

Military and police	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Serbian Armed Forces	43	29.45	5	11.63	37	86.05	1	2.33
BIA	32	21.92	0	0.00	31	96.88	1	3.13
Military Security Agency	15	10.27	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian Military Union	14	9.59	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian Police Union	14	9.59	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Service for Combating Organized Crime	3	2.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Special Armed Forces	3	2.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
other	22	15.07	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
total	146	100.00	5	3.42	139	95.21	2	1.37

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 61. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective political actors: **position**

Position	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
SNS	274	54.80	1	0.36	252	91.97	21	7.66
SPS	117	23.40	1	0.85	115	98.29	1	0.85
United Serbia	31	6.20	0	0.00	31	100.00	0	0.00
SPO	17	3.40	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
Socialists' Movement	16	3.20	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
PUPS	10	2.00	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
SVM	10	2.00	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
SDPS	10	2.00	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
SNP	8	1.60	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Strength of Serbia Movement	4	0.80	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
other	3	0.60	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
total	500	100.00	2	0.40	475	95.00	23	4.60

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 62. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of domestic collective actors: **opposition**

Opposition-parties	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
DS	92	22.01	0	0.00	91	98.91	1	1.09
LDP	46	11.00	0	0.00	46	100.00	0	0.00
Enough is enough	43	10.29	0	0.00	42	97.67	1	2.33
SRS	43	10.29	0	0.00	43	100.00	0	0.00
Dveri	40	9.57	0	0.00	40	100.00	0	0.00
DSS	35	8.37	0	0.00	35	100.00	0	0.00
SDS	31	7.42	0	0.00	31	100.00	0	0.00
LSV	25	5.98	0	0.00	25	100.00	0	0.00
New party	18	4.31	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
PSG	18	4.31	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
New Serbia	11	2.63	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00

Reversal Movement	5	1.20	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Sandžak SDA	4	0.96	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian Left	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	4	0.96	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
total	418	100.00	0	0.00	416	99.52	2	0.48

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

A significantly lower percentage of texts from the cover page talk about foreign (individual and collective) political actors and political actors from Kosovo (only 25.36% of the total number of actors). The protagonists of these texts are more often individual actors (in 80.95% of cases) than those of the collective (19.04%) (see **Table 47** and Tables **63-76**).

Table 63. – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective actors: **Kosovo**

Kosovo	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Ramuš Haradinaj	119	24.19	0	0.00	52	43.70	67	56.30
Hašim Tači	93	18.90	0	0.00	54	58.06	39	41.94
OVK	42	8.54	0	0.00	18	42.86	24	57.14
Daut Haradinaj	21	4.27	0	0.00	6	28.57	15	71.43
“Kosovo authorities”	14	2.85	0	0.00	10	71.43	4	28.57
Kadri Veselji	13	2.64	0	0.00	8	61.54	5	38.46
KFOR	11	2.24	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian list	11	2.24	1	9.09	10	90.91	0	0.00
Kosovo police	11	2.24	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Bedžet Pacoli	11	2.24	0	0.00	6	54.55	5	45.45
Fatmir Limaj	10	2.03	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Oliver Ivanović	10	2.03	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Isa Mustafa	9	1.83	0	0.00	7	77.78	2	22.22
Unmik	8	1.63	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Self-determination movement	6	1.22	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Albin Kurti	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Kosovo Government	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Agim Čeku	5	1.02	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Slavko Simić	4	0.81	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

Kosovo Assembly	4	0.81	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Kosovo alliance for the future	4	0.81	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Enver Hodžaj	3	0.61	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Edita Tahiri	3	0.61	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Euleks	3	0.61	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Kosovo security forces	3	0.61	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	64	13.01	0	0.00	54	84.38	10	15.63
total	492	100.00	1	0.20	314	63.82	177	35.98

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 64. – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Croatia**

Croatia	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović	42	30.66	0	0.00	38	90.48	4	9.52
Andrej Plenković	21	15.33	0	0.00	19	90.48	2	9.52
Franjo Tuđman	7	5.11	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Milorad Pupovac	7	5.11	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
“Croatian authorities”	5	3.65	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
Ante Pavelić	5	3.65	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Zoran Milanović	4	2.92	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Ivo Josipović	4	2.92	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
HDZ	3	2.19	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Other	39	28.47	1	2.56	35	89.74	3	7.69
total	137	100.00	1	0.73	120	87.59	16	11.68

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 65. – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Montenegro**

Montenegro	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Milo Đukanović	17	22.97	1	5.88	13	76.47	3	17.65
Filip Vujanović	16	21.62	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Democratic front	4	5.41	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

Andrija Mandić	4	5.41	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Duško Mar-ković	4	5.41	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Montenegrin police	3	4.05	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	26	35.14	0	0.00	25	96.15	1	3.85
total	74	100.00	1	1.35	69	93.24	4	5.41

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 66. – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Federation of BiH/Republic of Srpska**

BiH	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Milorad Dodik	63	40.91	0	0.00	63	100.00	0	0.00
Bakir Izetbegović	19	12.34	0	0.00	17	89.47	2	10.53
Mladen Ivanić	11	7.14	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Željka Cvijanović	11	7.14	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Alija Izetbegović	5	3.25	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Dragan Čović	5	3.25	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Čamil Duraković	4	2.60	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Mektić	3	1.95	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Denis Zvizdić	3	1.95	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Čavić	3	1.95	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	27	17.53	0	0.00	27	100.00	0	0.00
total	154	100.00	0	0.00	151	98.05	3	1.95

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 67. – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Macedonia**¹³

Makedonija	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Zoran Zaev	64	22.07	0	0.00	45	70.31	19	29.69
Đorđe Ivanov	42	14.48	0	0.00	42	100.00	0	0.00
Talat Džaferi	28	9.66	0	0.00	16	57.14	12	42.86
Nikola Gruevski	28	9.66	0	0.00	22	78.57	6	21.43

¹³ In the last two quarters, there has been an increase in the number of actors from Macedonia. Media interest in events in Macedonia has risen sharply after holding parliamentary elections in that country on December 11th 2016, after which Makedonija entered into a period of prolonged instability. The accompanying table shows that the media in Serbia reported about events with certain value positions, since almost 15% of the texts are connotated (42 negative and 1 positive). It is interesting to note that the most negative connotations were written about Zoran Zaev (29.69%) and Talat Jafari (42.86%), and that about Đorđe Ivanov was reported exclusively in a neutral context.

VMRO-DPMNE	27	9.31	0	0.00	26	96.30	1	3.70
SDSM	21	7.24	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
DUI	10	3.45	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Stojković	8	2.76	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Ali Ahmeti	5	1.72	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Others	57	19.66	1	1.75	54	94.74	2	3.51
total	290	100.00	1	0.34	247	85.17	42	14.48

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 68. – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual foreign political actors outside the region- **foreign politicians**

Foreign political actors	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Edi Rama	63	8.85	0	0.00	39	61.90	24	38.10
Xi Jinping	36	5.06	0	0.00	36	100.00	0	0.00
Emmanuel Macron	32	4.49	4	12.50	28	87.50	0	0.00
Bashar al Assad	30	4.21	0	0.00	30	100.00	0	0.00
Marin le Pen	29	4.07	0	0.00	28	96.55	1	3.45
Viktor Orban	27	3.79	0	0.00	27	100.00	0	0.00
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	27	3.79	0	0.00	23	85.19	4	14.81
Theresa May	19	2.67	1	5.26	16	84.21	2	10.53
Francois Hollande	15	2.11	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Li Keqiang	15	2.11	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Marti Ahtisari	15	2.11	0	0.00	6	40.00	9	60.00
Alexander Lukashenko	14	1.97	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Sebastian Kurtz	12	1.69	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Lee Machang	10	1.40	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Alexis Tsipras	9	1.26	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Kim Jong Un	8	1.12	1	12.50	6	75.00	1	12.50
Boris Johnson	7	0.98	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Helena Ranta	6	0.84	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Peter Siarto	6	0.84	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Tony Blair	5	0.70	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
"French authorities"	4	0.56	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Nigel Farage	4	0.56	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Bujar Nishani	4	0.56	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
"Chinese authorities"	4	0.56	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

Jeremy Corbin	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nursultan Nazarbayev	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Miro Cerar	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Filip Hammond	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	3	0.42	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	296	41.57	0	0.00	279	94.26	17	5.74
total	712	100.00	6	0.84	642	90.17	64	8.99

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 69. – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual foreign political actors outside the region: **Germany**

Germany	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Angela Merkel	66	48.53	1	1.52	65	98.48	0	0.00
Gerhard Schröder	23	16.91	1	4.35	22	95.65	0	0.00
Sigmar Gabriel	15	11.03	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Axel Dittmann	7	5.15	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Wolfgang Schäuble	3	2.21	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	22	16.18	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
total	136	100.00	2	1.47	134	98.53	0	0.00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 70. – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: **Russia**

Russia	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Vladimir Putin	128	35.85	5	3.91	123	96.09	0	0.00
Dmitry Rogozin	23	6.44	0	0.00	23	100.00	0	0.00
“Russian authorities”	19	5.32	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Sergey Lavrov	18	5.04	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Centre	15	4.20	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Maria Zakharova	12	3.36	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Russia’s Ministry of Foreign affairs	12	3.36	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Peskov	12	3.36	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00

Alexander Chepurin	11	3.08	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Medvedev	11	3.08	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Sergey Shoygu	8	2.24	1	12.50	7	87.50	0	0.00
Sergei Zheleznyak	8	2.24	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Russia Military	4	1.12	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Russia’s Ministry of Defence	4	1.12	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Sputnik	3	0.84	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	69	19.33	3	4.35	65	94.20	1	1.45
total	357	100.00	10	2.80	346	96.92	1	0.28

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 71. – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors outside the region: **USA**¹⁴

USA	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Donald Trump	114	20.18	1	0.88	100	87.72	13	11.40
Kyle Scott	40	7.08	0	0.00	33	82.50	7	17.50
George Soros	33	5.84	0	0.00	25	75.76	8	24.24
“American authorities”	32	5.66	0	0.00	25	78.13	7	21.88
Hoyt Brian Yee	29	5.13	0	0.00	23	79.31	6	20.69
Barack Obama	26	4.60	0	0.00	25	96.15	1	3.85
Hillary Clinton	23	4.07	0	0.00	19	82.61	4	17.39
CIA	21	3.72	0	0.00	17	80.95	4	19.05
Rex Tillerson	16	2.83	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Madeleine Allbright	12	2.12	0	0.00	5	41.67	7	58.33
John McCain	11	1.95	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
“American administration”	11	1.95	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Pentagon	10	1.77	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
US Embassy	10	1.77	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Bill Clinton	8	1.42	0	0.00	5	62.50	3	37.50

¹⁴ As in the previous few trimesters we notice in this one too the increase of the number of political actors from the USA. In the previous trimester we recorded 763 political actors’ appearances from the USA. In the last trimester in 2016 the numbers of actors from the USA increased significantly (871) in comparison to the third (369) and the second trimester (222). Even though that number is significantly dropping it is still significantly higher in comparison to the previous sets of period.

US Congress	8	1.42	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
State Department	7	1.24	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Mike Pence	6	1.06	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
FBI	6	1.06	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
George Bush	5	0.88	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
US Democratic party	5	0.88	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Jared Kushner	4	0.71	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
James Comey	4	0.71	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ivanka Trump	4	0.71	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Maureen Cormack	4	0.71	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
The New York Times	4	0.71	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Jeff Sessions	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Joe Biden	3	0.53	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Michael Flynn	3	0.53	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
USAID	3	0.53	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
FED	2	0.35	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
other	98	17.35	0	0.00	91	92.86	7	7.14
total	565	100.00	1	0.18	489	86.55	75	13.27

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 72. – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign political actors: **representatives of EU institutions and EU institutions**

EU	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
EU	64	23.44	0	0.00	55	85.94	9	14.06
Johannes Han	39	14.29	0	0.00	37	94.87	2	5.13
Federica Mogherini	27	9.89	0	0.00	26	96.30	1	3.70
“European authorities”	23	8.42	0	0.00	22	95.65	1	4.35
European Commission	20	7.33	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Jean Claude Juncker	15	5.49	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Donald Tusk	10	3.66	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
European Parliament	9	3.30	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Maja Kocijančič	7	2.56	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00

David McAlister	6	2.20	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Martin Schulz	6	2.20	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
European Investment bank	4	1.47	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
European Council	4	1.47	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Other	39	14.29	0	0.00	39	100.00	0	0.00
total	273	100.00	0	0.00	259	94.87	14	5.13

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 73. – Distribution of frequency and value context of individual and collective foreign political actors: **OSCE and Council of Europe representatives**

Human Rights	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
William Walker	32	59.26	0	0.00	12	37.50	20	62.50
OEBS	10	18.52	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
European Council	5	9.26	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Other	7	12.96	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
total	54	100.00	0	0.00	34	62.96	20	37.04

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 74. – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign political actors: **representatives of EU institutions and EU institutions**

UN	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
United Nations	13	37.14	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
SB UN	10	28.57	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
UNESCO	4	11.43	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Other	8	22.86	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
total	35	100.00	0	0.00	35	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 75. – Distribution of frequency and value context of the appearance of individual and collective foreign actors: **NATO**

NATO	No	%	Posi- tive	%	Neutral	%	Nega- tive	%
NATO	93	75.61	0	0.00	76	81.72	17	18.28
Jens Stoltenberg	14	11.38	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Others	16	13.01	0	0.00	13	81.25	3	18.75
total	123	100.00	0	0.00	103	83.74	20	16.26

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 76. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective actors: **actors related to The Hague Tribunal**

The Hague Tribunal	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Hague tribunal	28	32.56	0	0.00	22	78.57	6	21.43
Radovan Karadžić	12	13.95	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Ratko Mladić	12	13.95	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Jovica Stanišić	5	5.81	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Franko Simatović	4	4.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Neboša Pavković	4	4.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Other	21	24.42	2	9.52	17	80.95	2	9.52
total	86	100.00	2	2.33	76	88.37	8	9.30

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Already from this cursory review of the frequency of the appearance of individual actors on the front pages of the selected printed daily newspapers from our sample, it is clearly noticed that the media treat issues from the domain of internal and external politics with unequal interest. The fact that foreign actors on the cover of daily newspapers in Serbia are present in a significantly smaller percentage (34.06% in relation to 65.93% of the frequency of appearance of domestic political actors) speaks of the focus of domestic media on the field of internal politics, which often takes the appearance of fiction in interpretations of individual daily newspapers, about which there were more words in the part of the analysis, which deals with interpretative strategies in the media processing of certain topics. The reasons for a noticeable lack of interest for economic actors and their understanding of the social, economic and political situation in Serbia and the world remains enigmatic (only 6.79% of the total sample of actors are economic actors), the only thing is that in the narratives of many politicians economic issues and economic consolidation of the country are referred to as key elements of future development strategies of the Serbian society (see **Table 47** and **Tables 77-79**).

Table 77. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective economy/economic actors

Privredni Actors - individualno	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Miroslav Mišković	25	7.72	0	0.00	21	84.00	4	16.00
Dobrosav Bojović	20	6.17	0	0.00	6	30.00	14	70.00
Ivica Todorić	17	5.25	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
Zoran Babić	10	3.09	1	10.00	8	80.00	1	10.00
Milan Beko	8	2.47	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Cvetan Vasilev	6	1.85	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Marko Čadež	6	1.85	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Bajatović	5	1.54	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Kostić	5	1.54	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Drob-njak	4	1.23	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Mišković	4	1.23	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Kiril Kravčenko	4	1.23	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Miroslav Bogićević	4	1.23	1	25.00	2	50.00	1	25.00
Nebojša Atanacković	4	1.23	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Predrag Ranković Peconi	3	0.93	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Petar Matijević	3	0.93	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Stevan Džele-tović	3	0.93	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Other	193	59.57	0	0.00	173	89.64	20	10.36
total	324	100.00	2	0.62	274	84.57	48	14.81

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 78. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective **domestic economic actors**

Economic actors	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Electrodistribution of Serbia	30	5.08	0	0.00	28	93.33	2	6.67
Agrokor	28	4.74	0	0.00	25	89.29	3	10.71
RTB Bor	23	3.89	0	0.00	23	100.00	0	0.00
Goša	23	3.89	0	0.00	22	95.65	1	4.35
Energoprojekt	21	3.55	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
NIS	20	3.38	0	0.00	8	40.00	12	60.00
Merkator S	14	2.37	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Železara Smederevo	13	2.20	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Frikom	12	2.03	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Delta holding	11	1.86	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Fiat	11	1.86	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
Srbija Corridors	11	1.86	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Srbijagas	10	1.69	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Gaspromnjeft	9	1.52	0	0.00	7	77.78	2	22.22
Hestil	9	1.52	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Jura	7	1.18	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Commerce Chamber of Serbia	7	1.18	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Airport Nikola Tesla	7	1.18	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
CRBC	6	1.02	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Railway of Serbia	6	1.02	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Resavica	6	1.02	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Diners	6	1.02	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Roads of Serbia	5	0.85	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Milenijum team	4	0.68	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Telekom Serbia	4	0.68	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Erste Card	4	0.68	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Zastava Weapons	4	0.68	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
MK Group	3	0.51	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

ŽOS Trnava	3	0.51	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Jugoimport SDPR	3	0.51	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Air Serbia	3	0.51	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
NALED	3	0.51	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Krušik Valjevo	2	0.34	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Other	265	44.84	0	0.00	250	94.33	15	5.67
total	591	100.00	1	0.17	549	92.55	43	7.28

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 79. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective **foreign economic actors**

MMF/World Bank	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
IMF	19	54.29	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
World Bank	12	34.29	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Other	4	11.43	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
total	35	100.00	0	0.00	35	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

In addition to already mentioned political and economic actors, the protagonists are also various other social actors, who in different ways influence the social and political situation within the Serbian society. Based on the collected empirical material, we divided them into:

(a) representatives of independent and independent governmental bodies and institutions (see **Table 80**), (b) political, social, economic, security and other analysts¹⁵ (**Tables 81 and 82**), (c) representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations¹⁶ (d) actors from the media (**Table 85**), (e) representatives of judicial authorities (**Table 86**), (f) lawyers and protagonists of various court proceedings (**Tables 87 and 88**), (h) media protagonists and other scandals (**Tables 89, 90 and 91**) and (i) actors from the past (**Table 92**).

¹⁵ For more information on the representation of individual analysts on the covers of various media from our sample, see Tables 103 - 109 in Appendix.

¹⁶ For more information on the representation of individual representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations on the cover of different media from our sample, see Tables 110 - 116 in Appendix.

Table 80. –Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of independent bodies**

Independent bodies	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
REM	38	31.93	0	0.00	38	100.00	0	0.00
Anti-Corruption Agency	25	21.01	0	0.00	24	96.00	1	4.00
Rodoljub Šabić	15	12.61	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Miloš Janković	6	5.04	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Fiscal Council	5	4.20	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
National Educational Council	5	4.20	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Pavle Petrović	3	2.52	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	22	18.49	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
total	119	100.00	0	0.00	117	98.32	2	1.68

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Special role in front-page texts of the media from our sample are played by the analysts (experts) (please see **tables 81 and 82**), Media treat them neutrally in as much as 98.88% of texts. During the second quarter in 2017, the analyzed dailies significantly promoted attitudes of these experts. Greatest participation and the number of represented analysts was recorded in the daily paper *Informer* (188 appearances). For more information please see **table 82**. Therefore their opinion was represented 613 times.

Table 81. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic and social actors: **analysts**

Analysts	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Dragomir Anđelković	54	8,81	0	0.00	54	100.00	0	0.00
Bojan Klačar	20	3,26	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Janjić	17	2,77	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Radun	14	2,28	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Radić	14	2,28	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Orhan Dragaš	13	2,12	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Saša Borojević	13	2,12	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Dejan Vuk Stanković	13	2,12	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Krstić	12	1,96	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Živadin Jovanović	12	1,96	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Vuletić	10	1,63	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00

Zoran Stojiljković	10	1,63	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Dobrašinović	10	1,63	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Dževad Galijašević	10	1,63	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubomir Madžar	10	1,63	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Nikolić	9	1,47	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubodrag Savić	9	1,47	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Jovo Bakić	9	1,47	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Milojko Arsić	9	1,47	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Momir Stojanović	8	1,31	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Proroković	8	1,31	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Pejić	7	1,14	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Vlade Radulović	7	1,14	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Božidar Prelević	7	1,14	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Goati	7	1,14	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Popov	7	1,14	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Nikolić	6	0,98	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Ljuban Karan	6	0,98	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Vojislav Stanković	5	0,82	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Bojan Dimitrijević	5	0,82	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Mahmud Bušatlija	5	0,82	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Mladen Kovačević	5	0,82	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ratko Božović	5	0,82	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Darko Trifunović	4	0,65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Nemanja Nenadić	4	0,65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Draško Đenović	4	0,65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandra Joksimović	4	0,65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Milivojević	4	0,65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Cvijetin Milivojević	4	0,65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Božidar Delić	4	0,65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Nicović	4	0,65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Antonijević	4	0,65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Kovačević	4	0,65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Čedomir Antić	3	0,49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Petar Vojinović	3	0,49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Danijel Cvjetičanin	3	0,49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Đukanović	3	0,49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Toma Fila	3	0,49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladislav Jovanović	3	0,49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nemanja Todorović Štipleja	3	0,49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dragovan Milićević	3	0,49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Dragišić	3	0,49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Predrag Petrović	3	0,49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Srđan Bogosavljević	3	0,49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mihailo Crnobrnja	3	0,49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	181	29,53	2	1.10	179	98.90	0	0.00
total	613	100,00	2	0.33	609	99.35	2	0.33

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 82. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages in different media from the research sample

Media/Analysts	No	%
<i>Informer</i>	188	30.67
<i>Blic</i>	104	16.97
<i>Danas</i>	95	15.50
<i>Politika</i>	75	12.23
<i>Kurir</i>	68	11.09
<i>Alo!</i>	68	11.09
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	15	2.45
total	613	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 83. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and religious organizations**

Religion	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Patriarch Irinej	47	21.96	1	2.13	45	95.74	1	2.13
Serbian Orthodox Church	42	19.63	0	0.00	39	92.86	3	7.14
Alojzije Stepinac	18	8.41	0	0.00	12	66.67	6	33.33
Pope Francis	10	4.67	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	9	4.21	1	11.11	7	77.78	1	11.11
Catholic church	9	4.21	0	0.00	5	55.56	4	44.44
Stanislav Hočevar								
Arch-bishop of Belgrade	6	2.80	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Porfirije, Metropolitan of Zagreb and Ljubljana	5	2.34	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Mustafa Jusufspahić	5	2.34	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Teodosije	3	1.40	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop of Backa Irinej	3	1.40	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop zahumsko-hercegovački Grigorije	3	1.40	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Bishop of Sumadija Jovan	3	1.40	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	51	23.83	3	5.88	43	84.31	5	9.80
total	214	100.00	5	2.34	186	86.92	23	10.75

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 84. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious communities on the front pages of difference media from the sample

Media/Religion	No	%
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	71	33.18
<i>Politika</i>	40	18.69
<i>Alo!</i>	30	14.02
<i>Blic</i>	23	10.75
<i>Kurir</i>	17	7.94
<i>Danas</i>	17	7.94
<i>Informer</i>	16	7.48
total	214	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 85. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual and collective social domestic actors from **the media**

Media	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
RTS	58	11.01	0	0.00	55	94.83	3	5.17
Aleksandar Rodić	47	8.92	1	2.13	18	38.30	28	59.57
Kurir	41	7.78	0	0.00	16	39.02	25	60.98
Informer	22	4.17	0	0.00	18	81.82	4	18.18
NUNS	20	3.80	0	0.00	19	95.00	1	5.00
Večernje novosti	19	3.61	3	15.79	14	73.68	2	10.53
Politika	18	3.42	0	0.00	14	77.78	4	22.22
RTV	17	3.23	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
Adrija Mediaa grupa	16	3.04	0	0.00	15	93.75	1	6.25
Pink	14	2.66	0	0.00	9	64.29	5	35.71
N1	11	2.09	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
Slaviša Lekić	11	2.09	0	0.00	8	72.73	3	27.27
Dragan J. Vučićević	11	2.09	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Bujošević	10	1.90	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Željko Cvijanović	8	1.52	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
UNS	8	1.52	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Vreme	7	1.33	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Danas	7	1.33	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Ljiljana Smajlović	7	1.33	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
NDNV	6	1.14	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Draž Petrović	5	0.95	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Studio B	5	0.95	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
Željko Mitrović	5	0.95	1	20.00	4	80.00	0	0.00
NIN	5	0.95	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Nedim Sejdinović	5	0.95	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ratko Dmitrović	5	0.95	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Olja Bečković	5	0.95	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Blic	4	0.76	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Kesić	3	0.57	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Georgiev	3	0.57	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Other	124	23.53	1	0.81	118	95.16	5	4.03

total	527	100.00	6	1.14	431	81.78	90	17.08
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Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

During the collection of empirical material, a significant presence of actors in connection with the activities of the judicial and investigative bodies was noted on the cover pages. The actors from this group are shown in **Tables 86-88** as representatives of judicial authorities (169), lawyers (86) and other protagonists of current or completed court / investigative proceedings (165).

Table 86. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of collective domestic social actors: **representatives of judicial bodies**

Judicial system	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Higher Public Prosecutor in Belgrade	13	7.69	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38
Court of Appeals in Belgrade	11	6.51	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Prosecution for Organized Crime	11	6.51	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
First Basic Public Prosecutor in Belgrade	11	6.51	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Higher Court in Belgrade	9	5.33	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Prosecution for War Crime	8	4.73	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
The state public prosecutor	7	4.14	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
High Cassation Court	5	2.96	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Constitutional Court	5	2.96	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Vukčević	4	2.37	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
First Primary Court in Belgrade	4	2.37	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Special Court in Belgrade	3	1.78	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Higher Court in Valjevo	3	1.78	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Court of Appeals in Novi Sad	3	1.78	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	72	42.60	0	0.00	70	97.22	2	2.78
total	169	100.00	0	0.00	160	94.67	9	5.33

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 87. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **lawyers**

Lawyers	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Predrag Savić	4	4.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Gajić	4	4.65	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Branislav Tapušковиć	2	2.33	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Borivoje Borović	2	2.33	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Šoškić	2	2.33	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Vojin Biljić	2	2.33	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Lukić	2	2.33	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Bar association of Serbia	2	2.33	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Petronijević	2	2.33	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Other	64	74.42	0	0.00	64	100.00	0	0.00
total	86	100.00	0	0.00	86	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 88. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **actors of court proceedings and investigations**

Actors of court proceedings and investigations	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Sreten Jocić Joca Amsterdam	9	5.45	0	0.00	3	33.33	6	66.67
Milorad Ulemek Legija	8	4.85	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Željko Ražnatović Arkan	7	4.24	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Miroslav Kurak	6	3.64	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Zvezdan Jovanović	5	3.03	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ratko Romić	5	3.03	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Stanković Sale Mutavi	5	3.03	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Radonjić	4	2.42	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Darko Šarić	4	2.42	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Veljko Belivuk Velja Nevolja	4	2.42	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Božidar Spasić	4	2.42	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Radomir Marković	4	2.42	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

Rodoljub Radulović Miša Banana	3	1.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Lazarević	3	1.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mile Luković Kum	3	1.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vlastimir Mi-lošević	3	1.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Spasojević Šiptar	3	1.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Others	85	51.52	0	0.00	59	69.41	26	30.59
total	165	100.00	0	0.00	128	77.58	37	22.42

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 89 shows all the actors who were linked by the media with the murder of singer Jelena Marjanović, as well as members of her family, acquaintances and friends. In the second quarter of 2016, these actors were present in 968 appearances, almost double the number of foreign politicians or state authorities and institutions, for example. Although this media-built affair continues to survive on the front pages of the analyzed daily newspapers, interest in it has begun to decline significantly, so on the front pages in the previous period, 54 appearances of the protagonists of this case were recorded.

Table 89. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **"The murder of Jelena Marjanović"**

Jelena Marjanović murder	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Jelena Marjanović	15	27.78	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Marjanović	14	25.93	0	0.00	12	85.71	2	14.29
Jana Marjanović	9	16.67	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Zorica Krsmanović	3	5.56	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Marjanović	3	5.56	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Others	10	18.52	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
total	54	100.00	0	0.00	49	90.74	5	9.26

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 90 shows actors in connection with the demolition of objects in Savamala. About this topic 49 appearances were recorded, almost twice as high as in the previous quarter (25), and approximately in relation to the fourth (54) and the third (59) trimester of 2016.

Table 90. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: "Savamala"

Savamala	No	%	Posi- tive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Ne davimo Beograd								
Initiative	31	63.27	0	0.00	31	100.00	0	0.00
Dobrica Veselinović	7	14.29	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Radomir Lazović	5	10.20	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Other	6	12.24	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
total	49	100.00	0	0.00	49	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Events related to the employees from the sports area are also the ones that have a social-political connotation and are still of interest to the media. Therefore, 34 appearances were recorded on front pages related to the events in sports clubs (**Table 91**).

Table 91. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **Sports**

Sports	No	%	Positive	%	Neutral	%	Negative	%
Milorad Vučelić	8	23.53	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Slaviša Kokeza	6	17.65	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Zvezdan Terzić	5	14.71	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
FC Partizan	4	11.76	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Miloš Vazura	4	11.76	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
FC Crvena zvezda	3	8.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Other	4	11.76	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
total	34	100.00	0	0.00	32	94.12	2	5.88

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 92. – Distribution of frequency and value context of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **actors from the distant past**

The past	No	%	Posi- tive	%	Neu- tral	%	Nega- tive	%
Josip Broz Tito	42	53.85	0	0.00	41	97.62	1	2.38
Nikola Kalabić	10	12.82	0	0.00	7	70.00	3	30.00
Dragoljub Mihailović	8	10.26	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Milan Nedić	7	8.97	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Others	11	14.10	1	9.09	10	90.91	0	0.00
total	78	100.00	1	1.28	72	92.31	5	6.41

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

UNNAMED SOURCES

In the selected front page articles from the sampled media, unnamed sources have also been the second most prominent actor. This time there were 514 instances of quoting anonymous sources, or rather 24.58% captions, which was almost identical to the results from the previous quarter (23.81%).

The widespread usage of unnamed sources has been precisely determined thanks to the manner of qualifying anonymous sources, which we have been applying since the second *Mediameter* issue, so as to not only classify those sources which the very media has defined as anonymous, but also those who provide information that cannot be verified, no matter the manner in which they have been incorporated into an article. Of course, the presence of information gained from anonymous sources speaks more about the manner of the reporting done by the seven media found in our sample, than about the actual need of protecting the identities of the individual who provide certain information.

As Matt Carlson, in his book "On the Condition of Anonymity" has said: "Journalism is woven into the fabric of our environment, and in turn is based on it, meaning that it can never be an objective observer, as it is claimed...These sorts of questions are better answered through an approach that recognizes the culture of unnamed sources as a *culture*. This view steers an inquiry into unnamed sources away from frequency and implementation, toward issues of meanings that we share and patterns of collective interpretation between journalists, sources and the public. The securing of anonymity is not just a question of technique. It is, actually, a request for a certain type of imagining of relations between these three sides."¹⁷

A newsletter that contains the largest number of information obtained from an unnamed source is a report. Of the 1571 texts written in this form, 449 or 28.58% contains anonymous sources. Although the largest share of unnamed sources is recorded in the news, the number of texts in this form, and therefore unnamed sources, is negligible (9), due to the generally low number of published news (**Table 93**).

¹⁷ M. Carlson, *On the condition of anonymity*, Urbana, Chicago, Springfield, University of Illinois Press, 2011, 7

Table 93. – Share of “unnamed sources” in all journalistic forms, in seven media from the sample

Genre	Total no. of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Report	1571	449	28,58
Article	186	48	25,81
News	22	9	40,91
reportage	16	3	18,75
Commentary	83	3	3,61
other	27	2	7,41
interview	186	0	0,00
total	2091	514	24,58

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

The largest share, as well as the number of articles that contain information obtained from anonymous sources in relation to the total number of published articles in an individual media, was recorded in *Informer* (43.63% or 89 texts). The next newspaper, which in exactly one third of texts uses unnamed sources is *Blic* (33.33% - 80), followed by *Alo!* (32.58%), *Kurir* (27.35%), *Večernje novosti* (19.55%) and *Danas* (17.98%). A little less texts that rely on this form of obtaining information are recorded in *Politika* (15.57% - 66) (**Table 94**).

Table 94. – Share of unnamed sources per analyzed media outlets

Media outlet	Total no. of texts	Unnamed sources	%
<i>Informer</i>	204	89	43,63
<i>Blic</i>	240	80	33,33
<i>Alo!</i>	221	72	32,58
<i>Kurir</i>	234	64	27,35
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	312	61	19,55
<i>Danas</i>	456	82	17,98
<i>Politika</i>	424	66	15,57
total	2091	514	24,58

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Biggest number of texts containing information from anonymous sources was recorded in texts where the topic was *political life in Serbia* (215 or 33.86%) while the other unnamed sources on other texts are equable- mostly between 20% and 30% (**table 95**).

Number of texts containing information obtained from “unnamed sources,” against five top ranked topics, in each of the seven analyzed media may be seen in the Appendix in **tables 118 - 124**.

Table 95. – Number of texts containing information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the seven media from the sample¹⁸

Topic/All media	Total no. of texts	Unnamed sources	%
Political life in Serbia	635	215	33,86
Economy	158	49	31,01
Kosovo/Belgrade and Pristina relations	137	37	27,01
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	132	28	21,21
Media/freedom of media	73	23	31,51
International relations	77	14	18,18
Military	56	12	21,43
System of Justice/ judiciary bodies activities	56	11	19,64
The President of Serbia activities	35	10	28,57
Russia/ relations with Russia	37	9	24,32
The Government of Serbia activities	37	9	24,32

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Conclusion

The elections for the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister marked the period between April and June 2017. These were the competitive topics for the media, especially dailies for the sake of their circulation and influence. No other topic in any way managed to gain considerably more importance except for the periodical political crisis and conflicts in the region (Macedonia and Kosovo).

Reports are still the most popular genre in about 75% of all texts. Everything observed in the previous analysis is becoming even more expressed in this quarter. Low levels of impartiality, high rate of value oriented texts, big number of texts with causes created in the editorial staff offices- are all clear indications of big problems in Serbian journalism.

Low level of professionalism in journalism is direct consequence of the domination of politics. The loss of interest in any other area but political, could lead not only to the decrease of circulation and influence, but also to the creation of a certain profile of a “stereotyped reader” who represents a serious obstacle to modernization and democratization of the profession and the society as a whole.

¹⁸ Ten topics with the largest number of unnamed sources are displayed.

Appendix**Table 96.** – Sample *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	
Total number of selected front-page texts	312
Total number of front-page texts koji nisu selektovani	201
Other	10134
Total	10647

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 97. – Sample *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	
Total number of selected front-page texts	204
Total number of front-page texts koji nisu selektovani	177
Other	5521
Total	5902

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 98. – Sample *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	
Total number of selected front-page texts	221
Total number of front-page texts koji nisu selektovani	260
Other	5408
Total	5889

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 99. – Sample *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	
Total number of selected front-page texts	240
Total number of front-page texts koji nisu selektovani	145
Other	9196
Total	9581

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 100. – Sample *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	
Total number of selected front-page texts	424
Total number of front-page texts koji nisu selektovani	245
Other	9172
Total	9841

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 101. – Sample *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	
Total number of selected front-page texts	456
Total number of front-page texts koji nisu selektovani	82
Other	5702
Total	6240

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 102. – Sample *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	
Total number of selected front-page texts	234
Total number of front-page texts koji nisu selektovani	145
Other	6550
Total	6929

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 103. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily: *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	No	%
Srđan Bogosavljević	1	6.67%
Bojan Klačar	1	6.67%
Dragovan Milićević	1	6.67%
Petar Vojinović	1	6.67%
Dževad Galijašević	1	6.67%
Srđan Cvetković	1	6.67%
Milojko Arsić	1	6.67%
Nemanja Nenadić	1	6.67%
Others	7	46.67%
total	15	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 104. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily: *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	No	%
Dragomir Anđelković	12	6.38%
Dejan Vuk Stanković	11	5.85%
Orhan Dragaš	10	5.32%
Dušan Proroković	8	4.26%
Živadin Jovanović	7	3.72%
Ljuban Karan	6	3.19%
Dževad Galijašević	6	3.19%
Branko Radun	6	3.19%
Vladimir Pejić	5	2.66%
Nebojša Krstić	5	2.66%
Saša Borojević	5	2.66%
Ljubodrag Savić	5	2.66%
Momir Stojanović	5	2.66%
Bojan Klačar	4	2.13%
Božidar Delić	4	2.13%
Milan Nikolić	4	2.13%
Vlade Radulović	4	2.13%
Aleksandar Radić	3	1.60%
Mahmud Bušatlija	3	1.60%
Ljubomir Madžar	3	1.60%
Others	72	38.30%
total	188	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 105. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily: *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	No	%
Dragomir Anđelković	20	29.41%
Saša Borojević	8	11.76%
Branko Radun	6	8.82%
Nebojša Krstić	5	7.35%
Živadin Jovanović	3	4.41%
Darko Trifunović	3	4.41%
Others	23	33.83%
total	68	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 106. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily: *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	No	%
Dušan Janjić	11	10.58%
Bojan Klačar	10	9.62%
Aleksandar Radić	6	5.77%
Dragan Dobrašinović	6	5.77%
Zoran Stojiljković	5	4.81%
Jovo Bakić	5	4.81%
Vladimir Goati	4	3.85%
Vladimir Vuletić	4	3.85%
Dragomir Anđelković	3	2.88%
Bojan Dimitrijević	3	2.88%
Others	47	45.19%
total	104	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 107. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily: *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	No	%
Vojislav Stanković	4	5.33%
Ivan Nikolić	3	4.00%
Dragomir Anđelković	3	4.00%
Milojko Arsić	3	4.00%
Others	62	82.67%
total	75	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 109. – Distribution of frequency of appearances of analysts on the front pages of the daily: *Kurir*

<i>Danas</i>	No	%
Dragomir Anđelković	6	6.32%
Božidar Prelević	4	4.21%
Zoran Stojiljković	4	4.21%
Vladimir Vuletić	3	3.16%
Nemanja Todorović Štiplija	3	3.16%
Jovo Bakić	3	3.16%
Ljubomir Madžar	3	3.16%
Others	69	72.63%
total	95	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 109. – Distribucija učestalosti pojavljivanja analitičara na naslovnica u dnevnom listu: *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	No	%
Dragomir Anđelković	10	14.71%
Aleksandar Radić	3	4.41%
Marko Nicović	3	4.41%
Dragan Dobrašinović	3	4.41%
Dušan Janjić	3	4.41%
Others	46	67.65%
total	68	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 110. – Distribution of appearances of SOC and other religious communities' representatives on the front pages of the daily: *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	No	%
SOC	14	19.72%
Patriarch Irinej	8	11.27%
Catholic Church	5	7.04%
Alojzije Stepinac	5	7.04%
Pope Francis	4	5.63%
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović	3	4.23%
Other	32	45.07%
total	71	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 111. – Distribution of appearances of SOC and other religious communities' representatives on the front pages of the daily: *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	No	%
Alojzije Stepinac	4	25.00%
Patriarch Irinej	4	25.00%
SOC	4	25.00%
Pope Francis	4	25.00%
total	16	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 112. – Distribution of appearances of SOC and other religious communities' representatives on the front pages of the daily: *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	No	%
Patriarch Irinej	8	26.67%
SOC	6	20.00%
Bishop zahumsko-hercegovački Grigorije	3	10.00%
Other	15	43.33%
total	30	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 113. – Distribution of appearances of SOC and other religious communities' representatives on the front pages of the daily: *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	No	%
Patriarch Irinej	8	34.78%
SOC	6	26.09%
Others	9	39.13%
total	23	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 114. – Distribution of appearances of SOC and other religious communities' representatives on the front pages of the daily: *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	No	%
Patriarch Irinej	10	25.00%
SOC	7	17.50%
Alojzije Stepinac	7	17.50%

Papa Franja	4	10.00%
Others	12	30.00%
total	40	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 115. – Distribution of appearances of SOC and other religious communities' representatives on the front pages of the daily: *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	No	%
SOC	4	23.53%
Patriarch Irinej	4	23.53%
Stanislav Hočevar, Archbishop of Belgrade	2	11.76%
Others	7	41.16%
total	17	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 116. – Distribution of appearances of SOC and other religious communities' representatives on the front pages of the daily: *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	No	%
Others	5	29.41%
Patriarch Irinej	5	29.41%
Catholic Church	7	41.18%
total	17	100.00%

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 117. – Number of texts that contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the paper: *Blic*

Topic/ <i>Blic</i>	Unnamed sources	%	Total no. of texts
Political life in Serbia	38	38,38	99
economy	22	57,89	38
Regional cooperation/relations in the region	5	41,67	12
Activities of the Govrenment of The Republic of Serbia	3	33,33	9
System of Justice, judiciary bodies' acitivities	2	25,00	8

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 118. – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the paper: *Kurir*

Topic/ <i>Kurir</i>	Unnamed sources	%	Total no. of texts
Political life in Serbia	31	30,39	102
Kosovo/ Belgrade and Pristina relations	9	56,25	16
Crime	4	44,44	9
Murder of the singer Jelena Marijanovic	2	33,33	6
Protocolled events	2	40,00	5

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 119. – Number of texts that contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the paper: *Večernje novosti*

Topic/ <i>Večernje novosti</i>	Unnamed sources	%	Total no. of texts
Political life in Serbia	25	40,98	61
International relations	4	44,44	9
Regional cooperation/ relations in the region	3	12,50	24
Economy	3	15,79	19
Kosovo/ Belgrade and Pristina relations	3	12,50	24

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 120. – Number of texts that contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the paper: *Alo!*

Topic/ <i>Alo!</i>	Unnamed sources	%	Total no. of texts
Political life in Serbia	39	41,94	93
Kosovo/ Belgrade and Pristina relations	9	37,50	24
Regional cooperation/ relations in the region	5	55,56	9
Crime	3	75,00	4
Religious and Church issues	3	50,00	6

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 121. – Number of texts that contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the paper : *Politika*

Topic/ <i>Politika</i>	Unnamed sources	%	Total no. of texts
Economy	17	33,33	51
Political life in Serbia	7	17,95	39
Kosovo/ Belgrade and Pristina relations	5	20,00	25
Protocolled events	4	66,67	6
Energetic	4	36,36	11

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 122. – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the paper : *Danas*

Topic/ <i>Danas</i>	Unnamed sources	%	Total no. of texts
Political life in Serbia	58	28,29	205
Kosovo/ Belgrade and Pristina relations	3	37,50	8
System of Justice, judiciary bodies' activities	2	12,50	16
Regional cooperation/ relations in the region	2	16,67	12
Local Government	2	20,00	10


Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

Table 123. – Number of texts which contain information obtained from “unnamed sources” according to topics in the paper : *Informer*

Topic/ <i>Informer</i>	Unnamed sources	%	Total no. of texts
Media/freedom of media	20	74,07	27
Political life in Serbia	17	47,22	36
Regional cooperation/ relations in the region	11	35,48	31
Kosovo/ Belgrade and Pristina relations	8	44,44	18
Economy	5	62,50	8

Source: Mediameter research, April - June 2017

4



Discourse
Analysis

DEJAN VUK STANKOVIĆ

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Continued political and media battle in the post-election period

A quick overview of the Serbian weeklies in the period from April to July 2017, shows a pronounced continuity of the heated atmosphere of the election campaign that ended on April 2nd with a convincing victory of Aleksandar Vučić, the leader of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party and other parties in the ruling coalition. Serbian print media, especially the weeklies, contrary to the norms of analytical and interpretive journalism, turned out to be the keepers of the pre-election atmosphere in the post-election period. Strong political and moral convictions, particularly obvious in the radically critical media, often are about the great and essential rhetorical-semantic overlaps of the views of the opposition parties. Furthermore, some headlines significantly cross the critical edge with provocations, the content of the messages and the suggestive conclusions of the opposition leaders and their supporters.

As well as the media close to the opposition, rare print media, such as *Informer* retained a noticeable distance, suspicion and judgmental tone towards the opposition players, constantly questioning their moral credibility and political skill.

In the tangle of complex and dynamic media-political relations, the political scene, viewed from the prism of editorial columns, leading articles in the weekly newspapers and numerous interviews whose protagonists are placed on the front page, remained in the pre-election period- equally strong in the controversy, with the excess of accusations and the lack of restraint, without any space for balanced interpretations in rational or democratic political practice.

Regardless of the approach and content of the newspaper articles, the basic levels of media freedom and freedoms of thought and speech were in place, since there were literally no positions that were eliminated from the public discourse. The presence of political and ideological pluralism, and the diversity of approaches to the actors, events and processes, is such, that there is absolutely no consensus on any political actor, event or process. The divisions are deep and definitive, almost fatal. Despite the strong polemical charge and the primary intent to persuade and not rationalize, the press is not free of the usual dynamics typical of democratic societies. Serbian weeklies demonstrate a variety of approaches, perspectives and conclusions, as well as the tendency to problematize, almost every issue in the ever-complex political and social realm.

In the period April-June 2017, three topics have dominated the weekly columns of the Serbian press: analysis of the elections and the future presidential term, the crisis in Macedonia and the election of the new Prime Minister Ana Brnabić.

As a part of the analysis and interpretation of the elections, their course and outcome, coordinates for interpretive understanding of the key political actors are clearly set between the government and the opposition. Extremely negative portrayal of political actors is a clear method in every journalistic approach, in every direct or indirect conclusion offered to the reader.

Analyzing the course and outcome of the elections, especially notable was the endemic division that is typical of every pluralistic society: the division between the pro-government and anti-government media. In line with the matrices already established and detected in this research project, the image of political actors is predominantly negative. The focus of writing is placed on the challenging and discrediting the political opponent and noticeably less on presenting the concrete solutions and different conceptual ideas.

To understand the political and ideological messages of the weekly newspapers and editorial columns, in addition to the experience of a written word, one also needs the visual experience, since this is what mostly affects the readership. If the cover page is the identity of a newspaper, then to understand its message it is of great importance to understand its cover, or more precisely its visual aspect.

Often the cover page features a big image of the interviewee, which bears an uncanny resemblance to a campaign poster, a picture from everyday political and social life that is almost as a rule politically and socially negative. A compound of the visual and graphic on the front page is intended to initiate interest for the content, but also to indicate to the reader, either directly or indirectly, the righteousness of the ideology, or the political orientation of the paper.

In weekly journalism, in this quarter as well, a negative image of the government, especially its central actor, the current President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, still dominates. The first man of Serbian politics, according to the popular and constantly underlined opinion of the weeklies in the past five years, is a synonym for extensive undermining of the democratic-liberal values and political practices. The common denominator in the writing of all weeklies, except for "*Pečat*" is a position that Vučić is not a Democrat. He is an authoritarian leader, devoid of any moral and political substance, a skilled technologist of political power, especially the media censor a manipulator. The story of Vučić rests on the radical doubt that not only political. It is deeply personal. The point is to distort, politically question or preferably mock each of his decisions or symbolic gestures. The key is in the following extract from a column by Dragoljub Žarković, which is dated to the ceremony of taking the Presidential oath in the National Assembly, when the President swore on the Constitution and the Miroslav's gospel: "Yes, when he was inaugurated for the president he swore to the Constitution, but planted the Miroslav's gospel underneath, which reminded me of kinds swearing in and holding crossed fingers behind their back, thinking that this frees them from the promise they made."¹

In the same politically toxic manner a journalist of *Vreme*, Milos Vasić, wrote: "We got used to the ego-mania, grandomania and pseudology fiction. More precisely, he got us used to it. Already bored with constant outbursts of these phenomena, we have lost all sense of measure, logic, common sense and basic decency. Not to mention mathematics: He has been bombing us for years with unverifiable piles

¹ Dragoljub Žarković, "Krunisanje za predsednika [Crowning for the President]," *Vreme*, No. 1378, p. 5



Vreme, 1st June 2017

of numbers, percentages and fractions that not even Mika Alas would understand (or would, but, alas, he is not here). Alongside, he uses every public appearance to 'dick around' (brag) how he is not scared of anyone (although everyone is against him); a truly brave man would never say something like this, only cowards do this. Finally, the impression that remains is predictable, but no less sad. Vučić's egomania and grandomania, with an accompanying busyness, give the impression of meaninglessness, obscenity and bad taste. Rational arguments are not acceptable to them; only the Supreme Will, whatever that may be, whatever that is. Yesterday a new era begun, in which Aleksandar Vučić will be the creator of new conditions and circumstances, pointing us in the right direction every day, like he did up to now. He will nag to the new Prime Minister as well (may God help him/her), to the ministers, teachers, doctors, journalists, police officers and other nobodies whenever he has the urge, and that is very often. And why wouldn't he? "²

Exaggerated political and moral accusatory approach of the editors and journalists of almost all Serbian weekly newspapers largely relies and supports, and eventually articulates the messages of euro-reformist political parties. After Vučić's convincing victory in the presidential elections held on the second day of April 2017, undoubtedly the question of his successor as Prime Minister was raised.

As usual, the selection of Ana Brnabić for the new Serbian PM polarized the public. Her unstandardized persona (non-party person, an expert, a woman, a member of the LGBT community) on the political scene in Serbia, initiated a strong proliferation of stereotypes specific to each actor close the ruling party. Ana Brnabić is inadequate from the liberal-democratic point of view, but also from the national-patriotic position. Instead of the usual hundred days, Brnabić almost immediately faced a wide range of labels and challenges that are semantically, but also rhetorically, closely associated with the dominant radical-critical form of thought and speech in the Serbian public. On the other hand, the opposition as a political actor was abundantly and wholeheartedly supported in radically critical media. In the period of April-July 2017, the unconditional support was given to the student movement which organized the protests across Serbia, called "Against the dictatorship" with an aim to criticize the outcome of the elections. Like other civic initiatives such as "Do not drown Belgrade", the attempted student movement was presented as a politically credible social force that has the potential to shake up the current government. The admiration for the student movement also implied evoking of the memories from the "glory days" of the nineties' student demonstrations and propaganda of glorifying the youth who took their destiny into their own hands. *Inglorious end of the student movement in an attempt* was deliberately not analyzed by the press, which is a proof of journalistic bias and political despair.

Events in Macedonia showed that the Serbian press is polarized in the approach, analysis and conclusions about the sensitive issues in the field of regional policy. Print media such as the daily *Informer* and the weekly *Pečat* situated the internal turbulence in Macedonia from June 2017 in the context of broader regional and global geopolitical considerations, emphasizing their pro-Russian and clearly anti-Western orientation. On the other hand, the Euro-reformist print media showed indifference to the ideological interpretation of the internal crisis in Macedonia. Their approach was extremely objectivist, based on the logic of events and political processes, emphasizing the key role of Western countries, especially the United States in resolving the crisis. Special attention of the radically critical euro-reformist media

2 Miloš Vasić, "Odakle ti Miroslav, crni Aleksandre? [Where did you find Miroslav, black Aleksandar?]" *Vreme*, No. 1378

was given to the fact that the pro-government media treated the crisis in Macedonia with great attention. The ferocity and the contesting of a possible interpretation of events in Macedonia encouraged by the pro-government media, showed that the even the events in a neighboring country are set in the context of endemic and almost fatal political and media battles in Serbia.

The radical criticism of the government is formed and multiplied through the synergy of views by opposition leaders, public intellectuals and journalists of daily and weekly newspapers. This kind of media-political approach is deeply rooted in the multi-party system and is not a specialty of our region. The focus of writing is on the challenging, questioning and discrediting the political opponent, and noticeably less on presenting concrete solutions and different conceptual ideas.

In addition to the indisputable dynamic and controversial political atmosphere, weeklies and many editorial columns in newspapers show a striking drive for polemics between the media. In a sharp political conflict, media are not left out as a social factor with their own purpose of existence and functioning, untouched daily political disputes. Moreover, they do not merely convey certain messages, on the contrary, they are active participants in a vibrant, sharp, somewhat exhausting daily political debate.

Weeklies can be divided in two categories. According to the criterion of division common in a democratic society, they should be separated into the ones close to the ruling party's ideology, and those that are moderately or radically critical of the same. In Serbia, this criterion for division cannot be used consistently for the simple reason that all weeklies in Serbia are either partially or completely critical of the party in power. Weekly *Pečat* falls under the category of partially critical of the authorities, because of its open criticizing of the government's pro-European foreign policy under the Vučić's rule. However, this weekly shows strong critical stance towards moral credibility, axiological orientation and political views of the 5th October winners

On the other hand, weeklies like *NIN*, *Vreme*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* fall under the category of completely critical of the government. There is however a difference in the tone of criticism. While *Vreme* and somewhat *NIN* (especially the domain of domestic politics and economics) are completely, directly and fiercely criticizing the government, weeklies *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* apply a more moderate tone in expressing critical views. Their level of accusing and labeling is far lower than in the cases of *Vreme* and *NIN*.

Another classification that can be applied to the weeklies is their foreign policy orientation. *Vreme*, *NIN*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* are more or less pro-European. On the other hand, the weekly *Pečat* clearly emphasizes the anti-Western and pro-Russian stance, intended to support the nationalist discourse, close to the one which was dominant in wars in the 1990s.

Image of the Government- image of Aleksandar Vučić – an extremely authoritarian and unscrupulous leader with no democratic features, manipulator, demagogue and a populist, obsessed with the power, inspirer and a promoter of public banality and anti-intellectualism, political symbol of moral and spiritual collapse, an expression of deep decadence in the society.

Even just a glance at the headlines and the content of the leading journalists and editors' columns and interviews in weekly and daily newspapers, will easily tell the reader that the central obsession of the majority of Serbian press is the negative image of Aleksandar Vučić, as the central political figure in the country. Although the leader of the SNS confirmed his unquestionable democratic legitimacy after the victory achieved in the limits of constitutional and legal norms, many well-known and less well-known editors, journalists, political figures and public intellectuals, passionately and "in good faith" but most of all loudly, sought to undermine his political legitimacy and the moral grounds for state governance. Construction and continuous reproduction of Vučić's negative image of has picked up a number of interconnected moments.

The ritual repetition of the thesis about the undemocratic character of his government is comprised of the pseudo-scientific discourse, journalists' mostly intuitive observations, political disqualifications, and euphoric, at times rhapsodic testimonies related to his personality and morals. Along with the written explication of this negative obsession, either with him as an individual or a political actor, there is another thesis being developed paralelly – the one on the pseudo-democratic character of Serbia as a country, which is in fact ruled by a huge media manipulation and a cultural model inappropriate for a modern civilized society.

In the discourse of the opposition, a wider picture of Serbia is also important. Serbia is an example of a historical decline and a country without any perspective. Poor and socially devastated, it is a perfect match for the leader such as Aleksandar Vučić.

A typical description of the socio-historical moment of Serbia as a decadent state is given by the academic Dušan Teodorović, an active participant in the campaign of opposition presidential candidate, Saša Janković: "Serbia seems to me as a dying country. I know it's tough statement, but I believe in it, it is my perception. We saw a large number of abandoned houses collapsing, in which no one lives, especially in smaller towns. We saw a lot of failed factories, industrial plants. We saw a lot of abandoned fields. We saw many poor, distressed people. It was a sickening feeling for me, and I just felt the pain in my soul. However I am convinced that Serbia can be better. I am terribly sorry for our pensioners, from whom 200 million euros are taken each year, and I am convinced that these 200 million are dissipated elsewhere and stolen. And it doesn't have to be so."³

In a similar radically pessimistic tone, with a reference to the mentality and historical experience, a for-

³ Dušan Teodorović, "Mi ćemo Vučića sigurno da pobedimo [We will certainly defeat Vučić]," interview with Olja Bećković, *NIN*, No. 3460, p. 11

mer official of the opposition party DSS, prof. dr Vladeta Janković says: “A total of seventy years (some three generations!) of Communism, then regimes of Milosević and Vučić had to do have left a mark. Deceived, deprived and humiliated with poverty, the people lost self-awareness and something went wrong in the mentality of the nation. It is difficult thing to say, but I’m afraid it’s true. I’m afraid that deep down inside something viciously cracked, and if it can still heal, it will happen in some very dramatic moment in the future, like it always does with Serbs.”⁴

Despite this negative image, it is an indisputable fact that Aleksandar Vučić smoothly and convincingly beat his opponents on the 2nd April 2017. This political fact is being relativized by the prominent opposition stance on the unequal terms of the electoral game. In the light of media domination, Vučić’s victory in the first round is not considered a particular success: “No doubt that Serbia has given the SNS candidate, the eight parties in the ruling coalition and the Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić confidence on 2nd April that he should be the one to lead Serbia in the next 5 years. With more than 55 percent votes in his favor and a turnout of 55 percent of the population, Vučić has more or less confirmed all the election forecasts, even exceeded them, which was not surprising given that he had the most intensive and expensive election campaign. With the additional impulse in the form of so-called. PM’s campaign.”⁵

In a similar tone, only a little more hostile and ironic, the elections were analyzed by Dragoljub Žarković, Editor in Chief of the weekly *Vreme*: “When someone invests so much energy, money and lies into the campaign, it is hard to expect anything other than victory in the so-called first round. Vučić has confirmed a new mandate to ‘knead a new dough in an old oven’, and he will bake it however he thinks is appropriate, and at this point there is no force that would hold him within the limits of law and decency ... the formal change in the status, opens the new fields for operations and holds a protection net over his head. He has an undisputed mandate in the next five years, and for everything that befalls on us, someone will eventually be guilty of.”⁶

Identical position on the elections had the leader of the Movement of Free Citizens and a presidential candidate Saša Janković. Janković even goes a step further. While presenting the circumstances under which the electoral process took place, he talks of the kidnapping of the country by the authorities, which occurred due to deception, continuously produced and reproduced by Vučić’s powerful media machinery.

Janković’s reasoning is politically prosaic. Avoiding story on the outcome, he puts the focus on other issues, namely the issue of the alleged theft and consequently, stealing of votes: “Elections are not completed, but abducted. Aleksandar Vučić forcibly usurped the office of President of the Republic and does not care about the legality or legitimacy of what he did. “Electoral fraud is documented, but it is a whole other issue that the evidence cannot be taken before the authorities, for those authorities were abducted long before these elections – Dr Nebojsa Stefanovic threw the Ministry of internal Affairs un-

4 Vladeta Janković, “Došli smo do vladavine ološa [We have reached the rule of the scum],” talk with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, No. 3465, p. 14

5 Jelka Jovanović, “Pobeda u više boja [Multicolored victory],” *Novi magazin*, No. 310, p. 10

6 Dragoljub Žarković, “Vučić nije hteo predsednika Republike koji će da mu zvoca; sad najavljuje da će da zvoca premijeru, a o nama ostalima da ne govorim [Vučić didn’t want a nagging President; now he announces that he will nag to the prime minister, and not to mention the rest of us],” *Vreme*, No. 1370, p. 5

der Vučić’s feet, and in turn, in the last episode, got a kiss on the forehead. Does anyone seriously believe that the tape with the footage of ballots in Novi Pazar being inserted in the electoral box was really a “joke” made by the president of the voting committee? Or that the ballots were found in the polling box, but folded did not previously pass through the opening at its top? Did the Easter miracle really happen in the parliamentary basement overnight two bags of 800 for non-existent votes for Vučić transformed into four? How should it be argued that on the television stations with national coverage Vučić was ten times more present than all other candidates combined. Is it just me who thinks that he was abusing the office of the Prime Minister? Were the interviewers of public opinion accidentally underestimating my chances? Who still believes that the rental of the aircraft cost 200 euros? Were the people lying that they were threatened with dismissals from jobs or canceled concerts, literary prizes abolished...?”⁷

In the spirit of Janković’s diagnosis of the electoral process, the already quoted Dragoljub Žarković concludes on Vučić’s campaign, or more specifically his profile. For the Editor in Chief of the anti-government weekly *Vreme*, Vučić is a manipulator, a man who uses lies and self-deception to stay in power. Seemingly sophisticated attitude about Vučić as a political liar, in refined terms, can be read the following lines: “Vučić enjoys the self-deception and a deception of a good part of the electorate that he is never wrong. One step is followed so quickly by another, that in such a short time it is impossible to reconstruct the past and analyze if better decisions could have been made. He pretends that every step in the process was a necessity imposed by the need.”⁸

That the editorial policy of *Vreme* is fully in line with the rhetoric of the opposition parties shows the article by Zora Drčelić that literally takes over the interpretation and oratory of Saša Janković on the pace and the outcome of the presidential elections. As can be seen in previous passages, Saša Janković sees the elections as undemocratic and considers them a political and media manipulation that looks like a kidnapping. The metaphor “kidnapping” is not accidentally chosen; in fact it has a strong propaganda effect. The kidnappers have bad motives, seizing someone their freedom, threatening them with the loss of life in case their goal is not reached or interests satisfied. Similarly, believes Janković, Aleksandar Vučić performs an act of “coercion of the electoral process,” the massive manipulation through the media and a field campaign forcing people to vote for him and his party. It is a deliberate violence and repression of free choice of the citizens. Metaphor is used to point out that Vučić is an undemocratic president. This matrix is literally taken over, and very sharply articulated by the journalist Zora Drčelić.

In a journalistic-opposition inspiration, she says, “Jankovic failed to enter the second round of elections, nor was it realistic, in terms of the election campaign and the fact that it was in every possible way controlled by Aleksandar Vučić, but he was the first opposition candidate who managed to get such a significant number of votes in the past five years. Such support can only be retained and increased by setting and meeting sustainable goals. The most important thing is to ensure that the next elections are more or less fair. At least there was one thing that these elections were fair and accurate about: they made a clear boundary between attainable and unattainable goals both to the opposition and Aleksan-

7 Saša Janković, “Ovako dalje ne ide. Srbija se uspravlja [This is no longer acceptable. Serbia is rising],” interview with Jelena Jorgačević, *Vreme*, No. 1371, p. 17

8 Dragoljub Žarković, “Vučić nije hteo predsednika Republike koji će da mu zvoca; sad najavljuje da će da zvoca premijeru, a o nama ostalima da ne govorim [Vučić didn’t want a nagging President; now he announces that he will nag to the prime minister, and not to mention the rest of us],” *Vreme*, No. 1370, p. 4

dar Vučić. If the opposition agreed to a media blackout and tabloid lynch, if it agreed to the obstruction of the Parliament, to the fact that Aleksandar Vučić participated in the presidential campaign as a Prime Minister, ignoring the Constitution and the Law on the Government, as well as all of the good practices set by European Union, if they agreed to the harnessing of the majority of the media and all state resources in the campaign of a candidate Aleksandar Vučić, including REM and REC, the manipulation of voting lists and Kosovo votes, the public secret about the buying of votes recorded with a mobile phone, the threatening with dismissals from jobs to those who do not vote for Vučić, the public secrets of black-mails, threats and violence, SNS groups in jeeps, the public secret of the photographing of ballots and other 'Bulgarian trains' if in short, the parliamentary opposition and opposition candidates agreed to be a theater backdrop for Vučić's idea of multi-party elections, then they, together with their supporters had to have assumed that the result of the elections would be what it is, without the subsequent whining on missed chances and failed expectations."⁹

The need to undermine the democratic legitimacy, namely the level of absurdity reached in an attempt to send a message that Serbia does not support Vučić can be followed through another aspect as well. Vučić, as a political leader, is exclusively and only a marketing product, a man who by using his knowledge, intuition and political skill, creates an impression of the eligible representative of the general population. So, Vučić is not an authentic popular leader, but one of many political marketing creations. The support to this thesis is provided on numerous instances:

Aleksandar Apostolovski, a columnist for the weekly magazine *Nedeljnik* and journalist of *Politika* writes: "Why did the Prime Minister win the first round? He imposed himself as the main topic of the campaign, creating an illusion for the opposition that they were fighting against 'that' Vučić. In the ambush waited the 'new' Vučić, who got support from the only man who could beat him in Serbia, without the campaign. That man is called Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. Thus, he demonstrated to the patriots who has a monopoly on love for Russia, as later proven by the results of Boško Obradović from Dveri and a few Eurosceptics ... As the most skilled campaigner, taking over *Šešelj's* fierce and Toma's *Šumadian* know-how, equally in love with the Red Star as well as the focus groups, public opinion surveys and polls which he sees as a seismograph: knowing exactly what to say to cause an earthquake, or face gesture to make so that the people feel sorry for him."¹⁰

In addition to the proven marketing skills, Vučić would not be the president if the West, namely Germany, did not give the "green light". On the, literally, crucial influence of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel on the outcome of the Serbian presidential elections, Apostolovski compares and contrasts, with a great deal of confidence, Tadić's firmness with Vučić's humility in relation to the German, that is Western demands regarding Kosovo and Metohija: "Vučić could see from the tubes of his links in Boris's government, of the late Miki Rakić, where the true power lies, when Angela Merkel sent Boris to the movies, and then to Vuk Jeremić, whose movie was not welcomed by the audience. New Vučić, unlike the old, realized that it is important to win the hearts of foreigners first, and then those of the Serbs. But unlike that Vučić, this Vučić understood that any sudden reform moves could bewilder the growing number of supporters eager, thus Serbia remained the only country in Europe that did not impose sanctions on Russia. At the same time he connected with the Central

Committee of the Communist party of China, understanding that the focus of the new world is shifting towards Asia."¹¹

In the spirit of the already familiar matrix of the opposition, though in a slightly jollier mood, stripped of resentment and anger, Apostolovski sets a reader's sights at the money and media based advantages Vučić had: "Of course that in his big win Aleksandar Vučić had the support of the media, public resources and foreigners who didn't want a weak ruler on the migrant's route in the region that is on fire, aside from the Bosnian pot stew. Having those assets, it wasn't so difficult convincing Serbs to follow his lead for another five years. He had a divided opposition out of which at least a half of the candidates were his light cavalry."¹²

The relativisation of numbers presenting the attitude of the electorate in Serbia is another of the often used strategies to deny Aleksandar Vučić's political legitimacy. As opposed to the Aleksandar Vučić's 56% of the votes, the only relevant candidate of the opposition, Saša Janković, won not more than 16% of the votes. According to the opinion of the almost all commentators of the weeklies, this outcome shows the creation of the opposition leader, who supposedly, should be a politically established opponent to Vučić's alleged autocracy over the country and its society.

With the purpose of indirect and undoubted sabotage of Aleksandar Vučić, some authors like Veljko Lalić from the weekly *Nedeljnik*, suggest that despite everything these elections have two winners: "The winners of these elections are Aleksandar Vučić and Saša Janković, who intermixed their electorate and scheduled a derby in Belgrade for next year. Janković didn't fit the projection of the government: if he had won 12% as previously predicted by agencies, or had been below Beli on the list, these would have been the elections as sketched by Vučić."¹³

A message with the same relevance is sent by Lalić's colleague, Nenad Čaluković, who writes that the presidential elections were not held in order to choose the president, but rather to choose the opposition's leader: "It seems that the thesis suggesting these were the opposition's leader elections rather than the presidential ones, became even more plausible a week after the results were counted. The absolute victory of Aleksandar Vučić fell in the shadow of the dilemma about who should be a new opposition's leader. Saša Janković has the most chance, of course, since he had the best score when it comes to the votes of the public."¹⁴

The belief in the Janković's dominance is supported by a completely non-political branch as well. The actor Nebojša Glogovac, who signed the appeal of support to Saša Janković called Appeal 100, euphorically claims that the end of the Vučić's reign is on the horizon: "At these elections Vučić got a counterbalance of sorts. The stronger is our pressure, the stronger will be pressure on the government. But something will come to be from this clash, from this clinch. They can't stop us now. Only

⁹ Zora Drčelić, "Pištaljkom protiv otmičara [With whistle against the kidnappers]," *Vreme*, No. 1370, p. 5

¹⁰ Aleksandar Apostolovski, "Vučićeva igra prestola [Vučić's game of thrones]," *Nedeljnik*, No. 273, p. 8

¹¹ Ibid, p. 9

¹² Ibid, p. 11

¹³ Veljko Lalić, "Kraj petooktobarske republike [The end of 5th October Republic]," *Nedeljnik*, No. 273, p. 4

¹⁴ Nenad Čaluković, "Da li je Saša Janković novi zaštitnik opozicije [Is Saša Janković the new guardian of opposition]," *Nedeljnik*, No. 273, p. 18

if they put me in prison. But one can act from prison too. All you need is a little bit of brain and courage and everything will be alright.”¹⁵

Nebojša Glogovac's optimism when it comes to the chances of Saša Janković is in the close relation to the minimisation of Aleksandar Vučić's success. The most concrete example of this intellectually political action is the attitude of the sociologist Božidar Jakšić who in the interview for *Novi Magazin* belittles Vučić's victory and the democracy in Serbia.” Janković didn't win these elections, but he didn't lose either; the other one who won with the same percentage, actually truly lost because in the conditions the elections took place and with such a politics model, unless you win 98,7% of the votes, unless you have 107% - you don't achieve anything. 55% is a miserable score.”¹⁶

After the relativisation of the election's results, actually at the same time, there is an undoubted attempt to define the political order in Serbia lead by Aleksandar Vučić. As we are about to see, there is a steady number of principles used to define the political order, its structure and functions. Despite its different variations, there is one core, the key element of all the definitions. The common denominator of all the attempts to define the political order is shown in this attitude: “Vučić's governing is in its base antidemocratic and antiliberal.” Simultaneously with the negation of democracy, what is more than obvious is the negative obsession with Vučić's rule which, as explained, combines the elements of resignation, anger and deep personal and political frustration. This statement is a sort of explicit and implicit assumption, but also a conclusion. Any further thinking is a modeled confirmation of the already set and easily accepted hypothesis about the absence of democracy. The roots of this premise are so deep that the fact the elections were held without violence or hard evidence of the theft of the people's votes, is completely disregarded. What is ignored with the same consistency is the factual and legal existence of the political pluralism, the absence of the systematical-political repression, as well as the liberally democratic support of the world that was never guaranteed to the undemocratic rulers in this part of the world, whose evidence is Slobodan Milošević's case during the 1990s.

Since the whole context of the analysis stems from the initial premise about the “undemocratic political order”, what ensues is a series of different verbal variations. Despite the abundance of the manifestations of the mentioned political premise, the leading motive seems to be the explanation of the idea about the presidential elections being another proof of Vučić's absolutistic tendencies. The general attitude of the opposition's criticism is given by Dragoljub Žarković: “Vučić has a free pass to play with the more or less thoroughly passivized institutions even more, and present himself as the ‘patron of the nation’, the leading sponsor and the founder of the new rules. But it is not an easy task even in ‘the Wonderland’... His mandate is strong and his power is big, though basically it was so even before the elections, because no sober mind when it comes to politics and practical business believed that Toma Nikolić had any influence in the state's affairs. Nikolić had it the least of all. This formal change in the status gave Aleksandar Vučić new fields of action and opened a protective parachute above his head. He has

15 Nebojša Glogovac, “Borba se nastavlja [The fight continues],” talk with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3458, p. 16

16 Božidar Jakšić, “Nacionalizam uništava i svoje i druge [The nationalism destroys its own as well as others],” talk with Jelka Jovanović and Nadežda Gaće, *Novi magazin*, No. 314, p. 19



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an undisputable mandate for the next five years, and there is always someone else to blame for everything that happens to us.”¹⁷

Different principles of the definition of the political order led by Aleksandar Vučić include a whole list of extremely negative and morally political terms. Starting with “the mafia state” as Serbia is seen by Jovo Bakić, over “the private state”, “classical dictatorship”, and “stabilocracy”, down to “the reign of scum and provincial dilettantes” as claimed by professor doctor Vladeta Janković.

The inner “wealth” of the critical discourse can be illustrated through a list of examples from different weeklies. Content-wise there are no major deviations from the previous research period. Quite on the contrary, the very strategy is a constant repetition with the aim to impose a clearly determined and, from a democratically liberal point of view, extremely negative image. The best way to start the saga about Aleksandar Vučić’s dictatorship is probably the political analysis of the actor Nikola Đuričko, the active supporter of the opposition’s candidate Saša Janković: “Maybe he is not aware that at the moment he is the President, the Prime Minister, the security service coordinator, the residents board president of this and every other building, every school’s council president, but I am aware and everybody sees that this is a typical example of dictatorship. For five years they have had the absolute power in the Parliament. They own the administration of justice and they own the police. They own the Parliament, so what stopped them from taking us to the European Union during these five years?! It doesn’t matter when we will get there on paper, it’s the laws of the social justice that we need. God knows who finances the political parties! And we all know that is where the corruption starts. How are the supposedly independent judges chosen? Are they chosen by the parties? Of course they are. Are they independent? Of course they are not. Then what does SPP has to do with the European values? This government does nothing whe it comes to new ideas, it performs with the strictly personal interest. If I have the right to oppose somebody’s decision to support SPP, then it is because I think that support can only be based on the personal interest, not on one’s ideals.”¹⁸

This falsely Europe-oriented, autocratic, political persona of Aleksandar Vučić leads a strictly interest-motivated group of people. His politics contains no ideas or any moral consideration, it all comes down to his aspiration for bigger concentration and demonstration of power. Semantically, and even rhetorically to some extent, the sociologist Jovo Bakić presents quite similar stance. He quite bluntly claims the following: “We have an authoritarian ruler of oligarchy. That oligarchy existed even before him, but with one exception, it was more powerful than its rulers. Now, the ruler is more powerful than the oligarchy, he actually placed himself as a leader of that very oligarchy he commands. That oligarchy was in a way disciplined, when Mišković was sent to jail, and that was an indication that something important was about to change. The old system however, remained the same, it only got an authoritarian leader. Oligarchy itself is a bad thing, and an authoritarian oligarchy is even worse. That’s the system we are living in.”¹⁹ To additionally assert himself as a number one critic of the current government, Jovo Bakić presents an even more radical stance, he

17 Dragoljub Žarković, “Vučić nije hteo predsednika Republike koji će da mu zvoća; sad najavljuje da će da zvoća premijeru, a o nama ostalima da ne govorim [Vučić didn’t want a nagging President; now he announces that he will nag to the prime minister, and not to mention the rest of us],” *Vreme*, No. 1370, p. 4

18 Nikola Đuričko, “Ovo je knjiški primer diktature [This is textbook example of dictatorship],” interview with Olja Bećković, No. 3461, p. 20

19 Jovo Bakić, Dejan Vuk Stanković, “Mafijaška ili demokratska država [Mafia state or democratic state],” interview by Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3464

claims that Serbia under the current rule of Aleksandar Vučić, is in fact a mafia state. The reasoning behind this claim lies in the yet unresolved murder and the role of Partizan football club fans leader, and in the personal opinion, of sociologist by vocation, on the work of the judicial authorities in Serbia, “We do not have a normal state, but a mafia state that has enslaved the entire country, and they can do whatever they want and they will continue to do so until the people stands up and says ‘this is too much, way too much!’”. “When you say that we do not have a state, but a mafia state, what does that exactly mean?”

Bakić: “That means that the Prime minister is yet to provide an answer for a question on who was Sale Mutavi serving as bodyguard, the child of which high ranking politician, while Mutavi himself had a bodyguard that was a warden in Central prison, in other words an employee of the the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Was that person Vučić himself? When Mutavi was murdered, the the Internal Affairs minister declared a war on mafia. Why does he need to do that? Isn’t that states’ default stance towards mafia? Or is this state just another tool for them? And who is the mafia boss? These are some crucial problems in Serbia. Everything else is a matter of secondary importance, as we have a high reason to believe that this country’s highest ranking politicians are in fact members of mafia. National Security should be dealing with things like that, if they are actually doing anything. And then you have Vučić sending a message, ‘don’t even think of meeting with mobsters in the local splavs’. What does that mean?”²⁰

Vučić’s undemocratic rule saga, has been kept alive by interviews with some other prominent fighters for ‘democratic and national issue’. One of them is dr Slobodan Antonić, and he says: “Vučić is a reformatory Caesar, he defeated the tycoons, he defeated the budget’s deficit, he defeated... I’m afraid that’s the system that is coming to be, political capitalism, plus people’s Caesarism which is Euro-reformatory in nature, plus political economy. We are headed for Europe, but in a way to make one political family more and more powerful, and to make foreign banks and companies more protected and more high-handed, while all the rest of us are growing poorer and more helpless. I’m not sure we will survive such a trip to Europe.”²¹

Simultaneously, Vučić’s rise to power has never been nor it can ever be a matter of people’s choice. It is a political agreement with the West which was made at the expense of Serbian interests in Kosovo and in wider region: “First of all, Vučić would have never come to power if it hadn’t for his ‘Canossa voyage’ to Washington and Brussels. If he hadn’t publicly repented and had a change of heart, do you think he would have been allowed to win the elections in 2012? Perhaps the significance of Brussels congratulating Nikolić three hours before the polling places have been officially closed, is being overrated, but with fair elections and without the ‘Canossa’, Vučić would have never actually come to power. And second of all, Vučić would never have been given the freedom to do what he wants if he didn’t ‘hand over’ the northern part of Kosovo, in other words if there wasn’t for Brussels Agreement I and II. Brussels Agreement was signed on April the 19th 2013. After that, as far as the Washington and Brussels were concerned, Vučić could do whatever he wanted with the Serbian democracy and media, as long as he could guarantee peace and stability that were emanated by the Brussels Agreement I and II. Meanwhile, Vučić has grown in power to an extent where

20 Ibid, pp. 15-16.

21 Slobodan Antonić, “Srbija je privatno preduzeće jedne familije [Serbia is private property of a single family],” *Vreme*, No. 1379, interview with Radmilo Marković, p. 14

he actually started controlling everything, even the elections. And the elections are the very heart of democracy, they cannot depend on a will of just one man.”²²

Furthermore, in order to remain in power Vučić had to serve to a general public a specific political marketing which was in essence a mixture of Russophilia and Euro-reformatory views. Vučić is a ‘political Don Juan’, a two-faced ‘seducer of the masses’ and a skillful technologist of the power, which he loves to enforce as much as possible. “He gets both ‘pro-Europeans and ‘nationalists’ to support him. He tells one side that European Union has no alternative, and he tells the other that he will use the Russian MiGs to save Kosovo and Republika Srpska. That is in its nature contradictory, but as Don Juan, he also gets both sides to trust him. That is the politics, which Vučić will continue to administer even as President. Playing on both sides, a little bit with Washington, and a little bit with Moscow. The only issue, however, is that the foreign powerful figures are not Serbian voters; they do not watch *Pink* television nor do they read the *Informer*. They know what he is doing, and they will force him to fulfill his promises. At that point, when both sides make that demand, it won’t go well for Vučić.”²³

Antonić adds that Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party does not function on the principle of traditional parties. It does not have program principles, a system of values and a concrete elaborated public policy for different segments of society and governance in general. Instead of valuable and political orientations, it is about the interest community of the leaders and an army of loyal supporters who each benefit in their own way. Awareness of the interest-clientelist community edged with family interest of the Vučić family. Antoniće says in the following point from his interview to the weekly newspaper *Vreme*: “The Serbian Progressive Party is not a true political party. This is more Vučić’s personal political army. He is the general of this army, talented and capable – he is a Bonaparte. And of course he decides everything.”²⁴

Oscillation between Russia and the West was not the only one so-called “political inconsistency” by Aleksandar Vučić. Vučić is also portrayed as a worthwhile provisional and ideologically incoherent politician, inclined to fluctuate between different, assuming strictly antagonized ideological extremes. Vučić’s ideological inconsistency is presented in an ironic and somewhat caricaturely-ironical way, by drama artist Zlatko Paković, who says: “We have a man who was loyal to one radical, nationalist idea, the idea of Greater Serbia, and who is now loyal to one liberal idea of the European Union. There is no continuity – neither ethical, nor moral, nor political. As he has been loyal to Šešelji, he is now loyal to the idea of the European Union and Angela Merkel. This is called the ethics of responsibility for the current job.”²⁵

That there is a significant overlap between the views of public intellectuals and political leaders of the opposition, that it is about forming a common front against the Serbian Progressive Party and its leader, shows the relevant similarity of the views of former Serbian President Boris Tadić and already quoted Slobodan Antoniće. In an interview with the weekly newspaper *NIN*, Boris Tadić confirms and further elaborates the attitude on the Serbian Progressive Party as a clientelist party, with the touch of political enthusiasm and “sound” moralism: “Vučić’s closest associates, brothers, godparents control the software industry, road construction, all jobs in connection with electricity, agriculture. Vučić creates economic power in order

for his future election defeat to be irrelevant, as he will have all the levers of state management in his hands. Regarding the representatives of the West, they give legitimacy to the collapse of democracy in Serbia due to the co-operation of this government in the process of recognizing Kosovo’s independence. The foreigners who recognize the independence of Kosovo will praise us in all other aspects, and we will be left step by step without Kosovo and without democracy and economic perspective.”²⁶

The combination of geopolitical moments and manipulation by the definition of democracy leads to the concept of stabilocracy. The heading of stabilocracy implies a stable political order that suspends or literally does not accept democratic values and practices, but it is supported by large democratic states for certain geopolitical reasons. In the case of Serbia, the West supports the undemocratic order in Serbia because of readiness for essential concessions on Kosovo and Republika Srpska. Due to stability in the region, democratic political practice is sacrificed: “Unfortunately, we are witnessing that the democracy and freedom of the citizens of Serbia are subordinated to the promised stability (it regards to stability in the Western Balkans region – author’s note) offered by a cooperative usurper of political life in Serbia. “Stabilocracy”, and not consolidated democracy, are their (the key EU countries and the United States, author’s note) priorities in this area, and this has a negative impact on the political and everyday life of Serbian citizens. Further consolidation of power in the hands of one man, however, does not have to be related to constitutional changes. The current Constitution does not allow usurpation of power, but it is largely at work. The rule of law in Serbia today is in the deep shadow of a man who draws his legitimacy in popularity, and transmits it outside of his jurisdiction. He is appointed as the supreme social arbiter, whether he is the first deputy prime minister, prime minister or president of the republic.”²⁷ But the construction of Vučić’s negative image does not move exclusively in the level of political and moral attitudes. It hits deeper. A critical discourse to heritage and a paradigm of strong cultural and political racism. A striking place for this media-political tendency is the interview of prof. dr Vladeta Janković, former senior official of the Democratic Party of Serbia and the Serbian ambassador in Great Britain and the Vatican.

In an interview entitled “We have come to the rule of scourge” in the weekly newspaper *NIN*, with a bitter contempt and political frustration, he speaks about the Serbian Progressive Party and its leader, Aleksandar Vučić. Pseudo-spiritually aristocratic arrogant and politically futile moralism speaks arrogantly and authoritatively in the following words: “This is some provincial dilettantism, with a touch of gluttonous rapacity. The prime minister and his environment are basically like those who, when entering the apartment, leave their shoes in the hallway. On this ground have sprouted phenomena such as the letter from Toma Nikolić to Queen Elizabeth, the English language and the extravagant charm of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, hijab of Maja Gojković, or Vučić’s decision to withdraw the ambassador because of a court judgment and severely punish the French with 90 days of inaction by our politicians. The holders of power in today’s Serbia are not only largely unqualified and inadequate for work, but are unworthy of participating in public life at all.”²⁸

26 Boris Tadić, “Novi tajkuni zavlada li Srbijom [New tycoons are governing Serbia],” interview with Olja Bećković, *NIN*, No. 3470, p. 8

27 Zoran Lutovac, “Postali smo taoci stabilokratije [We have become the hostages of the stabilocracy],” interview with Filip Švarm and Tatjana Tagirov, *Vreme*, No. 1379, p. 17

28 Vladeta Janković, “Došli smo do vladavine ološa [We have come to the rule of the scum],” interview with Olja Bećković, *NIN*, No. 3465, p. 11

22 Ibid

23 Ibid

24 Ibid

25 Zlatko Paković, “Sudbina ili karijera [Destiny or career],” interview with Radoslav Čebić, *Vreme*, No. 1371, p. 22

Almost uncontrolled false-style decorated outbursts of anger and frustration are evident in the following syntagms, which unambiguously describe how the rhetoric of hatred in a high intellectual society works: “Now we are seriously threatened by the loss of another important heritage of the struggle from the 1990s – free elections. Because what we have had recently is quite similar to the appearance of Tito's election, with the bots replacing the SKOJ²⁹ activists, and the state security roughians – and we are going to get the check-house masters – deliverers in the image of the building managers. That's what happened with the coming of the progressives. They went off like cockroaches go out, gradually, tapping into the air. As soon as they felt secure, they began to conquer the ministerial armchairs to grab sinecures, but, by God, they do not forget to take revenge, they felt like they should arrest people. Thus, we came to the rule of scum, in the original sense, because the root is a Greek noun *ohlos* meaning mob. Hence the notion of chaos as the rule of populists who manipulate the masses.”³⁰

Janković's obsession with Vučić and his party on the cultural and political agenda has a broader development. Namely, to a certain type of government, more precisely to the rulers, a certain cultural pattern also suits them, which he either directly or indirectly stimulates. It is about a massive culture of low quality that, through the light entertainment industry, serves as an “opium for the people”, which ultimately accepts “voluntary slavery” and signs a pact with the “devil”, in this case – Aleksandar Vučić.

This construction, quite clear without much depth, but with great pretentiousness, was presented by actor Nebojša Glogovac, one of the promoters of the opposition presidential candidate, Saša Janković: “Where is the capital going? In the formation of distastefulness, since it was created in the '90s, because it was in the hands of those who took away our money during wars, who opened firms, factories, and are part of the system. This mass of capital pays for Dara Bubamara, fake artists, quasi-cultures of ignorance, horror, mud, immorality... These tits and asses have become a landmark for these people. It is presented to them as culture, and it is not culture. It is an embarrassment for a healthy brain. The people act like a flock. You persistently repeat one thing, and they accept it, because they are overwhelmed by the struggle of returning the loan, will their wheat harvest be successful or not, how they will make it without dough... And while this struggle for existence is in progress, the brain is focused on it. Everything from TV, okay, I need only light content, I do not need Shakespeare to think too much. People do not think because they do not have the time while fighting for existence, they have no strength to concentrate, although it would be curative. And when you see the people in this type of anesthesia, the darkness, then it is easy to manipulate. And our people are ignorant, 40 percent functionally literate; you can really do what you want. Brain-drained in such a way, with such a poor offer of spirituality, such a nation chooses such a leader, and that is it. And then you do not have a second circle, and you're becoming North Korea? Kiosk, that Thursday, it's already a detail enough indicative to confirm the absolute power.”³¹

In addition to the analogy with North Korea and low cultural standards in Serbia, another popular contribution has emerged in the devastation of Aleksandar Vučić and Serbia he leads. In the spirit of the cultural racism of Vladeta Janković and in line with the “acting-political” inspiration of Nebojša Glogovac,

29 SKOJ – Savez Komunističke Omladine Jugoslavije (Young Communist League of Yugoslavia)

30 Vladeta Janković, “Došli smo do vladavine ološa [We have come to the rule of the scum],” interview with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, No. 3465, p. 11

31 Nebojša Glogovac, “Borba se nastavlja [The struggle continues],” interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3458, p. 16

vac, literary critic Milan Vlačić, compares the present spiritual situation of time in Serbia with “Monty Python's Flying Circus”, a popular British satire from the 1980s which had a strong and prominent political message. According to Vlačić's view, public immorality in relation to power allows for the poverty of the largest number of people, and the authorities often perform absurd moves that resemble the satire of the aforementioned British artists: “We are in some sort of Flying Circus by Monty Python, in one of my books I published a text about Ministry of silly walking. What Britain and the whole world laughed at, that became our reality. Most of our ministries have a silly walk in the political sense, and this goes by, because as I said at the beginning, we are too poor for morality and there is no bottom.”³²

The coupling of culture and politics was systematically developed in an interview by prof. dr Jelena Đorđević from the Belgrade Faculty of Political Science. Speaking about the current model of culture, promoted by the authorities, it explicitly states: “The dominant cultural pattern offered by the current regime based on the forced values of basic survival followed by radical anti-intellectualism and the arrogance of a imagined omniscience of the authorities. It is simply fantastic to what extent a public discourse is reduced, poor, devoid of any interest in the values of culture, knowledge, morality, meaning. A disdain for anything that rises above the daily bare life – the absence of any meaningful order of value that would offer the people a minimum orientation for a meaningful, genuine human existence. This cultural pattern does not offer any possible horizon of expectations, especially for young people, and especially for educated people, who would have some realistic, humane content that goes beyond abstract figures about GDP and counting the years for the start of ‘betterment’. It does not offer any value order that would overcome the ideas of enemies, traitors, conspiracies. It's a form without meaningful content. Pragmatically bare. Painfully empty. It lives from the production of fear and the initiation of the state of apathy and helplessness ... the reduction of life to the banality of survival and the escape of reality, all assisted by the legitimacy of violence, aggressiveness in speech and deeds, the work of radical polarization of society, and the persistent propagation of one single discourse and one single man. This cultural model permeates hatred of diversity in spite of declarative, ritual ‘advocacy’ for respecting the other. The lie got into all the pores.”³³

The culmination of the construction and maintenance of the negative image of Aleksandar Vučić is reflected in an unconcealed attempt to explain his action in politics by referring to psychiatric terms. The goal of raising discrediting to the level of colloquial speech about madness, more accurately legitimizes the attitude towards the president of Serbia as a madman. Psychiatrist and member of the Serbian parliament Sanda Rašković-Ivić plays an important role in this media strategy. Participating in the panel discussion of the weekly newspaper *NIN* under the working title: “Does Vučić produce madness?”, she becomes an example of the abuse of psychiatry for daily political and propaganda purposes.

Rašković-Ivić starts applying psychiatry with the following statement: “Serbian society is in a terrible crisis, people say ‘this is madness’, press conferences, the National Assembly, insanity, wherever you turn. Vučić rules by dancing on the edge of the knife, by constant mobilization, by the fear of plotting behind his back, fear of overturning and destabilization if he loses power. He presents himself as a person who

32 Milan Vlačić, “Blesavi hod oko muzičke fontane [Silly walk around the musical fountain],” interview with Biljana Vasić, No. 1381, p. 14

33 Jelena Đorđević, “Radikalna laž, nasilje i banalnost [Radical falsehood, violence and banality],” *Vreme*, No. 1374, p. 16

solves every problem and, if he is gone, disaster will strike. Therefore, the atmosphere of the state of emergency is forced, we will have a coup, a Macedonian, a Ukrainian scenario ... And we have tabloids as the official messenger of Vučić and Serbian Progressive Party. One morning I saw on the front pages of four tabloids written 'WAR'. The colleague must have read Thomas Szasz for sure, that is the production of social madness. And ideology, rhetoric, and rituals of political organization should, I guess, behave as a 'therapeutic state.'³⁴

Along with the stated motives in the conceivment of criticism, various texts were published. In post-election Serbia from April to July 2017, the heat of the presidential campaign has still remained in the radical opposition media. The disputes of Aleksandar Vučić included a number of different and mutually related moments: from moral-political, institutional, cultural, ending with medical. In opposition circles, it became a matter of prestige in which ways Vučić would be disputed. The distinctive competition in the rhetoric of contestation, the competition over who is going to adhere to the accusation of an ironic or furious label more intensely, quickly and better. Throughout the development of critical discourse, the reactualization of the Savamala case had a significant role, which served as a trigger for a negative campaign of power and a confirmation of the thesis of its arbitrariness. A lot of effort was invested in almost all weekly newspapers to denigrate the appointment of Bratislav Gašić as the head of the BIA, and the texts devoted to the relativization of the economic success of the current Government of Serbia took over a significant space. It is especially interesting that the critical media expose to mockery the ceremony of taking the oath in the Serbian Parliament and the inauguration of the president in the former Palace of the Federation in New Belgrade.

The ceremony of taking the solemn oath at the House of the National Assembly of Serbia was seen as a coronation, and not the election of a democratic president and the affirmation of the republican order of Serbia. Dragoljub Žarković, the editor of the newspaper *Vreme*, summed up all the resentment and cynicism about the symbolic appointment of the new president of Serbia in his weekly column: "Vučić and his people will not miss any opportunity to increase the significance of the presidential role by means of external features. The rise from the constitutional position of the president to the key figure of Serbian politics will not be carried out gradually. He has already emphasized that he has a 'controlling role over the government and the parliament,' only that he did not define it as it says in the Constitution, that it means that he can once again take a law into consideration. As long as he remains the head of the strongest ruling party, therefore the government and parliamentary majority, he will not even have the need to use this limited and timely constitutional authority: namely, he will write laws and adopt them as he wishes."³⁵

Obsession with Vučić, as indicated by the quotation, is confirmed as a constant in the writing of almost all weekly newspapers in Serbia. This obsession is manifested at four levels of stigmatization: moral, political, cultural and psychological. In each of these aspects, the power of Aleksandar Vučić is controversial, precisely radically disputed and dominantly and in detail negatively written with a significant amount of anger, frustration and other forms of utterly irrational intensity.

34 Sanda Rašković –Ivić and Slavica Đukić –Dejanović "Proizvodi li Vučić ludilo [Does Vučić produce madness]," interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, No. 3466, p. 10

35 Dragoljub Žarković, "Krunisanje za predsednika [Crowning for the President]," *Vreme*, No. 1378, p. 4

Image of the opposition - "eternal losers" or a chance for a new beginning

Unlike the authorities, the image of the opposition in weekly newspapers and editorial columns is more complex. On the one hand, in certain media that are close to government, the opposition is denoted with negative value, politically and morally condemned with a significant dose of euphoria and sharp, categorical and disqualifying judgments. On the other hand, certain, primarily critical-minded media open up the space for the explication and articulation of oppositional views, giving them at the same time indirectly or directly support for a fierce political struggle with the government.

And in the period after the presidential elections, the relation between the treatment of the opposition and the government is identical, when we talk about the quantity of media space in the print media. Unlike the current government that is significantly present in news columns in daily and weekly newspapers, the opposition is much less a subject of dealing with journalistic circles, especially those who achieve their professional engagement in weekly newspapers. The reasons for such status of the opposition are plenty. Among them, it seems that the two are most important. Firstly, the influence of the opposition on the dynamics of the outcome of political processes in the country is small. Government has a convincing majority both in the Assembly and in the public opinion. Secondly, almost all weekly newspapers are, in a sense, are critically oriented towards the government. Their thematic orientation is such that the opposition in the comments, editorial columns, is more or less reduced to several descriptive, mostly critical remarks.

At the same time, the orientation on the critique of the government, by itself, entails a little space devoted to a critical analysis of the period in which the opposition was in the positions of power. In general, until the presidential election period, the dominant flow of thought and writing, more precisely to the construction of the image, was predictable and constant. The construction of the negative image of the opposition is a blend of a valuation of its activities and an analysis of the circumstances that led to the almost endemic impossibility of the opposition, especially the Euro-reformist, to establish itself as a political participant with the potential for political struggle with the government.

The result of Saša Janković in the elections and the appearance of a student movement opposed to the current government has led to a certain correction of the point of view. A new critical discourse towards Vučić began to function as a system of investing expectations into political participants that can lead to desirable political changes.

Columns and writing of the daily newspaper *Informer* and the column of the editor in chief Dragan J. Vučićević are of particular importance for understanding the negative image of the opposition. Vučićević's columns in the moral-political sense problematize participants of the opposition scene, in same way they critically treat both media of the opposition and non-governmental organizations, with almost unavoidable reflection on the period of power of the winners of the 5th October events. The basic thesis of these theses could be summarized into the following three interrelated moments that form the approach of this author: 1) the current opposition has no moral credibility (because of the highly corrupt political class it is composed of) nor the political capacity to lead the state due to the failure of the tran-

sition in Serbia; 2) in the opposition oriented media, and among the print media, which is the majority, the current government is attacked without a serious rational reasoning and with one sole aim: to be overthrown as soon as possible; 3) in the media that support the current opposition there is undoubtedly a discrimination of all non-direct opponents of Vučić's authority.

For the understanding of the media-political scene in Serbia, the writing of the editor-in-chief of *Informer* is relevant from three interrelated reasons. Firstly, the style of writing and the content of his texts is such that he maintains an interest for politics in the lower educated layers who mainly buy and read tabloids and are very loyal voters in the electoral process. Secondly, *Informer* is important for the current government, because every week, every day it deals with the re-examination of negative attitudes and media-political images that are created about it and continuously reproduced by critically-minded media. And finally, *Informer* is the leader in daily newspapers in creating a negative image of the current opposition as a political participant.

In the period from October to December, Vučićević, along with the participants in political life, also dealt with the analysis of the media scene with negative values in relation to the editorial policy of RTS and tabloid *Kurir*. Also, he was actively spreading anti-European sentiment in public life, undermining the already fragile foundation of regional relations, and in particular affirmed support for Russia and its political leader Vladimir Putin.

It is precisely that this political and value determination of Dragan J. Vučićević does not allow him to be fully identified with the politics of the current Serbian government, since it sees itself as an active factor in the process of European integration and advocates of regional peace and political stability.

Nevertheless, attitude towards political opponents of government is openly critical in an already familiar language that seeks to morally stigmatize the opponent, with the sole description of it, while the conclusion, i.e. the value attitude logically necessarily follows from a cursory description spiced up often with a swear word.

The weekly newspaper *Pečat* shares the same critical attitude towards the Euro-reformist opposition, as Dragan Vučićević. It is radical and contains several interconnected elements. The opposition, especially the Euro-reform, has no political support and moral credibility, represents a factor of internal instability in the country, has a suspicious patriotic orientation and is turned towards, more precisely completely dependent on the West, and above all its reputation is controversial due to poor governance in the state from 2000-2012.

After the presidential elections, the image of the opposition was formed on the basis of the results achieved on the elections, the potential it has in political struggle, the readiness to accept the democratic rules of the game and the relation to the geopolitical challenges that Serbia faces.

For critics of the opposition, the term opposition means not only a set of parties that vote in the institutions of the system against decisions and legislative proposals of the government, but the concept of the opposition is significantly expanded. The political opposition is the unity of parties, non-governmental organizations, and the media and public intellectuals who are opposed to the authorities, either in a conceptual or in a personal sense.

The negative characterization of the opposition begins with a search for its internal political contradictions and logical inconsistencies. One of them is a constant reference to a democracy that also follows the continuing rejection of election results that do not match its political interests. This inner contradiction, Dragan detects. Vučićević, pointing out that it is based not only on the inconsistent understanding of democracy, but also on the deeply rooted and repeatedly mentioned cultural-racist political premise that divides the citizens, depending on the political position, into "higher" and "lower", morally superior (voters of the opposition) and morally problematic (voters of the government): "The people are rotten, change the people! The people are stupid; they do not know how to decide! In these two simple sentences, all the ideas of the post-election, in the essence, racist rebellion against the people are summed up... The best ideologist of the yellow scum-elite,³⁶ editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper *Danas*, Dragoljub Draža Petrović, explained this in his post-election column. In the footnote under the heading 'Feast of the Demons of Democracy', it was written that democracy is not a good system for Serbia: 'And what do we do now that democracy is a bad thing for Serbia, nobody has come up with anything better yet. Wherever three Svetlanas Ražnatović can outvote two Dušans Ivković, this eventually turns into a devoted democracy', says Petrović. That is, therefore, the essence, that is the program, that is the idea. Guilty is the people and the blame is on democracy! The people and democracy should be abolished in order for Serbia to be ruled by a 'higher yellow race' forever. Thank God, so the yellow scum-elite does not decide on the fate of Serbia. And it will not do so for long."³⁷

Delegitimization of the election victory of Aleksandar Vučić, absence of ritualistic, to a democratic society, appropriate congratulations of the opposition leaders to the newly elected president, and the accompanying sharp anti-Vučić rhetoric with the help of tycoons and foreign donors generated the student rebellion in the streets of Belgrade. There are two key motives of gathering – pure hatred towards Aleksandar Vučić and the need of opposition leaders to protect and enhance their own interest.

On hatred as a political instigator of student protests and the writing of opposition, anti-government media, Vučićević says, it represents not only hatred for Vučić, but also for majority Serbia. Identifying the political participant and majority of the politically-defined population, it should additionally allow the reader to suggest the inadmissibility of opposition political messages and activities. The distinctive addition in the rhetorical sense is the mention of the hated NATO (to most of Serbia's citizens unacceptable due to bombing in 1999) and the US billionaire George Soros: "Hatred of the Serbs. Hatred towards the majority Serbia that refuses to believe in NATO-Euro-Union-Soros fairy tale, according to which it will only be good for us only when we to mutilate and tame ourselves. Do not be in any doubt, all these self-proclaimed little leaders, all those big experts, scientists, artists, all those members of the languid minority who, unsuccessfully, thank God, are pushing Serbia into a new circle of hell, they all have only one interest which is - their own ass. That is why they hate Vučić so much. Because he has abolished their incomes, because he will not pay their rackets, because he knocked down the order in which they could sell nothing for something. We understand each other, right?"

This passage reveals the vulgar colloquial expression of "one's own ass" which is a metaphor for the care of political and social participants for their own material interest. By pointing out to the baseness

36 i.e. members of the Democratic Party, yellow being their party color

37 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Ne valja narod [The people are rotten]," *Informer*, 08. 04. 2017, p. 4

of the motive of political action (hatred and selfish interest), the author of the text tries to show the unacceptable and worthless political activity of the opposition participants. At the same time, referring to foreigners, above all the West, allows for the opposition activities to appear as something that does not have authentic support in Serbia. The opposition front against Vučić is ideologically heterogeneous and, as such, its main driving force is not essentially political, but is the expression of a personal negative obsession with Alexander Vučić. A sharp contrasting of the unworthy political motives of the opposition and the support of the people of Vučić, the focus on the ideological inconsistency of the opposition scene is often used as the motive in the writing of Dragan Vučićević, and the evidence in support of the aforementioned content is contained in the following quote: "They do not care about Vučić, they care about themselves. They do not fight against the Serbian Progressive Party, they fight for themselves. They do not have any ideology and principle, they know only for personal gain. And that is why they are so easily joined together, the left and right wing, both nationalists and non-nationalists, and separatists and unitarists, yellow, red and black, gather together without any difficulty. That's why Boško Obradović and Saša Janković kiss in the mouth publicly, Boris Tadić with Sanda Rašković-Ivić, Đorđe Vukadinović with Vesna Pešić, Vuk Pozderac Jeremić with Borka Pavićević. Anyway, long ago psychologists found out that people are strongly connected by a hatred of a common enemy. In this case, the hatred of Vučić, the pathological hatred of the elected president of Serbia, who was given the right by the majority of the people to rule this country at least until 2022. The sole knowledge that at least five more years will pass, and probably for a full 10 years, until a time in which they, the members of the yellow elite, will be able to come close enough to the state treasury, is forcing them to pathological hatred and general hysteria."³⁸

The particular dimension of Vučićević's writing is a constant controversy with the opposition media, especially with their attitude towards President Aleksandar Vučić. The editor-in-chief of *Informer* clearly writes about the aforementioned media tendency of the political and moral stigmatization of the president of the state through the media. At the same time, critical writing, even radical form and content, is proof that there is no media censorship in Serbia, which is one of the general points of critical discourse against the authorities: "But in the current Serbian version of 'democracy' it is possible that all weekly newspapers will be against, and even not against Vučić, not against the government, but against the state. In that and such democracy it is possible that the proven racketeering, mafia newspaper for weeks leads the most dreadful campaign against the president of Serbia; and he is forbidden even to respond to these monstrous lies. Finally, only in this and such democracy it is possible that RTS - a public media service paid by all citizens, even the 55% of those who voted for Vučić on April 2nd - are kidnapped by the yellow scum-elite and then turns them into a hysterical hostile association of propagandists whose editorial policy comes down to the slogan 'Vučić is a fagot' ... I'm personally not the advocate of such, not so much, radical 'democracy'. But, when I think a little better, perhaps it is a good development in Serbia. To see and to know. To make it clear to everyone, even the most naïve one, about what is happening in Serbia. There is a lot going on, but there is no censorship."³⁹

Equally critically strict and morally-politically accusing discourse is present in the weekly newspaper *Pečat*. Its columnists, similarly to Vučićević, use political motives, primarily the original democratic inauthenticity of the Serbian opposition, linking opposition parties, media, non-governmental organiza-

tions and public intellectuals with Western political and security circles, encouraging geopolitical and intelligent considerations that have rhetorically convincing suggestions, and in fact, they are concealed theories of conspiracy in weekly newspaper form.

Nevertheless, the assessment and estimations of the elective epilogue is clear and unambiguous. It directly shows the political impotence and the lack of perspective of the current, primarily civil-European opposition. Thusly, the columnist of *Pečat*, Dragomir Anđelković, says: "The presidential elections confirmed that there was no opposition in sight that could endanger the government. Only the government could undermine itself by withdrawing national irresponsible moves. Janković undoubtedly achieved a good result. However, his problem is that this is done by combining his head and someone else's body, on whose back he was sitting during the campaign. This candidate was relying on the infrastructure of the conceptually and personally worn Democratic Party, that is, its capacity to raise funds for the campaign. There is a spirit of the Democratic Party of the 5th October, and then the original Liberal Democratic Party, but with disdain it is looking at those now presenting themselves as his guardians (even if they were 'founding fathers' of the parties, such as the affair and overthrowing done by Čedomir Jovanović). It seems to them that he has 'bought' a springboard for further growth. However, when things are thoroughly examined, it is clear that this is an 'account without a bartender'. Janković has gathered someone else's team although he has his supporters. In fact, neither team gave him a new quality, nor is it the other way around. It is just the first impression. Jeremić's firm in the establishment has already collapsed, while around Janković's neck are hanging yellow-corrupted creditors. He will not be able to do anything quickly because of this, even if in the medium run. There is no point in talking about the longer deadlines in a dynamic Serbian political milieu. Until then - some will live, some will die."⁴⁰

Nevertheless, the electoral failure of the opposition does not mean the end of a political struggle. Internal turbulence in the Republic Electoral Commission on the proclamation of the election results and the beginning of student demonstrations, lead the editor of *Pečat* Milorad Vučelić to remind us that a scenario for destabilizing the state on the streets had already been prepared in the event of a defeat of the candidates of the Euro-reform parties and non-governmental organizations: "The ability to recognize scenarios of colored revolutions around the world are somewhat notorious and countless times analyzed and described. So, nothing new, but in our case it is a little humiliating that there is not even the effort to conceal the interest and efforts to destabilize our country with some more inventive scenarios." In order to intensify the potentially destructive component of street protests, a syntagma about the "Chilean scenario" (the allusion to the liquidation of left-wing President Chilean Salvador Allende by General Austin Pinochet, supported by the United States after the demonstrations and the military coup in 1973), was released into circulation. This analogy between the protests in Belgrade in April 2017 and Santiago de Chile in 1973 is introduced by journalist Nikola Vrzić, who sees in the complete gathering of the opposition a part of a wider plan of internal destabilization of Serbia with the aim of overthrowing Vučić's authority and directing Serbia towards NATO, along with the accompanying complete renunciation of Kosovo and the Republic Srpska.

Government's resistance to demonstrations should be a test of its strength and endurance in complex geopolitical circumstances. The combination of warnings and demystification of scenarios by opposi-

38 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Žuta laža [Yellow lies]," *Informer*, 04. 06. 2017, p. 4

39 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Srpska demokratija [Serbian democracy]," 18. 06. 2017, p. 4

40 Dragomir Anđelković, "Kultivisanje pobede [Cultivation of victory]," *Pečat*, No. 465, p. 10

tion political groups and the West can be seen in the following two quotes: "In order to be more stable, Serbia must now, first of all, be saved from the second round of presidential elections, which, since it will not be in polling stations for Easter, plays out on the streets of Belgrade, Novi Sad and several other cities across Serbia. The late undemocratic character of the ongoing protests that they are trying to dispute, therefore, to change, is the outcome of the election that has just finished. The majority voted the way it voted, it's democracy, better luck next time. In this way, there is a loud minority on the streets, which wants to take away the victory of the silent majority. More importantly, the question is who is standing behind current protests?"⁴¹

Regarding the aims of the demonstration already quoted, Vrzić is clear - his goal is to politically undermine Vučić and at the cost of internal stability of the state with pro-democratic rhetoric: "The point is, in fact, that Serbia has already had too many opportunities to choose over the past several years and, either we like it or not, it chose Aleksandar Vučić every time. So, as before, as a matter of fact, pressing Vučić will do the pressure on Serbia. And weakened, destabilized and delegitimized Vučić will be much more lenient under pressure than he would otherwise be."⁴²

Perhaps the display of the negative image of the opposition could be completely circled with a quote from the editor-in-chief of *Pečat* Milorad Vučelić concerning the inauguration of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. At this important gathering, part of the opposition, predominantly Euro-reform is not present, denying not only the legitimacy of the gathering, but also the political foundation of the whole electoral process. Vučelić represents the opposition symbiotically and realistically as in an anti-state mood and disrespecting the written and unwritten rules of democratic political culture and practice. At the same time, the opposition appears in the text as an participant without a political substance, rather a political factor without politics and programs, inclined to tiny scandalous actions and disdaining the democratically elected president and the state as a whole: "It is striking that Serbia is otherwise failing to respect the standards, procedures and institutions. In all states that hold to themselves, they are small or large, they respect the taking of the oath of the elected president, and always on such occasions certain rituals, processions or ceremonies are held and performed. And as a rule, this is an opportunity to show the respect to their country, and so it should be in Serbia as an old and significant country. But to our opposition members of the Parliament and politicians, this is an opportunity to embarrass themselves and to try to make an unworthy circus of the ceremony. Contrary to this behavior, it is precisely this kind of politicians and parliamentarians who, with great respect and excitement, will listen to the address of every EU official who appears in the parliament. All of them are eager to participate in a mass prayer breakfast, and it does not occur to them to violate the rules of these ritualistic performances. After all, what can be expected of people who have shown that burials are also opportunities for humor and joy?

Laying the oath of the president of the state in the Serbian Parliament, some of our politically-minded politicians decided to overthrow with some assembly of 'white shirts', which recently defeated the presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the election wore. Such an assembly of "white shirts" was held by the Albanian secessionists and demonstrators in the 1990s, and this seems to have been an example for our people. Swell competition, indeed. Such kind of politicians and deputies can hardly gain the trust of citizens, so they cannot even expect anything in the elections on which the Serbian people

41 Nikola Vrzić, "Drugi krug [The second round]," *Pečat*, No. 465, p. 6

42 Nikola Vrzić, "Upotreba demokratije [The use of democracy]," *Pečat*, No. 466, p. 8

and citizens of Serbia decide. They do not have any politics at all. Most of our political parties no longer deal with politics, but are devotedly engaged in gossiping of the government and Aleksandar Vučić and some of his close associates."⁴³

A significantly different view of the opposition is present with the radically critical or, more precisely, anti-government media. Unlike *Informer* and *Pečat*, these newspapers significantly mitigate the critical tone, reflect on the prospects of a more successful political activity, and encourage the continuation of a disgruntled struggle against Vučić and his coalition partners. In the post-election period, after Aleksandar Vučić's pretty convincing victory in the first round of presidential elections, the challenge of relativization of Vučić's political success and the affirmation of opposition leaders arose in front of anti-government media. As part of this intellectual-political endeavor, models of interpretation of election results have been set up which are more propaganda-suggestive than rational, as the expectations of a student as (new) old participants on the political scene have increased with the announcement of new, third in four years, "fateful" Belgrade elections. Two reading of election results suggesting relativization, almost banalization of Vučić's victory and almost glorification of Janković's solid result, which was a convincing defeat as a result of the presidential elections expressed in numbers, are striking. The contradictory nature of this slightly written sentence shows the logical and political confusion of opposition journalism and the almost endemic futility of the opposition political factors. In an interview for the weekly magazine *Novi Magazin*, sociologist dr. Božidar Jakšić says, with a great deal of contradiction, but also the irony of the following: "Janković did not win the elections, but he did not lose either; the other one, who won with this percentage, actually lost terribly, because in the conditions where the elections were conducted with this model of politics, if you do not have 98.7% of the votes, if you do not have 107% of the votes - you have not done anything. 55% is miserable."⁴⁴

In the same spirit, but with the tendency to be more rational than the predecessor, journalist Veljko Lalić takes a look at the presidential election. Lalić's interpretation of statistics should contradict political and statistical obviousness, and is therefore confusing, inaccurate, but politically usable. Especially when either justifiable reason for defeat is being sought or a positive expectation from the losing candidates is upheld. As undoubtedly precise numerical relations are going to burst into the whirlwind of journalistic political cheerleading, the following quote will be shown: "The winners of these elections, Aleksandar Vučić and Saša Janković, two candidates who have homogenized their electorate and scheduled a derby match in Belgrade next year. Janković did not fit into the projection of the government: if he had had 12 percent, what many agencies had predicted, or that he was behind Beli, these elections would have been drawn by Vučić. Thus, the new president, who did not want at any price in the second round to win 70% of the vote, won the first round with 70% of the voting potential that the Serbian Progressive Party, the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Radical Party took last year to 60 percentage in the sum. The civil option received artificial respiration in the big cities where Janković ended up with more votes than Tadić in 2012 when he could form the government. And, together with Beli and Vuk, he won in all central municipalities in Belgrade. Vučić certainly cannot be satisfied with 36 percent on Zvezdara, or a little more in New Belgrade, and together with the Socialist Party of Serbia, in contrast to Janković's 30,

43 Milorad Vučelić, "Ogovaranje [Gossiping]," *Pečat*, No. 474, p. 5

44 Božidar Jakšić, "Nacionalizam uništava i svoje i druge [The nationalism destroys its own as well as others]," interview with Jelka Jovanović and Nadežda Gaće, *Novi magazin*, No. 314, p. 19.

especially next year he cannot run for mayor. Many calculations, such as Šapić's, have fallen, he now has 20%, which is like Jeremić's 18, while there is no one else in the race."⁴⁵

Far more realistic presentation of the outcome of the election to the level of analysis of the results themselves and their political consequences is that Dragoljub Žarković says: "After all, fairly speaking, none of the contenders in the elections did not believe that Vučić would win. They had a goal that was confirmed by the recent elections: it is time for a new political scene configuration of Serbia. Some parliamentary parties and movements disappear before our eyes (It is enough, the original Democratic Party of Serbia, Boris, Čeda and Čanak, Serbian radicals who as a party can hardly exceed the performance of their frontman Vojislav Šešelj), and some, like the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party of Serbia, sacrificed a part of their identity by supporting 'other people' candidates - Saša Janković and Aleksandar Vučić - and they will still see the account of this self-sacrifice. Saša Janković and Vuk Jeremić, wh, it seems, like he is being treated by a deep amok after the results which turned out to be less than what he expected, have the chance to impose themselves with the good organization as tailors of the new Serbian parliamentary rug, especially if they analyze and extract lessons from the success of Beli Preletačević, or know the roots of national dissatisfaction."⁴⁶

A review of the results of the opposition candidates could not even go without a search for justifying reasons for defeat. This task was conscientiously carried out by the journalist of *Vreme* Zora Drčelić. The key to the defeat is not in the quality of the program, the campaign, or the credibility of the leaders who were running the presidential campaign, but in the systematic media satanization that Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party conducted through the media. What seems to be the transformation of political losers into the "victims" of the media "terror" will show the following quote: "While Vučić's machinery represented Saša Janković as 'Sale Prangija', i.e. 'the killer', Jeremić was accused of being 'involved in the murder of a guard'. That was not enough, but in the end of the campaign, his wife, in a terrible announcement of the promoter, Milenko Jovanov, was charged with being 'the boss of the narco-cartel'".⁴⁷

"All rebellion rests on hope" - a striking slogan of the former Lukas, and today the Disney Star Wars. The dawn of "new hope" for the opposition was the appearance of students on the streets of Belgrade after the end of the presidential election. The whole critical-minded political-media front, tired of persuasive defeats for a moment, found new heroes. They were students. The combination of nostalgia in the 1990s and the struggle against Slobodan Milošević, the frustration of Vučić's strength, the desire to give something to change for the time opened up the possibility of another media-political campaign of high intensity. This time too, there has been a "concerted effort" between media workers and political leaders with the assistance of current and former leaders of student protests. Older students of the students should initiate memory of the middle-aged political abstainers of the former opponents of Milošević and Šešelj, while the younger leaders were shot as a new chance for a more massive and persistent rebellion against Vučić's dictatorship. Glorification, almost divinization of students as political forces, gets clear contours in the first week of their gathering on the streets of Belgrade and other cities of Serbia. The repeatedly quoted, almost traditionally

45 Dragoljub Žarković, "Demonstracija – Vučić ima dovoljno onih koji mu šetaju opanke, ali cela Srbija neće [Demonstration – Vučić has a plenty of those who walk in his shoes, but Serbia as a whole rejects that]," *Vreme*, No. 1371, p. 7

46 Ibid

47 Zora Drčelić, "Pištaljkom protiv otmičara [With whistle against the kidnappers]," *Vreme*, No. 1370, p. 8

skeptically-ironic commentator Dragoljub Žarković, declares the student rebellion of 2017 as an excitingly positive event on the political scene: "Protests are one of the better things that happened to Serbia. They warn the current consciousness that it has come close to the utmost limits of popular tolerance."⁴⁸ Euphoric of the elderly counterpart of the opposition was Veljko Lalić, a journalist who said: "These student protests, when nobody expected them, after all, next year we mark half a century since the student rebellion in 1968 that changed the world. And you think that everything will be OK."⁴⁹

In order to reaffirm the student movement as a political subject, as well as with the intention to re-awaken nostalgia for the past times of "resistance against the tyranny of Slobodan Milošević", the pages of weekly newspapers were full of views of the former leaders of the student rebellion. Thus, in the authorial text in *Vreme*, Dragan Đilas says that the fascination and ignorance of the authorities in relation to demonstrations is fascinating and for every compliment the students' determination to oppose the authorities of Aleksandar Vučić and seek the space for opportunities for a better life and more freedom: "It was always fascinating to me that the government, whoever did it, does not understand the essence of the protests of young people. When those who were today in power behaved in this way, it would be very easy to understand this entire fine, young, decent world on the street. They would realize that people will not and can not live in a country where almost all the media are in the service of government, where those who differ differently will be stamped out as criminals, drug-mafia bosses, killers. If people do not want to live in a country where they should be happy to work for a salary of 23,000-24,000 dinars. If they do not want them every day, as they learn at ten o'clock, they turn to television with politicians who all know that they came to the muffs not only to a college diploma, but also a doctorate Young people faced with the hopelessness of their lives, dismayed by the fact that the year and Years of learning are less valuable than a party book, they are irritated the claims of the authorities that the country is progressing and how better it is to be from day to day, have decided to show their rebellion on the street."⁵⁰

Dragan Šutanovac, the current president of the Democratic Party, confirms that there is a clear connection between student and opposition thinking: "The Democratic Party welcomed the protests of young people, students throughout Serbia who showed great energy by going out onto the streets of our country. The protests are not only for the sake of one election day and the election of Aleksandar Vučić as president of Serbia, but that energy accumulates for five years, because Vučić did not only get rid of the state but also the lives of many young people in Serbia and it is good that they express their dissatisfaction. I think, however, that their demands are to be articulated through the political system, through political parties, through the Serbian Parliament, that the interests of the citizens of Serbia are represented in the positions in which they are in charge."⁵¹

Although student protests compared to the protests of the 1990s, quickly and easily collapsed, his appearance gained significant media space and an extremely positive evaluation in the eyes of the media critical of the government. By inciting the virtues of student protests as if the weekly opposition press

48 Dragoljub Žarković, "Demonstracija – Vučić ima dovoljno onih koji mu šetaju opanke, ali cela Srbija neće [Demonstration – Vučić has a plenty of those who walk in his shoes, but Serbia as a whole rejects that]," *Vreme*, No. 1371, p. 7

49 Veljko Lalić, "Ljudi sa dva palca [People with two thumbs]," *Nedeljnik*, No. 274, p. 4

50 Dragan Đilas, "Reči predaja nema u rečniku mladosti [There is no word 'defeat' in the dictionary of youth]," *Vreme*, No. 1371, p. 14

51 Dragan Šutanovac, "I na novim izborima DS i Janković [Democratic Party and Janković together in the new elections]," interview with Jelka Jovanović, *Novi magazin*, No. 311, p. 18

wanted to construct an affirmative attitude towards the possibilities of fighting against the powerful government system of Aleksandar Vučić. An optimistic picture of the opposition, largely independent of the politically relevant facts that describe the historical moment, will inform some of the critically-minded journalists that the situation of the opposition is interpreted extremely positively. So mentioned already, Zora Drčelić says: “After the undemocratic presidential elections and student-civic protests in the cities of Serbia, the opposition is far more visible than before. Both inside and outside. In the meantime, they should have in mind that no one needs to “meet the world”, as Tadić had Dačić, Nikolić and Vučić, because unlike the three - they were not on the black list. At least not on that international one. What will be with the domestic blacklist, that depends mostly on the opposition.”⁵²

In the spirit of the aforementioned observation by the columnist of *Vreme*, opposition MP and public opinion researcher Đorđe Vukadinović, speaking about the Belgrade elections next “It’s a little different now, and despite the fact that the Serbian Progressive Party is still a favorite, the Belgrade elections contain a degree of uncertainty, which is necessary in order for something to be called at all, that is, the one that the real election differs from mere ‘voting’ - to what they again began to settle in this ‘Vučić’s era.’ The position can provide control, but the real one, at every polling station - that in all previous, ‘national’ elections is by no means it was a case. Finally, the opposition may, more precisely, have to find out mechanisms of mutual communication and coordination to eliminate or at least minimize the danger of Vučić’s ‘Trojans’. That is, the opposition must be flexible enough not to act ideologically exclusively and sectarianly, but also sufficiently complex and firm to, among other things, recognize and reject the cuckoo eggs within its ranks. So let’s conclude. This time there is no justification, abandonment or apology. I mean, regardless of all the ‘advanced’ strategies and marathi, the chance finally exists, and if it fails - this time we will be guilty.”⁵³

On the other hand, the wave of opposition euphoria, and much more from the depths of its own idiosyncrasy, Zoran Živković suggests more opposition activism in the current, unhurried struggle with power: “The opposition must be better, more active, it must respond more quickly and unambiguously, precisely as it does A new party. Belgrade’s elections are a test for the opposition that must find the best way to get Belgrade out of the dirty hands of Vučić’s small ‘complete idiots,’ as he called them in the case of Savamala. That The method involves a joint appearance. All that can rightly be called a democratic pro-European opposition should make a single list, and I have been telling it for two months now. Who do I think? These are the DS, the SDS, more sincerely because of Marko Đurišić, and Tadić himself will not be nominated in these elections, the movement of Saša Janković, ‘Do not drown Belgrade’ and New Party. The same as against Milošević. Continuous display of all the dirt, stupidity and madness that the authorities show and offering alternatives to everything that the government does badly. The recipe is to be consistent, competent for what you do and brave. Courage is now necessary. We must not be scared.”⁵⁴

Some of the journalists demonstrated an enviable level of activist journalism. Not only did they exhibit

52 Zora Drčelić, “Crna lista trojanskih konja [Blacklist of trojan horses],” *Vreme*, No. 1379, p. 12

53 Đorđe Vukadinović, “Bitka koja se može dobiti [A battle that can be won],” *Vreme*, No. 1375, p. 16

54 Zoran Živković, “Ovde je London postao drugi Kumrovec [London has become the second Kumrovec],” *Vreme*, No. 1382, p. 14

and explain their point of view as professionals, but rather assigned themselves the role of the ideologue of the opposition. From the level of descriptions, analyzes and explanations, journalism moved to the level of political propaganda activism. In the spirit of engaging journalism, a journalist of the magazine *Novi Magazin*, Mijat Lakićević says: “... joining the European Union is a programmatic ‘conditio sine qua non’, which the opposition must adopt and declare as its goal. Even if it was the same as that of Vučić after that goal. This is a necessary condition. But it’s not enough. The opposition must unite in the fight against Vucic’s system of blackmail, intimidation and bribery, which secures a large number of votes.”⁵⁵

If the image of the opposition in the critical, and more precisely anti-government media is positive in terms of designing for them a favorable outcome, the change in power will show another quote. This is about the position of academician Dušan Teodorović, the signatory of the Appeal 100 to support Saša Janković. He resorted to creating optimism by autoheroising engagements in the presidential campaign: “Nevertheless, despite all of us, we got almost 17 percent, exclusively with fieldwork, without money, we went to Serbia with three or four cars, with which we often paid gasoline and all other expenses, forbade us access to cultural centers and sales, we spoke on the street, without sound, without access to local media. But we did it with a full heart. At one meeting, I even cried.”⁵⁶

Ana Brnabić - President of the Government of Serbia; woman and expert in the whirlpool of negative campaign

After the victory of Aleksandar Vučić, the logical political question was who will be his successor. After many media speculations and (un)usual doses of dramatization, the choice fell on Anne Brnabić, former minister of state administration and local self-government. Educated in the West, more precisely to British and American universities, and later engaged in work in the non-governmental sector and business, Ana Brnabić was introduced if a woman expert, European defined, is sufficiently self-aware that despite the dominantly patriarchal culture, she does not hide her homosexual orientation. But Brnabić’s biography, although written in the codes of liberal political correctness, was not sufficient to receive the most critical criticism from the very evolutionary, and more precisely, pro-Western political organizations and the media. It is understood, for weekly newspaper, extremely pro-Russian and traditionalist, like *Pečat*, Ana Brnabić was morally and politically suspicious, and therefore unacceptable. Several different motives and political-moral courts form the core of critical discourse towards the first woman Prime Minister of Serbia in the era multi-party.

The lack of competence, the deficit of democratic legitimacy, Vučić’s puppet, deprived of the actual power of management, regardless of the high level of constitutional powers of the pre-eminent Government, as well as details from the business biography, are the main moments in the critical narrative about Ana Brnabić. After a fierce criticism, but also after the absence of a conventionally accepted 100 days for

55 Mijat Lakićević, “Vučićem protiv Vučića [With Vučić against Vučić],” *Novi magazin*, No. 320

56 Dušan Teodorović, “Mi ćemo Vučića sigurno da pobedimo [We will certainly defeat Vučić],” interview with Olja Bećković, *NIN*, No. 3460



NIN, 22nd June 2017

the work of the cabinet, the impression is that the synchronized media attack on Ana Brnabić is part of a broader media image of power that is extremely negative. Taking into account all the circumstances related to the modeling and explication of a radically critical discussion that was based on the negative obsession by Aleksandar Vučić, the strong impression is that media attacks on Ana Brnabić, an incidental variation on the subject of media-political accountability with Vučić. The case of Ana Brnabić is a case of a political personality that literally symbolically and realistically needs not only to continuously stigmatize, but to permanently remove from political life.

An important motive in undermining Ana Brnabić's authority is to re-examine Ana Brnabić's role in the construction of wind farms. It is the role of Ana Brnabić in that affair the basis for gaining the trust of Aleksandar Vučić, who was rewarded with a unexpectedly high position due to such a position. According to these statements, the sister of former Minister Kori Udovički said that EMS Director and Vučić's godfather Nikola Petrović tried to rack up Continental Wind partners and to collect two million Euros in order to connect the wind farm in Serbia on the electrical network. Vučić reacted quite nervously, arguing that this company had excused a few congressmen to write a letter to Joseph Biden in which Petrović and Vučić's brother are described as champions of corruption in Serbia. Then, Brnabić, the director of Continental Wind Serbia, together with Petrović and the Minister of Energy, Aleksandar Antić, denied any allegations. Amnestyping two of the most important people in Vučić's surroundings, Brnabić secured Vučić's favor. It was her chip for big parties, and she would show that her wisdom, which was then rolling on to others, was quickly convenient for her too.⁵⁷

Apparently, Preradović believes that the recommendation for the appointment of Ana Brnabić is contained in her allegedly morally problematic attitude in the case of one of the series of affair in the Serbian public. Discreditation is not based on any evidence, but the media has been placed in the position of a particular personality, in particular Ana Brnabić, put on the moral pillar of shame before she takes the post of prime minister. In parallel with personal stigmatization, Ana Brnabić faced the problem of her own "political irrelevance." The presidential candidate, before the election, got the label that in the political sense she is a nobody. This message has different variations.

In addition to the already stated negative political characteristics, political desubuctification of Ana Brnabić has been set up by the context of the undemocratic character of her choice, that is, in the context of a cunning move by President Vučić, devised for home, for foreign use. Brnabić's sexual orientation, education in the West, and an expert-business career, undoubted loyalty to the EU, serves as a cover for Vučić's unbroken power that remains operational. The political desirable features of Ana Brnabić are the "fig leaf" for the extension of Vučić for the much controversial authoritarian rule: "It is already clear now that Ana Brnabić will be more a symbol than Prime Minister. This is not affected by the circumstance that the government, whose head will be the first woman in the history of Serbia, is likely to be only a transitional solution until the next elections. The precedent happened. The symbol has already played its role. After Iceland, Ireland, Belgium and Luxembourg, Serbia will receive a LGBT leader. It is news that broke into all the important world media. And I have fulfilled its goal. For her symbolic content, it is completely unclear whether her 'expertise, dedication to work and personal qualities' influenced her choice, the work carried out in the form of evidence of loyalty from the time of the Udovički affair, or

57 Zoran Preradović, "Njen park i druge vetrenjače [Her park and other windmills]," *NIN*, No. 3469, p. 16

even this 'difficult' decision is only a product of the manipulative nature of the technology of governance Aleksandar Vučić, with whom he is culminating in intolerance in the Serbian political scene, tries to erect a democratic wallet and retouches the true nature of his government."⁵⁸

As part of the story about Vučić as a skillful technologist and manipulant in the public, *NIN* journalist Radmila Stanković said openly that Ana Brnabić's election happened because of loyalty and proof that Vučić would keep all the lines in his hands with the election of his new prime minister. "Brnabić was a surprise for the SNS part of the public, then for a part of the Socialistic Party of Serbia public, and for a good part of the opposition. It's a pretty tricky move for many reasons. First, the word is about a woman, and secondly, the word is about a woman of semi-Croatian origin, and ultimately it is about a woman who was pronounced a member of the gay population. So, the politically correct move by which the president's cap is down. The second question is how many of her abilities are to do such a job, how much will she be able to work independently. The third, and most important, question is how much this choice will show to what extent Mr. Vučić has autocratized the state and to what extent will he continue to expand the scope of his rule. He was prime minister, now president of the state and president of the biggest party, and there is no impression that he will distance himself from any of these functions."⁵⁹

The power of Aleksandar Vučić has been manifested several times with a different message, but with the same goals. The first goal is to discredit Vučić from a democratic point of view, which was extremely important given that he restored the democratic credentials with a convincing victory in the presidential election. The others discredit Ana Brnabić herself, with the aim to have her as soon as possible, removed from political life, if even a message is sent that any pro-Western beliefs and supra-educational education can and should not be in any way politically close to Vučić. In the function of showing Vučić's mystery in Serbia, the thesis that Ana Brnabić was deprived of democratic foundation, has a borrowed authority from the previous prime minister, if she was never politically elected. She is the choice, but the choice of Vučić's undisciplined self-will. Brnabić's act of selection is portrayed as a "circus scandal" and mockery of sound political reason.

Shifting the focus from Brnabić to Vučić shows the main tendency to deal with the choice of the new prime minister by the media critical of the government. Again, the negative obsession is in the hands of Aleksandar Vučić. An example of this journalistic approach and the accompanying reasoning is evident in the following sentences by the editor-in-chief of *Vreme*, Dragoljub Žarković: "Vučić is therefore not in the Constitution, which is best seen from the election process of the prime minister. Slobodan Antić wrote these days that she (Ana Brnabić) flew out of Zeus' head, without having any kind of point of departure in the world of democratic politics. In which election did she participate? Where did she win? What kind of support does the ruling party have? And what about coalition partners? How popular is the voter? Can he order anything to his ministers – Dačić, Zorana, Vulin ...? This man (Vučić) could also nominate a cat for the prime minister. He progresses every day and in every way and it seems to me that it is only a matter of political technique and banal execution when he will turn his power into something more tangible and still wrapped up in the Constitution. It's not just a question of extending presidential

58 Vesna Mališić, "Upotreba simbola [The use of symbols]," *NIN*, No. 3469, p. 3

59 Radmila Stanković, "Vlast voli udvorice i ume da ih nagradi [The government likes sycophants and knows how to reward them]," *NIN*, No. 3469, p. 16

powers, but perhaps an extension of the mandate from five to eight years, or as much as it takes. Such efforts would go hand in hand with the dominantly authoritarian attitudes of the majority of Serbian citizens who first look forward to the exit from the hopelessness in their firm hands: to know who is mowing and who is carrying the water and know who is the boss in the house."⁶⁰

It is understood the case of Ana Brnabić, she will show the "joint media-political work" of engaged and critical journalists and opposition leaders whose loudness and daring in the reorientation lead to a direct correlation with political immorality. The old rule "The less significance, the rhetoric is more gigantic". An example of these principles is the interview by New Party leader Zoran Živković, who, in connection with the election of Ana Brnabić: "According to everything until now, the new prime minister will only be a little unusual poltroon of Aleksandar Vučić, compared to the 'common poles' we have so far. Her expertise - what? What was she doing? In the past year, as far as the minister for local self-government and state administration, I do not see that something changed in that area. In her previous business life, there is only one fact that is known, which is an affair with windmills, a wind farm, where there was racketeering and where she hid in front of the competent authorities that she was blackmailed and looking for a bribe. Prior to that, she said she shared the flyers across London. London has already become a new Kumrovec. There, Vučić worked in the ironmonger, she shared the flyers, and now she should see who sells the seeds on the Ridge Street, because he will become someone in this country tomorrow."⁶¹

And finally, the position of the political insignificance of the most powerful people in the country should be explicitly expressed. This direct and sharp undermining not only of Ana Brnabić, but also of the constitutional system, is expressed in a sharp and conscious interpretation of some public attitudes that have been heard about the election of the new Prime Minister. Momir Turudić from *Vreme*, writing about the political integrity of the new government, points out that it will be completely insignificant and subordinate to the relations of the Kolja in the level of the relationship between party and leader's power. "As for the independence of the new government's work, this is without a glance, ministers. So Rasim Ljajić says that Vučić was expected to have an impact on the work of the government, and that the head of diplomacy Ivica Dačić was brutal in honesty. He said that "it is well known who is the political winner of the election", and that experts in the Serbian government, including the current parliamentary speaker for the composition of the new government, Ana Brnabić, do not work in conjunction with the parties that won the elections. "What they think now is that experts will lead a separate policy, without consulting a party that has won power. Such a thing exists nowhere, not even in Serbia," Dačić said. The common denominator for an unsuccessful attempt to land in the former SIV and forming a new government is "a lot of noise and nothing".⁶²

Different but fundamentally negative, full of political subjection to Ani Brnabić, we could read on the pages, nationalist and pro-Russian weekly newspaper *Pečat*. For *Pečat* Ana Brnabić is not unacceptable because she is Aleksandar Vučić's choice and a way to indicate that he still manages all government

60 Dragoljub Žarković, "Jedna politička enigma – Da li je bolji i onakav Ustav nego ovakav Vučić [A political enigma – Is such Constitution better than this Vučić]," *Vreme*, No. 1381, p. 4

61 Zoran Živković, "Ovde je London postao drugi Kumrovec [London has become the second Kumrovec]," *Vreme*, No. 1382, p. 14

62 Momir Turudić, "Nemam autoritet i nisam ga zaslužila [I do not have the authority and I have not deserved it]," *Vreme*, No. 1382, p. 6

bureaucrats, although formally speaking, does not have the authority. For Pečat Ana Brnabić is unacceptable due to her professional biography and European integration which she accepts as a key geopolitical determination.

Summarizing the reactions of the public to the election of Ana Brnabić, columnist Nikola Vrzić, he suggested a suggestively ironic question about the negative and rather ideologically confusing attitude of the euro-reform Serbia about the election of Ana Brnabić: "It is a miracle, which can be attributed to pure political or narrow-mindedness, which Dragan Šutanovac, Saša Janković and similar public representatives of Euro-American values in Serbia did not express their public enthusiasm with the decision of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić that his current chair will be succeeded by former Minister of State Administration and Local Government Ana Brnabić. Because, according to the British Telegraph, 'Brnabić's nomination is considered Vučić's turn to the West despite the strong pressure from Russia to preserve its influence in the region,' and the French *Figaro* noted that her choice Vučić 'beautified the image of her country in the eyes of the West, and symbolically fenced off Russia, where the position of homosexuals is uninhabitable.' Is not that precisely what Šutanovac, Janković (and the like) want Serbia, to be a beautiful West and proportionally enclosed by Russia, and why they are all dissatisfied, unless they are politicians or just jealous that they have not arrived here An extraordinary opportunity to get Ana Brnabić, in spite of Putin, out of a hat with staff ready to meet the West?"⁶³

Unlike the euroreformers whose disapproval was not particularly politically valued, it was basically personal, daily political, Vrzić's suspicions about the work biography of Ana Brnabić "Not because of her sexual determination, which is now delighted by the Western media - they have such a commitment that are very Serbian, in any case - neither because of Croatian descent to her father's father, but because of her previous work biography."

The work biography of Ana Brnabić includes activities in domestic and foreign non-governmental organizations that are funded by the Fund for Open Society, either from USAID. Both organizations have sufficient reason to doubt the sincerity of political intentions by Ana Brnabić, especially in light of the fact that the United States intends to neutralize or lessen the influence of Russia on Serbia as much as possible by political and media means.

Bearing in mind the business and educational links of Ana Brnabić with the US, Vrzić constructs a sort of dilemma about her election: "Let's return to the election of the future Serbian prime minister - the basic question is whether it is that Aleksandar Vučić chose Ana Brnabić on his own, or was selected by her former US employers. From the answer to this question, and we will learn it very soon, we will also find out what Ana Brnabić is of those three; an instrument for the functioning of the Government of Serbia, or an announcement of giving up the West, or a means of impeding the eyes of the West. At this moment, it is only certain that our pressures follow, and that all the blame, or all credit, for the Serbian response to these pressures will be attributed exclusively to Aleksandar Vučić."⁶⁴

63 Nikola Vrzić, "S one strane duge [From the other side of the rainbow]," *Pečat*, No. 476, p. 3

64 Ibid. p. 5



Pečat, 30th June 2017

Vrzić dealt with the program of the new Prime Minister in detail. His suspicions concerned the pro-European commitment of the new Prime Minister. Anyone who is prone to the EU is an open opposition to the protection and promotion of Serb interests. Vrzić expresses this kind of constant political-value orientation for the weekly newspaper *Pečat* in the following words: “The first chapter of her program is dedicated to ‘linking Serbia with Europe and the world’, and within that - enigmatic, because it is inserted - and the point ‘Kosovo and Metohija’, and that - to further exacerbate this, at first glance - at the last place, unlike ‘continuing the way to the European Union’, which is the first priority... The repetition of phrases that were fictitious even before the EU began to fall apart, when they may have sounded convincing - The EU accession process is not an end in itself, but it is the best possible framework for overall reforms, modernization and development of Serbia ... It is important that we all understand that we strive for EU membership for the sake of our common future the generations to come, reforming society in a better, more equitable, more accessible, richer way, using the best European models and practices along the way ... EU propagandists are at the head of the Serbian government.”⁶⁵

However, the negative qualification of priorities in the work of Ana Brnabić is compensated by the awareness of the existence of pro-Russian ministers in the government. Their participation in the work of the government stocks is that Serbia will not be completely turned to the West, but will also take care of relations with Russia and on protecting their own national interests on the issue of Republika Srpska and above all, Kosovo: “The choice of Vulin and Popović should be a guarantee that Serbian relations with NATO will not be deepened and that, on the contrary, we will work to strengthen our relations with Russia, which in fact, and more and more, represent a measure of our independence. In this, the significance of this, conditionally speaking, the Russian wing of the pro-European government of Serbia, whose strengthening is even more significant, coincides with the announced US offensive on the Balkans to expel the malignant Russian presence, and any Russian presence for the Americans is malignant.”⁶⁶

Ana Brnabić was a “target” of various inscriptions that largely negatively evaluated her election as prime minister. Different journalists for various reasons were unacceptable. There was no original and rational support. Even when the support arrived, she came indirectly. The basis for her was the moral-political profile of her political opponents. A classic example of the tendency in Serbian printed journalism is the text of the editor-in-chief of the daily *Informer*, Dragan J. Vučićević: “Anyway, in the absence of arguments and concrete evidence of systemic thugs and affair that today is in the top of the Serbian authorities or not, much less than for the ‘dosistic’ vault, the media-political fighters of the yellow-elite are trying to provoke the anger of the people by launching monstrous conspiracy theories. So from the Internet center of a civil and democratic, liberal party this Wednesday, a monstrous lie was launched that Ane’s grandfather from Krk was an ustasha who had pledged Serbs to the NDH by hand!? When, in the end, I see who, how and why attacks Ana Brnabić, I have to support her. Not because of what she does or does not do in her bedroom, but because of what she will, I am sure, will do from the position of the Prime Minister of Serbia. I do not know anything, it must be that for Serbia the good solution is the one that is attacked at the same time by Ilić and Bojan Pajić and Saša Janković and Boško Obradović.”⁶⁷

65 Nikola Vrzić, “Rusko krilo proevropske vlade [The Russian wing of the pro-European government],” *Pečat*, No. 477, p. 3

66 Ibid, p. 5

67 Dragan J. Vučićević, “Priča o Ani [Story about Ana],” *Informer*, 24. 06. 2017, p. 5

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About
authors

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Public Policy Institute is a regional think-tank organization that operates in the Western Balkans region through the work of its branch offices in Belgrade, Podgorica and Ljubljana. By promoting public dialogue and constructive solutions, Public Policy Institute contributes to the efforts of the Western Balkan countries to become equal, reliable and progressive partners in the process of European integrations and mutual relationships. After the initial research and analysis of social and media context in the countries of the Western Balkans, the Institute has developed and implemented a series of media related projects, including: Role of the media in the process of securitisation in the Western Balkans, Civil Response to Clientelism in the media - MEDIA CIRCLE, NATO Reach Out - media monitoring and Role of the media in monitoring of R1325 in Montenegro.

EBART Media Archive is privately owned company established in 2000. Its main activity is archiving print media data in e-format. The print media archive consists of up-to-date material dating back to 2003, and more than 3 million print media reports from sources with national coverage. EBART is also specialized for media analysis, basic quantitative and qualitative analyses, comparing media treatment of specific keywords, as well as complex content analyses according to BBC methodology. EBART Media Archive is unmatched in the region with its unique media reports database, and 12 years of media research experience. This media database allows for the overall study of long-term media presence.

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